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Foreword 
The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) 
is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial and 
associated rule and on the context in which this took place. In 1945, aside from the 
countries of present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, Britain had over 
fifty formal dependencies; by the end of 1965 the total had been almost halved and by 
1985 only a handful remained. The ending of Britain's position in these formal 
dependencies was paralleled by changes in relations with states in an informal 
empire. The end of empire in the period at least since 1945 involved a change also in 
the empire as something that was more than the sum of its parts and as such formed 
an integral part of Britain's domestic affairs and international relations. In 
publishing official British documents on the end of empire this project is, to a 
degree, the successor to the two earlier series of published documents concerning 
the end of British rule in India and Burma which were edited by Professors Mansergh 
and Tinker respectively. The successful completion of The transfer of power and The 
struggle for independence, 1 both of which were based on British records, emphasised 
the need for similar published collections of documents important to the history of 
the final stages of Britain's association with other dependencies in Africa, the Middle 
East, the Caribbean, South-East Asia and the Pacific. These documents are crucial 
research tools for scholars both from sovereign independent states which emerged 
from colonial rule as well as those from Britain itself. BDEEP is also set in the much 
wider context of the efforts made by successive British governments to locate 
Britain's position in an international order. Here the empire, both in its formal and 
informal senses, is viewed as an instrument of the domestic, foreign and defence 
policies of successive British governments. The project is therefore concerned with 
the ending of colonial rule in individual territories as seen from the British side at 
one level, and the broader political, economic and strategic considerations involved 
in that at another. 
Despite the similarities, however, BDEEP differs in significant ways from its 
predecessors in terms both of presentation and content. The project is of greater 
magnitude than that undertaken by Professor Mansergh for India. Four major 
differences can be identified. First, the ending of colonial rule within a dependent 
empire took place over a much longer period of time, extending into the final years of 
the twentieth century while having its roots in the Second World War and before. 
Secondly, the empire consisted of a large number of territories, varying in area, 
population, wealth and in many other ways, each with its own individual problems 
but often with their futures linked to those of neighbouring territories and the 
1 Nicholas Mansergh et al, eds, Constitutional relations between Britain and India: the transfer of power 
1942-47, 12 vols, (London, 1970- 1983); Hugh Tinker, ed, Constitutional relations between Britain and 
Burma: the struggle for independence 1944-1948, 2 vols, (London, 1983-1984). 
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growing complexity surrounding the colonial empire. Thirdly, while for India the 
documentary record for certain matters of high policy could be encapsulated within a 
relatively straightforward 'country' study, in the case of the colonial empire the 
documentary record is more diffuse because of the plethora of territories and their 
scattered location. Finally, the documents relating to the ending of colonial rule are 
not conveniently located within one leading department of state but rather are to be 
found in several of them. As the purpose of the project is to publish documents 
relating to the end of empire from the extensive range and quantity of official British 
records, private collections and other categories of non-official material are not 
regarded as principal documentary sources. In BDEEP, selections from non-official 
material will be used only in exceptional cases to fill gaps where they exist in the 
available official record. 
In recognition of these differences and also of the fact that the end of empire 
involves consideration of a range of issues which operated at a much wider level than 
that normally associated with the ending of colonial rule in a single country, BDEEP 
is structured in two main series along with a third support series. Series A represents 
the general volumes in which, for successive British governments, documents 
relating to the empire as a whole will be published. Series B represents the country 
or territory volumes and provides territorial studies of how, from a British 
government perspective, former colonies and dependencies achieved their 
independence and countries which were part of an informal empire regained their 
autonomy. In addition to the two main documentary series, a third series-series 
C-has been published in the form of handbooks to the records of the former 
colonial empire which are deposited at the Public Record Office (PRO) . Series C 
consists of two volumes which form an integral part of BDEEP and also serve as PRO 
guides to the records. Together they enable scholars and others wishing to follow the 
record of the ending of colonial rule and empire to pursue their inquiries beyond the 
published record provided by the general studies in series A and the country studies 
in series B. Volume one of the handbooks, a revised and updated version of The 
records of the Colonial and Dominions Offices by R B Pugh which was first published 
in 1964, is entitled Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Commonwealth 
Relations Office and Commonwealth Office (1995). It covers over two hundred years 
of activity down to 1968 when the Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign 
Office to form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Volume two, entitled Records 
of the Cabinet, Foreign Office, Treasury and other records (1998), focuses more 
specifically on twentieth-century departmental records and also includes references 
to the records of inter-departmental committees, commissions of inquiry and 
international organisations. The two volumes were prepared under the direction and 
supervision of Or Anne Thurston, at the time honorary research fellow at the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the University of London, and now executive 
director of the International Records Management Trust. 
In the two main series the research is organised in stages. Stage one, covering the 
years 1925-1957, is now complete and consists of three general volumes and five 
country volumes, collectively published in twenty-one individual parts. In series A 
there are volumes on Imperial policy and colonial practice 1925-1945 in two parts 
(1996), The Labour government and the end of empire 1945-1951 in four parts 
(1992), and The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951-1957 in three 
parts (1994). In series B there are volumes on Ghana in two parts (1992) , Sri Lanka 
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in two parts (1997), Malaya in three parts (1995), Egypt and the defence of the 
Middle East in three parts (1998) and the Sudan in two parts (1998). Starting in 
1999, the project began publishing volumes in a second stage which covers the 
period 1957-1964. Here there are five volumes, a general volume on the 
Conservative government and the end of empire 1957-1964, and country volumes 
on The West In dies, Nigeria, Kenya and Malaysia. 
The criteria which have been used in selecting documents for inclusion in 
individual volumes are explained in the introductions written by the specialist 
editors. These introductions are more substantial and contextual than those in 
previous series. Each volume also lists the PRO sources which have been searched. 
However, it may be helpful to outline the more general guiding principles which 
have been employed. BDEEP editors pursue several lines of inquiry. There is first the 
end of empire in a broad high policy sense in which the empire is viewed in terms of 
Britain's position as a world power and of the inter-relationship between what 
derives from this position and developments within the colonial dependencies. Here 
Britain's relations with the dependencies of the empire are set in the wider defence, 
economic and foreign policy contexts of Britain's relations with the United States, 
with Europe, and with the Commonwealth and United Nations. Secondly, there is 
investigation into colonial policy in its strict sense. Here the emphasis is on those 
areas which were specifically-but not exclusively-the concern of the leading 
department. In the period before the administrative amalgamations of the 1960s, 2 
the leading department of the British government for most of the dependencies was 
the Colonial Office; for a minority it was either the Dominions Office and its 
successor, the Commonwealth Relations Office, or the Foreign Office. Colonial policy 
included questions of economic and social development, questions of governmental 
institutions and constitutional structures, and administrative questions concerning 
the future of the civil and public services and of the defence forces in a period of 
transition from European to indigenous control. Finally there is inquiry into the 
development of political and social forces within colonies, the response to these and 
the transfer of governmental authority and of legal sovereignty from Britain to its 
colonial dependencies as these processes were understood and interpreted by the 
British government. Here it should be emphasised that the purpose of BDEEP is not 
to document the history of colony politics or nationalist movements in any particular 
territory. Given the purpose of the project and the nature of much of the source 
material, the place of colony politics in BDEEP is conditioned by the extent to which 
an awareness of local political situations played an overt part in influencing major 
policy decisions made in Britain. 
Although in varying degrees and from different perspectives, elements of these 
various lines of inquiry appear in both the general and the country series. The aim in 
both is to concentrate on the British record by selecting documents which illustrate 
those policy issues which were deemed important by ministers and officials at the 
time. General volumes do not normally treat in any detail of matters which will be 
fully documented in the country volumes but some especially significant documents 
do appear in both series. The process of selection involves an inevitable degree of 
2 The Colonial Office merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1966 to form the Common-
wealth Office. The Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office in 1968 to form the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. 
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sifting and subtraction. Issues which in retrospect appear to be of lesser significance 
or to be ephemeral have been omitted. The main example concerns the extensive 
quantity of material devoted to appointments and terms of service-salaries, 
gradings, allowances, pension rights and compensation-within the colonial and 
related services. It is equally important to stress certain negative aspects of the 
official documentary record. Officials in London were sometimes not in a position to 
address potentially significant issues because the information was not available. 
Much in this respect depended on the extent of the documentation sent to London by 
the different colonial administrations. Once the stage of internal self-government 
had been reached, or where there was a dyarchy, the flow of detailed local 
information to London began to diminish. 
Selection policy has been influenced by one further factor, namely access to the 
records at the PRO. Unlike the India and Burma series and the current Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office series of Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO), 
BDEEP is not an official project. In practice this means that while editors have 
privileged access (in the form of research facilities and requisitioning procedures) to 
the records at the PRO, they do not have unrestricted access. For files which at the 
time a volume is in preparation are either subject to extended closures beyond the 
statutory thirty years or retained in the originating department under section 3(4) of 
the Public Records Act of 1958, editors are subject to the same restrictions as all 
other researchers. Apart from cases where files or series of files are withheld, official 
weeding processes now tend to remove sentences or paragraphs from public view, 
rather than the whole document; such omissions are indicated in footnotes. To date 
access has not impeded the research undertaken by the project to any significant 
degree, and the project has been successful in securing the release of a number of 
hitherto withheld documents from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and 
the Records Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
A thematic arrangement of the documents has been adopted for the general 
volumes in series A. The country volumes in series B follow a chronological 
arrangement; in this respect they adopt the same approach as was used in the India 
and Burma series. For each volume in both series A and B a summary list of the 
documents included is provided. The headings to BDEEP documents, which have 
been editorially standardised, present the essential information. Together with the 
sequence number, the file reference (in the form of the PRO call-up number and any 
internal pagination or numeration) and the date of the document appear on the first 
line. 3 The second and subsequent lines record the subject of the document, the type 
of document (letter, memorandum, telegram etc), the originator (person or persons, 
committee, department) and the recipient (if any). A subject entry in a heading in 
single quotation marks denotes the title of a document as it appears in the original. 
An entry in square brackets denotes a subject indicator composed by the editor. This 
latter device has been employed in cases where no title is given in the original or 
where the original title is too unwieldy to reproduce in its entirety. Security 
classifications and, in the case of telegrams, times of despatch and receipt, have 
generally been omitted. In the headings to documents and the contents lists, 
3 The PRO call-up number precedes the comma in the references cited. In the case of documents from FO 
371, the major Foreign Office political class, the internal numeration refers to the jacket number of the 
file . 
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ministers are identified by the name of the office-holder, not the title of the office (ie, 
Mr Macleod, not secretary of state for the colonies). 4 In the same contexts, officials 
are identified by their initials and surname. In a general volumes, ambassadors, 
governors, high commissioners and other embassy or high commission staff are 
cited in the form Sir H Foot (Cyprus). Footnotes to documents appearing below the 
rule are editorial; those above the rule, or where no rule is printed, are part of the 
original document. Each volume provides an initial summary list of which principal 
offices were held by whom, and a separate series of biographical notes (at the end) for 
major figures who appear in the documents. Other figures are identified in editorial 
footnotes on the occasion of first appearance. Link-notes, written by the volume 
editor and indented in square brackets between the heading and the beginning of a 
document, are often used to explain the context of a document. Technical detail or 
extraneous material has been extracted from a number of documents. In such cases 
omission dots have been inserted in the text and the document is identified in the 
heading as an extract. Occasional omission dots have also been used to excise purely 
mechanical chain-of-command executive instructions and some redundant internal 
referencing has been removed, though much of it remains in place, for the benefit of 
researchers. No substantive material relating to policy-making has been excised from 
the documents. In general the aim has been to reproduce documents in their 
entirety but where available space is a major constraint on editors, a consideration 
which applies particularly in the case of general volumes, where the documentation 
is voluminous, this is not always possible, and some purely factual information may 
be omitted. It must also be emphasised in this context that the BDEEP volumes do 
not remove the necessity for researchers to study the original records themselves. 
The footnote reference 'not printed' is used only in cases where a specified enclosure 
or an annex to a document has not been included. Unless a specific cross-reference or 
note of explanation is provided, however, it can be assumed that other documents 
referred to in the text of the documents included have not been reproduced. Obvious 
typing errors in the original are in the main silently corrected, but abbreviations and 
contractions stand. Each volume has a list of abbreviations together with a 
consolidated index, and country volumes include a chronology of principal events. 
One radical innovation, compared with previous Foreign Office or India and 
Burma series, is that BDEEP reproduces many more minutes by ministers and 
officials. 
Crown copyright material is used by permission of the Public Record Office under 
licence from the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office. All references and 
dates are given in the form recommended in PRO guidelines. 
* * * * 
Formally launched in 1987, BDEEP has been based since its inception at the 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The work of the project is supervised by a 
Project Committee chaired by Professor Andrew Porter, Rhodes professor of imperial 
history in the University of London. Professor Porter succeeded Professor Anthony 
4 This is an editorial convention, following DBPO practice. Very few memoranda issued in their name were 
actually written by ministers themselves, but normally drafted by officials. 
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Low, formerly Smuts professor of the history of the Commonwealth in the University 
of Cambridge, who retired in November 1994. Professor Michael Crowder became the 
first general editor while holding a visiting professorship in the University of London 
and a part-time position at Amherst College, Massachusetts. Following his untimely 
death in 1988, Professor Crowder was replaced as general editor by Professor David 
Murray, pro vice-chancellor and professor of government at the Open University, 
who played a critical role in establishing a secure financial base for the project and in 
negotiating contracts with the volume editors and the publisher. His invaluable 
advice and expertise in dealing with the early manuscripts are acknowledged with 
particular gratitude. Mrs Anita Burdett was appointed as project secretary and 
research assistant. She was succeeded in September 1989 by Dr Stephen Ashton who 
had previously worked with Professors Mansergh and Tinker during the final stages 
of the India and Burma series. Dr Ashton replaced Professor Murray as project 
director and general editor in 1993. 
The project benefited from an initial pump-priming grant from the British 
Academy. Thanks are due to the secretary and Board of the Academy for this grant 
and for the decision of the British Academy to adopt BDEEP as one of its major 
projects. The Academy made a further award in 1996 which enabled the project to 
employ a research assistant on a fixed term contract. The Managers of the Smuts 
Memorial Fund in the University of Cambridge are also to be acknowledged. They 
made possible the workshop from which the project developed and they have since 
provided a further grant for work on two of the stage two volumes. The principal 
funding for the project has been provided by the Leverhulme Trust and the volumes 
are a tribute to the support provided by the Trustees. A major debt of gratitude is 
owed to the Trustees. In addition to their generous grants to cover the major costs of 
both stages, the Trustees agreed to a subsequent request to extend the duration of 
the first grant, and also provided a supplementary grant which enabled the project to 
secure Dr Ashton's appointment. It is thanks largely to the Leverhulme Trust that 
BDEEP has developed into one of the country's most successful historical research 
projects. 
Members of the Project Committee, who meet annually at the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, have provided valuable advice and much needed 
encouragement. Professor Low, the first chairman of the Committee, made a 
singular contribution, initiating the first exploratory meeting at Cambridge in 1985 
and presiding over subsequent developments in his customary constructive but 
unobtrusive manner. Professor Porter continues in a similar vein and his leadership 
and experience are much appreciated by the general editor. The director and the staff 
of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies have provided administrative support and 
the congenial surroundings within which the general editor works. The editors of 
volumes in both stages one have benefited considerably from the researches 
undertaken by Dr Anne Thurston and her assistants which resulted in the 
publication of the two handbooks. Although BDEEP is not an official project, the 
general editor wishes to acknowledge the support and co-operation received from the 
Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and the Records Department of the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office. He wishes also to record his appreciation of the spirit of 
friendly co-operation received from the editors of DBPO. Dr Ronald Hyam, editor in 
stage one of the general volume on the post-war Labour government and co-editor of 
the stage two volume on the Conservative government, played an important role in 
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the compilation of the house-style adopted by BDEEP and his contribution is 
acknowledged with gratitude. Thanks also are due to The Stationery Office for 
assuming publishing responsibility and for their expert advice on matters of design 
and production. Last, but by no means least, the contribution of the chief executive 
and keeper of the records and the staff, both curatorial and administrative, at the 
PRO must be emphasised. Without the facilities and privileges afforded to BDEEP 
editors at the PRO, the project would not be viable. 
S RAshton 
Institute of Commonwealth Studies 
February 1999 
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Chronological Table of Principal Events 
1940 
July Sir Frank Stockdale appointed comptroller for development and welfare 
in West Indies 
Sept Exchange of notes between UK and US: US to acquire 99-year leases of 
areas in British West Indies and Newfoundland for military and naval 
bases; US to transfer to UK fifty US navy destroyers 
1941 
Mar Formal conclusion of Leased Bases Agreement 
1942 
Mar Establishment of Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (becomes 
Caribbean Commission in 1946 when France and Netherlands 
participate) 
1945 
Mar Despatch from Oliver Stanley, S of S colonies, discussing federation as a 
means to self-government and suggesting that West Indian legislatures 
debate idea 
Oct Publication of Report of West India Royal Commission (Moyne Report) 
1947 
Feb Despatch from Arthur Creech Jones, S of S colonies, proposing a 
conference at Montego Bay, Jamaica, to consider formulation of 
proposals for closer association 
Sept Montego Bay conference agrees to appoint Standing Closer Association 
Committee (SCAC) 
1948 
Sept Publication of Report of British Guiana and British Honduras Settlement 
Commission (Evans Commission) 
Mar 
Mar 
1950 
Publication of SCAC Report 
Publication of Report of Public Services Commission (Holmes 
Commission) I 
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1951 
Feb Publication of Report of Customs Union Commission (McLagan 
Commission) 
May Establishment of Regional Economic Committee of West In dies 
1952 
Dec US Immigration and Nationality Act (McCarran-Walter Act) comes into 
force 
1953 
Apr London conference on West Indian Federation 
Apr Elections in British Guiana; PPP form government 
Oct British troops arrive in British Guiana; emergency declared and 
constitution suspended; PPP leaders detained 
1954 
Nov Robertson Commission recommends period of 'marking time' in British 
Guiana's progress towards self-government 
1955 
Jan PNP wins elections in Jamaica; Norman Manley chief minister 
Mar Conference in Trinidad on freedom of movement 
Nov Appointment of Cabinet Committee on Colonial Immigrants 
1956 
Jan Report of fiscal commissioner (Sir Sydney Caine) 
Feb London conference on West Indian Federation; key issues Manley's 
'seven propositions', sources of federal revenue and UK financial 
assistance 
May First meeting of Standing Federation Committee under Sir Stephen 
Luke, pre-federal commissioner 
Sept Report of British Caribbean Federal Capital Commission (Mudie 
Commission) 
Sept PNM wins elections in Trinidad; Eric Williams chief minister 
1957 
Apr Announcement of Lord Hailes's appointment as governor-general of West 
Indies Federation 
Apr Regional Economic Committee of West Indies advises against 
participation of British West Indies in EFTA 
May Standing Federation Committee decides that site of federal capital should 
be North-West peninsula of Trinidad and requests release of US naval 
base at Chaguaramas 
June Conference on West India Regiment at Barbados 
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July UK becomes aware of highly secret US defence installation at 
Chaguaramas 
July Discussions in London with US and West Indian representatives on US 
bases, Chaguaramas and the site for the federal capital; agreement to 
establish a joint commission 
Aug PPP wins elections in British Guiana and Cheddi Jagan returns to 
government as minister of trade and industry 
Jan 
Mar 
Mar 
June 
Aug-Sept 
Nov 
1958 
Hailes sworn in as governor-general and West Indies Federation 
established 
Chaguaramas Joint Commission concludes that release of base is not 
practicable 
Federal elections in the West Indies 
Federal government requests conference to review 1941 base agreement 
Outbreak of racial disturbances in UK at Nottingham and Notting Hill in 
London 
Clash between Manley and Sir Grantley Adams, federal prime minister, 
over authority of federal government to impose income tax 
1959 
Feb-Mar CO rejects proposal from Sir Colin Thornley (British Honduras) that 
statement should be made to effect that the colony is free to decide if it 
wishes to form a relationship with Guatemala 
May Publication of Jamaican Ministry Paper No 5 to effect that federal 
constitution is 'colonial' in character and proposing amendments to limit 
authority of federal government on issues of industrial development, 
income tax and excise duties 
June Conference in London agrees changes to constitutions of Leeward and 
Windward Islands to bring them more in line with those of other federal 
units 
Aug Discussions in London with Hailes on the timing of independence for the 
federation 
Sept Inter-governmental conference in Trinidad reveals serious differences in 
West Indies over federation and breaks down on issue of Jamaica's 
representation in federal legislature 
Oct-Nov CO proposes but Hailes rejects discreet campaign of lobbying to rally 
support for federation 
Dec Adams moves resolution in Federal House of Representatives calling for 
introduction of Cabinet government and the inauguration of dominion 
status in the West Indies as early as possible in 1960; Manley repudiates 
on behalf of Jamaica 
1960 
Jan Discussions in London with Jamaican delegation led by Manley on 
essential attributes of sovereignty, financial and economic implications of 
independence and consequences of Jamaican secession 
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Mar Public demonstration in Trinidad to demand release of Chaguaramas 
Mar Constitutional conference on British Guiana in London reveals 
significant differences between PPP and opposition on voting system, 
number of chambers and control of police 
May Statement by lain Macleod, S of S colonies, on Cabinet government and 
financial assistance to West Indies Federation over transitional period 
May Sir Alexander Bustamante announces resignation as president of FDLP 
and his 'irrevocable decision' to take Jamaica out of federation; Manley 
announces intention to hold a referendum in Jamaica 
June Macleod visits West Indies 
July UK circulates paper to US and Canadian governments on financial and 
economic implications of independence for The West Indies 
Aug Antigua discussions between Manley and Williams on creation of reserve 
list 
Nov Stage I of bases talks held in London 
Nov Discussions with West Indian ministers in London on UK financial 
assistance 
Dec Stage 11 of bases talks in Tobago 
Feb 
Mar 
May 
May-June 
June 
July 
Aug 
Aug 
Sept 
Oct 
Nov 
1961 
Stage Ill of bases talks conclude with Chaguaramas agreement signed in 
Port of Spain 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visits West Indies 
Resumed inter-governmental conference in Trinidad 
Lancaster House Conference; West Indian ministers continue to express 
reservations about aspects of the federal constitution but 31 May 1962 
envisaged as independence date 
Leeward and Windward Islands constitutional conference in London 
Lord Perth discusses EEC with West Indian ministers in Trinidad and 
Jamaica 
PPP win elections in British Guiana 
Joint Economic Mission (UK, US, Canada) to Leeward and Windward 
Islands submits proposals on interim aid 
Referendum in Jamaica; State Dept expresses surprise at result and US 
offer of financial aid to federation is withdrawn 
Separate discussions in London with Manley (on secession and 
independence) and Adams and federal ministers (on the continuation of 
federation) 
Prof Arthur Lewis submits proposals for a unitary state in the Caribbean 
1962 
Jan Lewis submits revised proposals for an independent Trinidad and a 
Federation of the Eight based on Barbados 
Jan Reginald Maudling, S of S colonies, visits West Indies (arrives 13 Jan) 
Jan General Council of PNM rejects Trinidad's participation in a new 
federation in the East Caribbean and resolves that Trinidad should 
proceed to separate independence (14 Jan) 
Jan 
Feb 
Feb 
Feb 
Feb 
Feb-Mar 
Mar 
Apr 
Apr 
Apr 
Apr 
May 
May 
May 
June 
July 
Aug 
Aug 
Nov 
Nov 
Apr 
Apr 
May 
June 
July 
Aug-Sept 
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PM of Barbados and chief ministers of Leeward and Windward Islands 
present proposals to Maudling for a new Federation of the Eight (19 Jan) 
Maudling announces in House of Commons intention to dissolve existing 
federation 
Jamaica independence conference in London 
Disturbances in Georgetown (British Guiana) following austerity budget 
introduced by PPP government 
Discussions between Williams and Eric Gairy on Grenada joining 
Trinidad in a unitary state 
Exchange of letters between Lord Home, foreign secretary, and Dean 
Rusk, US S of S, over British Guiana 
Hugh Fraser, parliamentary under-secretary of state, CO, discusses 
British Guiana with President Kennedy and US officials in Washington 
Colonial Policy Committee agrees negotiating position with Guatemala 
over British Honduras 
JLP wins elections in Jamaica; Bustamante prime minister 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act receives Royal Assent 
The West Indies Act to dissolve existing federation receives Royal Assent 
(Order-in-Council providing for dissolution takes effect from 31 May) 
Marlborough House conference on proposals to establish a Federation of 
the Eight in the East Caribbean 
Trinidad independence conference in London 
Commission of Inquiry on maladministration in Grenada submits findings 
CO asks Dr Carleen O'Loughlin, UCWI, to conduct economic survey of 
East Caribbean 
Financial settlement with Jamaica negotiated in London with delegation 
led by Bustamante 
Jamaica becomes independent (6 Aug) 
Trinidad becomes independent (31 Aug) 
Williams rejects UK offer of a financial settlement with Trinidad (issue 
not resolved until Dec 1963) 
British Guiana independence conference in London breaks down on 
issues of voting system, voting age and whether there should be new 
elections before independence 
1963 
Robert Lightbourne, Jamaican trade and industry minister, raises 
question of Jamaica joining EFTA 
General strike in British Guiana in response to government's Labour 
Relations Bill 
Preparatory conference on East Caribbean Federation at Barbados; 
Antigua seeks looser form of federation than that envisaged at 1962 
conference 
Anglo-American talks in London on British Guiana 
London constitutional conference on British Honduras 
O'Loughlin survey reports that East Caribbean will require in region of 
£59 million in assistance over a ten-year period 
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Oct British Guiana conference in London; Duncan Sandys, S of S colonies, 
imposes settlement based on new elections under proportional 
representation and a further conference before a date can be fixed for 
independence 
1964 
Jan New constitution for internal self-government in British Honduras 
June State of emergency declared in British Guiana after six months of 
unprecedented violence 
Oct Discussions in London between Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Jagan 
on conditions under which UK would be prepared to grant independence 
to British Guiana 
Oct US government suggests a new approach to aid policy for the Caribbean 
Dec At a meeting in London US officials advocate a new economic survey on 
aid 
Dec Elections under proportional representation in British Guiana; Jagan 
dismissed and Forbes Burnham forms new PNC-UF coalition government 
Feb-Mar 
Mar 
Apr-May 
May 
June 
July 
Aug 
Sept 
Oct 
Oct 
Oct-Nov 
Nov 
Jan 
Feb- Mar 
1965 
Arthur Greenwood, S of S colonies, visits East Caribbean; recommends 
that strong federation is still the best of four possible constitutional 
futures for the territories 
Greenwood visits British Guiana; reports favourably on Burnham 
government and suggests that independence might be granted in 1966 
Luke visits East Caribbean and reports that prospects of achieving 
federation are remote 
Greenwood circulates minute on liquidation of colonialism 
Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers discusses future of 
remaining UK colonial territories 
Conference at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, on future of remaining UK 
colonial territories 
Draft white paper on remaining UK colonial territories circulated by CO; 
objections raised by FO, CRO, MOD, Treasury and ODM 
CO abandons attempts to put in place an East Caribbean Federation and 
circulates proposals for associated status for all except Montserrat 
Discussions between Greenwood and Rusk in Washington on future of 
colonial territories 
Publication of Report of International Commission of Jurists on Racial 
Imbalance in British Guiana 
Senior ministers in Wilson government consider whether UK troops 
should remain in British Guiana for short period after independence 
London conference on independence for British Guiana; Jagan and PPP 
decline to attend 
1966 
British Development Commission in Caribbean established at Barbados 
Antigua constitutional conference in London on associated status 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS XXXV 
Apr Report of Tripartite Economic Survey of East Caribbean completed 
(published Jan 1967) 
Apr-May Windward Islands constitutional conference in London on associated 
status 
May British Guiana become independent as Guyana (26 May) 
May St Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla constitutional conference in London on 
associated status 
June-July Barbados independence conference in London 
Nov Barbados becomes independent (30 Nov) 
1967 
Feb The West Indies Act on associated status receives Royal Assent 
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Introduction 
The primary focus of this volume of documents is the short lived West Indies 
Federation which was slowly created in the decade before 1958 and which collapsed 
four years later. The documents come from the British Public Record Office and thus 
offer the official view of West Indian affairs as observed from London. There is 
another perspective, that of the individual politicians and governments in each 
Caribbean territory but, with a handful of exceptions, that is only included here when 
it occurs in the British correspondence on the making and shaping of British official 
policy towards the West Indies. Federation, of course, is only part of the story of the 
process of decolonisation in the many islands and territories that made up the 
British empire in the Caribbean, but it is a central one that touched most colonies 
and peoples in the region. It was the commonly recognised goal of British policy 
makers who did not even begin to contemplate separate independence for any of the 
individual islands until as late as 1959. Also, the Caribbean is a large and diverse 
region, and to do justice to each story of the transfer of power in the many individual 
islands and territories would be far beyond the capacity of a single volume. Thus the 
events included in this volume are less about individual territories and islands and 
more about the process of creating and sustaining the federation. The major islands, 
particularly Jamaica and Trinidad, were prominent players in the drama of 
federation, and aspects of their domestic politics, and their gaining independence, 
are inevitably included as they had a direct bearing on the progress and the collapse 
of the attempted union. Certain islands did not join the federation, most notably the 
peripheral Bahamas, while Bermuda was not considered as belonging to the 
Caribbean. From the early discussions about federation, British Guiana indicated 
that it would not join, a position later adopted by British Honduras. Some 
consideration is given to their separate histories of decolonisation, with considerably 
more coverage of the successive crises in British Guiana which exercised the minds 
of British officials and politicians and engaged West Indian passions. 
While the focus is primarily on federation, other aspects of end of empire in the 
Caribbean have not been neglected. The volume includes coverage of defence issues, 
in terms both of local defence requirements in the West Indies as a whole (as distinct 
from UK defence interests which were negligible) and negotiations with the US over 
the future and disposal of American bases located in a number of the islands. 
Significant attention is devoted to the question of immigration to the UK from the 
Caribbean. Here the reasoning behind the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962 is 
revealed. The Colonial Office especially came reluctantly to the view that legisation 
was necessary but departmental ministers and officials viewed with considerable 
distaste the measures adopted in the legislation to control immigration. Also covered 
is the place of the Caribbean in UK foreign policy in the context especially of 
relations with the United States. The UK was always sensitive towards US security 
concerns in the region but this did not always entail deference to the views or wishes 
of Washington. On occasion, notably over the future of British Guiana, there were 
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significant differences of opinion and sharp exchanges between UK and US 
politicians and officials. Above all there is considerable coverage throughout the 
volume of those economic and financial issues which so dominated the 
contemporary debates about development programmes in the Caribbean. It is 
impossible to separate the question of federation from the wider questions of finance 
and economic development. Although political factors were important, finance and 
economics provided the essential rationale for federation. Subsumed within the 
broad economic and financial themes, there are a number of related issues, notably 
the implications for the West Indies of Britain's negotiations with the European 
Economic Community and the place of the Caribbean in the aid programmes of 
Canada and the US. Two issues are not covered in any detail, namely the territorial 
claims of Guatemala and Venezuela against British Honduras and British Guiana 
respectively. These are subjects which the editors consider beyond the scope of the 
present undertaking and they are also those areas of Caribbean affairs which are 
subject to restricted access at the PRO. Several files on the border disputes 
concerning the two British colonies remain withheld under extended closures. 
The range of issues is reflected in the sources from which the documents have 
been selected. Inevitably the majority of documents have been drawn from the West 
Indian Department of the Colonial Office, with smaller numbers originating in the 
subject departments of the CO. These are supplemented by material from the 
Commonwealth Relations Office where the departmental perspective on the 
Caribbean was often different from that of the Colonial Office. Foreign Office records 
provide material on American bases and relations more generally with the US. The 
Treasury input is limited but significant while the records of the Home Office and the 
Ministry of Labour in its various guises are important in recording the evolution of 
attitudes throughout Whitehall on the question of immigration. Files from the Office 
of the Prime Minister have proved rather more useful than the conclusions and 
memoranda of the full Cabinet and the research uncovered an unexpectedly large 
number of Cabinet committees involved with Caribbean issues. The details of these, 
and all other references consulted, are compiled in the first of the two bibliographies 
at the end of the volume. 
The volume starts in 1948 and concludes in 1966. A word of explanation is 
required as to why this period has been selected. A West Indian federation had for 
years been a subject discussed in London and in various Caribbean capitals, but 
decisive action was taken only after the Second World War with the convening of the 
Montego Bay conference in September 1947 which, as part of its lengthy 
deliberations, agreed to establish a Standing Closer Association Committee (SCAC) . 
This Committee held its first meeting in early 1948, and from its recommendations 
there followed detailed discussions and planning which led to the creation of the 
West Indies Federation. Other volumes in the BDEEP series include a number of 
documents that deal with constitutional and economic developments in the West 
Indies both before and after 1948.1 The concluding date for this volume, 1966, is 
determined in part by the thirty-year rule of access to British official documents. To 
go beyond this point in an attempt to document how independence came to the 
small islands and to British Honduras as Belize in the 1970s and 1980s is not as yet 
possible. But more substantially 1966 represents the point at which, the federation 
having collapsed four years earlier with first Jamaica and then Trinidad proceeding 
to separate independence, the British government finally abandoned its efforts to put 
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in place a federation in the East Caribbean. Instead, Barbados followed the main 
islands in achieving independence in its own right while for all but one of the smaller 
and fiscally much weaker islands of the Leewards and Windwards, a new 
constitutional structure of associated status with the UK was put in place. 1966 was 
also the year in which a relieved British government was also able to transfer power 
to Guyana, thus ending several years of responsibility for the most strife-torn 
territory in the British Caribbean.* 
In 1927, following reforms to the organisation of the CO, a separate West Indian 
Department was created. This was divided in 1949 into Departments 'A' and 'B' each 
with a number of geographic and functional responsibilities; federal affairs lay with 
Department 'A'. An under-secretary of state headed the West Indian Department and 
advised on policy while Departments 'A' and 'B' were headed by assistant secretaries. 
In 1945 most West Indian colonies were Crown colonies directly administered by the 
CO. Colonial governors were appointed to administer the larger colonies of British 
Guiana, Trinidad and Tobago, British Honduras, Jamaica, Barbados, and the island 
groupings of the Leewards (Antigua was the residence of the governor) and the 
Windwards (the governor was normally resident in Grenada), while in each of the 
small islands day-to-day government was the responsibility of an administrator. In 
the Leeward and Windward Islands, following decisions taken at a constitutional 
conference in London in 1959, the two governorships were abolished and the powers 
of the governors were assumed by the individual administrators for each island. 
Before 1940 there were limited representative institutions in the West Indies. 
Electorates were very small and qualified by property and income. Universal adult 
suffrage was demanded by many West Indian nationalists and the Moyne 
Commission accepted this as generally a desirable aim of British policy in its 
recommendations which were published, ahead of the full report, in 1940. However, 
following his visit to the area in 1942-1943, the permanent under-secretary at the 
CO reported that universal suffrage should be given only to Jamaica and that the 
other islands and territories did not need constitutional advance which should be 
preceded by local representative institutions at the village and local community 
level.2 Universal adult suffrage was gradually introduced to all the territories that 
were to form the federation by 1951. It was achieved in Jamaica in 1944, in Trinidad 
and Tobago in 1946, and in Barbados in 1950. British Guiana and British Honduras 
both achieved universal adult suffrage in 1953. Elsewhere in the British Caribbean, 
adult suffrage came much later, the first such elections in the Bahamas and Bermuda 
being held in 1967 and 1968 respectively. Full internal self-government was formally 
recognised in Jamaica by 1959 and in both Trinidad and Barbados by 1961. 
Ministerial systems existed in the smaller islands of the Leewards and the Windwards 
but these fell some way short of internal self-government 
* * * * 
Eric Williams, the historian who became prime minister of Trinidad, referred to the 
British West Indies in the eighteenth century as 'the hub of Empire'. The West Indian 
islands were among England's earliest overseas possessions and along with the 
1 The editors wish especially to thank Ronald Hyam and Michael Twaddle for advice and comments during 
the preparation of this volume. 
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Atlantic system of trade they had a special place in the development of Britain's 
imperial might in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In those centuries a 
large part of Britain's commercial wealth derived from dominance of the African 
slave trade and exploitation of the sugar plantations of the West Indies. Additional 
Caribbean possessions were gained as spoils of war in the early nineteenth century, 
but this was not matched for long with a continued extension of fortune as it came at 
a time when the slave trade was abolished, then slaves emancipated and the volume 
and value of sugar exports declined. The Caribbean islands ceased to be jewels in the 
imperial crown and increasingly became pocket paupers of empire. 
By the end of the nineteenth centuries the economic weaknesses of the West 
Indian colonies were profound. Joseph Chamberlain referred to the area as 'Empire's 
darkest slum'. The reasons were several-fold. In the first place the economy of most 
of the islands and territories was heavily reliant upon a single export crop, plantation 
grown sugar. Although the consumption of sugar had greatly increased during the 
nineteenth century, demand was largely met from beet sugar grown in temperate 
zones. In an increasingly laissez faire global market, the price of sugar on the world 
market fell with disastrous consequences for the economically insecure 'sugar 
islands' of the West Indies. Sugar was essentially a plantation crop. It had originally 
been grown on plantations using slave labour. After emancipation there were fears of 
a labour shortage and the necessary intensive labour force for plantations was 
provided by free blacks, supplemented from 1838 until 1917 by some 400,000 
indentured East Indian workers imported from the sub-continent. The majority of 
these immigrant workers went to British Guiana and Trinidad with a smaller 
number going to Jamaica. The idea held by some emancipationists that freed slaves 
would become a free and self-supporting peasantry, developing into small farmers, 
was rarely realised. Similar ideas were expressed by the Royal Commission of 1897 
and subsequent reports, but by the 1930s a main feature of much West Indian 
agriculture was 'shifting cultivation, low technical knowledge, indebtedness, 
reluctance to try new methods combined with over-sanguine adventurousness when 
a cash crop had a good year'-all of which 'testified to the truth that the average 
West Indian peasant's attitude to the land was that it was something to be used to 
scrape together a bare living until something better turned up'.3 
Other export crops were developed, such as bananas, cocoa and cotton, but these 
were also grown mainly as plantation crops, and in the case of bananas control of 
much of the industry rested with large and powerful United States companies, 
notably the United Fruit Company. From the early twentieth century Trinidad, a 
larger and more thinly inhabited island, began to exploit its asphalt and oil 
industries. This gave it an economic advantage over most of its Caribbean 
neighbours and the oil industry also attracted migrant labour from less well endowed 
islands. A large part of West Indian trade was with Britain although potentially the 
largest and certainly the most obvious markets were in North America. However, the 
colonial policy of the United States in the first decade of the twentieth century placed 
severe restrictions on trade with the British West Indies, and it was only the special 
terms agreed with Canada, including steamship subsidies, that saved the sugar 
industry from even more severe depression. 
A second problem for the West Indian islands, and one often remarked upon by offi-
cials and in government reports, was the pressure of population. The pattern of pop-
ulation growth and density was not uniform throughout the region. Certain islands 
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had higher growth rates and when this was combined with small areas of cultivable 
land it led to what was sometimes described as over-population. Barbados was densely 
populated with over 500 people to the square kilometre. Jamaica, although a relatively 
large island, also had a rapidly growing population which pressed on limited land. By 
contrast British Guiana's large hinterland was thinly inhabited. Population pressure, 
lack of employment and low levels of income pushed many people from the West 
Indian islands as migrant workers. Some moved to other islands, but by the end of the 
nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries a steady flow of migrants, mainly 
men, went to work on the plantations of Central America, as labourers to construct 
the Panama Canal, and increasingly to the United States. 
A third economic difficulty for the West Indian islands was that poor and vulnera-
ble economies with low levels of personal income in turn generated low levels of per-
sonal saving and consumption and also yielded small revenues to government. The 
infrastructure of government, especially in the poorer islands and territories, rarely 
extended to social and welfare departments. Social improvement rested either on pri-
vate provision or, in the few cases where governments thought it politically important 
to act, small-scale action often supported by imperial grants-in-aid. It was clear to all 
informed observers, whether in the West Indies or not, that proper development of a 
social and economic infrastructure could only come about with the injection of sub-
stantial capital from external sources. Local revenues were grossly inadequate 
although, compared to most African colonies, the West Indies had a larger number of 
people with secondary and higher education. As a consequence of their poor 
economies, the West Indian islands were characterised by all the signs of poverty and 
its accompanying social problems-low levels of education, inadequate and insanitary 
housing, poor diet and standards of health. Official local reports and commissions sent 
from London frequently commented upon the poor economic and social conditions. 
However, little serious attention was given to the problem until the end of the inter-
war years and after serious unrest had broken out in the West Indies. 
Finally, the West Indian islands were in many respects isolated from the metropole 
and from each other. Steamship services to Britain and North America were limited 
and often irregular, and that could only be reversed if governments were prepared to 
subsidise services which was rarely so. Inter-island and external communications 
only improved with the Second World War as the region increased in strategic 
significance and as aircraft travel developed. 
From the middle of the nineteenth century federation of the islands in one form or 
another was proposed. Federation, it was argued, would rationalise administration, 
produce a unified civil service and create common services, as well as establishing 
stronger economic units. The obstacles were considerable even in getting islands to 
agree to local union with each other. For example, the abortive attempt in 
1875-1876 to link Barbados more closely with the Windward Islands led to serious 
riots in the capital Bridgetown. However, the confederation of the Leeward Islands 
was established in 1871, St Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla merged in 1882, and Tobago was 
attached to Trinidad in 1899, although relations between the various islands were 
often acrimonious. Generally there was little local enthusiasm for local federations. 
Insular particularism meant that neighbouring islands were viewed with suspicion, 
while political leaders sought to safeguard their local power bases from outside 
rivals. Unions with larger islands were regarded with considerable apprehension by 
smaller neighbours who feared that this would mean political domination and at 
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worst economic marginalisation. The more prosperous islands, such as Barbados, 
rejected unions with economically poorer islands for fear that this would prove a 
burden to their own exchequer; when unions were created there were squabbles over 
all manner of parish pump issues which invariably revolved around questions of 
where revenue was to come from and where and how it should be spent. A federation 
of all the West Indian islands and territories might have been dreamt about, but few 
thought it feasible. Geographical distance, history, culture, administrative 
structures, economics and politics, and to some extent language, all served to 
separate the colonies from one another. Few thought of the West Indies as a single 
political and economic entity, although increasingly there were cultural and sporting 
ties that fostered a sense of unity. 
In the 1930s the international depression savagely hit the precarious economies of 
the West Indies. Economic problems, already acute in the 1920s, increased as trade 
was reduced, agriculture depressed, and the normal exit routes for labour to the 
United States closed and migrant workers already there began to return home. A new 
breed of trade union leaders emerged in the Trinidad oil fields and to organise 
plantation labour. At the same time there was a new nationalism which demanded an 
extension of the franchise and self-government. Trade unionists and nationalists also 
began to argue for West Indian federation which increasingly was seen to be essential 
for West Indian survival. As Thomas Marryshow of Grenada said at a Labour Congress 
in Georgetown in 1938 it was a question of 'Federate or Disintegrate'.4 The Colonial 
Office in 1933 had urged Closer Union between the Leeward and Windward Islands,5 
an attempt at constitutional re-arrangement which barely addressed Caribbean 
problems. 
London only began to take real notice of the social and economic condition of the 
West Indies when the depression and imperial neglect resulted in serious labour 
unrest and riots . The first trouble took place in Port of Spain, Trinidad, in 1933 with 
a demonstration of unemployed people which was followed early in the next year by 
strikes and further demonstrations. In October 1934 rioting unemployed workers 
were arrested in British Honduras, and in 1935 strikes and riots occurred on sugar 
estates in St Kitts and in British Guiana. The labour leader Uriah Butler led a march 
of the unemployed in Trinidad, 6 coal carriers in St Lucia struck for higher wages, and 
people opposed to an increase in customs duties rioted in St Vincent. Police fired on 
crowds in St Kitts, killing three workers, a state of emergency was declared in St 
Lucia and a British warship was summoned. Unrest continued into 1936 and 1937, 
and the number of people joining trade unions rapidly increased. In 1938 there were 
further demonstrations by unemployed workers and strikers which led to riots in 
Jamaica and in British Guiana. In Frame, in Jamaica, in May of that year, the police 
fired at striking sugar workers killing four men, and later that month a strike among 
dock workers in Kingston led by Alexander Bustamante was followed by rioting in 
the capital in which eight people were killed and 170 arrested.7 The West Indian 
troubles spawned a new concern in Britain including a lengthy debate in the House 
of Commons in June 1938.8 
Although a number of small political parties had existed in the West Indies since 
the start of the century, most were narrow in conception and in practice. The unrest 
of 1930s saw the growth of new and better organised modern parties which had a 
nationalist appeal. Among the first were the Trinidad Labour Party, the Barbados 
Labour Party founded by Grantley Adams, and the People's National Party in Jamaica 
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led by Norman Manley and Bustamante. Other political parties were formed during 
the 1940s and early 1950s, most of them representing labour and nationalist 
interests. 
In response to the West Indian unrest, Malcolm MacDonald the secretary of state 
for the colonies, over-ruling the despairing attitudes of the West Indian 
Department, appointed in 1938 a commission of inquiry to investigate the eco-
nomic and social conditions in the West Indies, to be chaired by Lord Moyne. 
Moyne's commission gathered evidence in the West Indies and its report was ready 
by 1940. Much of what it had to say was highly critical of government neglect in 
the West Indies, and the economic and social conditions that had led to the labour 
unrest of the decade. By then war had broken out, and reluctant to have a critical 
report made public in wartime the Cabinet decided that the full report should not 
be published for the duration. A statement of the main recommendations was made 
to parliament on 20 February 1940.9 Simultaneously, the new policy on Colonial 
Development and Welfare was announced.10 The full Royal Commission report was 
published in 1945.11 Before the report appeared, MacDonald realised that the social 
and economic difficulties of the West Indies could be addressed only by a greater 
commitment by the Exchequer to higher expenditure in the region. Such ideas had 
already been voiced in W M Macmillan's Warning from the West Indies, published 
in London in 1936.12 The Moyne Commission recommended the creation of a West 
Indian Welfare Fund to provide an annual sum of one million pounds over a 
twenty-year period for the region, which would be administered by a comptroller 
independent of any government. In addition the report recommended the develop-
ment of local industries, such as cement, and changes in agricultural methods and 
practices. The need to introduce universal suffrage was a subject that divided the 
commissioners, but it was recognised that the implementation of electoral reform 
at some time was desirable. On the question of federation the commission, in its 
full report, stated that 'it is an end to which policy should be directed' .13 As a practi-
cal test of the advantages of federation it was suggested the Leeward and Windward 
Islands be combined in a single federation on the lines of that already existing in 
the former group. 
Imperial financial aid to the West Indies from the Colonial Development Fund 
during the 1930s had been negligible. This was to change with the introduction of 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, although not surprisingly, 
coming in wartime, the total investment capital promised to all the colonies was not 
met. In the West Indies a local Development and Welfare Organisation, established in 
1940, assisted the allocation of British funds and loans to the region. The Act, said 
Oliver Stanley, the secretary of state for the colonies in November 1944, as he urged 
his Cabinet colleagues to increase the funds for colonial social and economic 
development, 'was never meant to be more than a gesture'Y Nevertheless, the West 
Indies fared reasonably well in the allocation of this limited imperial fund. In the 
period 1940-1944 the West Indies received sixty per cent of total expenditure; in 
1944-1946 the proportion was thirty per cent, just over £6.3 million out of the total 
Development and Welfare budget of £21.16 million. In the period 1940-1946, thirty-
eight per cent of all such funds were invested in the West Indies, a total of £10.96 
million, and under the 1945 Act, eighteen per cent which amounted to £15.4 
million.15 Given the enormous social and economic needs of the West Indies these 
were small sums of money, but they did represent a change in imperial policy and the 
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recognition by the Exchequer that trusteeship included a greater measure of fiscal 
responsibility. The lrvine Commission of 1945 proposed plans for a University 
College of the West Indies which was established three years later with imperial 
funds on the site of the Imperial Agricultural Institute in Trinidad, although the 
intention was that the West Indian governments, and then the federal authorities, 
would assume financial responsibility for the institution. 
One motivation for the Development and Welfare Act of 1940 was an anxiety that 
the United States by its regional predominance might steal a lead over Britain in the 
West In dies. In September 1940, an exchange of notes between London and Washington 
agreed to a deal which brought a United States military presence to the British West 
Indies. A number of areas, principally in Antigua, Jamaica and Trinidad, were given 
free of charge and on ninety-nine year leases to the United States for use as bases, in 
exchange for fifty old destroyers which were badly needed by the Royal Navy to guard 
convoys against attacks from German submarines-what became known as the 'Bases 
for Destroyers Deal'.16 Another result of Britain's increasing wartime collaboration 
with the United States (the Lend-Lease programme providing large sums of aid to 
Britain, was passed by Congress in March 1941) was the creation of the Anglo-American 
Caribbean Commission in March 1942. With purely advisory functions, the commis-
sion was designed to encourage and strengthen social and economic co-operation in 
the region and to avoid unnecessary duplication of researchY A Caribbean Research 
Council was established in 1943 to provide the commission with technical advice, and 
inquiries were carried out into industry in the region and forestry research. The West 
Indian Conference established in January 1944 was designed to discuss questions of 
common concern to peoples of the Caribbean. In 1946 France and The Netherlands 
became members and the body was renamed the Caribbean Commission. 
From 1943 staff at the Colonial Office became convinced that 'the development of 
self-governing institutions should be linked up with the question of West Indian 
federation' and 'that this should be the declared object of British policy'.18 It was 
believed that none of the colonies could stand as self-governing units and thus some 
form of unity was essential. This conclusion was supported by the experience of the 
comptroller's organisation. Perhaps more pertinently, federation was an attempt to 
shape a regional policy that could confront the political power and the critical gaze of 
the United States on to its own backyard area. As Philip Rogers, then a principal in 
the West Indian Department, minuted in January 1944, 'we are perpetually in danger 
of being dragged along in the wake of the Americans partly because our interests 
there have a much more ill-defined focus than theirs and partly because of our 
inevitable handicaps in men and materials'. In the same minute Rogers wrote of the 
existing and proposed regional institutions, the rising tide of West Indian intellectual 
interest in federation, and thus the need to avoid being caught 'backward on the 
political side', all of which 'have made the question of West Indian "unity" or 
federation one of increasing urgency' .19 Whether this would be one or two 
federations was for later discussion. What was important was a unity which would 
give the West Indies an 'effective voice in Caribbean affairs', and it was essential that 
there should be pressure from the British government to bring this about. Mter 
some delay, a despatch was sent to the governors in July 1944 in order to gather their 
semi-official responses to the idea of federation. The governors' replies indicated that 
federation would be supported by liberal and professional groups and opposed by the 
white planter and commercial class.20 Bahamas preferred to remain apart. Any 
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discussions on West Indian unity should not prejudice the discussions in hand on a 
possible Leeward and Windward federation. On two points the governors were clear: 
that Britain should provide a stronger lead and the importance of financial stability 
as a prerequisite to political independence. 
Britain's policy towards the colonial empire at the end of the war was conditioned 
by the change in its own global position and the economic problems of post-war 
recovery and reconstruction. Considerable rethinking about the dependent empire 
had gone on in the Colonial Office during the war. By 1945 the CO was determined 
on constitutional advance to self-government in the colonies although the pace of 
change was going to vary. It was agreed that there should be some form of federation 
for the West Indies, now not only as a solution to the economic and social difficulties 
of the region but also as a step towards political advance. Other issues of concern 
were regional security and relations with the United States. In the long drawn out 
discussions on West Indian federation, officials at the CO recognised that most of the 
colonies in the region would continue to be a burden on the metropolitan Exchequer 
for some time to come. In a despatch to the governors of 14 March 1945, stating his 
desire for a West Indian federation and asking for the views of the local legislatures, 
Stanley emphasised the need for economic stability and suggested that 'one 
important responsibility of any federation would, therefore, be to show that federal 
administration can be carried out without recurrent financial assistance from 
outside'. 21 This was to be a constant theme running through the subsequent and 
lengthy federal negotiations. The case for federation was summarised nearly a year 
later by Rogers22 whose views were discussed at a departmental meeting in 
September 1946,23 while the financial implications were considered by the Treasury. 
A spur was given to CO action early in 1947 when Grantley Adams, the leader of the 
majority party in the Barbados House of Assembly, circulated among other West 
Indian islands a draft bill for a federal constitution of the West Indies with dominion 
status. Arthur Creech Jones, the Labour secretary of state, urged action and in 
February 1947 he proposed a conference to discuss closer association to be held at 
Montego Bay, Jamaica, that coming September.24 To avoid an unwieldy conference, 
Creech Jones suggested that each colony's legislature should nominate three 
delegates, and that each delegation should be accompanied by the chief legal and 
financial advisers of the colony. The discussions between the Leeward and Windward 
Islands about local federation were continuing, but the course and outcome of those 
proceedings, it was felt, did not merit delaying the convening of a conference to 
discuss a wider West Indian federation. In the meantime the CO prepared a series of 
briefs on constitutional, financial and economic issues for use by the chairman of the 
Montego Bay conference.25 
The conference met from 11-19 September 1947. Creech Jones chaired the 
proceedings until he was forced to return to London to deal with the Palestine crisis. 
His place at Montego Bay was taken by George See!, assistant under-secretary of state 
at the CO. Twenty-two delegates attended and all accepted the principle of a British 
Caribbean federation, with the exception of the British Guiana delegates who 
nevertheless agreed to participate in the future discussions. Resolutions were agreed 
that the British government would be responsible for establishing a Standing Closer 
Association Committee to draft a federal constitution, and producing reports on 
customs services and the unification of the public services, while West Indian 
governments would report on a unified currency, the formation of a British 
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Caribbean Regional Economic Committee, and also create a body to represent 
primary producers. Local delegates appointed by the legislatures of each colony were 
to consider and make recommendations on all these matters. SCAC was to have 
headquarters in Barbados and to consist of seventeen delegates under the 
chairmanship of Sir Hubert Ranee, the former governor of Burma, who also became 
British eo-chairman of the Caribbean Commission. SCAC was asked to produce a 
report for the Colonial Office not later than 30 June 1949 (document no 4). 
While the Montego Bay conference was being planned, the Colonial Office was also 
occupied with other West Indian matters: the ongoing question of constitutional 
reform, the Development Commission on British Guiana and British Honduras, the 
scheme for closer union between the Leeward and Windward Islands which had been 
suggested by the Moyne Report, and regional security. The need for constitutional 
advance in the colonial empire had been agreed during wartime. The constitutional 
and political scene in the West Indies was one of considerable diversity. In many of 
the colonies, most notably Barbados and the Leeward Islands, economic and political 
power had been in the hands of the planter classes and Europeans. Government in 
most territories was Crown colony rule. The governor was advised by a nominated 
council and as representative of the Crown exercised control over revenue and 
expenditure. This system of Crown colony rule had even been tightened in British 
Guiana where the constitution of 1928 removed from the legislative council its 
power to control revenue and expenditure. Throughout the British West Indies the 
franchise was limited by property and income. Thus in 1934 in Trinidad and Tobago 
there were only 25,000 electors in an adult population of 400,000, Barbados had an 
electorate of 7,000 out of 200,000 people, and Jamaica's electorate in 1935 numbered 
66,000, just over ten per cent of the adult population. Elected members of legislative 
councils had the power to criticise but effective power rested with the governor 
acting for the Crown. For many years there had been a steadily growing popular 
demand for self-government. The labour unrest of the 1930s and the growth of trade 
unions and a new nationalism in the West Indies, plus the impact of the Second 
World War, all increased the demand, and official recognition of the need, for the 
introduction of political reform. In the years 1944-1958 adult suffrage and systems 
of ministerial responsibility were introduced but at separate speeds in each colony. 
By 1951 only Trinidad and Tobago had an executive council on which the majority of 
members were elected, while the legislative councils in most colonies still contained 
official and nominated members although in all but the British Virgin Islands elected 
members were in the majority (10). The slowness of change to electoral and 
ministerial systems of government was strongly criticised by West Indian politicians 
who argued that self-government institutions should advance much more rapidly as 
a necessary preparation for federation. Well organised political parties existed in 
Jamaica and Barbados, but throughout the British Caribbean, reported Lord 
Listowel, minister of state in the CO after his visit to the region in November 1949, 
'there is a growing divergence between the sources of economic and political power. 
Economic power ... is European .. . whereas political power is passing by degrees 
into the hands of the coloured population. ' It was right, argued Listowel, that 
decisions of legislatures should be taken by elected members but it was also vital that 
nominated members should continue to be able 'to state their case when the 
financial or economic affairs of the Colony are under discussion'.26 
The Development Commission, chaired by Sir Geoffrey Evans, was set up to 
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investigate the economic potentialities of the two mainland colonies and their 
prospects of absorbing as settlers the surplus population from the West Indies and 
also from Europe. Evans's report in 1948 recommended economic development for 
both colonies which would cost between £15-20 millions over the next ten years.27 
Most of the investment would have to come from or be backed by the British 
government. Subsequent investigations by the Colonial Development Corporation 
and the two colonial governments revealed obstacles to development more serious 
than the commission had expected. And the sums of money proposed, argued Lord 
Trefgarne, the chairman of the Colonial Development Corporation in 1949, were well 
beyond what the Corporation could expend on just two colonies.28 In British 
Honduras there was widespread popular opposition to the idea of large-scale West 
Indian immigration. Evans, in comments to the secretary of state not published in 
his report, was highly sceptical that development in British Guiana and British 
Honduras over the next ten years would 'suffice to relieve pressure of population in 
the British West Indies'. He was also concerned at criticism by the United States and 
Latin American countries of British colonies in the Western hemisphere. The two 
mainland British colonies, he argued, were 'shop windows' and 'for the British 
connection to survive it was vital that a more active policy of development be 
pursued'. 29 
The closer union of the Leeward and Windward Islands was discussed at a 
conference in St Kitts in late January and early February 1947. The smaller and 
poorer islands, which had little to lose and much to gain financially from federation, 
more warmly endorsed the proposal of federation which was accepted in principle by 
all eight legislatures involved. Creech Jones then set about having the legal 
instruments drawn up as he was anxious to achieve maximum progress on the local 
federation before the Montego Bay conference convened. However, as See! pointed 
out in November 1947, now that West Indian federation had become a live issue 
there was little to be gained in labouring over the St Kitts proposal.30 This view was 
endorsed by Ranee when he observed that 'a three decker bus consisting of a British 
West Indian Federal Government, a Windward-Leeward Government and then unit 
governments would seem to be unwieldy, expensive and unworkable' (6) . 
Throughout the twentieth century Britain's military and naval presence in the 
Caribbean had increasingly been dependent upon the goodwill of the United States. 
The war of 1939-1945 greatly weakened Britain's economy and military capacity 
which, in the West Indies, was marked by the cession of bases to Washington. By 
1946 British military manpower was stretched to its limit and for reasons of 
economy the locally recruited wartime Caribbean Regiment had been disbanded. 
Thus the garrison in the West Indies was reduced to less than a battalion of British 
troops, supported by a locally raised infantry battalion in Jamaica which was 
restricted to service within the island, local territorial forces, relatively weak police 
forces, and the itinerant presence of Royal Navy vessels. Serious external and internal 
security questions remained: for decades the republic of Guatemala had laid claim to 
British Honduras and was now renewing its clamour, while Venezuela also had a 
long-standing dispute over its frontier with British Guiana; and as nationalist 
sentiment and labour militancy increased in the West Indian colonies there was 
always risk of further labour unrest which local security forces might be unable to 
contain. By March 1948 the foreign secretary and the secretary of state for the 
colonies stated that Britain's dispositions in the region could no longer be regarded 
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as 'politic and safe'. It was essential to increase the British military presence by a 
further battalion of troops and also to revive the West India Regiment, part of the 
cost being met by the colonies, which would be subject to War Office control and 
available for general service (2). 
The report of the Standing Closer Association Committee was published in March 
1950. It recommended that federation was the shortest path to self-government, that 
the federal capital should be in Trinidad, and that the constitution should be based 
on the Australian model where the federal government only exercised those powers 
surrendered to it by the states. The governor-general of the federation would 
represent the Crown and have reserve powers over defence, foreign affairs, currency 
and public safety. He would preside over the executive Council of State where the 
prime minister and the elected ministers would form the majority of the ministers. 
There was to be a bi-cameral legislature, an elected House of Assembly and a 
nominated Senate. The House of Assembly would consist of fifty members 
apportioned to territories according to population, while the Senate would have two 
members from each territory except for Montserrat which was to have one. There 
was also to be a federal judicature and a federal supreme court (10, 28). The SCAC 
Report, which took some time to be debated in the various colonial legislatures, was 
accepted by all except British Guiana, British Honduras and the British Virgin 
Islands. The CO had expected criticisms of the SCAC report, and predictably these 
came from West Indian representatives who thought that the measures did not go far 
or fast enough and smacked of Crown colony style rule. There were objections to the 
governor-general's reserve powers, especially from Barbados where the governor did 
not have such powers, over Trinidad as the site of the federal capital, and more 
generally that the basis of federation was not self-government for the West Indies. 
It was widely accepted in Whitehall that a customs union was an essential 
corollary of political federation. The creation of a union was to be a major and thorny 
question. There were thirteen different customs tariffs in the British West Indies, not 
including Bahamas and Bermuda, and import duties were often jealously guarded as 
the largest item of revenue, although income tax was a growing source of 
government income in British Guiana, Barbados and Trinidad. A customs union had 
been proposed for the abortive Eastern Caribbean federation in 1932 and again by 
Stanley in 1944 when the response was not very positive, although the CO felt that 
West Indian opinion was more accepting of the idea by 1947. The commission to 
discuss the question was set up under J McLagan, the former inspector-general of 
customs and excise in Iraq. The report, published in February 1951, recommended a 
customs union with or without federation. The secretary of state asked West Indian 
governments to complete detailed examination of McLagan's report before a 
conference in London scheduled for 1953. The questions of the customs union was 
such a tortuous one that it was not ready for discussion at the 1953 conference. In 
contrast the commission on the unification of public services, chaired by Sir Maurice 
Holmes, proceeded more smoothly. Although West Indian ministers feared the loss 
of local influence the report was published in March 1950. 
The financial condition of the West Indies, and the way in which the future federal 
fiscal system might operate, could not be other than a matter of concern to London. 
The West Indies was in receipt of a large part of the CD&W funds throughout the 
period 1945-1956, and most territories ran a deficit in visible trade. Revenues and 
expenditures were very low, some islands operating budgets not dissimilar in size to 
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those of very small British towns. Most trade in 1951 was with Britain (57.4 per cent 
by value) followed by Canada (24 per cent) and then the United States (11.25 per 
cent) (10). The CO view, in early 1952, was that the federation should collect revenue 
from customs duties and possibly also income tax, and retain a fixed proportion, 
perhaps twenty-five per cent, of the proceeds for its own purposes and in order to 
build up a federal reserve. It was recognised in London that a West Indian federation 
would continue to require grants from the imperial Exchequer and, minuted Henry 
Bourdillon, head of the CO Finance Department in February 1952, these were likely 
to be a good deal larger than the projected £20 million over five years. HMG thinking 
was that an annual grant to the federal government over a period of ten years would 
be equivalent to the average aggregate grants-in-aid over the five years before 
federation was established. Additionally a grant of about £1 million might be 
provided for setting up the federal authorities. The Treasury suggested that this 
might come from the Colonial Development and Welfare votes, a view strongly 
resisted by the Colonial Office. However, both departments seemed agreed that, since 
the war, too much emphasis had been placed on improving social services and not 
enough on the economic development needed to sustain them (8). 
It was clear to CO officials that movement towards federation would be a fairly 
slow process. The timetable was dictated in part by the need of SCAC and the other 
committees to gather information, many of the issues under consideration being 
controversial and not easy of resolution, while the constitutional changes and 
elections in twelve colonies also took time. Ministers in the colonies tended to have a 
possessive attitude about their new powers and to be more critical about the 
restraints that might be imposed by federation. In addition, in the early 1950s the 
Colonial Office had a heavy agenda involving affairs in Asia and Africa.31 Criticisms 
about the conditions for federation came from legislative bodies, specially those in 
Barbados and Jamaica, and there was a widespread view that HMG was 'foisting 
federation in the West Indies in order to escape from financial responsibilities' (5) . 
When Listowel visited the West Indies in November 1949 he came forearmed with 
arguments and answers provided by Ranee with which to confront the critics of 
federation. Prominent points for Listowel to emphasise to critics were that they 
should await the SCAC report, and that federation was for the colonies to agree on 
(6) . This latter argument, dictated by West Indian suspicions, deprived the UK of the 
opportunity to bring real pressure to bear, and it was a handicap under which the UK 
laboured throughout the entire period of its attempts to put in place a federation of 
one description or another in the Caribbean. A number of governors were also 
concerned at the slow progress (9). There was a constant expectation in the CO that 
West Indian leaders would demand more aid and also want to know the level of 
CD&W funding in the tranche after 1956. Accompanied by S E V Luke, assistant 
under-secretary of state at the CO, Bourdillon visited the Caribbean between January 
and March 1951 to assess the financial aspects of the West Indian federation. His 
report was pessimistic, arguing that funds beyond those calculated would be required 
for the West Indies; it was nevertheless essential that financial aid should be 
channelled through a co-ordinated economic development plan for the region (8). 
Oliver Lyttelton, who became secretary of state when the Conservatives took office 
in October 1951, outlined in a despatch of February 1952 a conference to discuss and 
refine the plans for West Indian federation to be held as planned in London the 
following year. In preparation for the conference the Colonial Office set up t\.vo 
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working parties to consider constitutional and financial matters, which included 
representatives from the Treasury. In the CO and the Treasury there was a good deal 
of pessimism about the financial future of federation.32 The London Conference met 
from 13-30 April 1953 and was chaired by Lyttelton (11). This was the first 
conference on federation attended exclusively by elected representatives, now that 
universal suffrage had been introduced throughout the West Indies. Representatives 
from Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the Leeward and Windward Islands 
met with British officials; observers came from British Guiana and British Honduras, 
as the legislatures in both colonies had voted against participating in a federation. 
The SCAC report was generally accepted but there was still strong dissent over the 
fiscal and constitutional terms and also about freedom of movement and the site of 
the federal capital. 
Although federation was now the established aim, discussion of its progress was 
often qualified by deep feelings of scepticism about its likely success. The major 
concern continued to be the financial viability of the federation, an anxiety which 
was not helped by the repeated negative reactions coming from the West Indies, and 
specially Jamaica, about Britain being seen to 'off-load its [financial] responsibilities 
for the West Indies' (31). N L Mayle, an assistant secretary, minuted in November 
1954 that federation would involve 'an expensive political superstructure which none 
of them [the West Indian colonies] can afford' (21), while early in 1955 the CRO 
queried whether a CO paper circulated to Commonwealth governments on 
regionalisation should not be more positive about West Indian federation (28). Even 
Sir Stephen Luke in September 1956, a few months into his task as commissioner of 
the Standing Federation Committee, wondered about the 'costly edifice' of the 
federal government (49). This scepticism was shared by Lord Lloyd, the 
parliamentary under-secretary of state, who in a minute written in November 1955 
which was also critical of 'mendicant' West Indian leaders, commented: 'I think we 
ought to examine far more closely exactly how independent the West Indies could 
ever become' (31) . But despite the difficulties the CO still believed that federation 
remained the only serious option for the West Indies (21) and recommended, both as 
a means to encourage local opinion and to concentrate local minds on their 
responsibilities, that the UK should issue a statement of intent to the effect that 
dominion status was the aim of British policy (31). 
A further dilemma for the Colonial Office was the future status of the smaller 
territories such as the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands, both of 
which were dependencies of Jamaica, but more particularly that of the British Virgin 
Islands which had opted not to join the federation. Although administered from 
Antigua, and also included in the abortive scheme to unify the Leeward and 
Windward Islands, the British Virgin Islands were closely tied economically and 
geographically to the neighbouring US Virgin islands. A short-lived agitation in 1949 
had argued for union with the United States. These close links with a dollar economy 
persuaded most people in the islands that membership of the West Indian federation 
would not be to their advantage. Indeed, it was voiced that they were likely to receive 
more sympathetic financial support from London than from the federation. The 
Colonial Office view was that the British Virgin Islands should be encouraged to join 
the federation. This would give the islands access to the technical and administrative 
support of the federation, and also remove from British direct control a weak colony 
that was reliant upon grants-in-aid (16) . 
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The CO had a timetable which aimed to resolve all the major issues at a second 
London conference, planned for February 1956, which would then be followed by an 
enabling act. Unfortunately this schedule also had to take account of the often slow 
responses of the various West Indian legislatures and the politics and rivalries of the 
islands. Federation may have been the primary concern of London, but all too often 
the pace of metropolitan plans was dictated by local political rivalries, elections and 
budgets in the West Indies, which Alan Lennox-Boyd, Lyttelton's successor, referred 
to as the 'game of ... bluff and counterbluff' (38). The Colonial Office was keen to act 
on a suggestion by Sir Hugh Foot, the governor of Jamaica, that an enabling act 
should be passed. This would make federation more likely, and it would be followed 
by elections for the federal parliament (34) . Ideally an enabling act should be passed 
before elections were held in Trinidad in September 1956, the outcome of which 
might bring into office a government less favourable to federation than the quasi-
ministerial administration dominated by Albert Comes (41) . In November 1955 the 
Colonial Office schedule looked as if it was going to be seriously interrupted when 
Norman Manley, the Jamaican chief minister, whose People's National Party had 
gained power in the elections of January, announced his 'seven propositions'. These 
demands raised serious questions about federation by challenging some of the 
matters agreed at the London conference in 1953 and led the CO to fear that 
federation might actually be killed (37, 41). London hoped that the delegates at the 
1956 conference would have plenipotentiary powers, thus avoiding the necessity for 
reference back to local legislatures. This would not be possible if major changes were 
contemplated from what had been agreed at the 1953 talks (37). The CO accepted 
that discussion of decisions taken in 1953 could not be precluded, but if delegates, 
and Manley in particular, wanted wholesale changes this risked upsetting federation 
(36). For Lennox-Boyd especially, 'the whole political future of the West Indies' was 
at stake at the forthcoming London conference (41). 
Between 1953 and the 1956 conference a number of further reports were prepared. 
The first was concerned with freedom of movement within the federation, or what Luke 
called the 'freedom to settle and accept work' (25). There were serious differences 
between units over this . Barbados, with its large and dense population and high levels 
of unemployment, accepted the idea, as did most of the smaller islands, and in June 
1954 the local House of Representatives called for a conference to consider the ques-
tion. Freedom of movement was strongly opposed by Trinidad which already had a sub-
stantial immigrant population. Fearful for its more prosperous economy, Trinidad 
viewed freedom of movement as a threat to its standard of living. However, in 
December 1954 Trinidad agreed that a conference should be called to consider the 
matter, an idea accepted by other legislatures. To demonstrate its goodwill, a few 
months before the conference met Trinidad relaxed certain restrictions on the entry 
of people into the island for employment from other West Indian territories. The pur-
pose of the freedom of movement conference, chaired by Lord Lloyd in Port of Spain, 
14-17 March 1955, was to reach agreement between the positions of Barbados and 
Trinidad that would be binding on the federation. The conference reversed a decision 
reached at London in 1953 that migration within the federation, other than on grounds 
of health and security, should be exclusively a federal concern. The new position was 
that local legislatures would exercise control for a period of just over five years after 
the inauguration of federation (28). This compromise position was subsequently 
agreed to by all West Indian legislatures. 
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In the spring of 1955 the British government appointed three commissions to 
examine fiscal, civil service and judicial matters. The first to be appointed, and the 
most important, was the Fiscal Commission under Sir Sydney Caine. A parallel 
consideration 'implicit in a federation' was a customs union, the report of which 
committee was then before the various legislatures (21}. Caine's report 
recommended that the federation draw its finances not from a fifteen per cent 
customs duty, as had been agreed at London in 1953, but from profits on currency 
and from customs and excise duty on a few selected items such as cigarettes, spirits 
and petrol (37, 43) . The two other commissions proved to be less controversial. The 
Judicial Commission encountered a few problems but agreement was reached over 
the structure of the federal supreme court and the appointment of federal judges. 
The Civil Service Report, although received along with the other two reports in late 
1955, was not studied or adopted by the 1956 conference.33 
In preparation for the London conference, Luke toured the West Indies for two 
weeks in January 1955 to gather ideas about the line to be taken by the various 
delegates. His report helped to shape the various briefing notes provided for the 
British delegation to the conference.34 Manley had been a firm advocate of federation 
while in opposition. Although he remained committed to the idea now that he was in 
office, the realities of local politics, specially those within his own People's National 
Party, imposed restraints. Jamaica was geographically the most distant island within 
the proposed federation, one thousand miles from Trinidad; indeed, earlier schemes 
of federation had not considered including Jamaica. It also had the largest 
population, sent most emigrants to Britain, and was building infant industries 
behind tariff walls (90). Manley's PNP was split between those in favour of federation 
and those with serious reservations. In the latter camp the most powerful figure was 
the burly Wills Isaacs, the minister for trade, industry and commerce, who demanded 
measures to protect Jamaican industry in any federation (34) . Manley as a new chief 
minister was keen to show that he could uphold the interests of Jamaica, and by late 
1955 this had to be demonstrated against the background of two impending by-
elections. Manley also argued forcibly that if federal elections took place before 1958 
he would face the threat of revolution within his party. The position of the Jamaican 
chief minister was explained to London by Foot, who, unlike Whitehall, had a 
stronger belief in Manley's good faith (35). In an exchange of letters with the Colonial 
Office, Foot revealed his more radical credentials by supporting Manley's argument 
that the West Indies could advance towards self-government and yet be in receipt of 
substantial aid from Britain (38, 47). The CO seized on this and argued internally 
that Foot misunderstood the position: it was not that independent governments 
could not receive financial aid but that budgetary support for recurrent costs and 
administration would be incompatible with independence and membership of the 
Commonwealth, and it had ever been so (39). 
In opposition Manley had argued that the 1953 London conference had delivered a 
federation which was colonial in nature. This needed to be changed by removing 
officials from the Council of State, by reducing the governor-general's reserve 
powers and by creating a federal minister of finance rather than a financial secretary 
so that the federation could achieve dominion status as quickly as possible. Jamaica, 
with fi fty-two per cent of the population of the federation, should be given more seats 
in the federal parliament, and in order to safeguard Jamaica's industries a more 
gradual approach should be made towards federation via a looser association. It was 
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these ideas that lay behind the "seven propositions" announced in the Jamaica House 
of Representatives in November 1955. The Colonial Office viewed with alarm 
Manley's apparent equivocation, fearing that it would put in disarray the schedule 
planned for establishing the federation. The CO argued that if Manley wished to 
amend the constitution of the federation then that could be done in its first five years 
of operation. More immediately, Luke viewed the seven propositions as very grave 
indeed in that they constituted 'a formidable threat to the success of the 
conference'.35 Rogers thought that if Manley could not be persuaded to restrict his 
demands when he came to London, then it would prove to be 'a stormy conference' 
(37). 
The Trinidad delegation to London was led by Comes who, in opposition to the 
wishes of Jamaica, wanted to see a customs unions and free movement of goods 
introduced as soon as possible (43). For domestic political reasons Comes was 
anxious to see federation advanced rapidly (34), and in 1955 he had successfully 
pushed through the legislature a motion suspending for one year the election 
planned for that September. In the event this proved unwise. In January 1956 Eric 
Williams formed his own party, the People's National Movement, which was well 
organised with a definite programme and generally pro-federation. It was more than 
a match for the loose coalitions of political groupings associated with Comes and 
other political leaders. In the election of the following September, the PNM won a 
majority of the elected seats (13 out of the 24). London had fixed feelings about the 
prospects for the new government in Trinidad. Colonial Office officials had a high 
regard for Williams's intellect and integrity but a low view of his ability to be a 
successful chief minister of a government which had already shown that it was likely 
to be left-wing and radical (51). 
The London conference met at Lancaster House during the bitterly cold weeks 
from 7-22 February 1956, a climate very different from the one from which the 
delegates had come (43) . Typical of the difficulties in assembling delegates was that 
Crantley Adams, a key player, nearly did not come because it was the time of the 
Barbados budget. The proceedings were opened by Lennox-Boyd. The policy of the 
Colonial Office was that West Indian delegates should sort out differences between 
themselves. There was no shortage of contentious issues, one of the most serious 
being the question of the federal capital site (40). Manley's 'seven propositions' 
further fuelled controversy. For the second and the next few days, the West Indian 
delegates met by themselves in the Connaught Rooms, off Kingsway, where 
discussions were heated and 'ugly'.36 Lennox-Boyd and CO officials talked 
individually to delegates, the secretary of state being anxious to put to rest the idea 
that the disputes were between progressives and reactionaries but rather an issue of 
balancing power between units. The site of the federal capital could not be agreed 
and Lennox-Boyd suggested that the issue be referred to a fact-finding commission of 
three non-West Indians, one to be an architect and another a financial expert. Strong 
objections to Manley's demands came from Comes of Trinidad and Robert Bradshaw 
of St Kitts, not so much over the substance but because consideration of these major 
issues would delay federation. 
On the structure of federal finances, delegates accepted that revenue could come 
from currency profits. However, exception was taken to Caine's proposal that for the 
first five years federal customs and duties should be confined to selected consumer 
items, including spirits and cigarettes, on the grounds that this would be a burden 
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on the poorer sections of the community and thus make federation less appealing. 
The solution adopted was that for the first five years there would be a fixed 
contribution or a federal levy from each unit which would be raised as each 
legislature thought best. For the CO, this was a weak compromise as it would not 
take federation far along the path towards economic control. On the issue of customs 
and excise a compromise decision was hammered out: the preamble to the 
constitution was to state that 'it was essential for the economic strength of the area 
that there should be an integrated trade policy for the Federation' with the 
introduction of a customs union and internal free trade. A further expert commission 
on trade and tariffs was created and directed to report within two years. 
The fifth point in Manley's 'seven propositions' concerned future British financial 
support to the federation. All West Indian leaders felt strongly on this issue. The 
Colonial Office also had very firm ideas about financial aid which had been well 
rehearsed in discussions about federation with West Indian representatives over 
many years. The matter assumed new prominence as self-government for the feder-
ation came nearer and the question of Commonwealth membership was raised. 
Dominion status for the federation had been recommended by a group from the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association which had recently toured the West 
Indies, and Sir Alan Burns, the UK permanent representative on the UN Trusteeship 
Council, also thought this a valuable move not only for the West Indies but also for 
the federation's international relations. However, Commonwealth membership was 
not merely a matter for the United Kingdom; it involved all the other members as 
was shown by the discussions over the membership of the soon-to-be-independent 
Ghana. But on one thing the Colonial Office was clear; receipt of financial assis-
tance for budgetary purposes and administration was incompatible with full mem-
bership of the Commonwealth (31) . The volume of British aid from various sources 
to the West Indies since 1946 totalled £56 million (44) . In an answer in June 1956 
to Foot, who had pursued the question of self-government and levels of aid, and 
which also formed a despatch to other West Indian governors, the secretary of state 
reiterated his view that it was impossible for 'real political independence to be 
attained and maintained when ... financial assistance to several of the territories is 
at a scale which is incompatible with the reality of political independence' (47). As 
things stood in mid-1956, the putative federation had no means of defence and 
although each unit had agreed to contribute one per cent of revenue to the revived 
West India Regiment, that sum was insufficient. When dominion status came the 
full cost of the regiment would fall on the federation. The request by West Indian 
delegates at the London conference that Britain should make available to the feder-
ation an interest-free loan of £2 million had been rejected (44). Other sources of 
finance had been raised at London such as a proposed 'Caribbean Colombo Plan' 
which was subsequently taken up with the Canadian government. Luke, who won-
dered if the federal government would have anything useful to do with its limited 
financial resources, called this a 'vague' idea and suggested an International Bank 
economic mission to advise on regional economic co-ordination (49). This was not 
accepted by the Colonial Office and instead it was recommended that a Federal 
Economic Advisory Bureau be created under the aegis of the Standing Federation 
Committee. 
Although the financial weakness of the putative federation had not been resolved in 
London, matters moved ahead fairly swiftly after the conclusion of the conference. 
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Delegates agreed to take the final steps to establish the federation, and the British gov-
ernment was authorised to pass an enabling act. The British Caribbean Act was duly 
passed by Parliament in August 1956. A few months earlier, in May, the Standing 
Federation Committee had been created with authority to settle the final details and 
to assemble staff for the federation. The commissioner was Luke who presided over 
the sixteen members drawn three each from Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and one 
from each of the Leeward and Windward Islands. Membership was such that the views 
of the smaller islands could prevail. The first meeting was held in Barbados and sub-
sequent meetings, until October 1957, in Jamaica and Port of Spain. It was decided 
that the name of the federation should be The West Indies Federation not the British 
Caribbean Federation. The report of the fact-finding commission on the federal site, 
headed by Sir Francis Mudie, was published in September 1956. Mudie's report argued 
that the federal capital required good services and communications, all of which were 
lacking in Grenada and the other small islands. The commission recommended a site 
in either Barbados, Jamaica, or Trinidad. The three sites were discussed with some 
acrimony at the second meeting of the Standing Federation Committee in February 
1957 and it was agreed that Trinidad should be the location of the federal capital. This 
was the site favoured most by the Colonial Office, partly for practical reasons but also 
because it was cheap and the land might be made available from little used United 
States bases on the island. Although this was welcomed by Eric Williams's government 
in Trinidad, there was some displeasure at the critical tone of Mudie's published report 
which branded the island's public life as corrupt (48, 69). The cost of the federal cap-
ital was to be assisted by a grant from the British Exchequer, now elevated to a sum 
not more than £1 million, and until the actual site could be decided upon the nascent 
administration moved into temporary headquarters in an office building on Treasury 
Street, Port of Spain. 
There remained the appointment of a governor-general for the new federation. An 
experienced colonial governor, preferably with West Indian experience, was the kind 
of person favoured by the Colonial Office, and Lennox-Boyd had virtually promised 
the position to Foot who would also have been the street corner 'choice' in the West 
Indies. West Indian leaders preferred a person with West Indian experience who was 
sympathetic to the political ambitions of the region. But the matter was settled in 
London at the highest level. Harold Macmillan, the prime minister, decided in 
February 1957 that the post should go to 'a man who has had long experience in 
British Parliamentary life, who has been in charge of an administrative Department 
and has served in the Cabinet' (52). His choice was a loyal Cabinet colleague, Patrick 
Buchan-Hepburn, Conservative MP for Beckenham, a former chief whip and the 
current minister of works, who, for his new position, was ennobled as Lord Hailes. 
There was little opposition to this announcement by West Indian leaders; most 
criticism came from the British press and the Labour Party. 
The Caribbean colony which caused the largest headache for the Colonial Office 
during the process of end of empire was British Guiana. The colony was socially and 
culturally plural, the population being mainly composed of the descendants of 
African slaves and of East Indian indentured labourers brought to work on the sugar 
plantations between 1838-1917. This racial divide existed in the trade unions formed 
from the 1920s and also in the small political parties that existed by the late 1940s. 
Economic life in the colony was dominated by white owned plantations and the 
bauxite mining industry. Poverty was widespread and the frequent cause of unrest, as 
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was officially acknowledged. During the late 1940s, Or Cheddi Jagan, a US-educated 
dentist, steadily brought together some of the racially divided unions and parties and, 
in 1950, formed the People's Progressive Party (PPP) . The PPP had a programme of 
radical social and economic reform for the colony which reflected Jagan's Marxist 
ideas. In 1951 a commission chaired by Sir John Waddington recommended that 
adult suffrage be introduced and a system of government with a measure of 
ministerial responsibility. This was established by the new 1953 constitution. In the 
general election that followed, on 27 April 1953, Chedi Jagan's PPP won 18 of the 24 
elected seats with the support of fifty-one per cent of the votes cast (12). The 
activities of the PPP were being watched with some anxiety by the Special Branch 
both before and after the election although the commissioner of police, in the 
monthly intelligence report for April 1953, acknowledged that the party had popular 
bi-racial working class support. The police commissioner and the governor, Sir 
Alfred Savage, who had recently come from the much more orderly political 
surroundings of Barbados, acknowledged that the intransigent attitudes of the white-
owned companies contributed to the economic and political tensions in the colony. 
Jagan's government set about implementing its manifesto and also changing some of 
the measures introduced by the previous administration. It was proposed to remove 
ecclesiastical control over schools, an issue of long-standing contention, and to lift 
the ban on the importation of left-wing literature and the measure preventing left-
wing activists entering the colony. These were hardly matters of revolutionary intent 
but in a Cold War context they assumed greater significance in the minds of Colonial 
Office officials than they might have done at another time. The governor made an 
effort to work with Jagan and his ministers hoping to separate 'moderates' from the 
'extremists', a line which the CO from the outset thought might not be the right one. 
Relations between governor and ministers became increasingly tense, reaching crisis 
level when strikes broke out on the sugar plantations on the last day of August 1953 
when the government supported break-away unions against the Sugar Producers' 
Association. Savage asked that a Royal Navy frigate should remain in the area, but a 
week later, on 13 September, he reported by letter to the Colonial Office his fears 
that the 'foundations of society are being attacked insidiously almost without check', 
and that the PPP seemed likely to 'secure a more or less complete grip of the country, 
irrespectively of whether I step in, as I shall no doubt have to do before long, and use 
my reserved powers on this or that individual issue'. He continued: 'The crucial 
question is how long and how far should we allow this process to continue and how 
can we stop it?' Unless the opposition to the PPP could be galvanised, Savage believed 
that, in order to keep British Guiana in the Commonwealth, it would be necessary to 
go back to the former constitution (13). 
The Colonial Office needed little convincing that action was needed to remove the 
Jagan government. On 24 September, Lyttelton, the secretary of state, instructed 
Savage to suspend the constitution and declare a state of emergency (15). The CO jus-
tification for this act of force majeure was that the aim of the PPP government was to 
turn British Guiana into a Soviet-leaning communist republic which would become a 
centre for organising communist activity throughout the British West Indies, and 
Central and South America. This decision was taken within the Colonial Office and 
then referred to the Cabinet for approval. The US was hostile to a leftist government 
in the Western hemisphere. This helped frame British policy but the decision to remove 
the PPP from office was not taken in response to pressure from Washington (14).37 The 
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British Guiana constitution was suspended on 9 October, bringing to an end the 133-
day government of the PPP. Because the governor could not rely upon the support of 
the police force, a battalion of British troops was sent from Jamaica to the colony, 
arriving on 8 October. Jagan and his political associate Linden Forbes Burnham, flew 
to London ten days later in order to lobby for their cause only to be closely followed 
by another delegation composed of their political opponents. At the same time the 
minister of state at the CO visited British Guiana. Within the colony, sugar plantation 
workers returned to work and disputes were channelled through labour officers rather 
than trade unions (17). 
The crisis in British Guiana and the need to deploy British troops there, stirred the 
Colonial Office to push harder for the revival of a West India Regiment. Discussions 
on this had lagged for three years, caught up in local legislatures. London's aim was 
to re-establish a locally-recruited military force in the West Indies which would be 
used primarily for purposes of internal security in those colonies. This would aid 
Britain's military manpower problem as the British battalion based in Jamaica could 
be withdrawn for use elsewhere (18) . The new West Indies Federation would need an 
armed force and defence was envisaged as an inclusive (federal) subject which would 
have to be paid for from federal funds (26). 
The British West Indies experienced a rapid growth in population during the 1940s 
and early 1950s which outstripped the pace of economic and social development. 
Many of the officials in the Colonial Office and in West Indian administration were 
concerned at what they saw as overpopulation in the area, an issue that was to 
become closely linked with the question of West Indian immigration into the United 
Kingdom (45). One of the remits of the Evans Commission had been to assess the 
possibility of the surplus island populations being settled in the thinly inhabited 
areas of British Honduras and British Guiana. Another solution to the surplus 
population of the West Indies, floated somewhat loosely in March 1948 by Sir 
Thomas Lloyd, the permanent under-secretary of state in the Colonial Office and the 
former secretary to the Moyne Commission, was that Britain's post-war labour 
shortage might be assisted by immigrants from the Caribbean (1) . Officials at the 
Ministry of Labour and National Service opposed the idea and an inter-departmental 
working party, reporting in July 1949, rejected the proposal. While more than 600 
Jamaican men and women, two-thirds of whom had served in the forces in Britain 
during the war, were sailing to Tilbury on the liner Empire Windrush in June 1948, 
several Labour MPs were writing to Clement Attlee, the prime minister, demanding 
controls on coloured immigration, a demand that was firmly rejected (3). Britain's 
traditional policy had been that entry to Britain was open to all subjects of the Crown 
without distinction, a system of common rights and obligations for all. However, 
Canada in 1946 defined its own citizenship laws as had India and Pakistan when they 
gained independence in 1947 and Ceylon in 1948. In the light of these changes, 
Britain's traditional policy of right of entry for all subjects of the Crown needed to be 
redefined. This was done by the British Nationality Bill, then going through 
Parliament and passed in 1948, which created a separate status of 'citizenship of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies', and also the status of Commonwealth citizen, people 
in both categories being entitled to enter the United Kingdom.38 Immigration to 
Britain from the West Indies increased through the 1950s; in 1953 there were 2,000 
immigrants, in 1954 the figure had risen to 10,000, and by 1956 to 29,800. At the end 
of the decade nearly 50,000 people from the West Indies entered the United 
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Kingdom. In addition there had been a growing number of immigrants from the 
Indian sub-continent; in 1960 a total of 136,400 immigrants from the tropical 
empire and Commonwealth countries entered Britain.39 Emigration to the United 
States had for long been a regular outlet for the West Indies, particularly for men 
from Jamaica, but this had been severely reduced by the McCarran-Walter Act passed 
by Congress in December 1952 (23). 
Government departments were wary of imposing immigration controls because 
they involved questions of race and citizenship, relations with Commonwealth 
states and dependencies, and the position of Irish nationals who were entitled to 
enter Britain. The Colonial Office in particular was anxious not to be seen acting or 
being involved in actions or policies that might appear to involve racial discrimina-
tion of any kind. Although the CO was prepared to look at voluntary means of 
restricting West Indian immigration, and was not opposed to the introduction of 
powers to deport undesirables and measures to ensure that immigrants had guaran-
teed jobs, accommodation and sufficient money for maintenance, there was strong 
objection to any discrimination on the grounds of colour. J L Keith, the student 
welfare officer in the CO and a fairly liberal voice on matters involving race, 
regarded immigration as beyond the control of West Indian governments and more 
a matter to be tackled by welfare and economic development. Winston Churchill, 
the prime minister, saw West Indian immigrants as a problem that required action, 
while Lord Salisbury, the lord privy seal, regarded continued uncontrolled immi-
gration of non-Europeans as a threat to the racial integrity of Britain. Most minis-
ters thought that action was not necessary and that were it to be taken, it should be 
based on consensus with the opposition parties and also consultation with 
Commonwealth countries and colonies. The question of restricting West Indian 
immigration was brought before the Cabinet again in early 1954. Ministers autho-
rised the appointment of a working party to report on the powers of other 
Commonwealth countries to deport British subjects, the outcome of which was a 
proposal to restrict immigration by the introduction of a 'permit to land'. While the 
working party was deliberating, Philip Rogers, the assistant under-secretary of 
state, had returned from a visit to the West Indies. He thought restrictions should 
be imposed and applied to all Commonwealth citizens irrespective of colour (19). 
Later that year Foot spoke of his fears for Jamaican immigrants in Britain if a 
recession were to occur; at current levels of immigration this might leave 30,000 
Jamaicans unemployed in London alone. In these circumstances some form of reg-
ulation of immigration through a quota system would be necessary. As Foot 
pointed out, all West Indian governments had restrictions on immigration. In the 
discussions over federation, the question of freedom of movement was a bitterly 
contested idea. By the autumn of 1954, senior officials in the Colonial Office had 
come round to the view that 'now was the time to take steps to control' unregu-
lated immigration although this must apply to the whole Commonwealth (20). 
Lennox-Boyd felt strongly on this as he told Lord Swinton, the secretary of state for 
Commonwealth relations, in response to a suggestion that the terms of a commit-
tee of inquiry should be limited only to selected immigrants.40 At the end of 1954 
the Colonial Office and the Home Office were together preparing draft legislation to 
restrict immigration into the United Kingdom, although Lennox-Boyd was con-
cerned that the wording of the bill should not imply that his department was sup-
porting racially discriminatory measures (22, 29) . Race by then was becoming a 
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lively issue in British politics. An anti-coloured immigration lobby, led by Sir Cyril 
Osborne, the Conservative MP for Louth, represented one extreme of that party. At 
the opposite pole were more liberally-minded MPs such as Nigel Fisher, the parlia-
mentary private secretary to the home secretary, who toured the West Indies in 
mid-1954. In a report, which Anthony Eden as prime minister called 'very helpful', 
Fisher summarised the economic and social conditions in the West Indies which 
gave rise to emigration, and he stressed that although restriction applied only to 
those colonies might be a quick and easy solution for Britain, it would be neither 
'morally right' nor 'politically expedient' (30). As minister of defence, Macmillan, 
with an eye on the public mood and with the prospect of a general election not far 
away, suggested in January 1955 to Eden that 'we might introduce a Bill and let it 
fall. This would at least show willing.'41 Many of the arguments by the anti-immi-
gration lobby, which had a growing populist currency in certain areas of the coun-
try, claimed that immigrants were a cause of social problems and crime, views 
which the Colonial Office took steps to refute (24) . 
The draft Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, prepared by early 1955, was suspended 
because of the general election which was called for May. Most government 
departments now accepted that immigration from the Commonwealth should be 
restricted. The Colonial Office was very anxious that this should meet with the 
approval and the co-operation of the West Indian governments and not be a source of 
economic embarrassment to them which, in the case of Manley in Jamaica, might 
lead to his fall from office (32) . Quota figures for immigrants were regarded as 
discriminatory by the Colonial Office, and Sir Thomas Lloyd in October 1956 was still 
resisting the proposed legislation which he argued was 'directed against the West 
Indies'. The Cabinet was evenly divided on the need for legislation, so in late 1955 Sir 
Norman Brook, the Cabinet secretary, suggested to Eden that as resolution was not 
forthcoming the matter should be referred to a small committee for further 
consideration (33). Eden agreed, and the Committee on Colonial Immigrants was set 
up chaired by the lord chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, and including the secretary of state 
for the colonies. It concluded in its report of mid-1956 that immigration was an 
'onerous problem which cannot now be ignored'.42 Cabinet discussed the issue on 11 
July but the divisions remained. Predictably Salisbury was for restrictive legislation 
and G Lloyd George, the home secretary, argued for the changes in the law 
recommended by the committee in 1954-1955. Lennox-Boyd accepted the need for 
restrictive legislation but not on grounds of colour, and said that he would consult 
with the chief ministers of Jamaica and Barbados with a view to gaining their support 
to discourage emigration from the West Indies. At the end of the year a decision was 
no nearer. The Colonial Office view, put forcibly, was that although West Indian 
immigration was a cause for concern- for Lord Lloyd especially the root cause was 
uncontrolled population growth in the Caribbean (45)-its 'effects do not as yet 
appear to be socially or economically serious for this country as to justify the 
political difficulties which would be caused to the United Kingdom's relations with 
the West Indies, and with other Commonwealth countries, by so marked a step as 
legislation directed against the West Indians' (50) . 
The Cabinet was still divided over what should be done in mid-1957, with Kilmuir, 
Lennox-Boyd and R A Butler, the new home secretary, all being opposed to 
restrictive legislation (59) . This remained the Cabinet view a year later. However, 
race riots in Nottingham and then in London's Notting Hill district between 
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23 August and 2 September 1958, brought the matter back to the top of the political 
agenda. The deputy prime minister of the federation, Dr Car! La Corbiniere, flew to 
London and so did Manley and Dr Hugh Cummins, the premier of Barbados, to 
discuss the unrest. The Cabinet's immediate reaction was that immigration controls 
were needed, but this was moderated by the need not to be seen to be reacting to 
racist unrest. Restrictive legislation was not to be entertained. Other measures were 
to be adopted to strengthen welfare services for immigrants in Britain and to 
encourage West Indian governments to more carefully screen prospective 
immigrants (78). In June 1959 a committee of ministers chaired by Butler agreed 
that no action should be taken to deport undesirable immigrants or to control 
immigration into the country (94). Over the next two years Cabinet discussed 
immigration control only twice, the matter being left largely for the attention of 
the Home Office. Immigration control was not mentioned in the Conservative 
manifesto for the general election of October 1959, but a group of West Midlands 
MPs kept the issue on the political agenda. It was an issue which the CO continued to 
monitor. 
In early 1957 the Standing Federation Committee recommended Trinidad as the 
site for the new federal capital. Nearly a year before the governments of Trinidad 
and St Lucia asked London to enquire about the possibility of releasing areas leased 
to the United States in 1941. The CO hoped that Washington would make a sympa-
thetic response to the embryo federation (46). In May 1957 the SFC agreed that the 
north-west peninsula of Trinidad, which included the US base at Chaguaramas, 
would be the best site for the federal capital. The site was near Port of Spain and 
possessed many advantages, as the CO acknowledged, while the US base only had a 
small care-and-maintenance staff mainly concerned with operating a guided missile 
radar-tracking station (55). Manley, Bradshaw and Adams, and other members of 
the SFC, were adamant that the base should be surrendered as the new federal site. 
Eric Williams of Trinidad, who had only recently joined the SFC, abstained and 
contended that he would support the existing international agreement. It was in 
this spirit that the West Indian leaders went to London in July 1957 to meet with 
British and American representatives in order to discuss what Rogers at the CO 
referred to as the 'trickiest question'.43 A British approach to the United States over 
the bases issue was met with some sympathetic understanding by the State 
Department but with intransigence from the Defense Department (58) . CO officials 
thought that an uncompromising attitude from Washington would not be helpful 
to either the interests of the United Kingdom or the United States (60). As to the 
military significance of the base, at least one of the UK service departments dis-
counted its value to British and West Indian defence and said that the problem was 
political (61). However, US reluctance to leave Chaguaramas was dictated by the 
fact that it was the terminal station of the Caesar Chain, a secret anti-submarine 
monitoring system stretching down the western Atlantic coastline, information 
about which they were reluctant to share even with their British allies (62, 73). The 
London talks took place at the Foreign Office from 16-23 July. Manley and the 
other West Indian leaders presented their arguments for the surrender of the base. 
On the third day Williams spoke. He had moved from his previous conciliatory posi-
tion and now denounced the Lend-Lease agreement and the US presence in 
Trinidad. Armed with documents from 1940-1941, he fiercely argued that by the 
Lend-Lease agreement the 'rights of Trinidad were trampled on in 1940' against the 
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wishes of the then governor and executive council whose protests had been over-
ruled by the War Cabinet.44 The situation was different now. Trinidad had an 
elected government and thus it was necessary to negotiate a new agreement 
between the two countries (64). Faced with this upset in the talks, Macmillan wrote 
the next day to President Eisenhower requesting support for a joint commission of 
technical experts to examine the question of Chaguaramas as a federal site (63). 
Eisenhower agreed and a joint commission was accepted by the representatives of 
the three parties at the London talks. 
The joint commission was appointed in January 1958 and, chaired by Sir Charles 
Arden-Clarke, the former governor of the Gold Coast, met in Port of Spain to prepare 
a report which was completed in March but not published until after the federal 
government was in place (70). The bases questions generated strong feelings in 
Trinidad and elsewhere in the West Indies in the run-up to the first federal elections 
in March. Passions were stirred by the continued construction of a radar-tracking 
station at Chaguaramas and the belief that the United States was determined to keep 
that base whatever the joint commission recommended (67). In an aide memoire 
Christian Herter, the US under-secretary of state, urged Britain's active support for 
retention of the base and implied that the United States intended to stay put. This 
was 'an astonishing statement', minuted Rogers at the CO, which 'calls seriously into 
question the good faith of the U.S. Government in agreeing to the setting up of the 
Joint Commission on Chaguaramas'.45 The Foreign Office, thinking that partition 
might also be possible, was prepared to await the findings of the joint commission. 
Once the federal government had been elected, the FO argued, the question would be 
more a dispute between the West Indies and the United States, a view which the 
Colonial Office had also adopted (68, 72). By then the joint commission had 
recommended that the United States should retain the Chaguaramas base as a vital 
part of its defence system and that partition was not practicable (70) . The dilemma 
for the CO was that the federation was on its way to independence but the bases 
agreement did not have the federal government's consent and was not likely to 
receive it. And full details of the military bases were not to be shared with West 
Indian ministers (73). Foreign Office officials were opposed to any action that might 
threaten the intergrity of the Anglo-American alliance although Selwyn Lloyd, the 
foreign secretary, hoped that the US might 'sugar the pill' by offering to pay for an 
alternative capital site for the federation (72, 77). 
In May 1958 Lennox-Boyd publicly announced that Britain would not ask the US 
to move from Chaguaramas, a statement that greatly irritated federal politicians who 
felt that West Indian interests had not been properly consulted or sufficiently 
supported by London. Pressure from the West Indies on London increased, political 
feelings in Trinidad having been further stirred by the heavy-handed behaviour of the 
American consul-general in Port of Spain which 'appalled' the colonial attache at the 
British embassy in Washington (66, 76). The British government approached Dulles, 
the US secretary of state, and gained his agreement in September 1958 for a proposal 
initially made by Hailes that the American need for all or part of the bases would be 
reconsidered after a period of ten years. The CO recognised that movement on the 
question of the bases would require slow diplomacy. There were several parties 
involved although London was determined that as far as possible it would try to keep 
the discussions away from the concerns of Trinidad and at the federal level (79). The 
position of the US government, that the bases were legally entailed and not 
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negotiable, was supported by the Foreign Office which was insistent that the western 
defence system should not be compromised. By late 1958 it appeared that the United 
States might be willing to discuss the issue (87) . Three months later FO views had 
shifted from their unshakeable position of autumn 1958 and it was now accepted that 
it was better for the US to gain agreement on such a crucial issue, which also 
involved regional defence, with the West Indies before rather than after 
independence (96). Julian Amery, parliamentary under-secretary of state at the CO, 
visited the West Indies in June of the following year. Upon his return he floated the 
idea that the West Indies might be closely identified with both the United Kingdom 
and the United States in a shared defence scheme for the region (95, 99). 
Relations with Trinidad and how to deal with its unpredictable and often fiery chief 
minister increasingly exercised Colonial Office time. Adams and the federal 
government had accepted the ten-year moritorium on the base issue without 
consulting Williams, and this was a cause of rancour between the two men who 
should have been close associates. To Williams, Chaguaramas was first and foremost 
a concern of Trinidad and only secondly of the federal government. Williams's 
repeated argument that the 1941 agreement was out of date and needed revising was 
received with some sympathy in the Colonial Office which was eager to bring the 
United States to the discussion table. A British approach to the State Department in 
March 1959 was rebuffed. The federal government requested, through London in 
June 1959, a three- power conference at which they would discuss the revision of the 
1941 agreement with representatives of the UK and US (96). Williams wanted a four-
power conference, to include Trinidad and to be held in Port of Spain. The CO 
supported the federal government, accepting that West Indian representatives, 
including Williams, would attend such a conference as more than observers, but 
there was no question of endorsing Trinidad's claim to separate representation (97, 
99). US intransigence over Chaguaramas became a major political issue in Trinidad, 
and Williams's government, which the State Department viewed with great 
suspicion, threatened that measures would be taken to disrupt US activities in the 
base, many of which were in breach of the agreement (100, 124). 
In July 1959 Amery summarised the situation over Chaguaramas. Britain 
recognised that western defence interests were at stake, but in the face of growing 
West Indian resentment at the US presence it would be impossible for the British 
government to publicly support American retention of the base. 'We have to avoid', 
Amery wrote, 'getting into a position where we might seem to be ganging up with the 
U.S. against a member of the Commonwealth' (99). At the end of August 1959, 
Selwyn Lloyd met Herter, now the US secretary of state, at the Foreign Office to 
discuss the question of the bases. Herter's concern was to ensure that the 1941 
agreement would remain legally binding after the federation became independent. 
Selwyn Lloyd agreed that a British statement on the legal position would be 
produced. He suggested that federal acceptance of the agreement might be made a 
condition for independence but he stopped short of recommending such a course 
(105). 
During 1956 the West Indies Federal Labour Party was created, a loose grouping of 
parties, including the People's National Movement in Trinidad, with Manley the 
elected leader. A rival Federal Democratic Labour party was formed in 1957. These 
two parties contested the first federal election held in March 1958. The result 
surprised observers who had expected the FLP to gain a resounding victory. Neither 
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party gained a majority; the FLP held 22 of the 45 seats, with the DLP holding 20 
seats. The balance was held by three independents who came from Grenada and 
Barbados. A political arrangement was put together by the FLP and Adams became 
prime minister, but only because the two more obvious contenders for the position 
opted to remain in the politics of their home islands (69, 71). Adams presided over a 
structure which lacked most of the ingredients of an independent state in the 
making. His Council of State contained ministers who possessed little political or 
administrative experience. No date had been given for the federation's independence 
but it had been stipulated at the outset that the constitution could be reviewed 
within five years. An opposition motion on dominion status moved within the first 
session of the federal parliament raised the prospect of a constitutional review after 
only one year. Lord Home, secretary of state at the CRO, voiced reservations on 
behalf of his department. He assumed that dominion status in the West Indies could 
not be achieved for at least four years and he was concerned about the impact of a 
premature conference for the West Indies on the politically more advanced 
federation in Central Africa (80) . While arguing that political advance in the 
Caribbean could not be held up by reason of Central African considerations, the CO 
sought to allay Home's fears. CO officials welcomed an early review of the 
constitution as a means of confronting West Indian leaders with the financial and 
administrative weakness of the federal government which, commented Lennox-Boyd, 
'is hardly worth the name' (83). 
From the outset the federation was destined to be weak with its only source of 
revenue dependent on a limited mandatory levy. Adams suggested that the federal 
government should collect income tax and he added that this might be made 
retroactive. Such talk exacerbated fears in Jamaica that its programme of industrial 
development would be over-ridden by a federal government intent on 'Empire 
building'. Large elements of the Jamaican electorate had never been well disposed to 
federation and threats like these only served to increase popular distaste (81, 82). 
Although Manley supported federation the divisions within his own party determined 
that he should espouse a looser and more gradual form of federalism than that 
envisaged by many of the other West Indian leaders (85). For its part, the CO 
sympathised with the federal government's need for a larger source of revenue (84) 
and sought every means, including the allocation of CD&W grants (128 n 4) to 
strengthen its authority. It might be possible, wrote Lennox-Boyd in December 1958, 
looking ahead to the constitutional review of the next year, to set a date for West 
Indian independence, say in 1962 or 1963, but this was dependent upon the 
federation being 'endowed with the necessary powers and finance to make it able to 
stand among its peers at a Commonwealth gathering' (89). Elsewhere in the 
federation, constitutional progress for the Leeward and Windward Islands was 
speeded up at conferences in Trinidad and London in March and June 1959 
respectively in order to bring those units closer in line to other parts of the 
federation (98 n 1). 
In preparation for the constitutional review conference, scheduled for Trinidad in 
the middle of 1959, Manley's government outlined Jamaica's stance in a ministry 
paper (93). Attention was drawn to the colonial character of the constitution and to 
this was added the demand for dominion status with representation in the federal 
legislature based on population and other significant demands. Prominent amongst 
these was the removal from federal control of any possibility of interference with the 
lxiv INTRODUCTION 
development of industry, powers to levy an income tax or to collect excise duty. In 
short, Manley wanted a looser federal association. A system of free trade would allow 
each unit to protect its own industries and markets and the introduction of a 
customs union would be a very slow process. Elsewhere in the West Indies there was 
a growing demand for dominion status with Williams making populist statements 
that he would demand independence for 22 April1960, on the second anniversary of 
the inauguration of the federal parliament. CO officials did not take this seriously but 
now realised that dominion status might be closer than hitherto assumed. They were 
on 'something of a runaway train' and there was a need to 'speed up action' to 
provide an improved administrative infrastructure for the federation (98). Amery 
applied the brake. He denounced as 'absurd' and 'preposterous' the West Indian 
proposal that dominion status be granted without a proper federal structure and 
defence force. Upon this basis it would not be possible for the rest of the 
Commonwealth to accept the federation as a member. But, he added, if the demand 
was going to be made for independence within twelve months, then a programme 
had better be prepared so that it might be possible by 1965 or even two or three years 
earlier (101). These effectively were the arguments used by Amery in response to 
renewed expressions of CRO concern and at a meeting with Hailes in August 1959. 
HMG would not be prepared to sponsor the West Indies for Commonwealth 
membership until the question of the balance of revenues had been agreed, there was 
progress towards a customs union, provision had been made for military forces, the 
administrative structures had been strengthened and a diplomatic apparatus was in 
place. In the meantime, with every chance that the Trinidad conference might break 
down, London should 'play for time' (104). 
Jamaica had gained internal self-government under a new constitution introduced 
in July 1959. In the Jamaican elections of that month, Manley's PNP increased its 
hold on an enlarged legislature by gaining 29 seats to the 16 seats held by 
Bustamante's JLP which had campaigned under the slogan 'Jamaica must lead-or 
secede'. Manley argued in the campaign that the federation was flawed but that 
Jamaica's position could be safeguarded by negotiations. Yet in the event, 
negotiations at the inter-governmental conference in Trinidad in late September 
1959 revealed the deep divisions that existed between Jamaica, Trinidad and the 
federal government. The conference got no further than discussing Jamaica's claim 
to greater representation in the federal legislature. Rogers, who attended as a UK 
observer, reflected on the 'squalid' nature of the proceedings which showed the 
'bitter political antagonism' that existed between the West Indian leaders. Hailes was 
slightly less pessimistic, seeing the conference as a 'shock' rather than a 'set back' to 
federation (107). Breakdown was only avoided when it was agreed that the 
constitutional and economic and social issues on the agenda be referred to two 
committees, known as Alpha and Orion, which would report by the end of March 
1960. In London officials now believed that to save the federation they would have to 
be more forthcoming about a date for dominion status, and that further 
consideration should be given to the question of future financial assistance. After the 
conference, the CO considered launching a discreet campaign to muster support for 
the federation. This involved commercial firms, the media, Canadian diplomatic aid, 
and the assistance of those organisations in the West Indies that had an interest in 
federation (108) . To this end exploratory talks were held with the Canadians in 
London. All this was done without the governor-general's knowledge and when 
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eventually Hailes was informed he reacted strongly, arguing that any attempt to 
bring outside influence to bear would be resented locally and thus have a negative 
effect. The CO therefore backed off. Whether or not this was a missed opportunity to 
galvanise support for the federation remains an open question. 
With the two-fold prospect of the federation demanding dominion status and 
Jamaica's future within the union uncertain, the CO, in October 1959, asked the CRO 
for advice on the significance of Commonwealth membership. One concern was 
whether small states could be members of the Commonwealth, an issue recently 
raised over Cyprus. The result was a CRO paper that stressed financial independence 
and which went on to state that Jamaica's claims to Commonwealth status were 
'marginal' . Another CRO concern was Jamaica's trade boycott against South Africa. A 
surprising idea advanced was that Britain might deny Commonwealth membership 
to Jamaica if the island withdrew from the federation (109). The CO was critical of 
the CRO memorandum. CO officials still hoped that Jamaica would remain within 
the federation, but separate membership of the Commonwealth should not be ruled 
out (and Jamaica was to be preferred to South Africa) (110). At the end of 1959, in an 
attempt to bolster his position after his feeble performance at the Trinidad 
conference, Adams announced that the federal government would approach HMG 
early in the next year with a view to fixing a date for dominion status (111). Manley 
viewed Adams's proposal as 'little short of lunacy', forcing federation at a speed and 
in a direction far ahead of the minimum powers advocated by Jamaica. He was intent 
on ensuring that the federation would not have economic and fiscal powers that 
would disrupt Jamaica's economy and the ten-year development programme which 
was being fostered behind high tariff walls (90). 
Manley visited London in January 1960 to discuss with the CO, now with lain 
Macleod at the ministerial helm, the necessary criteria for dominion status and 
Commonwealth membership. In preparation for the visit the CO argued that there 
were sound economic, social and political reasons for Britain to depart from present 
policy and provide temporary financial or transitional assistance to the federation 
after independence (114). The Treasury countered that such a departure in policy 
would set an unwelcome precedent (115) . Differences remained between the two 
departments but a general formula on aid was agreed for communication to Manley 
(117). In discussions with the Jamaicans, the CO listed eight essential attributes of 
sovereignty and said that Jamaica's secession from the federation would be a 'severe 
disappointment' . This was a factor to be taken into account if the island then sought 
separate membership of the Commonwealth. Jamaica's size and economy placed her 
in a 'marginal position' for membership, raising the question of whether small 
territories elsewhere could become members (118, 119). 
In March 1960 exploratory talks were held with a US official on the likelihood of 
US aid to the federation (122) . A 'Colombo Plan' for the Caribbean was also mooted, 
an idea which emanated from the Caribbean Commission. The CO was not 
sympathetic, arguing that the plan would not increase the overall amount of aid to 
the region, and that under a 'Colombo' scheme West Indian governments would be 
donors as well as recipients (123) . Throughout there were growing signs that 
Jamaica was increasingly uneasy within the federation. In November 1959 Manley 
rejected a call from Bustamante's JLP for an immediate referendum on federation. 
When Bustamante announced in May 1960 his resignation as president of the FDLP 
and his intention to campaign to take Jamaica out of the federation, Manley was left 
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with little choice but to announce a referendum for the following year. This 
unilateral announcement was made shortly after a despatch from Macleod on 15 May 
which stated that Cabinet government would be extended to the federation (125). 
Macleod still believed that federation might survive although he continued the CO 
line that its shape and the pace of advance to independence were matters for the West 
Indian leaders to decide. It was in this frame of mind that he left London for a visit to 
the West Indies in early June. Britain, he said, was prepared to sponsor the federation 
for membership of the Commonwealth once the 'essential attributes of sovereignty' 
were achieved (126). 
One of the 'essential attributes of sovereignty' was the ability of the federation to 
defend itself. Discussions on reforming the West India Regiment for West Indian 
defence and internal security had begun in 1954 with most units in favour except 
British Guiana while St Kitts reserved its option. At that time the WIR was envisaged 
as a force for the whole of the region, not just for the proposed federation. Inquiry by 
the Treasury, the Colonial and War Offices in November 1956 concluded that a 
reformed WIR could replace British garrisons and thus result in a substantial 
economy to HMG in the foreseeable future (53). At a conference in Barbados in June 
1956, it was agreed that the WIR should be formed at the start of 1958 and be funded 
by a one per cent levy on the annual revenues of each unit government. The 
estimated cost of the force in its first five years would be slightly in excess of £3 
million, much of which would have to be borne by the United Kingdom. The CO view 
on West Indian defence was gradually shaped as British Guiana and British Honduras 
indicated that they did not wish to participate in the WIR, so that by mid-1958 it was 
accepted that the federation would have exclusive responsibility for the regiment and 
eventually for its own defence (56). The intention was that remaining British troops, 
part of a battalion, would be withdrawn from the West Indies early in 1960 in 
accordance with Army Council plans to reduce the size of the British Army on the 
ending of conscription. In the meantime, the Jamaica Regiment could become the 
nucleus of the new WIR. However, plans laid in London soon got out of step with 
discussions on the financing of the force in the West Indies. By late 1957 the forming 
of the WIR had been deferred to January 1959, but more worrying for the CO was 
that because of this delay no provision had been made in the Colonial Services Vote 
Estimate for a contribution to the Jamaica Regiment for 1958-1959. In the 
circumstances the CO proposed that the only way to salvage the situation was to take 
the unpopular step of asking the federal government to meet these costs (65). 
On the wider level of regional security, although the West Indies was perceived in 
London as largely under the arm of the United States, Britain still had a 
responsibility to guard colonial territory against claims by Latin American states and 
to ensure that internal security was maintained (74). In view of the financial and 
strategic requirements of the West Indies, Lennox-Boyd in December 1958 urged 
Duncan Sandys, the minister of defence, to agree that a British battalion should 
remain in the West Indies until1963, a position which the Chiefs of Staff confirmed 
in September 1959 (106) . When the federation achieved independence, Britain would 
continue to be responsible for the defence of non-federal territories and thus need 
troops and a naval presence in the region. Some thought was given to the stationing 
of British troops in the federation after Jamaica's independence but it was recognised 
that their presence might be politically embarrassing, particularly if the federal 
government wanted to use them in a civil capacity. Finance was another 
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consideration. A British battalion in Jamaica would cost an additional £600,000 a 
year, which suggested that it might be better to remove British troops to the 
Bahamas where they would still be available for local use but in territory under 
British jurisdiction (137). The defence solution put forward by Amery in July 1959 
was intended both to resolve the deadlock over Chaguaramas and to meet the 
federation's naval requirements. It might be possible, he suggested, for the United 
Kingdom, the United States and the federation together to have joint control over 
the base and in the process to get the United States to underwrite the costs of the 
small naval forces required by the federation. The Foreign Office, ever protective of 
good relations with Washington, was not particularly impressed by the idea (99), and 
a year later the Ministry of Defence was quick to scotch any suggestion of a regional 
defence pact in the Caribbean (134). At the local level, Sir Kenneth Blackburne, the 
new governor of Jamaica, argued that the island occupied a strategic position in the 
Caribbean with three potentially politically unstable republics a short distance to the 
north. The defence of Jamaica and the outlying islands, he argued, required the 
reforming of a Jamaica Regiment and the retention of a British battalion in the 
region. Blackburne referred only to incursions by Castroist rebel forces, but from 
early 1960 there was an increasing concern by local governments and the CO over 
the destabilising influence of Fidel Castro's Cuba regime in the Caribbean (112, 128). 
The integrity of British Honduras was also threatened by neighbouring Guatemala 
which laid claim to the territory. Although the frontier between the colony and 
Guatemala had been agreed by treaty in 1859, the conservative president Ydigoras 
Fuentes, who had recently come to power, sought political capital by reviving the 
claim. The politics of British Honduras reflected the colony's divided ethnic 
population. George Price's People's United Party was led by moderately left-leaning 
Roman Catholics, whose focus was more to the United States than Britain; and they 
were not averse to talking to the Guatemalans, actions often interpreted by officials 
in London as verging on the treasonable. The Colonial Office hoped, as late as 1959, 
that British Honduras might see the advantages of joining the federation. This was 
unlikely, and Sir Colin Thornley, the governor since 1955, proposed making a 
broadcast to the colony stating that the people were free to chose whether or not 
they joined with Guatemala. Thornley was confident that they would prefer to 
remain within the Commonwealth and eventually become an independent state, 
even if the prospect of independence seemed so remote that it might never happen. 
The CO rejected Thornley's proposal, arguing that it would be counter-productive 
and that it might encourage irredentist claims on other British territories, notably 
Cyprus and Malta (91). 
When he arrived in the West Indies in June 1960 one of Macleod's first meetings 
was with Bustamante and representatives of the JLP. Here he heard first hand of 
their opposition to federation, in particular what they felt was the inadequate 
representation for Jamaica and the economic burdens that integration would entail. 
Bustamante interjected that the financial problem had been one of Britain's making 
ever since the Montego Bay conference of 1947. In all of this Macleod declared his 
neutrality, although he stressed that if Jamaica went it alone and applied for 
Commonwealth membership that would be a matter for Commonwealth members to 
decide, not just the United Kingdom (127). Relations between Eric Williams and the 
CO had been tense for some time. To improve them it had been announced that Sir 
Solomon Hochoy, a local career civil servant, would succeed Sir Edward Beetham as 
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the governor of Trinidad, and Macleod was also able to tell Williams that the colony 
was to be granted Cabinet government after the next elections in 1961. At Macleod's 
meeting with Adams and the federal ministers on 15 June, a substantial part of the 
discussions was taken up with financial affairs. However, in a departure from the 
views of his predecessor, the secretary of state acknowledged that political 
independence might precede financial independence although he was non-committal 
as to the amount of British aid that might follow that event (128). This was a 
significant change of policy which later impinged on other parts of the colonial 
empire. Over the West Indies, Britain was now in something of a paradoxical 
position: London wanted an independent federation in order to reduce its own 
financial burden but now found itself having to contemplate even more financial 
assistance in order to keep federation alive. 
Of the many differences over the conditions for federation, those between Jamaica 
and Trinidad were the most serious. Manley's position was particularly acute, with a 
faction within his own party pressing for stringent terms and Bustamante's JLP 
demanding secession. Anxious to save federation, Williams sought to rescue Manley 
from this political dilemma by meeting those problems half way. During June the 
two leaders met privately at the home of C L R James in Port of Spain, and then again 
in Antigua in early August. The Antigua meeting was to prove controversial for two 
main reasons: first because Williams and Manley produced different accounts of the 
outcome, and secondly because the federal prime minister viewed with suspicion a 
covert meeting between the leaders of the two major states of the federation. 
Although neither Manley nor Williams had become directly involved in federation 
politics, this did not mean that they lacked political ambitions at the federal centre. 
From July 1960 Adams thought that Manley was planning to oust him from office.46 
In Antigua Manley and Williams agreed on Jamaica's representation in the 
federation and also that questions of industrial development and income tax should 
constitute a further reserve or 'third list', that is, they should remain the 
responsibility of unit governments and not be removed unless by majority 
recommendation of the Council of State and at least a two-thirds majority of the 
federal parliament. The second condition effectively gave Jamaica a veto over both 
issues. On freedom of movement, an issue over which Williams would not retreat, 
Manley agreed that this should remain a matter for unit governments for five years 
from the date of independence. Federal ministers reacted angrily to what were seen 
as the secret Antigua talks. So did some of Williams's own ministers, particularly 
Patrick Solomon who held the portfolio on home affairs, and John O'Halloran who 
was minister of industry and commerce (130) . In Jamaica Manley hoped that the 
Antigua agreement would serve to persuade elements in his own party and the 
broader electorate that the federation posed no threat to the island's future industrial 
development and economy. The agreement was endorsed only after lengthy 
discussion by the Jamaican Cabinet. In the run up to the referendum, so an 
intelligence report informed the CO, the decision whether or not Jamaica remained 
in the federation would be decided on party lines, and for Manley there was the 
danger that PNP members would not turn out in sufficient numbers to vote for 
federation (131). Isaacs, the minister of trade and industry, remained unwilling to 
surrender control over Jamaica's economic interests and threatened to break with 
the PNP if necessary. He was a Roman Catholic, deeply suspicious of the influence of 
the extreme left in West Indian politics and firmly opposed to the admission of 
INTRODUCTION lxix 
Jagan's British Guiana to the federation; hence his demand that Jamaica should have 
the right of veto on the admission of any new state to membership (143) . The CO saw 
no sign of Jagan wishing to join the federation, although it continued to believe, as 
did federal ministers, that along with British Honduras, British Guiana might 
ultimately become a member (135). From London the Williams-Manley talks could 
seem to be other than a means of saving federation; rather in 1960 it appeared as if 
the two 'protectionist dictates' of the major islands over industrial development and 
freedom of movement were likely to either wreck the federation or reduce it to a 
weak shadow of what the CO had hoped and planned for (143) . 
The differences between Jamaica and Trinidad, however politically resolved at 
Antigua, did not answer the acute financial problems of the federation. Hochoy, in 
September 1960, reported to the CO that Manley and Williams felt that their 
problems could be resolved if a substantial sum in development aid was given to the 
federation. CO officials were eager for a Commonwealth Assistance Loan and also to 
more closely involve both Canada and the United States in an aid programme for the 
West Indies. Prospects of a Commonwealth Assistance Loan did not appear good, 
however. In October 1960, a Treasury circular argued that colonies were consuming 
a disproportionate share of overseas aid, and that Commonwealth Assistance Loans 
granted to emergent territories shortly after independence would have to be be offset 
by a corresponding reduction in Exchequer finance available to the dependent 
territories (132). But the prospect of US financial aid was now more promising. 
Although Washington was unwilling to link the question of aid with that of bases, the 
CO rightly thought that United States' strategic interests in the Caribbean would 
dictate that aid should be given to the federation. This could not be budgetary 
support but the federation would benefit from the Social Development Program for 
Latin America and other forms of as yet unspecified assistance (133, 139). 
West Indian politicians rarely thought that Britain was giving a fair financial deal 
to either the federation or the individual unit governments. There was always deep 
suspicion of Britain's motives in creating the federation. W H Bramble, the chief 
minister of Montserrat, rather abrasively viewed it as an attempt by the metropole to 
rid itself of weak and impoverished colonies. The CO had little time for such ideas 
and viewed with patrician disdain politicians, such as Bramble, who inefficiently ran 
colonies where a culture of financial dependency was encouraged (136, 192). By and 
large CO officials were reasonably understanding of the problems encountered by 
West Indian politicians and the way in which they were handled. The difficulties that 
kept islands and territories apart as they sought means to draw themselves together 
were generally well understood in London, although the constant bickering and the 
rifts that opened up between rival personalities tended to strain the patience of 
officials who had spent a long time trying to create the federation and get it off the 
ground. Despite official acknowledgement of the economic barriers to federation, 
officials perhaps made less allowance than they might have done for the very real 
difficulties in bringing together different islands and territories spread over a large 
area, a point repeatedly made by West Indian politicians. For West Indians, federation 
was not only about decolonisation and nationhood; equally importantly it was about 
economic development and modernisation. All the unit governments wanted this but 
not all had the resources or the infrastructures to achieve it. Not surprisingly the 
wealthier territories jealously guarded their economies, and messages from London 
that said that the better off should aid the poorer were not acceptable to local 
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electorates in territories designated as potential donors. To the CO the 'attitude of 
self-pity' often present in West Indian economic thinking and demands for financial 
aid, and the idea that each island should be developed to the same level of economic 
activity as the larger islands, were unreasonable. It would be, minuted G W Jamieson, 
a CO principal, in October 1960, commenting on the case made by the Trinidad 
government for financial aid, similar to saying that HMG was 'obliged to develop say 
Denbighshire or Ross-shire to the same level of economic activity as Yorkshire or S. 
Wales'. At the same time the CO constantly pointed out to West Indian politicians 
that the federation enjoyed an income per head considerably higher than that of 
many Asian and Mrican colonies. Indeed, argued Jamieson, the gross domestic 
product of Trinidad compared not unfavourably with that of France and might match 
that of southern European countries such as Greece and Portugal. In world terms 
the West Indies belonged with the ranks of the lower middle class, not the under-
privileged (138). 
A meeting with West Indian ministers in London in November 1960 discussed 
the financial settlement at independence. The CO regarded this as 'the single most 
important question still to be answered'. The discussions were not easy as the West 
Indian leaders, both federal ministers and politicians from Jamaica, Trinidad, 
Antigua and St Lucia, suspected British motives, especially over any suggestion 
that the level of UK assistance might be determined by that provided by the US 
(139, 140). The level of financial aid eventually offered by the US to the West 
Indies in November 1960 rather surprised CO officials, and it reflected 
Washington's growing unease about Castro's activities in the region. Washington 
proposed future financial aid totalling US $3.5 million per annum to the federation 
over the next four years plus loans of approximately US $8 million to Trinidad and 
Jamaica. Agreement having been reached at the same time over US bases, it was 
also suggested that US help might be given to develop the military and naval facili-
ties of the federation (141). United States' financial assistance to the West Indies 
up to 1964 was intended to match, pound for pound, that granted by the United 
Kingdom, although it was a formula that Washington did not want divulged to 
West Indian politicians. The Treasury meanwhile was concerned at the 'generous 
and preferential share of total U.K./U.S. resources available for all under-developed 
countries' being directed to the West Indies. The West Indies would become accus-
tomed to receiving a 'disproportionate level of aid' which would create problems 
for the federation of dependent expectation, and for future United Kingdom over-
seas aid policy when there were so many demands from other areas for assistance. 
In the circumstances British aid to the West Indies should be tapered down after 
1964 (144). 
In February 1961 Hugh Fraser, parliamentary under-secretary of state at the CO, 
visited the West Indies. While in no way underestimating the difficulties which lay 
ahead, his April appreciation about the prospects for federation was generally 
optimistic. On aid he believed that the UK might have to offer more and for longer in 
grant-in-aid to the smaller territories, a notion hotly contested by Sir William Gorell 
Barnes, the joint deputy under-secretary of state, on the grounds of the UK's own 
straitened financial circumstances (148). But despite Fraser's optimism, the CO was 
by now taking no chances and already planning to cover all eventualities. In April 
1961 a draft memorandum was prepared for the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee 
which anticipated the options for UK policy should the Jamaican referendum result 
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in a vote against continued membership with Jamaica then seceding. The 
memorandum summarised Britain's position: 
The Caribbean is an area of the world where there are no vital United Kingdom 
interests and few strategic considerations, and where our fundamental aim in the area 
since 1945 has been political disengagement. This being so our principal objective 
following secession by Jamaica must be to avoid any situation which results in our 
being left with any of the present federated territories on our hands for which we can 
see no obvious future except as colonies (147). 
This draft was never submitted, possibly because of the risk of a leak. But the 
sentences from it quoted above encapsulate the two aims of British policy in the 
periods both before and after the referendum in Jamaica. 
Attention now shifted to the proceedings of the resumed inter-governmental 
conference at Trinidad in May 1961 which assembled to consider the reports of the 
Alpha and Orion working parties. Chaired by John Mordecai, the Alpha group 
provided the IGC with detailed estimates of a weak and decentralised federation and a 
strong centralised system. It was increasingly clear that the former would prevail. 
The resumed conference also revealed sharp differences over freedom of movement. 
Trinidad firmly opposed the working party proposal that freedom of movement 
should remain on the exclusive list with territories retaining concurrent powers 
until the end of 1966. Williams's counter-proposal, that freedom of movement 
remain on the exclusive list but not be exercised by the federal government during 
the nine years following independence and that this be linked with an approach to 
the British government for financial aid, was narrowly accepted by six votes to five 
(149). As Hailes reported, the atmosphere of the IGC was 'thundery'. Jamaica's 
insistence that no item be taken off the reserve list without the consent of two-thirds 
of the population/electorate of the federation, effectively giving Jamaica a veto, was 
deferred to a full constitutional conference which was scheduled to meet at Lancaster 
House in London towards the end of the month. The IGC also discussed the position 
of the small islands in relation to the federation. The CO was anxious not to be left 
with a residue of financially dependent territories such as the Caymans, Turks and 
Caicos and the British Virgin Islands. Alternative strategies were considered to take 
account of the wishes of the inhabitants (145, 150). 
The Lancaster House conference opened on 31 May 1961 and the proceedings were 
dominated by two main problems: amendment of the reserve list and freedom of 
movement. On the first Macleod proposed a compromise which eliminated the 
reserve list but which still left Jamaica in a strong position over income tax and 
industrial development. On the second Barbados especially threatened to make 
freedom of movement a breaking-point but the position adopted at the Trinidad IGC 
was confirmed. The conference also accepted the IGC decision that in the first five 
years of independence the federal government should raise finance by customs dues 
on a limited number of items. An insistent demand throughout was the need for 
substantial financial aid from Britain (153). At the end of the gruelling and 
acrimonious two weeks of discussions, the conference report was far from 
unanimous; individual delegations recorded their own points of dissent and the split 
between Manley and Williams had deepened and become virtually unbridgeable. 
Two days after the end of the conference Britain announced that if the constitu-
tion was ratified the federation would become independent on 31 May 1962, to be 
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followed six weeks later by a second round of federal elections. The conference had 
fallen far short of CO expectations and for officials it was a depressing experience 
to witness such a marked lack of enthusiasm for the federal cause. The CO wanted 
local legislatures as soon as possible to indicate their support for the Lancaster 
House agreement. In a circular to governors seeking this support, A R Thomas, an 
assistant under-secretary of state, alluded to the fears of the smaller islands that 
the agreement would leave them financially worse off. As a means of placating 
them it had been agreed to send an Economic Aid Mission, the US and Canada 
being associated with the UK, to the grant-aided Leeward and Winward Islands 
(193) . On the political front, a further conference with representatives of the 
Leewards and Windwards was held in London shortly after Lancaster House to 
consider parity of status between units when the federation became independent. 
Spokesmen for the islands pressed for immediate constitutional change but the CO 
resisted arguing that this must be conditional on the federation becoming inde-
pendent (156). 
Britain's interest in joining the European Common Market took Lord Perth, the 
minister of state at the Colonial Office, to Trinidad for discussions with federal 
ministers and local chambers of commerce in July 1961, a month after the Lancaster 
House conference. Earlier, in March 1957, two days after the signature of the Treaty 
of Rome, a West Indian delegation arrived in London to join with other colonial 
deputations to discuss the implications for trade of the European Economic 
Community and Britain's counter-proposal for a European Free Trade Area. West 
Indian reluctance to be associated with a European free trade system was largely 
determined by the British Caribbean's heavy reliance upon sugar exports, 
particularly to Canada, and the impact of the proposals on the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement (54). Perth encountered the same concern in 1961, the fear being that 
Britain's membership of the Common Market would threaten the export of West 
Indian primary products. The preferential position of sugar within the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement remained crucial and the export of citrus, 
bananas, cocoa, bauxite and aluminium, and oil were also important. British 
adherence to a European customs union or free trade association would also impinge 
on West Indian trade with Canada. Perth assured federal ministers that Britain would 
not join the Common Market without first consulting Commonwealth countries. He 
reported that an impression was abroad that Britain was prepared to sacrifice the 
Commonwealth and the West Indies in favour of Europe (154, 196, 199). 
As the issue of Europe assumed growing significance in the UKs relations with the 
Caribbean so too did the question of immigration. West Indian immigration to 
Britain fluctuated in the late 1950s but increased in 1960-1961. Attempts by the CO 
to persuade West Indian governments to reduce the flow of immigrants were 
ultimately unsuccessful, although a CO minute in June 1960 stated that the solution 
lay not with Caribbean administrations but with the British government which could 
either keep an open door or pass legislation to restrict entry (129, 142). As West 
Indian immigration increased in early 1961 it was accompanied by intensified 
demands for restriction from some Conservative MPs and sections of the press. 
Ministers decided that if legislation were needed, it should not be introduced until 
after the decision of the Jamaican referendum in September 1961 and preferably also 
West Indian independence (152). However, the -CO continued to oppose restriction 
on colonial subjects as unjustified and unnecessary and likely to be racially 
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discriminatory and thus damaging to relations with The West Indies Federation (155, 
160). Legislation to restrict Commonwealth immigration was announced in the 
Queen's speech in October 1961. In face of protests by the federal government the 
Bill, which Macleod said he detested, became law in July 1962 (164) . The prospect of 
the new law led to a surge of immigrants into Britain from the West Indies and South 
Asia in 1961-1962. Although the legislation regulated and reduced the number of 
coloured immigrants, the large demand for job vouchers in the Caribbean and Asia 
indicated that many more people wished to enter Britain to work. In opposition the 
Labour Party had opposed controls. When it took power in the autumn of 1964 
coloured immigration had become a major political issue and tighter controls were 
sought. It was hoped that this could be achieved by Caribbean and other 
Commonwealth countries adopting self-regulating measures. To this end Lord 
Mountbatten visited the Caribbean in May 1965 for discussions with the Jamaican 
and Trinidad governments (232). Neither government was prepared to agree to such 
measures. In August 1965, the Labour government's White Paper, Immigration from 
the Commonwealth, 47 introduced tighter rules of entry for coloured immigrants by 
reducing the number of vouchers. At the same time a Race Relations Act was 
introduced which prohibited incitement to race hatred. 
The Jamaican referendum held on 19 September 1961 delivered a fatal blow to CO 
hopes for the federation. In a poll of sixty per cent, just over half the voters said 'no' 
to federation. A good deal of the support for Bustamante's campaign in favour of 
secession had come from voters in the rural areas (163). Macleod, in a minute to 
Macmillan, called the result 'a most grievous blow to the federal ideal.. . . It is 
certain that the Federation cannot continue in its present form and must be doubtful 
whether it can survive at all.' The CO now expected Jamaica to leave the federation 
and demand independence, to be followed by Trinidad, and for London these 
demands would be difficult to resist. The secretary of state described as 'dismal' the 
prospect that the UK might be left with indefinite financial responsibility for the 
small islands (158). Manley refused to resign office or hold an election, as the 
opposition demanded, but Jamaica's course was set not only by the referendum 
result but also by Bustamante's demand for independence on 23 May 1962. The bi-
partisan approach to independence which Manley wished to follow did not 
materialise (159). At the end of September Manley and his ministers arrived in 
London for discussions with the CO on Jamaican independence (165). From 
Washington the CO's representative reported that the State Department was 'both 
disappointed and bewildered' by the referendum result. Ominously the prospect of 
US aid to the federation was now in the balance (161). Further evidence of West 
Indian uncertainties was provided by a report from Hochoy in late September, on a 
resolution passed at a recent PNM convention which gave Williams a free hand over 
the future of the federation. Even before the referendum Williams was said to be 
thoroughly disillusioned with the federal project (157). Now, in response to the 
referendum result, Hochoy reported that he was likely 'to shy away from 
consideration of any questions on Federation' and 'to seek independence for Trinidad 
and Tobago at the earliest possible date' (162). 
Jamaica's decision to secede from the federation led to a period of confusion and 
uncertainty in the Colonial Office. London acknowledged that Jamaica could become 
independent and grudgingly conceded that Trinidad might also follow. In September, 
Adams and his ministers came to London to discuss ways of keeping the federation 
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together. For economic and political reasons the CO was equally concerned to 
maintain a federal system in the Eastern Caribbean. Amongst several considered, two 
main options emerged: a federation of nine to include Trinidad as the dominant 
member in what effectively would be a unitary state, or a federation of eight focused 
on Barbados and without Trinidad (166). Both options left the islands as a financial 
burden on Britain when the major purpose of federation had been to avoid this . Perth 
called for greater clarity over what it was that the UK wanted to achieve before the 
next move was taken (171). A tougher line on questions of financial aid to the small 
islands was urged on London (167, 173) and the CO looked to the prime minister to 
persuade the Americans not to withdraw from their pledges on aid (174), a task in 
which he did not succeed. In January 1962 Reginald Maudling, the new secretary of 
state, visited the West Indies to assess the chances of what remained of the federation 
surviving. His arrival coincided with a decision by Williams's PNM, which had won a 
substantial majority in the elections a month before, in favour of separate 
independence. When Maudling reported this back in London it was accepted by the 
Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee in the hope that it might still be possible to 
group some of the islands with Trinidad, a remote prospect given that politicians in 
Barbados and the Leewards and Windwards were suspicious of Eric Williams and 
wary of becoming subservient to Trinidad (178). 
As the CO grappled with policy options for the small islands, Arthur Lewis, the 
distinguished economist and vice-chancellor of the University College of the West 
Indies, put himself at the disposal of the federal government. He too, after 
discussions with Williams, had earlier proposed a unitary state under Trinidad 
dressed up as a federation (168), the scheme that was preferred by the CRO (188). 
But the price likely to be demanded by Williams-said to be as much as £71 million 
over ten years (166)-was prohibitive. Besides, Williams was now in a mood which 
was both combative and unaccommodating and his antagonism was directed against 
the US as well as the UK (176). Following further talks with Trinidad's premier, 
Lewis concluded that the Trinidad option for the small islands was no longer viable. 
He drew up a plan for an Eastern Caribbean federation without Trinidad and made a 
strong plea for the continuance of regional common services (177). A conference of 
ministers from Barbados, and the Leeward and Windward Islands met in Barbados 
from 26 February to 3 March 1962 and recommended the creation of a 'Federation of 
Eight'. Simultaneously, in London, The West Indies Federation was formally 
dissolved by the West Indies Act, 1962. Officials discussed whether it was right for the 
UK to contribute to the deficit of the now defunct federation, some arguing that the 
UK had other and more important financial priorities (183). 
Maudling endorsed the proposal for a new East Caribbean federation but insisted 
that it should have greater central power and federal control over income tax. Along 
with his officials, the secretary of state doubted that the UK would be able to reduce 
its grant-in-aid to the new federation to the figure of £1.76m per annum, a sum 
projected by Lewis and calculated upon the basis of price stability and an increased 
volume of exports from the Eight (187). Nevertheless, the Federation of Eight was 
formally agreed by the Marlborough House conference of 9-24 May. Differences 
remained between the unit governments over constitutional questions and parity of 
status, but agreement was achieved for a customs union, a unified public service, and 
the direction of all aid through the federal government. Maudling described the 
conference as 'quite promising' and he hoped independence could be achieved in 
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1963 (194) . However, in view of various financial scandals in Grenada and Antigua 
(195, 205), he was pessimistic about the economic and political future of the 
federation. As with the old one, the CO recognised that the new federation would 
remain financially dependent upon Britain for some time after independence (204). 
The Federation of Eight was taken a step further with the creation of a Regional 
Council of Ministers to represent the islands. But fissures were already beginning to 
appear in the edifice and Errol Barrow, the premier of Barbados, the most prosperous 
and politically most stable of the island states, announced that it would be best if a 
customs union was established first (201). The most serious opposition came from 
Grenada. Owing to financial irregularities, Eric Gairy's government was dismissed 
and the island's constitution suspended in June 1962. The September elections were 
won by the Grenada National Party which had campaigned for a unitary state with 
Trinidad (203). Grenada withdrew completely from the Regional Council of Ministers 
and exploratory talks began with the Trinidad government in October. Mter 
protracted discussions spread over three years, public hostility in Trinidad and 
Tobago to such a union ended the idea. 
Until the autumn of 1965 Britain clung to the hope that a federation of seven or 
eight might materialise in the Eastern Caribbean. Inter-island discussions seemed 
only to exacerbate rivalries: shortly before the Barbados conference to finalise 
federation planned for May 1963, the Antigua government announced that it could 
not adhere to the proposed scheme. At one time or another most governments 
questioned the extent of central federal power with only St Lucia being prepared to 
accept arrangements which closely resembled a unitary state. When Anthony 
Greenwood, the secretary of state in Harold Wilson's Labour government, visited the 
islands in early 1965, he found little interest for or against the federal proposal, but 
having considered various alternatives, he was still inclined to pursue federation as 
the best policy option for the UK (230). Such optimism did not long survive. Antigua 
opted out of the federal discussions in April and a few months later the Barbados 
legislature agreed that the island should proceed to independence before further 
consideration was given to federation. In September 1965 the CO finally admitted 
that efforts for an Eastern Caribbean federation had broken down. 
Most of the Leeward and Windward islands demanded self-government but few 
wanted total independence if it meant the loss of British financial aid. In the period 
following the Cuban missile crisis (1962), when the US had asserted its traditional 
hegemony in the Caribbean, the policy dilemma for the British remained stark. How 
were they to deal with their remaining small and economically poor colonies in the 
Caribbean in a way that would satisfy the strategic and political interests of the US on 
the one hand, and convince the anti-colonial lobby at the United Nations on the 
other? The US was reluctant to see a British withdrawal from the region if that might 
lead to the emergence of 'little Haiti's or Cuba's' and 'communist' penetration in the 
region (220). The CO's solution, part of a much wider policy initiative which aimed 
to deal with the future constitutional status of smaller territories more generally, 
was to suggest associated status for the Eastern Caribbean islands with the exception 
of the small and economically weak Montserrat. Associated status would give full 
internal self-government with Britain retaining responsibility for defence and 
external affairs, but at the same time it would remove the 'colonial stigma' from each 
island (234). A conference spread over February to May 1966 agreed the principles of 
associated status (249, 251) and Britain sought US support for this new 'voluntary 
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association with Britain' (235, 250). To be certain that the UK had the means to fulfil 
its continuing responsibilities, and to meet US anxieties, the Foreign Office insisted 
that a three-quarters majority would be needed in votes both in the legislative 
assembly and a referendum before an island could only change its associated status 
constitution (256). Of the Eastern Caribbean islands, Barbados alone was thought by 
the CO to be economically suited for independence, a status which it achieved after 
an election at the end of November 1966 (253). 
In that US interests were a prime consideration in the arrangements made for asso-
ciated status, the colony causing most concern to Washington was British Guiana 
where Cheddi Jagan's left-wing People's Progressive Party had been returned to office 
after the election of August 1961.48 Although, in principle, independence for the 
colony had been conceded at the constitutional conference of 1960 (135), British min-
isters were aware that the US would not wish to see a 'communist' regime established 
in the British Caribbean. They were equally concerned that Congress would be 
unlikely to approve aid to the colonies should that occur. Thus London consulted 
closely with Washington over developments in British Guiana. What happened in the 
territory was not only a matter of UK colonial policy; it also had 'bearing on general 
Anglo/Americans relations' (175) . In February 1962 riots occurred in Georgetown, the 
capital of British Guiana, in protest at austerity plans introduced by Jagan's govern-
ment. The local police force, which was weak and predominantly African, was not 
trusted by the PPP government so Jagan was forced to ask for British military aid to 
help restore order. In view of what London saw as racial unrest in the colony, inde-
pendence scheduled for later that year was postponed (185). Following the riots 
Macmillan and Home, now the foreign secretary, took a dim view of attempts by Dean 
Rusk, the US secretary of state, to dictate that Jagan 'should not to accede to power 
again' in British Guiana (180-182). Hugh Fraser was sent to Georgetown to investi-
gate and at the same time to try to resolve the political differences between Jagan and 
his opponents in order to prepare the way for the independence constitution. 
Returning via Washington he had talks with President Kennedy and other senior fig-
ures about strategy in British Guiana. In London Fraser recommended to the secre-
tary of state that consideration be given to fresh elections under proportional 
representation in the colony before independence was granted (184). 
An independent British Guiana clearly needed an adequate internal security force. 
London urged that the armed police should be reformed and expanded with an 
increased Asian element to represent the racial divide in the colony. Contrary to this 
advice, Jagan's government proposed a battalion-strong military force and a 'Home 
Guard' which were beyond the colony's revenues (189). The CO regarded the scheme 
as combining 'expense and inefficiency', an attempt to create a 'politically reliable 
force' similar to Castro's militia.49 The Treasury would not sanction additional 
money for an army, and Duncan Sandys, Maudling's successor at the CO, argued that 
if the British Guiana government would not expand the police then British policy 
would be 'no action to help' (202). When Jagan turned to Israel for help with the 
militia the US, also hostile to the British Guiana scheme, pressed Tel Aviv not to get 
involved. The difference between Georgetown and London outlasted Jagan's 
government and in September 1965 the new administration of Forbes Burnham, 
Jagan's erstwhile ally but chief political opponent since 1957, came down in favour of 
a military rather than an expanded police force (237). By then, however, Britain 
viewed the colony's political order in a much more favourable light. 
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As elsewhere in the Caribbean, Britain had no essential interests in British Guiana 
and was anxious to disengage as soon as possible. But the territory needed investment 
on a scale which Britain alone could not provide and the US would countenance nei-
ther aid nor independence while Jagan remained in power. A nine-week strike in the 
colony in April-May 1963 resulted in London proroguing the legislature. Britain was 
more prepared than the US to contemplate independence under Jagan but if he had to 
be removed and direct UK rule reinstated, which was what the US desired, the UK 
insisted that Washington should be more forthcoming over aid and more supportive 
at the UN (214, 215). However, Jagan and the PPP were increasingly viewed in London 
as the reasons why the UK could not withdraw and in the autumn of 1963, in close 
consultation with the Kennedy administration, the UK embarked on a strategy which 
was designed to oust Jagan. Spurning the latter's offer of neutrality (216), Duncan 
Sandys summoned a resumed constitutional conference in London. In the face of the 
expected absence of agreement amongst the contending political parties, he imposed 
a solution based upon a change to proportional representation in the electoral system, 
ostensibly 'to counteract racism' in the colony's politics. Elections under the new sys-
tem were to be held as a prelude to independence (217). The strategy did not, as 
expected, provoke an immediate crisis with Jagan but further unrest in British Guiana 
during the first half of 1964, on a much larger scale than hitherto, resulted in a state 
of emergency being declared in June. The secretary of state now suggested that the 
three major political leaders might be detained and even deported, a drastic remedy 
which was opposed both by the governor and the permanent under-secretary of state 
at the CO (221). The Labour Party condemned the measures implemented under the 
emergency but within a few months of an angry exchange in the House of Commons 
(223), Labour was in power with a slim majority. 
Harold Wilson, the new prime minister, met Jagan at the end of October and 
insisted that elections would have to be held under the new system and that there 
could be no question of independence until the political parties had demonstrated 
their willingness to co-operate (224). The British Guiana elections, supervised by a 
team of Commonwealth observers, were held on 7 December 1964. The PPP won 
nearly 46 per cent of the vote but the rival PNC and United Force gained 53 per cent 
and agreed to form a coalition with Burnham as premier. Jagan refused to resign, 
was dismissed by the governor, and thereafter he and his PPP boycotted the House of 
Assembly. Greenwood visited the colony in early 1965 and reported favourably upon 
the coalition led by Burnham. Independence, he suggested, might now be granted in 
1966 (231) . The Cabinet secretary urged caution because of possible adverse 
reactions in the US and in October 1965 Greenwood visited Washington to discuss 
British Guiana in the wider context of colonial policy more generally (235). 
Simultaneously, and in the wake of a report by the International Commission of 
Jurists on racial imbalance in the public services of the colony (236), arrangements 
were made for an independence conference in London. This Jagan refused to attend 
despite the urgings of the British prime minister (239). 
Internal security in British Guiana remained a concern for London. The police 
force was still weak and in process of reform while the new army, to which London 
had eventually agreed, would not be effective until October 1966. It was feared that 
there might be either a renewed outbreak of violence in the colony or an attempt by 
the PPP to seize power. Burnham asked that British troops remain in the colony after 
independence, which was also what the Americans wanted (235). Greenwood 
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endorsed this and the Cabinet ministers most directly involved eventually agreed 
that a British military presence should remain in the colony for three months after 
independence (237-238, 241, 243-244). British Guiana, renamed as Guyana, finally 
became independent in May 1966 (246). Burnham had been anxious to secure a 
defence agreement with Britain in order to help protect the country from Venezuelan 
territorial claims. His request was refused (245) but in February 1966 the FO secured 
agreement with Venezuela over the disputed border area and thus removed a British 
defence problem in the region (247) . 
It had long been acknowledged in London that Britain had no strategic interests in 
the Caribbean and the few remaining defence commitments to dependencies and 
associated states could be met mainly by the Royal Navy. A potential threat was seen 
in Guatemala's continuing claim to British Honduras, a colony which London 
increasingly viewed as an embarrassing and costly possession (186) . A small 
detachment of British troops remained to protect the colony and Stanley Field, near 
Belize, was extended to take strategic aircraft (191). By early 1964 British Honduras 
had become internally self-governing (242) . Independence was a long-term aim and 
London viewed a greater US commitment in terms both of defence and economic aid 
as the only hope for this financially dependent colony. 
The economic and financial issues, which had so dominated the negotiations to 
establish a federation in the West Indies, continued to the end of the period covered 
by this volume. For the governments of the two islands which achieved 
independence in 1962, two such issues were vital: the question of future trade 
relations should Britain join the European Economic Community (EEC) or the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA),50 and what they might gain financially from the 
UK by way of an independence settlement. Both the federal and the unit 
governments had been anxious about Britain joining the EEC and this increased in 
the second half of 1961 as discussions continued in London and Brussels. West 
Indian fears were well placed as Britain was their largest export market. For example, 
two-thirds of Jamaica's sugar crop (also a temperate crop), the price of which was 
protected and inflated by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, went to Britain, as 
did most bananas and ninety per cent of citrus fruit (196). The West Indian islands 
feared that they might be cut loose by Britain while the Commonwealth Immigrants 
Bill, currently before the House of Commons, was seen by Williams especially as an 
attempt to exclude West Indian labour in order to accommodate EEC membership 
and free movement of European labour (169, 172). Although Trinidad was less 
reliant on the UK market than Jamaica, Williams was certainly concerned about 
future trade and, for all his public rhetoric, he viewed Britain as a political 
counterpoise to US influence in the Caribbean (199, 200).51 Until such time as the 
French president, Charles de Gaulle, vetoed Britain's application in 1963 to join the 
EEC, London's aim was to pursue closer economic ties with Europe and at the same 
time to try to gain a favoured position for the exports of the West Indian islands in 
the countries of the Six. Thereafter Britain fell back on EFTA but officials advised 
against a surprise approach made unofficially by a minister in the Jamaican 
government that Jamaica might be admitted as a member (211-212). 
The financial negotiations for independence settlements with Jamaica and 
Trinidad were far from harmonious. Both countries presented demands which UK 
ministers and officials regarded as excessive. While neither country came away empty 
handed, both were awarded much less than they had wanted or what they thought 
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they were entitled to. For Williams especially Trinidad's award was an insult and at 
first he refused to accept it. He spoke publicly his differences with the UK and the 
financial issue was not resolved until the end of 1963 (197-198, 206-207, 209). But 
for all the acrimony, it was not expected that Trinidad would break ranks with the 
West at a time of heightened Cold War. Just over a year into independence, the UK 
high commissioner in Port of Spain reported favourably on Trinidad's foreign policy 
although both he, and his counterpart in Kingston, were rather more circumspect in 
their assessments of the prospects for the domestic economies of the first two 
additions to the Commonwealth in the Caribbean (210, 218). Relations between 
Jamaica and Trinidad were also the subject of correspondence. According to UK 
officials, the ambitious plans which Williams had for development in the Caribbean 
were not always to the liking of ministers in Kingston. Relations became increasingly 
strained, for reasons which serve in part as retrospective judgments on why the West 
Indies Federation failed (225, 227). 
The UK could not be other than disappointed in its efforts to disengage from the 
Caribbean by involving the US and Canada in aid policies to the region. Of the two, 
Canada was the more reliable but strings were attached in that Canadian aid was tied 
and the overall Canadian aid budget was much smaller than commonly assumed (193, 
208). The US was still more of a disappointment, especially when, in response to the 
collapse of the original federation, the offer to match pound for pound UK aid was 
withdrawn. For all its concerns about instability and an outbreak of 'mini states' in the 
Caribbean-ideally the US wanted the UK to remain in the region (220)-it was not 
until the end of 1964 that the State Department suggested a more constructive 
approach based upon a renewal of American aid. By this time US officialdom was 
beginning to resolve its own bureaucratic differences over responsibility for dealing 
with the English-speaking Caribbean (255) and it was now suggested that the UK and 
the US, in association with Canada, should sponsor a yet further study to determine 
the economic needs of the region. The response from UK officials varied. Some at the 
Overseas Development Ministry, established in October 1964 to take from the 
Department of Technical Co-operation responsibility for technical assistance and 
development (functions which the CO had surrendered in 1961), were sceptical. 
Others from the same department were more enthusiastic and viewed the US propos-
als as an opportunity which was too good to be missed. The CO shared this latter view. 
The UK record on aid to the Caribbean compared unfavourably with that of the French 
and the Dutch to their own territories in the region and if Britain declined to partici-
pate in the US initiative its name 'would be mud' (228-229). The resulting tripartite 
survey produced a report which was hardly original in its findings. Wherever they went 
in the Caribbean, members of the survey team were told that what was needed was not 
more paper but cash (255). Meanwhile the UK established its own Development 
Division in the Caribbean with headquarters in Barbados. In setting up the division 
officials were concerned that it should not be identified as a 'continuation of colo-
nialism' (233). The first head of the division identified the lack of adequate publicity 
for Britain's development initiatives as a particular handicap (254). 
* * * * 
By the mid-1960s Britain's political disengagement from the Caribbean increased in 
pace, but the issues involved remained constant and essentially the same as those 
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documented in this volume. Most of the larger islands and territories had either 
become independent, gained self-government or were moving towards that goal. 
Britain remained politically and economically responsible for the smaller territories 
most of which had been given associated status. St Kitts-Nevis and the smaller and 
poorer island of Anguilla became an associated state in early 1967 but the 
relationship in this union was uneasy. In May 1967 an armed rebellion in Anguilla 
ejected the administration and in a 'referendum' held two months later the islanders 
overwhelmingly demanded independence. The premier of St Kitts-Nevis 
unsuccessfully asked for British military intervention. Britain appointed an 
administrator to the island in late 1967 but the Anguillans resented London's 
attempts to maintain the union with St Kitts-Nevis and a year later they again 
declared their independence. At the repeated request of the premier of St Kitts-Nevis, 
and to a storm of protest in Britain and the Caribbean at what was seen as a 
'colonialist' invasion, British troops occupied the island in March 1969. The affairs of 
this small island were discussed in the UN and a joint St Kitts-Nevis and British 
commission of inquiry chaired by Sir Hugh Wooding, a Trinidad judge, was 
appointed which presented a report to parliament in November 1970.52 The 
commission recommended substantial autonomy for Anguilla which was to remain 
within the associated state of St Kitts-Nevis. This was unacceptable to the islanders 
and in June 1971 Britain reluctantly resumed control of Anguilla. In 1980 Anguilla 
was formally separated from the failed union with St Kitts-Nevis and became a 
British Dependent Territory with a governor. A new constitution was introduced in 
1982. 
The Anguilla experience in the late 1960's ended the experiment of associated 
statehood. British governments recognised that associated status had neither 
fulfilled its local objective nor satisfied the critics at the UN where it continued to be 
regarded as a colonial relationship. It was not to be repeated for other smaller 
territories in what remained of the empire. Elsewhere the choice was between 
remaining in a colonial relationship, possibly with internal self-government, or 
progressing to complete independence. 
In the Caribbean itself the West Indies Act of 1967 stated that the associated states 
were able at any time to become independent states. The first of the smaller islands 
to do so was Grenada which became independent in 1974,53 to be followed by 
Dominica in 1978, St Lucia and St Vincent in 1979, Antigua in 1981 and St Kitts-
Nevis in 1983. A number of smaller islands remained as British Dependent 
Territories-the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Montserrat and the 
Turks and Caicos Islands-each with a governor and chief minister. Some, such as 
the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands, were economically successful with 
off-shore financial operations and tourism. The Turks and Caicos, a Crown colony 
between 1962 and 1972, was beset by a corruption and narcotics scandal in 1985 and 
the constitution was suspended by Britain for three years. Montserrat's economic 
development was severely disrupted by Hurricane Hugo in 1989, while a volcanic 
eruption in 1996 destroyed Plymouth, the capital town, and the southern part of the 
island, putting at risk the future welfare of the island's 12,500 inhabitants. The 
ensuing debate about Monserrat's economic and financial needs, and the extent to 
' which Britain was duty bound to sustain them, echoed the arguments which had 
been deployed over the island's future nearly thirty years earlier and which are 
documented in this volume. More positively, the uncertain future of the 
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Montserratans led Robin Cook, the foreign secretary, to announce in February 1998 
that HMG was considering the possibility of granting British citizenship to all the 
citizens of those Dependent Territories that did not already have it. If implemented 
this would be extended to about 100,000 people in what would become known as 
British Overseas Territories around the world. The return to China of Hong Kong 
and its several million people in July 1997 made such a statement possible. 
In British Honduras, British troops were still stationed as a defence against the 
continued territorial claims by the neighbouring republic of Guatemala. Renamed 
Belize, the colony became independent in 1981 with Britain maintaining 
responsibility for defence. At the end of the 1980s, and with US support, Britain 
continued to keep troops and a few aircraft in Belize at what was then an annual cost 
of £31 million. With the exception of about 100 troops who remained for the 
purposes of training local units in jungle warfare, UK forces were withdrawn in 1994. 
At the time of independence talks were held on a 'Heads of Agreement' designed to 
resolve Guatemala's claim. However, in 1994 Guatemala reasserted its claim at the 
UN and the matter remains unresolved. 
Throughout, the process of political integration in the Caribbean failed to 
materialise. The diversity of islands scattered over a wide area, each with its own 
institutions and jealously guarded interests and political ambitions, made a 
federation difficult if not impossible to achieve. However, despite the collapse of the 
federation in 1962 and the failure thereafter to persuade the Eight to federate, a 
number of inter-island institutions have been maintained and provide a common 
sense of West Indian unity, most notably the federal University of the West Indies 
with main campuses in Trinidad, Jamaica and Barbados. Cricket also provides a sense 
of common identity which in international matches overrides particularism. 
Concern at economic weakness and vulnerability led to the creation by the former 
members of the federation of the Caribbean Community and Common Market 
(CARICOM) in 1973, with the aim of providing free trade, tariff protection for goods 
produced in the region, and the long-range goal of regional economic integration. 
Notes to Introduction 
S RAshton 
David Killingray 
1 British Documents on the End of Empire: series A, vol 1, S R Ashton & S E Stockwell, eds, Imperial 
Policy and Colonial Practice 1925-1945 (London, 1996); series A, vol 2, Ronald Hyam, eds, The Labour 
government and the end of empire 1945- 1951 (London, 1992); series A, vol, 3, David Goldsworthy, ed, The 
Conservative government and the end of empire 1951- 1957 (1994). 
2 CO 318/453/18, no 39, CO note of departmental meeting on constitutional reform and federation 
following Sir C Parkinson's visit to the West Indies, 12 Jan 1943, in Ashton & Stockwell, part I, 67. 
3 Gordon K Lewis, The growth of the modem West Indies (New York, 1968) p 90. 
4 Quoted in PM Sherlock, West Indian nations: a new history (London, 1973) p 293. 
5 Colonial Office, West Indies: Report of the Closer Union Commission (London, April 1933). See also 
Ashton & Stockwell, eds, part I, p lvii. 
6 Ashton & Stockwell, eds, part !I, p 268 n 2. 
lxxxii NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 
7 0 Nigel Bolland, On the march: labour rebellions in the British Caribbean, 1934--39 (Kingston and 
London, 1995). W Arthur Lewis, Labour in the West Indies: the birth of a workers' movement (London 
1938). 
8 H of C Debs, 1938-1939, vol337, cols 84 ff, 14 June 1938. 
9 Recommendations of the West India Royal Commission (Cmd 6174, 1940). 
10 Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare (Cmd 6175, 1940). 
11 West India Royal Commission: Report (Cmd 6607, June 1945). 
12 First published in 1936 and then by Alien Lane as a 'Penguin Special' in 1938. 
13 West India Royal Commission: Report (Cmd 6607, June 1945) p 93, recommendation 27. 
14 CO 852/588/11, no 10, WP(44)643, War Cabinet memo by Stanley, 'Future provision for colonial 
development and welfare', 15 Nov 1944, reproduced in Ashton & Stockwell, eds, part II, 120. 
15 The figures are given in Michael Havinden and David Meredith, Colonialism and development: 
Britain and its tropical colonies, 1850-1960 (London, 1993), pp 220-225 and 254. 
16 Ashton and Stockwell, eds, part I, 24. 
17 ibid, 28, 34. 
18 CO 318/453/18, no 39, CO note of departmental meeting on constitutional reform and federation 
following Sir C Parkinson's visit to the West Indies, 12 Jan 1943, reproduced in Ashton & Stockwell, eds, 
part!, 67. 
19 CO 318/453/18, minute by Rogers, 13 Jan 1944, reproduced in Ashton & Stockwell, eds, part I, 73. 
20 Among West Indian intellectuals and trade unionists there was growing support for the idea of 
federation, expressed at some length by the conference of the Caribbean Labour Congress meeting in 
Barbados in Sept 1945. See Caribbean Labour Congress: Official Report of Conference held at Barbados 
from 17th to 27th September 1945. 
21 Included as Appendix I to the White Paper on Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies 
(Cmd 7120, May 1947). 
22 CO 318/466/2, no 9, memo by Rogers, 'Federation of the West Indies', [12 Feb 1946], reproduced in 
Hyam, ed, part Ill, 248. 
23 CO 318/466/2, record by A M MacKintosh of CO departmental meeting, 4 Sept 1946, reproduced in 
ibid, 249. 
24 CO 318/466/2, nos 45-48, Creech Jones circular despatch to West Indian governors, 14 Feb 1947, 
reproduced in ibid, 250. 
25 CO 318/484/2-8 & CO 318/485/1. 
26 CO 28/342/16, no 1, report by Listowel, [Dec 1949], reproduced in Hyam, ed, op cit, part Ill, 253. 
27 Report of the British Guiana and British Honduras Settlement Commission (Cmd 7533, 1948). 
28 CO 318/492/2 no 11, Trefgarne to Creech Jones, 4 Oct 1949. 
29 CO 318/492/1, no 27, Evans to Creech Jones, 28 June 1948. 
30 CO 318/473/3, no 36, minute by See!, 4 Nov 1947. 
31 In his autobiography, Oliver Lyttelton, The memoirs of Lord Chandos (London 1962), who became 
secretary of state for the colonies in Oct 1951, there are chapters on Malaya, the Central Mrican 
Federation, Kenya and West Mrican questions, but other than the 1953 crisis in British Guiana the West 
Indies is not mentioned. 
32 T 220/360, Treasury minute & note by A E Drake, 19 Mar and 30 Mar 1953, & CO brief for ministers, 
Mar 1953, reproduced in A N Porter & A J Stockwell, eds, British imperial policy and decolonization 
1938- 64 vol2 (London, 1989) pp 219-231. 
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION lxxxiii 
33 The Plan for a British Caribbean Federation, 1955: 1 Report of the Fiscal Commissioner (Cmnd 
9618), 2 Report of the Judicial Commissioner (Cmnd 9620), 3 Report of the Civil Service Commissioner 
(Cmnd 9619). 
34 CO 1031/1696, no 371, Luke to Rogers, 22 Jan 1956, enclosing a note on his visit to local capitals. 
35 ibid. 
36 John Mordecai, The West Indies: the federal negotiations (London, 1969) p 54. 
37 Trevor Munroe, The cold war and the Jamaican left 1950- 55: re-opening the files (Kingston, 1992) 
pp 82-85. 
38 !an R G Spencer, British immigration policy since 1939: the making of multi-racial Britain (London, 
1997) pp 53-55. Also Hyam, The Labour Government part I, p lxix. 
39 Figures for the number of immigrants differ from one government department to another; the 
figures cited here are from the Home Office and are quoted by Spencer, op cif, p 90, Tables 3 and 4. 
40 CAB 124/1191, minute by Lennox-Boyd, 17 Nov 1954. 
41 PREM 11/824, note by Macmillan to Eden, 'West Indian immigration', 14 Jan 1955, reproduced in 
Goldsworthy, ed, op cif, part Ill, 523. 
42 CAB 128/81, CP(56), 22 June 1956. 
43 CO 1031/2021, nos 1 & 2, minute by Rogers, 29 June 1957. 
44 This was not a new view; it had been argued in the Trinidad Legislative Council in 1952-1953 during 
Anglo-American negotiations to release deactivated bases for agricultural purposes. See CO 1031/536, no 
48, Ranee to Lyttelton, tel, 9 Mar 1952. 
45 CO 1031/2025, no 264, CO minute by Rogers, 14 Mar 1958. 
46 See the exchange of letters in Mordecai, op cif, pp 254- 257. 
47 Cmndl739,1965. 
48 See Arthur M Schlesinger, A thousand days: John F Kennedy in the White House (New York, 1965) 
pp 709-713; also, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961- 1963, Vol XII American Republics 
(Washington, 1996). 
49 CO 1031/4321, minutes by Huijsman, 5 & 9 Apr 1962, and no 24, CO to Sir R Grey, 14 June 1962. 
50 The chancellor of the Exchequer in November 1956 announced his intention to try to draw the 
United Kingdom into an industrial free trade area within Europe. While this was confined to industrial 
manufactures it did not directly effect the trade of most tropical colonies. However, in late 1956 the 
French decided that the dependent overseas territories of the six European nations should be included in 
the European Common Market. The European Free Trade Area, with Britain as a member, was established 
in November 1959. See Catherine R Schenk, 'Decolonization and European economic integration: the 
Free Trade Area negotiations, 1956-58', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 24 (1996), pp 
444--463, although this ignores the interests of the West Indies. 
51 Eric Williams, Inward hunger: the education of a prime minister (London, 1969) pp 289-91, provides 
the Trinidad view of the EEC. 
52 Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed by the Governments of the United Kingdom and St. 
Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla to examine the Anguilla problem (Cmnd 4510, 1970). See also, DJ Morgan, 
The official history of colonial development vol 5 Guidance towards self-government in British colonies 
1941- 1971 (London, 1980) pp 279- 287. 
53 Continuing US security concerns in the Caribbean led the Reagan administration, without consulting 
London, to launch an invasion of Grenada in 1983 to oust a left-wing government. 

[1-8] lxxxv 
Summary of Documents 
Chapter 1 
Financial and defence issues in planning a federation of the West 
Indies; the growth of immigration from the West Indies into the UK; 
the 1953 British Guiana crisis, Mar 1948-Nov 1956 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1948 
1 Sir T Lloyd 5Mar Letter suggesting UK labour shortage & 1 
to Sir G Ince (MLNS) unemployment problem in West Indies 
might be partly addressed by employing 
colonial labour in UK 
2 Mr Bevin (FO) & Mr Mar Joint memo, 'West Indies: proposal for 2 
Creech Jones an increase in the garrison force' 
3 A W Peterson (HO) 5 July Letter on arguments against 5 
to F LT Graham- introduction of legislation to curb 
Harrison (HO) immigration from colonies 
1949 
4 C Y Carstairs 21June Draft introduction to report of SCAC on 6 
arguments in favour of federation 
5 H T Bourdillon 27 June Minute on financial arrangements for 11 
to W L Gorell Barnes federation 
6 C Y Carstairs 5 Sept Letter on West Indian attitudes and 13 
to I B Watt suspicions of federation, + Enclosure: 
notes by Sir H Ranee for use by Lord 
Listowel during his visit to West Indies 
1951 
7 CO [Dec] Draft memo on urgent need for release 19 
for agricultural purposes of deactivated 
US base areas in Antigua, Trinidad & 
Jamaica 
1952 
8 CO Jan Note, 'The financial aspects of West 21 
for Mr Lyttelton Indian Federation', on the estimated cost 
to HMG, +Minute by HT Bourdillon 
lxxxvi SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [9-21) 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1952 
9 Sir K Blackburne 15Aug Letter expressing concern over delay in 26 
(Antigua) next move towards federation, + 
to SE V Luke Enclosure: memo by Blackburne, 
'Federation in the British West Indies' 
1953 
10 Reference Division, COl 7 Jan Paper, 'West Indian Federation: a 31 
(Commonwealth Section) background note' 
11 CO [Apr) Communique summarising results of 42 
1953 London conference on West 
Indian Federation 
12 W A Orrett (police comr, 5May Intelligence report for Apr on general 44 
British Guiana) election & prospects for internal 
security [Extract] 
13 Sir A Savage (British 13 Sept Letter on PPP govt & economic 49 
Guiana) situation, +Enclosure: notes by Savage 
to Sir T Lloyd 
14 JWVemon 16 Sept Minute on justification for intervention 54 
in British Guiana to remove PPP govt 
15 Mr Lyttelton 24 Sept Tel on intervention to remove PPP govt 56 
to Sir A Savage & introduction of emergency powers 
(British Guiana) 
16 Sir K Blackbume 19 Oct Letter on arguments for & against 59 
(Antigua) British Virgin Islands joining federation 
toP Rogers 
17 Sir A Savage (British 31 Oct Political report on military intervention 63 
Guiana) & its immediate aftermath [Extract] 
1954 
18 CO 1 Jan Draft letter to govts of Jamaica, Trinidad, 67 
Barbados, Antigua & Grenada on urgent 
need for a local West India Regiment 
19 P Rogers 26Apr Minute advocating legislation to restrict 68 
to C Y Carstairs immigration from Commonwealth 
20 CO 23 Sept Record of meeting with Sir H Foot 70 
(Jamaica) on question of restricting 
immigration, +Minutes by W I J 
Wallace & C Y Carstairs 
21 N L May le, P Rogers & 22-29 Minutes on whether it would be 71 
Sir C Jeffries Oct appropriate to defer appointment of Civil 
Service & Judicial Commissions until 
after Fiscal Commission has reported 
[22-35] FINANCIAL AND DEFENCE ISSUES IN PLANNING A FEDERATION OF THE WEST INDIES lxxxvii 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1954 
22 Mr Lennox-Boyd 28Nov Letter on terms of reference for 75 
to Mr Lloyd George proposed committee on colonial 
(HO) immigration 
23 CO [Dec] Note, 'The McCarran Act in the United 76 
States and immigration from the West 
Indies' 
1955 
24 CO (Press Section) Jan Memo, 'West Indian immigration', on 77 
numbers & the issues of employment 
and accommodation in UK 
25 SirS Luke (Barbados) 2 Feb Letter on critical importance of freedom 80 
toP Rogers of movement within federation 
26 CO Feb Note on delay in reforming West India 83 
Regiment [Extract] 
27 Conference on Movement 17 Mar Report of conference held in Port of 85 
of Persons within British Spain, Trinidad, 14-17 Mar 
Caribbean Federation 
28 CO May Brief, 'United Kingdom policy in its 88 
for Commonwealth Caribbean territories' 
govts 
29 C Y Carstairs 21 Oct Minute on 'principle' involved in 91 
proposal to control immigration' 
[Extract] 
30 Mr Lloyd George (HO) 28 Oct Minute on immigration, +Annex: report 92 
to Mr Eden by Mr Fisher (PPS to home secretary), 
'West Indian immigration to the UK' 
31 P Rogers, Sir T Lloyd & 28 Oct Minutes, 'Full Commonwealth status 97 
Lord Lloyd -4Nov for the Caribbean Federation' 
32 eo [Nov] Brief, 'Colonial immigrants', on 101 
for Mr Lennox-Boyd proposals put to Cabinet by home 
secretary 
33 Sir N Brook (Cabinet sec) 10 Nov Minute, 'Colonial immigrants', 103 
to Mr Eden proposing appointment of a Cabinet 
committee 
34 Lord Lloyd 17 Nov Letter on position of Mr Manley in 104 
to Sir H Foot relation to Jamaica & federation 
(Jamaica) 
35 Sir H Foot (Jamaica) 25 Nov Letter (reply to 34) 108 
to Lord Lloyd 
lxxxviii SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [36-48] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1955 
36 Lord Lloyd 15 Dec Letter (reply to 35) on Mr Manley's 112 
to Sir H Foot position & prospects for forthcoming 
(Jamaica) 1956 London conference on federation 
37 P Rogers 16 Dec Minute on recommendations of fiscal 114 
commissioner & prospects for 1956 
London conference 
1956 
38 Mr Lennox-Boyd 6 Jan Letter on Mr Manley, critical 116 
to Sir H Foot importance of 1956 London conference 
(Jamaica) & financial assistance to federation 
39 Sir H Foot (Jamaica) 16 Jan Letter (reply to 38) on West-Indian self- 117 
to Mr Lennox-Boyd government and UK financial assistance, 
+Minutes by Lord Lloyd & E Melville 
40 CO 30 Jan Brief no 6, 'The site of the federal 120 
for UK delegation at capital' 
1956 London 
conference 
41 CO 1 Feb Brief no 15, 'Mr Manley's "seven 121 
for UK delegation at propositions"' 
1956 London 
conference 
42 CO for UK delegation at 1 Feb Brief no 22, 'United Kingdom financial 125 
1956 London assistance' 
conference 
43 1956 London conference 13 Feb Summary record of 3rd plenary session 127 
on sources of federal revenue & cost of 
federal capital, +Annexes II & Ill 
44 1956 London conference 15 Feb Summary record of 7th plenary session 131 
on UK financial assistance 
45 Lord Lloyd 14Apr Minute, 'West Indian immigrants', on 134 
to Mr Lennox-Boyd the problem of population growth in 
the Caribbean 
46 P Rogers 18 Apr Letter on possible use of a US naval base 136 
toR L Speaight (FO) as location for federal capital 
47 Mr Lennox-Boyd 23 June Letter on incompatibility between 138 
to Sir H Foot political independence and financial 
(Jamaica) dependence 
48 British Caribbean Sept Report assessing merits of Barbados, 140 
Federal Capital Jamaica and Trinidad as site for federal 
Commission capital [Extract] 
[49-59) THE DISPUTE OVER CHAGUARAMAS AND US BASES lxxxix 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1956 
49 Sir S Luke (Barbados) 20 Sept Letter on functions of federal govt & 146 
toP Kennedy economic planning 
50 CO [Oct) Brief, 'Committee on colonial 147 
for Lord Lloyd immigrants', on reasons why there is as 
yet no justification to restrict by 
legislation immigration from West 
Indies 
51 CO [Nov) Note, 'Trinidad and Tobago elections' , 150 
on general election & new govt of Dr 
Williams 
Chapter 2 
The dispute over Chaguaramas and US bases; race riots in the UK and 
immigration; West Indian differences over federation; financial 
assistance to the West Indies after independence, 
Feb 1957-June 1960 
1957 
52 Sir J Macpherson & 28 Feb Minutes on appointment of gov-gen 153 
Mr Macmillan 
53 Defence Dept, CO 28 Mar Brief, 'West India Regiment', on costs 154 
for Mr Lennox-Boyd toUK 
54 Regional Economic 4Apr Report on implications for West Indies 156 
Committee of West ofECM & EFTA 
Indies 
55 CO [June) Note on US naval base at Chaguaramas 163 
56 CO 14 June Report on proceedings of Barbados 164 
conference on West India Regiment, 
3-7 June 
57 N B J Huijsman 19 June Minute on Mr Manley's determination 167 
to secure concessions from US over 
proposed site for federal capital in 
Trinidad 
58 D Williams (Washington) 26 June Tel on difference of opinion between US 169 
to CO State & Defense Depts over release of 
US bases 
59 Mr Butler (HO) 3 July Minute on immigration 170 
to Mr Macmillan 
XC SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [60-73] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1957 
60 WWWallace [8July] Minute on reasons why US should be 171 
to W I J Wallace warned against adopting uncompromising 
position over Chaguaramas 
61 F Cooper (Air Staff) 10 July Letter conveying opinion of Air Council 172 
to Sir I Kirkpatrick that problem of Chaguaramas is 
(FO) political not military 
62 CO July Note on secret US defence installation 173 
in northern half of Tucker Valley in 
Trinidad 
63 Mr Macmillan 19 July Letter on federal capital & proposal to 174 
to President appoint a joint commission 
Eisenhower 
64 FO July Record of London discussions on 176 
release of Chaguaramas; statement by 
US ambassador & memo by Dr Williams 
65 CO 25 Nov Note on reformation of West India 184 
for Lord Hailes Regiment & financial implications 
1958 
66 Sir E Beetham (Trinidad) 19 Feb Letter on response in Trinidad to US 189 
toP Rogers stand over Chaguaramas 
67 H A A Hankey (FO) 7 Mar Letter on US stand over Chaguaramas & 191 
toP Rogers most appropriate UK response, + 
Enclosure: letter from Lord Hood 
(Washington) to FO, 1 Mar 
68 Sir F Hoyer Millar (FO) 21 Mar Letter on how UK should respond to US 196 
to Sir H Caccia request for support over Chaguaramas 
(Washington) 
69 CO Mar Note on federal finances & federal 200 
for War Office prime minister [Extract] 
70 Chaguaramas Joint 25 Mar Chapter VII of report, summary of 201 
Commission commission's conclusions 
71 KDLaw 3 Apr Letter on result of federal elections 202 
to A R Adair (CRO) 
72 Mr Selwyn Lloyd (FO) 3Apr Letter on US response to findings of 203 
to Sir H Caccia Chaguaramas Joint Commission 
(Washington) 
73 J E Marnham 12 May Letter on functions of US defence 204 
to Lt-Col A Lovelace facilities in West Indies 
(Port of Spain) 
[74-87] THE DISPUTE OVER CHAGUARAMAS AND US BASES xci 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1958 
74 ACambell 4 June Letter on defence outlook in West 207 
to Maj-Gen J RC In dies 
Hamilton (War Office) 
75 D Williams (Washington) 6Aug Letter criticising behaviour of US 209 
to J E Marnham officials in Trinidad 
76 Jamaica Times 9Aug Editorial, 'Abandoning us ', on question 210 
of UK financial assistance to federation 
77 D HT Hildyard (FO) 27 Aug Letter on how best to approach 211 
to J E Marnham question of revising 1941 base 
agreement 
78 Mr Lennox-Boyd 24 Sept Letter on immigration & constructive 212 
to Lord Hailes & West measures to improve conditions for 
Indian governors & West Indians in UK [Extract] 
administrators 
79 P Rogers 16 Oct Letter proposing initiative on part of 214 
to H A A Hankey (FO) federal govt as means of lifting bases 
problem from purely Trinidad level 
80 Lord Home (CRO) 28 Oct Minute, 'West Indies', expressing 217 
to Mr Lennox-Boyd concern about prospect of early 
conference to review federal constitution 
81 Sir K Blackburne 1 Nov Tel on dispute between Sir G Adams & 218 
(Jamaica) Mr Manley over authority of federal govt 
to Mr Lennox-Boyd to levy income tax 
82 Sir K Blackburne 4Nov Letter on feeling in Jamaica that federal 219 
(Jamaica) govt is 'empire building' 
toP Rogers 
83 Mr Lennox-Boyd 5Nov Minute (reply to 80) on possible 222 
to Lord Home (CRO) repercussions of dominion status for 
West Indies 
84 R Kirkwood (WISA) 10 Nov Letter on importance of UK financial 223 
to Mr Lennox-Boyd aid to federation, +Minute by P Rogers 
on financial aid & dominion status 
85 P Rogers 26 Nov Letter (reply to 82) on Jamaica's 227 
to Sir K Blackburne position within federation 
(Jamaica) 
86 Mr Lennox-Boyd 2 Dec Minute, 'West Indies garrison', on 230 
to Mr Duncan Sandys reasons why a UK battalion should 
(MOD) remain in West Indies until1963 
87 H AA Hankey (FO) 3 Dec Letter on initial US response to 231 
toP Rogers suggested review of 1941 base 
agreement 
xcii SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [88-99] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1958 
88 Sir K Blackburne 5 Dec Letter (reply to 85) on current state of 233 
(Jamaica) anti-federation feeling in Jamaica, + 
toP Rogers Enclosure: note by governor of his 
latest discussion with Mr Manley 
89 Mr Lennox-Boyd 10 Dec Letter on dominion status 235 
to Lord Hailes 
90 R GC Smith (cmr for 23 Dec Despatch, 'Some observations on the 237 
Canada in Trinidad) Jamaican economy' 
to CMEA, Ottawa 
1959 
91 Sir C Thornley (British 17 Feb Letter proposing a statement to effect 240 
Honduras) that British Honduras is free to choose 
toP Rogers whether it wishes to join relationship 
with Guatemala, +Minutes by P Rogers, 
HT Bourdillon, Sir J Macpherson, Mr 
Amery & Mr Lennox-Boyd 
92 G W SU Chadwick (CRO) 8May Letter on Canadian attitude towards 250 
toP Rogers West Indies Federation 
93 Sir K Blackburne 28 May Letter on Jamaica & federation, + 251 
(Jamaica) Enclosure: Jamaican Ministry Paper No 
toP Rogers 5, 'The Federation of the West Indies' 
94 HO 2 June Record of ministerial meeting chaired 254 
by Mr Butler to discuss immigration 
situation in Notting Hill area of London 
[Extract] 
95 MrAmery 15 June Minute, 'American bases- Chaguaramas', 256 
on how to 'soften up' the Americans 
96 J E Marnham 15 June Letter urging FO to support federal 257 
to H A A Hankey (FO) govt's request for review of 1941 base 
agreement 
97 P Rogers 18 June Minute reporting meeting with Mr Rose 259 
on difficulties caused by 'secretiveness' 
of federal prime minister 
98 G W Jamieson 26 June Minute on growing tide of opinion in 261 
West Indies in favour of early dominion 
status 
99 MAmery July Memo, 'Chaguaramas', reviewing 262 
for Mr Lennox-Boyd history of dispute & suggesting possible 
solution 
[100-113] THE DISPUTE OVER CHAGUARAMAS AND US BASES xciii 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1959 
100 Sir S Hochoy (Trinidad) 31 July Tel on measures contemplated by 269 
to Mr Lennox-Boyd Trinidad govt should US persist in its 
refusal to review 1941 base agreement 
101 MrAmery 6Aug Minute on why it would be 'absurd' to 272 
embark on West Indian independence 
102 CO 14Aug 'The West Indies: independence and 273 
Commonwealth status': record of 
meeting between Mr Amery & Lord 
Hailes, +Minute by Sir H Poynton 
103 CO Aug Aide memoire for discussions on bases 276 
for Mr Amery with US representatives on 20 Aug 
[Extract] 
104 MrAmery 27 Aug Minute, 'The West Indies', responding 279 
to Lord Home (CRO) to CRO concerns over prospect of early 
independence 
105 FO 28Aug Record of meeting between Mr Selwyn 281 
Lloyd & Mr Herter (US S of S) on US 
bases & question of revision conference 
106 cos 22 Sept Memo, 'Military implications of the 283 
for Mr Duncan Sandys attainment of independence by The 
(MOD) West Indies Federation' 
107 P Rogers (Port of Spain) 6 Oct Letter on failure of Trinidad conference 287 
to Sir H Poynton to review federal constitution 
108 P Rogers 20 Oct Minute on measures needed to generate 294 
to Sir H Poynton support for federation 
109 CRO 29 Oct Memo, 'Question of Jamaica's 299 
candidature for membership of the 
Commonwealth' 
110 P J Kitcatt 3 Dec Minute on 109, disputing CRO views on 302 
Jamaica's eligibility for Commonwealth 
membership 
111 Lord Hailes 11 Dec Letter on Sir G Adams's resolution on 304 
to Mr Macleod dominion status 
112 Sir K Blackburne 23 Dec Letter on special defence risks to 306 
(Jamaica) Jamaica 
toP Rogers 
1960 
113 Govt of Jamaica 2 Jan Resume of points about federation to be 307 
raised with CO by Jamaican govt 
delegation in London 
xciv SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [114- 126] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1960 
114 CO 6 Jan Note, 'Financial assistance to the West 308 
for Cabinet (Official) Indies Federation after independence' 
Committee on 
Development Policy 
115 L Pliatzky & A W Taylor 6 Jan Minutes on 114, on aid to West Indies 317 
(Treasury) after independence 
116 Cabinet (Official) 7 Jan Minutes of meeting on CO proposals in 320 
Committee on 114 [Extract] 
Development Policy 
117 Treasury 11 Jan Note, 'Financial assistance to the West 322 
Indies after independence', on the 
proposed statement by CO ministers to 
Mr Manley 
118 CO & govt of Jamaica 16 Jan Joint memo summarising talks on 323 
delegation federal matters in London 
119 CO 19 Jan 'Consequences of Jamaican secession', 328 
note of discussion with Jamaican 
delegation in London 
120 CO 3 Mar Record of meeting between A R Thomas 328 
& Mr Bird & I G Turbutt on Antigua & 
federation 
121 R GC Smith (cmr for 7 Mar Despatch, 'Prospects for federation' 330 
Canada in Trinidad) 
to CMEA, Ottawa 
122 CO 28 Mar Record of meeting with I White (US 334 
ambassador designate to federation) on 
financial assistance [Extract] 
123 CO [Mar] Note, 'Colombo Plan for the Caribbean' 335 
to Sir J Martin 
124 SirE Beetham 9Apr Letter urging caution over proposed 337 
(Trinidad) demonstration over Chaguaramas 
to Dr Williams 
125 Mr Macleod 15May Tel on introduction of Cabinet govt & 338 
to Lord Hailes financial assistance to federation over 
transitional period 
126 Mr Macleod 2 June Tel on how S of S proposes to respond 340 
to Lord Hailes to questions about federation during his 
visit to West Indies 
[127-138] FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND THE 1961 AGREEMENT OVER BASES XCV 
Chapter 3 
Financial assistance and the 1961 agreement over bases; the Lancaster 
House conference and the referendum in Jamaica, 
June1960-Sept1961 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1960 
127 CO 4 June Record of meeting in Jamaica between 341 
Mr Macleod & JLP delegation led by Sir 
A Bustamante 
128 CO 15 June Record of meeting in Trinidad between 343 
Mr Macleod and federal ministers 
[Extract] 
129 M Z Terry 20 June Minute arguing that immigration to UK 349 
is a problem for UK govt, not for local 
govts in West Indies [Extract] 
130 Sir S Hochoy (Trinidad) 22Aug Letter on Antigua talks between Mr 351 
toAR Thomas Manley & Dr Williams to resolve 
differences over industrial development 
& income tax, +Enclosure 
131 Jamaica intelligence Aug Report on creation of federal 'reserved 356 
report -Sept list' & prospects for referendum 
[Extract] 
132 G W Jamieson, HA 3-7 Minutes on UK financial assistance for 357 
Harding & A R Thomas Oct federation 
133 D Williams (Washington) 7 Oct Letter on US policy towards financial 359 
to G W Jamieson assistance for federation 
134 C E F Cough (MOD) 19 Oct Minute on base negotiations & defence 361 
to Mr Watkinson arrangements 
(MOD) 
135 Sir R Grey (British 24 Oct Letter on relations between British 363 
Guiana) Guiana & federal govt 
to Lord Hailes 
136 Mr Bramble (Montserrat) 25 Oct Minute on financial & economic 367 
to D A Wiles concerns of Montserrat 
(Montserrat) 
137 RJVile 25 Oct Letter on question of stationing UK 368 
to C WWright (MOD) forces in federation after independence 
138 G W Jamieson 27 Oct Minute on case put forward by Trinidad 371 
govt for UK financial assistance 
[Extract] 
xcvi SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [139-152] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1960 
139 CO 3 Nov Memo, 'Visit of West Indian ministers: 373 
for UK delegation financial assistance at independence', 
on the 'single most important question' 
still to be answered in relation to West 
Indian independence 
140 CO 22 Nov Record of meeting on financial 377 
assistance with West Indian minsiters at 
Lancaster House on 8 Nov 
141 AR Thomas 20 Dec Minute clarifYing US position on 384 
to W L Gorell Barnes financial assistance 
142 M Z Terry Dec Minute, 'West Indian immigration', on 387 
current situation 
1961 
143 D Williams & Mr Fraser 18- 20 Minutes on Wills Isaacs & his three 389 
Jan conditions for Jamaica remaining 
within federation [Extract] 
144 A W Taylor (Treasury) 7 Feb Letter urging that no further financial 391 
to Sir W Gorell commitments should be made to West 
Barnes Indies beyond 1964 
145 G J Bryan (British 21 Mar Memo, 'The constitutional position of 393 
Virgin Islands) the British Virgin Islands' 
146 Sir J Martin 11 Apr Minute on issues raised during Mr 395 
to Mr Fraser Macmillan's tour of West Indies 
147 CO Apr Draft memo, 'Jamaican secession from 398 
for Cabinet Colonial the West Indies Federation' (not 
Policy Committee submitted) 
148 Mr Fraser Apr Memo, 'West Indies Federation: a 401 
political appreciation', +Annexes, + 
Minute by Sir W Go reil Barnes 
149 Trinidad inter- 2-16 Record of proceedings on freedom of 408 
governmental May movement [Extract] 
conference 
150 A R Thomas (Port of 9May Letter on discussions with observers from 415 
Spain) Cayman Islands & Turks and Caicos 
to D Williams Islands at Trinidad conference [Extract] 
151 A R Thomas (Port of 10 May Tel on 'thundery atmosphere' at 418 
Spain) reconvened inter -governmental 
to Mr Fraser conference in Trinidad 
152 CO June Brief on immigration for Lancaster 420 
for UK delegation House conference 
[153-164] THE BREAK-UP OF THE FEDERATION xcvii 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1961 
153 G W Jamieson 11-15 Tels on proceedings of Lancaster House 426 
to M S Staveley (Port June conference on federation 
of Spain) 
154 Lord Perth 15 July Report on his discussions about EEC 428 
with West Indian ministers in Trinidad 
& Jamaica, +Annex C 
155 RJVile 28 July Brief on report of inter-departmental 431 
for Mr Fraser working party on immigration for 
Cabinet Commonwealth Migrants 
Committee 
156 AR Thomas 4Aug Circular letter on outlook for federation 433 
to West Indian after Lancaster House conference 
governors & 
administrators 
157 J A Craddock (Port of 22Aug Note on Dr Williams and his attitude 436 
Spain) towards federation 
158 Mr Macleod 22 Sept Minute, 'The West Indies', on the 438 
to Mr Macmillan Jamaican referendum 
159 Sir K Blackburne 25 Sept Letter on local situation following 440 
(Jamaica) referendum 
toAR Thomas 
160 M Z Terry 27 Sept Minute on discriminatory nature of 442 
proposed scheme to control 
immigration 
161 J D Hennings 28 Sept Tel on US State Dept 'bewilderment' at 446 
(Washington) Jamaican referendum result & 
to CO implications for US financial aid 
162 Sir S Hochoy (Trinidad) 29 Sept Letter on Dr Williams's reaction to 446 
to Mr Fraser Jamaican referendum 
163 Jamaica intelligence Sept Report analysing referendum result 448 
report [Extract] 
Chapter 4 
The break-up of the federation and independence for Jamaica and 
Trinidad; the West Indies and the EEC; the Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act, 1962; Anglo-American relations and the British Guiana crisis; from 
federation to associated status in the East Caribbean, Oct 1961-Dec 1966 
1961 
164 Sir H Poynton & Mr 4 Oct Minutes on timing of proposed 452 
Macleod legislation on immigration 
xcviii SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [165-177] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1961 
165 D Williams 9 Oct Letter on discussions with Mr Manley in 454 
to Sir K Blackburne London on secession & independence 
(Jamaica) 
166 G W Jamieson 31 Oct Memo, 'Federation in the West Indies: 457 
predictions and possibilities' 
167 Lord Hailes 1 Nov Letter on need to take a 'much tougher 461 
toARThomas line' with small territories 
168 Lord Hailes 10 Nov Letter on Prof A Lewis's propsals for a 462 
to Mr Maudling unitary state in East Caribbean, + 
Annex: note by Lewis of his meetings 
with Dr Williams 
169 Dr Williams (Trinidad) 11 Nov Letter on EEC, expressing concern over 465 
to Mr Maudling trade & immigration 
170 Sir GAdams 17Nov Message protesting about proposed 467 
to Mr Macmillan legislation to control immigration from 
Commonwealth 
171 Lord Perth 22 Nov Minute on 'basic interests' of UK in 468 
Caribbean 
172 MrMaudling 23 Nov Letter (reply to 169) 469 
to Dr Williams 
(Trinidad) 
173 Lord Hailes 6 Dec Letter on need to take a firm line with 471 
to Mr Maudling Leeward & Windward Islands 
174 CO 15 Dec Brief, 'The West Indies Federation', on 472 
for Mr Macmillan US aid to Caribbean, for prime 
minister's meeting with President 
Kennedy in Bermuda 
175 MrMaudling 15 Dec Memo, 'British Guiana independence', 475 
for Cabinet Colonial on arguments for & against moving 
Policy Committee more quickly to independence 
176 S J G Fingland (Port of 29 Dec Letter, 'United States-Trinidad 477 
Spain) relations', on a strained political & 
to D Williams economic relationship 
1962 
177 CO 8 Jan Brief no 8, 'The Lewis Report', forS of 480 
for Mr Maudling S's visit to West Indies on Prof A Lewis's 
view that best option is now an 
independent Trinidad & a Federation of 
the Eight, +Annex: letter from Lewis to 
Mr Fraser, 2 Jan 
[178-191] THE BREAK-UP OF THE FEDERATION xcix 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1962 
178 CO 11 Jan Brief no 23, 'The "legality" of Jamaican 483 
for Mr Maudling secession', forS of S's visit to West 
Indies 
179 Lord Hailes 31 Jan Letter on why Jamaican referendum 485 
to Mr Maudling was allowed to proceed 
180 Mr Rusk (US S of S) 20 Feb Letter asserting that it is not possible 486 
to Lord Home (FO) for US 'to put up with an independent 
British Guiana under Jagan', +Minute 
by Mr Macmillan 
181 Lord Home (FO) 26 Feb Letter (reply to 180) challenging US 488 
to Mr Rusk (US S of S) policy over British Guiana 
182 Lord Home (FO) 12 Mar Record of a conversation about British 489 
Guiana with Mr Rusk in Geneva 
183 Sir H Poynton 19 Mar Minute on whether UK should contribute 489 
to Mr Maudling forty per cent of federal deficit in 
dissolving federation 
184 Mr Fraser 20Mar Note on conversations about British 491 
to Mr Maudling Guiana with President Kennedy & US 
officials in Washington 
185 Mr Maudling 3 Apr Memo, 'Recent developments in British 493 
for Cabinet Colonial Guiana', on disturbances in Georgetown 
Policy Committee & appointment of commission of inquiry 
186 Lord Home (FO) & Mr 4Apr Joint memo, 'The future of British 497 
Maudling Honduras' , +Annex [Extract] 
for Cabinet Colonial 
Policy Committee 
187 Mr Maudling 6Apr Memo, 'Federation of the Eight' , + 502 
for Cabinet Colonial Annex 
Policy Committee 
188 CO 6Apr Brief on 187, on questions raised by 510 
for Mr Maudling Treasury & CRO 
189 Sir R Grey (British 27 Apr Letter on proposal to raise a local army 512 
Guiana) 
to N B J Huijsman 
190 DWilliams 21 May Letter on UK financial assistance to a 515 
to F G Burrett Federation of the Eight [Extract] 
(Treasury) 
191 cos 23May Report, 'United Kingdom military 517 
requirments in the West Indies' 
[Extract] 
c SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [192-205] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1962 
192 J D Higham 25May Minute on financial irregularities in 521 
to Sir H Poynton Antigua & Montserrat 
193 CO May Brief no 7, 'The Joint Economic Mission 522 
for UK delegation to to the Leeward and Windward Islands' 
East Caribbean 
conference in London 
194 Mr Maudling 18 June Memo, 'East Caribbean Federation 527 
for Cabinet Colonial conference', on proposals to establish a 
Policy Committee Federation of the Eight 
195 CO June Note on maladministration in Grenada, 531 
on background to Grenada 
(Constitution) Order-in-Council, 1962 
196 CO 29 June Note, 'Jamaica and the Common 533 
for CRO Market',+ Annex 
197 CO 2 July Note of meeting on finance and defence 539 
between Mr Maudling & Jamaican 
delegation led by Sir A Bustamante 
198 Mr Fraser 6 July Letter on financial settlement with 541 
to Mr Brooke Jamaica 
(Treasury) 
199 CO 13Aug Note, 'Trinidad and the Common 542 
for CRO Market', +Annex 1 
200 N E Costar (Port of 31 Aug Letter reporting conversation with Dr 550 
Spain) Williams on Trinidad's relations with 
to SirS Garner (CRO) UK & US & his view of Common Market 
[Extract] 
201 DWilliams 13 Sept Minute on delaying tactics of Mr Barrow 551 
to A R Thomas (Barbados) with regard to a Federation 
of the Eight 
202 Sir H Poynton & Mr 20-21 Minutes, 'British Guiana: proposed 552 
Duncan-Sandys Sept army' 
203 CO 16 Oct Memo, 'UK policy towards a Federation 553 
for Mr Duncan of the Eight and Grenada's proposal to 
Sandys enter negotiations for a unitary state 
with Trinidad' 
204 CO 24 Oct Note, 'Financial implications of a 557 
for CRO Federation of the Eight' 
205 CO [31 Oct] Note, 'The appointment of a financial 558 
for CO ministers secretary in Antigua and related 
matters' 
[206-218] THE BREAK-UP OF THE FEDERATION ci 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1962 
206 Dr Williams (London) 5Nov Tel proposing to reject UK offer of 561 
to Mr Macmillan financial settlement with Trinidad 
207 CO [Nov] Draft tel on Trinidad financial 564 
to UK high cmrs settlement, +Annex 
208 CO 22 Nov Record of meeting with Canadian 566 
officials on Candian aid programme 
209 N E Costar (Port of 13 Dec Letter on why Dr Williams rejected UK 568 
Spain) offer of financial settlement with 
to Mr Duncan Sandys Trinidad [Extract] 
210 CRO 20 Dec Note, 'Future prospects for Jamaica and 571 
for Cabinet (Official) for Trinidad and Tobago' 
Committee on Latin 
America & Caribbean 
1963 
211 CRO 14 June Note, 'Jamaica and the European Free 586 
for Cabinet (Official) Trade Association', on a proposal that 
External Economic Jamaica should join EFTA 
Relations Committee 
212 Cabinet (Official) 20 June Minutes advising against proposal that 589 
External Economic Jamaica should join EFTA 
Relations Committee 
meeting 
213 CO 24 June Briefing note for Anglo-American 591 
official talks on current situation in 
British Guiana & options for UK policy 
214 FO 28 June Record of meeting between Lord Home, 594 
Mr Duncan Sandys and Mr Rusk (US S 
of S) on situation in British Guiana 
215 FO 30 June Record of meeting between Mr 597 
Macmillan and President Kennedy on 
situation in British Guiana 
216 Sir H Poynton 16 Oct Minute, 'Austrian State Treaty and 600 
to Mr Duncan Sandys British Guiana', on whether treaty forms 
suitable precedent for British Guiana 
217 British Guiana London 5Nov Record of 4th plenary session on 31 Oct 602 
conference, 1963 on decisions by Mr Duncan Sandys & 
his closing statement, +Annex 
218 Sir N Costar (Port of 18 Dec Despatch, 'Trinidad's foreign policy' 609 
Spain) 
to Mr Duncan Sandys 
cii SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [219-231 ] 
NUMBER SUBJECT PAGE 
1963 
219 CO 19 Dec CO record of discussion between Mr 613 
Duncan Sandys and Mr Rusk (US S of S) 
on current situation in British Guiana 
1964 
220 I J M Sutherland 7 Jan Letter on concerns of US State Dept in 616 
(Washington) Caribbean 
to A R Thomas 
221 Sir H Poynton 26May Tel on declaration of emergency in 618 
to Sir R Luyt (British British Guiana & possible detention of 
Guiana) all three political leaders 
222 Sir R Luyt (British 28May Tel (reply to 221), +Minute by Sir H 618 
Guiana) Poynton 
to Sir H Poynton 
223 H ofCDebs 21 July Questions and answers in the House of 620 
Commons on the emergency in British 
Guiana 
224 J 0 Wright (private sec 29 Oct Record of conversation between Mr 627 
to PM) Wilson & Dr Jagan on the conditions 
under which the UK would be prepared 
to grant independence to British Guiana 
225 Sir A Morley (Kingston) 11 Nov Memo, 'Jamaica-Trinidad relations', on 629 
a growing rift between Jamaica and 
Trinidad 
226 J 0 Wright (private sec 25 Nov Record of ministerial meeting on line to 633 
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1 LAB 13/42 5 Mar 1948 
[Colonial labour in UK]: letter from Sir T Lloyd to Sir G lnce1 
suggesting that the British labour shortage and the problem of 
unemployment in the West Indies might be partly addressed by 
employing colonial labour in the UK 
In looking through the minutes of the Labour Committee of the Cabinet, one cannot 
help but be impressed by what is being done to adjust the manpower position of the 
United Kingdom by employment of volunteers from European countries and by the 
resettlement of displaced persons. 
2. As you know, my Secretary of State is not a member of the Labour Committee 
and it seems to us that the question of ways and means by which the surplus 
manpower of certain Colonies could be used to assist the manpower situation here 
might well be worth the consideration of that Committee. I think you will agree that 
this is a matter which could be of mutual benefit both to the Colonies and the United 
Kingdom. 
3. There is a very definite unemployment problem in most of the West Indian 
Colonies, in particular in Jamaica, where the number of unemployed has been 
roughly estimated to be from 40,000 to 50,000; also in Barbados who are asking us to 
consider a proposal to import a number of women domestic workers to work in 
hospitals. In Malta there is an undoubted surplus of labour-local unemployed run 
into over 1,000 and the number is steadily increasing as a result of discharges from 
the dockyard, which derive in turn from the retrenchment in United Kingdom naval 
expenditure. The pressure to leave Malta in search of work is so intense that the new 
Malta Government have appointed a special Minister in charge of Emigration. Some 
Maltese are going to the Dominions but the flow does not yet meet the demand. St. 
Helena too is most anxious to secure employment in this country for a few hundred 
agriculturalists. Cyprus also would like us to take a few Cypriot miners who have 
volunteered for the coal mines. 
4. There has been correspondence about the workers from the West Indies and 
St. Helena with Bevan2 of your Overseas Department who has been of the greatest 
assistance in helping us to formulate proposals and is aware generally of the 
difficulties which we are up against in the form of opposition from the Trades Unions 
as well as from other Government Departments and employers. 
5. We have been thinking of getting a reliable survey made of surplus labour in 
the Colonies, but the machinery to compile manpower statistics overseas is 
primitive, since the facilities afforded by unemployment insurance returns do not 
exist. It could, I think, be done nevertheless, and in this connexion the model form of 
Annual Labour report (in preparing which your representatives on the Colonial 
Labour Advisory Committee helped us) will yield some results. But great care would 
be necessary to avoid the raising of expectations that could not be fulfilled. I mean of 
course expectations of schemes of absorption in the United Kingdom. Already 
Ministerial statements on the labour needs of this country have raised the hopes of 
thousands of Jamaicans of finding employment here. 
1 Permanent secretary, Ministry of Labour and National Service, 1944-1956. 
2 M A Bevan, assistant secretary, Overseas Dept, Ministry of Labour and National Service. 
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6. One realises the complications in the United Kingdom of settling in 
employment peoples of other races, as we have found to our cost in attempts with 
your Ministry to place some of the many unemployed Colonial people who are 
already in this country and are continually arriving in small groups to seek 
employment here. There are over 1,000 unemployed in the London, South Wales and 
North Western areas and we are at present'responsible for their maintenance under 
the Special Scheme for the Assistance of Colonials which is worked by the Assistance 
Board on our behalf. This scheme will cease when the National Insurance scheme 
comes into operation, but the human problem of the unemployment of these people 
will remain with its unfortunate repercussions in the Colonies where it is difficult to 
explain unemployment among such Colonials who come here in the face of repeated 
statements by Ministers about shortages of labour. I am well aware that there is a 
good explanation for this state of affairs but it is not easy to put it over to the 
Colonies and one cannot help but feel that some concerted plan for the employment 
of unemployed Colonials in Britain might be devised if we can persuade the Coal 
Board and other industries to accept them as an Imperial responsibility. 
7. The object of this letter is then to get your views on the matter generally and 
whether you think that it would be of help to us and to your Ministry to introduce a 
paper on the subject of the employment of Colonials in this country to the Labour 
Committee of the Cabinet. 
8. There is, of course, another aspect to the problem of surplus labour in the 
Colonies, namely its employment in other Colonies which may have deficiencies (e.g. 
North Borneo) or even in foreign countries (e.g. West Indians in the U.S.A.) but as 
this does not to any great extent affect the United Kingdom as such I have not dealt 
with it in this letter. I mention it merely to show that we have not overlooked it. 
2 CO 318/491/1, no 4 Mar 1948 
'West Indies: proposal for an increase in the garrison force' : joint 
memorandum by Mr Bevin and Mr Creech Jones 
1. In the light of recent developments in the dispute with Guatemala over British 
Honduras we have been reviewing the position in regard to British Forces in the 
West Indies. 
2. Naval Forces. There is no British Naval Base in the West Indies. These 
Colonies fall within the Command of the C. in C., America and West Indies Station, 
whose H.Q. is in Bermuda. His fleet is understood to consist of one Cruiser, three 
Escort vessels and two auxiliary craft. 
Military Forces. A British battalion less one company, is normally stationed in 
Jamaica. A detachment from this battalion has just been sent to British Honduras. 
The remaining company is stationed in Bermuda. The only other regular military 
unit in the region is a weak battalion of Jamaica Infantry, about 600 all ranks, which 
is not available for service outside Jamaica. Part-time forces, on the model of the 
Territorial Force in this country, are being raised in Trinidad, British Guiana and 
British Honduras, but they are still in the early stages of formation and training and 
are not liable for service outside their respective Colonies. 
Air Forces. There are no British Air Forces of any kind in the West Indies. 
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3. It would be foolish to deny that, in the last resort, the security of our position 
in the West Indies rests on the undoubted wish of the vast majority of the inhabitants 
to remain within the Commonwealth, and on the goodwill of the United States. 
Nevertheless, recent events force us to conclude that reliance on these factors, and 
the general desire to reduce our military commitments, have affected our 
dispositions in the Caribbean to a degree which can no longer be considered politic 
or safe. There is no doubt that the Guatemalan Government have deliberately 
inflamed public feeling in their country over their claim to British Honduras, 1 which, 
though of long standing, has not hitherto given rise to popular excitement or 
demonstrations on the scale recently experienced. They are now seeking the support 
of other Latin American States in a policy of "America for the Americans" which is 
coupled with the usual attacks on British Imperialism, and are understood to be 
proposing to put forward a resolution on these lines at the forthcoming Conference 
at Bogota. They are already assured of support from the Argentine and Chile, and 
other Latin American countries are also likely to join them, in particular Venezuela, 
which has in the past had boundary claims against British Guiana. It must therefore 
be expected that the agitation will continue, with the likelihood of a high political 
temperature from time to time in the Latin American countries and the possibility of 
frontier incidents. Obviously, these are questions of great delicacy, needing most 
careful handling. But the absence of any effective defence forces in the British 
Colonies, being interpreted as evidence of weakness on our part, offers a standing 
incitement to such incidents. 
4. The West Indian Colonies value the British connection, and would welcome 
any indication that we are ready and able to give them more effective protection 
against encroachment. At the same time, the question of internal security within 
those Colonies will continue during the next few years to cause us concern. In recent 
times there have been serious disturbances in Jamaica, Trinidad, the Bahamas and 
the Leeward Islands. The economic resources of the islands are slender; the rate of 
increase of their population is high. Therefore, although efforts are being 
continuously made to develop their trade and agriculture (we are at present awaiting 
the report of a Development Commission on British Guiana and British Honduras),2 
1 See 91, note. 
2 Report of the British Guiana and British Honduras Settlement Commission (chairman, Sir Geoffrey 
Evans) Cmd 7533, 1948. Appointed by the CO to examine the economic potential of British Guiana and 
British Honduras and their prospects of further settlement in attracting surplus labour from the West 
Indian islands, the Evans Commission reported that no settlement would be possible without a policy of 
vigorous economic development. The commissioners therefore regarded themselves as in effect a 
development commission and made recommendations accordingly. Their proposals involved investment 
of between £15 and £20 million over a ten-year period, during which time they anticipated that the two 
territories might be able to absorb 100,000 people. The Colonial Development Corporation was invited to 
participate in the specific schemes recommended by the commission but it soon became apparent that the 
obstacles to development were much more serious than expected. Lord Listowel, who visited the West 
Indies in 1949, reported back: 'I found no well informed person in the West Indies who supported the view 
that 100,000 immigrants can be absorbed within ten years, or that the large volume of capital investment 
to sustain their labour will be forthcoming during this period' (CO 318/510/5, no 3). Lord Trefgarne, 
chairman of the CDC, informed Creech Jones in Oct 1949 that, 'For us to contemplate investment in 
schemes of the magnitude proposed would be grossly out of scale with the claims of other colonies both 
in the financial sums to be committed and in the severe administrative burden on the Corporation' 
(CO 318/492/2, no 11, Trefgarne to Creech Jones, 4 Oct 1949). 
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the underlying causes for these disturbances are likely to persist for some time, and 
the possibility that military forces may from time to time be required to assist the 
police in maintaining order is a real one. The Governor of Jamaica in particular has 
on more than one occasion expressed grave concern at the serious situation which 
may develop if the Colony is left without a garrison of British troops, or when, as at 
present, that garrison is drawn upon for the security of other Colonies in the region. 
The Acting Governor of the Leeward Islands is anxious at the absence of effective 
means of dealing with disorder which may arise from the present strikes in Antigua 
and St. Kitts. 
5. In these circumstances it is in our view essential that the forces should be 
adequate to deal with any threat to security which is likely to develop whether from 
external or internal sources, until reinforcements, which if required would have to 
be sent from the U.K., could arrive: and also to provide visible evidence-as a 
warning to the South American States and a reassurance to the people of our own 
Colonies-of the intention of H.M.G. to make no territorial concessions to threats. 
In the light of recent events, the very small forces at present available in this area 
cannot be regarded as sufficient for these purposes. 
6. A proposal that the British garrison should be strengthened was considered by 
the Chiefs of Staff in 1946, at the request of the Colonial Office. Although the Chiefs 
of Staff did not question the desirability of an increase in the garrison they felt 
unable "in view of the manpower shortage and conditions elsewhere" at that time to 
provide the necessary additional forces. We consider that in the circumstances which 
have now developed since 1946 this decision should be reviewed, and that the 
permanent British garrison in the Caribbean area should be raised to two Battalions 
(less one company in Bermuda). 
7. We also feel that the question of raising a regular West Indian Military Force 
available for general service should be revived. There have been such forces in the 
past, namely the West India Regiment (which was a regular unit of the British Army), 
the British West Indies Regiment, disbanded in 1927, and the Caribbean Regiment, 
formed during the recent war and also recently disbanded. Apart from its military 
value-and with the facilities for training with British troops there is no reason why 
it should not compare favourably in this respect with other regular Colonial forces-
a regiment of this character would have a most valuable political influence. It would 
give the West Indian Colonies an opportunity of participating directly in Imperial 
defence, would strengthen the political bonds between the peoples of the Colonies 
and of the U.K., and would assist in maintaining British prestige especially in those 
Colonies where the United States have bases. It would also contribute towards a 
solution of the unemployment, which in the more seriously overpopulated islands 
creates acute economic, social and political problems both for the Colonial 
Governments and for H.M. Government. 
8. The difficulties in the way of this proposal are wholly financial. The West 
Indian Governments could not afford to maintain a regiment of this kind from their 
own resources, though they would be willing to contribute towards the cost. The War 
Office, when this matter was considered in 1947, did not feel that the proposal could 
command sufficient priority to qualify for assistance from the limited funds at their 
disposal. We understand that the cost of maintaining a West Indian Battalion would 
be in the neighbourhood of £160,000 a year. The West Indian Governments are about 
to be approached with a request for a larger contribution to Imperial defence, and if 
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this request were coupled with a proposal to revive a West Indian Regiment there 
should be a better prospect of the Governments agreeing amongst themselves to 
contribute a substantial proportion of the cost. In any case it is our view that the 
present situation justifies whatever expense may be required to enable this proposal 
to be carried into effect, whether the U.K. contribution is found from the War Office 
or from some other Vote. 
9. We therefore recommend:-
(a) that the British garrison in the West Indies should be increased by one 
Battalion; 
(b) that steps should be taken to re-constitute a West Indian Regiment as a 
regular military force available under War Office control for general service. 
3 HO 213/244 5 July 1948 
[Immigration]: letter from A W Peterson1 to F LT Graham-Harrison2 
on the arguments against the introduction of legislation to curb 
immigration from the colonies 
You sent me on 25th June a copy of a letter which the Prime Minister had received 
from a number of Members of Parliament suggesting that the Government should 
take power to control immigration from the Colonies into this country. The Home 
Secretary has considered this suggestion in consultation with the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies and feels that there are the strongest objections to it. 
It is a traditional element in United Kingdom policy that British subjects, of 
whatever colour and whether of Dominion or Colonial origin, are freely admissible to 
the United Kingdom. From time to time some particular influx of less desirable 
elements, e.g. the influx of Cypriots of the waiter type into London, has brought the 
issue into relief but the principle has stood and stands. It would be especially 
undesirable to abandon this principle at a time when we are officially sponsoring the 
introduction of foreign labour in large numbers, and the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies advises that any such proposal would give rise to a fierce reaction in the 
Colonies themselves. 
It is also of especial importance at the moment in connection with the Nationality 
Bill that the position should not be weakened. In the Bill there was included the 
phrase "citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies", a phrase which in a yet more 
particular way associates the United Kingdom with British subjects of Colonial 
origin. This phrase was struck out by an amendment in the Lords and stands to be 
restored this week by a Government amendment when the Bill is reintroduced in the 
Commons. This development admittedly makes it specially unfortunate that the 
Jamaica party should have arrived,3 and the issue have been raised now, as it may 
introduce an extraneous element into the discussion in the Commons. 
It would be inadvisable in replying to touch on this complication. 
In some press articles, as in the letter addressed to the Prime Minister, the 
1 Home Office from 1938; assistant private secretary to prime minister, 1946-1949. 
2 Principal, Home Office. 
3 ie on the Empire Windrush, seep lvii. 
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Jamaican party has been hailed as the precursor of larger emigrations from Colonies 
where unemployment is rife. Reports have appeared that there are some 2,000 more 
Jamaicans awaiting an opportunity of a passage. The grounds for this fear are not 
clear. There was a peculiar combination of circumstances in the case of the Jamaican 
party which are not likely to be repeated. In the first place, the passages at a 
particularly favourable cost were available on a troop ship, and in the second place, 
some two-thirds of the men who arrived were ex-servicemen who had money in their 
pockets from their gratuities. Even so, not all the cheap troop-deck passages were 
taken up. Moreover, in many articles appearing subsequent to the arrival of the 
Jamaicans emphasis has been laid on the fact that owing to costs here they may find 
that their wages will not allow them to support themselves and at the same time send 
remittances to their dependants in Jamaica. 
Although it is not yet possible to give a complete picture of the disposal of the 
Jamaicans, it is perhaps worth mentioning that, out of 236 who were accommodated 
at the Clapham Shelter' because they had no particular prospects in view, 145 had 
been placed in employment within one week of their arrival and the population at the 
Clapham Shelter had dropped to 76 on the night of July 2nd. This evidence suggests 
that the party consists of men who are able and willing to find and accept honest 
work, and it would be a great mistake to regard them as a "riffraff' of unemployables. 
It may be that the episode is a comparatively isolated one, and that, although there 
has been a steady trickle of coloured Colonials reaching here as stowaways who have 
been a considerable nuisance, nothing is to be expected to call for alarm such as 
would justify a departure from the principle enunciated. 
The enclosed draft reply, which has been agreed with the Colonial Office, is 
submitted for the Prime Minister's consideration. 
4 A Second World War air-raid shelter on Clapham Common in south London used as emergency 
accommodation. 
4 CO 318/487/2, no 1 21 June 1949 
[Federation]: draft introduction by C Y Carstairs to the report of the 
Standing Closer Association Committee on the arguments in favour of 
federation 
In this introductory section of our Report, we discuss certain of the underlying 
principles which have guided us in framing our more detailed proposals. Certain 
principles were provided in our terms of reference, notably that a Federal 
constitution should follow the Australian pattern, with residual powers remaining 
with the constituent units, and we have naturally been much influenced by the 
records of the discussions at Montego Bay. But we have found it necessary to make 
more precise certain other considerations and, since these have profoundly 
influenced us in framing our recommendations, we consider that in the interests of 
informed public discussion we should set them down at the outset. 
2. We start from the assumption that the main underlying purpose of our task is 
to seek the shortest path towards a real political independence for the British peoples 
of the region, within the framework of the British Commonwealth. We assume 
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further that we have been charged with this task because there is general agreement 
that this object cannot be attained without some form of Federal association between 
the territories concerned, but that with Federation its attainment becomes practical 
politics. We are aware that in some circles there is a demand for "independence", on 
the basis of existing political units, either in advance of, or simultaneously with, the 
establishment of Federation. While we yield to none in the region in our attachment 
to the idea of independence, we venture to agree with the underlying thought of the 
advocates of Federation, that the sheer force of circumstances of the modern world 
make independence on a "unit" basis a mirage. 
3. This categorical statement requires elaboration. Let it not be thought that we 
imply any reflection on the political capacity, or the public spirit, of the peoples of the 
territories as they stand today. Did we do so, we should not be justified in putting for-
ward a scheme for a larger political unit, which, together with the existing territories, 
cannot fail to make even greater demands on the political resources of the region than 
are made today. Our reasons for this view lie in the fields of economics, public finance 
and administration, but particularly economics, the basis of all the rest. 
4. It is now a truism to say that political independence is unreal unless it is based 
on financial stability which, in turn, must rest on a solid foundation of economic 
productivity-on an adequate "national income". It is true that there are many states 
in the world today which are legally sovereign and independent; but it can be 
asserted that only those which can pay their way can really be said to enjoy full 
independence. From this point of view it does not matter what form is taken by 
outside financial support. Grants from United Kingdom public funds are familiar to 
this region, whether in the form of grant-aid with its concomitant of Treasury 
control, or of grants under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, which do not 
involve Treasury control. Other nominally independent states have, however, been 
assisted in other ways, e.g. by private banks or other firms, and their history shows 
that their real, though not perhaps their apparent, independence, is no less curbed by 
this form of assistance than it is by the overt receipt of assistance as from one 
Government to another. 
5. The way to real political independence is, in short through economic stability 
and solvency. We should explain that by this we do not mean economic self-suffi-
ciency. Whatever may be done to produce in the region a wider range of the goods con-
sumed there-and in our view much can and should be done- it would be foolish to 
shut our eyes to the fact that the West Indies and the mainland territories live by world 
trade. This is a fact of cardinal importance in the political field, to which we shall 
return in various contexts. To resume, if economic stability and financial solvency are 
the necessary foundations for political independence, any proposals for attaining the 
latter must be judged, among other things, by the extent to which they promote the 
former. From this point of view, various questions arise, e.g.: (a) are the West Indies 
economically stable and solvent now? (b) can they become so on the existing political 
basis, i.e. the basis of a comparatively large number of separate political units? (c) if 
not, can Federation lead to stability and solvency, either immediately or in the long 
run? These questions demand an answer, and upon those answers will depend in large 
measure the nature of the proposals which we shall make. 
6. Taking the first of these questions, it is the case that, over the region as a whole, 
broadly speaking, public revenues cover public expenditures at the present time. If 
that were a permanent condition, the future could be regarded with some equanim-
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ity: it might even be argued that there was little needed [sic] for adding a further 
political superstructure in the form of a Federal constitution. But on closer examination 
the picture is not so reassuring. In the first place, several territories are at present in 
receipt of grant-aid and are likely to continue to require it. Some others may at any 
time come to require it. Secondly, there is scarcely a territory, even among the largest, 
whose finances do not give cause for concern, and which might not, as a result of some 
by no means unprecedented misfortune or disaster, be brought to insolvency. Thirdly, 
there is a basic instability about even the present apparently satisfactory state of the 
public finances. Revenues are very substantially greater than they were before the war; 
but these increases are not unfortunately due to any real increase in the basic pro-
ductivity of the region, in relation to numbers. There is in fact evidence that in this 
region-as indeed elsewhere in the world-basic productivity has suffered a decline. 
This is a serious matter, since basic productivity is the foundation upon which eco-
nomic stability, solvency and hence real political independence must be built. 
Revenues may thus be described as "elastic", or sensitively responsive to changes in a 
number of factors . Expenditure on the other hand is less so. For reasons into which 
we need not enter, recent years have witnessed a substantial increase in public com-
mitments in the field of social and allied services. These provisions are by no means 
excessive in relation to needs, or by any modern standards; but they are large in rela-
tion to revenues and, what is more important for present purposes, they could not eas-
ily be reduced substantially if revenues suddenly shrank. They therefore constitute a 
standing potential threat to the solvency of the region. 
7. The temporarily healthy state of the public finances is in fact attributable to 
other factors than any basic increase in the taxable capacity of the region. These 
include, first, the comparatively high prices till lately prevailing for the exports of the 
region, and to such other sources of overseas income as wartime expenditures by His 
Majesty's Government and the United States Government. These incomes are 
directly reflected in higher taxability in the region itself, and indirectly in larger 
imports which, at present high prices, mean large ad valorem customs revenues. It is 
obvious that any important recession in the value of the region's exports could have a 
profound and harmful effect alike on the private incomes and the public finances of 
the region as a whole. Signs are not wanting in the world at large that commodity 
prices may be on the turn: this is a matter of the utmost significance for this region, 
even although there seems no present reason to expect a disastrous slump. Should 
there be an important recession, the consequences for the economy of the region 
would be serious, unless steps were taken to mitigate them by means of special price 
arrangements with His Majesty's Government. But it is in point to observe that such 
arrangements, if made, would in essence constitute indirect grants of assistance to 
the region, and would be doubtfully compatible with the ideal of genuine 
independence. We do not argue for or against such arrangements, but we are 
concerned here to point out their political consequences. 
8. The conclusion which we are forced to draw from the above is that, taking the 
region as a whole, there does not at present exist that basic economic stability which 
we believe to be an essential prerequisite to genuine political independence. It 
follows, therefore, that if independence is to be achieved, there must be some hope of 
creating a state of economic stability. That the possibility exists in principle we do 
not consider it necessary to discuss at length. We are conscious that, unsuspected 
discoveries apart, this is not to be reckoned among the richly endowed areas of the 
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world. But we refuse to believe that in an age which has seen such stupendous 
advances in the natural sciences, and where further advances, particularly in biology 
and its applications to agriculture, may confidently be expected, applications cannot 
be found which can provide a reasonable standard of living to all those in this region 
who are prepared to earn it. This result will not come about easily, and we recognise 
that the not too abundant resources of the region will require to be freely fertilised 
with brains, skill and application. But that this can be done we do not permit 
ourselves to doubt, provided always that the political and administrative 
arrangements of the region are such as to enable modern knowledge to be promptly 
and effectively applied where it is most needed. The constitutional implications of 
that proviso are the subject of our report. 
9. The next question is to consider whether there are possibilities that the 
economic weaknesses of the region can be remedied within the existing political 
framework-i.e. on a "territorial" rather than a "regional" basis. Can, that is to say, 
the existing units, or any of them, hope to achieve a sufficient degree of economic 
stability to enable them to achieve a real and permanent independence of outside aid 
and so the possibility of real as distinct from formal political independence? Setting 
aside miracles, the answer for many of the territories is, assuredly not. Some of the 
units, particularly of the smaller ones, have no evident prospect, as units, of moving 
very far from the margin of subsistence in public finance; and, while that is so, 
genuine independence must remain a mirage and its pursuit an occupation doomed 
to failure and frustration. The same is, we consider, less obviously but equally true of 
the larger units, for a variety of reasons. In the first place, no one of them is so large 
that a disaster to one of its major industries or resources could not bring it to 
insolvency and so to the need for outside assistance and the postponement of real 
independence. Secondly, no one unit is large enough, or rich enough, to be able to 
maintain by itself the range of scientists and others to whom, as we have suggested 
above, the region must look for a real improvement in its productivity and economic 
stability. Thirdly, all experience shows that on the basis of independent units, the 
joint action in economic and related matters, which daily becomes more and more 
important, is rendered infinitely slow and difficult and consequently much less 
effective than it should be. There is much more to be said on this topic, but we do not 
consider it necessary to labour it, since we believe that it is perhaps one of the few on 
which there is fairly general unanimity. We are satisfied the region will not achieve 
economic stability while it consists of a large number of quite separate political 
units, and consequently that the hopes of such units of achieving real political 
independence, as such, are slight. 
10. But even if the preceding arguments are accepted, it does not automatically 
follow that the region can achieve, as a single political entity, what its constituent 
units cannot achieve individually. That is to say, for present purposes, that a 
Federation of the British Caribbean, British Guiana and British Honduras can achieve 
a sufficient degree of economic and fiscal stability to enable it to enjoy real political 
independence. We cannot in honesty discount the possibility that we may be attempt-
ing the impossible. Let us make it clear at the outset that the only real proof will be 
the course of history. No one can guarantee success in this undertaking. No one can 
legislate against major and unprecedented natural calamities, against disastrous 
trends in the progress of human affairs in the world at large, or against human fail-
ings on the part of those who may come to power in a Federal Government. In this, as 
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in other major decisions, we can only weigh up probabilities as we see them, and 
express our considered conclusions knowing that other views may be held, and that 
events may show our conclusions to be wrong. That is incidentally the measure of the 
responsibility of our task. In making our recommendations we do so with a full sense 
of the serious consequences of any important error of judgment. 
11. This said, we may place on record our considered and emphatic view that 
Federation, and only Federation, affords a reasonable prospect of achieving economic 
stability and through it that political independence which is our constant object. We 
have chosen these words with care. We do not claim that Federation will immediately 
and automatically solve the economic and fiscal problems of the region, or that it 
cannot fail. We do claim that it will put in the hands of men responsible to the region 
as a whole, powers and opportunities which do not exist at present, and which these 
men according to their abilities and inclinations can use for the betterment of the 
region. Federation will not solve our problems, but will provide the conditions in 
which they can be dealt with. 
12. We desire here to emphasise this point. There is in some quarters a 
disposition to imagine that immediately a Federation is established certain 
difficulties will cease to exist. Conversely, others appear to hold that, because the 
establishment of a Federation will of itself only mean another Legislature and 
administration, and consequent expense, in addition to those already existing (which 
is true so far as it goes) that it will not help the region. Both views are false, because 
problems are never solved automatically by new constitutions but only by the efforts 
of men to whom new constitutions may give appropriate powers and responsibilities 
which did not exist before. These two apparently contradictory views are thus closely 
akin, in that they rest on the fallacy that results are or should be achieved by 
adjustments of political and administrative machinery, instead of by the efforts of 
men who may be helped or hindered by the machinery but who cannot thereby be 
absolved from effort. Federation will not absolve the region from the necessity for 
physical and mental and moral effort- it may, if successful, help that effort to issue 
in greater productivity, more security and higher standards of living. 
13. Arising from this, we wish to point out that the mere establishment of a 
Federation will not of itself bring about a condition of financial and economic 
stability. That can only come when the efforts of a Federalised region have so 
strengthened its economy, and adapted it to its place in the economy of the world, 
that it no longer requires outside backing in financial matters. This may be the work 
of a generation or more- events will show-but at the least it cannot come about 
immediately or automatically. To the extent, therefore, that financial dependence 
involves some form or degree of political dependence, the latter will not be achieved, 
whatever form a Federal constitution takes, until Federation has enabled the region 
to achieve economic stability. To ignore this fact and to speak of full independence, 
without regard to economic realities, is to run the risk of the frustration to which we 
have earlier referred, and to do a disservice to the region. We do not hereby imply 
that the actual operation of the financial links with His Majesty's Government, and 
particularly of Treasury Control, are incapable of improvement-far from it-but 
that is a separate topic to which we shall return in due course. 
14. Briefly, the services that Federation can render, and which can be adequately 
rendered in no other way, can be summarised as prompt, effective action in the eco-
nomic field on behalf of the region as a whole. There is a clamant necessity for some 
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single agency which can speak and act with authority, full knowledge, and at short 
notice, for the region in a wide field of activities, of which trade negotiations are only 
the most prominent example. This necessitates an agency which can act in its own 
right, and not by delegation from other agencies and subject to their confirmation. 
This in turn requires a fully representative deliberative organisation from which to 
derive the necessary authority-that is to say, a legislature in which the directly 
elected representatives of the people of the region have a preponderant voice. No other 
arrangement can, in our view, be more than a second-best: and to adopt any expedi-
ent short of full Federation carries with it the serious risk that the delays and frustra-
tions which may arise from its working may turn opinion against still closer 
association, and so become an obstacle to Federation and not a stepping-stone to it. 
15. We are conscious that much of the foregoing is a restatement of what is 
already accepted, and that, strictly speaking, it is not incumbent upon us to argue the 
pros and cons of Federation. But we have in our deliberations had an unusual 
opportunity of discussing the matter in much greater detail than was possible at the 
Montego Bay Conference, or in the discussions in the various Legislatures of the 
recommendations of that Conference; and we feel that there is advantage in setting 
out at length some of the basic considerations which we have evolved, and which 
have largely guided us in our more detailed recommendations. In summary, we 
believe that the attainment of independence within the British Commonwealth is the 
legitimate political objective of the region; that its attainment is contingent upon the 
attainment of economic stability and the prospect of continuing solvency; that 
economic stability and solvency can, and can only, be reached (though not in a day) 
by setting up a Federal Government and entrusting to it certain important powers 
and responsibilities, particularly though not exclusively in the economic field. The 
remainder of this Report consists of the detailed application of these principles to a 
Federal Constitution within the framework of which the statesmen of the region will 
have the opportunity of leading their people towards their goal. We shall treat the 
matter under the broad headings of, first, the relations between the Federal and the 
Territorial Governments, and the division of functions between them; secondly, the 
relations, particularly as regards finance, between the Federal Government and His 
Majesty's Government; thirdly, the finances of the Federation; fourthly, the Federal 
Executive and, fifthly, the Federal Legislature; sixthly, the Judiciary; seventhly, the 
position of certain Dependencies; and finally, constitutional Revision. 
5 CO 318/486/3 27 June 1949 
[Finance]: minute by HT Bourdillon toW L Gorell Barnes on the 
financial arrangements for federation 
[This minute was written in response to a memo submitted by Beasley1 through Rance2 in 
which Beasley, having been asked by SCAC to prepare a 'personal' memo on financial 
1 Prof C G Beasley, economic adviser to comptroller, Development and Welfare Organisation, British West 
Indies, from 1946; adviser at Montego Bay Conference, 1947; member of Evans Commission on 
Settlement of British Guiana and British Honduras; chairman, Regional Economic Committee, British 
West Indies and financial adviser to SCAC. 
2 Sir H Ranee, gov of Burma, 1946-1948; chairman, SCAC, 1948- 1950; British eo-chairman, Caribbean 
Commission, 1948-1950; gov of Trinidad and Tobago, 1950-1955. 
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arrangements, requested from the CO clarification on a number of important points. In 
particular Beasley wanted an expression of CO views on the arrangements for a customs 
union and financial devolution. The CO agreed with Beasley that customs duties would be 
the principal source of federal revenue and that seventy-five per cent of the total collected 
should be returned to the units. However, for the reasons explained at the end of the third 
paragraph of Bourdillon's minute reproduced here, the CO did not accept Beasley's view 
that financial control over the unit governments should be vested, not in the federal 
government but in the governor-general on behalf of or by devolution from the secretary 
of state (CO 318/486/3, no 4, letter from Ranee to See!, 27 May 1949, forwarding Beasley's 
memo, 4 May 1949).] 
This is the file dealing with the financial arrangements for the West Indian 
Federation-if it comes off. You will remember that I mentioned the matter to you a 
few days ago, and told you that we had had important discussions with the Treasury. 
You may now like to see the papers. 
There seem to be a number of trends of opinion relative to this matter in the West 
Indies, not all of them pulling in the same direction. In fact it would hardly be going 
too far to say that there are some fundamental contradictions in the West Indian 
attitude. On the one hand there are [sic], of course, the desire for political advance 
and the impatience with Treasury control (though we may hope that the latter has 
been mitigated by the recent improvements in the working of the system). On the 
other hand we find a desire for continued financial support from H.M.G. and a strong 
disinclination on the part of the Treasury-controlled territories to exchange control 
by H.M.G. for control by a hypothetical federal authority. This preference for a 
known evil as opposed to an unknown is doubtless natural, but is an indication, I 
think, of the failure of West Indian opinion to face up to the implications of 
federation and political independence. A similar failure is evident from allegations in 
the West Indian press that H.M.G. are "foisting federation in the West Indies in order 
to escape from financial responsibilities". The answer to these allegations is, of 
course, that while H.M.G. are certainly not going to abandon their responsibilities 
overnight, financial self-sufficiency and political autonomy must go hand in hand. 
The end of direct financial support from H.M.G. should in fact be not only a 
concomitant of federation self-government, but one of its objectives. 
It was against this background that we were called upon (see No. 4) to say 
something authorative at short about a number of things, and in particular about the 
financial arrangements which we envisage for the future Federation. The matter was 
thrashed out first at an internal meeting in Mr. Seel's room, and later at a discussion 
with the Treasury, attended by Mr. See!, Mr. Watt, Mr. Greig3 and myself. It might 
have been held that the corect [sic] course was for H.M.G. to refuse to be drawn 
until the people on the spot had produced at least some provisional ideas, but you 
will notice from the enclosure to No. 4 that Professor Beasley presses strongly for a 
lead from the Colonial Office in this and other matters, and it was felt by all 
concerned, including the Treasury, that this request should be met. The result was 
the telegram at No. 6, which was agreed with the Treasury before despatch. You will 
see that, without entering into any commitments at the present stage, we have 
endeavoured to indicate that H.M.G. would be prepared to go a long way in the 
abandonment of control at least for an initial period, provided the Federation is 
allowed to become a financial reality from the outset, with prospects of financial self-
sufficiency at a later stage. It is proposed, as you know, that the federal authority 
3 I B Watt, CO principal, West Indian Dept 'B'; R C H Greig, principal, CO Finance Dept. 
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should collect customs revenue and perhaps income tax throughout the constituent 
territories and should retain a fixed proportion (say 25%) of the proceeds for its own 
purposes. The major portion of this would be used to meet federal expenses, but it is 
to be hoped that there would be a margin, which might be used in the first instance 
to build up a federal reserve. Our suggestion, as you will see from No. 6, is that 
H.M.G. should make a block grant over, say, 5 years based on the average aggregate 
of grants-in-aid in the recent past, and should hand over this money to the federal 
authorities at stated intervals without control, provided it were understood that the 
federal authority would do its utmost not to come back for more and would meet any 
further deficits in the deficit colonies out of the federal reserve in the first instance. 
Under this arrangement the exact relations between the federal authority and the 
colonies requiring assistance would be left for local settlement. This, of course, 
would be bound to lead to some local opposition, but the whole point of the 
suggestion is that, while giving evidence of generosity on the part of H.M.G. during 
an initial period, it will at the same time confront the West Indian peoples with the 
responsibilities inseparable from political advance. 
Another feature of our suggestion is that H.M.G. might make an additional grant 
towards the capital expenses of setting up the federal authority. There was some 
discussion about the source of this grant. The Treasury were in favour of the C.D. & 
W. Vote-a suggestion which the Colonial Office, for familiar reasons, resisted. The 
matter was left open. 
The Treasury were as strongly in support of all this as we were ourselves. I think 
the results are important, and when the time comes for H.M.G. to commit 
themselves, I hope they will not hesitate to do so on the above lines. 
When you have studied the file, perhaps you would pass it to Mr. Marnham as 
requested in the immediately preceding minute. 
6 CO 318/487/1, no 10 5 Sept 1949 
[Federation]: letter from C Y Carstairs to I B Watt on West Indian 
attitudes and suspicions. Enclosure: notes by Sir H Ranee for use by 
Lord Listowel during his visit to the West Indies 
With reference to your letter of the 19th of August, I enclose notes by the Chairman 
on the major points of enquiry or criticisms which Lord Listowel is likely to encounter. 
I should like to add a few general observations, from which the Chairman does not 
dissent. 
First, in this and indeed any other connexion, one must accept the fact that there 
is a widespread and probably ineradicable distrust of the motives of H.M.G. No 
statement of policy is accepted as disinterested, or without hidden motives, the 
search for which provides congenial employment for many journalists and others. 
This of course lacks factual basis: and I feel that it largely derives not from the 
behaviour of H.M.G. at all but from the prevailing low standards of political morality 
in the region. West Indians have good reason to believe that most if not all of their 
public men seldom if ever advocate a proposal or policy for its own sake but for some 
interested and personal motive. It is foreign to that experience and estimation of 
probabilities that H.M.G. should act otherwise. 
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Secondly, and consequently, any policy strongly urged by H.M.G. is ipso facto 
suspect. Witness certain reactions to the Secretary of State's statements at Montego 
Bay. To us, they could hardly be clearer; but the statement that H.M.G. would 
support a federated West Indies caused some, particularly in Jamaica, to infer that 
H.M.G. would be less well disposed to an unfederated West Indies, and those who 
twisted all this to mean "federate or else" got and still enjoy a considerable hearing. 
Hence the desirability of not seeming to "push" federation and of emphasising the 
fact that the decision is one for the West Indies themselves. 
Thirdly, we have to contend with a great body of sheer ignorance about the very 
nature of a federal structure. Misconceptions abound, such as that territorial 
Governments would be "under" a federal Government for all purposes; that 
federation is bound to be enormously costly, that federation equals Dominion status, 
or independence automatically. This widespread ignorance is made use of by several 
who do not care openly to oppose federation: their line, which finds plenty of 
response is "Tell us more about it". When you meet a "Tell us more about it" man, 
you may be pretty sure that you are meeting a cryto-opponent [sic]. 
All in all, my own personal view is that the omens are against the acceptance by the 
region of any proposals that the Standing Closer Association Committee may put for-
ward at this time. On that assumption, the main value of its work and its Report will be 
educative; and, without neglecting the chance that a scheme might be accepted, it seems 
that we should take a long view and, in billiards parlance, "play for the leave." This means 
avoiding any suggestion of "now or never"-the answer is too likely to be "never"-and 
so far as I am able I have been trying so to frame the draft of the SCAC report as to pro-
vide public opinion with some informative reading between what I expect will be the 
rejection of the Committee's proposals and the next time the matter comes up. I go on 
the assumption that the more information is spread abroad the better public discussion 
is likely to be and the better the chances of wise and "solid" decisions later on. 
Enclosure to 6 
1. Avoid any suggestion that H.M.G. is bringing pressure to bear so that federation 
may be achieved. Representatives of the weaker colonies hope that H.M.G. will adopt 
such a course, as they believe (with truth) that opposition to federation will be 
strongest in the larger or more wealthy colonies. Some of the members of the Standing 
Closer Association Committee have already mentioned to me that they doubt if 
federation will come to pass from West Indian fruition alone, and that H.M.G. should 
compel the colonies to federate in the same way as the Britain North American Act was 
forced on Canada in 1867. This latter contention is of course incorrect but some ardent 
federalists believe it to be true and they may well advance this argument in discussion. 
Arguments 
If any such representation is made I suggest that the reply could take the following 
line:-
H.M.G's policy is the same now as it was when a West Indies Federation was first 
mooted. Attention could be directed to Lord Halifax's1 statement made after his visit 
1 Edward F L Wood, 1st Baron lrwin 1925, 3rd Viscount Halifax 1934; parliamentary under-secretary of 
state for the colonies, 1921-1922; Viceroy of India, 1926- 1931; foreign secretary, 1938-1940; British 
ambassador to US, 1941-1946. 
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to the West Indies in 1921-22 in which, inter alia, he said "But I desire once again to 
emphasise my opinion that, on this or on any analogous proposition, it must be 
made clear that an essential condition of approval by the Secretary of State will be a 
deliberate opinion in favour of the change in the Colonies themselves". 
This statement is quoted in Command Paper 7291, page 3- the Report of the 
Montego Bay Conference 1947. 
2. There is likely to be insistence from many quarters, that the constitution of any 
Federal Government must be an advance on all existing constitutions in the British 
West Indies. 
Argument 
Cannot prejudge or forecast recommendations of the Standing Closer Association 
Committee nor of H.M.G's reactions until report is received. 
3. Many elements, more especially from the Trade Unions and extreme left, will 
argue that federation is unacceptable unless accompanied by complete self-
government. The most vociferous of the protagonists for this theory will probably be 
met in the more powerful colonies. 
Arguments 
(a) There are many answers to this theory but the one I have found to be most 
useful is to play up the fears of the weaker colonies. In these colonies even the most 
ardent federalist fears domination by the more powerful colonies and the possibility 
that his country may be looked upon, and in fact become, a poor relation. For these 
reasons, safeguards are asked for by the weaker brethren. When analysed, these 
safeguards can only effectively be provided by H.M.G. All the units comprising the 
British West Indies will have to be coaxed into a federation for one reason or another 
and therefore in the first instance it is essential to devise a constitution acceptable to 
all, or at least the majority. Mter federation, when the fears and prejudices have 
waned then steps can be taken to achieve more responsibility. 
(b) The argument that self-government must be in step with financial stability is 
indeed relevant and can be used to a chosen audience. To some West Indians, however, 
such an argument is complete anathema; they believe, like the Irish, that H.M.G. is 
perpetually in debt to the West In dies for errors or omissions of the past three hundred 
years. The sum mentioned, in all seriousness, to liquify this debt is astronomical and 
would undoubtedly provide financial stability for a greater or lesser number of years. 
4. Fears of the weaker units that they will be dominated by their more powerful 
cousins. 
Arguments 
Essential that H.M.G. possesses safeguards for use in the last resort until these fears 
have been dissipated 
5. Fears of the wealthy units that they will be called upon to shoulder the recurring 
financial indebtedness of those units now in receipt of grant-in-aid. 
Arguments 
Some politicians and prominent persons in the wealthy units may well advance the 
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theory that the enthusiasm shown by H.M.G. for federation, is due mainly to the 
desire to rid herself of the financial liabilities of the weaker units. 
I have always used the argument that H.M.G. has no intention of escaping her 
financial responsibilities in this respect and have referred to the Secretary of State's 
financial proposals for the smaller federation Windward-Leewards. (Command Paper 
7120, page 14). 
I have also pointed out that the members of the Standing Closer Association 
Committee are well aware of the problem and the subject will undoubtedly be 
included in the report. 
6. Jamaica 
(a) A peculiar situation exists here. The opposition represented by the Peoples [sic] 
National Party (P.N.P.) with Manley at the head have weighed in strongly in favour of 
federation. This has placed "Busta" in a difficult position-his "volte face" at Montego 
Bay was probably due to his realisation that he was in a minority when initially he 
poured cold water on the earlier speakers who spoke as ardent supporters of federation. 
Although later during the proceedings at Montego Bay he came down on the side of 
federation , I doubt if he is strongly wedded to this view for the following reasons:-
(i) He is afraid that P.N.P. will achieve power through the back door of federation. 
He is confident that he can hold his opponents in check in local politics in 
Jamaica, but when it comes to federal elections, he is not so happy. 
(ii) He prefers to be "monarch of his own castle" rather than an "also ran" in a 
federal set up. If he thought that he would be Governor-General, or possible 
Federal Prime Minister, then his attitude would probably change. 
(iii) He is in any event a purely political animal. His conduct will always be deter-
mined by its effect on his own personal position, the only qualification being that, 
given more than one course of action, he will usually choose the more flamboyant 
and exhibitionist. So Busta's reaction will depend on his estimate of the form at the 
moment of taking a decision and one can only speculate about it beforehand. 
(b) Busta's arguments against federation will probably be in the main, financiaJ.2 
2 Bustamante launched a strong attack on UK policy when he spoke at the first plenary session of the 
Montego Bay conference in Sept 1947. Alluding to his suspicion of the motive behind federation, he 
observed that 'whilst most of us West Indians have been asking for self-government, we are told that self-
government for the time being is really not good for us and the thing we deserve is federation . .. . 
Federation can come, but I cannot see the advisability of federation without self-government or greater self-
determination for each and every island'. Bustamante was also critical of how it was proposed to establish a 
federation:' . . . what are we going to federate with? Apart from Trinidad, who [sic] has oil, and Demerara, 98% 
of the other West Indian islands are pauperised and in a state of bankruptcy. I have never heard that in 
joining with bankrupts one can become successful or prosperous . . . . The most important thing is finance. 
Before this Conference was called, the first thing, in my considered opinion, that should have been done 
was to have an approximate estimate of the financial cost of the federation. We have not been given any idea 
as to the financial cost or where the money is to come from ... . It looks to me as if we are starting at the 
wrong end. We are putting the cart before the horse. The horse should be before the cart, or the cart should 
come simultaneously-self-government before federation can come. We must be told who will finance this 
federal council, we must be told how much of our revenue must go abroad, we must be told many more 
things so that we can enlighten the other people of the country. Before we can have federation there must 
be a better understanding in the West Indies, there must be better friendship between the West Indies' 
(Conference on the Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies, Montego Bay, Jamaica, 11th-
19th September 1947, Part 2: Proceedings, Col218, 1948, pp 20-27, copy in CO 318/488/1). 
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He will overestimate the cost of the federal structure and will bid for a fantastic grant 
from H.M.G. before he is prepared to give his support. He will know that there isn't 
the slightest chance of his bid being accepted by H.M.G., but he knows that a refusal, 
or even silence on the part of H.M.G. regarding his bid, will present him with 
excellent material in elections against his opponents when federation is put forward 
as a plank in P.N.Ps political gangway. Busta's attitude is also likely to be adopted by 
prominent business men in Jamaica who see no benefits for themselves and shut 
their eyes to any benefits that should accrue to the area as a whole or even Jamaica. 
Arguments 
(i) The total cost of a federal structure will not be a very large sum. 
(ii) A regional authority representing the whole British West Indies must 
necessarily carry more weight in this modern world of perpetual conferences than 
a number of small individual units . The introduction of unified tariffs and an 
efficient unified customs service will undoubtedly produce benefits in time for the 
area and for individual units. Regional planning in essential aspects of West Indian 
life will also be possible. These considerations are appreciated by all, even in 
Jamaica, but what isn't sufficiently understood is that a regional authority without 
power is almost valueless. This power can best be supplied by federation. 
7. Trinidad 
(a) Has a prominent minority problem in that over 30% of the population are 
East Indians. The Indian politician generally opposes federation although he is chary 
of making his opinion public. At the present time East Indians are strongly 
represented in the Trinidad Government but they fear that in a Federal Government 
their representation will be nil or negligible. East Indians accordingly may ask for 
safeguards, but the Standing Closer Association Committee are adamant against any 
such concessions, on the grounds that East Indians must regard themselves as West 
Indians and a Federal Government will be West Indian, and will do all that is right 
and proper for its peoples. 
(b) There is a widespread fear that Federation will open the door to widespread 
immigration from both the less wealthy and over-populated colonies. Trinidad has 
suffered recently from authorised and unauthorised immigrants from Grenada. 
Argument 
The Standing Closer Association Committee are aware of this problem which affects 
not only Trinidad, but also those other colonies where space or employment appears 
available. Assurance can be given that such fears are groundless. 
8. British Guiana 
The slogan of a "Continental Destiny" first enunciated by a former Governor still 
persists. There is widespread belief also among all sections of the people from high to 
low that British Guiana is the El Dorado of Sir Waiter Raleigh's dreams. For these 
reasons articulate opinion does not favour federation. It will be remembered that the 
British Guiana Legislative Council when debating the Montego Bay Resolutions 
decided "that this Council records that it does not endorse the Conference 
Resolution No. 1 insofar as concerns British Guiana and further reserves judgment 
and full freedom of decision on all aspects of closer association as envisaged by the 
Conference, but agrees that British Guiana should, without prejudice, participate in 
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the Committees and such Commissions recommended to be set up in terms of the 
Conference Resolutions Nos. 2 to 14". 
Resolution No. 1 reads "That this Conference, recognising the desirability of a 
political federation of the British Caribbean territories, accepts the principle of a 
federation in which each constituent unit retains complete control over all matters 
except those specifically assigned to the Federal Government". 
(b) British Guiana fears wide scale immigration especially during the period 
when the Evans Commission recommendations are being implemented (See 7(b) 
above). 
(c) British Guiana has also an East Indian problem of greater proportions than 
Trinidad (See 7(a) above). 
(d) The negro labour organisations are in favour of federation but want more 
power than at present envisaged, vide Mr. Lee's memorandum referred to by Watt in 
his letter to Carstairs. Mr. Lee is a leader of labour in British Guiana and also a 
member of the Standing Closer Association Committee. The East Indians who have 
their own labour organisations are in their heart or hearts against federation for 
reasons given in 7(a) above. 
9. British Honduras 
(a) The currency is linked with the U.S.A. and many prominent persons believe 
that their destiny is linked with the North i.e. U.S.A. and Canada, rather than with 
the rest of the British West Indies and the United Kingdom. This linkage with the 
North is due to the sale of British Honduras products, mahogany and chide, the 
latter being an ingredient of chewing gum. Thinking people however realise that 
these assets are wasting, mahogany because of the depletion of reserves in the past 
without adequate regeneration, and chide because of the competition of synthetic 
ingredients. These same thinking people believe (with truth perhaps) that it will not 
be long, especially if the Evans Commission recommendations are implemented, 
before British Honduras' economy is almost entirely dependent on an eastward link. 
The fear of Guatemala has also undoubtedly strengthened the desire to unite with 
the British West Indies. 
(b) British Honduras is also afraid of immigration and has almost a vitriolic 
hatred of Jamaicans. This is due in part to misbehaviour by Jamaican labour 
imported temporarily for work many years ago. This hatred however is kept alive by 
certain self-seeking politicians and others with an axe to grind. British Honduras is 
amenable to immigration when conditions warrant provided that the immigrants 
come from elsewhere than Jamaica. 
(c) The negroes are very proud of their efforts in the Battle of St. Georges Cay 
(pronounced Key) in 1798 when as slaves they were armed to repulse the 
Spaniards. 
10. Barbados 
Is proud of running own show satisfactorily and without outside help for the past 300 
years. A number of people therefore see little benefit in federation. The advocates for 
federation consist in the main of negro and coloured politicians and the "have nots" 
with the white Barbadians preferring the "status quo". The main fear of federation is 
finance: reckless spending by a Federal Administration and liabilities for the grant-
in-aid colonies. 
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11. Windwards and Leewards 
The small islands are generally in favour of federation as in their opinion they have 
all to gain and little to lose. The main fear is domination by their more powerful 
cousins. The proposal, not yet dead, to federate the Windwards and Leewards may be 
raised in these islands. Opinion is strongly against such a federation with the wider 
federation in view. It is difficult to argue against this opinion; a three decker bus 
consisting of a British West Indian Federal Government, a Windward-Leeward 
Government and then unit governments would seem to be unwieldly, expensive and 
unworkable. 
7 CO 10311539, no 1 [Dec 1951] 
[US bases]: draft CO memorandum on the urgent need for the release 
for agricultural purposes of deactivated US base areas in Antigua, 
Trinidad and Jamaica 
His Majesty's Government wish to draw attention to the serious difficulties which 
have arisen in certain West Indian Colonies as a result of delay in securing the 
release for cultivation purposes of deactivated United States Base areas. The 
territories particularly concerned are Antigua, Trinidad, and Jamaica. The majority 
of leased areas in these islands were evacuated in 1949, and negotiations were then 
set in motion for the conclusion of formal agreements covering the use of such areas, 
concurrently with negotiations for permanent leasing arrangements in the islands. 
These negotiations are still in progress but meanwhile valuable agricultural land has 
remained idle for over two years, and it has become increasingly difficult for the 
Colonial Governments concerned to persuade local opinion that important areas 
which are clearly no longer in operational use by the United States, cannot be placed 
under cultivation. The pressure of rapidly expanding populations and the marked rise 
in the cost of living in British Caribbean Colonies during the last nine months, make 
it a matter of urgency in these territories that all available land should be applied to 
the expansion of local food production or of the out-put of basic export crops. 
Moreover both in Trinidad and Antigua there are political elements anxious to 
exploit the economic situation and it is already evident in these two islands that the 
question of the release of the leased areas is assuming a political as well as an 
economic importance. It is no exaggeration to say that if delay in bringing these 
areas into cultivation were to continue indefinitely, it might prove to be a cause of 
instability and discontent. His Majesty's Government are also concerned lest the 
warm feelings of friendships for the U.S. which have hitherto existed in these 
Colonies, should be impaired as a result of such delays. 
2. As the United States Government are aware, negotiations for the conclusion of 
formal agreements for the use of leased areas when not required operationally are 
still incomplete in Antigua and Trinidad, but even where general agreement in 
principle has been reached, the United States has not so far been able to agree that 
such arrangements should come into force until the question of leasing 
arrangements has also been finally settled. It is likely that these formal agreements 
regarding the leasing and use of Base areas will govern the position in the Colonies 
concerned for many years to come and for this reason His Majesty's Government, 
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while anxious to avoid undue delay and appreciative of the desire of the United States 
Government to secure the execution of definitive lease instruments at an early date, 
consider that such agreements merit detailed and careful consideration before their 
final ratification. There appears however to be no reason why the actual use of the 
land in question should be denied to the peoples of the Colonies concerned, while 
such negotiations are in progress, provided that there exists a basis of understanding 
acceptable to both the United States and His Majesty's Government on which such 
interim use might be made. During the war years, areas urgently required by the 
United States for operational purposes were readily made available by Colonial 
Governments, although the position regarding the legal title of the United States and 
the precise extent of the areas remained under discussion or was left for subsequent 
negotiation. His Majesty's Government have every reason to hope that in the spirit of 
the final paragraph of the preamble to the Leased Bases Agreement, the United States 
Government will be equally willing to agree to the agricultural use of Bases areas in 
cases where the peacetime requirements of the Colonial Governments are of similar 
urgency, pending a satisfactory long-term settlement by the conclusion of formal 
agreements. 
3. If the United States Government were prepared to agree to the immediate 
release of deactivated areas in Antigua, Trinidad and Jamaica, His Majesty's 
Government suggest that their use during the interim period until formal Utilisation 
Agreements are brought into operation in each Island, might be on the following 
basis:-
(i) The United States to have the right to reoccupy the areas at 48 hours notice, if 
necessary; 
(ii) The United States to be free from any liability to pay compensation for claims 
arising during the Colonial Government's occupation or as a result of 
reoccupation by the United States; 
(iii) Colonial Government to be free from any liability to pay rent or compensation 
to the United States for the use of the areas; 
(iv) Colonial Governments to be free to allow use of the areas by third parties; 
(v) Colonial Governments to consult with the local U.S. authorities before 
constructing or carrying out improvements in the areas; 
(vi) The United States to have the right to inspect the areas at all reasonable times; 
(vii) These arrangements to remain in operation until a formal Utilisation 
Agreement has been brought into effect. 
His Majesty's Government also suggest that any difficulties in implementing these 
arrangements for bringing the areas under cultivation could be resolved by 
consultation at the local level, and that no further detailed agreement would be 
required beyond the concurrence of the two governments in the above 
understanding. These arrangements however would be expressly without prejudice 
to the terms of formal Utilisation Agreements now under negotiation, and in this 
connection His Majesty's Government wish to inform the United States Government 
that they hope to be able shortly to transmit definitive and comprehensive proposals 
for the conclusion of formal Utilisation Agreements in the various Colonies 
concerned. 
4. Apart from the general considerations set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, 
there are also certain special circumstances in each of the territories mentioned; 
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(i) Antigua 
During the past year as a result of strikes and strained labour relations, a large part 
of the 1951 sugar crop has gone to waste. It is imperative both to the political 
stability and economy of the Island that every possible acre of land should be 
brought under cultivation at the earliest possible date. The position in Antigua was 
regarded as urgent in July this year when personal representations by the 
Governor of the Leeward Islands were brought to the United States Government's 
attention. With the passage of every month it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
placate local opinion. 
(ii) Trinidad 
The unrestricted spread of plant diseases in the untended Bases areas is 
imperilling cocoa and coconut crops outside the leases areas. The increasing cost 
of living has presented the Government with serious political and economic 
difficulties and a vigorous campaign has recently been launched to secure 
maximum local production. 
(iii) Jamaica 
The recent hurricane has deprived the people of many of their staple sources of 
food supply and created unemployment among some classes of agricultural 
workers. In these circumstances the restoration and increase of local food 
production is an urgent necessity. 
5. For these reasons His Majesty's Government must request the United States 
Government to give urgent consideration to the immediate release of areas in these 
three Colonies for agricultural purposes on the basis suggested. Particularly in 
Antigua it would be an advantage both for political and economic reasons if an 
announcement that the land had been made available could be made in January 
1952. As the areas are required principally for sugar planting for which a four-year 
planting cycle is necessary, His Majesty's Government would also welcome an 
assurance that in the case of Antigua, subject to the United States right of 
reoccupation, the arrangements would remain in operation for a period of not less 
than four years or until the bringing into operation of a formal Utilisation 
Agreement, whichever might be the earlier. 
8 CO 1031/760, no 9 Jan 1952 
'The financial aspects of West Indian Federation': CO note for Mr 
Lyttelton on the estimated cost to HMG. Minute by H T Bourdillon 
The S.C.A.C. Report makes the following financial proposals:-
(i) The Federal Government should have its own source of revenue; this should be 
customs revenue; but that, at least in the initial stages, not less than 75% of the 
customs revenue collected by the Federation should be returned to the constituent 
territories. 
(ii) H.M.G. should make to the Federal Government for ten years an annual grant 
equivalent to the average amount actually issued by way of grant-in-aid over the 
five years preceding the establishment of the Federation. This would be reserved 
for grants-in-aid to unit Governments. If it proved insufficient, the excess would 
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be sought in the first instance from Federal funds, though further aid might 
ultimately have to be provided by H.M.G. 
(iii) H.M.G. should make a capital grant towards the cost of the Federal 
Headquarters. 
(iv) The region should continue to be eligible for C.D. and W. assistance. 
These recommendations were made after informal consultations with the Colonial 
Office and the Treasury; and the Treasury subsequently confirmed that they were 
acceptable to them. 
2. The purpose of this note is to estimate the cost to H.M.G of recommendations 
(ii), (iii) and (iv) above. (It is assumed that British Guiana and British Honduras will 
stand out of federation). 
3. As regards (ii) , the provision for grants-in-aid for West Indian territories 
(excluding British Honduras) for 1952-53 is about £600,000. For present purposes, 
this figure can be taken as the amount of the annual payment to the Federal 
Government for grants to the deficit units. 
4. As regards (iii), the cost of providing a Federal Headquarters should not 
exceed £1 million, and may be less. 
5. The main problem arises under (iv). For purposes of calculation, it is 
necessary to make certain assumptions. These are that:-
(i) There will be a further C.D. and W. Act after the expiry of the present ten-year 
period. 
(ii) From 1956 further C.D. and W. assistance will be given on the present basis 
but for a five-year period only. 
(iii) A federation will not come into being in time to disturb the existing 
arrangements for the allocation and disbursement of C.D. and W. funds under the 
present Acts. 
The amount of C.D. and W. assistance to which the West Indies (excluding British 
Guiana and British Honduras) would be entitled on these assumptions in the five 
years 1956-61 can be calculated as follows:-
(a) C.D. and W. provision in 
1951-56 
(b) Provision for increased prices 
at 15% 
£ 
millions 
14 
2.5 
16.5 
6. Payments by H.M.G. in 1956-61 to the federated group of Colonies may 
therefore be estimated at:-
(a) Grant-in-aid 
(b) Federal Headquarters 
(c) C.D. and W. 
£ 
millions 
3 
1 
16.5 
20.5 
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It must, however, be emphasised that, if the assumptions in the preceding 
paragraph are correct, the expenditure under (a) and (c) would be incurred whether 
or not a federation came into being: a literal acceptance of the S.C.A.C. 
recommendations would cost H.M.G. only the small additional sum at (b). 
7. Grants uunder (a) and (b) in the preceding paragraph would obviously be 
made to the Federal Government. It is felt that C.D. and W. assistance should 
similarly be made to the Federal Government, i.e. it should be responsible for co-
ordinating the claims of the individual Governments, for putting in applications on 
their behalf to H.M.G and for supervising generally the use of funds provided by 
H.M.G. under this head. This arrangement will not be popular with the unit 
Governments and may not be secured, but it seems reasonable that the Federal 
Government should assume this responsibility as part of their general responsibility 
for regional economic planning. 
8. It is, however, unlikely that the West Indian political leaders, when they come 
to the proposed London Conference, will be satisfied with a promise of financial aid 
on the basis proposed by the S.C.A.C. report. Firstly, they will ask for a much more 
precise indication of the amount of C.D. and W. assistance they will receive from 
1956 onwards than H.M.G. may be able to give in 1952. Secondly, they will argue that 
political federation of these scattered territories with their economic weaknesses and 
rapidly expanding populations is inevitably a leap in the dark, that it will be 
successful only if it leads to further economic development, and that it is incumbent 
on H.M.G. to provide the basic conditions for success by providing initially funds for 
development over and above what would, even without federation, be provided under 
a new C. D. and W. Act. We do not at present know what sort of demands may be made 
for supplementary financial assistance for economic development, but it must be 
recognised that such demands will almost certainly be made and may be on a scale 
which would add appreciably to the estimated figure in paragraph 6 above. H.M.G.'s 
attitude towards them may affect decisively the result of the London Conference. 
Minute on 8 
Mr. Luke (through Mr Wallace) 
Mr. Smith1 has shown these papers to me, and I am very glad to have seen them 
again. 
2. Broadly speaking, I agree that there is nothing further to be done for the time 
being. I would, however, like to make one or two points, in case they are in danger of 
being forgotten. 
3. First, I should like to say a word about the reasons for supposing that we may 
have to give the West Indies, if and when they federate, a greater measure of new 
assistance towards capital development than a mere continuance of C.D. & W. 
assistance on its present scale (as tacitly envisaged in the S.C.A.C. Report). I see that 
the later papers on the file, including the submission to the Secretary of State at No. 
9 and the record of the discussion with Sir George See! at No. 10, tend to dwell on 
the point that financial arrangements as laid down in the S.C.A.C. Report might be 
insufficient to satisfy West Indian politicians. This may be true (though it seems a 
1 D M Smith, principal, CO Finance Dept. 
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little topsy-turvy that we should have to bribe the West Indies to accept federation 
proposals which are designed entirely for for their own benefit), but I do not think it 
is the most important point. The most important point is that by and large the West 
Indies, what with under-employment and rapidly increasing populations, are going 
economically downhill. While we may deride the claim that Britain owes a debt to the 
West Indies for the fortunes taken out of them in the plantation days, the fact 
remains that until quite recently nothing was done to put money back into these 
islands in order to expand their economy, and that the effects of this neglect are now 
being felt. Over-population in relation to economic resources becomes daily a more 
serious problem, and matters have been made worse by the phenomenonal rises in 
costs (not fully counterbalanced, in the case of the West Indies as a whole, by an 
equivalent rise in the value of produce) over the past few years. These facts impressed 
themselves on both of us during our tour of the West Indies a year ago, and we both 
felt grave doubts whether C.D. & W. assistance on the present scale is sufficient to 
stop the rot. If I may quote one passage from my report2 on the visit:-
"At the end of it all it is impossible not to have the feeling that we are only 
scratching the surface, and that the economic problems of the area will 
continue to advance faster than any progress we can make, without 
considerably greater capital outlay both in terms of loan and grant than falls 
within our present plans, towards solving them". 
If this is true, then the West Indies require increased assistance irrespective of 
federation; but the act of federation will emphasise the need, since it has always been 
our hope (and the hope of the supporters of closer union in the West Indies 
themselves) that a federated West Indies would become financially self-supporting as 
soon as possible.3 It is certain that the act of political federation would not by itself 
achieve this result, and you and I have therefore always felt that this act must be 
supported by H.M.G with a new measure of capital assistance if hopes are not to be 
frustrated and if the new political unit is ever to be more than a far;ade. To my mind, 
2 Accompanied by S E V Luke, Bourdillon visited the West Indies, including British Honduras, between Jan 
and Mar 1951. On this return he compiled a lengthy report which concentrated mainly on the Leeward 
and Windward Islands. He concluded that the policy of 'balanced development', designed over the past 
five years to secure an all-round improvement in social and economic services, had failed. There had been 
an insufficient concentration on 'first things first'. In answer to the common assumption that social 
conditions had to be improved before developing territories could advance economically, Bourdillon 
argued that the opposite was true in the West Indies. The fundamental problem was over-population in 
relation to resources: 'It is this which threatens to create increasing unemployment and to depress still 
further the general standard of living. It follows that a resolute concentration on the development and 
utilisation of economic resources is the only policy which, apart from maintaining financial stability, can 
hope to strike at the root of the social evil' (CO 1031/760, report by Bourdillon, 4 Apr 1951). Luke agreed 
with Bourdillon that the mistake made in the CD&W plans evolved during the war was that so much 
emphasis had been placed on social inprovement in advance of economic development. The smaller 
islands especially were now burdened with recurrent budgetary costs which they could not sustain but any 
attempt to correct the error and to reverse the order of priority would lead to a change of breach of faith (T 
220/229, Luke to A E Drake, Treasury, 12 June 1952). T 220/229 is a Treasury file on general financial and 
economic problems in the Caribbean containing extensive correspondence between Luke and Treasury 
officials between 1951 and 1953. 
3 Sir H Poynton commented in the margin against this sentence: 'Exactly. I am glad this point has been 
made. We are not bribing the W.I . into Federation but trying to buy them out of recurrent financial 
dependency.' 
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therefore, the case for increased assistance to the West Indies during the next few 
years is only political in the very broadest sense. It is primarily economic, in that 
without such assistance we may be confident that the economic situation of many of 
the West Indian territories will go from bad to worse. So it is not merely a question of 
buying off political opposition. It is a question of taking steps to avert a further 
deterioration in the already bad economic situation. In asking themselves whether 
they can afford to take these steps, H.M.G. must also ask themselves-however poor 
they may be feeling at the moment-whether they can afford not to. 
4. My second point, which is closely related to the first, concerns the regional 
approach. I am only too well aware that when everything has been said about the 
necessity for further economic development in the West Indies, the search for 
rewarding economic development is still far from easy. This is partly because so 
many of the territories are poor in natural resources, and partly because the West 
Indies have never attempted to co-ordinate their economic activites. One of the 
strongest impressions which we brought home from our visit was, therefore, that 
any new request for financial assistance by H.M.G. to the Caribbean area, either in 
connection with a new C.D. & W. Act after the present one or as a special measure to 
accompany political federation, must be based on a co-ordinated plan for economic 
development worked out in the region itself. If H.M;G. were to make further 
assistance conditional upon such an approach, we felt that this might at last enable 
West Indian economic problems to be tackled in the right way and might also 
promote regional thinking in wider than purely economic spheres. If I may say so, I 
still think that this is the key to the whole matter (if indeed there is a key to West 
Indian problems at all). And it was against this background that the late Secretary of 
State instructed us to undertake the exercise which was subsequently carried out 
with so much labour by Mr. D. M. Smith in conjunction with the West Indian 
departments.4 The figures which he produced were of course in the nature of crystal 
gazing, but they were not intended to form the basis of any immediate commitment 
by H.M.G. They were merely intended to suggest the order of assistance which 
H.M.G., once they had taken the decision to promote the regional plan, might 
ultimately have to offer if they were to make a realistic yet not extravagant response 
to the much larger requests which the West Indians themselves would no doubt 
produce. I am still pretty convinced that this is the correct way of tackling the 
problem and the correct order of events. We may be confident that the West Indian 
Governments, when and if they send Sir George See! their observations in response 
to the despatch at No. 12,5 will not produce any concrete and reasoned proposals for 
economic development, though they may make some general remarks to the effect 
that the S.C.A.C. report was inadequate on this side. If this supposition is correct, 
then the question of future economic development in a federated West Indies will be 
no further advanced by the time of the London Conference than it is now. On the 
4 Smith's survey-' "Colombo Plan" for the Caribbean' (CO 10311760, no 1, 21 Nov 1951)-estimated the 
cost over the period 1956-1961 at anywhere between £45 million and £75 million, figures which See! 
thought far too high (ibid, minute by Luke, 5 Mar 1952). 
5 No 12 on the file is a despatch from Lyttelton to the West Indian governments, 6 Feb 1952, asking them 
individually to study the financial implications of the SCAC Report, to examine the proposals made in the 
MacLagan Report on Customs Union (see 10), and then to circulate their findings to the other 
governments. 
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other hand, we may be sure that the Conference will be made the occasion for 
requests for astronomical financial aid. Such requests obviously cannot be met, but if 
the answer is flatly negative the whole Conference may be killed. It seems to me that 
when this point is reached it will be right for H.M.G., after suitable remarks about 
the financial straits of the United Kingdom and the impossibility of promising 
anything, to say that they could not even consider such requests except on the basis 
of a co-ordinated and practical plan of economic development, designed to achieve 
the viability of the whole region. It would then be for the West Indians to go away and 
work out such a plan (perhaps through the medium of the Regional Economic 
Committee), and by the time it had been produced we might in any case be moving 
towards the era when the Treasury will be willing to consider further C.D. & W. 
assistance to the Colonial Empire as a whole. 
5. If it is agreed that we can think provisionally along the above lines from a 
tactical point of view, I think we can now let the matter rest until we have the 
comments of the West Indian Governments as co-ordinated by Sir George See! (see 
No. 12). Between that time and the Conference itself we might consider, in the light 
of the West Indian comments as actually received, whether it would be necessary to 
warn both our Ministers and the Treasury somewhat more specifically than is done 
in the last sentence of No. 9, that the final bill to H.M.G.-though it may not be 
presented for a year or two-is likely to be a good deal bigger than £20 million over 
five years . . . . 
H.T.B. 
13.2.52 
9 CO 1031/751, no 215 15 Aug 1952 
[Federation]: letter from Sir K Blackburne (Antigua) to S E V Luke 
expressing concern over the delay in the next move towards 
federation. Enclosure: memorandum by Blackburne, 'Federation in 
the British West Indies' (14 Aug 1952) 
I am becoming increasingly disturbed at the delay in making the next move towards 
West Indian Federation, and I am becoming increasingly doubtful whether anything 
will emerge from the proposed London Conference unless adequate steps are taken 
in advance to ensure that the Conference does in fact get down to real business. My 
feelings have been much strengthened by my recent visit to Barbados where I was 
able to get another slant on things. 
All this has prompted me to put down my feelings on paper, and I enclose a copy of 
the result. My views are summarized in paragraph 17 of the enclosed note, and it will 
probably be enough if you just read that paragraph. 
I have written the note solely from the point of view of the Leeward Islands. But 
perhaps I may be permitted to add a personal word in this letter about my views on 
the political aspects of Federation in the West Indies as a whole-based on my 
general knowledge of the area gained when I was working in Hastings House (and so 
very out of date!). 
I may be unduly "starry-eyed" about West Indian politicians; but I do feel myself 
that there is sufficient material now among them to enable them to manage their 
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own affairs. Trinidad and Jamaica and Barbados are very near to doing so already. As 
regards the smaller islands there are one or two good men, but there are also a lot of 
half-baked "rabble rousers". I am quite sure, however, that the best-if not the only 
way-of dealing with people of the latter type is by letting them be handled by other 
West Indian politicians. Take the case of Montserrat-1 can deal with the 
irresponsible Mr. Griffith1 by the use of reserved powers, and by financial controts; 
but, if I do so, I do not undermine his prestige with his followers-! enhance it. Nor 
do I teach him anything; I merely make him more bitter. I am sure that the only way 
to train or eliminate people of this kind (and there seem to be even more of them in 
the Windward Islands than in this Colony) is by making other West Indian leaders 
deal with them through a Federal Government. 
At present we have the worst of all worlds. My Mr. Griffith- if I may continue to 
take him as an example of the worst type of West Indian politician-will attend 
future meetings of the Regional Economic Committee. He will make lengthy and 
irrelevant speeches about the way in which Montserrat is neglected. And he will 
receive support from some of the better West Indian leaders who, as you know well, 
are endeavoring to obtain the support of the small islands in their bid for power. But 
what a different picture would be presented if Mr. Griffith tried the same game in the 
Federal House of Assembly when seeking to obtain more money for Montserrat! 
Another example-! have often said that the Leeward and Windward Islands will 
never be self-supporting so long as they retain the ridiculous panoply of independent 
governments. Their future-if they are ever to pay their way-lies in administrative 
integration. It would be fruitless for us to try to put that idea across; but I should not 
be surprised if a Federal West Indian Government, with full responsibility, were to 
force it through in order to avoid having to issue continual grants-in-aid. 
To my mind all this adds up to the fact that it is in the interests of the West Indies 
and in the interests of Her Majesty's Government to push ahead with Federation. As 
things are going at the moment-with individual West Indian politicians vieing [sic] 
with one another for political power-1 doubt whether we shall get nearer to 
Federation for many years to come unless her Majesty's Government gives an 
imaginative lead. And I hope perhaps that such a lead can now be given. 
I am sending a copy of this letter with its enclosure to See!. 
Enclosure to 9 
From the point of view of the Leeward Islands the only hope of political advance lies 
in Federation. By themselves the small islands, and particularly those which are 
grant-aided, cannot aspire even to internal responsible government. Even those 
which are not grant-aided, e.g. St. Kitts, cannot stand on their own legs in regard to 
such matters as trade and the staffing of their civil services. 
2. The recent constitutional advance in the Leeward Islands, and particularly the 
local method which has been adopted for the application of the so-called "Committee 
system", means that these islands have now progressed nearly as far as is possible 
short of the grant of fully responsible internal government. The only further 
advances which can be contemplated are:-
1 R W Griffith, member of Executive Council and president of Legislative Council, Montserrat. 
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(1) the grant of executive instead of advisory status to the Chairmen of 
Committees (or "Ministers")-as in Trinidad; 
(2) the abolition of the reserved powers of the Governor-as in Barbados. 
If progress in Antigua during the past eight months is any guide, it will be possible-
and desirable-to approve the advance in (1) in a comparatively short time. The 
advance in (2) cannot be contemplated unless the Islands are financially self-
supporting, or unless a West Indian Federation is established which takes over the 
responsibility for issuing grants-in-aid. 
3. The small West Indian islands cannot be expected to remain "static" in regard 
to political advance. It is the declared policy of Her Majesty's Government that all 
colonial territories should be given increasing responsibility unti l they reach the 
stage of managing their own affairs. It is indeed essential on practical grounds that 
political advance should be continuous; and it would be disastrous to "freeze" this 
advance in the smaller West Indian islands, particularly when the larger West Indian 
territories-British Guiana, Jamaica, and Trinidad-can continue to advance and 
can aspire to responsible government, at least for internal affairs, in the near future. 
4. It follows from the above that her Majesty's Government will be faced within 
the next two or three years with the alternatives of "freezing" further constitutional 
advance in the smaller islands or of encouraging some form of Federation. The fi rst 
alternative is so unwise that it can scarcely be contemplated. Federation in some 
form is therefore urgent from the point of view of the smaller islands; and active 
steps to encourage Federation must be taken if the people of the smaller islands are 
to be given "something to look forward to". 
5. For those reasons the proposed London Conference on Federation should not 
be long delayed, and a definite date should be fixed for the Conference as soon as 
possible. 
6. The London Conference. It is clear that the London Conference will produce 
no useful results unless the delegates have a clear agenda covering the political, 
administrative and financial aspects of Federation. It is also clear that there is no 
prospect of such an agenda emerging from the deliberations which have hitherto 
taken place in the various territories. The smaller territories see that their only hope 
of responsible government lies in Federation, and they recognize that the Standing 
Closer Association Committee Report gives them favourable representation. For these 
reasons they decline to comment on the detailed proposals in that Report; they want 
Federation at all costs; and they are reluctant to suggest any changes in the S.C.A.C. 
Report lest they should thereby open the door for a reduction in their representation 
in the Federal Legislature. (Great concern was expressed in the other small islands at 
the stupidity of Montserrat in pressing for better representation.) The general 
attitude of political leaders in Antigua and St. Kitts is "We signed the S.C.A.C. Report, 
and we stand by our signatures". 
7. The larger territories, having less reason to press for Federation and being 
anxious to vie with one another for power in the Federation, are more willing to 
debate the form which it should take. But even the Select Committee of Jamaica, 
which has given more detailed study to the matter than has been the case in any 
other territory, has been unable to produce clear and unanimous proposals which 
would provide the basis even for the constitutional part of an agenda for the London 
Conference. 
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8. As regards the administrative and financial parts of the agenda, no territory is 
willing to make any definite suggestions until the constitutional proposals are clear. 
The smaller islands-not unreasonably-say, for example, that they may lose 
revenue if they adopt the McLagan proposals for Customs Union; 2 they are 
accordingly unwilling to discuss Customs Union until they can be assured that the 
constitutional and financial proposals for Federation are such as to ensure that those 
territories which may gain financially from Customs Union will have to accept 
responsibility in the Federal Government for making up the losses of those 
territories, such as Antigua, which may have to accept a reduction in their customs 
revenue. 
9. It follows from the above that no agenda for the Conference will emerge from 
separate discussions in the West Indian territories, and that the Conference will be a 
failure unless Her Majesty's Government takes a lead (as it appears to have done in 
regard to Central Mrican Federation). 
10. In the preparation of the agenda for the London Conference it must be 
recognized at the outset that the principal incentive to Federation is the prospect of 
the grant of responsible government in the British West Indies. Unless the 
Conference is able to point the way clearly to the early grant of fully responsible 
government, West Indian Federation will not take place. An imaginative approach to 
the constitutional part of the agenda is essential if the delegates to the Conference 
are to be persuaded to adopt a realistic attitude to the financial problems, and if they 
are to enter the Conference with a real incentive to sink their differences and to 
accept compromise solutions on such matters as representation in the Federal 
Legislature. It must be recognized that the S.C.A.C. Report is out of date in its 
approach to the constitutional issues; and that constitutional advance in the separate 
territories has made it necessary to revise substantially the constitutional 
"safeguards" proposed in the S.C.A.C. Report. It must be recognised that Her 
Majesty's Government, with its policy of developing fully responsible government, 
must run certain risks; and that some degree of administrative inefficiency and even 
of political turpitude must be accepted in order to give the British West Indies an 
opportunity of proving themselves as fit to manage their own affairs. This risk has 
been taken in the individual territories; it must be taken in the Federation. It must 
be recognized that Puerto Rico and the "independent" republics in the Caribbean do 
manage their own affairs, and that the British West Indies are in an even better 
position to do so after the training that they have received under British rule. And it 
must be recognized that political chaos has resulted in every case in which Britain 
has moved behind political opinion in her overseas possessions. In short, the 
Conference must open with a clear unequivocal and liberal statement of the 
intention of Her Majesty's Government to grant greater immediate responsibility to 
the Federal Government than was envisaged in the S.C.A.C. Report. The statement 
should give a date, subject to such financial conditions as may be necessary, for the 
grant of full "Dominion" status. 
11. With such a background the Conference can enter with greater hope of 
agreement on a discussion of the detailed constitutional proposals in the S.C.A.C. 
Report; and the delegates will be more willing to accept the officially prepared agenda 
which is described below. 
2 See 10. 
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12. With such a background, moreover, the delegates should be more willing to give 
realistic consideration to the financial aspects of Federation. To this end they should 
have available to them a clear statement of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government 
in regard to financial aid to the Federation. The issue of such a statement, particularly 
at the present time, presents obvious difficulties. Moreover the degree of financial aid 
will naturally be a matter for negotiation between the delegates and Her Majesty's 
Government. But, if the constitutional incentive is sufficiently great, then negotiations 
should not be unduly difficult. The West Indian politician, once he is convinced of the 
sincerity of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the grant of full responsibility to the 
British West Indies, is not likely to be unreasonable in his demands. 
13. If the Conference can be opened with clear statements by Her Majesty's 
Government on the constitutional and financial aspects, then-and only then-will 
the delegates be willing to discuss an officially prepared agenda. Such an agenda is 
essential if the Conference is to produce concrete results; and such an agenda can 
only be prepared by officials in view of the reluctance of the West Indian Legislatures 
to embark on any detailed consideration of Federation. But the agenda will be 
suspect-and will be valueless in the Conference-unless the suspicions of the 
delegates have first been removed by an unequivocal policy statement by Her 
Majesty's Government on the lines suggested above. 
14. The official agenda for the Conference will have to be prepared in great 
detail. It should cover all aspects of Federation including matters not mentioned in 
the S.C.A.C. Report, e.g. Postal Services. It should take the form of a blueprint of the 
practical steps necessary to introduce a Federal government. It should cover the 
financial aspects of Federation-for which statistics have already been collected by 
the Comptroller for Development and Welfare. Above all it should be a practical 
document. It should not necessarily suggest answers to the many practical problems 
which may arise; rather it should list the problems and assemble the facts in regard 
to those problems, leaving the delegates to determine the solutions. 
15. This "blueprint" for Federation will cover more ground than the S.C.A.C. 
Report and will deal with more matters than the financial aspects of Federation 
which are now being studied in the Comptroller's office. If the "blueprint" is to serve 
its purpose, it seems clear that its preparation will be a full-time job for an official 
with considerable experience of the West Indies. 
16. It is accordingly suggested that an official Secretary to the Conference 
should be appointed now and that he should be entrusted with the preparation of the 
agenda and of the "blueprint". He should work in the Comptroller's office in 
Barbados where he will have access to the records and will be able to call on the 
Comptroller's staff for information and advice-particularly for financial advice. But 
he should not be a member of the Comptroller's staff. He should be attached to the 
Colonial Office in order to ensure that the non-political tradition of the 
Comptroller's office is maintained. 
17. To sum up, this note seeks to show:-
(1) that Federation must be pursued with energy if the dangers of political 
stagnation and frustration are to be avoided; 
(2) that the Federation Conference should be held as soon as possible; 
(3) that the Conference will be a failure unless the delegates are persuaded to 
consider a detailed agenda; 
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(4) that such an agenda can only be prepared by officials; 
(5) that the officially prepared agenda will be unacceptable to the delegates and 
will not be considered by them unless Her Majesty's Government launches the 
Conference with clear and liberal statements of intention in the constitutional and 
financial fields; 
(6) that an officer should be detailed now to consider the agenda for the 
Conference, and that the agenda should take the form of a complete "blueprint" 
for Federation. 
18. The need for Federation is so great-or rather the choice between political 
advance under Federation on the one hand and political stagnation in the small 
islands on the other hand is so obvious-that the idea of Federation must not be 
allowed to die. Her Majesty's Government should accordingly keep in mind the 
possibility of appointing a Royal Commission to examine Federation on the spot if 
the Conference should end in failure. 
19. This memorandum is written solely from the point of view of the Leeward 
Islands. It does not of course pretend to look at Federation from the point of view of 
the other West Indian Colonies. 
10 CO 10311751, no 234 7 Jan 1953 
'West Indian Federation: a background note': paper by the Reference 
Division (Commonwealth Section) of the Central Office of 
Information 
I. Introduction 
The 1953 London conference 
On 13th Aprill953 representatives of the British West Indian te_rritories will meet in 
London for a conference on the political federation of their territories. The object of 
the conference will be to see whether they can agree to some federal scheme in 
sufficient detail to enable a start to be made in drafting the constitutional 
instruments necessary for bringing a federation into being. 
The need for federation 
The idea of a West Indian federation has been under consideration for many years, 
both in the United Kingdom and in the West Indies, and has received increasing 
attention since the second world war. Some of the advantages of closer association of 
the individual colonies were stated as follows in a Memorandum on Closer 
Association of the British West Indian Colonies, which was sent to the West Indian 
Governments in 1947 by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Creech 
Jones:-
'If any considerable and sustained advance in the political and social fields is 
to be achieved, it would seem essential that the separate units, especially the 
smaller ones, should take a wider view of the problems which confront them 
all. Economically and administratively, also, it is important that men and 
women (who should whenever possible be British West Indians) with the 
highest professional and technical qualifications should be available to 
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administer the various government services, but in most cases it is not 
economic that the activities of persons so qualified should be restricted to 
comparatively small units of administration.' 
'Possibly the most important reason of all for the view that closer association 
is necessary lies in the fact that it is clearly impossible in the modern world 
for the present separate communities, small or isolated as most of them are, 
to achieve and maintain full self-government on their own. It is not, for 
example, practical politics to suppose that communities of two hundred 
thousand souls, or in some cases even less, should play an independent part 
in international discussions. On the other hand a community of well over two 
million people in the Caribbean area, with much that is homogeneous in 
their culture, could reasonably hope to achieve real self-government and to 
be strong enough to stand against economic and cultural pressure and to 
formulate and carry through a policy and way of life of its own.' 
The obstacles to be overcome 
In the same memorandum, the Secretary of State referred to basic factors in the 
West Indies which affect the question of closer association:-
(a) ethnographic and historical differences which have tended to keep the 
territories apart. 
(b) the difficulty of communications between the Colonies which has kept them in 
isolation from one another. (The distances separating them are large. There are, 
for instance, over 1,000 miles between Jamaica and Trinidad.) 
(c) the great disparity between the individual Colonies in respect of constitutional 
development (see Part IV). Nevertheless in all the Colonies there is a well 
developed political tradition and the legislatures have a large measure of control 
over their local affairs. This independence is strongly cherished and the extent to 
which the legislatures will be prepared to surrender any of their powers to a 
central authority is a cardinal factor. 
(d) the considerable inequalities of natural wealth and financial resources 
between the Colonies. To the wealthier Colonies any proposal for closer 
association might present itself as bringing upon them part of the burdens of the 
smaller units. 
11. United Kingdom policy and West Indian opinion 
Official policy 1922-1952 
The need for some form of federation was officially recognized as far back as 1922, 
but it was realised then, as it is now, that the movement towards unity must come 
from within and not from outside the West Indies. In the words of Lord Halifax, when 
he was Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1922:-
'The establishment of West Indian political unity is likely to be a plant of slow 
and tender growth. If any advance in this direction is to be achieved, it can 
only be as the result of a deliberate demand of local opinion ... ' 
Changes in West Indian opinion 
In 1922, Lord Halifax reported against federation because he considered West Indian 
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opinion unfavourable to it. The effects of the first world war and the economic 
depression of the 1930's, however, made their mark on West Indian political 
consciousness, and demands for constitutional reform became linked with the idea of 
federation. In 1932 an unofficial West Indian Conference in Dominica discussed 
proposals for a federal constitution, and in 1938 a West Indian Labour Congress 
produced proposals for a federation. These changes in local opinion before the 
second world war were summed up in the following words by the West India Royal 
Commission of 1938, which was appointed to investigate economic and social 
conditions in the area. 
'Our general impression ... is that . . . local opinion has made a considerable 
advance in the direction of political unity .. . .' 
The influence of regional organizations 
While common problems caused by war and the slump were some of the influences 
encouraging West Indians to become conscious of the desirability of co-operative 
action, organizations set up to tackle those problems on a regional basis were also 
tending to widen insular outlooks. The Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture 
founded in Trinidad in 1924, for instance, has always directed its research work to 
meet the special needs of the West Indies as a whole, and in 1932 a Central Sugar 
Cane Breeding Station was established in Barbados to serve all the sugar-growing 
territories in the region. 
The organizations that have perhaps been most influential in stimulating a regional 
way of thought are those set up during and since the second world war: the West 
Indies Development and Welfare Organization in 1940, the Anglo-American 
Caribbean Commission in 1942 and the University College of the West Indies in 1948. 
The Development and Welfare Organization was originally set up to assist in the 
allocation of United Kingdom Colonial Development and Welfare grants and loans to 
the West Indies. It has made its advisory staff of social, economic and technical 
experts available for examining regional and individual problems and has convened 
many regional conferences. The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, which, 
with French and Netherlands participation, became the Caribbean Commission in 
1946, is concerned with formulating plans and recommending measures for the 
social and economic betterment of the territories in the Caribbean for which the 
member countries are responsible. It has worked on the economic, social and 
research needs of these dependencies and, through its biennial West Indian 
Conferences, has enabled West Indians from all these territories to meet and discuss 
united action to overcome their many common difficulties. The University College of 
the West Indies, situated in Jamaica, serves all the British West Indian Colonies who 
together meet the recurrent expenditure of the College. Many of the courses given 
and much of the research undertaken are based on a study of the whole area. 
The Regional Labour Board, consisting of representatives from each colony, was 
set up in 1951 to deal with problems arising from the employment of West Indian 
labour abroad, particularly in the United States of America. 
Ill. Steps towards federation since 1945 
Until 1945 federation had been recommended primarily as a solution to the 
economic and social ills of the area, but in that year its importance in relation to 
political advance was stressed. 
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Colonel Stanley's 1945 despatch 
In a dispatch of March 1945 to the West Indian Governments, the then Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Colonel Oliver Stanley, wrote ' ... the more immediate 
purpose of developing self-governing institutions in the individual British Caribbean 
Colonies should keep in view the larger project of their political federation . .. the 
aim of British policy should be the development of federation in the Caribbean at 
such time as the balance of opinion in the various Colonies is in favour of a change, 
and when the development of communications makes it administratively practicable. 
The ultimate aim of any federation which may be established would be full internal 
self-government within the British Commonwealth. But ... financial stability ... is 
an essential accompaniment of full self-government. ... ' He then went on to suggest 
that the issue of political federation should be debated in the legislatures of all the 
Colonies concerned and that if they approved the aim a conference might be called to 
discuss the formulation of proposals for closer association. 
This despatch was subsequently debated by the legislatures of the Bahamas, 
Barbados, British Guiana, British Honduras, Jamaica, Leeward Islands, Trinidad and 
the Windward Islands. The Bahamas expressed their opposition to participation in 
any such federation. The legislatures of the other Colonies agreed to future 
discussion among themselves. 
Mr. Creech ]ones's 1947 memorandum 
Following the debate of Colonel Stanley's despatch, the next Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, Mr. Creech Jones, sent the West Indian Governments in 1947 a 
despatch proposing that a conference should be held later in the year to consider the 
formulation of proposals for closer association. With this despatch he enclosed, as a 
starting point for discussion, a memorandum setting out the nature of the problem 
and discussing possible forms of federation. 
The Montego Bay conference 
On 11th September 1947 the Secretary of State himself opened the conference, 
which went on until 19th September at Montego Bay in Jamaica. It was attended by 
22 delegates from Barbados, British Guiana, British Honduras, Jamaica, the Leeward 
and Windward Islands and Trinidad, all · of whom had been nominated by the 
legislatures of their respective territories and represented some 3 million people 
living in the British Caribbean. They were accompanied by the Colonies' legal and 
financial advisers so that they might have expert help in dealing with practical 
problems. 
With the exception of the representatives of British Guiana these delegates 
accepted the principle of a British Caribbean federation in which each constituent 
unit would retain complete control over all matters other than those specifically 
assigned to the federal government. To report on the most suitable form of federal 
constitution and judiciary, and the means of financing federal services, they 
recommended that a Standing Closer Association Committee be set up. 
A number of recommendations relevant to preparing the way for political 
federation were also made. 
Preparing for action on the Mont ego Bay recommendations 
In a despatch on the conference, the then Secretary of State, Mr. Creech Jones, 
recorded his agreement with the resolution accepting the principle of federation, and 
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stated that the policy of the United Kingdom Government was represented in the 
conference resolution recommending that the political development of the 
territories concerned should be 'pursued as an aim in itself without prejudice and in 
no way subordinate to progress towards federation.' 
The despatch then indicated those resolutions requiring action primarily by the 
United Kingdom Government and those which were chiefly the concern of the West 
Indian legislatures. The following are the chief recommendations that have been 
acted on as suggested. 
Action by the United Kingdom government 
(1) The appointment of a Standing Closer Association Committee. 
(2) The appointment of a Commission to examine the question of a customs 
union. 
(3) The appointment of a Commission to examine unification of public services in 
the area. 
Action by West Indian legislatures 
(1) The introduction of unified currency. 
(2) The formation of a British Caribbean Regional Economic Committee which 
administers a Trade Commissioner Service in London and Montreal. 
(3) The setting up of a body of primary producers. 
Standing Closer Association Committee: proposals for a federation and their debate 
By May 1948 the legislatures of all the territories represented at Montego Bay, 
including British Guiana, had agreed to participate in the work of the Standing 
Closer Association Committee. The members of the Committee were appointed by 
the legislatures and they met under the chairmanship of Sir Hubert Ranee, a former 
Governor of Burma and now Governor of Trinidad and Tobago. 
The Committee's report was published in March 1950. It recommended federation 
as the shortest path to self-government within the British Commonwealth for the 
people of the West Indies, and proposed a federation with headquarters in Trinidad. 
The proposed constitution followed the Australian pattern in that the federal 
government would have only those powers specifically given to it, all others 
remaining with the individual participating governments. It was suggested that the 
federal government should consist of:-
(1) A Governor-General, representing Her Majesty. 
(2) A Federal Legislature composed of the Governor-General, a wholly elected 
House of Assembly and a nominated Senate which would act as a revisionary 
chamber. Representation in the House of Assembly would reflect the relative 
populations of the territories. In the Senate each territory would be represented by 
two members, except for Montserrat, which would have one. The Federal 
Legislature would have power to legislate on two classes of subject: a list over 
which it would have exclusive power (including defence, external affairs and the 
raising of external loans), and a list on which both the Federation and the 
constituent territories might legislate, Federal law prevailing. 
(3) A Federal Executive composed of the Governor-General and an advisory 
Council of State. This body would include a Prime Minister elected by the House of 
Assembly who would nominate the majority of the remaining members of the 
Council from among the members of the Legislature. 
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(4) A Federal Judicature with a Federal Supreme Court having power to hear 
certain types of appeal and having original jurisdiction in certain subjects. 
The powers of the Governor-General, as Head of the Federal State, to reserve Bills 
would be limited to a defined number of subjects including defence, foreign affairs 
and currency. 
This report has now been debated by the legislatures concerned with the following 
results:-
Territories accepting 
federation in principle 
Barbados 
(House of Assembly)! 
Jamaica 
Trinidad 
Windward Islands 
Leeward Islands 
Territories rejecting 
federation 
British Guiana 
British Honduras 
Virgin Islands 
In February 1952 Mr. Oliver Lyttelton sent a despatch to all the Governments 
concerned expressing his willingness to hold a conference in London at which 
delegates could discuss outstanding details, and points of difference between them, 
and between them and the United Kingdom Government. He emphasized the 
importance of thorough preliminary study by the Governments of the Ranee and 
McLagan Reports if the conference is to reach sufficient agreement to enable a start 
to be made on the long job of drafting constitutional instruments. Trinidad and the 
Windward and Leeward Islands have stated that they will adhere generally to the 
Ranee proposals, while the Jamaica House of Representatives, while accepting these 
as a basis for discussion, has indicated that the Jamaica delegates will seek greater 
power in the Federal Constitution for elected representatives, and adequate financial 
support from the start. These four Governments, together with Barbados whose final 
agreement is still awaited, have accordingly been invited to send delegates to a 
conference in London in April, 1953. 
Possibilities of a Customs Union 
In November 1948, Mr. J. McLagan, formerly Inspector-General of Customs and 
Excise in Iraq, was appointed Chairman of a Customs Union Commission. The 
Commission's report, published in February 1951, recommended that such a union 
be established as soon as possible, and claimed that it could be established with or 
without federation and would encourage inter-colonial trade and local industries and 
strengthen the position of the participating territories when negotiating 
international trade agreements. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies has said that 'a customs union seems to be 
an essential corollary of political federation', and he has accordingly requested the 
West Indian Governments to complete a detailed examination of the McLagan Report 
before the London conference. In the meantime, British Guiana, while rejecting 
federation, has accepted the principle of participation in a customs union. 
1 At the time of going to press the matter had still to be discussed by the Legislative Council. 
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Unification of Public Services 
A Public Services Commission, under the Chairmanship of Sir Maurice Holmes, 
formerly Permanent Secretary of the United Kingdom Ministry of Education, was 
appointed in September 1948, and its report was published in March 1950. 
This Commission considered the following branches of the Service suitable for 
unification:-
Administrative, Agriculture, Civil Aviation, Forestry, Legal, Medical, Police 
(commissioned ranks), Postal and Prison. 
Promotions and transfers within the region, should be made by a Caribbean Public 
Services Commission. No concrete steps towards such unification have yet been 
taken, though the Report provides a valuable basis for future action. 
Currency unification 
A step towards furthering inter-Colony trade, and towards eliminating anomalies, 
was made in 1951 when a unified currency expressed in dollars and cents (but linked 
with Sterling under the colonial Sterling Exchange Standard) was introduced into 
the Eastern Caribbean territories of Barbados, British Guiana, the Leeward and 
Windward Islands, and Trinidad and Tobago. Until then these territories had used 
United Kingdom silver and copper as well as dollar notes issued by their own 
Governments which were not always acceptable in other Colonies. Under the new 
system the unified currency is controlled and issued by a Currency Board consisting 
of representatives from the participating Colonies, and although British Honduras 
and Jamaica have for the present decided to remain outside the scheme they are free 
to take part in it at any time they wish. 
The Regional Economic Committee for the British West Indies, British Guiana and 
British Honduras 
The W.I. Colonies have set up a Regional Economic Committee to administer a Trade 
Commissioner Service in the United Kingdom and Canada, to advise the West Indian 
Governments on economic matters, and to collect and disseminate economic 
information of interest to those Governments. 
This Committee held its first meeting in May 1951 and has met four times since 
then. It is attended by representatives from all the participating Governments and 
the Economic Adviser to the Comptroller, Development and Welfare Organization, is 
permanent deputy chairman. The Committee is financed by contributions from each 
of the British Caribbean territories, and it has appointed an Executive Secretary and 
an Assistant Trade Commissioner to the United Kingdom. Among its other activities 
has been the sending of a goodwill trade mission to Canada. It is hoped that when it 
is fully established it will act as co-ordinating agent for all conferences and working 
· parties dealing with commodity agreements and other economic matters such as 
shipping, and will enable the West Indies to be represented as a unit in international 
economic negotiations. 
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IV. Facts about the territories concerned 
Area and Population 
Territory 
Barbados 
British Guiana 
British Honduras 
Jamaica and dependencies 
Leeward Islands: 
Antigua 
St. Christopher and Nevis 
Montserrat 
Virgin Islands 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Windward Islands: 
Dominica 
Grenada 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent 
Total Area 
(sq. miles) 
166 
83,000 
8,866 
4,677 
171 
153 
32 
67 
1,981 
305 
133 
233 
150 
* 1950 mid-year estimate. 
Economy 
Population 
(1951 mid-year 
estimate) 
209,000* 
431 ,000 
70,000 
1,443,200 
46,000 
49,000 
13,600 
6,500* 
649,000 
55,000 
77,000* 
80,000 
67,000* 
Agriculture is the principal economic activity in the British Caribbean. A number of 
tropical and mainly cash crops are grown including bananas, citrus fruits, cocoa, 
coconuts, coffee, cotton, rice and tobacco, but the most important crop is sugar. 
Owing to the climate, some-foodstuffs cannot be grown locally. Production of sugar 
in the exporting Colonies in 1951 was as follows:-
Jamaica .... 
British Guiana 
Barbados ... 
Trinidad 
St. Christopher and Nevis 
Antigua . 
St. Lucia ... .. ... . 
Tons 
267,928 
217,306 
187,643 
140,668 
44,272 
18,511 
9,824 
886,152 
The area also has some mineral resources. The oil industry in Trinidad is of 
paramount importance in that Island's economy, and production in 1951 amounted 
to 21.5 million barrels (app. 7 barrels = 1 metric ton) . Trinidad is also the world's 
chief source of natural asphalt, and exported over 132,000 tons in 1950. British 
Guiana exports some 2 million tons of bauxite annually, and produces diamonds and 
gold. In Jamaica there are estimated to be deposits of bauxite amounting to between 
200 and 315 million tons, and one Company has prepared to start mining this year. 
Industrialization is also attracting attention. Most of the territories have 
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introduced legislation designed to encourage investment in new secondary 
industries, and there are now factories for the production of cigars, cigarettes, 
textiles, cement, tomato juice, condensed milk, soap, sauces, furniture, footwear, 
shirts, cosmetics, boxes, time-recording clocks, industrial gases and many other 
products. 
Currency 
The British Caribbean territories are part of the sterling area. The unit of currency in 
each territory and par of exchange are as follows:-
Territory 
Barbados 
British Guiana 
Leeward Islands 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Windward Islands 
Jamaica 
British Honduras 
Revenue and expenditure 
Unit of Currency 
West Indian Dollar 
Jamaica Pound 
British Honduras 
[Dollar] 
Par of Exchange 
W.I. $ 4.80 = £1 
Sterling 
J. £1 = £1 
Sterling 
B.H. $4 =£1 
Sterling 
The following table shows revenue and expenditure in 1950, 1951 and 1952. (Figures 
include Colonial Development and Welfare receipts and expenditure, and grants-in-
aid receipts.) 
Colony 
Barbados 
British Guiana 
British Honduras 
Jamaica:-
Cayman Islands 
Turks & Caicos Islands 
Leeward Islands:-
Antigua 
St. Christopher-Nevis 
Montserrat 
Virgin Islands 
Trinidad & Tobago 
Windward Islands:-
Dominica 
Grenada 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent 
1950 1951 (1) 
Revenue Expenditure Revenue Expenditure 
2,264 2,009 2,625 2,344 
4,741 5,134 5,495 5,410 
1,340 1,354 1,221 1,110 
10,939 10,342 12,923 13,658 
62 49 75 73 
77 92 122 143 
648 633 765 726 
468 520 644 583 
85 100 177 149 
26 55 74 52 
10,546 10,506 11,545 11,434 
334 351 426 427 
787 621 821 800 
674 741 927 888 
372 400 455 483 
(1) Including some provisional figures. 
(2) Provisional. 
(3) Data not available. 
£'000 
1952 (2) 
Revenue Expenditure 
2,581 2,510 
5,463 5,370 
1,257 1,274 
14,712 15,035 
63 61 
(3) (3) 
932 1,075 
700 662 
145 185 
95 89 
11,759 12,715 
511 590 
708 717 
592 644 
387 442 
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Trade 
There is not a great deal of inter-Colonial trade though British Guiana exports rice to 
the island Colonies, and Trinidad sends cigarettes. 
The trade of most of the British Caribbean territories is principally with the United 
Kingdom, Canada and the United States, though the proportion of the trade of each 
territory which is transacted with each of these countries varies considerably. In 
1951 the total value of this trade was approximately as follows:-
£ million 
UK Canada USA 
Exports from British Caribbean territories 31 17 6 
Imports into do. 42 12 11 
Since the end of the war nearly all the territories have been running a regular 
deficit in their visible trade. Figures for 1951 are given below. 
Visible Trade-1951 
(a) B.W.I. $ million 
Exports 
Colony Total including Visible 
Imports re-Exports Balance 
C.I.F. F.O.B. of Trade 
Barbados 51.89 35.46 -16.43 
British Guiana 66.88 58.90 -7.98 
British Honduras 12.41 6.23 -6.18 
Jamaica & Dependencies 149.97 84.03 -65.94 
Leeward Islands 13.72 10.22 - 3.50 
Trinidad & Tobago 213.79 213.57 - 0.22 
Windward Islands:-
Dominica 5.23 2.72 -2.51 
Grenada 7.90 6.65 -1.25 
St. Lucia 5.80 2.42 -3.38 
St. Vincent 4.49 3.32 -1.17 
(a) Except British Honduras: $4.0 = £1. 
Forms of government 
The constitutions of the British Caribbean Colonies except those of Barbados and 
Jamaica, provide for a single chamber legislature and an Executive Council. In 
Barbados and Jamaica, the legislature is bicameral, and will be so in British Guiana 
under a new constitution to be brought into force in 1953. There is universal adult 
suffrage in Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and the Windward Islands, it is being 
introduced in the Leeward Islands, and it will be introduced in British Guiana under 
the new constitution. 
The composition of the executive and legislature of each territory is shown in the 
following table:-
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The Executive 
Territory Nature of Council Membership 
or Committee Official Unofficial 
Nominated Elected 
Barbados Executive Council Governor+ 2 2 
Executive Committee (a) Governor+ 2 7 
British Guiana Executive Council Governor+ 3 5 
British Honduras Executive Council Governor+ 3 4 
Jamaica Privy Council (b) Governor+ 4 2 
Executive Council( c) Governor+ 3 2 5 
Leeward Islands (d) Federal Executive Governor+ 7 1 6 
Council 
Antigua Executive Council Administrator + 3 3 
St. Christopher-Nevis Executive Council Administrator + 3 4 
Montserrat Executive Council Commissioner + 2 2 
Virgin Islands Executive Council Commissioner + 2 1 2 
Trinidad and Tobago Executive Council Governor+ 3 1 5 
Windward Islands: 
Dominica Executive Council Governor + 3 1 3 
Grenada Executive Council Governor+ 3 1 3 
St. Lucia Executive Council Governor+ 3 1 3 
St. Vincent Executive Council Governor+ 3 1 3 
(a) Introduces all money votes, prepares the estimates and initiates all Government measures. 
Comprises all members of the Executive Council, one member of the Legislative Council and four 
members of the House of Assembly appointed on the recommendation of its leader. 
(b) Advises the Governor on the exercise of his disciplinary powers over members of the Government 
service and on the exercise of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy. 
(c) Proposals are now under discussion to give the members of the House of Representatives on the 
Executive Council a majority, to establish separate Ministries and allot executive functions to Ministers. 
(d) The Colony of the Leeward Islands consists of four Presidencies with a General Federal Executive 
Council and Legislature as well as Presidential ones. The Leeward Islands are getting a new 
constitution, involving universal suffrage and a majority of elected members on the various Legislative 
Councils who are to elect from their number the unofficial members of the Executive Councils. The 
governor has also introduced what is known as the 'Committee System' whereby some of the elected 
members on Executive Council are appointed chairmen of Committees with advisory responsibility for 
such subjects as Public Works, Social Services and Trade and Production. The necessary revised 
Constitutional Instruments are at present in draft, but the system has already been established under 
the present Instruments, applied in the spirit of the new ones. 
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The Legislature 
Territory Nature of Council Membership Total 
Official Unofficial 
Nominated Elected 
Barbados {(Legislative Council 4 11 15 
House of Assembly 24 24 
British Guiana Legislative Council Governor+ 3 7 14 25 
British Honduras Legislative Council Governor+ 3 14 6 14 
Jamaica (a) {Legislative Council 5 10 15 
House of Representatives 32 32 
Leeward Islands: Federal Legislative Governor+ 8 2 13 24 
Council 
Antigua Legislative Council Administrator + 2 3 8 14 
St. Christopher-Nevis Legislative Council Administrator + 2 3 8 14 
Montserrat Legislative Council Commissioner + 2 2 5 10 
Virgin Islands Legislative Council Commissioner + 2 2 4 9 
Trinidad and Tobago Legislative Council (b) 3 5 18 26 
Windward Islands: 
Dominica Legislative Council Administrator + 2 3 8 14 
Grenada Legislative Council Administrator + 2 3 8 14 
St. Lucia Legislative Council Administrator + 2 3 8 14 
St. Vincent Legislative Council Administrator + 2 3 8 14 
(a) Bills must ordinarily be passed by both bodies before they become law; the delaying power of 
Legislative Council is limited to one year. 
(b) Presided over by a voteless Speaker appointed by the Governor from outside the Council. 
11 CO 1031/751, no 308 [April1953] 
'The West Indian Federation conference': CO communique no 14 
summarising the results of the 1953 London conference 
The West Indian Federation Conference met in London from 13th to 30th April. It 
was attended by Delegates from Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, St. Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago, 
and the United Kingdom. Observers also attended from British Guiana and British 
Honduras, whose Legislatures had already declared themselves against participation 
in a Federation. 
2. The purpose of the Conference was to try to reach agreement on the main 
features of a federal scheme, taking as a basis for discussion the proposals in the 
Report of the British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee (SCAC) 
which was published in March 1950 (Col. No. 255). 
3. The Conference discussed the federal scheme set out in the SCAC Report and 
agreed to certain modifications in it. The main changes are as follows:-
(a) Certain amendments should be made to recognise the principle that there 
should be the greatest possible freedom of movement within the Federation. 
(b) The number of seats in the Senate should be reduced by the number originally 
allocated to British Guiana and British Honduras, that is from 23 to 19. 
(c) The title of the House of Assembly should be altered to House of 
Representatives, and that the allocation of seats should be as follows:-
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Barbados 5 
Jamaica 17 
Antigua 2 
St. Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla 2 
Montserrat 1 
Trinidad and Tobago 10 
Grenada 2 
St. Vincent 2 
St. Lucia 2 
Dominica 2 
45 
As Montserrat has only one seat, there should be provision for an alternate. 
(d) For the first 5 years of Federation, a person should be allowed to be a member 
of both the Legislature in his unit and of the Federal Legislature, but he should 
not be a member of the Executive body in both. 
(e) Certain changes should be made in the categories of bills which the Governor-
General should be empowered to reserve for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure. 
(f) Changes should also be made in the list of subjects on which Her Majesty-in-
Council should have power to legislate for the Federation, including the deletion 
of the power to legislate for securing and maintaining public safety in an 
emergency, this being a matter for the unit governments. 
(g) For the first 5 years, the Council of State, under the chairmanship of the 
Governor-General, should consist of:-
(i) the Prime Minister; 
(ii) 3 Officials appointed by the Governor-General in his discretion; 
(iii) 7 members nominated by the Prime Minister, and 
(iv) 3 Senators appointed by the Governor-General-in-Council. 
(h) The Council of State should be the principal instrument of policy in the 
Federal Government. In the matter of the appointment and dismissal of members 
of the Council, the Governor-General should, except as otherwise provided, act in 
accordance with the constitutional conventions applicable to the exercise of a 
similar function in the United Kingdom by Her Majesty. 
(i) The Conference agreed that the 25% of customs revenues recommended by the 
SCAC Report as the maximum amount to be retained by the Federal Government for 
federal purposes should be reduced. They decided that on present indications a figure 
of 15% made up approximately of ten per cent for those Federal costs at present envis-
aged plus one half of this amount for additional Federal functions and for reserves, 
would initially be adequate and adopted this figure as the new maximum. The 
Conference agreed that an independent enquiry on the eve of Federation shall estab-
lish more firmly the estimates of annual Federal costs and this might result in the 
amount retained by the Federation in the first years being less than 15%. 
(j) Provision should be made in the federal Constitution for its amendment by 
Federal law, subject to safeguards protecting the rights of the units . 
(k) During the fifth year from the date of the coming into existence of the 
Federation there should be a conference to review the federal constitution. 
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(I) The seat of government of the Federation should be in Grenada instead of in 
Trinidad as recommended by SCAC. 
4. The Conference agreed with the SCAC recommendation that the name of the 
Federation should be "The British Caribbean Federation". 
5. The Conference were [sic] informed that Her Majesty's Government 
recognised that at the outset the proposed Federation would need some financial 
assistance and was therefore ready to follow up the recommendations on this matter 
made in the SCAC Report. 
Firstly, the region would continue to share in such financial assistance towards 
Colonial Development and Welfare as Her Majesty's Government is able to make 
available to Colonial territories. 
Secondly, subject to the approval of Parliament, Her Majesty's Government would 
make available to the Federation in the first ten years, grants intended to cover the 
budget deficits of those units which in spite of their best efforts could not pay their 
way. The annual amount to be paid in each of the first five years would be negotiated 
nearer the time of Federation but would not be less than the average of the ordinary 
deficits of grant aided colonies during the three years previous to Federation. 
Further negotiations would take place in respect of the second five years. Assistance 
in this form did not exclude the possibility of Her Majesty's Government considering 
special assistance to unit governments, in case of natural disasters, e.g. hurricanes, if 
the need were established. 
Finally, Her Majesty's Government would be willing subject to the submission of 
prepared schemes, to invite Parliament to make a grant of up to £500,000 towards 
the capital cost of establishing the Federal Headquarters. 
6. The West Indian delegations concluded that the SCAC proposals subject to the 
modifications agreed at the Conference, provided an acceptable and workable plan for a 
federation, and undertook to support the plan as a whole in their respective territories 
and when it came before their Legislatures. They were assured that Her Majesty's 
Government welcomed the agreement reached and that, if it was accepted by the West 
Indian Legislatures, Her Majesty's Government would take those measures which had 
been indicated to the Conference to enable the Federation to be set up. 
7. The above is a summary of the main recommendations of the Conference. The 
full report will shortly be published as a White Paper simultaneously in London and 
in the West Indies. 
12 CO 1031/128, no 22 5 May 1953 
[British Guiana]: intelligence report for April1953 by W A Orrettl on 
the general election and the prospects for internal security [Extract] 
2. Political activities 
(a) Organisations of security interest 
(i) People's Progressive Party. The Party was successful in the General Elections, as 
indeed foreshadowed in many previous Special Branch reports, beyond even the 
1 Commissioner of police, British Guiana. 
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expectations of their own leaders, collecting a sweeping majority of 18 seats out of 24 
in the new House of Assembly.2 
Special Branch records of Election meeting attendances for the period 24th March 
to 26th April are given below:-
Name of 
Party 
P.P.P. 
N.D.P. 
P.N.P. 
U.G.P. 
No. of meetings 
held 
132 
68 
38 
44 
Largest 
Attendance 
10,000 
2,000 
800 
2,000 
Average 
1,153 
451 
155 
190 
Total Number 
of persons 
attending 
during period 
152,245 
30,693 
5,918 
8,360 
The above figures are a clear reflection of the wide following the Party has among 
the working class and of their complete success in obtaining the labour vote. As 
shown in my report for March these meetings throughout the Colony, carefully 
followed by the Special Branch, have proved to be a safe guide to public opinion 
among the working class and to the result of the General Elections. 
The Party's success can be attributed to six outstanding factors:-
(i) the thorough organisation of the Party machine operated through well-run 
branch groups throughout the Colony for more than three years under the guidance 
of trained political minds (notably Dr. & Mrs. Jagan3 and Linden Burnham), and 
with no effective opposition party in the field to offer a counter-attraction. 
(ii) the unprecedented success in this Colony of African and Indian unity under 
one political Organisation forged by the untiring effort of Dr. Jagan and L.F.S. 
Burnham. The former has made his name a password among the Indian working 
classes, especially on the over-populated sugar estates throughout the Colony, and 
the latter has the same if not higher prestige among the Africans. Both have strong 
support among Africans and Indians alike because they have always shown 
themselves consistently opposed to racialism and have proved it by the equitable 
race balance they have scrupulously maintained in their Party executive. 
(iii) the complete defeat of racialism as an issue in the General Elections by 
accepting its existence outside Party ranks and apportioning party candidates 
strictly in accordance with race predominance in various constituencies. 
(However, it must be noted that it is a remarkable feature of the Elections that in a 
few constituencies a large number of Indians voted for African candidates and vice 
versa, notably Mrs. Jane Gay, who collected the majority of Indian votes from 
predominantly Indian Plantation Enmore and Chandra Persaud who collected a 
2 The election was held on 27 Apr 1953. Two seats were won by the NDP, the other four by independents. 
The parties polled as follows: PPP 77,613 votes; NDP 20,442; UGP 5,961; PNP 2,274. 
3 Wife of Cheddi Jagan; first woman elected to Georgetown Town Council; editor, The Thunder, 
1950- 1964; general secretary, PPP, 1953; elected to Legislative Council; appointed deputy speaker; first 
woman imprisoned for a political offence in British Guiana and the British Caribbean during the 
emergency, 1953-1956; restricted to Georgetown, 1957; minister of labour, health and housing, 1961 
(first woman to hold ministerial appointment); minister of home affairs, 1963, resigned 2 June 1964 (see 
221) . 
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large number of African votes in the Mahaica-Mahaicony constituency where he 
was opposed by a popular candidate of African descent among others.) 
(iv) the success the Party has achieved in identifying itself as the champion of the 
working class thus winning the labour vote. 
(v) the support from the indigenous professional classes particularly the medical 
profession and the Civil Service clerical and subordinate grades won by playing 
down and obscuring the communist taint of certain Party leaders and presenting 
their success at the polls as the best hope for broad social and economic reforms. 
(There are also a number of Party supporters in the Police Force, many of them 
identified but this was not an important factor in the election results.) 
(vi) the profound desire by many people for a change from the old order which 
they saw expressed in the P.P.P. as the only political Organisation in the field with 
unity of purpose, sound Organisation, consistent leadership and a tangible 
programme to offer. 
"Vote splitting" as a factor, while it could fairly be said to have been responsible for 
a number of P.P.P. victories, notably that of Clinton Wong over John Carter, Chandra 
Persaud over Eric Phillips and F.O. Van Sertima over P.A. Cummings, clearly did not 
give the P.P.P. their majority and at most its absence might have reduced their 
majority to 14 .... 
8. General 
The effect of the general elections on the internal security of the colony 
(I) The industrial and domestic sphere. The immediate implications of the 
Election results from the Security viewpoint as far as can be judged from the 
available Special Branch information and careful observation of Party meetings and 
statements of policy in the election period, can be set out as the obvious necessity to 
consolidate the Party's prestige and position by implementing legislation early in the 
first Session of the new House of Assembly, to give effect to those social reform 
measures which will immediately show concrete benefits and relief to the working 
classes and unemployed. 
Judging by past speeches these measures will include:-
(i) Slum clearance and housing projects with emphasis on sugar estate areas. 
(ii) A higher minimum wage Order and Old Age pension at 55. 
(iii) Speeding up of present development projects and taking steps to open up new 
fields of development with a view to showing an early improvement in the 
unemployment position. 
To this end it may be expected that overtures will be made to outside capital and 
local business interests. It is clear that to succeed with measures of the nature 
mentioned above all will depend on the success of the Party in restoring confidence 
among capital and business interests. It also depends equally on the ability of 
business interests like Booker Bros. and the Demerara Bauxite Company to face facts 
and make sincere efforts to co-operate with the new Government, to meeting them 
halfway and giving them a chance to prove their intentions. If such co-operation is 
not forthcoming and there are many business executives loath to face the realities of 
the new position, the P.P.P. will undoubtedly go to the country and lay the 
responsibility for their failure on the shoulders of business and industry. It is in that 
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event, with their wide control and support of Labour Unions, that we may expect 
internal unrest and disturbances in the Colony. 
(II) Communist infiltration. As I have shown in previous reports, the P.P.P. is by no 
means a Communist organisation as such, but is exploited by a tight clique of 
Communists or "fellow-travellers" in the Executive as being the nearest approach to a 
National Front movement aiming at self-government, the first objective of a Communist 
movement in any Colonial territory. The danger of further infiltration through the 
sweeping majority gained in the House of Assembly is therefore a distinct possibility. 
I give below a list of the Communist section and the non-Communist or "self-
government" section, who are now in the House of Assembly:-
Communist Section 
Cheddie [sic] Jagan, Member for 
Corentyne 
JanetJagan,Memberfor 
Western Essequibo 
Sydney King, 5 Member for 
Central Demerara 
F. Bowman, Member for 
Demerara-Essequibo 
Blind followers of lagan with no 
particular ideology or convictions 
Mohamed Khan, Member for 
Corentyne River 
Chandra Persaud, Member for 
Mahaica-Mahaicony 
Adjoda Singh, Member for 
Berbice River 
Ramkarran, Member for West 
Central Demerara 
Non-Communist "self-Government" 
section 
L.F.S. Burnham, Member for 
Georgetown North East 
Ashton Chase,4 Member for 
Georgetown South 
Clinton Wong, Member for 
Georgetown South Central 
Followers of Bumham with no 
particular ideology or convictions 
Jessie Burnham, Georgetown 
Central 
F.O. Van Sertima, Member for 
Georgetown North 
Individualists prepared to 
swing to either side 
Dr. J. Latchmansingh[sic),6 Member for East Bank, Demerara (fanatical figure in the 
sugar estates labour sphere) 
Balli Latchmansingh[sic), Member for Western Berbice (Brother and follower of the 
Doctor) 
Mrs. Jane Phillips-Gay, Member for East Central Demerara (a follower of the Doctor) 
Jenarine [sic] Singh,7 Member for West Bank, Demerara (a close friend of both Burnham 
and Jagan and will support either or both according to political expediency) 
4 Minister of labour, industry and commerce in 1953 PPP government. 
5 Minister of communications and works in 1953 PPP government; detained during emergency; resigned 
from PPP, 1957; defeated at 1959 general election; jointed People's National Congress but expelled when 
he advocated partition; founded Mrican Society for Racial Equality. 
6 Dr J Lachhmansingh, minister of health and housing in the 1953 PPP government. 
7 Jai Narine Singh, minister of local government and social welfare in the 1953 PPP government. 
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Further evidence of this distinct division in ideology in the party executive was 
clearly shown in the March 1953 edition of the Communist-controlled "Caribbean 
News". Significantly in this publication the success of the party's election cam-
paign was widely displayed but all the credit and publicity was given to Dr. lagan 
and Sydney King and not to Burnham and Company. It can be seen from the 
above that the Communist section have powerful influence but they are well-bal-
anced by the section under Burnham who threatens to rival Jagan's position. It 
must be remembered that the difference between Burnham and Jagan is essentially 
one of final aim and that as so much hard work is necessary before either aim can 
be achieved they are likely to remain united for a long time as they have come so 
far as a direct result of their union. To achieve this Jagan will probably be prepared 
to keep overt Communist activities away from the Party under the fac;:ade of the 
Peace Committee, recognising that the Party owes its numerical support and 
power to a labour electorate and not to a Communist following. For Burnham's 
part he will in all probability be prepared to keep his desire for final leadership in 
the background. 
(Ill) The neutralisation of positive repressive measures against communism in 
British Guiana 
It is likely that attempts will be made to introduce the following measures to satisfy 
the electorate as to the extremist election promises made:-
(i) The repeal of the Subversive Literature Bill, (an extract from a recent speech by 
Ash ton Chase, one of the Party leaders, speaks for itself:- "The P.P.P. has pledged 
itself to the people that all laws banning the subversive literature will be torn up 
and thrown in waste baskets". ) 
(ii) Again and again Jagan and Burnham and their party leaders have emphasised 
in their election speeches that they will repeal the Orders-in-Council under the 
Immigration Ordinance, banning the entry of Ferdinand Smith, Richard Hart, 
William Strachan, Rojas and other regional Communist leaders from this Colony. 
It is clear that with the above measures implemented the repressive action against 
Communism (discussed by Government) as to travel control and subversive 
literature insofar as this Colony is concerned will be rendered ineffective (vide SBS 
GEN 11/50). 
This Colony may then be expected to become the central meeting place for 
Caribbean Communist leaders, such as they are, and for the continued dissemination 
of Communist propaganda through the Peace Committee, and Pioneer Youth League 
which are, of course, controlled by executives of the Communist section of the P.P.P. 
mentioned above. However, the former measure relating to travel control has 
advantages as well as disadvantages in its withdrawal from the security point of view, 
as it may become possible for Special Branch to establish an efficient listening post 
in this Colony into plans and negotiations made by regional Communist leaders 
should they attempt to come here. 
To sum up it would appear that from a general security aspect the Colony may be 
in for a quiet period in the opening phase of the new Government's life always 
provided that a willingness for co-operation is shown by industrial interests and that 
on the other side Ministerial responsibility induces a period of moderation and 
constructive legislation by the P.P.P. while they consolidate their position. A quick 
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glance at the mental incapacity and lack of education and experience of some of the 
new Members makes it appear likely that Jagan and Burnham will be able to effect 
complete control of the Government in the orbit allotted to the elected Ministers 
whether they become Ministers themselves or not. 
13 CO 10311119, no 27 13 Sept 1953 
[British Guiana]: letter from Sir A Savage to Sir T Lloyd on the PPP 
government and the economic situation. Enclosure: notes by the 
governor 
I apologise for the delay in replying to your letter of the 22nd July but apart from the 
considerable travelling I have undertaken, the problem is unique and complex and I 
wanted to have more experience of the Ministers and their actions before writing you 
fully . Of course I agree generally with the different points of policy to which you refer 
and I assure you I will keep the Secretary of State well informed of developments. But 
I feel the real problem is something far more subtle and difficult and will not be 
solved merely by the use of reserve powers. 
The new Constitution has operated now for roughly four months. It is a fact that 
the P.P.P. have no planned policy and except for Jagan, the new Ministers had had no 
experience of Government departments or of normal administration. I still think that 
it is true to say that they were themselves unprepared for their landslide victory at 
the polls and had expected to find themselves in the role of a strong obstructive and 
disrupting opposition. It was inevitable that the new Government would suffer from 
growing pains, make some mistakes and until the International Bank Report arrived 
(which was to be the basis of a planned programme of development and taxation) it 
would be attacked by the opposition inside and outside of the Legislature for not 
making progress. I say it had no planned policy: although its election manifesto 
indicated broad lines of policy, it was a scurrilous document which I suggested to 
each Minister would best be forgotten if we were to obtain the confidence of the 
country and of overseas territories on whom we should depend for the capital for 
development. 
In early conversations (and indeed subsequently to date) some of the P.P.P. 
Ministers and members of the House volunteered to me privately that they intended 
to work for a stable and not extremist policy. But all exhibit the deepest bitterness 
against H.M.G. and the companies and businesses I have ever experienced. Their 
general line is that all previous governments were dominated by big business and 
now they intend to dominate the country in the interests of the "working class". 
Added to this is a fanatical hatred by the African Ministers of the white race. 
In spite of the growing difficulties I persisted in a policy of tolerance, goodwill and 
co-operation, but it became evident that there was little intention on their part to co-
operate with me or the other members of Executive Council or, in some cases, with 
Heads of Departments. This does not mean to say that some progress has not been 
made but, as I pointed out to Jagan weeks ago, most Ministers appeared to spend 
most of their time on matters with a political flavour and some on questions 
affecting the Civil Service which were outside of their constitutional purview. Also it 
would be fair to say that there have been one or two notable occasions when we have 
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been able to persuade them to drop or defer some proposed objectionable policy 
particularly in economic matters. As a general rule, however, they face us in 
Executive Council with their minds made up as the result of previous discussion at 
what they have recently termed their "Council of Ministers"-(! have asked them to 
desist from using this expression)-and it is practically impossible to induce them to 
accept any reasonable compromise. I have no doubt that if they would adopt a more 
co-operative policy with the officials much more could be achieved. 
But whilst in Executive Council Ministers have behaved themselves with a certain 
amount of propriety (although Sydney King and Burnham have on occasion shown a 
scarcely veiled insolence of manner), outside it their actions and speeches are quite 
irresponsible and during the recent crisis have verged on the seditious. In the House 
of Assembly this week Burnham has spoken of meeting "with sufficient force" any 
attempt to withdraw the new constitution and of being "willing to shed their blood, if 
necessary, for freedom". 
The obvious question which poses itself is whether or not they intend to continue 
to work within the framework of the new constitution. I believe that at present some 
of them do, in the expectation that Her Majesty's Government would concede full 
self-government in 1956, though it remains to be seen what their reaction would be 
if and when the State Council imposes a check on any measure put forward by the 
House of Assembly. But the extremist element, with Mrs. Jagan and Sydney King in 
the van, appear to believe that by creating disorder and economic chaos they could 
force the issue of self-government earlier. For the moment there is no doubt that the 
extremists dominate the position and the moderates, if indeed they are moderates, 
are afraid to declare themselves publicly and even tend to vie with the extremists on 
some issues-maybe through fear of losing ground but the effect is the same. An 
example of this is the recently formed "African and Colonial Affairs Committee", of 
which Burnham and Chase are leading lights: one of its objects is probably to build 
up their political strength and prestige vis-a-vis the Jagan group, but it specialises in 
vicious anti-British, anti-white propaganda of the worst type. 
Hence these party differences do not assist the cause of moderation-rather the 
reverse. In any case there is no doubt that the Governor, the official members of 
Executive Council and the State Council are the common enemy and it may well be 
that before you receive this letter a resolution may be tabled in the House saying that 
the Government is unable to carry out its plans without full self-government. 
The technique of the extremists for the present appears to be to press for legislative 
action only in matters which will not split the party and in the meantime to develop 
its organisation throughout the country and to obtain party control of every possible 
human activity. They are hard at work trying to undermine the Civil Service, 
exploiting every possible cause of discontent, resorting to intimidation: they have 
their cells and spies in most departments. The police are thought to be 75% reliable at 
the moment, but here again malcontents are being used as foci for the spread of 
disaffection. Recognised youth organisations, the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, the 
Y.M.C.A. and so on, are subjected to attack and the communist Pioneer Youth 
Movement is being given their official support. In this and countless other directions 
the foundations of society are being attacked insidiously almost without check. 
By this insidious undermining process, the party could in time secure a more or 
less complete grip of the country, irrespectively of whether I step in, as I shall no 
doubt have to do before long, and use my reserved powers on this or that individual 
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issue. The crucial question is how long and how far should we allow this process to 
continue and how can we stop it? It seemed to me that the crux of the position lies 
with the 51% of voters who put the P.P.P. in power. An ineffective number might 
perhaps vote against the P.P.P. on the next occasion through dissatisfaction with 
their policy, but even here there is the intimidation factor to be reckoned with. My 
personal policy has been to get among the 51% to demonstrate that I am deeply 
interested in their well being and by constant contact with small groups when 
travelling try to get their confidence for there are many who would respond to sound 
leadership. The enclosed notes will give you more of the background. 
The 49% who voted against the P.P.P. are completely lacking in effective 
leadership and cohesion and have little moral courage. Even the prestige which still 
attaches to the position of Governor here has the unfortunate result that in time of 
difficulty such as this the "opposition" tend to look helplessly to him for 
intervention, when the solution really lies in their own hands. Of course it may be 
that the outcome of the present strike or some other factor will cause a revulsion of 
feeling against the P.P.P., but in the absence of other leadership, particularly in the 
sugar areas, they would probably succumb to the intimidation and other pressures 
which I have mentioned above and drift back. In fact, I am rapidly coming to the 
conclusion that unless the opposition elements in the country rouse themselves 
quickly and wake up to their obligations and opportunities, then to retain British 
Guiana in the Commonwealth we shall have to go back on the new Constitution 
which would mean the use of force and the maintenance of military forces here for 
some considerable time. 
At a recent meeting with the leading businessmen here I pressed the problem on 
them and the part that they could play in arresting the deterioration of the situation. 
Unfortunately, I feel that some of them, supported particularly by the Portuguese 
community, consider the best solution is to hasten the breakdown of the constitution 
and to press Her Majesty's Government to go back to a less liberal system. 
Also may I say with respect that if Her Majesty's Government considers 
domestically and at an international level that British Guiana must be kept within 
the Commonwealth it must give more assistance in the propaganda field and assist to 
remove the conditions in the economic field on which communist propaganda 
thrives. 
Finally, as regards policy in the event of the resignation of Ministers from 
Executive Council and/or from the House of Assembly, I understand the remaining 
numbers will allow us to continue without a general election but I have asked the 
Attorney General to prepare a memorandum on this and other contingencies and 
will forward it as soon as possible. 
I realise that this letter is very patchy but you will realise that I am writing under 
heavy pressure. I should welcome an opportunity for discussion but that is not 
possible for the present and so I am looking forward very much to the visit of the 
Minister of State next month. 
Enclosure to 13 
British Guiana has a basic sugar economy of restricted output which provides frugal 
conditions of life for many people, a mining industry which gives good conditions for 
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a smaller number and a growing rice industry which does not appear to be really 
economic at world prices, and whose workers depend also on sugar and P.W.D. 
expenditure to support poor conditions of life. Coupled with this there is a rapidly 
increasing population which, unless there is hidden wealth in the interior, will mean 
poorer standards of living in the future. The generous grants of H. M. G. have done 
much to assist the local situation but the economic outlook is grim. 
I have now toured all the densely populated areas and seen for myself the general 
conditions of life. There is indeed, as elsewhere, much fertile ground for 
communists. The vast majority of the people are not communists but there is no 
doubt that they felt the voice of the common people was not heard in the previous 
councils of state and they demanded a change. Unfortunately, generally speaking, the 
only leadership offered was the highly organized P.P.P. party [sic]. 
Local Government, certainly in the rural areas, is almost dead. There is no real 
leadership among its members. 
The District Administration bears no resemblance to that of the African colonies. 
It started too late. District Commissioners are in the main ineffective and almost 
ignored by all. 
The Press has but little influence on the mass of the people. 
The Churches are full and although their leaders do have some influence, in the 
main they do not affect the lowest income groups as only recently, with notable 
exceptions, they have appreciated their responsibilities in social affairs. 
There is no real political opposition to the party in power. There are too many 
parties and independents and again no apparent leadership. Attempts are now being 
made to correct this in relation to the forthcoming by-election. 
The European Guianese have not yet recovered from the shock of the elections but 
they are not prepared to enter politics and indeed anti-white feeling is growing, fed 
by propaganda, and soon no white candidate will stand a chance of being elected. 
Unfortunately there is a fairly strong feeling by local Europeans against overseas 
Europeans. There is no real leadership in the European community. The majority of 
the leading business men are employees. 
In the above circumstances it is not surprising that the P.P.P. not only won the 
elections but have met with some success in strengthening their position 
subsequently. It is probably true that some of their supporters are becoming a little 
critical, particularly in Georgetown, but they are not an effective number. The 
outcome of the sugar strike may affect the position temporarily. 
The party members are a very mixed lot ranging from labourers to professional 
men and owners of substantial property. The six opposition members are of poor 
quality. 
The six Ministers are said to be made up of three Extremists (lagan, King and 
Lachhmansingh) and three Moderates (Burnham, Jenaraine Singh and Chase). There 
is no substance in Lachhmansingh and he is kicked around by his colleagues. The 
rest are very capable people and I believe far more intelligent than the previous 
Executive Council. After four months' experience I trust only one of them (Chase). 
Jagan, Jenaraine [sic] Singh and Chase appear to be working very hard and to a 
determined purpose to improve conditions. Burnham, whose popularity is said to be 
waning in Georgetown, is lazy, acid and fl ippant; King holds papers up and is vicious 
in his attacks, while Lachhmansingh flounders helplessly in everything he touches. 
Every one of these men has a deep bitterness of feeling against Britain, the past 
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administration and/or against society generally. Jagan, brought up on a sugar estate; 
Burnham, twice abused publicly overseas for being black; Jenaraine [sic] Singh, a 
qualified agronomist, failed to obtain an appointment in this his country; Chase, a 
reasonable trade unionist labelled communist unfairly; Lachhmansingh and King 
warned off certain sugar estates. 
The majority of the other P.P.P. members in the House of Assembly appear to be 
supporters of the Extremists. 
The "behind scenes" work being done by Mrs. Jagan and others is insidious and 
dangerous. She is a brilliant organizer and is by no means resting on her laurels and 
in every district where no P.P.P. unit presently exists, an organization is being 
developed. But no real opposition is being developed. 
The sugar estates are to a considerable extent the crux of the situation. It is there 
that the extremist is well supported. It is so easy for him to point to the dreadful 
housing and social conditions which exist (and to ignore the improvements) and 
compare them with the comfortable quarters and the neat compounds and the 
recreational facilities of the staff who are predominantly European. It is also easy for 
him to allege unfair profits being transferred to absentee landlords and to blame, as 
is done, the British Government for the conditions which exist. 
I have been in the homes, in the fields and in the workshops, and I believe that 
many of these people would have responded, and may yet respond, to sympathetic 
and sane leadership. I did not see one library on the est~tes I visited so the people 
read the extremist literature provided by the Party. A swimming bath might cost the 
companies the interest on the capital involved and although not vital would have 
reflected an interest of the owners in their workpeople. But it is the housing aspect 
where I feel the companies have been so shortsighted. Mter the special sugar funds 
were instituted, the companies appear to have taken the line that the contribution of 
10/- a ton to the Labour Welfare Fund was their money and relieved them of the 
obligation of doing anything further in respect of general housing and unnecessary 
for them to take advantage of the very generous Income Tax concessions in respect of 
workers' housing. 
The attack on overseas officers in the Civil Service is fairly general and has not 
been relieved by the numerous discussions I have had individually and collectively 
with Ministers. I fear too that there have been many weaknesses in the past in the 
Establishment Section of the Secretariat for which we are now suffering and that the 
previous Promotions Board was not objective or efficient. 
The most serious aspect from a security point of view are [sic] the attacks on police 
morale. I believe the Force to be loyal but some Ministers (particularly Sydney King) 
have been provocative and threatening in recent public speeches. 
We have not learnt much of Mrs. Jagan's recent visit to Europe but from odd 
remarks I suspect that in addition to the Communist literature we shall be receiving 
visits from overseas communists (not only West Indian) and possibly proposals for 
appointment of Russian technicians and professional officers at low rates of pay, if 
not an approach from a company of Russian origin anxious to develop our resources. 
There is a lot of racial feeling here. In spite of nationalistic slogans, there is a deep 
distrust by the Mrican of the Indian and a physical fear of the Mrican by the Indian. 
Many Mricans hate the white man, while the Portuguese are probably more 
responsible than anybody for racial feelings. The Mrican feels too that rice, which is 
predominantly an Indian crop, has received unfair preference in capital expenditure. 
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"White" clubs are a threat to security. One of these clubs recently blackballed a 
worthy Chinese citizen. 
There is very little social contact between white people and others. At the 
Coronation Ball at Government House a group of "whites" left early after a "Paul 
Jones". 
14 CO 1031/119 16 Sept 1953 
[British Guiana]: minute by J W Vernon1 on the justification for 
intervention to remove the PPP government 
Mr.Mayle 
1. The attached analysis2 of the political situation in British Guiana, which has 
been prepared partly as a brief for Mr. Hopkinson on his forthcoming visit to the 
territory, makes it clear that a very grave situation is developing. It is evident that 
there is an important section of the People's Progressive Party in British Guiana, 
including some of the Ministers, which is trying to turn the territory into a Republic 
completely independent of the United Kingdom with a Communist political bias and 
a leaning towards Russia rather than the West in international affairs. Other 
elements in the Party wish merely to see freedom from British yoke or improved 
social conditions for the people, but control of the Party is firmly vested in the hands 
of the extremists. They are doing everything to strengthen their hold by classical 
communist methods, such as the organisation of specific sections of the community 
(e.g. youth, women), by cells, by classes in political indoctrination, rallies, peace 
conferences, etc. They are also increasing their hold over labour through the trade 
unions they control and are trying to infiltrate into the police and the public service 
on the lines followed by Communist Parties in Eastern Europe after the war. Such 
political opposition as there is to the party is pathetically inadequate in the face of 
this organisation. If the Communists are allowed to continue their activities 
unchecked they will gradually tighten their grip on the organs of control and 
propaganda until they feel strong enough to make an all-out bid to throw off the 
British "yoke" entirely. In the meantime the economic situation of the country would 
gradually deteriorate, capital would move out of the territory as far as it was able and 
eventually only massive aid from outside, which is not likely to be forthcoming, 
would save the country from economic chaos. Moderate opinion would be more and 
more afraid to come out in open opposition to an apparently all powerful and ruthless 
communist party. 
2. From the point of view of the Cominform a Communist victory in one small 
bit of the South American continent is of no particular value in itself. To it the 
attractiveness of such a development would be that it would provide a centre for 
organising Communist activity throughout the British West Indies and Central and 
South America. This constitutes the gravest danger in the present situation from the 
Western point of view (see Sir T. Lloyd's letter of 4th September). Ministers have 
made use of their powers under the constitution to have the bans on West Indian 
Communists withdrawn. The proposal to organise a Peace Conference is an 
1 Principal, CO, West Indian Dept 'B'. 2 See 13. 
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indication of further plans on the same lines. The position in this respect therefore is 
slowly but steadily deteriorating. It is, moreover, not counterbalanced by any 
apparent increase in reasonableness amongst any of the Ministers on economic or 
social matters nor has the hoped-for split between the moderates and the extremists 
developed. 
3. It has already been agreed (see Sir T. Lloyd's letter of 22nd July) that if 
Ministers attempt to use their position to further the communist cause then 
immediate action should be taken before the situation gets out of hand. It might be 
argued, that since the people of British Guiana chose this government it is 
undemocratic to intervene and that we should wait until they have learnt the 
disadvantages of Communism and reject it for themselves. Intervention at an 
appropriate moment can however be justified on the following grounds:-
( a) the economic consequences of leaving the present government in power will 
be so serious for the people themselves as to justify us protecting them from their 
own folly. 
(b) the bauxite, sugar and rice exported by the territory are important to other 
countries-the bauxite is of very considerable importance to Canada's aluminium 
production and hence to our aircraft production, the loss of the sugar would 
involve the U.K. in the purchase of $25 million worth of dollar sugar per annum 
and the rice feeds many people in the Eastern Caribbean. 
(c) the encouragement given to communism in other B.W.I. territories would 
have serious repercussions. 
(d) the appearance of an overtly communist regime in British Guiana and its use 
as a communist centre would seriously embarrass the U.K. in its diplomatic 
relations with U.S.A. and other countries of the Western Hemisphere. 
(e) there is the over-riding objection that we cannot allow a Communist 
Government to remain in power in a British territory since its whole attitude must 
constitute a grave threat to the preservation there of law, order, justice and 
democratic rights as we know them. 
4. The power to intervene in British Guiana still rests in our hands. The 
Governor has reserve powers to act contrary to the advice of the Ministers in 
Executive Council and to certify legislation. If necessary the Constitution can be 
withdrawn by Order in Council. A note on the legal issues involved is attached.3 Any 
civil commotion fomented by the extremists would not be difficult to handle in view 
of the geographical configuration of the territory, although if trouble extended 
beyond the sugar estates troops would probably be needed. There is a battalion 
stationed in Jamaica at 48 hours readiness to move and H.M.S. "Bigbury Bay" is in 
Trinidad waters. It would be important to avoid bloodshed but the use of tear gas 
would probably be effective. None of the Ministers except possibly Sydney King is 
likely to prove to be a good leader of violent insurrection. 
5. There are now three possible eventualities:-
(i) The extremists will realize the errors of their ways and reform. Our hope that 
that would happen is gradually fading. 
(ii) Ministers will continue their campaign of attrition which will slowly 
3 Not printed. 
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undermine our position without providing any excuse for vigorous action against 
them. It may then be necessary to take action on a matter which is trivial in itself 
but which is felt to be the "sticking point" beyond which Ministers cannot be 
allowed to go. (Sir Thomas Lloyd's letter of 22nd July refers to this possibility). It 
would be difficult in such circumstances to justify not holding fresh elections 
which might very well return the same Ministers to power and thus weaken our 
case against them. Nevertheless no alternative to such action may be open to us 
and a case history of the misdeeds of Ministers should be maintained for use in 
that eventuality. 
(iii) Ministers may commit themselves, possibly inadvertently, to some action 
which would fully justify the Governor in the eyes of the world in sacking them 
and suspending the constitution. The spreading of the present sugar strike may 
well provide such an opportunity. There can now be no doubt any such 
opportunity should be vigorously seized and all necessary preparations should be 
made for the action that would then be necessary. 
6. The Governor has already been informed in various letters from Sir Thomas 
Lloyd [of] our views on possible developments. It would now seem necessary to 
inform him that the behaviour of Ministers since the letter of the 22nd July has led 
us to believe that action against them is very probably sooner or later going to be 
necessary, to propose to him that preparations for that action be now taken and that 
a full case history of the actions of Ministers and their associates should be 
maintained. It should also be pointed out to him that any concessions to Ministers 
which would make subsequent action against them more difficult (e.g. allowing 
them to pack local authorities with their adherents) ought to be avoided from now 
on. 
7. When the communist threat had been countered a long and difficult period of 
social and economic rehabilitation would start. The unemployment and bad housing 
conditions on which communism has battened in British Guiana will have to be 
removed and the populace educated in the virtues of true democracy so that they do 
not fall victims to the blandishments of Communists again. 
15 CO 1031/119, no 29 24 Sept 1953 
[British Guiana]: outward telegram no 21 from Mr Lyttelton to Sir A 
Savage on intervention to remove the PPP government and the 
introduction of emergency powers 
Your telegrams Personal No. 37, No. 49 and No. 51 and my telegram Personal No. 20. 
Political situation 
It has become increasingly clear to me from your recent reports including your letter 
to Lloyd of the 13th September1 that there was no prospect of Ministers acting 
1 See 13. 
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responsibly and foregoing their extremist aims. It was clearly right on the 
introduction of the new Constitution to try to do all that tact, patience and tolerance 
could achieve to win them away from the extremists and to see whether the 
responsibilities of office would make them see reason. It is however clear that they 
have no intention of working the present Constitution in the interests of the people 
of British Guiana as a whole, but are seeking a one party totalitarian control of the 
country and a link-up with Russia which we obviously cannot contemplate. 
2. Ministers have no doubt been trying to avoid a break until they could acquire 
more powers and the P.P.P. more adherents. In this way they are gradually 
undermining our position. We cannot allow this to continue and a halt must now be 
called. The report of sympathy strikes2 in your Personal telegrams Nos. 49 and 51, 
however much Ministers may attempt to disown responsibility for them, completes 
the justification for immediate action. Their general record is such that I have 
decided this latest development makes a break inevitable and that we must now act 
against them. 
3. Pending formal suspension of the Constitution the action to be taken as we 
now see it, once adequate force is available (see Paragraph 4 below), is for you to 
remove Portfolios from Ministers and to govern on your reserve powers (see 
paragraph 2 of my telegram Personal No. 20). When you do this it seems to me 
important that you should at the same time place the dangerous leaders of the P.P.P. 
under restraint and raid their premises for incriminating documents. Power to 
enable you to do this will be included in the Order in Council referred to in 
paragraph 5 below. 
4. Before you can take this action we must be certain that you have adequate 
forces available to maintain law and order. In view of paragraph 3 of your telegram 
No. 340 I am assuming that outside forces will be needed. I should be grateful for an 
estimate from you of the numbers needed and what arrangements you propose for 
deploying them immediately on arrival in the Colony. Meanwhile I am discussing the 
problem with military here. You should arrange for Commander, Caribbean Area 
visit you forthwith to discuss details. You will appreciate difficulty of making any 
reinforcements available from outside the Caribbean and length of time that would 
be involved. 
5. You must also have in this crisis full emergency legal powers for preservation 
of public order and the maintenance of supplies and services. In view of the doubt 
referred to in paragraph l(b) of my Personal telegram No. 20 whether the Emergency 
Powers Order in Council, 1939, validly applies to British Guiana I propose that an 
Order in Council of the kind referred to in paragraph l(c) of my telegram (which 
need not be laid in draft) should be made as soon as possible giving you such powers. 
I have in mind applying by reference such of the Defence Regulations as were in force 
in British Guiana during the war as would appear to be appropriate, but I should be 
2 A reference to the strike in the sugar belt which was called on 31 August and which lasted until 24 
September. From the outset the programme of the PPP government was viewed with disquiet by the 
British Guiana Sugar Producers' Association. With the strike in progress, the BGSPA mobilised support in 
the colony and in London through the influential West India Committee, not only for the removal of the 
PPP government but also for the dismissal of Savage. The governor was held responsible for having 
allowed the alleged excesses of his government (CO 1031160). 
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grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible what powers you yourself think 
you will need. I will attempt to get this Order in Council made in the next 10 days, 
but it can be kept secret until all other arrangements for making the break are 
complete. 
6. We must also have ready a statement for immediate issue when you take 
action giving the reasons for the withdrawal of Ministers' powers. I suggest that 
amongst other things this statement should make it clear that British Guiana was 
given its new constitution in the hope that it would seize this opportunity to advance 
along the road to responsible self-government within the British Commonwealth; 
that the constitution had been perverted by a small clique of Communist 
sympathisers who sought to impose totalitarianism on the territory and were 
bringing the economic life of the country to a standstill; that the Ministers had 
abused their authority in various ways which should be listed; that the withdrawal of 
their powers from Ministers would have to be followed by the suspension of the 
constitution; that you had the necessary emergency powers to ensure law and order 
and the safety of property and were proposing to do so; that it was Her Majesty's 
Government's intention to give the territory a revised constitution which would 
permit the British Guianese themselves to continue to partake in their own 
government; and that in the meantime you propose to take all possible measures to 
improve housing and the other social services and to ensure the rapid economic 
development of the territory's resources. 
7. The Order suspending the constitution will be prepared here and referred to 
you for comments. This will need to be laid in draft before Parliament, which will be 
done, if possible, as soon as it reassembles. I propose that this Order should also 
provide for the setting up of an interim Government. I have in mind a nominated 
Executive Council (which you could, but need not, consult and whose advice you 
need not take) and a nominated single legislative chamber including on both bodies 
as many members of the P.P.P. as will be prepared to co-operate. 
8. A Commission of Enquiry will also have to be appointed into the events in 
British Guiana which have led to this breakdown and to propose a new constitution. 
Reference might be made to such a Commission of Enquiry in the public statement 
referred to in paragraph 6 above. 
9. Arrival of forces, arrest of dangerous persons, publication of emergency Order 
in Council and issue of statement would, of course, have to be simultaneous with 
withdrawal of powers of Ministers. Meanwhile the greatest secrecy is essential in 
making these preparations in order that Ministers shall not be warned of our 
intentions before we are ready. I shall assume in future cypher messages that you 
have arranged for suitable staff to decypher. 
10. I should be glad if you would now make all preparations urgently. Please 
telegraph as soon as possible regarding emergency legal powers (paragraph 5 above) 
and forces required, including your recommendation as to timing of action if you 
and Commander Caribbean area regard forces from outside that area as essential 
despite the difficulties referred to in paragraph 4. I should also be grateful for your 
detailed plans for carrying out this operation and for a draft statement as outlined in 
paragraph 6. 
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16 CO 10311752, no 15 19 Oct 1953 
[British Virgin Islands]: letter from Sir K Blackburne (Antigua) to 
P Rogers on the arguments for and against the British Virgin Islands 
joining the federation 
[The CO was aware that the smaller territories were likely to pose greater problems than 
British Guiana and British Honduras, both of which had decided to remain outside the 
federation. Ultimately, British Guiana and British Honduras were said to have prospects 
of standing on their own feet; the British Virgin, Turks and Caicos and Cayman Islands 
would never be able to (CO 1031/752, minute by C E Wool-Lewis, principal, West Indian 
Dept 'B', 5 Feb 1952.) 
Thank you for your letter WIS 363/02 of the 2nd October about the position of the 
British Virgin Islands under the proposed British Caribbean Federation. The 
Secretary of State's despatch takes care of the immediate problem, and I think that 
local apprehensions will be allayed by the statement that no decision has yet been 
reached. 
But this is only putting off the evil day when a decision has to be reached; and, if 
the decision has to follow the lines proposed in the SCAC Report and in the Plan for a 
British Caribbean Federation, the sooner that I start to try and "sell" the idea in the 
Virgin Islands the less trouble may ultimately occur. 
At the risk of repetition I think that it may be helpful if I set out in some detail the 
position of the British Virgin Islands in regard to this matter. I feel perhaps that it 
may be important to do so, because I know that I never fully appreciated their 
position when I was with the Development and Welfare Organisation; and it seems 
possible that the position is not fully understood at home. Indeed one can only 
understand the position fully when one has had to deal at first-hand with the British 
Virgin Islanders and with their special problems. 
At the outset I would explain that it is extremely difficult to assess "public opinion" 
in the British Virgin Islands. They are a most independent minded people; and I am 
afraid that even their elected representatives in the Legislature cannot be said to 
"represent" them fully. Indeed the elected members are frequently divided in their 
opinions on many subjects. For that reason it is quite impossible for me to answer 
the normal question which would be asked in this connection-"If the British Virgin 
Islanders do not want to join the British Caribbean Federation, what do they want?" 
At the same time I can say that all those with whom I have discussed the matter are 
opposed to forming a part of the Federation; and in the following paragraphs I will 
try and explain the reasons for their feelings. 
The British Virgin Islands have the following "links" with the outside world:-
(1) social and economic links with the United States Virgin Islands. They have no 
links with the British West Indies (save in respect of (2) below); 
(2) administrative links with the Leeward Islands. So long as they receive visits 
and advice from the Governor of the Leeward Islands and from his staff, the British 
Virgin Islanders are prepared to recognize that they derive benefit from their 
association with the Leeward Islands. (All the old records are destroyed, but I 
should not be surprised if the agitation for union with the United States in 1949 
was due in part to the apparent breakdown of this administrative link, owing to 
infrequent visits to Tortola from Antigua); 
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(3) financial and traditional links with the United Kingdom. The Presidency 
receives an annual grant-in-aid from the United Kingdom; and the British Virgin 
Islanders take a certain pride in being British- though the more thoughtful ones 
often feel- and say privately-that this relationship is contrary to their economic 
interests. 
It should be noted that the British Virgin Islands are in the above respects quite 
different from the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Those islands 
have become accustomed to being dependencies of Jamaica; and their inclusion in 
the Federation does not involve the breaking of any old established links. The 
position in those islands might well have been very different if they had been 
geographically situated nearer to a foreign country (as is the case of the British 
Virgin Islands), and if they had regarded that foreign country as their natural source 
of employment, their natural trading centre, and their centre for social contacts such 
as marriage. 
Let me now put the arguments advanced in the British Virgin Islands against 
joining the Federation. 
As regards (1), social links, the people of the British Virgin Islands are closely 
related and intermarried with American Virgin Islanders. They have no such 
relationships with the other islands in the British West Indies. Inclusion in the 
Federation would, therefore, accentuate the division imposed on Virgin Islanders as a 
whole by the fact that they have already been arbitrarily divided into American and 
British nationalities. 
As regards economic links, British Virgin Islanders have always traded with the 
American islands rather than with the British islands simply because the former are 
closer. They will have to continue to purchase most of their necessities from St. 
Thomas in the future, whether or not they join in the Federation, because they will 
have lower transport costs to pay. (It should be noted in this connection that there 
has never been any suggestion that the proposed Caribbean shipping service should 
serve the British Virgin Islands; and indeed it would be hopelessly uneconomic for it 
to do so). If they have to purchase their necessities in St. Thomas, it is natural that 
they should wish also to sell their produce in St. Thomas. They are all small farmers, 
and they must operate their economic life on the basis of small and quick sales in the 
place where they have to do their shopping. They cannot see, therefore, any 
economic advantage coming to them through the Federation. Incidentally, the 
special position of the British Virgin Islands in the economic field is made clear by 
the facts that it is [sic] not represented on the Regional Economic Committee, and 
that to the best of my belief no matter hitherto handled by the Regional Economic 
Committee has had any bearing on this Presidency. 
Under Federation there will be free movement of population within the British 
Caribbean. If the British Virgin Islands have to admit other British West Indians 
freely (who go there in the hope of gaining admittance to St. Thomas by the "back 
door"), the American authorities will clamp down even more firmly on immigration 
from the British Virgin Islands. 
As regards (2)-administrative links- the British Virgin Islanders know that they 
need technical help and guidance from outside; but they doubt whether the 
Government of the Federation-faced continually with larger problems-will be able 
to give them as much help as they now receive from the Leeward Islands. There is 
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another point; I have been told in discussions that the British Virgin Islands do not 
want to be left on their own administratively; and that they would like to feel that 
they have someone to whom they can appeal when they are dissatisfied with the 
actions of the Commissioner; they feel that the Governor-General will be far too 
remote, and far too busy to pay regular visits to Tortola. They do not, therefore, like 
the idea of "direct administrative attachment to the Governor-General" (paragraph 
79 of the SCAC Report), nor do they feel that the Governor-General will be able to 
take the place of the Governor of the Leeward Islands. 
As regards (3)-financiallinks-the proposals in the SCAC Report (paragraphs 79 
and 36) and in the Plan for a British Caribbean Federation (paragraphs 3 and 70) 
amount to a complete abolition of the financial link with the United Kingdom. The 
British Virgin Islands do not relish the idea of being dependent for their grant-in-aid 
on a British Caribbean Government on which they will have no representative and no 
voice. They doubt whether their financial needs are likely to receive a sympathetic 
hearing from a State Council whose members are unlikely to know anything of the 
needs of the Islands and do not have to look to the Islands for electoral support. 
One cannot of course obtain any direct statement from the British Virgin Islanders 
about the second part of item (3)-links of tradition. People do not talk openly about 
this sort of thing. But there are many pointers which indicate clearly that the ties 
with Britain are deep and real. It is astonishing that British Virgin Islanders who visit 
St. Thomas and see wealth and prosperity and high wages, who eat American food, 
wear American clothes, smoke American cigarettes, read American papers, listen to 
American stations on American radios, continue to feel proud of being British. For 
example, I. G. Fonseca (one of the elected members, the organiser of the "Union with 
America" campaign in 1949, and a man who has adopted the American way of life 
most pronouncedly) took grave exception when I suggested that it would save 
expense if a new flag pole needed at Government House could be placed on the roof 
rather than on a specially prepared pedestal in the garden: "It is most important that 
the flag should be clearly seen by every ship entering the harbour; it would not be 
clearly seen on the roof against the background of the hills". That is just one small 
example of an outlook which is not openly voiced but is displayed in a number of 
different ways. I wonder myself whether we can honestly satisfy ourselves that we 
should be acting fairly if we deliberately broke this link between Britain and the 
Virgin Islands, and replaced it by an artificial alleigance to a Caribbean Federation 
with which these people have no existing links at all. 
Those are some of the arguments against the inclusion of the British Virgin 
Islands in the Federation. If they are to enter the Federation in spite of those 
arguments, and if we are to persuade them to enter it voluntarily and without risk of 
a campaign in favour of union with the American Virgin Islands, we must be 
prepared to produce reasonable answers. 
Here then are the arguments in favour of joining the Federation. 
(1) Economic and social. One of the principal aims of the Federation is to enable 
the area to be developed as a single economic unit; and to enable it to speak with one 
voice on economic affairs. It would be advantageous for the British Virgin Islands if 
they could have ready and assured markets for their livestock in the British islands to 
the south. It would place them in a stronger bargaining position with the American 
islands, and would ensure that they could dispose of their livestock (though not of 
their fish and vegetables) in times like the present when the American authorities 
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ban the import of cattle to St. Thomas. This is a strong argument; but it depends on 
the free convertibility of sterling. (At present the Virgin Islanders have to earn U.S. 
dollars to make their own purchases). And it depends on the establishment of better 
communications with the southern islands. 
Their social links with the American islands will be no more disrupted under 
Federation than they are at present by the restrictive immigration policy of the United 
States. The links might even be improved, because the British Caribbean Government 
Uudging from the performances of some of the present West Indian leaders) is likely 
to make much more public fuss over American red-tape in St. Thomas than the 
British Government is able to do. (The American attitude to the Virgin Islands 
problem is indefensible on humanitarian grounds and I often feel that, if the British 
Government could attract world publicity to the problem by using "Bustamante" 
methods (which of course it cannot do), then we should have the problem solved at 
once, and free intercourse between the two groups permitted) . But I do not fancy 
using this argument when speaking with people in the British Virgin Islands! 
The British Virgin Islands' horizon is limited to St. Thomas and the broadening of 
their outlook and contacts with the larger Federation would be an advantage. 
(2) Administrative. Although the Governor-General may not be able to visit the 
British Virgin Islands regularly, it seems probable that one of the Ministers on the 
State Council will have the Virgin Islands as part of his portfolio. This Minister, and 
his staff, should be able to devote as much attention to the Islands as the Governor of 
the Leeward Islands does to-day. As regards technical advice, the Virgin Islands will 
obviously find it easier to obtain all the help they need from other British Caribbean 
territories if they join the Federation. If they do not join, they may well find it 
difficult to obtain technical advice when they need it; and they will have to pay for it. 
Furthermore for staffing purposes it would be to the Virgin Islands' advantage as the 
Public Service Commission for the area would look after their needs. Otherwise there 
will be difficulty in recruitment and stagnation will result. Interchange of experience 
is important. It would be of direct benefit to the Virgin Islands if their horizons could 
be enlarged. 
(3) Financial and traditional. It would be wrong to suppose that the British 
Caribbean Federal Government would be so irresponsible as to overlook the needs of 
what will in effect be more or less a "dependency" of the Federation. Indeed it is to be 
expected that the Minister who deals with the affairs of the British Virgin Islands and 
the State Council will take a special pride in seeing that the Federation's 
"dependency" is properly helped. In any event the financial requirements of the 
British Virgin Islands are so small that they cannot materially affect the finances of 
the Federal Government. 
As regards the traditional link, the Federation will also be British; and the British 
Virgin Islands will maintain their British connection even after they are within the 
Federation. (I would not care to use this argument myself). 
That then is the case for and against; and I must confess that my own conclusion is 
that we must produce some much stronger arguments if we are to satisfy our own 
consciences that it would be right to force the British Virgin Islands to enter the 
Federation (however loosely), and if we are to persuade British Virgin Islanders that 
it is in their own interests to do so. You may be able to produce those arguments; but 
in case you cannot do so, I had better conclude by setting out the possible 
alternatives. 
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If we rule out the possibility of transfer to American control (which we can hardly 
suggest ourselves, and which might well be unacceptable to the Government of the 
United States), I feel that there is only one really practicable course of action-to 
allow the Virgin Islands to be administered by the Governor of the Leeward Islands in 
the early stages of Federation; and, when the Federation attains "Dominion" status, 
to transfer the administration to the United Kingdom High Commissioner who will 
presumably be appointed to the Federation at that time. 
Under this arrangement the Virgin Islands would continue to correspond on all 
matters with the Colonial Office through the Governor (and later the High 
Commissioner). They would receive their grant-in-aid direct from the United 
Kingdom. And they would be responsible for their own legislation. 
The question of legislation calls for special comment. Even when the Leeward 
Islands are "de-federated", it will presumably be necessary for the post of Governor to 
be retained together with one or two other "central" posts as in the Windward 
Islands, including an Attorney General. The Attorney General will thus still be 
available to assist the British Virgin Islands in the preparation of legislation. 
I appreciate of course that there can be no question at this moment of announcing 
that the British Virgin Islands are to be permitted to stand out from the Federation. 
Such an announcement could only be made after all the other West Indian territories 
have decided on their stand. And it could only be made after the British Virgin 
Islands have been asked to re-consider their present attitude. If, therefore, you feel 
that there is any substance in what I have written above, there is no need for further 
action at the present time. 
If, however, you still adhere to the view quoted in your letter that "we ourselves 
have reached the conclusion that ... there could be no question of the Virgin Islands 
being allowed to stand out" from the Federation, then I hope that you will be able to 
counter the arguments in this letter and that you will be able to provide me with 
ammunition with which to try and persuade the British Virgin Islanders to accept 
your decision. 
I am sending a copy of this letter to Luke.1 
1 In his reply, Rogers suggested that many of Blackburne's arguments were in effect reasons why the 
British Virgin Islands should not be under British administration at all, let alone part of the federation. 
While agreeing that there was much to be said for the islands being placed directly under the governor of 
the Leewards and later under the UK high commissioner to the federation, Rogers also argued that under 
such an arrangement the Virgin Islands would not have access to the technical help and guidance which 
they needed. The federation might provide such services on payment, but a territory outside the federation 
would have no right to expect them. The issue was not one which could be resolved at present (CO 
1031/752, no 16, Rogers to Blackburne, 31 Dec 1953). 
17 CO 1031/128, no 44 31 Oct 1953 
[British Guiana]: 52nd political report by Sir A Savage on military 
intervention and its immediate aftermath [Extract] 
[Having made the decision to intervene on 24 Sept (see 15), the CO obtained the 
Cabinet's approval on 2 Oct (CAB 129/63, C(53)261, Cabinet memo by Lyttelton on the 
constitutional crisis, 30 Sept 1953 and CAB 128/26/2, CC 54(53)4, 2 Oct, Cabinet 
conclusions on same, both reproduced in BDEEP series A, vol 3, David Goldsworthy, ed, 
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The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951-1957, part II, 336-337). A 
battalion of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers was ordered to proceed to British Guiana from 
Jamaica in a cruiser and two frigates. The intention was that the troops would arrive off 
Georgetown on 9 Oct; for the reasons explained in paras 2-3 of the report reproduced 
here, they arrived a day early. The reaction to this intervention elsewhere in the British 
Caribbean was mixed. Adams of Barbados and Bustamante of Jamaica condemned the 
PPP, as did other Caribbean politicians in less strident tones, but all of the Caribbean 
governors reported that there was little support for the action amongst the public at large 
(CO 1031/1188). The US supported the UK in its refusal to have the issue debated on the 
floor of the Assembly of the UN where representatives from Latin America and Eastern 
Europe were at one in their condemnation. Nehru of India was critical and there was little 
support for the UK elsewhere in the Commonwealth. The 'opposition' delegation which 
the CO sponsored to refute the case mounted by Jagan and Burnham during their visit to 
the UK (para 9 of the report reproduced here) was in fact less effective than the report 
suggests; the delegation found it difficult to put its case across (C0/1183, minutes, Rogers 
to Lloyd, 29 Oct 1953, Carstairs to Rogers, 2 Nov 1953). Officials in the CO were 
concerned that the Jagan-Burnham campaign might damage HMG's case which was 
published in a white paper (British Guiana: Suspension of the Constitution, Cmd 8980, 
1953). However, the government escaped censure in the ensuing parliamentary debate in 
the House of Commons, senior opposition speakers such as Attlee and James Griffith, 
secretary of state for the colonies when Labour left office in 1951, accepting the main 
charge against the PPP that they were either communists or the dupes of communists (H 
of C Debs, vol 518, cols 2159-2284, 22 Oct 1953). Post-intervention CO policy towards 
the PPP was, in the words of Philip Rogers, 'to go hard at it and smash the party 
completely' (CO 103111171, minute, Rogers to Lloyd, 16 Oct 1953). The anticipated split 
between Jagan and Burnham to which reference is made in para 11 of this report did not 
occur until Feb 1955. One factor among many contributing to the growing rift between 
the two leaders was the manner in which the commission of inquiry which investigated 
events leading up to the intervention (Report of the British Guiana Constitutional 
Commission (chairman, Sir James Robertson) Cmd 9274, 1954) identified Burnham in 
the moderate camp of the PPP leadership and Jagan in the communist camp. The 
commission recommended that constitutional development in British Guiana should be 
suspended until such time as the people themselves recognised that the UK would never 
transfer power to a communist-dominated PPP.] 
This report covers the period from the 1st to the 31st October, 1953. 
I. General political situation 
The events of the month have already been reported separately as they occurred. The 
deterioration in the general situation reported during September continued rapidly 
during the opening week of October and confirmed the conclusion which had already 
been reached that no action could be taken to check the P.P.P. leaders, now firmly 
under Communist control, in their arrogant and insolent career without serious risk 
of provoking public disorder. With the police not entirely dependable there was no 
alternative but to have overseas forces available in the country to support them 
before such action could be taken. The decision had been taken towards the end of 
September that action should be taken to suspend the Constitution, to remove the 
Ministers' portfolios, and to vest the Governor with emergency powers. The 
necessary naval and military forces would assemble at Georgetown in the early hours 
of the 9th October in order to support the police in the event of disorder and searches 
would immediately be carried out with the object of securing documentary evidence 
of communist affiliations and subversive activities. The element of surprise was of 
course essential to the success of the latter operation. 
2. In the event there was a serious leakage in regard to warship movements and 
the growing hostility evinced by the U.K. Press at the withholding of information led 
to a decision by Her Majesty's Government to announce the despatch of forces to 
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British Guiana. This announcement was made on the 6th October. It naturally 
caused considerable concern here since the forces were then not due until the 9th, 
and if the P.P.P. leaders had decided to provoke disorder in the interval, there might 
well have been grave results: also the element of surprise essential to the proposed 
searches was thus jettisoned. 
3. Fortunately, however, the P.P.P. leaders chose to adopt an attitude of injured 
innocence which, though nauseating in the extreme, ensured that no rash action 
would ensue before the arrival of the troops. The latter was accelerated by 24 hours 
and the first units landed in the early morning of the 8th October. Also, the news that 
troops were on the way resulted in an immediate improvement in the morale of the 
police. 
4. In the meantime discussion of the Labour Relations Bill was continued in the 
House of Assembly on the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th and 8th October and it was eventually 
passed. There were large crowds outside the House each day and on the last two days 
their mood was particularly excitable. On the 7th Dr. Jagan had sought to introduce 
a motion protesting against the presence of military and naval forces in the Colony 
and demanding their withdrawal, but it was ruled out of roder[sic] by the Speaker. 
The following day he renewed his attempt without success. The Speaker announced 
that Dr. Jagan had seen him before the meeting and had most regrettably lost his 
temper and accused him of partiality. Dr. Jagan repeated this accusation in the 
House. The Legislature was prorogued by me on the 9th October. 
5. On the 7th and 8th October meetings of the Executive Council were held at 
the request of Dr. Jagan. The Ministers vied with one another in their protestations 
of the innocence of their conduct and intentions; maintained that they should have 
been consulted before troops were brought here and that their presence was 
unnecessary and provocative and that they should be removed; and attempted to 
elicit information as to the rumoured intention to suspend the Constitution. 
6. The announcement of this and the other steps taken and contemplated was 
made locally in a statement by Her Majesty's Government which was read over the 
wireless by the Chief Secretary early on the 9th October and followed by a broadcast 
to the people by myself. These measures were received with manifest relief by a large 
section of the population as well as by the business community. The P.P.P. leaders 
who had issued a leaflet entitled "On Guard" on the 8th October put out a reply to 
H.M.G.'s statement on the 9th October and another leaflet on the lOth October 
under the heading "Call to Action", calling for stoppage of work, a campaign of non-
cooperation, and boycott of U.K. goods. Copies of these are enclosed.1 There were 
reliable reports that some of the P.P.P. leaders were contemplating inspmng 
disorder, particularly incendiarism, and firewatching precautions were taken by 
business firms. 
7. The call for strike action had no appreciable effect except on the sugar estates 
where Mrs. Jagan, Sydney King and others of the extremist group were most active. 
Their activities were responsible for retarding the normal return to work on some 
estates and causing a renewal of the strike on the Courantyne in the Port 
Mourant/Albion area and at Enmore on the East Coast. In the former, Jagan's 
personal influence is very strong and it has been said that there will be no 
1 Not printed. 
66 FINANCIAL AND DEFENCE ISSUES IN PLANNING A FEDERATION OF THE WEST INDIES (17) 
resumption of work until his return from his travels: Enmore is on Sydney King's 
home ground. During the weekend of the 24th/25th October Sydney King, Martin 
Carter, Rory Westmaas, Balli Latchmansingh [sic], Adjodha Singh and two others 
(who were subsequently released) were arrested near Blairmont where they had been 
holding illegal meetings. Whilst there is no doubt that these meetings were held it 
would be difficult owing to the prevalence of intimidation to bring prosecutions 
against them with any prospect of success. They are now held in detention under the 
Emergency Regulations. 
8. Searches were carried out by the security forces on the 13th October and 
subsequently, and documents of some interest, confirming the Communist 
affiliations of P.P.P. leaders, were found: as was expected, there was also evidence 
that other material had been removed and burnt. 
9. Shortly after the announcement of the suspension of the Constitution etc. Dr. 
Jagan and Mr. Burnham stated their intention to visit the U.K. to lay their case before 
the Secretary of State, Opposition leaders and other bodies: subsequent visits to India 
and to the United States to make representations to the United Nations were also 
contemplated. However, they ran into difficulty in making their way to London 
owing to the refusal of the United States and West Indian territories en route to 
permit them to land. Eventually by chartering a British Guiana Airways plane to 
Surinam and travelling from there by K.L.M. they reached London on the 20th 
October where they seem to have made little impression on anyone except those 
already of their persuasion. They were followed by a strong "Opposition" delegation 
consisting of Mr. John Carter, Mr. W.O.R. Kendall, Mr. L. Luckhoo, Mr. John 
Fernandes and Mr. Dare, the President of the Georgetown Chamber of Commerce.2 
This delegation seems to have played a useful part in countering the attempt of Jagan 
and Burnham to hold themselves out as representative of united Guianese opinion. 
10. The Minister of State visited British Guiana from the 19th to the 22nd 
October and was able to meet representatives of all shades of opinion. On the 20th 
October he met a delegation of P.P.P. leaders headed by Mr. Ashton Chase, Mr. J.N. 
Singh, Mr. Sydney King and Dr. Lachhmansingh: Mrs. Jagan chose to absent herself, 
but afterwards issued a communique as Secretary of the Party stating that the 
delegation had informed the Minister that "the British Government would have to 
make up their minds to rule by force if they continued in this way to flout the wishes 
of the people". Mr. Singh described the Minister as being "ruthless and unbending in 
his attitude". 
2 In 1951, Lionel Luckhoo, a successful Indian barrister who was nominated to the old Legislative Council 
a year later, joined forces with John Carter, an elected member of the council and a barrister of African 
descent, to organise the National Democratic Party (NDP). Like the PPP, the NDP employed a strategy of 
racial balance and included East Indians, Africans and Portuguese in its leadership. The NDP represented 
the forces of conservatism in Guianese society. In 1952, Luckhoo introduced an Undesirable Publications 
Bill designed to ban the entry into British Guiana of literature deemed 'subversive and contrary to the 
public interest'. The bill was specifically aimed at the political literature imported by the PPP for 
distribution to its own cadres. Besides Luckhoo and Carter, the NDP candidates at the 1953 elections also 
included John Fernandes, a Portuguese businessman, and W 0 R Kendall, an African businessman. All 
were militant anti-communists. The NDP polled only thirteen per cent of the votes at the elections (see 12, 
note 2), less than half the votes polled by independent candidates, and only two of its candidates were 
successful, one of whom was Kendall. Luckhoo became a nominated official of the interim administration 
established in British Guiana in 1953. He was also minister without portfolio on the Executive Council 
between 1955 and 1957. 
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11. There have been reports during the month of anxiety on the part of the so-
called moderate group headed by Chase and Jai Naraine Singh that Burnham should 
break away from Jagan and the other extremists and form his own party. It is also 
said that Burnham has insisted on the maintenance of a united front with Jagan until 
he returns from London and that he anticipates that Jagan will make compromising 
contacts with communists in the United Kingdom which would provide justification 
for the expulsion of him and the other communists from the party. It is doubtful 
what reliance can be placed on these reports and there has been no overt sign of any 
effective split in the party developing. Jai Naraine Singh has announced his intention 
to proceed on a tour of the Latin American countries to promote sympathy for the 
party's cause. He has no doubt been encouraged by the attitude of the Venezuelan 
Government (he lived and worked in a Government post in Venezuela for some 
years) which with the advent of British troops exchanged its fears of communist 
infiltration for accusations of "colonialism". 
12. Although the situation is outwardly quiet and there have been few incidents 
apart from some instances of intimidation, sporadic incendiarism of canefields and 
an attempted derailment, it is reported that the P.P.P. leaders are aiming at building 
up their cell organisation throughout the country into a resistance movement which 
will be used to disseminate anti-Government propaganda and to undermine public 
order. It would also be used to obstruct any efforts aimed at restoring good relations 
on the sugar estates and promoting economic development generally. Although the 
detention of Sydney King and others may cause a temporary set-back to these plans, 
there are unfortunately others capable of carrying them into effect, whilst the return 
of Jagan and Burnham is awaited expectantly by their supporters. All this underlines 
the urgent need to accelerate positive action to improve social and economic 
conditions in the Colony and thus weaken the hold of the P.P.P. leaders. There 
remains, too, the dire need for some effective alternative political leadership .... 
18 CO 968/371, no 71 1 Jan 1954 
[West India Regiment]: draft CO letter to the governments of JamaiCa, 
Trinidad, Barbados, Antigua and Grenada on the urgent need to 
establish a local force 
We have recently been giving much thought to the question of the West India 
Regiment, the plans for which have made very little advance during the past two 
years. 
The emergency in British Guiana in October and the consequent reinforcement of 
the Caribbean area by a second regular United Kingdom battalion have made it more 
desirable than ever to establish a local force able to move to any part of the area and 
preserve law and order in support of volunteer forces and police. The accepted 
principle that Colonial Governments are responsible for their own internal security 
was one of the factors which prompted the original proposal to form a two-battalion 
local force in the Caribbean. Another was the expectation that in due course, when 
the second of these battalions had become operational, the regular U.K. battalion 
could be withdrawn for use elsewhere. I need hardly say that the War Office's global 
commitments are a great deal heavier than they were three years ago, and they are 
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seriously handicapped by being obliged to deploy one battalion-and probably two 
throughout 1954-in the Caribbean where strategically they are much less valuably 
placed than almost anywhere else. 
At the same time we must satisfy ourselves, before launching the reformation of 
the West India Regiment, that it will be able to do what it is meant to do, and that all 
the participating Governments are going to give it unqualified moral and political, 
apart from financial support. During the crisis in British Guiana in October we found 
that the temporary replacement of the United Kingdom garrison company by a 
company of the Jamaica battalion would be politically unacceptable in British 
Honduras. Admittedly the Jamaica battalion is not at all the same thing as a battalion 
of the West India Regiment; but obviously if this sort of attitude were to show itself 
towards units of that Regiment, and if for local reasons soldiers of the West India 
Regiment could not be successfully used for reinforcing the police or volunteers of a 
territory to which they do not belong, the whole conception of a West India 
Regiment would be stultified. 
Although it would be our aim to obtain recruits to the Regiment from as many 
territories as possible, I imagine that the great majority of the first battalion would 
be drawn from Jamaica and Trinidad. No difficulty of the sort to which I have just 
referred would presumably arise at that stage as the U.K. battalion would still be in 
the area and could no doubt be used, with the consent of the Commander, to help 
deal with any trouble which was likely to have embarrassing political consequences. 
But with the formation of the second local battalion, and after the withdrawal of the 
U.K. battalion, Governments could not pick and choose but would have to be 
prepared to accept into their territory any unit or sub-unit, whether composed of 
men from a number of Islands or from Jamaica or Trinidad only. 
We should be glad to know to what extent soldiers of the West India Regiment who 
were not inhabitants of your territory could be used as reinforcements on internal 
security duties in your territory, and to have your views on this problem generally. 
19 CO 1032/119 26 Apr 1954 
[Immigration]: minute by P Rogers to C Y Carstairs advocating 
legislation to restrict immigration from the Commonwealth 
I am grateful to you for showing me these papers, which raise an issue of acute 
political difficulty and urgent practical importance in relation to the West Indies. I 
should like Mr. Wallace and Mr. May le on his return to see them. I would also suggest 
that the heads of the West Mrican, Mediterranean and Central Mrican Departments 
(the latter in respect bf, at any rate, Somaliland) should also see them and that the 
Under-Secretaries in charge of all geographical regions should see also. 
I mentioned to you on my return from my West Indian tour (at which time I was 
not aware of the consideration being given to this issue here) that I was much 
concerned at this influx of West Indians into the U.K. I foresee serious difficulty and 
embarrassment from two aspects:-
(1) The aspect which has already been ventilated in these papers viz. the 
difficulties in the U.K. from a growing and uncontrolled influx of coloured 
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persons, particularly in relation to the growth of colour prejudice here. Since that 
aspect has already been fairly fully covered in these papers, I will not comment on 
it further, except to say with reference to the point expressed by the Home 
Secretary in (4) (viz. that the influx is not yet [of] a scale to cause concern) that I 
am convinced from what I saw and heard in the West Indies that from that region, 
at any rate, we shall have to face a steadily and perhaps rapidly rising influx over 
the next few years, unless we take steps to deal with it. The manner in which 
Jamaicans, at any rate, come to this country argues some form of organisation 
(and financial backing) in Jamaica. In fact it has the appearance of an organised 
"racket" though I have no proof of this. Further, we are likely to get considerably 
increased numbers from the Leeward, and possibly the Windward, Islands, and 
also from Barbados, if Jamaica continues to send such considerable numbers. 
(2) The second aspect, which has hardly been touched on in these papers, is the 
damage to the immigrants themselves on which there is a striking report by Mr. de 
Souza, the Jamaican Welfare Liaison Officer, on the file which I temporarily attach 
to this bundle. Moreover, it will in my view do no good service to the future of the 
Colonies in question if they remain under the impression that they can solve their 
own population problems by uncontrolled immigration to the U.K. I can, however, 
hold out little or no hope that West Indian Governments will find it politically 
possible to impose restrictions on such immigration comparable to those imposed 
in West Africa-nor do I think it would be sufficiently effective if they could. 
In short, my own view is that it is very necessary to pass, and to pass soon, 
legislation which would not only enable us to deport Colonial criminals, but also to 
control the entry of other Commonwealth citizens into the U.K. It would, as has 
already been emphasised on these papers, be essential that the control should apply 
to all inhabitants of the Commonwealth and not only to coloured ones. 
With reference to the enclosure to (23), I doubt if a deposit of £25 by itself, in the 
absence of definite and guaranteed employment would in any way be adequate. 
I should add that I discussed (in ignorance of the papers on this file) the 
possibility of imposing such restrictions with Sir K. Blackburne and Sir H. Foot, as 
the Governors primarily concerned at this stage. I made it clear that I was speaking 
quite personally. Both thought that it would be fully justifiable for the U.K. to impose 
such restrictions, which would be no more than (and indeed in practice might well 
be less) than those imposed by all West Indian Colonial Governments, provided of 
course it was done on a non-discriminatory basis and did not exclude immigrants 
altogether. Sir H. Foot suggested that it would be politically much more acceptable if 
the legislation were presented as being in the interests of immigrants themselves, as 
well as of purely domestic concern to the U.K., and accompanied by measures to look 
after those immigrants who were allowed to enter the country. Mr. de Souza's report 
is independently a striking commentary on this aspect and Mr. de Souza's own 
appointment can properly be presented as an important part of such measures. 
I cannot commit Sir K. Blackburne and Sir H. Foot to agreeing to such a proposal 
without further consultation, since my talks with them were purely exploratory. I 
think it important that all West Indian Governors should be consulted if and when it 
is proposed to introduce legislation of the kind now under discussion. I hope, 
however, that the Colonial Office will take the view that such legislation, and of the 
more extensive kind, is very necessary and should not be delayed. 
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20 CO 1032/119, no 72 23 Sept 1954 
[Immigration]: CO record of a meeting with Sir H Foot (Jamaica) on 
the question of restricting immigration. Minutes by W I J Wallace and 
C Y Carstairs 
At a meeting with Mr. Rogers, Mr. Wallace and Mr. Gordon Taylor1 on 23rd 
September Sir H. Foot reverted to the question of Jamaican migrants to this country. 
He said that he had thought and talked a good deal about this since his arrival in the 
U.K. and that he had gradually come to the conclusion that some form of restriction 
would be a good thing, particularly if it could be tied to the availability of 
employment. At present Jamaicans were arriving here at the rate of 10,000 a year. If 
anything like this rate of immigration were maintained it might mean that in a 
recession 30,000 Jamaicans would be out of work in London alone. That would have 
serious repercussions. Sir Hugh thought that if the proposition were put to Mr. 
Bustamante in this way he might agree to co-operate in the selection of migrants 
within whatever quota was imposed. 
Sir Hugh had visited a number of groups of migrants with Mr. De Souza. He was 
favourably impressed by them and by the work Mr. De Souza was doing, but was 
struck by the enormous rents the Jamaicans were apparently having to pay. 
Minutes on 20 
Mr. Carstairs 
I believe you want this file urgently. I have added to it at (71) a note of some remarks 
made about the problem by Mr. Gomes2 and Mr. Hochoy3 at lunch with the Secretary 
of State the other day. The most interesting point was Mr. Hochoy's remark on the 
subject of the U.K. applying restrictions to persons from Colonial territories and not 
applying them to persons from the self-governing countries of the Commonwealth. 
At (72), however, you will see that Sir Hugh Foot has been so impressed by the 
problem as a result of his researches over here that he himself is coming to the view 
that somehow or other restrictions must be imposed. He even thinks that it might be 
possible to carry Mr. Bustamante with us. Unfortunately this item had to be 
sandwiched into an omnibus discussion ranging over many other matters and we 
were not able to pursue this point with Sir Hugh. I think what he had in mind was 
some sort of special agreement with Jamaica for allowing in a limited number of 
people each year, possibly something on the lines of the arrangement for the 
seasonal Jamaican agricultural labour for the United States. I seem to remember that 
at an earlier discussion with Sir Hugh you told him that the Ministry of Labour was 
not likely to view with favour any suggestions for agreements to import labour. 
W.I.J.W. 
30.9.54 
1 Author, specialising in understanding social change; direclor, Social Research Organisation, 1950-1954. 
2 Albert Comes, elected member of Legislative and Executive Councils, Trinidad, 1945-1956; minister of 
labour, industry and commerce, 1950- 1956. 
3 Solomon Hochoy (KCMG, 1959); commissioner of labour, Trinidad, 1949; deputy colonial secretary, 
Trinidad, 1955; colonial secretary (later chief secretary), 1956; gov of Trinidad, 1960-1962; gov-gen of 
Trinidad, 1962. 
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The Secretary of State yesterday discussed with Lord Munster, Sir T. Lloyd, Sir C. 
Jeffries and myself the line to be taken on this subject should it be discussed 
Ministerially during his absence. Mr. Evans4 was also present. 
The following conclusions were reached:-
(1) That any proposal to treat Colonials differently from citizens of the 
Dominions, new or old, should be resisted strongly whether as regards deportation 
only or as regards immigration control. It was agreed that movement of persons 
from Southern Ireland could be regarded for this purpose as an exception. 
(2) AI; between deportation only, and the control of immigration, the balance of 
advantage lay with going the whole way now (always provided that the condition in 
(1) above is met) . As to the argument that the Government might await a further 
development of public opinion in the matter, it was felt that a decisive movement of 
public opinion would probably only come as a result of some major scandal or 
disorder, and that the consequences of such in terms of relations with Colonial 
peoples would be so bad that it would be wrong to await any such development. On 
the other hand, it was felt that the trend was all in the direction of an increasing flow 
of unregulated immigration, and that now was the time to take steps to control it. 
(3) With regard to the suggestions put forward by Sir Hugh Foot-see (72) 
opposite-involving the institution of some quota arrangements, and the co-
operation of the Government of Jamaica in the selection of migrants, it was agreed 
that no quota system should be advocated; that permission to enter should be a 
matter solely for decision by the U.K. authorities concerned; and that their 
function in this respect should not be delegated to any agency of the Government 
of Jamaica or any other Colonial Government, if only because of the serious risk of 
corruption in administration. 
(4) It should be suggested at the appropriate time that Sir Vincent Tewson5 should 
be brought into consultation as soon as possible when policy was beginning to 
crystallise, owing to the acute interest of the Trade Union movement in the 
question of coloured labour and migration. 
(5) It was felt that this matter should not be allowed to hang on too long, since 
there was considerable Parliamentary interest in the matter and public interest 
was growing owing to the successive arrivals of large batches of Jamaicans. 
Decisions of policy need not await the submission by the Official Working Party of 
a detailed deportation scheme. 
4 S H Evans, head of Information Dept, CO. 
21 CO 1031/1693 
C.Y.C. 
1.10.54 
5 General secretary, TUC in UK, 1946- 1960. 
22-29 Oct 1954 
[Federation]: minutes by N L May le, P Rogers and Sir C Jeffries on 
whether it would be appropriate to defer the appointment of the Civil 
Service and Judicial Commissions until after the Fiscal Commission 
has reported 
[Once the federal plan agreed at the 1953 London conference had been approved by West 
Indian legislatures, the CO envisaged the following procedure which was heavily based on 
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that which had been adopted for the Central African Federation: (1) Fiscal, Civil Service 
and Judicial Commissions established. (2) CO working parties set up to consider reports 
of commissions. (3) Consultation with West Indian governments on commissions' 
reports. (4) Final federation conference to be held with plenipotentiary powers (no 
reporting back to local legislatures) to consider points of disagreement and the main 
political issues.1 (5) Order-in-Council to be drafted. (6) Pre-federal organisation to be set 
up. (7) Establishment of interim federal government which would come into being upon 
the appointment of the governor-general. Rogers commented in a letter to Luke: 'You 
may at first sight feel that we have followed the Central African procedure rather 
slavishly, but I confess that I for one, and I think all of us here, were impressed in 
discussion with those who had handled the Central African job how necessary these 
various stages were' (CO 103111693, no 11, Rogers to Luke, 19 July 1954, enclosure). 
Luke replied: 'I must confess that I was surprised, and rather dismayed, to find out how 
much still remains to be done, in spite of the past seven years' intermittent preparatory 
work' (ibid, no 14, Luke to Rogers, 5 Aug 1954). The minutes reproduced here reveal a 
division of opinion within the CO about the prospects for federation.) 
. . . There are, however, other points arising out of the drafts which I think require 
consideration:-
(!) Ought the three Commissions to be appointed simultaneously? See in this 
connection my minute of the 14th September in which I suggested, for the 
reasons given, that the Fiscal Commission should be appointed first, and that the 
appointment of the other two Commissions should be deferred until after the 
Fiscal Commission has done its work and reported.2 
(2) Ought we not to propose that the question of Federal Capital, and also that of 
Freedom of Movement, should be taken up with all the Governments as soon as 
the Barbados Legislative Council and the Trinidad Legislature have accepted the 
plan? At present draft "A" says that Her Majesty's Government will in due course 
consult the West Indian Governments about the arrangements to be made for the 
Federal Capital, bearing in mind the recommendation made by the Federation 
Conference, and makes no reference at all to the question of Freedom of 
Movement. But we know that these two questions have not really been finally 
settled and if steps are not taken to settle them before the setting up of the 
Commissions, they may well interfere with the work of the Commissions or 
otherwise prejudice the establishment of the Federation. 
(3) The proposed terms of reference for the Fiscal Commission dodges the 
question whether there is to be a Customs Union for the West Indies. This 
question of a Customs Union has already been reported on in a comprehensive 
report (copy attached)3 which is technically under submission to the Legislatures 
1 On point 4 the CO originally thought (a) that it should be made known that it could not be taken for 
granted that HMG would allow any territory to stay out of the federation, and (b) that HMG might, 
following the Central Mrican precedent, issue an ultimatum to the effect that if no agreement was reached 
at the conference after so much preparation, it would be many years before the UK could be expected to 
interest itself in federation again. Luke questioned the wisdom of both propositions and they were dropped 
by the CO. 
2 In his minute of 14 Sept 1953, Mayle commented: ' . . . the main reason why I suggested that the Fiscal 
Commission should be appointed before the other two Commissions is that, in my view insufficient 
attention has been paid to the financial implications of Federation. Frankly, I think that when the 
territories (other than those which are grant-aided) see more clearly how Federation will affect them 
financially, they will wish to think again' . It was necessary therefore to be sure they they were still 
committed and in view of the doubt on this, it would save much unnecessary work if the appointment of 
the other two commissions was deferred until after the Fiscal Commission had reported (CO 1031/1693). 
3 Not printed. 
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of the territories concerned, with the exception of British Guiana which has 
already accepted the report. It is not, in my view, practicable to leave the question 
of a Customs Union uncertain like this. I think that the Fiscal Commission will 
want to know whether a Customs Union is to be established or not. The Fiscal 
Commissioner for the African Federal Scheme proceeded on the assumption that 
the unification of the territorial tariffs could be brought about with no important 
effect on revenue except for a limited number of items, and later on in his report 
set out his conclusions on the internal and external problems created by a decision 
to establish a Customs Union, and also indicated the nature of the Customs Union 
which they recommended should be set up. I think that the Caribbean Fiscal 
Commission will have to deal with the question of Customs Union to the same 
extent, but before they can do so it will clearly be necessary for all the Legislatures 
to agree in principle to the establishment of a Customs Union. There is, in my 
view, no doubt as to the desirability of establishing a Customs Union in the West 
Indies, whether there is federation or not. In this connection, the report of the 
British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee 1948-49 (Col. No. 255) 
stated inter alia that the establishment of a Customs Union, involving a free trade 
area, uniform tariffs and a single Customs administration, are [sic] the foundation 
of a federal structure, particularly one of which the functions [sic] will include 
responsibility for economic and commercial matters. Since the contributions of 
the West Indian territories towards the cost of federation are to be based on a 
percentage of their Customs revenues, and since it is likely that their Customs 
revenues, unlike those of the African territories, will be materially affected by a 
Customs Union, it is clearly necessary from this point of view alone to get a 
decision on the establishment of a Customs Union before the Fiscal Commission 
gets to work. 
Although I must confess that I have yet to be convinced myself that there are 
economic advantages to the West Indian territories as a whole to be derived from 
federation, and that the Federation will not, in fact, mean much more to the West 
Indies than the setting up of an expensive political superstructure which none of 
them can afford, and which will certainly not help them on their way to complete 
financial independence, I have not, of course, raised the above points with a view to 
delaying matters. But I would like to suggest that whatever decision may be taken on 
point (1) above, we should be wise to defer the issue of the letters until we know for 
certain that the Barbados Legislative Council and the Trinidad Legislature have 
accepted federation. With so many other problems to occupy the attention of 
Governors in the West Indies at present, I really don't think that we should confront 
them with these problems arising out of federation until we are quite sure that they 
will need to be considered - that is to say, until we have the agreement of the 
Barbados Legislative Council and the Trinidad Legislature to federation. I don't think 
that any momentum will be lost if we do defer the issue of these documents until 
then. 
Sir C. Jeffries 
N.L.M. 
22.10.54 
I now submit four drafts concerning our plans to carry through West Indian 
federation once the Trinidad Legislature has voted in favour of a London Conference 
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plan. These drafts have been agreed with all concerned in the Office and I think 
explain themselves. There is only one major issue which I should submit to you in 
addition. This is the question of timing as raised in Mr. Mayle's minute of the 14th 
September and in sub-paragraph 1 and the final paragraph of his minute of the 22nd 
October. Briefly Mr. May le's view is that:-
(i) We should not issue these documents until we have the agreement of the 
Barbados Legislative Council and the Trinidad Legislature to federation; and 
(ii) When and if that stage comes, we should only appoint the Fiscal Commission 
in the first place and defer the appointment of the other two Commissions until we 
have the report of the former. 
I submit a contrary view on both issues. My major reason for disagreeing on both 
is that I am seriously concerned lest we lose the possibility of federating the West 
Indies because of delay. Self-government has now gone so far in some of the terri-
tories that in fact, if not yet in public for the most part, they are half-hearted about 
federation because of the checks which it will impose on island sovereignty. In 
Jamaica, for example, there is already public talk about Jamaica achieving 
Dominion status. I cannot myself for a moment believe that, even if it were practi-
cable, which I doubt, it can in any way be considered in the interest of the West 
Indies. But we cannot ignore the force that may lie behind this, if we take too long 
over setting up a federal structure. In my view, therefore, we cannot afford to delay 
in agreeing our plans, either while we are awaiting the debates in Trinidad and 
Barbados, or later while we are awaiting the report of the Fiscal Commission. I 
recognise that some of our work may be made nugatory through later develop-
ments, if we go ahead now, but I believe that that is better than risking the loss of 
everything through delay. Similarly, in respect of the report of the Fiscal 
Commission, I recognise the force of Mr. Mayle's contention that we run the risk of 
going ahead on a plan that financially is inadequately prepared. Such indications as 
we have had, however, of the cost of federation do not go to show that this is 
beyond the financial means of the West Indies and the reasons in favour of federa-
tion are in my view so compelling that we must go ahead as fast as we can now. If 
we have a Fiscal Commission now, and then appoint other Commissions later, not 
only may one dishearten the advocates of federation, but we may find ourselves 
faced with the task of having to re-do our financial calculations when all the other 
steps have been taken. I very greatly hope you will agree that the matter should not 
be delayed as Mr. Mayle proposes, but that we should go ahead on the basis pro-
posed in the drafts. 
P.R. 
28.10.54 
This has been dealt with so comprehensively that I have little to add. On the two 
points mentioned by Mr. Rogers, I am inclined to agree with him. At any rate we can 
see if any doubts are raised from the other end. To suggest doubts from here would 
imply some lack of faith in Federation, and we must get this through while we have 
the chance .... 
C.J.J. 
29.10.54 
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22 CO 1032/120, no 113 28 Nov 1954 
[Immigration]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Mr Lloyd George1 on 
the terms of reference for a proposed committee on colonial 
immigration 
At Wednesday morning's Cabinet I had a word with you as to the significance of the 
words "any class of'' in the 3rd and 4th lines of your proposed terms of reference for 
the Enquiry into Colonial Immigration. 
I said that I thought they could (and would) be construed as an invitation to make 
discriminatory recommendations. I said I would send you a line about it. While I 
think myself that the Government will find itself obliged to impose control on the 
immigration of British subjects into this country, and that the sooner action is taken 
the better, I also agree that (provided the delay is not too long) the appointment of 
the proposed committee and the consequent opportunity for the maturing of public 
opinion on this subject will bring political advantages for which it would be worth 
paying the price of the postponement for a few months of a statement on what the 
Government is actually going to do about the matter. 
The time for considering whether control should or should not in fact be 
discriminatory as between coloured and other British subjects would in these 
circumstances come when we have the recommendations of the proposed 
committee. I will only say here and now that I would regard any discriminatory 
legislation as open to the gravest objections, and I must completely reserve my 
position on that point for the present. However that may be, I am absolutely 
convinced that it would be the greatest mistake for us now, in appointing a 
committee, to use language open to the criticism that we were inviting the 
committee to consider discriminatory proposals. That I am afraid would be the effect 
of the retention in the terms of reference of the words "any class of'' before "British 
subjects" in the third and fourth lines of the terms of reference proposed in paragraph 
7 of your paper. For that reason, I strongly urge that these words be omitted from the 
terms of reference. That would not by any means prevent the Committee from 
proposing discriminatory measures, if they saw fit to do so; and if they did, without a 
virtual invitation, we should be in a very good position to measure public and 
parliamentary reactions to such proposals, without the Government having been in 
any way implicated in them. H on the other hand we include the offending words, I 
am quite certain that the Government would be accused by many critics here, and by 
repercussion in the Colonies themselves, of having set themselves to discriminate 
against coloured British subjects, and one of our objectives, which must always be to 
deal with this difficult problem without raising questions of racial discrimination, 
would at once be lost. 
I am sending copies of this letter to Swinton, Salisbury2 and Monckton.3 
1 G Lloyd George, home secretary, 1955- 1958. 2 Lord president of the Council, 1952- 1957. 
3 Minister of labour and national service, 1951-1955. 
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23 CO 1032/1846, no 38 [Dec 1954] 
'The McCarran Act in the United States and immigration from the 
West Indies': CO note 
There are two classes of migrants from the British Caribbean territories to the United 
States of America:-
(a) Immigrants proper, who go to the United States to settle; 
(b) Migrant workers, who go for short periods to do farm work under contracts 
negotiated between the employers and the colonial governments. 
The United States Immigration and Nationality Act (the McCarran-Walter Act), 
which came into force on 24th December, 1952, affected these two classes differently. 
Immigrants proper 
2. Prior to the Act, the annual quota of immigrants allowed into the United 
States from the United Kingdom and the Colonies was 65,721, and within this figure 
no discrimination was made between United Kingdom-born and Colony-born 
Britishers. As about two-thirds of this quota regularly remained unused, it imposed 
no practical restriction on immigration from the West Indies, which was able to find 
its own level. This had come to be between 2,000 and 3,000 a year. 
3. The McCarran Act, although it left the quota substantially unchanged, fixed a 
ceiling of 100 on the annual number of immigrants from any one colony (the test 
being place of birth). Thus the permitted maximum from the West Indies became 
700, made up of seven equal lots, with no possibility of varying the allocations as 
between territories. 
4. Despite diplomatic protests, no amendment of this provision has been 
secured; and as the Act was in any case passed over President Truman's veto, this is 
hardly surprising. (A Bill which would have restored the old arrangement was 
published earlier this year, but nothing has been heard of it for some months, and it 
is presumably dead.) 
Migrant workers 
5. The West Indies Farm Labour Programme in the United States originated 
during the war and operated on a large scale involving up to 40,000 workers until 
1947. It was put on a new footing by agreements made in 1951. In 1952, some 12,500 
workers entered the United States, the largest numbers being from Jamaica and the 
Bahamas. 
6. The position of the workers under the McCarran Act is governed by 
regulations. At first sight it appeared that these would have a very restrictive effect. 
They provided that the workers, who had previously needed to carry only identity 
cards issued by their home Governments, would in future require passports and 
visas; that employers should pay an application fee of $10 per worker; that each 
application should be endorsed by the local labour organisation; and that labourers 
would no longer be permitted to move freely from district to district. Clearly, if 
literally enforced, these rules would have caused considerable administrative 
difficulties and might well have stifled the labour scheme. 
7. However, diplomatic representations and talks between United States officials 
and representatives of the British West Indies Central Labour Organisation and the 
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interested employers in 1953 led to an extremely liberal interpretation being given to 
the regulations. Workers' identity cards are accepted in lieu of passports, visas are 
not required and the $10 employer's application fee is permitted to cover a bulk 
application for any number of labourers. Surprisingly, the net result has been that 
the new arrangements are rather more favourable to the operation of the scheme 
than were those in force before the McCarran Act. Their successful continuation is 
very much dependent on their receiving no publicity, as they might not appear to the 
proponents of the Act as being properly within its spirit. 
8. The West Indies labour programme was thus able to continue on its former 
scale. Recently there has been a sharp falling-off in the numbers of workers 
employed: there are probably now about 6,500. This is mainly due, however, to rising 
unemployment in the United States and consequent pressure on the employers by 
the labour unions. There is anxiety about the position and an approach has been 
made to the United States Government by the British Embassy in Washington asking 
that the programme should receive as sympathetic administrative treatment as 
possible. But these difficulties can in no way be regarded as the aftermath of the 
McCarran Act. 
9. The McCarran Act, therefore, has clearly resulted in a reduction in the 
number of West Indians able to immigrate into the United States and settle there. 
(Actual figures are not available here.) It has not affected the scale of temporary 
migration under the West Indies farm labour programme, although this is now 
suffering a setback due to increased unemployment in the United States. 
24 DO 35/5217, no 143 Jan 1955 
'West Indian immigration': memorandum by CO (Press Section) on 
the numbers of immigrants and the issues of employment and 
accommodation in the UK 
It is estimated that at the end of 1954 there were some 25,000 West Indian workers in 
the United Kingdom. Of these, 10,000 arrived during 1954. In the immediately 
preceding years immigration had been at the rate of about 2,000 annually. 
2. These figures are based on information from the West Indian Governments. 
The U.K. immigration authorities are unable to supply statistics of immigrants to the 
U.K. as they have no statutory authority to question British subjects entering this 
country about the purposes of their visits or what part of the Commonwealth they 
come from. 
3. Most of the 25,000 West Indians are Jamaicans but in recent months there 
have been increasingly large numbers from other West Indian colonies (about 1,200 
in the last four months). 
4. The migrants are British subjects and under existing legislation are free to 
enter this country on proof of identification. Any restriction on their entry would 
mean new legislation. This is a difficult question affecting our relations with other 
countries in the Commonwealth, both colonial and self-governing. The matter is 
being urgently considered by H.M.G. and the last official public statements were in 
Parliament on the 16th December. In the House of Lords Lord Swinton said that the 
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matter was being carefully considered by the Government and a statement would be 
made as soon as possible. In the House of Commons the Home Secretary said that 
the Government was considering the question of legislation to restrict the 
immigration of British subjects but was not ready to make a statement. 
5. The West Indian Governments cannot reasonably be expected to impose 
restrictions on people leaving their territories. It is not normal practice for 
"democratic" governments to impose such restrictions. It is for the receiving 
Government to restrict entry if it desires to do so. 
6. Our information is that most of the migrants are finding employment. The 
Ministry of Labour and the National Assistance Board say that the incidence of 
unemployment and relief among the West Indian immigrants is not abnormal in 
relation to their numbers. Neither is there evidence that a disproportionate number 
of migrants are involved in undesirable activities or are ill-behaved. 
7. The main troubles are in accommodation and social welfare but the migrants 
themselves are undoubtedly finding ways and means gradually to resolve their 
present problems. These solutions are not always of a kind satisfactory to the local 
authorities, e.g. buying up slum property and creating coloured quarters in some 
areas. 
8. The Government of Jamaica have been doing what they can to warn migrants 
about the difficulties likely to face them in the U.K. Over the past year the Labour 
Department has issued statements to the press from time to time about the 
difficulties of Jamaican workers in England, and in addition to official statements the 
press has co-operated in publishing news stories emphasising the difficulties. There 
have in particular been many news reports recently in the local press of hardships 
arising from winter conditions. 
9. In view of the fact that immigrants are now beginning to arrive in substantial 
numbers from other West Indian territories the Governments of those territories 
have been asked to take similar measures to warn intending migrants to the U.K. of 
the difficulties ahead. In general the migrants from Jamaica seem to know the ropes: 
most have addresses to which they can go and are quite ready for hardships and 
difficulties in the early stages. Migrants from the other territories, however, are not 
at the moment equally well aware of the difficulties and arrive without any plans or 
ideas. Hence the recent request to the other West Indian Governments to give widest 
possible publicity to the problems involved. 
10. Some Press criticism is directed against the alleged inadequacy of these 
information measures, but the fact remains that the U.K. is enjoying a boom, that it 
does provide social services and that few of the migrants fail to find employment. 
So far in Jamaica official warnings of difficulties have not prevailed against these 
facts plus the fact that Jamaican migrants already here are writing home to their 
relatives saying they have obtained work and sending money home for relatives to 
join them. 
11. Some Press criticism is also directed at the alleged inadequacy of the efforts 
taken to mitigate the hardships of immigrants immediately on reaching the U.K. To 
date most of the migrants have been met by friends and relatives already here and 
have had addresses to go to: also, they have usually known the ropes and how to set 
about obtaining assistance from the appropriate authorities in the U.K., whether in 
finding employment or obtaining relief. It is also significant that the migrants 
themselves do not complain. However, the Jamaican Government some time ago 
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attached an officer to the Colonial Office to take a general interest in the problems of 
the Jamaican migrants and to give them any additional advice and assistance within 
his power. This officer has met parties on arrival and helps to sort out the immediate 
problems: among other things he has distributed a pamphlet of which a copy is 
attached.1 He is also available for consultation by migrants subsequently. 
12. Other West Indian Governments are being consulted about joining with the 
Jamaican Government in this arrangement and expanding the work at present 
undertaken. 
13. It is to be noted that special measures taken to assist the migrants on arrival 
may well be criticised by those who say that the migrants should be discouraged. 
14. There is also a body of criticism which alleges that the migration is due to 
bad economic conditions in the West Indies. This is true only to the extent that, 
despite great efforts in recent years to increase the economic potential of the islands, 
productivity has not caught up with the ever-growing population. West Indians have 
long been accustomed to seek work abroad but in recent years outlets in foreign 
countries have been much restricted. The West Indian Governments, with the help of 
H.M.G., are doing a great deal to improve economic conditions and the movement to 
the U.K. is to some extent due to the fact that there is a certain degree of prosperity 
allowing money to be found to pay fares. For a general picture of the problems and 
what is being done to tackle them reference can be made to the 1953 Annual Report 
of the Comptroller for Development and Welfare in the West Indies, and also to the 
two recent turn-over articles in the Times. 
Miscellaneous points 
(1) No precise information is available about the proportion of the migrants who 
return to their own countries but at the moment there seems little doubt that very 
few are at present returning and that those who have done so had special family or 
health reasons. On the other hand it would not be possible to say that the migrants 
intend to settle permanently in the U.K. Many are probably thinking in terms of 
acquiring wider experience, cash and increased skill (there are indications that 
West Indians make good use of the facilities provided by evening classes and public 
libraries). 
(2) In the past most of the migrants have been men but an increasing proportion 
are now women and children i.e. the families of earlier migrants. In November and 
December the number of women totalled 320. 
(3) The total number of West Indian workers in the U.K. is still "a drop in the 
ocean", and it is interesting to note that the interest taken in them is out of 
proportion to their numbers and that corresponding interest does not seem to be 
taken in other immigrants, e.g. Irish, Indians, Cypriots and Maltese. 
(4) It is true that in London in particular the West Indians are tending to 
congregate in certain districts but this tendency is on the whole less apparent in 
the provincial centres where they are now working. It is also the case that the 
tendency to congregate in certain districts in London is partly because these 
districts are used as jumping-off places for the provincial centres when the 
migrants find work. Incidentally, a similar tendency to concentrate residence in 
one district is apparent with other immigrants, e.g. Cypriots. 
1 Not printed. 
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25 CO 103111776, no 67 2 Feb 1955 
'Federation': letter from Sir S Luke to P Rogers on the critical 
importance of freedom of movement within the federation 
It would, I think, be difficult to exaggerate the critical importance of the forthcoming 
conference on the control of movement within the federation. The federal scheme is, 
of course, threatened by other dangers-in particular by the growing political 
strength of the Indians in Trinidad. But the failure of the conference to devise a 
compromise offering reasonable prospects of acceptance by both the Trinidad and 
Barbados Legislatures would bring the danger of early disaster to the whole project. 
2. I do not want to be unduly pessimistic. The favourable tide is running more 
strongly than it has at any previous time. Manley is a far more convinced and 
energetic pro-federationist than his predecessor; and he is capable of exercising both 
a powerful and a constructive influence on political representatives from other parts 
of the region. In Barbados, the recent debate in the Legislative Council has 
stimulated an unprecedented interest in the whole question; the effect, I am told, has 
been to reinforce the sections of public opinion represented by Adams and Cuke. 1 
Those who attend the conference2 will themselves be convinced pro-federationists; 
most will have played a leading part in the long series of debates and conferences that 
have advanced the project to its present stage; and all will unquestionably be moved 
by the strongest desire to find an acceptable and workable solution. 
3. Nevertheless, I think that there is still a formidable gulf between the Trinidad 
and Barbados points of view, though each has been brought to recognise that there 
must be some concession to the other. (I take these as the protagonists of the two 
contrasting attitudes; I imagine that the other territories will probably give general 
support to the Barbados case). Barbados obviously has both logic and precedent on 
its side. It is theoretically indefensible to restrict free movement within a federation; 
and, as far as I am aware, no such restrictions are in fact imposed in the federations 
from which our ideas are drawn i.e. the United States, Canada and Australia. There is 
at present an intense pre-occupation in Barbados with the problems of 
unemployment, over-crowding, and pressure of population; against this background, 
it is hardly surprising that the House of Assembly has consistently taken the line that 
any federal scheme that failed to provide for freedom of movement would be 
unacceptable. On the other hand, the strength of public opinion in Trinidad, alive 
equally to the attractive force of the Island's present comparative prosperity and to 
the problems created by its own rapidly growing population, is so strongly against 
complete freedom of movement that even Comes has been brought to recognise that 
the federal scheme in its present form stands little chance of acceptance on that 
account. 
4. As I see it, there is only one way in which the Trinidad point of view could be 
completely safeguarded, that is by excluding the power to legislate for the control of 
movement between the Units from either the Exclusive or Concurrent Lists; 
1 (Sir) HA Cuke (Kt 1955), nominated member of Barbados Legislative Council and Executive Committee, 
1943-1958; federal senator, 1958-1962. 
2 A reference to the forthcoming conference on freedom of movement which was held in Trinidad in Mar 
1955 and chaired by Lord Lloyd (see 27). 
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conversely, the only way in which Barbados point of view could be completely 
safeguarded would be by providing in the Constitution itself that there shall be 
complete freedom of movement (as is the case, I understand, in the Australian 
Constitution) . Neither side have hitherto pressed for these extreme courses; and I 
remember that at the London Conference we found it difficult to understand the 
reasons for Adams' insistence on placing control of movement on the Exclusive List, 
since neither that (nor, for that matter, the preamble) would fetter the ultimate 
discretion of the Federal Government and Legislature. Adams' argument was, I 
think, that, by placing that item on the Exclusive List, the Federal Government 
would be forced to legislate rather than to let things drift. Nevertheless, except in so 
far as they took note of the expression of principle in the preamble, the Federal 
bodies would in no way be bound to legislate either for or against full freedom of 
movement. The effect of the London Agreement was, therefore, to arouse 
apprehensions in Trinidad without providing firm safeguards for Barbados. 
5. What, then, is the precise purpose of the forthcoming Conference? 
Presumably, it is to reach agreement on some compromise between the extreme 
Trinidad and Barbados views that will be binding on the Federation. It seems to me 
that this objective can be achieved only within the framework of the constitution 
itself. Adams has, I think, had it in mind that we should draft legislation which the 
Federal Government would be under an obligation to introduce at the first 
opportunity. But surely no such obligation could be imposed on the Federal 
Government, any more than the Federal Legislature could be obliged to enact it 
unaltered? It seems, therefore, that the federal constitution must itself reflect the 
intentions of the "Founding Fathers". 
6. As at present drafted, the constitution virtually leaves the decision to the 
Federal Government and Legislature, subject to the general statement of principle in 
the preamble. This has proved unacceptable to public opinion in Trinidad. The crux 
of the matter is not, of course, freedom of movement per se, but freedom to settle 
and accept work. No-one questions the desirability of the maximum freedom of 
movement; equally, Adams accepts the need for controlling the movement of 
criminals, lunatics, sick persons and the like. The conference will have achieved 
something if it simplifies movement within the Federation, though it is difficult to 
see how this could in practice be brought to the same state of simplicity as 
movement over land frontiers . A man arriving by ship in Trinidad, for instance, must 
surely carry some evidence that he comes from Barbados and not Guadeloupe. But 
the real issue is-shall persons be free to move from one Unit to another, to settle 
there, and to accept work that might otherwise be available to a person of local 
origin. Adams suggests that Trinidad's fears might be met by providing that Unit 
Governments shall accept responsibility for their own "nationals" who may become a 
charge on local funds in another Unit. I think that there is much to be said for this 
suggestion, and it will no doubt be fully discussed at the Conference. It might be 
elaborated by requiring persons intending to settle in another Unit to produce 
evidence of availability of work. But I very much doubt whether these suggestions 
fully meet Trinidad's point. The fear there is that Barbadians or Grenadians might 
enter in numbers and displace or exclude Trinidadians from employment. Adams has 
so far shown no sign of being willing so far to modify his views as to agree that 
Trinidad should employ immigration legislation against fellow West Indians for 
economic reasons only. One must then seek some form of protection short of the use 
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of immigration legislation that the Trinidad Government might provide for its 
"nationals" under federation. It has been suggested to me that it might be possible to 
devise legislation which would enable a Unit Government to guarantee priority of 
employment for its own local citizens. Such legislation would not seem to be 
inconsistent with any provisions of the draft federal constitution. It would, however, 
introduce the principle of discrimination within the Units against citizens from other 
Units, and this seems extremely objectionable. Moreover, it would need elaborate 
administrative machinery, such as employment bureaux and registration offices, 
beyond the resources of any West Indian Government. It would seem more profitable 
to consider whether any system of immigration quotas related to "economic 
absorptive capacity" would be practicable and politically acceptable. The political and 
administrative difficulties are obvious but some such system would at least avoid the 
risk of indiscriminate shifts of population from one over-crowded island to another. 
7. It cannot be said that any solution presents itself clearly at this stage. The 
difficulties are indeed so great that the conference might in the end decide to leave 
the draft constitution unchanged (i.e. to leave the problem for settlement in due 
course by the Federal bodies), contenting itself with issuing a report setting out as 
clearly as possible the arguments and facts on both sides in the hope that this would 
educate public opinion throughout the region. It would be for the delegates to judge 
whether the adoption of this course of action would be to court rejection of the 
whole federal scheme by either the Trinidad or the Barbados Legislature. But I do not 
think that either side would agree to this course, unless it was accompanied by some 
additional safeguard, and I do not see what this could be. Would it be possible to 
provide for a review of the situation after a stated period in such form as to leave the 
Units with any freedom of decision? At first sight, I do not see any answer to this . So 
long as the Federal Government has any power to legislate for the control of 
movement between the Units, it does not seem that the latter can ultimately have 
any defence against federal legislation, except secession. We certainly do not want to 
paper over any cracks that might destroy the edifice within a few years. But it does 
seem worth considering whether there is any constitutional device which would 
enable the position to be reviewed after a period in such a way as to leave the Unit 
Governments with some power of ultimate freedom of action. 
8. We cannot rule out the possibility that the conference may fail to reach 
agreement on a solution that either the Trinidad or Barbados delegates would be 
prepared to commend to their Legislatures. I do not think that this is likely, since 
delegates would probably prefer that the responsibility for rejection should be taken 
by their Legislatures rather than by themselves. But it is possible; and I think that we 
should be prepared for this contingency. It might perhaps be premature for Lord 
Lloyd to issue the warning mentioned in paragraph 4(h) of your letter of 4th 
November (WIS 175/01), but I do not think that this very representative gathering 
should be allowed to disperse without giving some thought to future action in the 
event of its report resulting in rejection of the federal scheme by either Trinidad or 
Barbados. My own view is that Trinidad's defection would fatally weaken the federal 
project; and that, in view of the refusal of both British Guiana and British Honduras 
to participate, the withdrawal of Barbados would be almost equally damaging. But I 
think that it would be useful, in the last resort, to ascertain the views of the West 
Indian political leaders on these points. If the consensus of opinion was that the 
federal project could sustain no further defections, then I suggest that the delegates 
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might be asked to direct their minds to the problem of salvaging something from the 
wreck of so many years' pre-federal consultations and planning. I have always 
assumed that, if the federal project should fail, H.M.G. would initiate consultations 
with all the Governments of the region with a view to devising regional machinery, 
falling short of political federation, which would enable the participating 
Governments to consult together and to act together more speedily and effectively 
than they can at the present time. Moreover, I would not think that the U.K. 
Government could tolerate the indefinite continuance of arrangements under which 
the Development and Welfare Organisation provides a large part of the machinery for 
regional consultation and co-ordination of action. These are far-reaching issues on 
which the conference could hardly be expected to express any opinions; if, however, 
it reaches a deadlock which seems to constitute a direct threat to the federal project, 
then I think that the West Indian leaders might well be asked to express informally 
their opinions on the procedure which should be adopted for formal consultations on 
these questions in the event of the failure of the federal plan. 
9. If the conference is held at Hastings House, we can provide all the necessary 
secretariat facilities and make the preliminary arrangements. I would propose that 
Rolfe3 should be secretary of the Conference. If it is held in Trinidad, both Rolfe and I 
would attend. I find it difficult to know what useful preparatory work we can 
undertake. I have sent Mayle a copy of a letter which I have addressed to Colonial 
Secretaries, asking for copies of existing immigration legislation and for statistics of 
the movement of persons between the islands in recent years. I imagine that the 
Colonial Office have been making some investigations about the position in other-
Federations. It occurs to me that it would be most helpful if Lord Lloyd could be 
accompanied by one of the Legal Advisers, preferably the one who will be concerned 
with drafting the constitutional documents. As you know, I have no Legal Adviser 
and, although each delegation will be accompanied by the local Attorney General, 
they may well be hampered by the necessity of working loyally with their political 
chiefs. The presence of an impartial Legal Adviser might therefore be of great value, 
particularly if he was well acquainted with the position and practice under the 
Dominion Constitutions. 
3 B E Rolfe, Development and Welfare Organisation, Barbados. 
26 CO 968/444, no 125 Feb 1955 
[West India Regiment]: CO note on the delay in reforming the West 
India Regiment [Extract] 
West Indian Governors were notified on the 11th October, 1954 (Wicir despatch 
No.53, copy attached) of the comprehensive outline scheme for raising the re-formed 
West India Regiment, and were asked for their Governments' agreement to the 
scheme. The despatch which followed lengthy semi-official exchanges, which had in 
turn followed an earlier despatch in 1952, was intended for presentation to 
Legislatives [sic]. 
2. The present position is that no Government has yet notified its concurrence, 
and that apparently no Legislature has yet even been consulted, although the 
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Governor of British Honduras proposed to do so in January of this year. Semi-official 
reactions have been received from the Governors of British Honduras and Barbados. 
The Governor, British Honduras, has:-
(a) questioned the ability of British Honduras to "contribute where required 
within (its territory) by the free provision of land, buildings and services"; 
(b) pointed out that British Honduras would not be in a position to contribute its 
share towards the cost of the Regiment before the financial year 1956/57; and 
(c) suggested that the proposed West India Regiment Board should also have full 
power to scrutinise expenditure on the Regiment and to review the scale of 
contributions. 
Governor, Barbados, has pointed out that his Premier would view with disfavour any 
failure by British Honduras to became a full participant financially in the scheme, 
and has asked whether Barbados participation on the basis of a contribution of one 
per cent of annual revenue, less the cost of the Barbados Regiment, would be 
acceptable (this financial arrangement was cleared with the Treasury towards the end 
of 1953). The Treasury are prepared to accept this arrangement in the last resort-as 
was originally agreed-but are not yet convinced that this situation has arisen. Their 
view is being passed to the Governor and he is being asked to confirm that no other 
financial arrangement for the Barbados contribution would be acceptable to his 
Government. 
3. Four months have passed since Wicir despatch No. 53 issued, and it is 
desirable to reach some decision in the near future. Inconclusive correspondence 
and discussions about the possible raising of this Regiment have now been going on 
for over three years. The despatch was intended to bring matters to a head. It must 
not be allowed to remain unanswered until time has rendered it out of date, or to tail 
off into further semi-official correspondence on subsidiary points. No real progress 
can be made until there is a definite "Yes" or "No" from all (or most) of the West 
Indian Legislatives [sic] . Even then it would still be some time before the Regiment 
could actually be raised, because a number of administrative planning decisions have 
still to be taken, and certain matters of principle (e.g. the allocation of responsibility 
for works services) have yet to be decided. 
4. A further complication is that delay will mean that the proposal to re-form the 
Regiment may become involved in the general question of West Indies Federation. 
For example, present plans for the Regiment envisage the participation of British 
Guiana and British Honduras, neither of which territories will initially form part of 
the Federation, though they may do so at a later date. Secondly, the closer 
Federation comes to reality the less relevant the present financial plans for the 
Regiment and the machinery for West Indies/War Office consultation will be in the 
new situation likely to be created by the Federation. For example, defence is 
envisaged as an exclusive (Federal) subject and the West Indies' share of the cost of 
the Regiment would therefore presumably have to be met from Federal funds. The 
despatch proposes contributions on the basis of one per cent of the total revenue of 
each territory. This basis of calculation would have to be altered and a new basis 
worked out with the Treasury, which would presumably not be possible until the 
recommendations of the pre-federal Fiscal Commission had been finally agreed 
probably towards the end of this year. The West India Regiment Board is as at present 
proposed to consist of a representative from each of the participating territories; this 
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basis of representation would presumably have to be altered once Federation came 
about. There would have to be some adjustments in the sphere of legislation. 
5. It is doubtful whether these points have as yet been taken into consideration 
in the West Indies, but there is little doubt that if concurrence in the outline plan for 
raising the Regiment is long delayed they will become obvious to the participating 
territories (particularly perhaps to those local politicians who would welcome 
excuses for going slow about the Regiment), with the result that the whole proposal 
may be thrown back into the melting pot and no further action will be possible 
pending the outcome of the present preparations for Federation. Even under the 
most favourable circumstances it will be a year or so after agreement has been 
reached before the Regiment will have been raised. If the object of relieving U.K. 
troops in the Caribbean at the earliest moment is to be achieved, and if real progress 
is to be made on this project, it is imperative that concurrence in the three major 
proposals summarised at the end of W.I.C.I.R. despatch No.53 (para.25)-vis. the 
financial commitment, the official request to the War Office to raise the Regiment, 
and the introduction of the necessary legislation-should be obtained at the earliest 
possible date before the whole matter becomes entangled in the wider Federal issues. 
Once concurrence in these three essential first steps has been obtained it should be 
possible to make any adjustments to the financial consultative and other provisions 
which Federation makes necessary at leisure without impeding the practical work of 
raising the Regiment. 
6. It would therefore be most desirable if opportunity could be taken during Lord 
Lloyd's tour and the forthcoming conference on movement to impress the urgency 
of getting a decision, on Governors and territorial representatives .... 
27 CO 1031/1777, no 140 17 Mar 1955 
[Freedom of movement]: Report of the Conference on Movement of 
Persons within a British Caribbean Federation held in Port-of-Spain, 
Trinidad, 14- 17 Mar 1955 
The report of the British Caribbean Standing Closer Association Committee placed 
all aspects of the movement of persons within the area among the list of subjects on 
which the Federal Legislature would have legislative powers concurrent with Unit 
Legislatures, the former prevailing in the event of conflict. At the Federation 
Conference in London in April, 1953, when the Standing Closer Association 
Committee report was re-examined, this recommendation was not accepted as it 
stood. The solution worked out in the Federal Plan produced by the Conference was 
that the desirability of freedom of movement was to be written in the preamble of the 
Constitution, that is to say, it should recite as one of the objects of federation that 
there should be the greatest possible freedom of movement for persons and goods 
within the federation. Further, the Constitution itself was to give the Federal 
Legislature exclusive powers to legislate for the control of the movement of persons 
between Units, subject to both the Federal and Unit Legislatures having power to 
legislate for the control of movement on health and security grounds, and provided 
that no federal law should make provision for the restriction on economic grounds of 
the movement between Units of persons other than aliens. This compromise was not 
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acceptable to one of the two delegates from Trinidad and Tobago, who only signed 
the report subject to disagreement on this issue. 
2. In their resolutions accepting the Federal Plan, the Legislatures of Barbados, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua and Montserrat commented on this subject. The 
resolution passed by the Barbados House of Assembly on the 29th June, 1954, stated: 
"The House stresses that freedom of movement for West Indians among the federated 
units of which they are natives is essential to any scheme and suggests that some 
scheme be devised whereby Federal legislation designed to secure this object may be 
enacted immediately after the institution of a Federation. The House, therefore, 
recommends that a conference be convened of legal and political representatives of 
the Units to make recommendations for the enactment of legislation which will, 
within the context of 'the greatest possible freedom of movement of persons' be likely 
to meet with general acceptance of the units. This legislation it suggests should 
cover all aspects of the movement of all peoples into, out of, and among the units 
comprising the Federation". 
3. The Legislative Council of Trinidad and Tobago in their resolution of the 11th 
December, 1954 supported the holding of a conference. This said that "Since there 
are reasonable doubts whether freedom of movement could be introduced without 
detriment to some islands, this Council welcomes the proposal of the Barbados 
House of Assembly for a conference on immigration, with a view to reaching the 
greatest measure of agreement on the measures designed to protect the position of 
the islands which may be so affected." On the 22nd December, 1954 the Legislative 
Council of Antigua approved "the plan adopted at the London Conference for a 
British Federation with the greatest possible freedom of movement for persons and 
goods within the area .... " On the 18th January, 1955 the Barbados Legislative 
Council concurred in the Federal Plan "subject to the modification that before the 
Plan is implemented, the question of freedom of movement of persons between the 
units of the Federation should first be settled. For this reason this Council supports 
the recommendation of the Barbados House of Assembly for a conference on 
immigration with a view to reaching the greatest measure of agreement on this 
question". The Montserrat Legislative Council passed on the 27th January, 1955 a 
resolution in similar terms to the Antigua resolution. 
4. In accordance with the wish of West Indian Governments, Her Majesty's 
Government accordingly arranged for the holding of a Conference to discuss the 
question of the control of the movement of persons between one member territory of 
a proposed West Indian Federation and another. It opened in Trinidad on the 14th 
March, 1955 under the Chairmanship of the Lord Lloyd, M.B.E., Parliamentary 
Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, assisted by Sir Stephen Luke, K.C.M.G., 
Commissioner for the preparation of a Federal Organisation and Mr. J.S. Mordecai, 
Assistant Commissioner. It was attended by delegates from Barbados, Jamaica, the 
Leeward Islands, Trinidad and Tobago and the Windward Islands and by an observer 
from British Guiana. 
5. The Conference was marked throughout by a conspicuous determination to 
find a solution which would be acceptable to the Governments of all the territories 
concerned. The discussions and debates on federation had already continued for 
nearly ten years; the principle of federation had twice been accepted by West Indian 
Legislatures; and the delegates were unanimous that no obstacles must now be 
allowed to stand in the way of achieving this great aim. 
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6. The Conference unanimously adopted the following resolutions:-
(1) The Preamble to the Federal Constitution should recite as one of the objects of 
Federation that there should be the greatest possible freedom of movement for 
persons and goods within the Federation. 
(2) Sub-paragraph (b) of the Exclusive Legislative List in paragraph 6 of the Plan 
for a British Caribbean Federation as agreed by the London Conference should be 
deleted. 
(3) Control of the movement of persons between the Units of the Federation on 
grounds other than health or security should be placed on the Concurrent 
Legislative List in paragraph 7 of that Plan with a provision that any Unit 
legislation on this matter in force at the expiry of five years from the date of the 
coming into force of the Federal Constitution should cease to have effect at the 
end of a further period of three months unless before the end of such further 
period a Resolution is passed by both Houses of the Federal Legislature approving 
such legislation. In calculating the period of three months no account should be 
taken of any time during which the House of Representatives is dissolved. All such 
Unit legislation should forthwith upon the expiry of the five-year period be laid 
upon the Table of both Houses and should be considered by both Houses before 
the end of the period of three months. 
Any Unit legislation on this matter enacted after the expiry of the five-year 
period should have effect only if it is approved by Resolution of both Houses of the 
Federal Legislature. Such legislation should forthwith upon enactment be laid on 
the Table of both Houses and be considered within two months of being laid, no 
account being taken of any time during which the House of Representatives is 
dissolved or prorogued. · 
(4) Control of the movement of persons between Units on grounds of health and 
security should remain, as already agreed, as a separate item on the Concurrent 
Legislative List. 
(5) That this Conference expressed the wish that in the interest of the early 
achievement of federation, its recommendations should be considered and 
determined by the various Legislatures at the earliest possible opportunity. 
(6) That the consideration of the recommendations of the Conference should in 
no way delay any of the work preparatory to the establishment of the federation 
including that of the Fiscal, Judicial and Public Service Commissions; and that the 
British Government should be requested to proceed with the greatest possible 
speed with the completion of the preliminary measures to enable the Federation to 
be established. 
7. During the course of their discussions the Conference were informed that the 
Government of Trinidad and Tobago had decided to demonstrate their faith in the 
future of federation by making immediate relaxations in their present restrictions on 
the entry of persons for employment into that Colony from other West Indian 
territories. These relaxations provided for the removal of no less than 53 categories 
from the list of occupations entry to which is at present prohibited on the part of 
persons from outside the Colony [sic] . This act on the part of the Government of 
Trinidad and Tobago was warmly appreciated and welcomed by all the delegates to 
the Conference. 
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8. In conclusion, all those present at the Conference wished to express to the 
Government of Trinidad and Tobago their warm appreciation of the excellent 
facilities afforded for their Conference and of the generous hospitality offered to 
them. 
28 CO 103111937, no 9 May 1955 
'United Kingdom policy in its Caribbean territories' CO brief for 
circulation to Commonwealth governments [Extract] 
[This was one of two papers circulated to Commonwealth governments; the first, on 
regional co-operation, was circulated in Jan 1955 (CO 1031/1937, no 10). The first draft of 
para 8 of the paper reproduced here was much more explicit about the problems 
surrounding federation. It read: 'Naturally each territory has fears about the effect of 
Federation on its own economy. Barbados which is proud of the effort which has enabled 
it, though not with a great deal to spare, to stand on its own feet financially is afraid that 
the cost of federation will unbalance its budget. Trinidad, the most prosperous of the 
territories, realises that with the present Federal Plan placing immigration on the 
exclusive federal list for purposes of legislation, it will lose the power to prevent 
immigrants from its more over-crowded neighbours upsetting the Trinidad labour 
market, and regards with disfavour the 1953 Conference's choice of Grenada for the site 
of the federal capital after S.C.A.C had chosen Trinidad. Furthermore the local East 
Indian community is afraid that it will be numerically swamped in a Federation. The new 
government in Jamaica has expressed itself no less in favour of Federation than its 
predecessor but sections of Jamaican opinion have always thought it unsatisfactory that a 
percentage of customs duties should be taken as the main source of federal revenue 
because Jamaica derives a much higher proportion of her own revenue from customs 
duties than does the other large unit in the proposed Federation, Trinidad. The smaller 
islands have shown signs of fearing that federal industrialisation would concentrate on 
the larger Units at the expense of the smaller which would be left to provide the market. 
Most territories have fears over the question of movement of West Indians within the 
federal area either, like Trinidad, that such freedom would lead to their own labour 
market being upset by an influx from poorer and more densely populated territories or, 
like most of the rest, that, if movement were unduly restricted, the population of some of 
the federal territories would be prevented from sharing in the economic prosperity and 
industrial development concentrated in others. In addition none of the territories is really 
satisfied with the strength proposed for its own representation in the Federal House of 
Representatives.' When consulted the CRO queried whether the paper should not be 
more positive about the advantages of federation and also whether it was wise, in view of 
the likely reaction in New Delhi, to be so explicit about the position of East Indians in 
Trinidad. The CO accepted this second point and itself decided to recast the whole of para 
8 on the grounds that the original draft struck too pessimistic a note about the prospects 
for federation. On the question of being more positive about the advantages, the CO 
decided that the redraft of the paper was adequate as it stood: ' .. . we do not want to 
involve H.M.G. in any definite views. H.M.G.'s attitude to Federation is little stronger 
than benevolent neutrality, in order to avoid any suggestion of a special obligation to 
support Federation in financial difficulties and any suspicion that H.M.G. was trying to 
off-load its responsibilities for the West Indies' (CO 1031/1937, minute by Miss B M 
Turnell, assistant principal, 18 Apr 1955.] 
Parallel with the increasing regional economic co-operation and the improved 
communications in the British Caribbean, to which reference was made in Part I of 
this Paper, there are two other trends making towards closer association. One is a 
greater interchange of ideas between the territories, fostered by the common 
training ground for the region's politicians, higher civil servants, and professional 
men and women which has been provided by the University College of the West 
Indies, established by Royal Charter in 1948, and by other shared institutions of 
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higher education. The other, with which we are here concerned, is the growth of the 
idea of closer political association which has drawn strength from the greater 
cohesion in the economic and cultural fields and is based on a feeling of "British 
West Indian" nationality, which though not yet universal, is becoming gradually 
more prevalent among the educated classes, especially the younger members, 
throughout the area .... 
5. The Federal Plan as drawn up by the London Conference1 provides for 45 seats 
in the elected House of Representatives allotted among the units in accordance with 
a number of factors-size of population, economic development, financial stability 
and so forth-and a nominated Senate or Upper House of nineteen (two from each 
territorial Unit except the smallest which supplies only one). Legislation to be 
exclusively federal includes defence, exchange control, external affairs and federal 
courts. Legislation which may be undertaken by either the Federal or territorial 
legislatures includes aviation, banking, criminal law, currency, industrial 
development, postal services, shipping and trade unions. The Federation is to derive 
its revenue mostly from an equal percentage of the customs duties levied on imports 
by the unit governments. The proposed Constitution, although it does not provide 
for full powers of self-government, is a fairly advanced one. In general it is in 
connection with the specified matters of defence, international relations and, in so 
far as the United Kingdom Government is affected, financial credit, that Bills may be 
reserved for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure, legislation disallowed by Her 
Majesty on the advice of the United Kingdom Government and Her Majesty in 
Council may legislate for the Federation. The advice of the Members of the Council of 
State, which is the executive body, has to be taken except in regard to certain 
specified matters which include those referred to in the previous sentence. The 
Federal Plan provides that the constitution should remain in its present form until 
five years after coming into force (unless each of the legislatures concerned raises no 
objection to a specific piece of amending legislation) but that during the fi fth year of 
the Federation a conference should be convened to review the Constitution. 
6. Consideration by the federation territories of the Reports on Customs Union 
and the Civil Service has been postponed as being subsidiary to the larger question of 
federation. A customs union is, however, recognised as implicit in a Federation. 
British Guiana, which in all earlier conferences had not proposed to join the 
Federation for the time being, has however accepted customs union in principle, and 
it will therefore presumably be for the Federal Government and the British Guiana 
Government between them to work out an extension of the customs union area to 
British Guiana. 
7. British Guiana and British Honduras, with their as yet undeveloped natural 
resources and their space for a larger population, would be a valuable part of the 
Federation, and the Federal Plan does not exclude the possibility of these mainland 
territories later joining it. The present position is that the Legislature of British 
Honduras, by a decision made before the People's United Party was elected to office 
in 1954, deferred indefinitely the further consideration of proposals for federation. In 
British Guiana in 1952 the Legislature specifically rejected proposals for federation. 
This was prior to the coming into power of the People's Progressive Party, which 
1 See 11. 
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although nominally in favour of federation, envisaged it only with immediate fully 
independent status and showed no interest in the Federal Plan. The present 
nominated government of British Guiana is keeping in touch with developments and 
a recent debate shows that there is a revived interest in the possibility of British 
Guiana becoming part of the Federation. 
8. The Report and Plan of the 1953 Conference have now been adopted by the 
Legislatures of all whose representatives formulated them, by the last on the 27th 
January of this year. On the 2nd February the Secretary of State for the Colonies in 
an announcement to Parliament welcomed the agreement reached and stated the 
intention of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in pursuance of the 
wishes of the British West Indian territories concerned, namely, Barbados, Jamaica, 
the Leeward Islands, Trinidad and the Windward Islands, to proceed with the next 
steps towards the creation of a Federation. These have included the establishment of 
three Commissions, which are about to begin work, to examine the Fiscal, Civil 
Service and Judicial aspects of Federation. The Barbados Legislature, in supporting 
the Federal Plan, included a recommendation that a conference on the movement of 
people within the federation should be held at an early date to reach a settlement of 
outstanding differences on the matter. The Legislative Council of Trinidad also asked 
for such a conference. A conference was accordingly arranged in Trinidad from the 
14th to 17th March under the chairmanship of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for the Colonies to reconsider the question of the control of movement of 
persons between member Units.2 The conference speedily reached a unanimous 
conclusion. Subject to the approval of Legislatures, the principle of the greatest 
possible freedom of movement of persons and goods within the Federation will be 
recited in the Preamble to the Constitution, and the subject of movement will be 
placed on the Concurrent Legislative List, with qualifications. The concept of free 
movement within the federal area arouses strong emotions in these territories with 
populations generally bigger than their economies can carry. Trinidad, the most 
prosperous, is afraid of its labour markets being disastrously upset by an influx from 
the poorer territories. Those territories fear that if movement is unduly restricted 
their people may be prevented from sharing in the prosperity deriving in a federal 
economy from concentration of industrialisation in the larger units, they themselves 
being left to provide the market. Seen against the background of these strains and 
stresses the compromise conclusion reached at the Trinidad Conference is 
heartening evidence of the desire of the West Indian territories to sink sectional 
interests for the sake of the greater whole. 
9. The major problems remaining to be dealt with are primarily administrative 
and financial, arising from the distances between the units of the proposed 
Federation and their comparative poverty. These problems will be dealt with in the 
reports of the Fiscal, Civil Service and Judicial Commissions. When their reports 
have been presented, the next step will be the calling of a Final Conference to 
approve a detailed Plan for the British Caribbean Federation which would take into 
account the recommendations of the Commissions. Either before this Conference (if 
plenipotentiary delegates are sent) or after it (if delegates are not plenipotentiary) 
West Indian Governments will have to give Federation their final approval. This will 
2 See 27. 
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entail debates in ten legislatures, twelve houses in all, with the delays inevitable in 
democratic processes and with, possibly, the elements of opposition, some of which 
are based on ethnographic and historical differences which were evident when the 
Plan produced by the 1953 London Conference went to Legislatures for approval. 
There is finally the difficulty of deciding on a site for the federal capital, for reasons 
which are common to many federations, i.e., jealousies between the larger units. On 
the basis of the Final Plan the constitutional instruments will be drawn up for the 
approval of the Queen in Council. At the same time, the necessary enabling 
legislation will be put before the United Kingdom Parliament. The new Federation 
will then come into existence. 
29 CO 1032/121, no 193 21 Oct 1955 
[Immigration]: minute by C Y Carstairs on the 'principle' involved in 
the proposal to control immigration 
The position is that at their meeting on the 15th of September the Cabinet asked the 
Home Secretary to circulate a draft Bill as a basis for discussion at a later meeting. 
The Home Office have accordingly prepared a memorandum, of which a copy is 
enclosed in (192), circulating the draft Bill prepared in consultation between the 
Home Office and the Colonial Office as a result of a decision taken by the Cabinet 
earlier in the year. The Home Office memorandum has not yet been circulated to the 
Cabinet, and I understand that the draft is at present with the Home Secretary. The 
Home Office will let us know at once as soon as it has been decided to circulate this 
paper; but I thought it well, in advance of that, to ask the Department, in 
consultation with Students Department and the West Indian Division, to prepare the 
papers for submission to the Secretary of State. The drafts opposite are the result. 
Briefly, the position is that it was decided in principle some considerable time ago 
by the Secretary of State (see my minute of the 1st of October, 1954 on Part A, 
Conclusion (2)) that the balance of advantage lay in favour of taking powers to 
control immigration now, rather than wait for some catastrophic development, 
subject to the rider that there should be no legislative discrimination between 
Colonials and the citizens of independent Commonwealth countries, whether white 
or not (saving only the Irish Republic). 1 
Since this [sic], the position has changed in that the West Indian Division feel, and 
for my part I have no grounds for dissenting from their judgment, that while they have 
no grounds for opposing the introduction of control as a matter of general principle, 
the political and economic situation in the West Indies has become such that before 
any decision to introduce control is promulgated, the Governors concerned should 
be consulted and, should it be decided as a result of such consultation to proceed 
with control, special steps should be taken to inform some at any rate of the West 
Indian Ministers concerned in advance of any public announcement here. 
As will be seen from proceeding minutes, Mr. Keith2 strongly adheres to his root 
and branch opposition to the idea of control, both on grounds of principle, and on 
1 See 20. 2 J L Keith, head of CO Students Dept and director of colonial scholars. 
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the ground that he does not consider that the control scheme contemplated, and 
particularly that aspect of it which relates to housing, would in fact be operable. With 
the greatest of respect to the strength and sincerity of Mr. Keith's views on the 
matter, I think that the time for review of the question of principle has now passed. 
There is indeed in my view no real question of principle involved, or if there is, the 
principle is that it is open to any country to take steps to control the composition of 
its own population. This principle has been accepted and indeed repeatedly 
proclaimed in respect of other Commonwealth countries, including Colonies, and 
the only difference so far as the United Kingdom is concerned has been that it has 
not until now been thought necessary to give it legislative expression here in respect 
of British subjects from overseas. As to the practicability of the control scheme, it is I 
think rather for the other "Home" Departments here to deal with that aspect of the 
matter, and it is pertinent that these points were in fact thrashed out at the last 
Official Interdepartmental Committee, whose report is at (184), and on which the 
Colonial Office was represented by a member of Students Department as well as by 
myself. In the circumstances and since advice to the Secretary of State must take the 
form of a single consistent view, I have ventured to amend the draft brief in such a 
way as to avoid exposing internal conflicts and inconsistencies .... 
30 PREM 11/824, ff 18-28 28 Oct 1955 
[Immigration]: minute by Mr Lloyd George to Mr Eden. Annex: report 
by Mr Fisher,1 'West Indian migration to the UK' (nd) 
Prime Minister 
I am submitting a paper to the Cabinet on the subject of Colonial Immigration (C.P. 
(55)166). You may care to see the attached report by my Parliamentary Private 
Secretary, Nigel Fisher, who was a member of the Parliamentary delegation to the 
West Indies, last summer. This gives the best, short account of the position in the 
West Indies that I have come across. 
Annex to 30 
1. The character and causes of the problem from the West Indian point of view 
The problem is caused by:-
(1) Over-population, which is everywhere on the increase. 
(2) Unemployment and under-employment, which is considerable in some 
Colonies and noticeable everywhere. 
(I) The increase in population is mainly due to the absence of birth control. There 
is comparatively little instruction in birth control in most territories and none in 
those Islands where the population is predominantly Catholic. Working class 
morals are lax and it is not uncommon to find an unmarried woman living with 
1 Mr N T L Fisher, parliamentary private secretary to home secretary, 1954-1957 (later parliamentary 
under-secretary of state for Commonwealth and colonies, 1962-1963). 
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her 3 or 4 young children of different fathers and called by different surnames. In 
some cases the woman does not even know the name of the father, who frequently 
contributes nothing to the support of his children and probably scarcely knows of 
their existence. 
(2) The unemployment and under-employment is due in many of the territories to 
under-development of the land and other natural resources. This is particularly true 
of the Windward Islands and of British Guiana. Nevertheless (apart from British 
Guiana and British Honduras) the Colonies could not absorb in employment their 
increasing populations even if their resources were fully developed. 
2. Reactions in the colonies to the U.K. problem 
In every Colony public men and private individuals were conscious of the issue, but 
seldom fully aware of its awkward features from the U.K. point of view. They were 
prepared to listen to our side of the picture and to talk it over in a frank and friendly 
way as a common problem to which a solution must be found. I did not encounter 
anywhere any reluctance to discuss the matter. On the contrary, discussion was 
usually initiated by W. Indians. 
(1) Barbados 
The Prime Minister, Grantly Adams, talked quite frankly about the problem, which is 
particularly acute in this small densely populated Island. The Barbadan Government 
is the only W. Indian Government which actually makes a per capita grant of £50 to 
certain emigrants to assist with their passage money. 
Mrs. Adams is herself on the newly-formed unofficial Family Planning Committee 
and confirmed the view expressed to me by a prominent local Doctor that Colonial 
opinion is not against family planning. No-one to whom they have so far suggested 
and explained the use of contraceptives has yet refused to use them and most are 
grateful for the instruction. But this work is only in its initial stages and it will be a 
long time before it has any real effect. Moreover, contraceptives are too expensive for 
most people to use. It would be helpful if they could be subsidised by the local 
Government. 
I had a long talk with Sir Stephen Luke, Comptroller for Development and Welfare 
in the W. Indies, who is sound and intelligent. He hopes the British Government's 
policy of "masterly inactivity" will continue, as reactions against restrictions would 
be considerable in Barbados. He thinks the flood of immigrants to Great Britain will 
not continue to increase at the present rate, because there will soon be fewer who 
can afford the passage money. So far, we have had only the comparatively affluent 
and enterprising among working-class Barbadans. He says that Barbadan 
immigrants do not concentrate in certain areas in England, as the Jamaicans do, but 
tend to disperse as individuals or in small groups. 
(2) Windward islands 
St. Lucia. The poorest Island we visited, with sub-human housing conditions and a 
rapidly increasing population. 
Between 3,000 and 4,000 children leave school every year and 9,000 of these are 
now unemployed and have no prospect of employment in the Island. This figure will 
increase. 
99% of the population are Catholic. Possibilities of birth control are, therefore, 
negligible. 
94 FINANCIAL AND DEFENCE ISSUES IN PLANNING A FEDERATION OF THE WEST INDIES (30) 
Much of the land is uncultivated due partly to lack of capital to plant or develop it, 
and partly to the French system of land tenure which has produced acute 
fragmentation. (1 acre of land may be jointly owned by as many as 10 different 
people). 
As St. Lucia is so depressed, few St. Lucians can afford the fare to England, but the 
view was expressed to me that restrictions by H.M.G. would be regarded 
unfavourably. 
Grenada is more prosperous than St. Lucia, but the standard of living is low. 
Population 85,000, increasing at the rate of 2,000 p.a. 
There is very little migration to the U.K. but some to Trinidad, and good prospects 
of migration to British Guiana, if the interior there could be developed. 
Generally, migration to Britain from the Windward Islands is on a small scale 
because very few people can afford the passage money. 
(3) Leeward islands 
St. Kitts and Nevis. Population 50,000, increasing at rate of 1,200 p.a. 
There is some unemployment among the younger people, and some under-
employment in the out-of-crop season. There is a minor migration to Great 
Britain-about 300 last year. 
There is also migration from Montserrat to St. Kitts. Island politicians and officials 
initiated discussion on W. Indian immigration to U.K. and took the line that 
informed opinion in St. Kitts is conscious of the problem and would not be unduly 
critical if H.M.G. felt obliged to impose restrictions, but that popular opinion (at least 
at first) would be resentful, and action by U.K. would provide fertile ground for anti-
British trouble-makers. 
Montserrat. Population 13,500. In grave economic difficulties due to persistent 
droughts. There is severe unemployment. 11% of the entire population have gone to 
Great Britain in the past 18 months, and many to St. Kitts and Antigua. 
In contrast to the other Islands, it is not the more prosperous who are going 
(almost no-one is prosperous in Montserrat). Passage money is usually sent back by 
earlier migrants who have saved money in the U.K. in order to pay for the fares of 
their friends and relations, who later repay the loan out of their U.K. earnings. Due to 
the extreme depression in Montserrat, the view was expressed that one of the 
migration factors there might be the existence of the Welfare State and a minimum 
subsistence standard in Britain. It is not considered that this motive applies to theW. 
Indies generally. 
Antigua. Population 51,000, increasing at rate of 1,000 p.a. There have been a few 
immigrants to the U.K. but these are discouraged by the political leader, Bird,Z who 
does not want them to go because it is the better and more enterprising people who 
leave and they are a loss to the Island's economy. 
Generally, informed opinion in the Leeward Islands would not object to H.M.G. 
restrictions to exclude those of low health standards or with criminal records, or if 
we insisted on immigrants possessing a return ticket or putting down a cash deposit 
2 V C Bird, member, Antigua Legislative Council from 1945, Executive Council from 1946; minister of 
trade and production, 1956-1960; chief minister, 1960-1967; led delegation to UK which achieved 
associated status for Antigua, 1966; premier, 1967-1971, 1976- 1981; minister of planning, external 
affairs, defence and energy, 1981-1982, of finance and defence, 1982- 1984. 
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in lieu of a return ticket. It would not be thought unreasonable to impose British 
military service upon immigrants. But all were agreed that a ban on immigration 
from the W. Indies, or even a quota system, would be much resented, and any 
restrictions would have to be applied to the whole Empire and Commonwealth, white 
and coloured. 
(4) Trinidad, like the United Kingdom, is at the receiving end of the Caribbean 
migration problem, because of her comparative wealth, based on oil. There is 
virtually no migration from Trinidad to Great Britain. 
Some politicians to whom we talked took the illogical and unreasonable view that 
Trinidad has the right to impose restrictions on immigration from other W. Indian 
islands, but H.M.G. has no right to impose similar restrictions on immigrants to the 
U.K. 
But the best opinion on the issue was expressed by Hugh Wooding, Q.C. (a very 
able and sound barrister of considerable standing) and others who consider that 
H.M.G. could impose restrictions such as Trinidad herself imposes, provided they 
were applied throughout the Commonwealth (including white immigrants) and 
provided the case was well presented and seen to be of universal application-e.g. the 
numbers of those affected in each Commonwealth country should be published. (It is 
conceded that an exception would have to be made, on practical grounds, in the case 
of Ireland). 
Hannais3, [sic] Q.C. (reputed to be the cleverest man in the W. Indies) thinks 
legislation by H.M.G. would be a mistake, and that the better method would be to get 
agreement with Manley (Jamaica) and Grantly Adams (Barbados) to co-operate from 
W. Indies end by limiting exit permits to the U.K. to a fixed and specified period, say 2 
years, so that immigrants could learn a trade and then return to the W. Indies better 
qualified and of greater usefulness to their own Island. This sounds sensible, but I am 
sure neither Manley nor Adams would agree, because neither could get away with it 
politically to their own electorate. 
(5) Jamaica. Birth control here is privately organised by doctors and social 
workers. It is not either officially encouraged or discouraged. Young girls often start 
babies at 14 years old, so sex education should really start in the schools. 
It was at once clear that it is not just the riff-raff who are going to Britain. Many of 
the emigrants are comparatively skilled men, whose departure is a serious loss to 
Jamaica. This aspect of the problem is well understood in the Island. A tailor and 
shirt maker I talked to when shopping in Kingston told me he had great difficulty in 
producing good clothes because his best men were always leaving to go to England. 
The W. Indian of African descent puts a high premium on leisure and is usually 
content to work 2 or 3 days a week to provide the necessities of life, and is idle for the 
rest of the week. Most of the Jamaicans who are coming to England are, therefore, 
the more enterprising who come here to better themselves. 
The Prime Minister, Manley, was reticent in expressing a personal view on the 
problem, which is political dynamite in Jamaica, but he listened with interest and 
sympathy when I spoke (without reporters present) to the two Houses of the 
Jamaican Parliament of the difficulties which confront Great Britain with regard to 
the matter. Those close to him told me afterwards that he had not at all resented my 
3 (Sir) L C Hannays (Kt 1957); member, SCAC; represented Trinidad at conferences on federation, 
1946-1956. 
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frank statement of the U.K. case, and he wrote me a charming (though still non-
committal) letter after I left Jamaica. 
Glasspole,4 his Minister of Labour and Leader of the House, told Patrick Cordon-
Walker that he would not object to restrictions on entry which were genuinely 
applied to the whole Commonwealth, but would deeply resent discrimination against 
W. Indian immigration. This was the usual view Jamaicans take of the matter. 
Colonial officials in Jamaica think we should not impose a total ban or even a 
quota; but that it would probably be possible to obtain agreement with the Jamaican 
Government to channel workers through a central organisation in London, which 
would send them to specific jobs or areas where they are needed, and thus avoid 
excessive concentration in certain localities in England. 
3. Conclusions and suggestions 
1. The long-term solutions to this problem are social, political and economic 
(a) Social 
Family planning and effective birth control measures are the best long-term social 
solutions and should be encouraged as much as possible; but they can make no 
real contribution for at least a generation, and are only even being attempted in 
Barbados and Jamaica (and in the latter only on a very non-official basis). 
In the other Islands this aspect of the problem appears to be virtually insoluble 
owing to the large Catholic communities in many of them and the high rate of 
illegitimacy in all of them. 
(b) Political 
This solution lies in W. Indian Federation and greater freedom of movement 
within the Caribbean, which may enable the smaller, poorer Islands to export part 
of their surplus population to the larger and richer Caribbean territories. 
(c) Economic 
This solution lies in the development of all the Caribbean Colonies by capital 
investment on a large scale from both public funds and private enterprise. In 
particular, British Guiana and British Honduras could absorb the whole of the 
surplus population of all the Islands if they could be developed and the interiors 
opened up on a sufficient scale. (This would incidentally also have the effect of 
solving the E. Indian problem in British Guiana) . But (especially in the case of 
B. G.) adequate capital investment from private enterprise sources is unlikely to be 
made available until greater political stability has been achieved. 
2. Short-term action 
(1) H.M.G. could make the forthright, direct and realistic approach and say "This is 
essentially a W. Indian problem and we must treat it as such"-and proceed to 
introduce restrictions applicable only to the W. Indies. 
This would be simple, easy and effective from our point of view and would avoid 
embarrassment and difficulty in the Commonwealth generally. But it would have 
serious repercussions throughout the Caribbean on the event of Federation and 
would presumably, therefore, not be acceptable to the Colonial Secretary. 
4 FA Glasspole, leader of House of Representatives, Jamaica, 1955-1962; minister of labour, 1955-1957; 
minister of education, 1959-1962. 
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It would be a convenient approach, but I do not think it would be morally right, or 
even (if we place any value on the British Caribbean Colonies) politically expedient. 
(2) My own view is that we could impose almost any reasonable restrictions (other 
than a total ban or a severe quota system) without any serious repercussions in the 
W. Indies, provided they were also applied to the whole Commonwealth and Empire, 
irrespective of race or colour, and provided they were clearly seen to be so applied 
fairly and fully and universally. Ireland would have to be exempted as a special case. 
The following are some of the restrictions which could be introduced, if it were 
thought desirable:-
(a) Minimum health standards. 
(b) No-one with a criminal record in his country of origin. 
(c) Immigrants of service age to be subject to British military service if remaining 
in U.K. for longer than an agreed period, say 2 years. 
(d) Immigrants to possess return ticket, or to put down cash deposit in lieu of a 
return ticket. 
(e) Duration of stay in U.K. to be limited to a specified period, say 2 years. 
(f) Joint central organisation to be set up in London by U.K. and Jamaican 
Governments to channel Jamaican workers to jobs or localities where they are 
most needed, thus avoiding concentration. 
I think H.M.G. should discuss the problem with Manley and Grantly Adams; but if 
anything is done it will have to be imposed by the U.K. (though in such a way that 
local leaders in W. Indies would not think it unreasonable or discriminatory). 
W. Indian politicians cannot be expected publicly to agree with restrictions, still 
less impose them themselves on their own would-be emigrants. They have their 
electorates to consider just as we have here. But if H.M.G. take the trouble to explain 
our difficulties and our decision fully, no responsible leader of opinion in the Islands 
will rouse popular feeling against Great Britain, provided our proposals are 
reasonably limited in scope and are applied universally throughout the 
Commonwealth. 
I think all members of the British Parliamentary Delegation were agreed that 
H.M.G. should not impose restrictions unless forced to do so by events, and that even 
then any restrictions should be applicable throughout the Commonwealth. 
Before imposing any restrictions, we felt that real efforts should be made to 
overcome the present concentration of immigrants in certain areas of Great Britain. 
31 CO 103111718, no 2 28 Oct-7 Nov 1955 
'Full Commonwealth status for the Caribbean Federation': minutes by 
P Rogers, Sir T Lloyd and Lord Lloyd 
Sir T. Lloyd 
The Department and I have discussed with Sir S. Luke the question of the Caribbean 
Federation becoming in due course a full member of the Commonwealth. I think it is 
fair to say that it has always been in the mind of everyone here that one day it should 
become such, but so far this has never been said publicly by a Secretary of State. 
Colonel Stanley's despatch ofthe 14th March, 1945 (Cmd. 7120) referred only to "full 
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internal self-government within the British Commonwealth". It was however 
referred to more explicitly by the Standing Closer Association Committee in its 
Report (Col. No. 255 para. 17) thus " ... we may place on record our considered and 
emphatic view that Federation, and only Federation, affords a reasonable prospect of 
achieving economic stability and through it that political independence which is our 
constant aim". There is no doubt that the prospect of full membership of the 
Commonwealth has been one of the most important reasons, if not the most 
important, why Federation has received such widespread support. But the issue has 
not so far been clearly defined by H.M.G. and we feel that the time has come for 
clarification. 
There has been little understanding of the obligations of independence, although 
it is true to say that the assumption has always been that this would mean full 
Commonwealth membership, and not secession; but the relationship between the 
proposal for federation and complete political independence within the 
Commonwealth has not always been clear in the minds of the general public in the 
West Indies, nor indeed in the U.K. and it is often assumed that promotion to this 
status will automatically accompany the achievement of Federation or follow close 
on its heels. Nor, again, does the West Indian public appear to have much appreci-
ation of the obligations which attach to full membership of the Commonwealth. 
On the other hand, those political leaders who recognise the obligations are far 
from clear about the prospect of the Federation achieving full membership of the 
Commonwealth and are mostly inclined to think that the U.K. intends to keep 
them on leading strings for a long time to come. They are therefore more grudg-
ing on their immediate approach than they otherwise might be. In the ordinary 
way we could wait and let all this take its course, but there are, in the view of Sir 
Stephen (and all of us here agree with him), special reasons for considering this 
issue now. We are going through a very uneasy period over federation, when on 
the one hand it is at long last becoming tacitly accepted as inevitable throughout 
the West Indies while on the other political leaders are becoming concerned about 
its financial and administrative implications and (particularly in Jamaica) are try-
ing to slow down the pace. On the other hand if the pace is slowed down too much 
that will give a further chance to the East Indians in Trinidad to try and wreck it 
altogether. With great difficulty we have nearly got to the point of agreement that 
there should be a final Conference in February next year, but we know that Mr. 
Manley will have a number of proposals about adjusting the federal constitution to 
the present stage of political development in the more advanced West Indies con-
stitutions, i.e. making it more advanced than is contemplated in the Federal Plan 
drawn up at the London Conference in 1953. We know too that this is likely to 
receive a great deal of support from delegates except those of Trinidad but we our-
selves feel it is a bit premature at [the] outset. Our reason for thinking it to be so 
is that we foresee that the first few years of Federation will be a difficult period 
administratively and politically, in which it will be vital to establish the federal 
machinery soundly i.e. they will be years in which administrative experience at the 
top may be of crucial importance. On the other hand, once the Federation is prop-
erly established, we see no reason to expect that it will not then be politically capa-
ble of full independence. 
In short, opinion in the West Indies, which has accepted federation, is not quite 
clear where it is leading and we may well face more difficulties than we need, because 
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there has so far been no clear statement of aim e.g. the delegates to the Conference 
may well seek greater political independence at the outset than we think wise, 
because they are not confident of an early prospect of independence. Sir Stephen 
Luke tells us that the members of the delegation of the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association which recently toured the West Indies feel very strongly 
that quite soon H.M.G. should make a statement that the Caribbean Federation will 
be admitted to full membership of the Commonwealth within a relatively short 
period after it is set up. Sir Alan Burns1 has told us more than once that a statement 
on these lines would be extremely valuable not only in the West Indies, but in the 
United Kingdom and the U.S.A. There is no doubt on the part of any of us that such a 
statement would have a galvanising and entirely favourable effect throughout the 
West Indies and, rightly timed, might well be decisive in achieving the success of the 
forthcoming Conference. There are, however, several snags. We recognise that 
admission to full membership is a matter for all the members of the Commonwealth, 
which it would seem premature to raise before a federation has even been set up. 
There is the financial difficulty, in that for five years at least and almost certainly for 
much longer, the Federation will not only be heavily dependent upon C.D. and W. 
monies, but will require grants-in-aid of administration for certain of its units. I am 
sufficiently old-fashioned to think that financial assistance of this kind is 
incompatible with full membership of the Commonwealth. It is true that we have the 
examples of, say, Jordan and Libya before us, as "independent" countries which 
receive such assistance in effect, but I cannot think that the interests of the 
Commonwealth are best served by suggesting that States of this order are suitable as 
full members of it. Indeed that would seem to me positively derogatory. In view of 
the financial uncertainties there is therefore even more than the usual difficulty and 
objection in fixing a timetable for the achievement of independence. Not only do we 
strongly dislike that on merit, but there is indeed the risk that if we seek to fix an 
early date for it, we run the risk of H.M.G. being accused of trying to deprive the West 
Indies of financial assistance before they are ready i.e. of promoting Federation solely 
for their own financial benefit. That would stir up strong opposition to Federation in 
many quarters. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties, we all agree with SirS. Luke that it is very 
important that a statement of intention should be made. The only way that we see 
out of the financial difficulty is to make it clear to the West Indies that H.M.G. are not 
seeking either to deprive them of financial assistance prematurely, or to delay their 
independence. This can only be done by leaving the final move for full independence 
to the West Indies themselves. The Secretary of State's opening speech cannot avoid 
reference to the ultimate aim of Federation and I should like to see it clarified. The 
statement should, I think, be made at some length. It might start with a brief history 
of the moves towards Caribbean Federation onwards from Colonel Stanley's despatch 
and then explain candidly the difficulties which still have to be overcome and the 
very great deal of work which remains to be done before Federation is achieved. So 
far the speech would be very much down to earth and almost depressing. Then would 
come the peroration which would we hope lift the Conference out of the mass of 
1 Gov of Gold Coast, 1941- 1947; permanent UK representative, UN Trusteeship Council, 1947- 1956. 
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detail and inspire them with a clear sight of the goal. The Secretary of State might 
state, while making it clear that he was not putting forward the subject of 
Commonwealth Membership for discussion as an item on the Agenda, that full 
membership of the Commonwealth was the goal towards which Federation was 
leading. Full Commonwealth membership would involve many obligations, not 
least of which would be the Federation's ability to stand on its own feet financially. 
As the delegates would know, one of the great principles of the Commonwealth 
was mutual help and there was no reason why one member or group of members 
should not give financial assistance towards further economic development to 
X other members (as in the Colombo Plan); but the Federation's ability to raise 
money on its own credit and to assume, to the extent involved by the geographical 
position, responsibility for defence and for its international relations, would be 
pre-requisites for entry into full membership of the Commonwealth. It would be 
for the Federal Government in the first instance to satisfy itself that it had reached 
the stage when it could carry these burdens; when it was so satisfied, and decided 
to seek full Membership of the Commonwealth, it would find H.M.G. ready to 
sponsor the application although of course the decision would involve the other 
Members of the Commonwealth as well. With this ultimate goal in mind the 
Delegates to the Conference might be reminded of the heartening degree of 
agreement already reached over the achievement of the more immediate goal of 
Federation and invited to press on from there towards taking the final decisions 
that would bring the Federation into being at an early date. 
A statement on these lines would require prior consultation with the Treasury and 
the Commonwealth Relations Office. We do not think that there could be any 
objection to making this statement for the first time in the Conference rather than in 
Parliament, since there is no early intention of introducing a Bill for the purpose of 
conferring independence on the West Indies. 
This minute has been agreed with the Dept, Mr. McPetrie2 and Mr. Watt. Sir 
Stephen Luke agrees in general. 
Secretary of State (through Lord Lloyd) 
P.R. 
28.10.55. 
Two or three days ago I showed you Mr. Roger's minute at No. 2 but you then had 
time to read only the last two paragraphs of it. You told me that you approved 
unreservedly the thought underlying Mr. Rogers' proposal at X in that minute 
though there were, as we agreed, some details which needed further consideration-
e.g. some more precise reservation might be necessary about financial stability as a 
pre-requisite to full Commonwealth membership and H.M.G. as well as the Federal 
Government could reasonably expect to be satisfied, before there was any question of 
Commonwealth membership, that the Caribbean Federation could in fact carry the 
burden of responsibility for defence and for international relations. 
These points and others Sir C. Jeffries, Mr. Rogers and I have discussed this 
morning. 
If, on a closer reading of No. 1,3 you confirm your acceptance of the general 
2 J C McPetrie. assistant legal adviser, CO. 
3 No 1 is another version of Rogers's minute reproduced here as No 2 from the file. 
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principle there expounded, Mr. Rogers would prepare and discuss with Treasury 
officials and the C.R.O. a first draft text of this part of the speech which you would 
have to make at the opening of the Federation Conference in February. 
Secretary of State 
T.I.K.L. 
4.11.55 
I quite agree with Mr. Rogers and Sir S. Luke that the time is very near when it 
would be advantageous to give the West Indies a glimpse of the prospect which lies 
ahead after Federation has been established, and I agree also that the ultimate 
prospect should be Dominion status. 
I equally agree very much with what has been said about the achievement of 
something near to econonic [sic] independence before Dominion status is reached. I 
am quite sure that Mr. Rogers is right when he says that the admission of countries 
who would depend on us to any large extent for grants-in-aid, etc. is really 
derogatory to the whole conception of Dominion status. 
The general attitude of most of the West Indian leaders is still too much that of 
the mendicant and too many of them still seem to think that we have a duty not 
only to give them independence but also large sums of money, and that their 
responsibilities are confined to asking for the money and spending it. I am sure 
therefore that we have got to bring the economic aspects home to the West Indian 
leaders. In this connection the question of birth control is to my mind still para-
mount. Of all the West Indian leaders Grantley Adams so far is the only one who 
has had the political courage to give any public support to family planning. It is 
time that Manley and others put their own house in order in this respect. If we do 
this however we are almost bound to be told that the West Indies can never stand 
on their own feet economically and before we put over this line I think we ought to 
examine far more closely exactly how independent the West Indies could ever 
become.4 
L. 
7.11.55 
4 Lennox-Boyd minuted (8 Nov): 'I have re-read and am in general accord with the general principle in 
No.l'. 
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'Colonial immigrants': CO brief for Mr Lennox-Boyd on the proposals 
put to the Cabinet by the home secretary 
On the 15th September the Cabinet asked to see the draft Bill which had been 
prepared on the Immigration of British subjects from overseas. This Bill has now 
been circulated to the Cabinet by the Home Secretary under cover of his 
Memorandum C.P.(55)166. The Home Secretary's memorandum discusses the 
question whether such legislation should apply to Commonwealth immigrants 
generally or to coloured immigrants only. It also discusses whether or not the Home 
Secretary's proposed power of deportation should be subject to a judicial process. It 
is suggested that the Secretary of State should circulate a memorandum to the 
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Cabinet on these two points. A note1 is annexed hereto giving the available facts 
regarding immigration from the West Indies over recent years, and discussing 
probable future trends. 
2. The main question which the Cabinet will wish to consider, however, is 
whether any legislation to control the entry of British subjects into the United 
Kingdom should, or should not, be introduced at the present time. In order to advise 
the Secretary of State, this matter has recently been reviewed in consultation with 
the West Indies Division and the Students Department, both of which are of course 
closely concerned. 
3. As the Secretary of State knows, the introduction of legislation to control the 
entry of British subjects into the United Kingdom and their stay here would be 
unprecedented. It would be a break with the traditional right of British subjects to 
come here freely. Such a change would be regarded as a serious matter by the 
general public here and throughout the Commonwealth, and it is not possible to 
foresee all the repercussions. 
4. Under the Bill circulated by the Home Secretary, entry into the United 
Kingdom could be refused to British subjects from overseas who cannot satisfy the 
Immigration Authorities that they are coming here 
(a) only on a temporary visit, or 
(b) to take up authorised employment or are in a position to support themselves 
and their dependents without employment, and that in either case suitable 
housing accommodation is available for them. 
Persons convicted of crime and persons whose entry would be undesirable on 
medical or security grounds could in any case be excluded. Powers are also provided 
for the deportation of British subjects who do not belong here. 
5. It has already been decided by the Secretary of State that in principle the 
proposal to extend the control of immigration to overseas British subjects is 
acceptable (provided that it extends to all overseas British subjects and is not confined 
to Colonials only) and that the balance of advantage is in favour of doing so. This is 
however subject of course to a workable scheme being introduced. On this point, 
doubts have been expressed whether the Home Office proposal involving evidence as 
to housing accommodation in this country would in fact work smoothly in the case of 
British subjects. This is primarily a matter for the "Home" Departments who would 
have to operate the scheme, but the Secretary of State might wish to raise the point 
specifically and seek an assurance from or on behalf of those Departments that this 
part of the control scheme would in fact work sufficiently well, since a breakdown in 
the control scheme as a whole might well be worse than having none at all. 
6. Given satisfaction as to the workability of a control scheme, current political 
and economic problems in relation to the West Indies have also to be taken into 
account. It has to be recognised that the introduction of control legislation now 
would cause much more political difficulty in the West Indies than would have been 
the case a year or 18 months ago. It has been represented that Mr. Manley's survival 
as Chief Minister in Jamaica depends on his obtaining more employment for 
Jamaicans; to the extent therefore that the emigration of Jamaicans to this country 
helps to deal with this problem, any impediment to the flow would aggravate the 
1 Not printed. 
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unemployment problem there, endanger Mr. Manley's position, and indirectly affect 
the degree of financial assistance from United Kingdom funds which may have to be 
given to the West Indies. This last effect could however arise even more sharply were 
there to be a considerable exodus of West Indians from the United Kingdom as a 
result of a recession here. 
7. It is not considered that a decision on the broad question of policy should be 
dictated by West Indian political considerations; but it is recommended that, should 
the Cabinet favour control in principle, the following conditions should apply and 
steps should be taken:-
(a) that legislation should apply to immigrants from the whole of the 
Commonwealth (with the exception perhaps of the Irish Republic) and not to 
immigrants from the Colonies only; 
(b) that Governors in the territories most directly concerned should be consulted 
privately about the effects of such legislation before any public statement is made 
to the effect that legislation has been decided upon; 
(c) that before any such public statement is made, West Indian Ministers should, 
preferably 24 hours beforehand or at least simultaneously, be given a careful 
explanation of the reasons for this decision of policy, which would require to take 
account of the fact that immigration control was not necessary to protect the 
immediate employment situation in this country. 
8. There is one subsidiary but nevertheless important point which should be 
exposed at the Cabinet. The Home Secretary's proposals involve giving the Home 
Secretary discretionary power to deport British subjects, corresponding to the 
similar power which he already has in respect of aliens. The Home Office are anxious 
to avoid having to concede some form of prior judicial process before deportation, 
since they attach the greatest importance to the discretionary principle in regard to 
aliens, and are already under regular pressure to introduce some judicial procedure 
as regards aliens. They fear that they would find their position much more difficult to 
hold if judicial process were introduced in regard to overseas British subjects. There 
are however two important objections to this from the Colonial point of view. The 
first is, as is pointed out in the Secretary of State's memorandum on the Home 
Secretary's paper, that it would make it difficult-and in constitutionally advanced 
territories probably impossible-to prevent Colonial Governments from assuming 
similar powers. The second, and more important, is that in removing the distinction 
between British subjects and aliens it might well strike a real blow at the concept of 
the Commonwealth community and reduce its attractions for Colonial territories. 
33 PREM 11/2920 10 Nov 1955 
'Colonial immigrants': minute by Sir N Brook to Mr Eden proposing 
the appointment of a Cabinet Committee 
Prime Minister 
Since the Cabinet's discussion on 3rd November I have been thinking how you might 
wish this matter to be pursued. 
2. This was the fifteenth time that the Cabinet have considered the problem, 
without being able to reach a conclusion. This, I believe, is because opinion in the 
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Cabinet is pretty evenly balanced on the main question, viz., whether the time is ripe 
to deal with the matter by legislation. Some Ministers, notably the Lord President, 1 
favour early legislative action to guard against the long-term threat to the racial 
character of the English people. Others feel that Colonial immigration is not yet a 
matter of general public concern, save in a few districts where the rapid influx of 
West Indians has been concentrated, and that it would be inexpedient to embark on 
such controversial legislation now. 
3. I doubt whether this difference of view will be resolved immediately, since 
each side appreciates the scruples of the other; and the difference between them is in 
deciding just where the balance of advantage lies. There may, therefore, be 
something to be said for avoiding further Cabinet discussion for a time-the case for 
legislation may become more clear.2 
4. It might, however, help Ministers if a further examination were made of the 
problems which would have to be solved if there were to be legislation. Unless these 
points can be got out of the way, Ministers who do not want any legislation on this 
subject will continue to use them as arguments on the question of principle. We 
could, when the time came, have a cleaner discussion on the main question if it had 
already been established what would be the best form of legislation to introduce if 
there was to be any at all. 
5. If you agree with this, there might be a small Committee composed as follows:-
Lord Chancellor (Chairman) 
Lord President 
Home Secretary 
Commonwealth Secretary 
Colonial Secretary 
Attorney-General 
to consider what form the legislation should take if it were decided to take powers to 
control this immigration. 
6. The Committee might also consider how this legislative action could best be 
justified. Three months ago officials prepared an objective statement on the problem 
(attached to C.P.(55) 102), but this was a purely factual document designed for 
publication in advance of any policy decision. What the Cabinet need now is to see 
what sort of a case could be made in favour of the Bill if the Government decided to 
introduce it. 
7. If you would like to proceed on these lines, I could draft a note which you 
might circulate to the Cabinet for their information.3 
1 Lord Salisbury. 
2 Marginal comment by Eden: 'Yes'. 
3 Eden responded: 'I agree. This is, I think, the best we can do' . 
34 CO 103111703, no 2 17 Nov 1955 
[Jamaica and federation]: letter from Lord Lloyd to Sir H Foot on the 
position of Mr Manley 
As you will realise I have kept in close touch with all developments affecting 
Federation and I have seen your letter of the 2nd November to Rogers. 
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The stage in Federation which we are now approaching is likely in my view to be 
the most difficult stage of all and we may well need all our ingenuity to bring matters 
to a successful conclusion. I am sure, therefore, that you will agree that it is 
important that there should be no misunderstandings between us and I felt that it 
might be useful at this juncture if I were to write to tell you what is in my mind and 
the difficulties as I see them. 
When Manley was last in London I took the opportunity of discussing the whole 
question with him and of eliciting his views.1 He declared that he was strongly in 
favour of Federation but that his party was divided upon the issue, some being 
completely opposed to Federation and even the majority, at the moment, more 
concerned with the implementation of the party's domestic programme than with 
Federation. In these circumstances any attempt on his part to force the pace and to 
involve his party in all the complications of Federal elections before 1958 would split 
the party. On the other hand he told me that he appreciated Comes's difficulties and 
was anxious to reach some compromise which would solve their mutual problems. 
The proposals set out in your telegram No. 7252 seem to him to provide such a 
solution. 
I do not know the extent of the internal dissension in Manley's party upon this 
issue. I know, of course, that Wills Isaacs3 is radically opposed to Federation but I was 
not aware that this feeling was shared by others. I shall be interested to have your 
impressions on this point. I assume, however, that Manley was not exaggerating his 
domestic difficulties and on this assumption his proposal seemed to me to be a 
genuine attempt to produce a reasonable compromise. Our talk was most friendly 
and at this time I felt much reassured about his attitude. 
The Trinidad problem is, I am sure, well known to you and it is a very real one. I 
am advised that the Indians may well win the Trinidad elections next September. As 
long as they regard Federation as a foregone conclusion, they will probably accept it 
and an Enabling Act will, I hope, have this effect upon them. If, however, there were 
no Enabling Act they might well decide to withdraw from Federation which would 
mean the collapse of the whole scheme. It is therefore not merely a parochial 
Trinidad interest. On the contrary it involves the future of Federation itself and I am 
satisfied that if Federation is to come about an Enabling Act before the Trinidad 
elections is absolutely essential. I emphasise this point because in my view it is the 
key to the whole issue. For all these reasons Comes's interest is to expedite 
Federation and he has no interest in waiting until 1958. On the contrary if it were 
possible he would like to see Federation fully established before September 1956. 
Since, on the question of timing at any rate, his interests and those of Manley are so 
diametrically opposed, it seemed to me all the more important to endeavour to 
secure an agreement between them. 
The next time, therefore, that Comes was in London I took the opportunity of 
discussing your proposition with him. I did not expect him to be enthusiastic about it 
1 Lloyd saw both Manley and Comes in London in Oct 1955. In discussion Manley said that 'any attempt 
on his part to have Federal elections before 1958 would involve him in a revolution within his own party' 
(CO 1031/1694, minute by Lloyd, 6 Oct 1955). 
2 Tel 725 suggested that as soon as possible after the 1956 constitutional conference there should be an act 
of the UK parliament enabling HMG to provide for a federation of the colonies concerned and for the 
establishment of a federal government, legislature, supreme court and the necessary federal authorities. 
3 Minister of trade and industry and deputy premier, Jamaica, 1955-1962. 
106 FINANCIAL AND DEFENCE ISSUES IN PLANNING A FEDERATION OF THE WEST INDIES [34) 
since he has nothing to gain by delay and he is quite shrewd enough to realise that an 
Enabling Act, although it takes us a long step towards finality, does not completely 
safeguard his position. Nevertheless, if not enthusiastic, he was very ready to be 
helpful and was quite prepared to agree to this proposal provided that the London 
Conference was plenipotentiary in character and that there was a definite date in 
1958 for Federal elections. 
The question of a Plenipotentiary Conference in London, of course, puts us all in a 
difficult position. I agree with you that it is highly undesirable that the Reports of the 
Commissions should be debated in Legislatures before the Conference. I agree also 
that if Legislatures are to be asked to send delegates with plenipotentiary powers 
there is inevitably a risk that they will press for such a debate. On the other hand if 
the decisions of the London Conference have to be referred back to Legislatures the 
consequent delay would make it impossible to pass an Enabling Act through 
Parliament before the Trinidad elections. Since the Enabling Act is a fundamental 
part of your whole proposal (to which Manley agrees) it is clear that reference back 
after the London Conference must at all costs be avoided and therefore that the 
delegates must come with plenipotentiary powers. I still hope that by avoiding the 
use of the word "plenipotentiary" we may avoid the risk of premature debates and 
that by persuasion at the Conference itself we may avoid any question of reference 
back to Legislatures and thus steer between Scylla and Charybdis. I am glad to see 
from your telegram No. 114 that although he is not enthusiastic about a 
Plenipotentiary Conference Manley is prepared to agree to such an arrangement. 
Comes's second condition is that there should be a definite date in 1958 for 
Federal elections. In your letter to Rogers you say that Manley has been very anxious 
not to be committed to a definite date in advance. I understand his anxiety, but I 
should have thought that this would have been largely dispelled now that Comes has 
agreed to meet him on the question of the elections in 1958. It is only fair to add that 
while I am sure Comes will keep to his bargain, Manley is going to be under strong 
pressure for early elections from a number of other West Indian delegates. However, 
I am sure that that is something that can be sorted out in the Consultative 
Committee, and that that Committee can be used for settling the date of elections, so 
that Manley will therefore have every opportunity of having his views considered. I 
believe that this could fully meet the point you make at (b) of your letter to Rogers. 
There have, as I am sure you know, been a number of disquieting rumours 
throughout the Caribbean in the course of the last few months about Manley's 
attitude towards Federation. It is said that he is lukewarm about it and that he would 
be not unduly distressed if Federation were to collapse provided that he were not 
saddled with the responsibility for its dissolution. For my part I have never wished to 
pay too much attention to such rumours and, as I have already said, I was 
considerably reassured by the talk I had with Manley in London. If, however, in the 
new circumstances he continues to equivocate about a final date I am bound to 
confess that it makes it difficult to dismiss these suspicions completely from one's 
mind, and if he really wants Federation I should have thought he could well accept a 
definite date in 1958. 
There is a further matter which also disturbs me. I understand that at the London 
Conference Manley intends to propose various amendments to the Constitution 
which go a long way beyond what was agreed in 1953. Within certain limits which 
can hardly be defined precisely in advance, without knowing just what Manley has in 
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mind, it may well be possible to agree some changes which make the constitution 
politically more advanced, without it being felt that such changes call for reference 
back to Legislatures, but to take the proposals beyond that limit would, even if the 
proposals were agreed by delegates, certainly make some of them consider that 
reference back was necessary, if faith was to be kept with their Legislatures. This 
would not be a question of whether or not Legislatures would be likely to approve, 
but rather that the proposals went so far beyond what they had previously approved, 
that they ought, despite the status of delegates, to be consulted again. In saying all 
this, I am, let me make it clear, not thinking of any difficulty on the part of Her 
Majesty's Government, though naturally we should have to consider any such 
proposals on the part of the Conference, but as I have said some delegates would, I 
am convinced, feel that political proposals which went beyond the limits I have 
mentioned would have to be referred back. In saying this I have Barbados particularly 
in mind, partly because of the general way in which their constitution works and 
partly because of their Upper House in particular. Indeed, it is possible that the issue 
might bring about a split between Adams and Cuke and a constitutional crisis 
between the two Houses, which would not only do great harm in Barbados, but leave 
Federation as its victim. 
A demand at the Conference for reference back would be very difficult to resist, if 
Manley's proposals go too far beyond what was agreed at the 1953 London 
Conference. Any proposal for constitutional advance is obviously likely to attract 
strong support from the other delegates and therefore it is quite possible that the 
Conference might agree to Manley's proposal and also to a Barbados demand for a 
reference back. You say in your letter to Rogers that Manley "was not finally decided 
in his mind whether reference back to the Caribbean Legislatures should or should 
not be made following the London Conference ... but that if reference back was 
considered necessary he would not shrink from it." Frankly I cannot understand how 
Manley could make such a statement if he really wanted Federation. He must be fully 
aware that if there has to be any reference back to Legislatures there can be no 
Enabling Act before the Trinidad elections and that as a result the whole of 
Federation may collapse. Since he is also very close to Grantley Adams I would have 
exptected [sic] him also to be aware that if these constitutional amendments are 
agreed there will be a demand for reference back in Barbados. Finally, he is 
sufficiently intelligent to realise that his objective could just as well be achieved by 
insisting that amendments to the Constitution might be made within the first five 
years of Federation if this was the general desire. 
Nevertheless, from your telegrams, I get the impression that he is determined to 
proceed with these constitutional amendments, beyond the limits which could be 
agreed without reference back to Legislatures. In the circumstances you will I am 
certain not be surprised if I and others are puzzled at what Manley is really after. I 
wish to believe his sincerity about Federation. At the same time he does appear not 
merely to be equivocating but actually taking a course which may deliberately 
endanger the whole Federal project. Furthermore, it is only fair to point out that 
should he insist upon these constitutional amendments he could count on being held 
in the West Indies as the champion of constitutional freedom whilst those who felt 
compelled to oppose him would be branded as reactionaries. If it were true that he 
wished to destroy Federation there could be no better or simpler way, from his point 
of view, of doing it. It could all be done in the name of constitutional freedom and far 
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from being blamed Manley would actually be praised. At the same time Federation 
would be killed just as surely as if Manley himself had deliberately opposed it. 
This is the situation as I see it. I had hoped that if I could get an agreement 
between Manley and Comes, our course might have been set reasonably clear. To 
reach such an agreement it is, of course, necessary to overcome the difficulties 
implicit in a Plenipotentiary Conference. I cannot help feeling, however, that with 
skill these difficulties could be overcome. It is also necessary for Manley to be 
prepared to settle a fixed date in 1958, and this I should have thought was not an 
unreasonable request. If in addition to this Manley were prepared-not to abandon 
any of his constitutional proposals-but to fight for the right to amend the 
Constitution at any time without the five year limit, I had hoped that success was 
within our grasp. I do not think that we here should make difficulties over the 
amendment of the Constitution and I would have thought that Manley could have 
been satisfied with this. 
In your letter to Rogers you suggest that of late we have been unduly critical of the 
Jamaican attitude. I think that "critical" is perhaps the wrong word. I would say 
rather that we have of late been finding increasing difficulty in equating Manley's 
avowed enthusiasm for Federation with some of his proposed actions. If he persists in 
his constitutional proposals I am afraid that we may have a very difficult Conference 
and although I do not say that Federation will inevitably be wrecked, I am bound to 
say that I think it will be in great danger. It was originally in my mind to ask you to 
use your influence with Manley to prevent him raising these particular amendments. 
The whole situation is, however, so delicate that I have decided that it would be a 
mistake to take any action with Manley until I had had your views on this letter. I 
should, however, be grateful if you would let me have your full and frank comments 
at the earliest possible moment. 
Perhaps I should add that this letter is not going on official record here and is 
obviously very personal to yourself. 
35 CO 1031/1703, no 3 25 Nov 1955 
[Jamaica and federation]: letter (reply) from Sir H Foot to Lord Lloyd 
on Mr Manley's position 
I thank you very much for your letter of the 17th of November1 about developments 
affecting Federation and I shall try in this letter to set out the situation as I see it 
here with special reference to Manley's position. 
Manley's attitude to Federation can I think be summarised by stating the following 
four points:-
(a) Ever since the Montego Bay Conference of 1947 he has plainly and clearly 
stated his support for West Indian Federation and never has he said a word in 
public against it. 
(b) He accepts the proposition that the Scheme agreed at the London Conference 
in 1953 must be the basis for Federation. He has several times said that there must 
be no question of scrapping that Scheme. 
1 See 34. 
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(c) He considers that in the light of constitutional advance in the separate 
territories in the past two years the 1953 Scheme should be improved by making a 
limited number of major changes. He has publicly said this on many occasions as I 
have duly reported over recent months. 
(d) He does not wish to be rushed in regard to the fixing of the date for Federal 
Elections and, as he told you in London, he does not wish Federal Elections to be 
fixed before early in 1958. 
As to the limited number of major changes in the 1953 Scheme which he wishes to 
propose I have asked him to set out for the purposes of the Agenda for next 
February's Conference in London the proposals which he wishes to raise. He has not 
yet done so partly because, as I reported in my Personal telegram No. 115, one of the 
issues involved has recently been raised as a matter of local controversy by 
Bustamante. 
I know from conversations with him that the main new points which he wishes to 
raise, apart from those which will in any event arise from consideration of the 
Commissions' Reports, will be these:-
( a) He does not like the proposal that officials should sit in the Federal Cabinet. 
Particularly he does not like the idea that there should be a Financial Secretary 
rather than a Federal Minister of Finance. 
(b) He thinks that it would be unsound to impose restrictions in advance on who 
is eligible to serve in the Federal Cabinet. 
(c) He does not think it necessary to include in the Federal Constitutional 
Instruments complicated provisions covering the method of future amendment of 
the Federal Constitution. He thinks that the way to change a constitution is by 
straight negotiation between the representatives of the people of the Region and 
H. M. Government. 
There may be one or two other major changes which he wishes to propose, in 
addition to those arising from the Commissions' Reports, such as the major change 
regarding Federal revenue proposed by Sir Sydney Caine2 (which is in fact probably 
more important than any of the changes that Manley has in mind). 
Except in regard to timing I myself generally agree with all Manley's views as I 
have recorded them. I think that I fairly well understand the situation in Trinidad 
and Barbados in this respect but I nevertheless think that it would be wrong for a 
Conference taking place in 1956 to be precluded from considering any major change 
in proposals agreed in 1953. 
Where I do not agree with Manley is on the question of timing and I wish that he 
was prepared to go full steam ahead and agree to hold Federal Elections as soon as all 
outstanding questions have been settled. 
I do hope however that you understand his position on this question of tactics and 
timing. After waiting ten years his Party has now achieved power. He is starting out 
on a period of office and he is therefore in a very different local position from that of 
Comes and Grantley Adams whose time is up and who have to face new elections this 
2 Formerly financial adviser to S of S for colonies, 1942, deputy under-secretary of state at the CO, 
1947-1948 and 3rd secretary, Treasury, 1948, Caine was the fiscal commissioner for the Caribbean 
Federation. For the major change in federal revenues which he proposed in his report, see 37. 
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year. He is determined to show that he and his Party can justify the support which 
they won at the polls this year. Moreover, to put it at its lowest, he is fighting for 
political survival. He knows that if he and his Party fail to seize the opportunity they 
now have in Jamaica his Party will be destroyed and all he hopes to achieve will be 
lost. It is quite likely that the two pending bye-elections will be won by his opponents 
and any defection in his Party even if led only by one Minister might bring his Party 
down. Wills Isaacs, as you say, is opposed to Federation and has already threatened to 
resign on the issue. If he went he would carry with him substantial support in the 
Party from the many people who say that the first obligation of the P.N.P. is to keep 
its election pledges to Jamaica. I am sure that you will appreciate that in these 
circumstances it is not surprising that Manley has uppermost in his mind the 
difficulties and dangers of his position in Jamaica. 
It came as a shock to me, however, when Manley told me after his return from 
London that he wanted it to be agreed that Federal Elections should not take place 
until early in 1958. I myself thought that that was much too late. I am bound to say 
however that in view of the local political situation here I am not surprised that a 
man in Manley's position should be determined to produce practical results in 
Jamaica before embarking on an adventure for which, we have to recognise, there is 
not yet any great popular enthusiasm. 
You can also picture, I am sure, how irritating it is to Manley to be told that not 
only the Federal system to be established but also the timing must be dictated by the 
local situations in Trinidad and Barbados. 
Jamaica throughout has, I would claim, a good record in regard to Federation. It is 
much the biggest territory. It has a population half of the whole but it has never put 
forward a claim for the Capital to be in Jamaica and it has agreed to representation in 
the Central Legislature much less than its population would justify. At every stage so 
far Jamaica has done its duty in the steps towards Federation. 
You say in your letter that I am no doubt aware of "disquieting rumours 
throughout the Caribbean" about Manley's attitude towards Federation. The first I 
heard of these rumours came from your letter and I have never imagined that 
Manley's good faith on the general purposes to be pursued was in question. 
To suggest that his proposal for certain limited but major changes in the Federal 
Scheme is an attempt to kill Federation and at the same time gain credit for himself 
is something which I do not for one minute believe. 
I very well realise the strong objections that exist to any reference back to 
Legislatures after the London Conference and Manley, as you know, has agreed that 
the invitation to attend a Conference to reach final decisions on the main questions 
at issue should be accepted. 
You must not think that I do not understand the full force of the arguments 
which you have set out in your letter against any reference back to the Legislatures 
after the Conference, but I must say that I should not have regarded it as impossible 
for successful reference back to the Legislatures to take place immediately following 
the London Conference and prior to the introduction of the Enabling Act in the 
United Kingdom Parliament before the Trinidad Elections. As far as Jamaica is con-
cerned I think Manley is right in saying that he would not at that stage have diffi-
culty from the Jamaica Legislature. And again I say that I do not regard it as 
reasonable that Manley should be precluded from raising limited and major propos-
als for improvement on the 1953 Scheme. In any event I very much hope that accep-
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tance of the invitation to attend a Conference to reach final conclusions on the 
major issues will in fact make it unnecessary to go back to the Legislatures after the 
Conference. 
As to the date of the Federal Elections I cannot of course give any firm assurance 
on Manley's behalf but in my correspondence with him he has said that one of his 
main objects is "to secure that the Jamaica Government is not compelled before the 
beginning of 1958 to plunge into Federal Elections with the tremendous strain on 
our energies and our resources that that is going to involve". 
I take it from that wording and from what Manley has told me in conversation that 
he will be content if a date early in 1958 is set for the Elections. 
Finally let me say that though I have great admiration and affection for Manley I 
am not in any way blind to his faults. Compromise does not come easy to him and he 
can turn nasty when things don't go his way. Particularly he can be unreasonable and 
obstinate and even vindictive when he has taken up a false position. Moreover I have 
emphasized that he is obsessed with the need to succeed in Jamaica in the genuine 
belief that he and his Party can serve and save Jamaica at this time. Certainly that 
overriding sense of obligation to Jamaica comes first in his mind and Federation is to 
him a comparatively secondary object. He feels, I am sure, that if he fails in his 
obligations to Jamaica everything else he cares about will fail too. He might become 
extremely difficult if his own position were not understood and if he felt that the 
situations in other territories were made a justification for hurriedly forcing through 
the 1953 Scheme unchanged. 
But to suggest that he is so dishonest as to wish to destroy Federation for which he 
has stood throughout his political life and so mean as to endeavour to gain political 
credit by doing so is something which I certainly could never believe. 
I on my part will continue to do my best to persuade Manley:-
(a) to keep his major proposals for change in the 1953 Scheme to a minimum; 
(b) to agree to Federal Elections not later than early in 1958; 
(c) to recognise the importance of avoiding reference back to Legislatures after 
the Conference; 
(d) to go to London next February determined that the Conference should 
succeed in reaching final agreement on all major issues.3 
3 Foot addressed a further letter to Rogers in Dec 1955 in which he referred to a discussion about 
federation in the Jamaica Executive Council on 28 Nov. Isaacs recorded his 'serious alarm' that federation 
might lead to the destruction of measures taken to protect Jamaican industries and he urged Manley to 
make a public statement to the effect that Jamaica's support for federation should be made conditional 
upon assurances being provided that there would be no interference with the policies of the Jamaican 
government to protect local industries. He was particularly concerned that the coconut industry and soap 
factories would be ruined by competition from factories in Trinidad 'backed by big interests from outside 
the Caribbean'. Manley responded that although he proposed to put forward 'a limited number of major 
changes' to the recommendations made at the 1953 London conference, he was not prepared to make the 
statement suggested by Isaacs who was told that he should have raised his arguments long ago. Foot 
reported the incident, partly by way of demonstrating how important the protection of local industries 
would be in Jamaica but mainly to illustrate that Manley was not having an easy time in persuading some 
of his supporters 'to come into line on the Federation issue' (CO 103111703, no lA, Foot to Rogers, 2 Dec 
1955). 
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36 CO 103111703, no 8 15 Dec 1955 
[Jamaica and federation]: letter (reply) from Lord Lloyd to Sir H Foot 
on Mr Manley's position and the prospects for the forthcoming 1956 
London conference 
I am most grateful to you for your helpful reply,1 to my letter of the 17th November2 
about federation. It has been most valuable to all of us here to have had your 
reactions and such a full assessment of Manley's attitude. I should like to dispose at 
once of the question of his good faith. As you know, we do not in the Colonial Office 
set much store on rumours, but those about Manley's attitude had come from a 
number of well-placed and well-disposed people, (and certainly not exclusively from 
Trinidad!) so that we could not afford to disregard them. Moreover I must say frankly 
that his behaviour at the Trinidad Conference did not reassure any of us on the U.K. 
side, but left us with the impression that he was playing a devious political game 
which did not quite accord with his public support of Federation. It is therefore a 
great relief to know that you who know Manley so much better than we do have no 
doubt about his good faith in this matter. 
Let me assure you at once that we are very conscious of his domestic political 
problems and that we understand and sympathise with his ambitions to serve 
Jamaica. With much of what you say in your letter about his attitude we would agree 
in general terms, such for example as the view that a Conference taking place in 1956 
should not and cannot be precluded from considering a major change in proposals 
agreed to in 1953, though, if we work on the theory that each successive Conference 
should review what happened at the previous one (and the results must go back once 
again to Legislatures), we shall clearly never reach finality. We sympathise too, as 
you know, on what is, I imagine, the really crucial issue for Manley, namely the date 
of federal elections. We also quite understand that it is irritating to Manley to be told 
that the federal system and also its timing must be dictated by the local situations in 
Trinidad and Barbados. I hope that he for his part equally understands that it is 
irritating to political leaders elsewhere for it to be suggested to them that the same 
issues should be dictated by the situation in Jamaica. Does not Manley in fact want 
the best of all worlds with his federation in the shape he favours and at the time it 
suits him best politically? As one who has always liked the best of all worlds, he has 
my sympathy, but as a practical politician, I hope he realises the difficulty. 
To say that he accepts the 1953 London scheme as a basis for federation and only 
wants to make a limited number of major changes sounds quite reasonable. But if the 
changes are major enough, even if limited in number, they can upset the whole basis 
and from the broader point of view of West Indian politics this is just what Manley is 
risking doing. I was frankly disappointed that he should have taken a public stand, 
since your letter was written, as reported in your telegram No. 801. There is certainly 
room for compromise and agreement on much of what he proposes, but some of his 
propositions are, I believe, unacceptable in full and others would certainly involve 
reference back to Legislatures, even if they were acceptable. I would have hoped that 
Manley would have been prepared to come without advance publicity and in a spirit of 
readiness to discuss and compromise round the table. My fears on this point are 
1 See 35. 2 See 34. 
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enhanced by what you say in your letter about his difficulty in compromising and the 
fact that he can be unreasonable when he has taken up a false position. 
I have considered again what you say about reference back to Legislatures after the 
Conference which is the crux of much of this, but here I really must ask you to accept 
in the light of our knowledge of the general West Indian scene and of Parliamentary 
difficulties here that there is the gravest risk that reference back after the Conference 
runs the risk of killing Federation. Although I hope we should certainly avoid the 
dismal history of what happened after the 1953 Conference when it took nearly two 
years to get the agreement of all Legislatures (even Jamaica took a year because of its 
preoccupation with internal politics), I see no prospect of the results of the 
Conference being rushed through all the West Indian Legislatures in a short space of 
time. For example, we have had the greatest difficulty in getting Grantley Adams to 
the Conference in February, because of the Barbados budget which is scheduled to go 
on until the end of March. There would be no hope whatever of getting Federation 
considered in Barbados until April at the earliest and if the Upper House should be 
difficult, it might take considerably longer. There is, moreover a very full Legislative 
programme in Parliament here and it is almost impossible to rush even important 
Bills through at short notice. If there is reference back to Legislatures after this 
Conference, we can therefore hardly achieve anything effective before the next 
Trinidad elections are through. Even if their new Legislature is not hostile to 
Federation, it may well wish to consider the matter afresh. If it is given time for that, 
then the next Barbados elections are upon us and the same process might be 
repeated. I fear that I may not have been sufficiently clear in my previous letter about 
the crucial nature of this aspect of the problem and I do hope that you will do your 
utmost to get Manley to come to the Conference in a spirit of willingness to 
compromise on his proposals and determined to avoid anything which necessitates 
reference back to Legislatures. The propositions which will cause the greatest 
difficulty in this respect are those at (1), (2) and (3) of your official telegram No. 801 
to some of which, incidentally, H.M.G. will also probably object.3 If Manley is 
adamant about those, I will say frankly that I think Federation may be killed. If, on 
the other hand, he is willing to compromise now, provided he can get agreement to a 
procedure which would facilitate early amendments to the federal constitution once 
it is working, I believe that everyone could meet him. That surely would meet his 
principles. Moreover, if he does not show willingness to compromise on this we feel 
sure that many of the delegates from the Eastern Caribbean will be gunning for him 
over an early date for the federal elections. Manley might, therefore, get federation 
more or less in the shape he wants, but at a time which will be disastrous for him 
because of his position in Jamaica. We will do our best to help him on that, because 
we understand and sympathise with his difficulties, and I think we can help him, but 
he must not make our task impossible by insisting on having everything his own way. 
I have written very frankly, because I felt that I had not fully succeeded in 
explaining the way in which we looked at this in my earlier letter and we had in any 
case been perturbed, as we know that some people in Trinidad and Barbados have 
been perturbed, by Manley's propositions. 
We are all of us here most apprehensive about the possible outcome of the 
3 These were the first three points of what became known as Manley's 'seven propositions' . They are 
explained in 37 and 41. 
114 FINANCIAL AND DEFENCE ISSUES IN PLANNING A FEDERATION OF THE WEST INDIES [37] 
Conference in February. I think that we can deal with most of the difficulties that are 
likely to arise in respect of other territories, but Manley seems likely to present a 
more difficult problem. Our only real hope is that you, who have, if I may say so, 
achieved such outstanding success in getting a highly diverse set of Ministers with 
the most prima donna-ish of Chief Ministers to work as an effective team will once 
again be able to achieve a miracle here. I very greatly welcome what you say in the 
last paragraph of your letter, which I am sure is the crux of the matter. If Manley 
comes here willing to compromise, I am sure that we can go quite a way to meet 
him. If, before the Conference, you can get Manley to come here in a suitable frame 
of mind, I think you will fairly be able to take credit for a successful outcome of the 
Conference and for the achievement at long last of West Indian Federation. May I 
wish you all good fortune in what I know will be a very difficult task. 
37 CO 1031/1703 16 Dec 1955 
[Federation]: minute by P Rogers on the recommendations of the 
fiscal commissioner and the prospects for the 1956 London conference 
Sir C. Jeffries 
In the course of our discussion with Lord Lloyd yesterday he asked for a note about 
the present stage of our dealings with West Indian Federation, so that he could 
inform the Secretary of State of how things stand. 
We have received the reports of the three Commissions on Fiscal, Judicial and 
Public Service matters and have studied them in detail in the Colonial Office. The 
Fiscal Report makes some important proposals for changes in the Plan agreed at the 
London Conference of 1953 as regards the finance of the Federal Government. The 
London Plan recommended that that Government should be financed by drawing a 
percentage, up to a maximum of 15%, of the customs revenues of all the unit 
administrations. The Fiscal Commissioner recommends instead that the Federal 
Government should draw its revenue from the profits on currency and from customs 
and excise duties on a few selected items viz. cigarettes, spirits and petrol. There is no 
doubt that technically this is a much better proposal and from all the soundings we 
have been able to take of West Indian leaders, we expect that it will be acceptable to 
them also. Certainly, I think we can say that as far as we know at present there is 
nothing in the report of the three Commissions which is likely to cause a crisis in 
our progress to Federation. There may of course be considerable argument over 
some points, but if that were all, I would expect a fairly easy Conference. 
We are, however, running into a nasty storm over other aspects. The interests of 
Trinidad in particular, and to a lesser extent the Leeward and Windward Islands, on 
the one hand, and of Jamaica on the other conflict. The Trinidad Government is very 
anxious to see Federation established very soon, and certainly to see a decisive step, in 
the shape of an enabling Act of the U.K. Parliament passed before their elections are 
due in September, 1956. For more general reasons the small islands are anxious to see 
Federation in operation as soon as possible. Mr. Manley, on the other hand, is most 
anxious that Federal elections should not take place until1958, so that he may be given 
time to show that his party can achieve results before there is an appeal to the Electorate. 
Further, Mr. Manley is very anxious to make the Federal constitution politically more 
advanced, by withdrawing the three officials from the Council of State (i.e. the Cabinet), 
by reducing the reserved powers of the Governor-General and by modifying the pro-
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vision for the appointment of members of the Upper House, or Senate to the Council 
of State. These proposals are unwelcome in themselves to Trinidad and to the delegate 
from the Upper House in Barbados (Sir A. Cuke) and, moreover, their adoption by the 
February Conference would in their view mean that even though delegates are given 
plenipotentiary powers, they would still have to refer the results of the Conference 
back to their Legislatures, since these proposals would represent such a major depar-
ture from what was agreed at the 1953 Conference, and subsequently endorsed by all 
West Indian Legislatures. On the other hand, there is likely to be great emotional sym-
pathy on the part of the West Indian delegates with these proposals for a more advanced 
constitution and it will be difficult for any of the delegates to oppose them openly. 
We all feel that if the results of the February Conference have to be referred back 
to Legislatures for their endorsement, there is a very grave risk indeed that the 
movement towards Federation will break down. Barbados will be in the middle of its 
budget session which is all important in the eyes of local opinion, and could not 
therefore take the results of the Conference before April at the earliest. Even if all the 
other Legislatures endorsed the results of the Conference very quickly (and on 
previous form, it will be wildly optimistic to expect that they would, for the results of 
the 1953 Conference took nearly two years to get through!), this would make it 
pretty well impossible to pass through all its stages in the U.K. Parliament an Act to 
enable Federation to be set up, i.e. the decisive step could not be taken, before the 
Trinidad elections will be upon us. Even if the Trinidad elections did not result in the 
return of a Legislature hostile to Federation (and there is a risk that they may), it 
would be not unreasonable for that Legislature to ask for an opportunity of 
considering the issues, if they are not then settled. That would result in further delay 
which might then take us on to the time of the next Barbados elections and there is a 
prospect of the whole process being repeated. It could hardly fail to result in such a 
decline of interest and indeed almost ridicule that Federation might well be killed. 
It will, therefore, be necessary at the Conference to induce Mr. Manley to reduce 
his demands for constitutional advance to a point at which they are acceptable to 
other delegates, without the need for reference back to Legislatures. This will be 
extremely difficult, the more particularly as he will have the sympathy of most of the 
delegates with him. There is, moreover, the question of H.M.G's own direct interest 
in this in which our proposals are set out in the attached file. If on the other hand 
Mr. Manley does not modify his constitutional proposals, he is likely to find his wish 
and indeed real need to see Federal elections postponed until 1958 sabotaged by Mr. 
Gomes and the representatives of the small islands. 
Taken all in all, there is every prospect of a stormy Conference. Personally, I 
believe that we shall be successful in getting an acceptable Federal constitution 
agreed without the need for reference back, but no-one could possibly state this with 
certainty and I am sure that at the best there will be many an anxious moment. There 
is certainly the very real possibility of failure. 
We are doing all we can to moderate the extreme demands on both sides and SirS. 
Luke will be making a rapid tour of the Caribbean for a fortnight in January to see 
what line delegates are then taking and to try and clarify the issues and induce them 
to compromise. He will come back in time to brief us all before the Conference starts.1 
1 Luke's report on his tour, which he enclosed with a letter to Rogers dated 22 Jan 1956, is in CO 
103111696, no 371. 
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38 CO 103111703, no 54 6 Jan 1956 
[Federation]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Sir H Foot on Mr 
Manley, the critical importance of the 1956 London conference and 
financial assistance 
I have been meaning to write to you myself for some time because I want to sound a per-
sonal note in the midst of our exchange of telegrams, which has ended today with my 
Secret and Personal Telegram No. 3. First of all I want you to know how strongly I agree 
with all that Lloyd said to you in his letter of the 15th December regarding Manley's atti-
tude.1 I hope that from what has already been said on many occasions Manley will be 
assured that we fully understand and sympathise with his own difficulties. At the same 
time, I am bound to say that I am very worried indeed about the line that he has been 
taking, particularly by publishing his seven propositions before the Conference. 
As I see it, if this Conference does not succeed in its objective of securing final 
agreement to the establishment of the Federation, there will be no chance of 
Federation coming into being within the foreseeable future. In short, Federation, and 
with it the whole political future of the West Indies is the stake at this Conference. This 
being the case I am sure you will agree that it behoves all of us to do everything 
possible to make the Conference a success. This is the spirit in which I trust all the 
delegates will approach the Conference and I must confess that I personally was greatly 
dismayed to find Manley committing himself in public to his seven propositions. As you 
know, some of these propositions are far from being wholly acceptable to Her Majesty's 
Government. The telegrams from the Leewards and from Trinidad, as well as what I 
know of the attitude of the Barbados Legislative Council and other indications, all 
make it clear that Manley is stirring up a hornet's nest. I have given you in the official 
telegram sent off today what I at present regard as the only way out. I am most grateful 
to you for the efforts you have been making to persuade Manley to approach the 
Conference in the spirit of constructive compromise, and I profoundly hope that you 
will also succeed in persuading him, if he is not prepared to make any further public 
announcement at this stage, to send reassuring messages to the other delegates, as I 
gather from paragraph 6 of your telegram Personal No. 126, you think he might do. 
Your Personal telegram No. 127 of the 28th December is encouraging on the 
prospect of a compromise being reached at the Conference and I very much hope that 
you will be able to bring Manley to this point of view before it starts. At this stage I 
would only add one comment on what you say, namely in paragraph 5 of your 
telegram, in which you suggest that it would be unfortunate if Her Majesty's 
Government were to insist on the test of officials in the Council of State or the ground 
of the extent of Her Majesty's Government's financial assistance.2 Naturally I recog-
nise the force of what you say, but however sympathetic I am to your point of view, I 
must point out that West Indian Governments will be receiving very extensive finan-
1 See 36. 
2 In para 5 of his tel 127, Foot remarked that it would be a pity if HMG insisted, against the view of a 
majority of West Indian delegates at the 1956 conference, that officials had to be retained in the Council of 
State. Foot believed that there should be a minister responsible for finance from the outset and he added: 
'It would be particularly unfortunate, it seems to me, if H.M.G. were to insist on retention of officials on 
grounds of extent of H.M.G.'s assistance' (CO 1031/1703, no 25, Foot to CO, 28 Dec 1955). 
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cial assistance through local, regional and central C. D. & W. allocations, through price 
assistance schemes for bananas and citrus, through increased preference for some of 
their products, through a grant for the federal capital and last, and most important of 
all in this particular connection, through a block grant in aid of administration. It 
would be doing the West Indians no good service to burke the fact that financial assis-
tance of this kind and of this order cannot come from anywhere in the world without 
some strings attached. Her Majesty's Government are after all themselves responsible 
to Parliament and through them to the Electorate, though that is a fact that I feel is 
often conveniently forgotten by West Indian political leaders when pleading their own 
electoral needs. I am sure we can find ways round the various difficulties that will arise 
over this from time to time, but only if West Indian leaders realise that they cannot 
have both extensive financial assistance and complete independence. That no doubt is 
putting the matter at its extreme, but it is a factor that all of us concerned with West 
Indian advance must have in mind. I very much hope that in handling it in the course 
of the Conference, probably in the way you suggest in paragraph 7 of your telegram, 
we can reach agreement on what should be done at various stages, provided always 
Manley comes willing to make compromises. 
Finally, I may say, lest you feel that I am reading messages from Bradshaw3 and 
Trinidad too much au pied de la lettre, that I take a good many things said by politicians 
in the West Indies with a considerable pinch of salt. The game can be seen as one of bluff 
and counter-bluff. On this occasion it has gone far enough and the great danger is that 
someone will get caught by his own stratagem, i.e. will say in public what he has only 
threatened to say. I feel most strongly that Manley must take some action to reassure 
his fellow-delegates, and Her Majesty's Government, before the Conference starts. 
Otherwise, it will not be merely a case of prolonging the Conference and prejudicing its 
prospects, but of destroying the possibility of Federation for many years to come. 
3 R L Bradshaw, chief minister of St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla; federal finance minister, 1958-1962. 
39 CO 1031/1703, no 65 16 Jan 1956 
[Federation]: letter (reply) from Sir H Foot to Mr Lennox-Boyd on 
West Indian self-government and financial assistance from the UK. 
Minutes by Lord Lloyd and E Melville1 
Thank you very much for your personal letter of the 6th of January2 about West 
Indian Federation. In my personal telegram No. 5 to Rogers I tried to summarize the 
position as it looks to me-and as you will by now know Manley has sent personal 
messages to the other delegates. 
I can influence him and push him a certain amount but you will realise, I am sure, 
that anything I can do now and in the future will be prejudiced if I badger him too 
much and too often. And at the risk of your displeasure I must say that so far I do not 
think that he has been seriously at fault. 
1 Assistant under-secretary of state, CO, responsible in 1956 for Economic General, Finance, Statistics, 
and Commercial Relations and Supplies. 
2 See 38. 
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I have always felt that given reasonable goodwill and straight dealing the 
Conference next month can succeed. West Indian politicians, in spite of their rivalries 
and animosities, have always agreed on Federation when they have come together in 
the past, and I still believe that they will agree this time. That is not to say that I am 
not anxious and alarmed by some recent developments-not the least of which is the 
tendency in many quarters here in Jamaica to back-pedal now that we come close to 
final decisions. So far Manley has courageously stuck to his guns in spite of local indif-
ference and opposition. Bearing in mind the difficulties and dangers of his own posi-
tion here I admire his determination to go ahead on Federation. 
I do not think that you will want me to enter into a discussion now on the very big 
question about United Kingdom financial assistance to which you referred in your 
letter. I know very well that West Indian leaders often take all the aid they receive far 
too much for granted. Nevertheless I should like to say that I do not regard political 
advance towards self-government as an argument for cutting down aid from Her 
Majesty's Government. Even when self-government is achieved it is my own view 
that Her Majesty's Government should continue to give substantial-indeed possibly 
increased-aid to the British West Indies. Existing arrangements will have to be 
radically changed of course. But can't we contemplate something very roughly on 
the lines of the Colombo Plan for the future? We surely should not rule out the 
possibility of assistance in marketing concessions and provision of capital and 
technical advice and even direct financial assistance from the big and powerful 
members of the Commonwealth to help the small and weak ones. 
I believe whole-heartedly in West Indian self-government, but if I felt that West 
Indian self-government would mean the end of all assistance from the United 
Kingdom I should be bound to be against it. I realise of course that financial 
assistance is never given without strings and if assistance is given there should be 
something given in return. But it would be wrong, I feel strongly, to make the 
continuation of financial assistance an argument against agreeing with 
constitutional changes which in themselves are justified. 
Do please forgive me for pursuing this here when you are so very busy with a 
thousand things. But I do most strongly believe that we shall have to work out some 
plan for the future under which we have Dominions of various sizes and resources 
and stages of development, with special arrangements for assisting the poorer 
members of the family to get the markets and the capital and the aid that they will 
continue so badly to require. 
May I send my most respectful good wishes for the success of the Conference? I 
earnestly and anxiously pray that Jamaica will not disgrace herself. My own bet is 
that you will find Manley the awkward one at the beginning but that others will be a 
much greater headache to you before the end. 
Minutes on 39 
Mr. Rogers 
Please see the attached letter from Sir Hugh Foot to the Secretary of State, upon 
which he has asked for my comments. 
I think that the Secretary of State ought to see the Governor's last telegram to you 
regarding his talk with Luke. As regards the question of financial aid it seems to me 
that once again Sir Hugh has misunderstood what we were trying to say to him. I do 
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not remember that we ever suggested that political advance was an argument for 
cutting down aid. Certainly we have always urged that aid should not be used by the 
West Indies as an argument for inefficiency or for lack of economic advance. Our aim 
has been to support the West Indian economy and at the same time to try by means 
of our support to help their economy to become more self-supporting. 
What we have said is that the fact that the British taxpayer is forced to make a very 
substantial contribution to the West Indies remains an argument as to why H.M.G. 
should continue to have an opportunity of supervising the expenditure of the money 
until such a time as they can be satisfied that such supervision is no longer 
necessary. May I please have your views? 3 
L. 
24.1.56 
I am sorry to have delayed this, because of similar preoccupations with Malaya. 
Indeed, I set the file aside to see whether the discussions in the Malayan Conference 
on this very issue would throw some light on the darkness with which Sir H. Foot's 
thoughts are surrounded. 
There was no disposition, on the part of the Malayan delegation, to deny that full 
self-government, within or without the Commonwealth, means financial self-
sufficiency, at any rate in the longer run. That is to say, while there might be 
transitional problems (aggravated, in Malaya, by the Emergency), there could be no 
real political independence without financial independence too. That would not, of 
course, exclude some form of inter-Commonwealth co-operation to which Sir H. 
Foot refers (and which he seems to confuse with budgetary aid)-access to the 
London loan market, private capital, preferences and marketing assistance and 
technical aid of the kind given under the Colombo plan. As the Commonwealth 
expands, the quantum of material aid through these channels may well expand, and 
the channels themselves may broaden. But the fundamental point-which is 
brought out in Mr Roger's draft but which might be made more precise-is that the 
continuation of budgetary support, especially for recurrent costs of administration, 
must carry with it an obligation to establish need, and hence involves interference in 
local budgetary policies which may be incompatible with independence. This has 
certainly been the experience so far, in the evolution of Commonwealth relations. 
It is true, of course, that the U.K. makes available certain budgetary assistance to a 
few foreign countries- Jordan and Libya, in particular; and that the Americans 
provide very large sums out of tax revenue for various forms of aid overseas. These 
exceptions to the principle of financial self-sufficiency can be explained in various 
ways- but essentially they are made because the donor country regards it as in its 
interests to make them. There is, therefore, some substance in Sir H. Foot's 
contention that, as the Commonwealth expands and new "poor relations" are 
admitted to it, there should be more help from the richer members. The only 
problem is to identify these richer members. On present showing, the U.K. is not 
one- with an overall deficit in her balance of payments with the rest of the world. It 
is possible, but usually dangerous, to offer help on an overdraft. ... 
3 Rogers drafted a reply to Foot and Melville was asked to comment. 
E.M. 
2.2.56 
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40 CO 103111785, no 22 30 Jan 1956 
'The site of the Federal capital': CO brief no 6 for the UK delegation at 
the London British Caribbean Federation conference 
1. The question of the site of the capital has long been a subject of dispute and 
rivalry in the West Indies. It needs also to be considered also [sic] in relation to the 
question of capital cost of setting up the Federal Headquarters, which is dealt with in 
a separate Brief. 
2. The Report of the Standing Closer Association Committee (Col.No. 255), 
Section 106, recommended that the seat of Government of the Federation should be 
in Trinidad. The 1953 London Conference, however, unable to agree on this 
recommendation, decided on Grenada (Cmd. 8837, Section 43) . In accepting in 
principle the London Conference Report, several Legislatures (Trinidad, Barbados 
House of Assembly, Antigua, St. Lucia and Montserrat) reserved their position on the 
question of the site of the capital, and current talk in the West Indies certainly 
suggests that no one, except possibly the Grenadians, is satisfied with the choice of 
Grenada. The Fiscal Commissioner in presenting his estimates for the cost of setting 
up the Federal Capital has made it clear that these will be considerably increased if 
the capital should be established where services and communications are poorly 
developed. For all these reasons the question of the site of the capital will almost 
certainly be re-opened. 
3. The notion has been canvassed that a temporary Federal Headquarters might 
be set up, e.g. in Barbados where the organisation of the Comptroller for 
Development and Welfare already is, and that the eventual site of the capital might be 
left for the Federal Government itself to decide. The Fiscal Commissioner states 
however, that the formidable estimated cost (net £1,725,000) of establishing the 
capital can only be held to a minimum by an early final decision on the choice of the 
capital and by choosing as that site an area suitable also for use as the temporary 
capital. 
4. Antigua has also voiced claims to have the capital but in view of the Fiscal 
Commissioner's recommendations there will probably be a move away from the 
notion of any of the smaller islands housing the capital. Jamaica has given indication 
that it will renounce its claim to be considered for the capital; it is in any case, 
despite its size and other advantages, too far removed from the centre of the 
Federation. 
5. Trinidad and Barbados therefore remain the main claimants. Of these two, 
Barbados, has the pleasanter climate and contains the more stable and unified 
society but although it is likely to press its claims vigorously, it is small and already 
over-crowded. Nor does the continuing existence of some social colour bar there 
commend it to other West Indians. In Trinidad there is greater space for the 
development of a capital, and it is understood that there is already a set of buildings 
on an unused United States Navy base in the Main West Peninsular which might well 
serve as temporary headquarters. Trinidad furthermore is at the centre of the 
communications network of the West Indies, and its people, of mixed origins 
themselves, have more of an "international" outlook than anywhere else in the West 
In dies. 
6. The choice of a site for the Federal capital is one for the delegates themselves. 
[41] FEB 1956 121 
There are three practical considerations which must play a large part in the decision. 
First, Government Services and good communications should be available. It is also 
very desirable that there should be labour of a suitable educational standard available 
for subordinate employment in the Federal Government e.g. as clerks, since it would 
be far too expensive if practically all the Federal Government staff had to be imported 
from other islands. Second, there must also be suitable accommodation which can 
be used temporarily whilst the Federation buildings are being constructed. Third, it 
will be necessary to keep down the cost, especially if Her Majesty's Government's 
contribution is to be limited to £1:; million. These considerations all militate against 
the choice of one of the smaller islands and in effect confine it to a choice between 
Trinidad and Barbados, in which it would be unpolitic for the Secretary of State to 
intervene, except perhaps if the Conference were to request him to do so. 
7. A separate brief will be submitted on the question of a grant from Her 
Majesty's Government towards the cost of the capital. 
41 CO 1031/1696, no 369 1 Feb 1956 
'Mr Manley's "seven propositions" ' : CO brief no 15 for the UK 
delegation at the London British Caribbean Federation conference 
[As this brief indicates, the more contentious issues in Manley's seven propositions were 
nos 1-3 and possibly no 7. They were resolved at the 1956 conference in the following 
way. No 1: it was decided that the Council of State should not contain three official 
members. The governor-general would, however, nominate three officials, selected by 
him, who would have the right to attend council meetings and take part in its 
discussions. The secretary of state gave an assurance that the need for the attendance of 
the officials would be kept under review. No 2: it was decided that the governor-general 
would consult unit governors before making appointments to the federal Senate and that 
three senators would be appointed to the Council of State on the recommendation of the 
federal prime minister and not, as proposed in the 1953 plan, by the governor-general in 
council. No 3: it was decided to make general the powers of the governor-general to 
reserve bills instead of specifying the particular categories of bills in respect of which the 
power might be exercised. No 7: it was decided to reinstate the ban proposed by SCAC but 
overturned at the 1953 conference on duality of membership of the legislative and 
executive bodies of the units and the federal legislature. The period within which a 
member of a unit legislative or executive body would be required to resign after becoming 
a member of the federal legislature would, however, be three months and not four weeks 
as proposed by SCAC. Report by the Conference on British Caribbean Federation held in 
London in February, 1956 (Cmd 9733, 1956) paras 14-17.] 
1. A fundamental danger to the success of the Conference lies in the possibility 
that some delegation may take a stand on proposals for amendments to the Federal 
Plan which involve a reference back to some, if not all of the West Indian Legislatures 
after the Conference, with consequent delays and the impossibility of getting 
enabling legislation through the United Kingdom Parliament this summer. The early 
passage of an enabling Act is particularly needed to meet Trinidad's requirements for 
the reaching of a "point of no return" by September. The East Indian element in 
Trinidad is opposed to Federation but has come to acquiesce in it, and would 
probably regard the U.K. enabling legislation as the point of no return. Should they 
achieve the increased success at the polls which is expected and take the view in the 
absence of U.K. enabling legislation that Federation is still in the melting pot their 
now quiescent opposition might well be re-aroused and we may find the Trinidad 
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legislature reversing its decision to join the Federation. Without Trinidad a 
worthwhile Federation is impossible. Delays would be unpalatable also to the smaller 
Islands which want Federation with their larger neighbours as soon as possible. 
Apart from the peculiar dangers of the Trinidad situation a reference back to the 
legislatures would inevitably mean delays which (on the precedent of the Federal 
Plan of April1953, which was not adopted by the last of the Legislatures concerned 
until January 1955) might amount to as much as two years, creating a vicious circle 
whereby any constitutional plan is overtaken by events and becomes out-of-date 
before it can be implemented. 
2. These considerations apply to some of Mr. Manley's propositions and would 
apply to any other proposals which would involve changes in the London Plan 
requiring reference back to any of the Legislatures. 
The seven propositions 
3. On the 30th November 1955 in moving a resolution to accept the Secretary of 
State's invitation to the Federation Conference, Mr. Manley, the Chief Minister, put 
to the Jamaica House of Representatives seven propositions, the acceptance of which 
the Jamaica Delegation would urge at the Conference. These were unanimously 
accepted by the House. 
4. The seven propositions are as follows:-
(1) That Official Members should be removed from the Federal Executive (See 
U.K. BriefNo.16). 
(2) That the Federal Prime Minister should be given sole discretion in the 
appointment of Federal Senators to the Executive without minimum limitation to 
number (See U.K. Brief No.17). 
(3) That the reserve powers of the Governor General should be reduced (See U.K. 
Brief No. 19). 
(4) That the Federal Government be given power of regional planning and 
initiation and maintenance of consultative and advisory services (See U.K. Brief 
No. 7) . 
(5) The reconsideration of United Kingdom financial assistance to the new 
Federation (See U.K. Brief No. 22) .1 
(6) The working out of a new method for revising the Federal Constitution (See 
U.K. Brief No. 18). 
(7) The amendment of the 1953 Conference recommendations on the status of 
unit and Federal Members and Ministers (See U.K. Brief No. 16). 
No elaboration of these propositions has so far been given. 
Reaction in the West Indies 
5. It was hoped that Delegations would refrain from nailing their colours to the 
mast by making advance announcements of their requirements and that they would 
arrive at the Conference in a spirit of compromise. 
6. As was to be expected the first reaction to Mr. Manley's propositions was 
violent, particularly on the part of Mr. Comes of the Trinidad Executive Council and 
Mr. Bradshaw of St. Kitts. The opposition did not arise over objection to the 
1 See 42. 
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propositions as such, although not all of them are acceptable in all parts of the West 
Indies, but because they were seen as going so far beyond the agreed Plan as to mean, 
if they were adopted, that reference back to Legislatures for many, if not most, of the 
Delegations would be inevitable. So far as the propositions themselves are concerned 
the Trinidad Government early made it clear that its Delegation could not go on 
record as reactionaries standing out against the Manley propositions as such, but 
would feel forced to support them and might even put forward more extreme 
proposals of their own. The difficulties must be viewed against the background of the 
fundamental Manley/Gomes antagonism and the rivalry between one whose star is in 
the ascendant and one who is about to face a very difficult election. 
7. The difference must also be seen as an expression of basic differences in 
political philosophy. Mr. Manley is thinking in British Constitutional terms with 
responsibility clearly in the hands of a party Cabinet, and he is anxious to get out of 
any constitutional provisions that might serve to blur that responsibility or retard 
the growth of Federal party structures. His opponents not only think that his 
proposals involve fundamental changes necessitating a reference back to their 
Legislatures; they consider that these changes would gravely threaten the stability 
and success of the Federation in its early years by concentrating too great power in 
the hands of the Prime Minister and by unduly weakening the restraining influence 
of the British Government. 
Steps already taken to reduce tension 
8. Mr. Manley has been persuaded to reiterate, both in a public statement and in 
a message of reassurance to other Delegations, his firm support of Federation as well 
as his conviction that difficulties can be resolved at the plenipotentiary Conference 
without reference back to Legislatures and that the Conference can be brought to a 
successful conclusion which will finally pave the way to the establishment of 
Federation. 
9. Sir Stephen Luke, during his pre-Conference tour, has both further reduced 
tension by giving delegates an opportunity for impartial discussion with him and 
thrown light on Her Majesty's intentions and the attitude of other West Indian 
leaders towards his propositions. It has become clear that only Points 1 (officials), 2, 
(senators), and 3 (Governor-General's powers) and possibly 7 (Unit and Federal 
Ministers) raise difficult issues which threaten the success of the Conference, and 
that [while] even over these the possibility of compromise exists, it would be false 
optimism to pretend that deep difficulties and dissensions no longer exist. 
The latest position 
10. Briefly summarised the latest known position of delegations is as follows:-
(i) Jamaica. Mr. Manley has now a much better although not yet complete 
understanding of the difficulties in which his insistence on his propositions would 
place other delegations. He does not expect to gain support for Point 7, and is 
prepared not to press either this or Point 3 to the embarrassment of others. Of the 
remaining Points 1 and 2, it is Point 1 (officials) that he regards as fundamental. 
The results of a meeting to be arranged between the Secretary of State and Mr. 
Manley after his arrival will not be known until after completion of this Brief. 
(ii) Trinidad favours a simplified procedure for revising the Constitution (Point 6) 
but continues to oppose even discussion of the remaining crucial points (1, 2, 3 
124 FINANCIAL AND DEFENCE ISSUES IN PLANNING A FEDERATION OF THE WEST INDIES (41] 
and 7) on the grounds that they go beyond the agreed Federal Plan. It has been 
made clear to Mr. Comes and other members of the Trinidad delegation that there 
can be no question of refusing discussion of any matter affecting Federation which 
delegates choose to bring before the Conference, but this does not mean that the 
Conference need reach decisions on them involving reference to Legislatures. The 
results of a meeting to be arranged between Mr. Comes and Lord Lloyd will not be 
known until after completion of this Brief. 
(iii) Barbados is deeply divided on many issues affecting Federation but now 
accepts it as a fact. Its delegation will wholeheartedly oppose Point 7 (Unit and 
Federal Ministers), sympathise with Point 5 (financial assistance) and are dubious 
about Point 4 (regional planning) . The Barbados formula is that no major 
modification of the Federal Plan (as already modified by The Trinidad Conference) 
ought to be pressed or adopted so long as it was unacceptable to any individual 
delegation either on its merits or because it might involve reference back to the 
local Legislative [sic] . The results of a meeting to be arranged between Mr. Crantley 
Adams and Lord Lloyd will not be known until after completion of this brief. 
(Since his arrival in London Mr. Crantley Adams has sent a message to Mr. Manley 
in Jamaica promising co-operation on all Mr. Manley's propositions with the 
exception of No. 7-duality of Ministers). 
(iv) Windwards. Their final conclusions are not known but in general their 
delegations will probably give support to the Barbados formula. 
(v) Leewards. So far as their views are known, the Leeward delegation may be 
expected to accept wholeheartedly the basic proposition that there must be no 
reference back to Legislatures. 
Line at conference 
11. It is important that if at all possible delegations should settle their 
differences outside the Conference. It is understood that Mr. Manley hopes 
Delegations will agree to meet informally on Monday, 6th February. If they do so 
they may be able to come to the Conference having agreed on a joint course of 
action. Steps will have been taken to ascertain in advance whether they have done so. 
If Mr. Manley no longer regards Points 3 and 7 as crucial and may not insist on Point 
2, there may remain only Point 1 (officials), which is discussed in U.K. Brief 16. In 
this case the position will be considerably eased. 
12. The tactics of handling the Conference on these points will have to be dealt 
with as the situation demands. If it is evident that delegations have not resolved in 
advance their differences on fundamental points, the Conference should nevertheless 
open formally as planned on the morning of the 7th February. It is suggested that at 
the first 'business' meeting after the session of opening speeches, the Secretary of 
State should take the agenda for the Conference as the first item for discussion. 
Subject to the outcome of the soundings referred to in paragraph 11 above. It is 
recommended that he should say that he understands some members of Delegations 
may wish for a little more time for discussion among themselves before the 
Conference. If so, he would suggest taking first on the agenda the items which are 
not expected to be controversial (in order to free some members of delegations for 
other discussions) and would propose that these should be the Reports of the Civil 
Service and Judicial Commissioners. Should this be unacceptable the Conference 
might in the last resort be adjourned for a day. 
[42] FEB 1956 125 
13. On present indications, it is likely that all the seven points will be discussed 
privately between the delegates before the Conference formally opens, in an 
endeavour to reach agreement. In so far as H.M.G's interests are concerned, it is 
proposed elsewhere that the Secretary of State or Lord Lloyd should see Mr. Manley, 
Mr. Adams and Mr. Comes to warn them not to disregard these interests in reaching 
such agreement. It may therefore be that intervention by H.M.G. in general terms 
about the propositions as a whole will not be called for. If it is, whether in private 
discussion outside the Conference, or at the Conference table, it is suggested that the 
following are the points which might be made. 
14. The Secretary of State might suggest that the question should be approached 
not as issues between progressives and reactionaries but as issues affecting the 
balance of power between the Units until such time as federal parties are developed 
across the existing geographical barriers. He should, it is suggested, deal with the 
Manley propositions and any others which threaten a reference back to Legislatures 
in the following way. He should refer to the fact (which is mentioned in the draft of 
his own opening speech) that West Indian Legislatures had already considered 
Federation on four or five occasions, in the course of which they had reached certain 
very definite conclusions about the nature of the Federation they wished to see; and 
he should point out (as in the draft speech) the dangers and delays implicit in any 
further reference back to the Legislatures. He should then go on to say that he 
regarded it as by no means unreasonable that after a lapse of nearly three years from 
the drawing up of the Federal Plan in 1953 certain amendments should require 
consideration. Some amendments indeed were to be welcomed (such as the 
arrangements to cover regional consultative and advisory services) if they met with 
the general approval of delegations. The tactics of how the more objectionable issues 
should be dealt with if they are pressed at the Conference will have to be concerted at 
the time. 
15. Separate briefs are provided on each of the Manley propositions as indicated 
in paragraph 4. 
42 CO 103111737, no 39 1 Feb 1956 
'United Kingdom financial assistance': CO brief no 22 for the UK 
delegation at the London British Caribbean Federation conference. 
Annexure 
1. The fifth of Mr. Manley's seven points is "The reconsideration of United 
Kingdom financial assistance". 
2. A large increase in United Kingdom financial assistance is likely to be urged 
under several heads, and by no means by Mr. Manley alone. These heads may be:-
(i) Increased Grant-in-Aid. 
(ii) A special grant to the smaller islands. Sir Stephen Luke has reported a very 
strong feeling in the Windward Islands that H.M.G. should be asked to make a 
special capital grant to bring up the standard of services in the smaller islands to 
something nearer the bigger ones. 
(iii) A much increased grant towards the cost of setting up the Federation. 
(iv) An increase in the present Colonial Development and Welfare Allocations. 
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3. If, as seems likely, the Report of the Fiscal Commissioner is taken at an early 
stage in the Conference these questions are likely to be raised in that context rather 
than in any discussion of Mr. Manley's points as such. They are therefore dealt with 
in Briefs relating to that Report, in particular U.K. Brief 5 on Grants-in-Aid and 
Financial Relations, together with the Conference Paper on this subject, and U.K. 
Brief 6 on the Federal Capital (Section on Cost). The Annexure to U.K. Brief 5, which 
for convenience is also annexed here, sets out the extent of H.M.G.'s financial 
assistance to the West Indies in the past ten years. 
4. Put shortly, the answer to these requests is that H.M.G. cannot increase its 
present financial commitments, but it will, of course, be desirable to deal with any 
such request in the fuller manner suggested in the Briefs. 
5. With regard to C. D. and W. allocations (not covered in the Briefs referred to), 
as stated in the Secretary of State's circular despatch No. 411 of the 26th April, 1955, 
there may be later on some small further allocation out of the existing reserve to 
West Indian territories, among others. 
Annexure to 42: Assistance given by HMG to British Caribbean territories 
The following information is supplied in support of H.M.G's case that it would be 
neither appropriate, nor in the present circumstances possible, to make a capital 
grant in order to meet any need which may be expressed at the Conference for 
raising the standard of services in the smaller islands to something nearer those in 
the larger islands. The information can be used also in rebutting any other form of 
accusation that H.M.G. have been ungenerous towards the West Indies. 
1. Assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts 
During the period April1946 to March 1955 nearly £22 million has been allocated to 
the West Indian Governments (including British Guiana £4% million and British 
Honduras £2% m.) for development purposes. Issues over the period amount to about 
£17 m., or little over three-quarters of the total allocation. A further £13~ million 
has been allocated under the 1955 Act. £18~ m. or more than £3~ m. a year, are 
therefore available for spending up to 1960. 
In addition the Governments have shared in the funds allocated for research work 
and for centrally administered development schemes for higher education and 
training, surveys, communications etc. Comprehensive figures are not available but 
C.D. and W. grants totalling some £1~ m. have been made in the period 1946-1955 
to the University College of the West Indies. Undertakings have also been given to 
certain West Indian Governments to evolve such schemes of assistance as may be 
necessary to safeguard their banana and citrus industries. 
It could be pointed out that a relatively high proportion of the total funds made 
available under the C.D. and W. Acts have gone to the West Indies. Although no 
precise figures are available it appears that the assistance received is very much 
greater in relation to the size of the population than in any other regional groups of 
territories. 
2. Grants-in-aid 
Over the ten year period 1946-1956 grants-in-aid of administration totalling £3% m. 
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have been made, chiefly to the islands of the Windwards and Leewards groups (this 
figure takes in only a very small part of the grants recently approved or under 
consideration in connection with the Hurricane Janet). Grants for relief and 
rehabilitation following natural disasters have already totalled over £4 m., and loans 
totalling over £1% m. have been made for the same purposes. There has also been 
given assistance to the extent of over £3~ m. in the form of price subsidies, 
expenditure on defence and other special items of regional and territorial 
expenditure. (Total: grants £10% m., loans £1% m.) 
3. Capital grant for federal headquarters 
Notwithstanding the economic difficulties at home and the increased demands upon 
U.K. funds for financial assistance to Colonial territories in general, H.M.G. are still 
prepared to stand by their offer, made at the 1953 Conference, of a capital grant to 
establish the Federal Headquarters (see U.K. Brief 6a). 
4. Other forms of economic assistance 
Reference might be made to the arrangements for duty free entry of goods (with 
certain exceptions) into the U.K.; to the great expansion in the West Indies sugar 
industry in recent years and the considerable degree of stability afforded to it by the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which has resulted in prices greatly above the 
world price (although both the preceding forms of assistance are available also to 
Colonial territories other than the West lndies); and to the support given to the 
banana industry (£IX m.) and the citrus industry (£370,000)-again largely in the 
smaller islands. 
There are of course other forms of assistance, both direct and indirect which the 
United Kingdom has given, and continues to give, to the West Indies and which are 
too numerous to mention here. One instance is the annual grant of £13,000 which 
the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation has been making to the British West 
Indies Meteorological Service since 1951, and another is the annual subsidy which 
B.O.A.C. has been making until recently to British West Indian Airways. 
Such calculations leave altogether out of account the many "hidden" forms of 
financial assistance given by the United Kingdom, such as the loan of staffs and 
advisers from Home Civil Service Departments without charging their salaries to the 
recipient West Indian government. 
43 CO 103111754, no 4, BCF(56)3 13 Feb 1956 
[Sources of federal revenue and the cost of the federal capital]: 
summary record of the third plenary session of the London British 
Caribbean Federation conference. Annexes: 11 and Ill 
The Conference agreed to adopt the Agenda proposed by the Secretary of State in his 
Despatch of the 1st December and to discuss first, in general terms, the most 
important considerations arising out of the Report of the Fiscal Commissioner, 
remitting specific points as necessary to a Committee. The agenda is set out in full in 
the Press Communique issued after the Meeting (Annex 1).1 
1 Annex I not printed. 
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The Secretary of State explained that it remained the view of Her Majesty's 
Government that, as stated in the report of the Standing Closer Association 
Committee (S.C.A.C.) (Col. No. 255), any Federal Government must have its own 
direct sources of finance and must not depend on contributions voted by the 
constituent territories which could be withheld; and moreover that it was essential 
for the Federation to be able to raise loans on the security of revenues raised and 
controlled by itself. These desiderata were in accordance with the proposals of the 
Fiscal Commissioner, which Her Majesty's Government were prepared to accept in 
principle if that was the wish of the Conference. 
In the discussion which followed, delegates made clear that they had discussed at 
length among themselves what they felt to be the most important aspect of the Fiscal 
Commissioner's Report-the method of raising revenue. They saw no objection to 
the proposal that profits from the currencies of the Units should be treated as Federal 
revenue, but foresaw a danger of inflaming existing prejudices among the 
populations if it were decided to confine Federal customs and excise duties during 
the first five years to those on gasoline, cigarettes, beer, rum and other potable 
spirits. They would prefer a formula which would avoid pin-pointing these particular 
commodities. Such a formula would give the Federal Government the power to 
impose fixed, obligatory contributions from Unit Governments which would produce 
the same revenue as would accrue under the Fiscal Commissioner's proposals, and to 
increase these contributions if necessary to the maximum already suggested, but 
would leave the Units free to raise their contributions in whatever manner they 
thought fit without necessarily relating them to any specific commodities. Like the 
other methods of raising revenue proposed, this would be an interim measure for the 
first five years, but it would have the further advantage of flexibi lity, since the levies 
could be imposed on a broad band of commodities and would be limited only by the 
overall sum required of each Unit and not by the specific rates for particular 
commodities. The proposed method, which had been agreed by all the West Indian 
delegations, is set out in Annex 11 to these Minutes. 
The West Indian delegations were, in general, of the opinion that the proposal to 
link Federal revenue to duties on individual commodities, particularly those 
affecting the poorer sections of the population, might arouse local opposition which 
might well prejudice the success of Federation as a whole. The Barbados delegation 
considered that in practice it would be irrelevant whether the Federal Government 
had its own sources of taxation earmarked, so long as the ordinary people could be 
assured that their cigarettes and liquor would not cost them more after federation, 
but that it should be left to the Unit Governments themselves to decide in what 
manner their individual contributions should bear on the peoples' pockets. Against 
this, however, it was pointed out that whatever commodities were taxed the pockets 
of some persons would be affected, and that to impose two taxes on one commodity 
might well lead to resentment and widespread evasion. 
It was pointed out on behalf of Her Majesty's Government that from the purely 
financial point of view the method suggested might meet the criteria proposed, but 
that, unless it were employed as a purely temporary measure, it would not satisfy the 
principle envisaged by S.C.A.C. that one of the aims of federation was to strengthen 
the economy of the Caribbean area with a view to eventual independence, since it 
would not take the Federal Government far on the road towards economic control. 
Politically, too, it involved a danger in that, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of 
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the Federation's call upon Unit resources, it would be necessary for each Unit to 
present annually a Federal Finance Bill to its legislature. Even though the 
contribution to the Federal Government would be mandatory, it would inevitably 
provide an opportunity for criticism of the burden of Federation on the population. 
The Barbados Delegation pointed out that part of the Barbados budget consisted of 
statutory items which were not discussed in the legislature. This same procedure 
could be adopted for the Federal Levy. If all territories agreed to reduce their own 
duties by the amount of the federal rate suggested by Sir Sidney Caine and to spread 
these charges elsewhere, the man in the street would not notice the cost of 
Federation to the extent that he would resent it, even though not discussed in the 
legislature, if payment was by means of a levy. 
Further discussion showed that the proposal for a Federal Levy had the support of 
all the delegations. The United Kingdom Delegation agreed to consider the matter 
further at the next meeting after they had had time fully to consider its implications. 
Customs union 
Mr. Comes read a draft note by the West Indies Delegation (text at Annex Ill) on the 
subject but made it clear that final agreement had not yet been reached on it within 
the Delegation. The Trinidad delegates had based their own calculations on the 
establishment of a customs union at an early date; they regarded it as fundamental to 
the act of federation and held that machinery should be set up immediately at the 
highest possible level to prepare for the introduction of a customs union. They also 
held that a directive to the Federal Government to establish a customs union ought 
to be included in the Constitutional instruments. Unless such a union was 
established at a very early date it was extremely difficult to foresee how the burdens 
of federation could be borne after five years. 
Mr. Manley said that Annex Ill had been prepared jointly and discussed by delegates, 
but that it had not yet been finally agreed. It would in any case be useful to have an 
exact definition of what was meant by customs union. The Secretary of State made it 
clear that Her Majesty's Government's views on the interim proposals for financing the 
Federation would be considerably influenced by the agreement of the delegates to the 
immediate establishment of a customs union. This would of course include both an 
internal free trade area and a co-ordination of the Federation's external customs tariff. 
On behalf of the smaller territories it was pointed out that customs union was the 
sine qua non of Federation, but that internal free trade and an external customs 
union must be introduced simultaneously. 
The Secretary of State said that he clearly understood that Annex III had been pro-
duced merely as a basis for discussion, but that it was extremely valuable to him and his 
advisers to have some idea as to the way delegates were thinking, and he much preferred 
to learn of their possible proposals at the Conference table than from the Press. 
Income tax 
In discussion it was agreed that any proposal to introduce a federal income tax 
during the first quinquennium would be of such importance as to necessitate 
reference back to the legislatures. 
Cost of the federal capital 
The Secretary of State drew attention to the fact that in 1953 the cost of establishing 
the federal capital had been estimated at £520,000 towards which Her Majesty's 
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Government undertook to make a grant of £500,000. In the Fiscal Commissioners' 
report the cost, based on the assumption that the host territory would provide the 
necessary land free of charge, was estimated at about £1,725,000. Delegates were 
aware of the financial difficulties facing Her Majesty's Government which had 
necessitated the curtailing of support for many desirable schemes. However, as an 
earnest of the importance Her Majesty's Government attached to Federation he had 
obtained consent, subject to the approval of Parliament, to an increase in the amount 
of the grant to a total not exceeding £1M. He must stress that this was the absolute 
maximum which could be given and that in due course they must discuss the period 
over which it should be paid. He hoped that this would be regarded as a generous 
donation. 
In discussion the delegates expressed appreciation of this offer. Nevertheless, while 
they understood the difficulties of Her Majesty's Government they hoped that Her 
Majesty's Government would understand that their own difficulties in the West 
Indies were even greater. They intended shortly to put forward a suggestion for a 
loan of £2M. at a low rate of interest to provide the working capital for the 
Federation. Attention was also drawn to the fact that proportionately to the total cost 
of the establishment of the capital the offer was not as generous as that of 1953. 
The Conference agreed to meet again at 10.30 a.m. on the 14th February, 1956. 
Annex 11 to 43: 'Fiscal commissioner's report: federal government revenue': 
memorandum by the West Indian delegations 
1. The Fiscal Commissioner recommended that the federal revenue should be 
obtained in the main from taxes under the direct control of the Federal Legislature. 
Specific recommendations were made for initial and maximum rates of federal 
customs and excise duties on gasoline, cigarettes, beer, rum and other spirits. 
2. The West Indian Delegations accept the principles underlying Sir Sydney 
Caine's proposals, but consider that the levying of federal consumption taxes on the 
specific commodities mentioned is likely to cause considerable public resentment in 
the early days of federation and, in some cases, to have an adverse effect on the 
manoeuvrability of unit governments which are themselves dependent on the 
taxation of these commodities for their own revenue. In these circumstances, the 
West Indian Delegations recommend that for the first five years the federal revenue 
should be raised in the following manner:-
(a) Currency profits; 
(b) The Federal Government should levy an initial annual charge on the Unit 
Governments, the amount to be determined in the light of the Conference 
decisions on financial assistance from Her Majesty's Government and the 
economies which the Federal authorities are expected to be able to effect during 
the early period of operations; 
(c) This amount should be levied from Unit Governments, payable out of unit 
revenues as a whole and unrelated to taxation of any specific commodity; 
(d) The amount should be shared between the Unit Governments in the same 
proportions as the estimated initial contributions from each territory under the 
Caine proposals for Consumption taxes (cf. Column (2) ofTable 8); 
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(e) The Federal Legislature shall have the right, as need may arise, progressively to 
increase the charge on Unit Governments, but subject to the maximum proposed 
in the Caine Report, to wit, $9,110,000 per annum (cf. Table 7), to be shared in the 
proportions laid down in (d) above. 
Annex Ill to 43: 'Customs union': draft note by West Indian delegations 
The West Indian Delegations recognise that the imposition of Customs duties and 
the regulation of external and internal trade are matters within the Legislative 
competence of the proposed Federal Government, but record their opinion:-
( a) That the declaration in the Federal Constitution in favour of the free 
movement-of goods (with special reference to goods originating within the Federal 
territories) should be implemented as soon as possible after Federation becomes 
an accomplished fact. Due regard being paid to particular problems and difficulties 
arising in each Unit. 
(b) That the establishment of a Customs Union embracing in addition to internal 
free trade the wider area of external trade and tariff arrangements is a desirable 
objective, but recognises that the economic existence and development of each 
territory is closely related to its own trade and tariff policy in relation to countries 
outside the Federal territory and considers that in the first five years of the 
Federation uniform tariffs should not be imposed except on consent by the Units 
affected. 
(c) That both the above matters should be made the subject of immediate further 
examination in the Caribbean area by experts so that action may be taken at the 
earliest appropriate times, but that all the objectives should not in any way delay 
the establishment of the Federation. 
(d) That the Federal Government should endeavour at the earliest possible 
opportunity to achieve an integrated policy amongst the units in relation to 
external trade. 
(e) In connection with these studies the position of British Guiana and British 
Honduras should be taken into account to facilitate their participation. 
44 CO 103111754, no 9, BCF(56)7 15 Feb 1956 
[UK financial assistance]: summary record of the seventh plenary 
session of the London British Caribbean Federation conference 
Discussion continued on the memorandum submitted by the Jamaican Delegation 
(B.C.F. (56) 9) proposing the establishment of a Consolidated Fund to be initiated by 
a loan of £2M. from Her Majesty's Government bearing interest at a nominal or low 
rate and having no fixed term of repayment. 
Lord Lloyd, who was in the Chair, repeated the Secretary of State's expression of 
Her Majesty's Government's willingness to do all it could to assist both the Federation 
and the Unit Governments, and referred to the statement given in B. C. F. (56) 121 of 
1 cf 42. 
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the assistance already given or allocated under the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Acts and by way of grants-in-aid of expenses of administration and grants for specific 
purposes, such as relief and rehabilitation following natural disasters. Allocations 
totalled some £56 M over the past ten years. He re-stated Her Majesty's Government's 
opinion that no case had been made so far for a loan of the order of £2 M. to provide 
working capital for the Federation, and that the resources of the Federation would be 
adequate to meet the relatively small sum of £350,000 which the Fiscal Commissioner 
had estimated would suffice to meet both initial expenditure and working capital. 
Nevertheless he would welcome evidence in support of the Jamaican proposal. 
Mr. Comes acknowledged the very considerable assistance which Her Majesty's 
Government had given to the British Caribbean territories in recent years, and 
agreed that if the Federation was to be self-sufficient it must as far as possible bear its 
own burdens, the wealthier territories contributing their full share. Nevertheless, 
considerable local resources had already been put into capital and industrial 
development plans, leaving a very slender margin to meet the cost of Federation. 
Further development would be desirable in the early stages of Federation, and this at 
a time when, thanks to political advances and the development of autonomous 
institutions, those in high political office were subjected to far more intense pressure 
and criticism than had been experienced ten years ago. 
Other delegates supported the Jamaican proposal, and expressed acute 
disappointment that Her Majesty's Government felt unable to agree to make a loan of 
the order suggested. The Windward Islands expressed the appreciation of the smaller 
territories of the assistance given by Her Majesty's Government so far in the way of 
grants-in-aid, but made it clear that they would much prefer to do without such 
assistance, and that they did not relish the idea of entering the Federation as grant-
aided territories. In the circumstances they felt that an initial loan by Her Majesty's 
Government was justified. 
The United Kingdom Delegation then outlined the requirements of the Federation 
with regard to the initial expenditure as they saw them. The Fiscal Commissioner 
had worked on the assumption that Her Majesty's Government would make a grant 
of £Yz M. towards the cost of the Federal Capital, leaving £1 %M. to be found; this sum 
could be met by annual contributions of £60,000 and, when the time came to raise a 
loan, the interest charges would similarly amount to £60,000 per annum. The 
situation had now been altered by Her Majesty's Government's consent to increase 
the amount of the capital grant to a total not exceeding £1 M., so that the deficit was 
expected to be only about £% M. If a loan were to be raised to cover this deficit the 
interest and sinking fund payments would be about £45,000 per annum, and even if 
the Commissioner had under-estimated the cost of the capital to the extent of £2 M. 
the service charges would still amount to only £130,000 per annum. Such a liability, 
it was thought, would not impair the viability of the Federal Government, though it 
would mean that reserves would be built up at a slower rate than the Fiscal 
Commissioner had envisaged. His assessment had aimed at producing a reserve of 
one year's revenue at the end of five years. It was not the wish of Her Majesty's 
Government to impose any restriction on the expenditure of the capital grant in 
relation to the expenditure from local funds; they would be quite happy to see their 
contribution used first. 
In reply to a question by Mr. Comes, Lord Lloyd said that in addition to the grant 
of £1 M. towards the cost of the Federal Capital Her Majesty's Government would, of 
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course, continue to make available Colonial Development and Welfare funds, grants-
in-aid to unit governments, etc., as at present. At the moment Her Majesty's 
Government bore the cost of defence in the Caribbean area, namely the cost of the 
Jamaica Regiment and the wider cost of the maintenance of the three British 
services. The wish had been expressed in the West Indies that the West India 
Regiment should be revived, and most of the territories had agreed to contribute 
1 per cent of their revenues to this project. Her Majesty's Government would, of 
course, pay the substantial outstanding balance of the cost. This proposal had 
developed separately from that of Federation, though when full Dominion status was 
reached the full cost of the Regiment would presumably fall on the Federation. It was 
not correct to say that the whole cost of the defence of Malaya fell on the United 
Kingdom Government; in fact Malaya made a substantial contribution to her own 
defence. 
In further discussion the point was made that the report of the Fiscal 
Commissioner was not necessarily infallible. It was not fair that the larger colonies 
should be expected to make a loan to federation when they themselves were in need 
of C.D. and W. assistance to develop their own economies. Several delegates 
suggested that the United Kingdom attitude seemed to imply little faith in the 
improvement of the United Kingdom's own economy or in the future viability of the 
Federation. It was stressed that a strong Federation could not be created if over-
shadowed with constant fear of economic insecurity. A proposal for a loan from the 
United Kingdom was made to ensure that from the start the federal government 
could work. The hope was strongly expressed that Her Majesty's Government would 
not throw away all the good-will it had earned in the West Indies from Montego Bay 
to the present day. 
After further discussion, the Trinidad Delegation asked whether Her Majesty's 
Government would agree that if their calculations and those of the Fiscal 
Commissioner proved to be wrong they would be prepared to make a loan available. 
The discussion had shown that if the Federation in its early days found itself in 
financial difficulties it would be impossible for it to raise a loan on the open market. 
The impression had been given that if this situation arose Her Majesty's Government 
hoped that the two wealthy colonies, Trinidad and Jamaica, would carry the burden. 
It would be fatal to the whole success of the Conference if Her Majesty's Government 
were to give a blunt refusal to the Delegation's proposal. On the other hand no one 
wished to borrow before the money was actually needed, since this would involve 
paying interest on money lying dormant. The position could be rectified if Her 
Majesty's Government would agree that a loan would be made available as and when 
the Federation Government proved its need. 
British Guiana Observers made the point that if Her Majesty's Government could 
acquiesce in this proposal it would be an important factor in influencing non-
federationalists in British Guiana in favour of the federation. 
Lord Lloyd said that the United Kingdom in no way doubted the viability of the 
Federation. Nevertheless, by any test of area or standard of living, more money was 
made available to the Caribbean than to any other comparable area administered by 
the Colonial Office. Good-will was something we all wanted, but it was a two-way 
traffic and the Conference must try to see the United Kingdom's position. Only a 
limited amount of capital was available for overseas investment by the United 
Kingdom, and demands for capital were presented to the United Kingdom from all 
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over the world. He had taken careful note of the Trinidad Delegation's proposal and 
would discuss it fully with the Secretary of State. The United Kingdom Government 
would examine the Trinidad Delegation's compromise proposal very carefully, but at 
this stage he could give no commitment on behalf of Her Majesty's Government. 
The terms of a short press communique were agreed, and the text is annexed to 
these Minutes. The Conference agreed to meet again at 10.30. a.m. on Thursday, 
16th February. 
45 CO 1032/121, no 232 14 Apr 1956 
'West Indian immigrants': minute by Lord Lloyd to Mr Lennox-Boyd 
on the problem of population growth in the Caribbean 
Secretary of State 
When we last discussed this appallingly difficult question there was, I fear, no 
complete agreement either between you and me Dr between those of the Department 
concerned on the crucial point of whether or not it would be right at the present 
time to restrict immigration. There are of course two aspects of the matter. First, the 
effect of this continued immigration upon the United Kingdom and secondly, its 
effect upon the Caribbean. 
2. My own feeling is that generally in discussion most people have concentrated 
upon the first aspect and have possibly paid too little attention to the second and, 
indeed, even if one considers the effect on the U.K. in isolation, there are a number of 
very thorny questions which arise. For example, are the people of this country really 
prepared to accept anything up to another half million coloured people over the next 
10 years? Is the influx of so many coloured people going to lead to strong colour 
prejudice in this country which at the moment is mercifully absent? How can we 
ever clear away our remaining slums if we encourage West Indians to go on creating 
them? I do not minimise the difficulty of these problems but I must say frankly that 
it is not so much the effect of West Indian immigration on this country that has 
influenced my views as the appalling population problem in the West Indies, and 
before you finally make up your mind upon the policy you wish to adopt, I would like 
to put before you the Caribbean situation as I see it. 
3. I attach to this minute the population estimates1 for the last ten years. Fifteen 
years ago the Moyne Commission, which realised the menace of the growing 
population, predicted that the average annual increase in the population would 
become as high as 2%. In effect this means that the population would double itself in 
thirty years. The figures show that in the three main territories which are sending 
immigrants to this country, namely Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad, the average 
annual increase is more than 2%. Taking Jamaica alone if the population continues 
to increase at its present rate it will in ten years' time be very nearly 2 million. If the 
population of this country were to increase at a similar rate we should have an 
additional million people every year. Even India and Pakistan whose population 
problem is considered by all the experts to be very serious, is only at the rate of some 
1.5% per annum. 
1 Not printed. 
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4. At this rate of increase the prospect in the Caribbean would be serious enough 
even if at the present time there were full employment and if moreover there were 
very great opportunities for creation of more employment through development. But 
the reverse is in fact the case. The statistics regarding employment in the West Indies 
are not very reliable. Nevertheless the following facts are relevant:-
(a) the International Bank Commission which visited Jamaica in 1952 estimated 
unemployment at that time at roughly 15-20% of a labour force of about 600,000; 
(b) in Trinidad a 1951 estimate put the unemployed at 6.6% of the total working 
population; 
(c) in Barbados it is estimated that seasonal unemployment in the sugar industry 
is approximately 10,000; 
(d) in Antigua an estimate in 1950 was that 25% of the labour force was unemployed 
and there does not appear to have been any significant change since then. 
5. If even at the present time the employment situation is so unsatisfactory, the 
prospects of employment through development are equally not very encouraging. 
Nearly all the islands are pretty fully developed already and the only hope of an outlet 
for any considerable number of people must be pinned upon development in British 
Guiana and British Honduras. It would however be very foolish I think to place any 
great reliance on this prospect. Development in British Guiana will be a slow and 
extremely costly business and the same applies to British Honduras where, in 
addition, there are strong political fears of an influx of people from Jamaica. 
6. At the present time the situation is only being held by the wholesale export of 
people to this country and the deterioration in the situation can be seen from the 
following figures of West Indian immigrants:-
1952 2,000 
1953 2,000 
1954 9,000 
1955 26,000 (18,000 from Jamaica) 
1956 4,200 (first quarter) 
This last figure already represents an increase of 100% on the figure for the first 
quarter of 1955 and does not include the recent arrival of some 1,200 in one ship. 
There is every reason to expect that the total figures for 1956 will exceed those for 
1955. 
7. The situation is therefore that in an area where present unemployment is high 
and the prospects of development are very speculative the situation is only being held 
by the steadily increasing export of surplus population. If the import of this 
population by the U.K. represented a lasting solution to this problem there might be 
a good deal to be said for continuing to allow it despite the danger of encouraging a 
similar migration from India and Pakistan, but from the figures it is clear that there 
can never be enough jobs in this country to cope with the problem and therefore 
sooner or later a day of reckoning is bound to arrive. How soon it arrives will depend 
I suppose on how soon there is either saturation of the market or a recession in this 
country. But when it does arrive we may well be faced with a situation where we 
either have to maintain a very large number of West Indians in this country on 
public assistance, or send them back to Jamaica, and the longer the situation is left 
and the more the numbers pile up the more difficult the problem is going to be. 
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8. To suddenly send a large number of workers back to the Caribbean at a time 
when it is probably also suffering from a recession would be catastrophic. One need 
only remember what happened during the 1930's when there was a considerable 
movement back to the British Caribbean islands of workers who had gone to the 
neighbouring republics. In some cases this movement was voluntary, in others, such 
as Cuba, the Dominican Republic and also, I believe, Panama, the Government 
concerned decided to get rid of a considerable number of their unemployed foreign 
workers. No figures are available of the total number of persons involved, but there is 
no doubt of the distress which it caused and the consensus of opinion seems to be 
that it was this as much as an increase of the population which caused congestion in 
the labour markets on the islands. As such it must be reckoned as a contributory 
factor in the conditions which led to the riots of the late 1930's. 
9. To sum up, I believe that unless something is done to deal with the root 
causes of this problem in the Caribbean we are riding for a fall. And the only real way 
of tackling the situation is some limitation of the population. If anything is to be 
done it must clearly be done by the local politicians and, if nothing else is certain, it 
is certain that nobody is going to face up to things as long as they think that their 
difficulties can be solved by exporting their surplus population to the U.K. 
10. It may be said that if you restrict immigration to-day it will be extremely 
unpopular in the Caribbean and that there is no guarantee that even so the West 
Indian politicians will take the only action which can ultimately save them, and that 
therefore we had better join them in putting off the evil day. I am quite prepared to 
admit that there is no guarantee that Manley, for example, will take the plunge, but I 
submit that we should at any rate make him face up to the problem and that by 
encouraging him to ignore it we shall create ultimately a situation of such gravity 
that nobody can cope with it. We shall of course come in for difficulty in the West 
Indies if we restrict although I think that restrictions based on housing will be far the 
easiest to defend. And of course it goes without saying that any restrictions which we 
impose must be effective and must be applied in the Commonwealth without 
discrimination. Nevertheless for the long term benefit of the West lndies, I am sure 
that this problem ought to be faced now and I am sure that in any policy decision 
which we reach, these considerations must take a very prominent place in our 
minds. 
46 CO 1031/1226, no 8 18 Apr 1956 
[Federal capital]: letter from P Rogers to R L SpeaighP on the 
possible use of a US naval base as the location for the federal capital 
Here is a slightly awkward one on which we should be grateful for your help. The 
story is this. At the recent London Conference on British Caribbean Federation, it 
was agreed that a Fact-finding Commission should be appointed to make 
recommendations on the three most suitable sites, in order of preference, for the 
Capital of the Federation. The Commission is enjoined to bear in mind such factors, 
inter alia, as the availability of land, the cost of necessary buildings and other works 
1 Assistant under-secretary of state, American Dept, FO. 
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on the selected site, communications and the services already available. As you may 
imagine, the Governments of the constituent units of the prospective Federation are 
most anxious to see the site located in their own particular territory. In preparation 
for their submissions to the Commission, the Governments of Trinidad and St. Lucia 
have asked that enquiries should be made about the possibility of releasing certain 
areas leased to the U.S. Government under the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement. The 
Government of Trinidad has enquired whether the leased area at Wailer Field (which 
has been completely evacuated by the U.S. Forces) or an adequate portion of it, could 
be released permanently and whether, subject to suitable safeguards, use might be 
made of the buildings and other facilities at the Chaguaramas Naval Base as a 
temporary measure whilst a permanent Capital is being built. If the U.S. Government 
were disposed to give these proposals, or either of them, favourable consideration, 
details could perhaps be discussed on the spot between the U.S. Consul-General and 
the Trinidad Government, bearing in mind of course the fact that at present all this is 
hypothetical. The Government of St. Lucia has asked whether the leased area at 
Beane Field could be released permanently. 
While both Governments fully understand the importance generally of the U.S. 
bases in the Caribbean to Western defence, they naturally wish to be able to inform 
the Commission of all the material considerations which might affect the siting of 
the Federal Capital. Until a decision is taken about the site of the Federal Capital, we 
shall not know whether in fact any of these facilities would in fact be required, so that 
it is only a hypothetical question which can be put to the U.S. Government at this 
stage. On the other hand, we quite recognise the anxiety, not only of the individual 
Governments immediately concerned, but indeed of all the West Indian Colonies that 
the full facts should be available to the Commission on the Capital, so that they may 
recommend the most suitable sites, bearing in mind what facilities will prove to be 
available. It is for this reason that we are anxious to meet the request of the 
Governments of Trinidad and St. Lucia for a statement of the views of the U.S. 
Government as to whether or not these particular areas could be made available in 
the manner suggested, if the Commission were to recommend any one of them as 
the most suitable site for the Federal Capital and that site were agreed by the 
representatives of the West Indian Governments concerned. 
This matter was mentioned by W.l.J. Wallace to Man2 during the recent 
discussions on U.S. defence requirements. I gather that the matter was mentioned 
informally to Taylor of the State Department who said that he had already heard of 
Trinidad's interest in this matter from the U.S. Consul-General in Trinidad, where 
the issue is, as you may imagine, a very lively popular topic. We realise, of course, 
that at the present stage of defence programme in the Caribbean, it may well be 
difficult for the State Department to give any definite assurances in this matter. 
Nevertheless, we hope very much that the Foreign Office will agree that the matter 
should be taken up with them. It may be indeed that if, for example, the U.S. 
Government are no longer interested in, say, Wailer Field, they might be glad of an 
opportunity to make a gesture of goodwill to the new British Caribbean Federation 
by making it available as a site, should that in fact prove to be the Commission's 
recommendation and that be endorsed by West Indian Governments. 
2 MC G Man, head of American Dept, FO. 
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There is some urgency about this, because the Commission will, we expect, start 
its work about the end of May. If you see no objection, we should therefore be 
grateful if the matter could be taken up with the State Department and, if they could 
be asked to give a reply before then, so that the Governments concerned will be in a 
position to know what submissions they may make to the Commission. 
47 CO 103111741, no 3/9 23 June 1956 
[Federation]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Sir H Foot on the 
incompatibility between political independence and financial 
dependence. Annex 
In the course of our correspondence1 just before the Federation Conference, we 
touched on the very big question of U.K. financial assistance in relation to self-
government. I quite agreed with your suggestion that we should not pursue that 
issue at the time, since that was not the occasion to do so. Now, however, that we are 
well clear of the conference, I think it might be useful to you and to other Governors 
in the West Indies, to whom I am accordingly sending a copy of this letter, to know 
the way I look at this matter. 
In your letter, you said that while you know very well that West Indian leaders 
often take far too much for granted of the aid they receive, nevertheless you did not 
regard the political advance towards self-government as an argument for cutting 
down aid from H.M.G. Even when self-government was achieved it was your view 
that H.M.G. should continue to give substantial- indeed possibly increased-aid to 
the British West Indies, not necessarily on existing arrangements, but perhaps on the 
lines of the Colombo Plan. You suggested that we should not rule out the possibility 
of assistance in marketing concessions, the provision of capital and technical advice, 
and even direct financial assistance from the big and powerful members of the 
Commonwealth to help small and weak ones. 
I made some comment on this in my speech at the opening of the conference, in 
relation to the achievement by the Federation of full membership of the 
Commonwealth. I attach for convenience a copy of paragraph 8 of the Conference 
Report which summarises my statement. 
I think it may be helpful if I expand a little in this letter on what I said then. It is 
important, first of all, to distinguish between the various kinds of assistance, for that 
difference is much more than one of the esoteric issues of financial propriety. To my 
mind it goes to the root of the political problem. 
We can all agree at once that there is nothing in full membership of the 
Commonwealth and political independence which rules out arrangements for intra-
Commonwealth marketing concessions, whether by tariff preferences, arrangements 
on the lines of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, or otherwise. I should point 
out, however, that of the present arrangements of most interest to the West Indies-
the G.A.T.T. waiver-is specifically limited to the "Colonies" and we cannot use it to 
help "Dominions", even if we wanted to do so. I would only add on this that 
politically it would not be possible for any arrangements that were applied to West 
1 See 38-39. 
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Indian Federation to be completely one-sided. By this I mean that no country can 
expect the U.K. Government to extend or continue trade concessions if it itself 
pursues a policy of narrow protectionism, without any regard to the interests of U.K. 
exports. 
We can also agree readily that there is nothing in political independence to 
prevent the provision of technical advice, and even capital assistance, from one 
member of the Commonwealth to another, whether on the lines of the Colombo Plan 
or otherwise. Indeed, it may well be that the future will see a considerable extension 
of this kind of arrangement. But it must be borne in mind that the assistance which 
has so far been given in this way is all marginal to the economies of the countries 
assisted and they are not dependent for their continued governmental existence upon 
it. 
It is over the third kind of assistance that I think the great difficulty will arise, that 
is assistance direct to the budget of a territory without which that country would be 
unable to maintain its administration. I recognise that the cases of Jordan and Libya 
are constantly cited as examples of countries which receive from the U.K. 
Government heavy financial assistance without detailed budgetary control. It is, I am 
sure, however, clear to leading politicians in the West Indies that that aid is given 
purely for reasons of defence and is as much a part of defence expenditure as money 
incurred in maintaining troops. Whatever the pros and cons I think that as a mere 
matter of political fact it must be faced that the electorate in this country would not 
be likely to acquiesce in payments of this kind to countries even within the 
Commonwealth where it was not needed on defence grounds. Grants-in-aid of 
expenses of administration, to give them their technical name, are given to 
dependent territories by virtue of this country's responsibility for them as long as 
they remain dependent. If political independence is to mean anything, it clearly must 
alter that status and relationship and I do not see how it is possible for real political 
independence to be attained and maintained when the Government of the country 
concerned is unable to maintain itself without financial assistance from outside. That 
is not merely a matter of the way in which the assistance is given, for if it were the 
amount could merely be transferred to a Colombo Plan type grant. It is a matter also 
of the scale of assistance and frankly it is here that it seems to me that the West 
Indies are going to meet their greatest difficulty. The fact is that financial assistance 
to several of the territories is at present required on a scale which is incompatible 
with the reality of political independence. If the Caribbean Federation is to become a 
full member of the Commonwealth there will have to be a combination of economic 
growth and assumption of the burden of assistance by the wealthier territories, in 
order to enable the Federal Government to pay its own way without being dependent 
for its very existence as such and as it may receive from outside. The great question-
mark in all this is, as we all know only too well, the continued growth of the 
population. 
Annex to 47: Extract from Mr Lennox-Boyd's speech at the London conference 
8. Mr. Lennox-Boyd went on to refer to the future of the Federation. Pointing 
out how Federation would facilitate the eventual achievement of self-government 
within the Commonwealth, he drew attention to the implications of that status. Self-
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government meant something more than the formal relinquishment by Her 
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of constitutional powers of control. It 
meant that a country must be able to stand on its own feet economically and 
financially, that it could finance its own administration and that it was able and 
prepared to assume responsibility for its own defence and its own international 
relations to the extent that either was involved by its geographical or international 
standing. On the other hand, in these days no country was independent in the sense 
of being entirely self-contained and self-sufficient. Mutual help was one of the great 
principles of the Commonwealth and there was no reason why one member or group 
of members should not help other members with their economic development, 
perhaps on the lines of the Colombo Plan. Nor would self-government preclude 
arrangements for intra-Commonwealth commerce of which the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement was an example. Unlike the situation where a state relied for its 
existence on outside help, there was nothing derogatory to a country's dignity in 
accepting the help of other partners to improve its economic situation and develop 
its resources to the general advantage of the partnership. The Commonwealth was an 
association of free nations, each of which was independent in the sense outlined. 
Membership of the Commonwealth was a matter for all members to consider, but 
delegates could be assured that when the British Caribbean Federation Government 
felt in due course ready to assume the responsibilities and obligations involved, it 
would find Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom glad to sponsor its 
admission to full Commonwealth membership. 
48 CO 103111791, no 177 Sept 1956 
[Federal capital]: Report of the British Caribbean Federal Capital 
Commission (chairman, Sir F Mudie) Col No 328, 1956 [Extract] 
Chapter IV 
Communications 
37. In Chapter 11 we came to the conclusion that the capital of the federation 
should be based on an existing town and in the previous Chapter, by an examination 
of the available accommodation and the services and amenities of the towns of the 
federating colonies, we eliminated as possible base towns all towns except Kingston 
in Jamaica, Port-of-Spain in Trinidad and Bridgetown in Barbados. We have thus 
completed the first part of our task, the selection of the three most suitable places for 
the capital. There remains the second part of our task, their arrangement in the 
order of our preference. From the point of view of amenities and services we saw that 
Kingston is to be preferred to Port-of-Spain, and Port-of-Spain to Barbados, but, 
before we can reach any final order of preference, we have to examine other matters 
referred to in our terms of reference. We take up first the question of 
communications. 
38. We have to consider communications by sea and air and by cable and 
wireless. The headquarters of Cable and Wireless (West Indies) Limited are in 
Barbados, which therefore fulfils all our requirements as regards this form of 
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communication. But so, we are satisfied, do Jamaica and Trinidad. Ocean-going 
steamers can come alongside in both Jamaica and Trinidad and the same will, in a 
few years, be true of Barbados. In any case it is air and not sea communications that 
are important. Those visiting the capital on business will do so by air and not by sea. 
The capital, therefore, must have good air communications, both with the other 
federating colonies and with the outside world. 
39. The main difficulty in inter-island communication by air is, of course, the 
crossing of the thousand-mile gap between Jamaica and the other islands. From this 
point of view it might appear to be a matter of indifference whether that half of the 
population that lives in the islands in the east had to go to a capital in Jamaica, or the 
half that lives in Jamaica had to go to a capital in one of the islands in the east; but 
the matter is not so simple. If the capital were in Jamaica then it would be important 
that communications between it and all the colonies in the east should be good, 
whereas if the capital were in Barbados or Trinidad all that would be important from 
this point of view would be the communications between Jamaica and Barbados or 
Trinidad. There are through flights between Jamaica and both of these islands and 
Antigua(8) but no through flight between Jamaica and any of the Windward Islands. 
Jamaica would therefore be a very awkward capital for the people of the Windward 
Islands, as to get to it they would have to change at Antigua, Barbados or Trinidad. 
40. To carry the analysis further it is necessary to make some estimate of the air 
traffic between the capital and each of the other colonies. In some cases such as a 
conference of representatives of the Colonial Governments, there would be more or 
less the same number from each colony, whether it is large or small. Generally 
speaking, however, there would be more coming and going between the capital and a 
large colony than between the capital and a small one. Perhaps it would be fair to 
assume that over the year the traffic from the various colonies to the capital would be 
in proportion to their representation in the two houses of the Federal Legislature. On 
this assumption, if the capital were in the east, in either Barbados or Trinidad, the 
number of people who would cross the gap to visit it from Jamaica would be 
represented by the number 19, against the number 45 who would have to cross the 
gap from the east if the capital were in Jamaica. On this showing, therefore, the 
advantage clearly lies with Barbados and Trinidad and against Jamaica. From the 
point of view of communications with Jamaica, Trinidad is to be preferred to 
Barbados, as it has three flights a week(9) to that island totalling 96 seats against one 
flight a week from Barbados, totalling 24 seats. 
41. As regards communications between Trinidad or Barbados and the other 
colonies in the east there is little in it. The local flights from Trinidad to St. Lucia 
and Antigua go through Barbados. Both Barbados and Trinidad are connected 
directly with Grenada, though Trinidad has four flights a week totalling 96 seats to 
that island, while Barbados has only two flights totalling 48 seats. On the other hand 
Barbados is directly connected by air with Dominica and St. Vincent, neither of 
(8) St. Kitts and Montserrat are connected by air only with Antigua. They may therefore, for our present 
purposes, be omitted and their populations considered as being concentrated in that island. 
(9) When we say in this and the following paragraphs that there is a number of flights from one place to 
another it is to be understood that there is an equal number of returning flights in the reverse direction. 
The numbers of flights and seats have been collated with all possible care from various sources, but their 
accuracy cannot be vouched for. 
142 FINANCIAL AND DEFENCEISSUES IN PLANNING A FEDERATION OF THE WEST INDIES [48] 
which has any direct communication with Trinidad. There is an excellent air service 
between Trinidad and Barbados, fourteen flights a week totalling 492 seats each way. 
From the point of view, therefore, of air communications with the other colonies in 
the east Barbados would perhaps be slightly better than Trinidad. The air 
communications between the islands are shown in Map No. J.1 
42. As regards external communications, Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados have 
each one flight of 48 seats a week to London. To New York there are nine flights a 
week from Jamaica totalling 572 seats, seven from Trinidad totalling 471 seats, and 
two from Barbados totalling 96 seats. To Montreal Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados 
each have two flights per week totalling 120, 108 and 48 seats respectively. There are 
no fewer than sixteen flights or 818 seats a week from Jamaica to Colombia and 
Venezuela and nineteen flights or 1,291 seats to other countries in South America; 
from Trinidad there are fifteen flights or 616 seats a week to Venezuela and nine 
flights or 530 seats to the Argentine and other countries in South America. Barbados 
has only two flights or 54 seats per week to Venezuela and one of24 seats to British 
Guiana. From the point of view of external communications there is thus little to 
choose between Trinidad and Jamaica, and both are considerably better off than 
Barbados. All three have, or will shortly have, airports that can take Stratocruisers. 
The trunk air lines between the islands and other countries are shown in Map No. II. 
43. To sum up on communications. Material differences from our point of view 
between these three islands are found only in the air. From the point of view of 
internal communications within the Federation, Jamaica would be a far less 
convenient place for the capital than either Trinidad or Barbados. From the point of 
view of external communications both Jamaica and Trinidad would be better than 
Barbados. It must be remembered, however, that the figures given above for flights 
and seating accommodation have been taken from the existing schedules, or rather 
from the schedules that will probably be in force when the Federation comes into 
being in the second half of 1957. If the traffic demands it there would, presumably, be 
no difficulty in making suitable adjustments to these schedules, provided the 
necessary airport facilities exist. Communications could, therefore, be improved 
between these three islands, or between any one of them and the outside world, if 
this were found to be necessary. It would, however, be difficult to improve 
communications between Jamaica and the Windward Islands, where airport facilities 
are either non-existent or unsuitable for long-distance aircraft. There is therefore in 
the long run very little to choose between these three islands in the matter of 
communications with the outside world. If, however, Jamaica were chosen for the 
capital, the problem of internal communications would remain and could only be got 
over at great cost. 
Chapter V 
Political and social considerations 
44. We now turn to the question of political, social and intellectual atmosphere 
and examine the conditions prevailing in Kingston, Port-of-Spain and Bridgetown 
from this point of view. For the atmosphere of the capital will inevitably, for many 
years at least, be strongly influenced by that of the base town. As the capital grows 
1 Maps not printed. 
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and comes to possess a distinct society of its own it will, in its turn, influence the 
base town, but this will be slow to develop. Unless the capital grows much more 
rapidly than we consider likely, the base town will, for a long time to come, be the 
larger and exercise the greater influence. It is of the first consequence, therefore, 
that the political traditions and practices of the base town should be sound, that its 
society should be united and progressive and that its people should be well educated, 
broad-minded and susceptible to new ideas. 
45. Trinidad, as already mentioned, is less politically advanced than either 
Jamaica or Barbados, in that up to now it has had no Chief Minister and no clear-cut 
political parties with established programmes. Recently, because of the elections, a 
number of parties have been formed, but many are based on personalities rather than 
programmes, one is communist, and another depends mainly on race. Whatever the 
result of the elections may be, the political future of Trinidad seems to us uncertain 
because of the traditional fragmentation of parties and the racial cleavage which 
exists there. 
46. A disturbing element in the public life of Trinidad, to which importance is 
attached in the other islands, is the presence there of a large population, 35 per cent. 
of the whole, of East Indian descent. East Indians, it is alleged, have ideals and 
loyalties differing from those to be found elsewhere in the Federation and they 
exercise a disruptive influence on social and political life in Trinidad which would 
vitiate the social and political life of the capital if it were placed on that island. We 
pass no judgment on these allegations, except to say that the existence of such a large 
minority, differing in so many ways from the rest of the people of the island, is bound 
to introduce complications which will make the growth of healthy political 
conditions in Trinidad even more difficult than it would otherwise have been. 
47. There are widespread reports of corruption in the public life of Trinidad. This 
is a matter on which we would hesitate to comment after a short stay of only one 
week on that island were it not for the almost universal belief in the other islands 
that the accusation is true. We naturally accepted with some reserve what we were 
told in other islands, particularly in those that themselves put in a claim for the 
capital. The state of affairs in the Port-of-Spain municipality was, however, only a few 
years ago the subject of a public enquiry, with the result that grave suspicion was 
thrown on the financial and other integrity of persons now prominent in the public 
life of the colony.(10) Financial scandals may, of course, occur anywhere, however 
high the tone of public life. What is significant in the case of Trinidad, however, is 
that these practices appear to be tolerated. This tolerance of such practices in public 
life would be a disquieting augury for the future of a capital located there. 
48. In Jamaica and Barbados the political atmosphere is healthy, but there are 
accusations in the other islands that there exists in Barbados a prejudice against 
colour not found elsewhere. This, too, is naturally a matter on which those who have 
been in the West Indies for a short time can comment only with the greatest 
diffidence. The colour question was, however, one into which we made discreet 
enquiries wherever we went. Colour prejudice was strong throughout the islands a 
[1°) Report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the affairs, administration, management and 
conduct of the Port-of-Spain Corporation and the activities and conduct of any person who holds, or has 
held, any corporate office in the Corporation or any person who is, or has been, an officer or in the 
employment of the Corporation, 1952. 
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matter of only 10 to 15 years ago, but it is fast disappearing everywhere. Pockets of 
prejudice certainly exist here and there, both in small islands and in large, but there 
is nowhere any organised or important public opinion that supports a colour bar, or 
anything like it. It may be that there remain more of these pockets of prejudice in 
Barbados than in some of the other islands. Changes occur more slowly in a stable 
society such as that of Barbados than in one which is less stable. But we have no 
doubt that Barbados is changing like the rest and after careful enquiries we are 
satisfied that the colour question raises no difficulty in the schools. 
49. The general level of education is probably higher in Barbados than in any 
other of the federating colonies, though Jamaica is close behind. Its schools are well 
staffed and some of them have a long tradition of successes at the Universities and 
elsewhere. Codrington College, though now confined to theology, had till recently 
classes in law as well . Barbadians are found all over the eastern islands in positions 
for which a good education is required and the Barbados schools have a considerable 
number of pupils from other islands. On the other hand the University College of the 
West Indies, which will be the intellectual centre of the Federation, is situated in 
Jamaica. In Trinidad the research work of the Imperial College of Tropical 
Agriculture is world famous but locally it provides a technical and not a general 
education. From the point of view of its intellectual atmosphere either Barbados or 
Jamaica is to be preferred to Trinidad. In the matter of the Press, however, both 
Jamaica and Trinidad are in advance of Barbados. The Barbados Advocate is quite a 
good paper, but it contains far less foreign news than the Daily Gleaner in Jamaica, 
or either of the two dailies in Trinidad. The Trinidad Guardian circulates throughout 
the eastern islands but no other paper has any appreciable circulation outside its own 
island. 
50. One thing that struck us about Jamaica was its aloofness from the other 
islands. There is considerable movement between the islands in the eastern half of 
the Federation, but little between these islands and Jamaica. This may improve with 
the growth of the influence of the University College of the West Indies, but at 
present it would be fair to say that in the east far more is known about life in the 
United Kingdom than about life in Jamaica. As one speaker put it "It is not so much 
that Jamaica is far away as that Jamaicans are." Similarly we found that in Jamaica 
very little is known about the islands in the east. Jamaicans, when they go abroad, go 
to Britain, the United States, or Canada and only very occasionally to the other 
islands of the British West Indies. The two halves of the Federation are widely 
separated by more than water. It will be one of the tasks of the Federation to bring 
them together, but this will not be easy and may well take a long time. 
51. Finally, we have to take into consideration the general feeling throughout 
the islands of the kind of capital that would be best suited to the new Federation. As 
we have said, opinions differ on this point, but there was one frequently held opinion 
which is of great importance, and that is that the capital should be in a small island, 
rather than in a large one. This feeling is naturally strongest in, but is not confined 
to, the small islands. The two large islands of Jamaica and Trinidad will, inevitably, 
because of their size and wealth, have very great influence on federal affairs and the 
fear is that, if the capital were placed in one of them, the influence of that island 
would be so great as almost to amount to domination. This is a possibility that 
cannot be ignored. It is also one that we would deprecate. If the small islands are to 
enter the Federation with zest, they must feel that they are taking a step nearer to 
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independence and to the management of their own affairs. This is the feeling that 
inspires the urge to federate and nothing should be done to discourage it. 
Domination, or fear of domination, of the Federation by one island would clearly do 
so. It would also hamper the growth of that common West Indian patriotism, which, 
as we have said, is essential if the Federation is to be a real one. 
Chapter VI 
Our order of preference 
52. We have set forth as they appear to us the relevant facts regarding the islands 
of Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados and their principal towns and have added such 
comment as our limited experience warrants. We now take up the second part of our 
task, the arrangement of these islands in the order in which we would place them 
according to their suitability to contain the capital. Here fact-finding ends. There is 
no objective method of combining, as it were, the marks that the different islands get 
under different tests into one combined set of marks indicating their final order. 
There exists no calculus by which we can measure the better communications of one 
against, say, the greater political stability of another, or against the better civic 
amenities and services to be found in a third. The final order of preference must be 
an act of judgment. All that we can claim for our order is that we reached it 
unanimously after careful thought and prolonged discussion. We can do little more, 
therefore, than indicate the main considerations that led us to our conclusions. 
53. Trinidad is wealthy and go ahead and has good communications and a good 
Press, and Port-of-Spain would be suitable, from the material point of view, as a base 
town. Nevertheless we consider it would be better to put the capital either in Jamaica 
or in Barbados than in Trinidad. Our reasons are the instability of that island's 
politics and the low standard accepted in its public life. To put the capital near Port-
of-Spain would, in our opinion, be to run a very great risk, which need not be run. 
54. The decision between Jamaica and Barbados is a difficult one. In the matter 
of external communications there is, taking the long view, little in it. As regards the 
colour question, it did not appear to us that there was any fundamental difference 
between Barbados and the other islands. Kingston is a better town than Bridgetown 
and has a better Press, but the average intellectual atmosphere in the daily life of 
Barbados appeared to us to be the keener. From the point of view of inter-island 
communications, however, Barbados would be distinctly better than Jamaica. To 
place the capital in Jamaica would almost certainly be to increase the number of 
persons who would have to cross the big gap between the two halves of the 
Federation on their way to and from the capital. Also, Barbados has direct air 
communication with the colonies of the Windward Islands, which Jamaica has not. 
But our main reason for preferring Barbados to Jamaica is that we hold the view that, 
if possible, the capital should be on a small island. Jamaica is so large and its 
potential development so great that the fears of the other islands that it would 
dominate the Federation, if it were chosen for the capital, would be very real. They 
would be increased by Jamaica's aloofness. The small islands would fear, not only 
that the Federation would be dominated by one island, but that the people of that 
island knew nothing about their needs and aspirations and so would tend to ignore 
them, however good the intentions of those in authority might be. And in our 
opinion these fears would not be groundless. Barbados is, on the other hand, a small 
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island in the eastern group and has knowledge of the other small islands and close 
connections with them. To place the capital in Jamaica would therefore, we think, be 
a psychological mistake which would give the Federation a bad start and so might 
have serious consequences. 
We would, therefore, arrange the three islands, which alone have towns that could 
act as base towns, in the following order: 
Barbados, 
Jamaica, 
Trinidad . . .. 
49 CO 103111743, no 3 20 Sept 1956 
[Federal government] : letter from Sir S Luke to P Kennedy on the 
functions of the federal government and economic planning 
Thank you for your letter of 1Oth September (WIS. 175/23/01) about the provision of 
economic advice for the Federal Government. 
I am afraid that we are not convinced that the solution to the problem has yet been 
found; but I do not think that we can carry this matter further until Mordecai and I 
can discuss it in London next month against the background of the detailed plan for 
the federal administration, which I shall be sending to you in a few days. 
In the meantime, I should like you to be giving preliminary thought to another, 
but related, proposition. As we progress with our detailed planning, we find ourselves 
increasingly pre-occupied with the difficulty of finding the answer to the simple 
question-what is the Federal Government going to do? That is, what functions is it 
going to perform which will justifiy, in the public eye, the large and costly edifice of 
its two Houses of Legislature, its numerous Ministers, and its extensive bureaucracy? 
The powers given by the constitution to the Federal Government are so niggardly 
that the development of policies that will provide an effective answer to these 
questions will test the first Federal Government very severely. Yet, if federation is to 
be successful, it must (to put it crudely) produce results during its first five years of 
life. It will not be sufficient for it merely to continue, in an elaborated form, the work 
of the Regional Economic Committee and the Organisation, though this in fact will 
necessarily be the starting point of its activities. 
For the most part, in this interim stage, we can do little more than plan for the 
establishment of the minimum administrative machinery which the Federal 
Government must have to fulfil , from the outset, its essential functions and 
responsibilities, and which shall be capable of quick expansion in response to the 
demands of policy. We cannot anticipate the programme of the Federal Government, 
nor attempt to impose policies on it. Nevertheless, I think that there would be 
general agreement that the success or failure of the Federal Government will largely 
depend, at least in its early years, on its economic policy; certainly, this was very 
much in the mind of the Standing Federation Committee when it decided that the 
Federal Prime Minister ought to have under him a highly qualified statistical and 
economic advisory staff. Most people who think about such matters feel that the 
Federal Government ought to work out a co-ordinated programme of economic 
development for the region as a whole, and that this would be the most effective way 
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of making a powerful impact on public opinion throughout the area. Some such 
conception was, of course, behind the "Caribbean Colombo Plan" proposal put 
forward at the London Conference, which was subsequently taken up with the 
Canadian Government. 
The idea is, however, a vague one, and no one kr-iows in what form or by what 
means it can be translated into reality. In so far as the idea implies something more 
than the greater co-ordination of policy and activity made possible by the creation of 
a central Government, it involves an imaginative and constructive effort in planning 
that has not so far been attempted. It seems to us that the Federal Government is 
bound to address itself to this task without delay, and that, indeed, it will expect its 
statistical and economic staff to have made some progress with the preparatory work 
before it comes into office. If this assumption is correct, we wonder whether it might 
not be a good idea, in the meantime, to try to persuade the International Bank to 
send one of its Economic Missions to advise on regional economic co-ordination and 
development. My recollection is that, some years ago, the Bank showed reluctance to 
undertake any further individual surveys in the area, but indicated that they might 
be prepared to do so if the field of enquiry could be widened. If they could be asked to 
send a Mission in 1957, its findings would provide a very valuable basis for the 
formulation of the Federal Government's policy, and would enable that Government 
to get to grips with its problems without the lengthy delays involved in preliminary 
investigations. 
Mordecai and I will elaborate these ideas in discussion, but I thought it advisable 
to give you advance warning of what is in our mind.1 
1 When Luke's suggestion of an International Bank mission was discussed at a meeting in the CO which he 
attended in Oct 1956, it was agreed that this was not the 'ideal solution', particularly as Bank reports 
'seemed more expert in presentation than in content'. Rather than have one comprehensive inquiry into 
Caribbean economic problems, it was decided instead that it would be more worthwhile-and probably 
cheaper-to single out a few, specific subjects, eg civil aviation, citrus fruit industry, and have small 
commissions of 'real experts' to examine and report on each one. It was recommended that a Federal 
Economic Advisory Bureau should be established to consider the subjects on which they thought an 
inquiry would be valuable; the Standing Federation Committee would arrange that the inquiries be made 
and the reports presented to ministers (CO 1031/1743, no 4, record of meeting, 10 Oct 1956). 
50 CO 1032/121, no 273 Oct 1956 
'Committee on colonial immigrants': CO brief for Lord Lloyd on the 
reasons why there is as yet no justification to restrict by legislation 
immigration from the West Indies 
1. The most up-to-date figures of West Indies immigration for this year show 
that for the first eight months 20,500 have arrived. This compares with the following 
annual rates for the past four years:-
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
2,000 
2,000 
9,000 
26,000 
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2. Unemployment figures as revealed by special counts made by the Ministry of 
Labour at selected dates are as follows:-
July 1955 2,065 
June 1956 3,817 
September 1956 4,909 
N.B. The figures in this paragraph include Africans as well as West Indians, but the proportion of the 
former is small-out of the total of 4,909 quoted above for September, 1956, only 577 are Africans. 
3. At the Cabinet meeting on 11th July, the Secretary of State undertook to 
discuss the problem with the Chief Ministers of Jamaica and Barbados when they are 
next in this country, with a view to inducing them to discourage emigration from the 
West Indies. 
4. To follow up this undertaking by the Secretary of State meanwhile, a 
savingram was sent to the Governments of Jamaica and Barbados (repeated to the 
other West Indies Governments), whose gist was that at the immediate moment 
there is short-time and redundancy in a number of industries, and that if further 
unemployment should arise it would undoubtedly re-act on all immigrant workers. 
The savingram put it to the West Indies Governments that prospective immigrants 
who continue to come to this country without some fair indication that a job is 
waiting them, as well as housing accommodation, may be faced with more serious 
difficulties than have arisen in the past. It requested the Governments to consider 
seriously what steps can be taken to slow down the flow of emigrants from the West 
Indies to this country. To supplement the savingram to Governments, Sir Hilton 
Poynton wrote a secret and personal letter to Sir Hugh Foot and Sir Robert Arundell, 
in which he warned them of the interest of Ministers here in the situation caused by 
the arrival in recent years of a large number of coloured immigrant workers, and 
informed them that Ministers have been considering whether legislation to control 
emigration would be desirable. The letter warned both Governors that Ministers 
intend to review the question of legislation in the autumn, and asked the Governors 
to encourage their Ministers to do everything practicable to make public the possible 
danger. 
5. In reply to Sir H. Poynton's letter, Sir Hugh Foot has said that:-
"We still see no sign of any drop in the rate of migration of Jamaican workers 
to England. Over recent weeks we have given to the Press all available 
information about the more difficult employment situation in England and 
the Press has been very good in giving prominence to this news. It is, 
however, too early to see any result from this and there is in any event a heavy 
back Jag [sic] of migrant bookings, both in ships and chartered aircraft. I have 
already had a preliminary talk with the Chief Minister and the Minister of 
Labour about this and we hope to raise the matter in Executive Council very 
soon". 
Sir Hugh wrote this letter on 15th August, and in a subsequent telegram of 18th 
September has reported that: "the question has been mentioned on several occasions 
recently in the Executive Council and I think that Ministers are well aware of the 
dangers and are anxious to do nothing to encourage the exodus of Jamaican workers 
to England". 
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6. Lord Lloyd will be able to add to the above any points which came out at his 
lunch with Sir Hugh Foot, the Secretary of State and the Home Secretary. 
7. The Governor and the Premier of Barbados are coming to London in the 
second half of October, and there will be an opportunity then to discuss the subject 
with them. 
8. At its meeting on 11th July the Cabinet asked officials to examine both the 
policy and administrative aspects of a suggestion that any legislation on immigration 
should include a reserve power to impose a quota on Commonwealth subjects 
permitted to enter this country. Lord Lloyd should be aware that the Officials' 
Committee is likely to report to Ministers that such a quota would be explicitly 
discriminatory against coloured people if it were to be of any purpose at all, and 
would be exceedingly difficult to administer. The Ministry of Housing has been asked 
to provide the Colonial Office with an assessment of the housing situation as it is 
affected by concentration of Colonial Immigrants in different parts of the country. 
This assessment has not yet been sent to us and Lord Lloyd might care to ask the 
Minister of Housing and Local Government for his views on the point. Meanwhile, 
Lord Lloyd may have seen the article in yesterday's "Times" describing how in 
Birmingham the local authorities are setting up bodies to assist the social welfare of 
the various Commonwealth immigrants working there. The project was favourably 
reported on in the "Times". There is not as yet any serious sign of interracial friction 
because of the recent comparatively modest industrial difficulties in the Midlands, 
and on the evidence of recent years it would seen unlikely that there will be any 
serious interracial friction unless and until unemployment becomes much more 
serious than at present. 
9. Generally, while the continuing rate of emigration from the West Indies 
must cause concern, Lord Lloyd might emphasize that its effects do not as yet 
appear to be socially or economically so serious for this country as to justify the 
political difficulties which would be caused to the United Kingdom's relations with 
the West Indies, and with other Commonwealth countries, by so marked a step as 
legislation directed against the West Indians. While it would be idle to pretend that 
the unrestricted flow of men and women from the West Indies here is at all in the 
best interests of the West Indies countries, there are some grounds to believe that 
the political leaders of the West Indies Governments concerned are aware of the 
dangers of letting things run as they have done in the past, and the Secretary of 
State has already begun to convey to them some of the real difficulties which its 
continuation will involve. Again, it does seem possible that the tone of the reports 
which immigrants are sending back to the West Indies is somewhat more sober, 
and is thus helping to discourage the kind of "free for all" departures from the West 
Indies which have created the problem. The Governor of Jamaica has said that 
already the Press there is proving helpful and that the speculative "travel agents" 
who have been much to blame in connection with the "free for all" immigration 
seem to be less prosperous. 
10. The case argued in the Home Secretary's memorandum Cl (56)5 on 
"Migration from the Irish Republic" is quite acceptable. 
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5 1 CO 1031/1301, no 17 Nov 1956 
'Trinidad and Tobago elections': CO note on the general election and 
the new government of Dr Williams1 
A general election took place in Trinidad and Tobago on 24th September, at which 
the recently-formed People's National Movement, led by Dr. Eric Williams, won 13 
out of the 24 elected seats in the Legislative Council. The following is background to 
the elections and a short appreciation of the effect which the victory of the People's 
National Movement may have on the political situation in Trinidad and the wider 
field of the British Caribbean. 
2. Under a revised constitution introduced in June 1956, the Legislative Council 
of Trinidad and Tobago consists of a Speaker, two ex-officio Members, five 
Nominated Members appointed by the Governor in his discretion, and 24 Members 
elected on adult suffrage. The Executive Council, which is the principal instrument 
of policy, consists of the Governor as Chairman, a Chief Minister and seven other 
Ministers (including a Minister of Finance) and two ex-officio Members. All the 
Ministers are elected by the Legislative Council from amongst the elected Members 
of the Council. The Governor retains reserve powers. Direct responsibility for the 
administration of defence, external affairs and security is with the ex-officio members 
of Executive Council, but, as in all other matters, the Governor is here equally bound 
to follow the advice of the Executive Council, subject only to the use of reserve 
powers. 
3. Until the beginning of this year, political parties of any size or permanence 
had not existed in Trinidad and at the last general election in 1950, the members of 
the Legislative Council were elected primarily on personal grounds. The Government 
of 1950 was then largely formed by independents loosely attached to political parties 
which really existed only in name. Amongst the most capable of the former Ministers 
were Albert Comes, the burly Minister of Labour, Industry and Commerce and Victor 
Bryan, Minister of Agriculture. Despite occasional storms, they gave Trinidad stable 
and quite sound administration for the five years they were in office. Towards the end 
of their term of office, however, the first real political party with an organisation and 
programme emerged. This was Dr. Williams ' Peoples National Movement. Founded 
early in 1956, it rapidly gained ground over such other parties as the Peoples 
Democratic Party (the East Indian Party), the Trinidad Labour Party, the Butler 
Party2 and the new Caribbean National Labour Party, led by Rojas,3 leader of the 
Oilfield Workers Trade Union. As the elections approached, efforts to contain the 
P.N.M. by a "National Front", advocated by several Ministers and intended to unite 
the smaller parties, were unsuccessful. Even so, on the eve of polling, it was generally 
felt in Trinidad that the P.N.M., most of whose candidates had little or no previous 
political experience, stood only a slightly better chance of polling more votes than 
1 Circulated as FO intel no 178, 8 Nov 1956, to selected diplomatic posts. 
2 The party ofT Uriah Butler, radical trade unionist and strike leader, which contested twenty seats at the 
1956 election and secured two with eleven per cent of the votes cast. Butler himself might have been a 
spent force but his movement was still strong enough to prevent the PNM winning any seats in the oil 
belt. 
3 John Rojas, president of the Oilfield Workers Trade Union and of the Caribbean National Labour Party 
which contested nine seats at the 1956 election and secured none with 1.5 per cent of the votes cast. 
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any of the other parties or personalities. The mixture in the new Government, it was 
felt locally, would be little different from the old, although the possibility of a 
landslide in favour of the P.N.M. was not discounted. 
4. The election was contested by 129 candidates, including 40 Independents, and 
the results provide a classic instance of what happens when an organised party with a 
definite programme enters the field where the opponents are numerous, but 
disunited. The P.N.M. won 13 of the 24 elected seats, the P.D.P. five, the Butler Party 
two, the Trinidad Labour Party two and Independents two. Of the former Ministers 
only Bryan (T.L.P.) and Ajodhasingh4 (P.D.P.) were re-elected. Amongst the 
successful candidates were Dr. Williams, Learie Constantine (the Test cricketer), Dr. 
Solomon,5 a former member of the Legislative Council, and Gerard Montano, the 
Mayor of San Fernando. Eighty per cent of the electorate voted, compared with 70% 
in 1950, and it is reported that the P.N.M. polled 103,000 out of the total of 239,000 
votes cast. 
5. Immediately after the election the Governor, Sir Edward Beetham, sent for Dr. 
Williams and invited him to form a Government. Dr. Williams then asked that his 
nominees should be appointed to fill the nominated seats and this request at first 
threatened to give rise to some constitutional difficulty. The reason for this request 
was that the People's National Movement, holding 13 out of the 31 seats in the new 
Legislative Council, would, even with the votes of the two official members have to 
command the vote of at least one other member to give them an overall majority in 
the Council. Dr. Williams was not prepared to have to rely on the votes of 
independent nominated members to implement the Movement's programme which 
he claimed he had a clear mandate from the electorate to pursue. As he put it, he 
could not accept that the "nominated tail should wag the elected dog". 
6. The revised constitution had been designed (in all essentials by a 
Constitutional Reform Committee in Trinidad) which included all the members of 
the previous Legislative Council, most of whom had been elected under adult 
suffrage, to suit the probable continuation of a situation where the electorate had not 
returned a majority of one party. The basis on which Nominated Members should be 
appointed remained as it had been set out in 1949 in a despatch from the Secretary of 
State to the Governor, namely that such members should "strengthen the experience 
and knowledge of the Council in dealing with the complex issues of Government" 
and should be appointed not to represent any particular interest, but "to serve the 
broad and best interests of the Colony as a whole." 
In one or two other colonial territories with advanced constitutions, it had, 
however, been recently recognised that nominated members could not be appointed 
to a Legislature to oppose the policy of the majority of the elected members, and in 
those territories the Governors had consulted with the Leaders of the majority 
parties about how they, the Governors, should fill the nominated seats. 
In Trinidad, therefore, the emergence of a majority party was recognised as calling 
for some modification of the principles of the 1949 despatch; in line with the kindred 
developments in other territories described above, the Secretary of State authorised 
4 Minister of communications and works, 1951-1956. 
5 Or Patrick Solomon; minister of education, Trinidad, 1956-1960, of home affairs, 1960-1964, of 
external affairs, 1964-1966; deputy prime minister, 1962-1966; subsequently high commissioner for 
Trinidad and Tobago in the UK, 1971-1976. 
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the Governor to "take such steps by way of nominating suitable persons to the 
Legislative Council, after consultation with the leader of the majority party, as will 
provide a reasonable working majority for that party." 
Discussions between the Governor and Dr. Williams have now taken place with a 
view to the former's appointing two or three Nominated Members who may be 
expected to support the P.N.M. It may therefore be expected that when the new 
Legislative Council meets to elect Ministers, the next Government of Trinidad will be 
formed by the P.N.M. and that Dr. Williams will become the Chief Minister. 
7. Born in Trinidad in 1911 of African descent, Dr. Eric Williams took a B.A., 
D.Phil., in an academically brilliant career at Oxford. He subsequently became a 
lecturer at Howard University, U.S.A.; he later joined the Caribbean Commission and 
became Deputy Chairman of its Research Council. His inability to work with others 
and his egotistic attitude however led to a decision by the four eo-Chairmen of the 
Commission (representing the United Kingdom, United States, French and 
Netherlands Governments) not to renew his contract last year. He then returned to 
Trinidad to enter politics for the first time. In politics he is in close sympathy with 
Mr. Manley, Chief Minister of Jamaica and leader of the People's National Party there, 
from whom he has received moral support and, the signs suggest, moderating advice. 
Williams, like Manley, is an intellectual and a Socialist, and of unblemished personal 
integrity, but he is a smaller man than Manley and is at present to some extent a 
disappointed and frustrated person, with a marked "chip on his shoulder" about 
"imperialism" and colour. Otherwise able economic/historical studies, written while 
he was with the Caribbean Commission, seem mainly designed to show that any of 
our humanitarian efforts in the British West Indies were governed by purely 
economic motives. He has not hitherto shown any capacity for co-operating with 
others and it remains to be seen whether he is able to hold a Ministry together. The 
accent in his Party programme was on the improvement of social services and 
education, immediate constitutional reform in Trinidad and early independence for 
the British Caribbean Federation, of which he is a strong supporter. Since his party's 
victory, however, he has announced that he will not seek early major changes in the 
constitution. He has also said that his Government would not be socialist and that 
he did not believe in nationalisation, though he would not say he was against public 
ownership in certain cases. He has also stated his intention of attracting overseas 
investment in Trinidad. It seems clear that under Dr. Williams' leadership the new 
Government will pursue more left-wing and radical policies than their predecessors, 
but experience and responsibility can often have a moderating influence, and, 
although the Opposition in the Legislative Council may lack cohesion, it will 
nevertheless be necessary for the P.N.M. Government, especially when Ministers are 
absent abroad, to have regard to them and to avoid alienating the votes of the non-
party members by pursuing an extremist policy. 
8. In the wider field of impending British Caribbean Federation the presence in 
power in Trinidad of a party of the same political sympathies as that in power in 
Jamaica should tend to some extent to blunt the edge of the rivalry between these 
two leading territories of the Federation, though basic differences of interest will 
remain. It can certainly be said that the election results in Trinidad have at least not 
added to the difficulties of establishing a successful Federation. 
9. The above may be used at your discretion, with the exception of the personal 
assessment of Dr. Williams in paragraph 7 above. 
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52 CO 1031/2870, nos 7 & 8 28 Feb 1957 
[Governor-general] : minutes by Sir J Macpherson and Mr Macmillan 
on the appointment of the governor-general 
[Macmillan's views on the appointment of the governor-general initially caused some 
embarrassment in the CO. Lennox-Boyd had virtually promised the position to Foot. 
Officials were also concerned that the federation would get off to the worst possible start 
if an appointment were imposed from outside. Adams, Manley and Williams were 
consulted, not about Hailes but about the criteria laid down by Macmillan. All three 
emphasised that the person appointed should have sympathy with the political 
aspirations of the West Indian people. Williams commented: 'The value of "long 
experience of British parliamentary life" and of service in the Cabinet would be purely 
academic if they were to be used in the West Indies to suppress, frustrate or retard the 
growth of Cabinet conventions and Cabinet government.' Lords Rosebery and Salisbury 
were identified by Williams as individuals meeting Macmillan's criteria who lacked the 
necessary political sympathies; the reverse, he argued, was probably true of Lords Oliver 
and Listowel, the latter being the newly appointed governor-general of Ghana. In the 
absence of specific information regarding the name under consideration, Williams 
regretted his inability to be more precise but concluded that West Indian history over the 
past twenty-five years had 'abundantly' demonstrated that 'political experience and 
administrative competence cannot alone be taken as criteria of suitability' (CO 
103112870, no 21, inward tel no 19, Beetham to Lennox-Boyd, 18 Mar 1957). Reaction in 
the Caribbean to the announcement on 17 Apr of Hailes's appointment was muted; press 
comment in the UK was much more critical. A Times leader of 10 May argued that the 
position should have gone to Foot. The News Chronicle on 4 May described the 
appointment as 'tactless' and observed: 'Nor is this an isolated example. The new 
Governor-General of the Central African Federation, Lord Dalhousie, shares with Lord 
Hailes a general unsuitability for his post and a career as a Conservative whip' (CO 
1031/2870). 
Mr. Bishop1 
As promised, by telephone this morning, I send this note on the position regarding 
the appointment of the first Governor-General of the West Indies. 
There are two issues:-
(i) Should the appointment go to a person with experience of administering a 
Colonial Government or Governments or should a public figure (with 
Parliamentary experience) be chosen from this country: 
(ii) What degree of consultation, if any, should there be with political leaders in 
the West Indies before an appointment is made. 
On (i) there is a considerable body of opinion, official and otherwise, both here and in 
the West Indies that as the job-and indeed the whole structure of the Federal 
Government-has to be created, and is not a going concern, administrative ability 
and Colonial experience are scarcely less necessary than political flair. 
On (ii) it will be seen from telegram No. 61, of which a copy is attached,2 that on 
5th February the Standing Federation Committee, meeting in Jamaica, adopted a 
resolution asking that the Secretary of State for the Colonies should consult a small 
sub-committee (consisting of the Premiers and Chief Ministers of the West Indian 
1 Private secretary to the prime minister. 2 Not printed. 
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territories) on all the circumstances before an appointment is made. We asked Sir 
Stephen Luke, Chairman of the Standing Federation Committee, about the 
background to this resolution, pointing out that consultation about the actual name 
would not, in any event, be proper, and that it might not be possible to go any way to 
meet the resolution at all. We now have received Sir Stephen Luke's reply, and I 
enclose a copy of his telegram of 19th February. You will see that he does not think 
that the three principal leaders back the request for setting up a formal sub-
committee, and that they would be fully satisfied if there could be informal 
consultation with them, individually, on the kind of person that they think should be 
chosen. You will also see that Grantley Adams, Premier of Barbados, favours the 
appointment of an administrator with a knowledge of the West Indies, and that it is 
Sir Stephen Luke's impression that this is also the opinion of Eric Williams, Chief 
Minister of Trinidad. 
We are giving thought now to how to ascertain, in the most informal way possible, 
the views of the principal West Indian leaders on the kind of appointment that should 
be made. 
Minister of state, colonial office 
J.S.M. 
28.2.57 
I have seen Sir John Macpherson's note about the present position of the choice of a 
Governor General for the West Indies. 
I think we should inform Sir Stephen Luke and the three Chief Ministers 
concerned of my intentions without delay. I propose to appoint as first Governor 
General a man who has had long experience in British Parliamentary life, who has 
been in charge of an administrative Department and has served in the Cabinet. In my 
view this is the right kind of appointment. I feel sure that these qualifications are 
more important than actual administrative experience in the West Indies. Indeed I 
should not be willing to recommend an officer of the Colonial Service. This would 
seem to me quite out of tune with the new approach that we are making to the 
problems of the Caribbean. 
I would be grateful if this information was sent as soon as possible in order that I 
may get the appointment settled. Perhaps you would consult with Sir John 
Macpherson. 
H.M. 
28.2.57 
53 CO 968/564, no 18 28 Mar 1957 
'West India Regiment': brief by the Defence Department, CO, for Mr 
Lennox-Boyd on the costs to the UK 
The Secretary of State will recall that on the 11th October 1954 he addressed a 
despatch to the territories composing the West Indies Federation plus British Guiana 
and British Honduras, proposing that the West India Regiment (which was disbanded 
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in 1927) should be re-formed and should take over responsibility for the local 
defence and internal security of the participating territories. This despatch ended by 
asking three questions:-
(a) whether the Governments and legislatures of the territories addressed 
concurred in the raising of the Regiment by Act of the U.K. Parliament; 
(b) whether they agreed that the Regiment should be raised and initially 
administered by the War Office; and 
(c) whether they were prepared to contribute one per cent of their revenue 
towards the recurrent cost of the Regiment, H.M.G. undertaking to meet the 
capital costs and any difference between the total recurrent cost and the 
contributions of the participating territories. 
2. All territories addressed, with the exception of St. Kitts and British Honduras, 
accepted the Secretary of State's proposals and steps were accordingly taken to 
secure space in the legislative programme for an Enabling Bill to raise the Regiment. 
Before the discussions in the Colonial Policy Committee on this proposal, the Prime 
Minister (Sir Anthony Eden) queried the desirability of raising the Regiment. After 
the discussion in the Colonial Policy Committee Mr. Macmillan, in his capacity as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, instructed that further action on the Regiment should 
be suspended until he was satisfied that its re-formation should not prove to impose 
an undue burden on the U.K. taxpayer. It is understood that he had gained the 
impression that the cost of raising the Regiment on the terms set out in paragraph 
1(b) might be greater than the cost of retaining a British garrison in the Caribbean. 
3. In November last year the Treasury, the War Office and the Colonial Office re-
examined the financial implications of raising the West India Regiment. The War 
Office and the Colonial Office submitted a joint paper pointing out the need for the 
Regiment, and, after thorough discussions with the Treasury, Treasury officials 
agreed that the estimates provided showed that the re-formation of the Regiment 
might well result in a substantial economy to H.M.G. within the foreseeable future. 
The Treasury have accordingly prepared a submission to the Chancellor. 
4. One of the main reasons why this submission has not yet reached the Chancellor 
is that he has been fully occupied with other urgent matters. In addition, however, the 
War Office have complicated the issue by producing new estimates for capital 
expenditure on the Regiment which are well in excess of the figures originally produced 
by them. Treasury officials are accordingly unwilling to forward their submission until 
the War Office produce a firm estimate by which they are prepared to stand. 
5. The latest War Office estimates which have caused this hold-up have been seen 
inside the Colonial Office and, with all due deference to the experience of the War 
Office Quartering Branches, it appeard as if accommodation for the West India 
Regiment is being planned on a plus-bottom scale. It is quite evident that great 
economy will have to be exercised in the capital expenditure on the West India 
Regiment in view of the high building costs in the Caribbean area, and it is suggested 
that if the Secretary of State has an opportunity of discussing this matter with the 
Chancellor he might undertake to accept a ceiling on the total U.K. capital 
expenditure on the Regiment, the exact figure to be agreed in consultation with 
Treasury officials. This should remove the last major obstacle to re-forming the 
Regiment, and it seems a reasonable concession to offer in order to secure removal of 
the Chancellor's objections to raising the Regiment as soon as possible. 
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54 CO 852/1702, no 1 4 Apr 1957 
[European Customs Union and free trade]: report by the Regional 
Economic Committee of the West In dies on the implications for the 
West In dies of the proposed European Common Market and the 
European Free Trade Area [Extract] 
In September 1956 the Secretary of State, referring to the plans of the Messina 
Countries, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to 
form a Customs Union, invited the views of West Indian Governments about 
proposals for the U.K. to enter a Free Trade Area with other O.E.E.C. countries 
including the countries proposing to create a Customs and Economic Union. The 
other O.E.E.C. countries are Austria, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. The Secretary of State advised that no 
decision had yet been taken by the Messina Countries to include their oversea 
territories in the Customs Union nor was it known whether European Countries 
would wish to include overseas territories in the wider Free Trade Area which H.M.G. 
had in mind to propose. The Secretary of State also advised that H.M.G. would make 
it an unqualified condition that food including manufactured foods, feeding stuffs for 
animals, drink and tobacco should be excluded from the scope of the Free Trade 
Area. West Indian Governments advised the Secretary of State that they saw no 
objections to the U.K. entering the proposed Free Trade Area, provided the 
arrangements would not apply to dependent territories and food, drink and tobacco 
were excluded. 
2. On the 28th February, 1957, the Secretary of State advised West Indian 
Governments that the Messina Countries had decided to associate their oversea 
territories with the Customs Union Area and that it was proposed to examine the Treaty 
in the G.A.T.T. on April 23rd. In order to assist H.M.G. in reaching decisions on her 
attitude to be taken in the G.A.T.T. and to assess the problems of individual West Indian 
territories arising from the complexity of problems relating to the Association of 
oversea territories with the Customs Union area and possibly the Free Trade Area, the 
Secretary of State invited West Indian Governments to send delegates to a meeting in 
London from March 27th to April 2nd, with the following terms of reference:-
To examine at an official level problems relating to Colonial Territories 
against the background of knowledge available to the U.K. departments in 
order to assist Colonial Governments to a full appreciation of all the com-
plicated economic and technical problems involved on which their final 
views would depend and to assist the Secretary of State to assess the par-
ticular problems of individual territories. 
3. The West Indian Governments referred the matter to a meeting of the 
Standing Committee on Commerce and Industries of the Regional Economic 
Committee held in Barbados on March 18th. The Standing Committee decided that 
West Indian Governments should be represented on a regional basis through the 
R.E.C. and appointed us a delegation for the purpose . . .. 
5. The Treaty which deals with the creation of the Customs Union Area was 
signed on 25th March and is known as the Treaty of Rome. The objects of the Treaty 
are as follows:-
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(a) to harmonise the economic development of the Messina Countries; 
(b) to ensure a balanced and continued expansion of their trade; 
(c) to increase stability and raise standards of living; 
(d) to secure closer relations between the member states. 
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These objects are to be achieved through co-operation by the following 
methods:-
(1) The abolition of tariffs, quantitative restrictions and other restrictions on 
trade between member states and the establishment of a Common Market; 
(2) The establishment of a common exterior tariff and a common commercial 
policy; 
(3) Free movement of persons, services and capital within the Community; 
(4) A common agricultural policy; 
(5) A regime to ensure fair competition; 
(6) A co-ordinated economic policy; 
(7) Harmonisation of legislation as far as necessary; 
(8) The creation of a European Social Fund to deal with the problems created 
when an industry faded out and movement and retraining of workers are required; 
(9) A European Investment Bank; 
(10) The association of oversea territories. 
Five institutions are to be set up:-
(1) A Council of Ministers to work out various details and procedures under the 
Treaty. 
(2) A Commission of nine persons, who would be internationalised, to prepare the 
work for the Council of Ministers. 
(3) A Court. 
(4) An Assembly which will be non-legislative and would give advice on which 
certain decisions would be taken. 
(5) An Economic and Social Consultative Committee comprising representatives 
from various walks of life from each of the Messina countries. 
6. The objects of the Treaty were to be realised over a period of 12 years in three 
stages. Each stage could be extended, but in no case could the total transitional 
period exceed 15 years. 
7. The elimination of tariffs between the member states are [sic] to be achieved 
by a series of steps with an overall 10% reduction at each step. A certain amount of 
flexibility in adjusting particular items is to be permitted but there must be a 
reduction of at least 5% on which item at each step. All customs duties are to be 
abolished and replaced by internal taxation. 
8. The Common exterior tariff is to be based on the arithmetical mean of the 
existing duties in each particular state subject to the provisos that no raw material 
should bear a duty of over 3%; that no semi-manufactures should bear over 10% and 
that the duties on certain chemicals be limited to 15% and others to 25%. The duties 
incorporated in List F of C.E. I. (57)10 have been agreed and those in List G of C.E.I. 
(57)10 have been specifically left for later negotiation. Movement towards the 
common tariff would not start for four years, then all duties which were different by 
less than 15% from the common customs tariff figure would be adjusted to that 
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figure; where the difference was more than 15%, the move to the common tariff 
would be in three stages 30%, 30% and 40%. There are provisions covering cases in 
which difficulty would arise for a member state and there are arrangements for duty-
free or reduced duty quotas. 
9. It is not proposed that there should be free trade in agriculture between the 
members and there are special arrangements including long term contracts and 
minimum price arrangements. 
10. Provision for the association of oversea territories with the Customs Union Area 
are contained in a Convention attached to the Treaty. The association of oversea 
territories was the result of insistence on the part of France and there is reason to 
believe that the other five countries had shown great reluctance to their inclusion: this 
could be seen from the time which elapsed before the final decision had been taken by 
the Six- and then only at the Prime Minister level-and also from the proviso 
contained in the Convention that the arrangements for association of oversea territories 
would be for an experimental period of five years only. The provisions embrace Algeria 
and the French Overseas Departments of Martinique, Guadeloupe, Cayenne and 
Reunion; the French overseas territories proper, namely French West and Equatorial 
Africa and the trusteeship territories of the Cameroons and Togo; and Madagascar and 
the small Pacific dependencies of France; the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi and 
Dutch New Guinea. Provision is also made for the inclusion of the following 
independent territories: Morocco, Tunisia, Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles and Libya. 
11. The main features of the Convention provide for the establishment of an 
investment fund, the removal of discrimination and the application of the special 
arrangements for agriculture to the tropical products of oversea territories. The 
arrangements for the removal of discrimination are also contained in Articles of the 
Treaty because the tariff arrangements unlike the other aspects of the association of 
the oversea territories, would not be subject to review at the end of five years. The 
tariffs of the Messina Six against imports from the oversea territories would be 
gradually removed and the Six would move gradually to a common tariff on such 
products from elsewhere based on the arithmetical mean. 
12. The Treaty now has to come before the Parliaments of the Messina 
Countries, for ratification. In European political and economic circles it is regarded 
as important that the ratification should be completed in all the territories before the 
date of the next West German elections which are due to be held in September or 
October this year. Measures to secure the early ratification of the proposals will 
therefore be pressed forward. 
13. The United Kingdom regards it as desirable that as many as possible of the 
member countries of the O.E.E.C. should enter the Free Trade Area. As regards the 
timing of its establishment also, the United Kingdom considers it a matter of 
importance that the Free Trade Area should be established within a few months after 
the European Economic Community comes into being. 
14. The Council of Ministers of the O.E.E.C. having accepted the report of its 
Working Party on methods of association with the Common Market of the Six, has 
decided to enter into negotiations in order to "determine the ways and means of 
bringing the European Free Trade Area into being". The Council has also requested 
the Chairman (Mr. Thorneycroft) to set up and guide Working Parties which are to 
submit a report in time to enable further decisions to be taken by the Council before 
the 31st July, 1957. As the minutes of our conference show, three such Working 
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Parties have been set up and the negotiations by these Working Parties will begin 
within the next few weeks. The next few months will therefore be a period of intense 
diplomatic activity and it is a matter of importance that the United Kingdom 
representatives should be in a position to make quick decisions on the basis of 
previous views as to the effects on United Kingdom and Colonial trade of particular 
proposals or suggestions. 
15. In the opinion of H.M.G. once a decision of the Messina Powers to include 
their oversea territories in the new Community had been taken it became essential 
that the British Overseas Dependent territories should be brought in so as to be 
informed as fully as possible about what was taking place. United Kingdom 
representatives also hoped that the Colonial representatives would be in a position to 
give detailed explanations of specific Colonial problems which would arise as a result 
of the creation of the Customs Union including the oversea territories of the Messina 
Powers, or which could be foreseen as arising out of the proposals for an Industrial 
Free Trade Area. The intention was that these problems should be taken into account 
in the future negotiations within the O.E.E.C. and elsewhere. In addition to defining 
exactly how the interest of their territories would be affected, Colonial 
representatives were invited to say whether, in their view, their respective territories 
should or should not be associated with the Industrial Free Trade Area. They would 
then take back to their governments information on the economic and other 
implications of the new proposals so as to assist the governments in making their 
decisions in regard to association with the Free Trade Area or otherwise. 
16. Our Report will therefore concern itself with three questions:-
(1) The implications for the British West Indian territories of the Treaty of Rome 
which brings the European Customs Union into being and associates with the six 
Messina Powers their Overseas Territories. 
(2) The implications for the West Indian territories, including British Guiana and 
British Honduras, of the Industrial Free Trade Area. 
(3) Whether it is in the interest of these territories to be included in the Free 
Trade Area. 
17. The Customs Union area proposals pose problems for the West Indies. The 
exports of the Messina oversea territories will enter those countries free of duty 
whereas West Indian products will have to pay the duties fixed under the common 
external tariff. At present the West Indies exports to Messina Countries total about 
£5 m. The 1955 figures were:-
France 
West Germany 
Italy 
Benelux 
£2.139 m. 
.857m. 
.323m. 
£1.714 m. 
£5.033 m. 
The main items are cocoa, coffee, spices, rum, scrap metal to Germany; asphalt 
and asphalt cement to Belgium, Luxembourg; rum, cocoa, spices, cocoa butter, 
petroleum products, iron and steel scrap, timber, bauxite to the Netherlands. 
18. The following is the position regarding the common external tariffs on items 
of West Indian exports:-
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Crude Petroleum 
Bauxite 
Alumina 
Asphalt 
Sugar 
Bananas 
Cocoa 
Rum 
Molasses 
Citrus: 
Oranges 
Grapefruit 
Other Citrus 
Coffee 
Cotton 
Cotton Linters 
Bitters 
Logwood Extract 
Timber 
Balata 
Lime Oil 
Arrowroot 
Vanilla 
Annatto 
Pimento 
Scrap Iron 
Glycerine 
Ginger 
Honey 
Bay Oil 
Veneer & Sheets 
for Plywood 
Plywood 
Cigars 
Hides & Skins 
Precious Stones 
Tamarinds 
Common Salt 
To be negotiated by members 
Not yet fixed but not to exceed 3% 
80% 
20% 
9% 
" " " " 
" " " 
To be negotiated by members 
Average not yet worked out 
From 15th March to 30th September 15% 
Other times 20% 
16% 
Free 
Not yet fixed but not to exceed 3% 
To be negotiated 
Not yet fixed but not to exceed 10% 
To be negotiated 
Free 
12% 
Average to be worked out 
" " " 
" " " " Free 
Average to be worked out 
30% 
12% 
10% 
15% 
Average to be worked out 
Free 
Not yet fixed but not to exceed 3% 
Average to be worked out 
To be negotiated 
12% 
16% 
19. At present the oversea territories produce tropical products competitive with 
those of the West Indies and can now be expected to expand their production on a 
planned basis. French Morocco and Algeria export citrus fruit; Madagascar tobacco; 
French Equatorial Africa and French Cameroons tropical hardwoods; French 
Cameroons bananas and nearly all produce coffee and cocoa in great quantity and 
some cotton. 
20. The common external tariffs fixed for bananas, cocoa, citrus, coffee, logwood 
extract, lime oil, honey bay oil, veneer sheets and plywood and those likely to be fixed 
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on other items are certain to operate to the detriment of West Indian interests. It 
should be remembered that even though we do not at present export certain items to 
Messina Countries, the exports of others who do will be replaced and come seeking 
alternative markets in the U.K. and elsewhere to our disadvantage. There will be also 
incentives for the production of artificial substitutes for some products. 
21. We have represented very strongly that H.M.G. should do everything possible 
to effect a reduction of the rates fixed under the common external tariffs on items of 
West Indian exports when the Treaty is considered in the G.A.T.T. later in the year. 
We have also suggested that if necessary delegates from the West Indies should be 
associated with the U. K. Working Party in Geneva for the purpose. 
22. The Industrial Free Trade Area is a United Kingdom idea. It is intended to 
include the six Messina countries, the United Kingdom itself and as many other 
member countries of O.E.E.C. as wish to join. It is not the intention of the United 
Kingdom that any oversea territories, whether of the Messina Powers or in the 
British Commonwealth, should be included. It is also the United Kingdom's 
intention that trade in food and drink (for man or beast) and tobacco should be 
excluded from the system. 
23. The proposals have not been formulated with any precision. There is no 
documentation except the O.E.E.C. Working Party Report, the United Kingdom 
Memorandum to O.E.E.C. which has been published as CMD 72, and the United 
Kingdom Memorandum on Definition of Origin within the Free Trade Area which 
has been circulated to Colonial Governments. 
24. It was generally admitted that the decision to include oversea territories of 
the Messina Powers in the European Economic Community seriously complicates 
the plans for establishing an Industrial Free Trade Area. Many Colonial territories 
would because of this decision be obliged to reconsider the question of their 
association or otherwise with the Free Trade Area. In the course of the discussion a 
clear interest emerged in the case of Colonial territories like Honk [sic] Kong, 
Singapore and Malta, with predominantly non-agricultural economies, in favour of 
association. Unless therefore it could be agreed that such Colonial territories should 
nevertheless be excluded it would become difficult for H.M.G. to secure the exclusion 
of the Messina Oversea Territories. British West Indian representatives were 
therefore forced to consider the question of association, or otherwise, in their case 
on the assumption that one or two British territories might be included and that the 
oversea territories of the Messina Powers almost certainly would be. 
25. What then were the considerations in the light of which the decision should be 
taken? The first is that within a period not exceeding fifteen years, complete free trade 
in non-food items would be introduced between the majority of the European countries, 
the United Kingdom and all of French and Belgian Africa. United Kingdom tariffs would 
still apply to the food exports from the French and Belgian territories in Africa and the 
French territories in the West Indies. Examples of the above would be, bananas from the 
French Cameroons, Martini que and Guadeloupe, citrus from Algeria and Morocco, cof-
fee and cocoa from French Equatorial Africa, Belgian Congo, Madagascar, etc. 
26. Non-food items exported by these oversea territories would enter the United 
Kingdom entirely free of duty, sharing in effect in the United Kingdom preference. 
Examples of the above would be cotton, hides, skins, etc. 
27. Certain basic commodities, however, which would otherwise have to 
surmont the United Kingdom tariffs, would because of the system being introduced 
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in regard to definition of origin be accorded Free Trade Area treatment, viz: they 
would be regarded as having originated within the Free Trade Area, whether they had 
in fact done so; in effect they would enter the United Kingdom market, free of duty. 
28. It becomes a matter of delicately balancing the advantage on the one hand of 
securing Free Trade Area treatment for some British Caribbean non-food exports, 
thus enabling them to circulate into the Western European market, and the 
disadvantage on the other of allowing similar or non-food exports from the oversea 
territories of France, Belgium and the Netherlands to circulate into the United 
Kingdom market via European Metropolitan countries. 
29. Appendices 1 and 2 of C.E.I. (57)9 which represented proposals put to H.M.G. 
by United Kingdom commercial interests (and which the Conference was specifically 
reminded had not yet been accepted by H.M.G.) include very detailed proposals 
setting out the basis on which particular commodities would, or would not, be given 
Free Trade Area treatment according to the extent of the processing they had 
undergone after importation. We consider it essential that the West Indian trading 
interests should be consulted on these particular details and have requested the 
United Kingdom representatives to consider whether commercial interests may in 
fact be consulted. We are to hear from them further on this point. Broadly, however, 
the position is that since the range of British West Indian non-food exports is so 
small, it is in our interests that the principles on which Free Trade Area treatment is 
accorded to such items should be restrictive rather than liberal. 
30. There are two main reasons why the B.W.I. should not join the Free Trade 
Area. The first of these is our special relations with Canada. The Canadian preference 
on sugar is of the utmost importance to the financial stability of the British West 
Indies. It is now under attack in Canada largely on account of currency restrictions. If 
the British West Indies came into the Free Trade Area Canadian exports would no 
longer enjoy the preference provided them under the Canada/West Indies Trade 
Agreements since European exports to the West Indies would receive the same pref-
erential treatment. This would be the death knell of our Canadian Sugar preference-
moreover, if the United Kingdom enters the Free Trade Area, Canada will suffer the 
loss of the United Kingdom preference or at least have to share this preference with 
European countries. To recompense Canada for this loss we should press for the 
removal of all currency restrictions against Canadian exports to the West Indies. 
31. The second reason is that at the present time we have the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement by which the United Kingdom agrees to purchase 640,000 tons 
sugar for a period of 8 years at reasonably remunerative prices. This Agreement can 
be and has in the past been extended each year for a further year, thus keeping the 
Agreement in force perpetually. In return United Kingdom exports to the West Indies 
enjoy preferential treatment. If the British West Indies joined the Free Trade Area, 
the United Kingdom's exports would no longer enjoy exclusively the West Indies 
preference since European exports would come in under the same preferential tariff. 
In the course of time the pressure would come from United Kingdom manufacturers 
against H.M.G. continuing the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. 
32. The meeting considered that there were four possible courses of action open 
to H.M.G. as follows:-
(1) Formal opposition to the provisions of the Treaty of Rome Associating oversea 
territories with the Customs Union. 
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(2) Negotiations with the six Messina States for specific adjustments to mitigate 
damage to the U.K. Colonies' interests caused by the inclusion of the Messina 
oversea territories in the Customs Union Treaty. 
(3) Amendment of the proposals for an Industrial Free Trade Area to permit 
association of oversea territories with it. 
(4) Maintenance of the U.K. proposals for a European Industrial Free Trade Area 
excluding dependent territories. 
33. It was the feeling of the majority that while reserving her position regarding 
point (1) the United Kingdom should pursue points (2) and (4) . The West Indian 
Delegation supported the majority view. It was also the majority view that in the 
event of opposition to the inclusion of oversea territories in the Customs Union 
developing when the matter is being considered in the G.A.T.T., H.M.G. should then 
move for their exclusion. It was felt that it would be embarrassing for H.M.G. to 
initiate action to oppose the inclusion of the Messina oversea territories in the 
Customs Union Area as such action would be tantamount to taking the lead in 
opposing the whole Messina Treaty and with it the whole concept of a strengthened 
Europe on which so many hopes had been set, both in Europe and the Free World. 
We recommend that an early meeting of the Regional Economic Committee should 
be convened, to consider these proposals as well as the definition of origin in the Free 
Trade Area, and to make recommendations to West Indian Governments .... 
55 CO 103112024, no 42, enclosure 2 June 1957 
[Federal capital]: CO note on the US naval base at Chaguaramas in 
Trinidad 
At a meeting held in Trinidad at the beginning of May, 1957, the Standing Federation 
Committee (which is composed of political representatives from the territories form-
ing the future Federation of the West Indies and which is charged with making the final 
administrative arrangements to bring the Federal Government into being) decided that 
the North West peninsula of Trinidad should be the site of the Federal capital. Since the 
area concerned is leased to the United States as a Naval Base, the Committee asked that 
Her Majesty's Government should take up with the U.S. Government the question of 
surrendering the leased area on such terms as may be agreed upon. 
2. On being informed of the Committee's resolution the U.S. State Department 
requested that H.M.G. should not take up a firm position before hearing the U.S. 
Government's views, and this was agreed to by H.M.G. The U.S. Government's views 
are expected to be received within two weeks, and, since the Standing Federation 
Committee have indicated their wish to discuss this matter with both H.M.G. and the 
Government of the U.S.A., it is likely that discussions, to which the U.S. Government 
have already agreed, will be held either in London or Washington (or both) about the 
second half of June, or as soon thereafter as may be arranged. Pending receipt of the 
U.S. Government's views, the object of this paper is to give the background to the 
Committee's decision. 
3. The U.S. Naval Base in the North West Peninsula, known as Chaguaramas, was 
leased to the United States for a period of 99 years under the Leased Bases Agreement 
of 1941 (Cmd 6259)-the "Destroyers for Bases" Agreement. This Agreement, 
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whereby a large number of bases in the Caribbean, the Bahamas and Bermuda were 
similarly leased, has always been resented by the people of the territories concerned. 
Whilst not lacking in loyalty or an appreciation that unpalatable things must be done 
in war-time, they feel that they were not closely enough consulted over the 
Agreement (there was, of course, no constitutional need to do so) nor the areas 
selected; and that the period of 99 years is excessive. Feeling has always been 
particularly high in Trinidad where two of the largest U.S. bases, the airfield at Wailer 
Field (18 square miles) and the Naval base at Chaguaramas (15 square miles) are 
situated. In addition, the base at Chaguaramas occupies some of the most attractive 
country and beaches near the capital, Port of Spain. 
At present the Chaguaramas naval base is on a care and maintenance basis and is 
occupied by between 150/300 U.S. servicemen only. There is also a radar installation 
used, it is understood, for the detection of Guided Missiles using the Long Range 
Proving Ground in the Caribbean and South Atlantic and in the development of an 
anti-missile programme. The Waller Field base has been inactive for a number of 
years and though much of it is being used for agricultural purposes by the local 
inhabitants, the U.S. retain the right of immediate re-occupation. 
4. There is no doubt that Chaguaramas has greater natural advantages than 
those of any alternative site in Trinidad; and it appears to answer many of the 
specifications laid down as suitable for a federal capital site last year by an 
independant [sic] Committee of experts from the United Kingdom. 
5. In passing the resolution on the capital site, the Committee also asked that 
the discussions between Her Majesty's Government and the United States 
Government should include the question of arriving at agreements between the 
United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Federal Government for the 
security of the West Indies. The meaning of this proposal requires clarification but in 
so far as it may concern the question of the capital site, it is thought to mean that 
alternative naval facilities, either in Trinidad or elsewhere in the federating 
territories, might be offered to the United States in return for the surrender of 
Chaguaramas; or alternatively, that part of the Chaguaramas base, particularly the 
Tucker Valley, might be surrendered. 
6. On receipt of the views of the United States Government it will be for Her 
Majesty's Government to consider their own position and to decide whether or not 
formally to seek amendment to the Leased Bases Agreement, 1941, to release 
permanently all or part of the Chaguaramas leased area. Her Majesty's Government's 
decision will depend upon their evaluation of the United States case and upon a 
consideration of the wider defence and political issues involved. 
56 CO 968/564, no 45 14 June 1957 
[West India Regiment]: CO report on the proceedings of a conference 
in Barbados, 3-7 June 19571 
After welcoming the delegates, the Chairman recalled that the proposal to re-form 
the West India Regiment had been put to the West Indian Governments, including 
1 The conference was chaired by N L Mayle, now administrative secretary, Development and Welfare 
Organisation in the West Indies, and attended by representatives of the West governments and 
commanders from the Caribbean Area Forces. N B J Huijsman, of the Defence Dept, CO, also attended. 
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British Guiana and British Honduras, some time ago, and that the unit governments 
of the Federation (with the exception of St. Kitts, which had reserved its position) 
and the Governments of British Guiana and the Virgin Islands had agreed to the 
proposal for the re-formation of the Regiment and:-
( a) to make contribution of not less than 1% of the revenue (in the case of 
Barbados 1% less the cost of local forces, and in the case of British Guiana on the 
basis of a fixed annual payment not exceeding 1% of the territory's yearly revenue 
at the time of the Regiment's inception); 
(b) to ask the War Office to raise the Regiment on their behalf; 
(c) to the constitution of the Regiment by United Kingdom Act of Parliament. 
2. The Chairman went on to say that, in view of this measure of agreement, it 
had been decided to go ahead with the re-formation of the Regiment, and the House 
of Commons had been informed to that effect. Since then the military authorities in 
the United Kingdom and the Caribbean, in conjunction with the Colonial Office, had 
worked out detailed plans for the re-formation of the Regiment, which were set out 
in the seven papers which had been circulated to the West Indian Governments. The 
task of the Conference was to make recommendations on these plans, and the 
Chairman said that he hoped that they would be able to submit to the Governments a 
comprehensive plan for raising the Regiment. 
3. The Chairman invited the members of the Conference, before discussing the 
detailed plans, to consider two general questions. First, whether they should make 
any recommendation regarding the transfer to the Federal Government from the 
territorial governments of the financial liability accepted by those governments in 
respect of the Regiment. Second, the date when a start should be made on raising the 
Regiment. 
4. On the first point, the Conference took the view that this was a matter for the 
Standing Federation Committee, which would no doubt consider it at their next 
meeting in October. 
5. As to the date on which a start should be made on raising the Regiment, the 
Conference recognized that, when the West Indies achieved nationhood within the 
Commonwealth, there would be an obvious need, as had been recognized by other 
Governments on attaining independance [sic], e.g. Ceylon and Ghana, for a national 
defence force, fully trained and efficient, even if numerically small, consonant with 
its status and dignity as a new nation. Such a force would provide a central reserve in 
aid of the civil power, where required, following natural disasters or to deal with civil 
disturbances, and would avoid recourse to external aid. It would however take some 
time to raise, equip, train, and accommodate the Regiment, and if the Federation was 
to be in a position to assume its proper responsibilities no time should be lost in 
making a start in raising the Regiment. A further consideration was that the United 
Kingdom's new defence policy would impose a contraction to half its present size of 
the British Army, while reducing few of its essential commitments, and a withdrawal 
of overseas garrisons was therefore inescapable. While there was no definite 
information as to the future of the United Kingdom Battalion in the Caribbean, the 
recent reduction in United Kingdom Forces in Europe and elsewhere, including the 
withdrawal of the Bermuda Garrison, led to the conclusion that it would be unwise to 
rely on the retention of the United Kingdom Battalion in the Caribbean for more 
than a strictly limited period. Militarily, it would take at least two years to train the 
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Regiment to that stage at which it could dispense with the aid of the British 
Battalion. It would certainly be much more difficult and expensive to raise the 
Regiment in the absence of any United Kingdom Forces in the Caribbean. 
6. It was recognized that all the considerations mentioned above did not 
necessarily apply to British Guiana. British Guiana, however, like the Federation, 
would need a permanent central reserve in aid of the civil power to be available on 
call, and participation in the West India Regiment was the only economic way to 
meet this requirement. 
7. The Conference therefore strongly recommended that a start should be made 
with the raising of the Regiment as soon as the United Kingdom legislation was 
brought into force, which it was understood might be about the 1st January, 1958. 
They accordingly recommended that this date should be adopted as the date for the 
re-formation of the West India Regiment. 
8. Turning to the financial arrangements, the Conference noted that the 
participating territories had not disputed that the whole cost of the Regiment, both 
capital and recurrent, should be regarded as their responsibility, and had agreed, 
with reservations on the part of Barbados and British Guiana, to make a contribution 
of not less than 1% of their annual revenue. The Conference considered the 
proposals put forward for clarifying the financial arrangements and recognized that, 
even under these proposals, Her Majesty's Government would still bear the greater 
part of the capital cost of the Regiment over the first five years, estimated at £3 
million plus. On the assumption that the contribution in respect of the federating 
territories will be met from Federal funds and given the ceiling fixed for Federal 
revenue for the first five years (which, although it includes provision for a 
contribution towards the cost of the Regiment, seems likely to restrict the activities 
of the Federal Government), the Conference felt obliged to take the view that the 
amount of the contribution from the Federal Government during the first five years 
should be fixed at the lowest possible figure consistent with the liability already 
accepted by the territorial governments. 
9. On this basis, the Conference recommended that the contribution should be 
fixed for the first five years at 1% of the aggregate of the tax revenue of the 
participating territories in the year in which the Regiment was raised. Given the 
Secretary of State's proposal that, in so far as the participating territories would be 
unable to meet the full cost of the regiment in any one year, the shortfall would be 
made good by Her Majesty's Government, The Conference further recommended 
that, if the total cost of the Regiment in any one year should fall below the amount 
of the contribution payable under the above formula, then the actual contribution 
paid in that year should not exceed such expenditure. The delegate from Jamaica 
however considered that the contributions should be based on revenue during the 
year 1954155 so as to conform to the pre-federal Fiscal Commission's 
recommendations. 
10. The above recommendations were made on the assumption that the 
Regiment would not be raised before 1958, and that accordingly contributions would 
not become payable before then. 
11. The adoption of these recommendations would mean that, on the rough 
estimates which had been prepared of the capital and recurrent costs of the Regiment 
over the first five years, the contribution from the participating territories would 
approximately meet the recurrent costs over that period, leaving Her Majesty's 
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Government to bear a capital cost estimated at $(B.W.I.) 14.4 million plus (£3 million 
plus). 
12. The Conference then proceeded to consider the detailed plans for the re-
formation of the Regiment set out in the seven papers which had been circulated to 
the Governments concerned. They decided to recommend that certain modifications 
should be made in these plans. An outline of the plans, modified in accordance with 
the recommendations of the Conference, is given in the annex to this report. 2 
13. The Conference recommended that these modified plans should be adopted, 
and that Her Majesty's Government should be informed at the earliest possible date 
of this approval so that the necessary legislation might be prepared and the War 
Office given time to make the complicated detailed arrangements for raising the 
regiment by the 1st January, 1958. 
14. The recommendation in the outline plan is that Headquarters should be 
located initially in Jamaica, but that it should be transferred to Trinidad as soon as 
permanent accommodation is available there. This would face the Commander with 
the problem of maintaining proper liaison with the Governor General in Trinidad 
and with the Governor of British Guiana for this initial period. 
15. The Conference understood that the most suitable arrangement to meet this 
problem would be for a senior staff officer to be stationed in Trinidad as the 
Commander's personal representative pending the move of Headquarters to 
Trinidad. An appointment of this nature would of necessity be additional to existing 
or proposed Headquarters establishments. The Conference hoped that the War Office 
would provide a suitable officer for this purpose. 
16. The Conference discussed the proposals, which had been made by the 
Secretary of State in his despatch to Governors of the 11th October, 1954, for the 
establishment of an advisory and consultative Board, without executive powers, in 
order to provide a regular channel through which Governments could obtain 
information and express their views on administrative and financial questions 
relating to the Regiment. 
17. The Conference recommended the setting-up of an advisory board for the 
above purposes, consisting of representatives at the official level of the Federal 
Government and the governments of British Guiana and the Virgin Islands; and the 
Commander, Caribbean Area, or his representative. 
18. The Conference recorded its appreciation of the services of the Secretary, Mr. 
John Vaughan, whose prompt and accurate summaries of the daily discussions 
contributed so much to the completion of their task. 
2 Not printed. 
57 CO 103112024, no 57 19 June 1957 
[Federal capital]: minute by NB J Huijsman1 reporting Mr Manley's 
determination to secure concessions from the US over the proposed 
site in Trinidad 
[The report of the Federal Capital Commission (see 48) aroused considerable feeling in 
the West Indies, and nowhere more so than in Trinidad where the commission's 
1 See 56, note 1. 
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comments about the East Indian population and corruption in public life were deeply 
resented. Eric Williams used a curious argument to counter the charge of corruption. 
Addressing the Standing Federation Committee on 11 Feb 1957, he explained that in 
1946 nearly ten per cent of Trinidad's population of 558,000 came from other West Indian 
territories. Continuing his theme of migration to Trinidad he argued that if the 
commission's charges were to be accepted 'then what we are doing is condemning the 
principle of freedom of movement in the West In dies; because surely, if Trinidad is what it 
is today, it has been made so by freedom of movement, and if Trinidad is what it is today 
then it is in the interest of every territory in the West Indies that its people should not be 
permitted to migrate there. Trinidad is the West Indies in terms of freedom of movement 
and you cannot condemn one without condemning the other' . In answer to the 
commission's argument that the East Indians were a disruptive influence in Trinidad, 
Williams countered that the existence of a large minority in Canada had not been 
considered a danger at the time of the formation of the Canadian federation. He also used 
the US to support his view that diversity of population was a source not of weakness but of 
strength (CO 1031/2888, no 74, enclosure). Trinidad's position attracted sympathy 
elsewhere and in Jan 1957, before Williams's speech, the Standing Federation Committee 
had already voted for Trinidad as the location for the federal capital, with Barbados as 
runner-up. A more extensive examination of possible sites in Trinidad led the committee 
to decide in favour of the Chaguaramas peninsula, in the north-west corner of the island 
and about seven miles from Port of Spain. A resolution was passed asking that the US 
should be approached for the release of Chaguaramas. The release of any US base territory 
was a highly contentious issue in Washington (see 58) and the UK line was that in order 
to avoid Caribbean politicians visiting Washington and demanding the right to put their 
case directly to the president, discussions should be held in London between the US, the 
UK and representatives from the West Indies.] 
Mr. W.I.J. Wallace 
Mr. Kennedy 
During my visit to Jamaica Mr. Stow2 arranged a meeting with Mr. Manley for me. 
The object of the meeting was to inform Mr. Manley of the outcome of the Barbados 
meeting on the West India Regiment.3 However, during the course of our talk Mr. 
Manley switched to the question of the Federal capital site. He said that he had heard 
of a proposal to discuss the Chaquarramas [sic] site in London. Did I know of this and 
why was this being done? I said that I had heard some mention of it in Barbados and 
had assumed that London was selected as being a more neutral venue than either 
Port of Spain or Washington. Asked for my personal view on the American reaction 
to the S.F.C. recommendation, I said that this was really an impossible question. The 
North West Peninsula contained a U.S. base and since the U.S. reaction would be 
coloured by the strategic value attached to this base by the U.S. Services my guess 
would probably have very little relevance to the American reaction. This led Mr. 
Manley to do some thinking aloud. Drawing a sketch map of the Peninsula he 
explained to me that what "we" (by which apparently he meant the S.F.C.- including 
Dr. Williams) wanted was the northern half of the Tucker Valley and the northern 
littoral. The Valley was required for the capital site, the littoral for recreation. (This 
requires a little explanation. Mr. Manley's argument is that if the littoral were 
Federal property U.S. Servicemen and their families would have complete liberty of 
access and residence there, whereas if it remained leased to the U.S. Government 
Federal employees would be debarred from using the beaches because these would be 
located in a military area). The S.F.C. had no desire to turn out the Americans and 
2 (Sir) John Stow (KCMG 1959) was colonial secretary, Jamaica, 1955-1959, before his appointment as 
governor of Barbados. 
3 See 56. 
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fully recognised their right of occupation of the southern half of the Peninsula; on 
the other hand, he (Mr. Manley) was not convinced that the base had a real value in a 
nuclear age (a murmured interjection about anti-submarine patrols and coastal 
protection was waved aside), or that the security of the base required the U.S.A. to 
hold the whole of the Tucker Valley and the northern coast. In his view the 
Americans held far more land than they really needed; this was the trouble with the 
U.S. military, they behaved in small islands as if they had the whole of the North 
American continent to spread themselves in. He himself would certainly enter the 
negotiations in London determined to secure concessions from the Americans. 
He next turned to the question of tactics. He was convinced that if only the matter 
could be put fairly to the President the latter would see the West Indian point of view 
and would be inclined to be helpful. The aim should therefore be to force the 
negotiations to the "top level" if the Americans proved to be sticky. To achieve this 
Mr. Manley would be prepared to make himself as difficult as possible, and in doing 
so he would be able to count on the help of the other members of the W.l. delegation. 
At this point he digressed and discussed whether an independent West Indies 
Federation could legally be bound by the Bases Agreements. He rather doubted it. 
"Of course", he said, "accepted standards of international morality would make it 
impossible for us to act in such a way, but (here an impish smile) I don't see why we 
shouldn't behave as if we would." Given a situation in which they would be faced with 
a resentful independent Federation disinclined to concede the Americans any further 
defence and other facilities, the U.S. Government would probably feel that the 
political advantages of making a concession which would mean so much to the 
Federation would outweigh the minimal security risks involved ("After all, they have 
not much to fear from the West India Regiment.") 
After reiterating that he was prepared to stir up a lot of trouble over this issue 
("And believe me I have enough influential friends outside the West Indies to help me 
over this.") he steered the discussion back to the original subject of our talk. 
Two things struck me particularly about this part of our discussion; one was an 
unmistakable tone of hostility towards the U.S. Services, the other an insistence on 
the rights and prerogatives of the Federation. The former may have been assumed, 
although he spoke very quietly and deliberately; the latter contrasted rather strongly 
with what I had been led to assume was the rather lukewarm attitude of the P.N.P. 
towards the Federation. His emphasis on strengthening the Federation was repeated 
again and again during the rest of our talk. 
You may find this account of some interest. 
58 CO 103112024, no 92 26 June 1957 
[Federal capital]: inward telegram no 30 from D Williams 
(Washington) to CO reporting a difference of opinion between the US 
State and Defense Departments over the release of US bases 
Your telegram No. 36. 
Federal Capital Site. 
Your views have been explained to the State Department who are entirely 
sympathetic. There is, however, a deep cleavage of opinion between them and the 
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Defence [sic: throughout] Department, which discussions they have had together 
today have not so far resolved. These discussions will be resumed tomorrow. 
2. I understand Defence Department representatives at one stage took the view 
that they would not enter into any discussions in London, if there was a possibility 
that they might be faced with a West Indian delegation backed with British support. 
They had foreseen their role as that of defence experts explaining the specialised 
defence reasons for rejecting the West Indian case. In this connection they seem to 
feel they have a right to expect U.K. Government support, because of the (to them) 
patent overriding defence necessity of their holding this base and because of the 
obligations which the U.K. Government accepted under the 1941 Agreement. 
3. I understand State Department have taken the line with them that (a) the U.K. 
Government must clearly take into account the political considerations as well as the 
military, (b) that it is not reasonable to expect the U.K. Government to come forward 
with an expression of view, until they have had a chance of consulting the West 
Indians further, and (c) that all parties are now committed to these discussions and 
that to postpone them at this stage would be extremely embarrassing to all 
concerned and of no advantage in the long run, even to the Defence Department. So 
far, however, State Department have failed to persuade Defence Department of the 
reasonableness of these views. 
4. State Department said it might help if U.K. Government would agree in 
advance that the arguments put forward in the U.S. memorandum were at least 
militarily sound and also admit that they were bound to honour the 1941 Agreement. 
I promised to put this suggestion to you, though I doubt very much whether you will 
be willing to commit yourselves so far at this stage. In order to help the State 
Department, however, would it be possible for you to authorise me to give them an 
assurance on the general lines that in considering the West Indian request, the U.K. 
Government will pay full regard to their obligations under the 1941 Agreements and 
also give full weight to the value of the naval base in Western defence? To be of any 
use, a reply on this point should reach me before 3 p.m. G.M. time tomorrow. 
5. Please pass copy to Foreign Office. 
59 PREM 11/2920 3 July 1957 
[Immigration]: minute by Mr Butler1 to Mr Macmillan on the current 
position 
Prime Minister 
You asked in your minute to me of 21st June what is the position now about West 
Indian immigrants into the United Kingdom. 
This problem has been kept under constant review by the Committee on Colonial 
Immigrants presided over by the Lord Chancellor. This Committee recently received 
a progress report from the working party of officials and will be reporting to the 
Cabinet on the whole question in a week or two. 
The total number of West Indians in this country continues to increase, but the 
1 RA Butler, home secretary, 1957-1962. 
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flow of immigration has displayed a continuous and striking fall since last summer. 
The total net immigration in 1957 is unlikely to be anything approaching the figure 
of 29,000 for 1956. Immigration from India and Pakistan, however, though on a 
smaller scale, shows no signs of abating. The presence of some 120,000 coloured 
people in this country has not so far given rise to such difficulties as to make 
legislation imperative, and the Lord Chancellor's Committee will be reporting 
accordingly, although it will recommend that the trend of immigration should 
continue to be closely watched. 
I am sending a copy of this minute to the Colonial Secretary. 
60 CO 103112024. no 116 [8 July 1957] 
'Federal capital site': minute by W W Wallace1 toW I J Wallace on the 
reasons why the US should be warned against adopting an 
uncompromising position over Chaguaramas 
The following are some personal thoughts on the Chaguaramas issue. 
2. This issue should, I think, be looked at against the background of the entire 
defence requirements in the Caribbean of the United States, the United Kingdom and 
even the Federal Government. We are familiar with the recent installations-the 
Guided Missile stations, the Oceanographic Research Stations and the proposed 
LORAN stations.2 The two latter types of stations are of importance to the United 
Kingdom as well as to the United States in that they are essential to the protection of 
wartime shipping in the area. The Guided Missile and Oceanographic Research 
Stations chains are, I think, practically complete but none of the four LORAN 
stations projected for British territory (Jamaica, Tobago, St. Kitts and the Bahamas) 
have yet been finally agreed. In addition, as techniques improve, I think there may 
well be further requests for new types of facilities which it might be in everyone's 
interest to grant. 
3. I believe therefore that if the U.S. refuse to surrender any part of 
Chaguaramas, future defence requirements ofU.S., U.K. and Federal importance may 
well be seriously prejudiced and even the operation of existing facilities might be 
made difficult. This is not a new thought but I think that we may not have fully 
appreciated that it may be a point of concern to both the U.K. and the West Indian 
Governments as well as to the U.S. If a compromise is not reached on the 
1 Principal, CO, West Indian Dept 'A'. 
2 The function of a Loran Station was to transmit a signal on a fixed line so that aircraft and ships having 
suitable equipment could determine their exact positions from the direction of several Loran signals. They 
were useful not only for military purposes (eg to naval patrols) but also as a general navigational aid to 
civilian traffic. They operated in groups. One group included stations under consideration in 1957 at San 
Salvador in the Bahamas; at South Caicos, Turks and Caicos Islands; and at Portland Ridge in Jamaica. The 
US had also expressed an interest in establishing stations at St Kitts and Tobago as part of another group. 
As it was to be established in an area made available under the 1941 Leased Bases Agreement and would 
have a certain defensive value, the Jamaica station would be operated under the terms of that agreement. 
The other stations, being situated in islands where there were no such areas, would be operated under 
separate agreements for ten years in the first instance. CO 1031/2022, no 1, provides a description of the 
various categories of US bases in the West Indies. See also 73. 
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Chaguaramas issue, I would expect that there might be very serious repercussions in 
the West Indies (this minute was dictated before our first meeting with the West 
Indian delegation on lOth July, but the views then expressed seem to me to reinforce 
the likelihood of strong W.l. reaction if no agreement is reached). We could 
reasonably expect, of course, that men like Mr. Manley are big enough not to adopt a 
dog in the manger attitude but other West Indian Ministers might not take the same 
broad view and Ministers in some of the smaller islands would almost certainly 
become even more unco-operative than at present in their attitude to U.S. requests 
for defence facilities. Further, the attitude of the general public in the West Indies if 
at least a part of Chaguaramas is not released, is likely, in my opinion, to make it 
politically impossible for any West Indian Government Federal, or Territorial, to 
entertain future U.S. requests at least for some years to come. 
4. I think therefore that we have to try to put it across to the Americans in the 
strongest terms that, in our view, if they adopt an uncompromising attitude on 
Chaguaramas, the repercussions will in our opinion be serious indeed and will affect 
the U.K. as well as the U.S. The Caribbean is an area of the utmost importance in the 
defence of America and the protection of Britain's sea-borne traffic of war materials 
and it would, I think, be short-sighted in the extreme to prejudice future, and even 
existing defence requirements of importance to us all for the sake of a part of the 
Chaguaramas base. 
5. On a minor point, we know that the U.S. fear that the release of even part of 
Chaguaramas Base would lead to further demands. I think this fear could be 
overcome if we could get the West Indian representatives to give an undertaking on 
the lines, for example, that so long as defence requirements exist, the need for 
facilities if [?is] fully recognised by them. This undertaking might with advantage be 
endorsed in due course by the future Federal Government. In particular, in Trinidad, 
this pledge could be reinforced by the Trinidad Government entering into a revised 
lease of the Chaguaramas area (less what might be surrendered) without delay. 
6. I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr. Rogers, Mr. Hughes (Defence Dept.), 
the Foreign Office, the Admiralty and the Ministry of Defence. 
61 CO 103112024, no 137 10 July 1957 
[ Chaguaramas]: letter from F Cooper1 to Sir I Kirkpatrick2 conveying 
the opinion of the Air Council that the problem is political not 
military 
I am commanded by the Air Council to refer to your letter A. 1075/21 of the 14th 
June, 1957, on the subject of the United States Naval Base in Trinidad, and to say that 
they have now considered your request for a statement of views on the importance to 
the United States and United Kingdom Governments of the United States Trinidad 
Naval Base. 
2. As regards the importance of the base to the United Kingdom, the Council 
wish to point out that the facilities which it offers could be of significance only 
1 Assistant secretary, head of Air Staff Secretariat. 2 Permanent under-secretary of state, FO. 
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during the post-nuclear phase of a global war. In the defence plans of the United 
Kingdom, expenditure related to this purpose is, under the terms of the Defence 
White Paper, accorded a low priority. If the war at sea did continue after the initial 
nuclear exchanges in a global war, the facilities provided by the United States base in 
Trinidad might be used but, so far as the air component of such facilities is 
concerned, and in relation solely to the defence of the United Kingdom and of the 
West Indies, the Air Council feel that the disappearance of the United States base 
from Trinidad would not be a serious loss. The Council recognises that, in the United 
States' view, which is based on the hypothesis that the war at sea would continue on 
a substantial scale after the initial nuclear exchanges, the base represents a defence 
investment worth retaining. 
3. The Council consider, however, that the military value of the aircraft 
operating installations in Trinidad are not such that they should influence the United 
Kingdom Government's approach to the problem. In the Council 's view, the problem 
should be regarded as purely a political conflict between the wishes of the United 
States Government, and the aspirations of the countries of the proposed Caribbean 
Federation. 
4. Finally, I am to suggest that, in the event of a need for the military value of the 
installations to be explored further, the matter should be placed before the Chiefs of 
Staff, so that the agreed views of the three Services may be obtained. 
5. Copies of this letter are being sent to the Colonial Office, the Admiralty and 
the Ministry of Defence. 
62 CO 103112024, no 185A July 1957 
[Federal capital]: CO note on a secret US defence installation in the 
northern half of Tucker Valley in Trinidad 
The Standing Federation Committee selected the United States Naval Base at 
Chaguaramas as the site for the Federal capital by ten votes to two with two 
abstentions. While a number of other sites in Trinidad were inspected by a Sub-
Committee and some by the full Committee, no alternative to Chaguaramas was 
decided upon by the full Committee. Some members consider that Wailer Field (also 
a U.S. Base, a large part of which the U.S. have offered to surrender) would be 
suitable, while others, in the hope that the question of having the capital elsewhere 
than in Trinidad might be thrown open, take the line that there is no alternative site 
in Trinidad. In any case, it is clear that if at least part of Chaguaramas is not released 
by the U.S., the Committee will have to think again. If a site outside Trinidad were to 
be selected such a decision would permanently embitter Trinidad/U.S. relations. It 
might also conceivably lead to Trinidad's withdrawing from the Federation. At best 
such a decision would turn Trinidad into an unwilling partner in federation. 
2. In their Memorandum, the U.S. have said that they cannot surrender the 
whole or any part of Chaguaramas. In recent discussions, the S.F.C. delegates have 
made it clear that they will not accept the U.S. views without further substantiation. 
They appear willing, however, to drop their request for the release of the whole area 
provided the Admiralty can assure them that there is a firm requirement for a U.S. 
174 THE DISPUTE OVER CHAGUARAMAS AND US BASES [63] 
Naval Base in the Eastern Caribbean and that there is no real alternative site in 
British territory to Chaguaramas. If this assurance can be given, then it seems likely 
that the delegates will accept it and will then press for the release of part of the Base, 
namely, the whole of the Tucker Valley. In doing so they are likely to take the line 
that the cost of re-locating the many installations in the southern half of the Valley 
should be at any one's expense but their own. There are fewer installations in the 
north of the Valley than in the south but it is not certain that they would accept only 
the northern half and, in addition, access to it would be difficult. 
3. The Admiralty are in an awkward position in this matter though they were 
warned in writing a month ago that they should be ready to answer exactly the points 
that the West Indian delegates have made. The Admiralty do not know enough of the 
U.S. defence plans to be able to form a firm view one way or the other of the validity 
of the U.S. case. The U.S. are notoriously reluctant to reveal defence secrets but the 
Admiralty hope to obtain sufficient information from the U.S. delegates to the 
discussions to enable them to reach a firm view. It is the Admiralty's private view at 
present, however, that it is unlikely that they could support a request for the release 
of the whole area. 
4. In considering the possible release of the Tucker Valley, there is an added 
complication in that, while no obvious defence installations are shown on the U.S. 
plan of the area, the Admiralty have just been informed that there is in fact a highly 
secret and important defence installation either sited in, or about to be sited in, the 
northern half of the Valley.! The installation is, or will be, of importance to the Royal 
Navy as well as to the U.S. Navy. Its security classification however is such that it 
cannot be spoken about in the presence of the West Indian delegates and indeed the 
U.S. Navy will not speak about it to anyone but the Admiralty. The Admiralty will 
discuss urgently with the U.S. Navy delegates whether this project could be moved 
westwards from the Tucker Valley into the main base area. If this can be done, the 
U.K./U.S. discussions are likely to centre on the possibility of the surrender of the 
whole or the northern part of the Tucker Valley and on the question of who will pay 
for the re-location of existing installations. There is in practice no alternative to the 
United States paying. If this secret project cannot be moved, there is a real risk that 
the London Talks will break down. In this event, some at least of the West Indian 
delegates are likely to insist on going to Washington to see President Eisenhower. 
1 On which see 66 and 67, enclosure, para 4. 
63 PREM 11/2880, pp 75-76 19 July 1957 
[Federal capital]: letter1 from Mr Macmillan to President Eisenhower 
on a proposal to appoint a joint commission 
[Talks on the release of Chaguaramas were held in London between 16 and 23 July 1957. 
The UK was represented by Mr D Ormsby-Gore, minister of state, FO, Mr Profumo from 
the CO and officials from the FO, CO and Admiralty. The US was represented by J H 
Whitney, US ambassador in London, and Admiral Collins of the US Navy. The West Indies 
were represented by Adams, Manley, Williams, Bradshaw (see 38, note 3) and Mr FA 
1 Sent as prime minister's personal tel no T.263/57 in FO outward tel no 2938 to the UK embassy in 
Washington. 
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Baron (minister of trade and production, Dominica). On the first day of the talks Whitney 
confided to Ormsby-Gore his concern that Collins had arrived with instructions from 
Washington which seemed very inflexible and to have little hope of satisfying the West 
Indian delegation. Ormsby-Gore suggested that the matter should be taken up 'at the 
very highest level ' in Washington (CO 1031/2024, no 143, minute by Ormsby-Gore, 
copied to Lennox-Boyd and Profumo). On day two of the talks Lennox-Boyd expressed 
similar concerns to Rogers. The issue had to be settled because of its importance to the 
establishment of the federation, a point which Whitney appeared not to appreciate. 
Lennox-Boyd also referred to the speech made by Eric Williams on the first day which 
made extensive use of official papers revealing the views of the governor of Trinidad in 
1940-1941 when the base agreement had been concluded. Williams used the same 
information in a memo which he circulated on 18 July (see 64). Whitney assumed that 
the papers had been made available in London (ie by the CO). Rogers denied this; they 
were papers either seen by Williams in Trinidad or which he had sent for from Trinidad 
while in London. Whitney, according to Lennox-Boyd, was 'clearly disturbed' by the 
speech which he regarded as an 'ultimatum'. The secretary of state believed that some 
good had come of it; it had at least jolted the Americans 'into a recognition of the 
inherent dangers of adopting a purely negative attitude' (CO 103112024, no 145, minute 
by Lennox-Boyd to Rogers, with marginal comments by the latter, 17 July 1957). 
Meanwhile the FO drafted the letter reproduced here which Macmillan sent to 
Eisenhower.] 
Dear Friend, 
I have been meaning to send you a letter about our general situation, but in the last 
weeks of the Session, as you can imagine, I am pretty heavily pressed. We hope to get 
Parliament up early in August and I will try to give you a picture of things as I see 
them when I have a little time to compose my thoughts. Meanwhile I am sorry to 
have to trouble you about rather a difficult matter which is causing us some anxiety. 
As you know, in accordance with our policy of developing our colonies into self-
governing and independent states within the Commonwealth, we have dealt with 
Ghana; Malaya follows in August. Now we are taking the first stages for the West 
Indian Federation, in which I know many Americans have taken a great interest for a 
long time. This development is going pretty well and I think it is going to be a real 
success. Their chief trouble is to find a capital for the Federal State. They can't have 
it in Jamaica, although, or really because, it is so much the largest unit-50% of the 
whole population of the proposed Federation. So everyone has agreed that it should 
be in Trinidad. The trouble is that the place they want to use in Trinidad is the site, 
or part of the site, of your naval base at Chaguaramas. We have got the 
representatives of these different islands over here now and they are really concerned 
about it. These politicians are not very easy to handle and I think it would be very 
embarrassing to us both if they insisted on visiting Washington and trying to discuss 
the question personally with you. With a good deal of difficulty we have persuaded 
them to retreat considerably from their original claims and we have been able to 
reach agreement in principle over a proposal for a joint commission to discuss 
possible solutions. As I understand it, it would be a commission representing the 
British Government, as still responsible, the West Indians and your own people. I 
believe this is agreeable to you; at least I hope so; and now the only point of trouble is 
really one of presentation more than of substance. Very strong political feelings have 
been raised in the West Indies and I am anxious that there may be a breakdown 
unless we can agree the terms of reference along the lines of our delegation's 
proposal of July 18. I very much hope you will be able to authorise your delegation to 
meet with ours and that the terms of reference proposed will be acceptable to you. I 
am sending these in a separate telegram to our Ambassador to make sure that there 
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is no mistake. I really feel rather guilty in troubling you about this matter, but all 
this "liquidation of colonialism" is going so well that I would be sorry if there was any 
hitch, especially one in the Caribbean. 
All kind regards, 
Yours ever, 
Harold 
64 CO 1031/2024, no 168 July 1957 
[Federal capital]: FO record of discussions on the release of 
Chaguaramas; statement by the US ambassador and memorandum by 
DrWilliams 
[At the end of the discussions, the FO produced a summary record of the seven meetings 
which had taken place. Reproduced here are annexes D and E to the record, a statement 
made by Whitney, the US ambassador, at the fifth meeting on 22 July, and the memo 
circulated by Williams on 18 July. After opening statements on day one by Ormsby-Gore, 
Manley and Whitney, and an independent statement on behalf of Trinidad by Williams 
calling for the complete evacuation of Chaguaramas but offering to discuss alternative 
sites for the base in Trinidad, day two was devoted to a discussion of the strategic 
importance of Chaguaramas led by Admiral Collins who emphasised in particular the 
problems involved in relocating any part of the base elsewhere. The West Indian delegates 
proposed that surveys should be made to determine if an alternative site could be found 
for a combined naval and military base. On day three a draft agreed between the West 
Indian and UK representatives for the terms of reference of a proposed survey was handed 
to the US delegation who suggested amendments to make it more acceptable to the US 
government. This was then referred to the State Dept. On day four Profumo explained 
that Macmillan had been in touch with Eisenhower (see 63) about a joint commission, a 
subject which formed the basis of the Whitney memo reproduced here. The final day 
consisted of two meetings to discuss the statement about a commission and a 
communique to be issued once the proceedings were over. The communique explained 
that although the West Indian delegates 'unanimously agreed' that there was a need for a 
US naval base in the Eastern Caribbean, they did not accept the US view that for 
economic and strategic reasons it should continue at Chaguaramas; they had therefore 
requested the release of the base which should be relocated. The communique concluded 
that the three parties had agreed to the establishment of a joint commission of technical 
experts to investigate all aspects of the West Indian request, taking into full account 
military and economic considerations.] 
Annex D to 64: Statement by the US ambassador at the fifth meeting (22 July 1957) 
In my opening statement at the beginning of these discussions I put forward the idea 
that the problem we were taking up was not one which represented a dispute 
between the United States and the West Indies. I said that it was rather a conflict 
between our mutual defense interests on the one hand and our mutual political 
problems on the other hand. Our discussions over the past week have shown that, 
with the best will on both sides, we do not yet have the necessary facts and figures to 
reach any firm conclusion as to the manner in which this conflict of interests can be 
finally resolved. In the meantime we have all learned a great deal more about each 
other's points of view and the desire on both sides to reach a satisfactory 
reconciliation of interests has been amply demonstrated. 
At this stage I would like to point out first, that this problem has been thoroughly 
reviewed at the highest levels of my Government and, secondly, I would like to 
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recount some of the considerations which have entered into that review. It is the 
basic policy of the United States never to force ourselves into a place where we are 
not wanted nor to remain in a place when we are not welcome. However, the United 
States feels strongly that to abandon Chaguaramas would be most unwise in view of 
our continuing common defense requirements for a major naval operating base in 
the Gulf of Paria. The base at Chaguaramas is the only facility in that part of the 
Caribbean adequately equipped to safeguard our common defense interests. The 
strategic considerations involved have already been thoroughly explained by Admiral 
Collins and he has also explained how the proposal for the release of Chaguaramas 
would affect not only the three of us but also the members of the Inter-American 
Defense Board. As we have already pointed out, the base at Chaguaramas represents a 
replacement cost of some 100 million dollars. The United States expended large sums 
in constructing the facilities at Chaguaramas on the presumption that we had a 99-
year lease thus warranting investment in permanent and more efficient facilities. 
Last week you proposed that a joint commission be established to examine 
whether feasible alternate sites exist for the establishment of either a combined Naval 
and Air Base or a Naval Base alone and to determine what if any parts of 
Chaguaramas might now be released. The President has now confirmed that the 
United States is prepared to agree to the establishment of a joint Commission whose 
purpose would be to investigate all aspects of the Standing Federation Committee's 
request for assistance in making Chaguaramas available as a capital site, taking into 
full account the military and economic considerations involved. 
My Government is not prepared to agree to the specific terms of reference which 
you originally proposed since they carry a clear inference that the United States 
would be committed in advance to the release of Chaguaramas and the selection of 
the best alternative site. This inference is unfortunate and inaccurate. We still 
maintain the hope of being able to convince you that this would not be a feasible or 
desirable solution to the problem. You on your side have similarly expressed the hope 
that we will be convinced that this would be in fact a feasible and desirable solution. 
As I understand it, we have now tacitly agreed to put aside further efforts of 
persuasion until a survey is able to develop the necessary facts which we then can 
consider. What I feel we both want is examination of the entire problem without 
having the Commission directed in advance toward just one solution of the problem 
either way. I would like to stress here that the final views of both sides will be affected 
by the results of the survey-thus the survey must have a broader scope than you 
have proposed for it. 
Having said this, there is one point I would like to clear up in advance. I do not 
want you to interpret the United States desire for broad and general terms of 
reference as implying that we will not participate actively and fully in an examination 
of possible alternative sites for the location of the facilities at Chaguaramas. 
Obviously this is one of the more important aspects of the entire survey. The survey 
would be pointless if it did not go into this problem. But we do not want the scope of 
the survey defined in such narrow terms. 
My Government is keenly interested in the future of the West Indies Federation 
and is determined to assist the Federal Government in every way practicable in the 
furtherance of its national aims, including that of the question of the site of the 
Federal capital. To this end we agree to the establishment of a joint Commission to 
investigate all aspects of the British West Indies request for assistance in making the 
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base at Chaguaramas available as a capital site taking into full account the military 
and economic considerations involved. 
I therefore propose consideration of language which the United States would like 
to see embodied in a joint statement that would serve both as a summary of these 
discussions and as a press statement at their conclusion. You will note that its first 
paragraph is based principally upon the preliminary paragraph of your proposal for 
the establishment of the joint commission. 
AnnexE to 64: Memorandum by Dr Williams (18 July 1957) 
Almost a year ago the People's National Movement, of which I am the Political 
Leader, gave an unambiguous pledge in its Election Manifesto to respect and honour 
all international obligations, both military and economic, with particular reference 
to the 99-year agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America. In accordance with this pledge the Trinidad Delegation to the S.F.C., at its 
meeting last May, abstained from voting-and gave its reasons for so doing-on the 
decision to site the Federal Capital in Chaguaramas. 
In taking this public stand we were unaware of the conditions and circumstances 
preceding the grant of the North West Peninsula. We took the matter in good faith, 
assuming that the only ground for complaint was the familiar one that the action 
had been taken without consulting the Government and people of Trinidad and 
Tobago. Within the past few days, however, certain facts have come to my knowledge 
which place me in no position to continue to pledge support of this Agreement or to 
abstain from discussion of the document submitted by the U.S. Government. Instead 
I give my wholehearted support to my Federal colleagues, for the reasons set out 
hereunder. 
The U.S. Ambassador, in his opening remarks, spoke of the conflict between our 
mutual defence interests and our mutual political interests. In 1940 that conflict 
resulted in a victory for defence. The 1941 Agreement was signed in the face of the 
unrelenting opposition of the then Governor of Trinidad and Tobago, Sir Hubert 
Young, 1 and his Executive Council. 
1. The opposition of the governor 
The Governor, in a despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on October 22, 
1940, expressed 
"the hope that it might be found possible to combine the provision of the 
necessary facilities for the United States forces with some at least of the 
requirements of the Colony in which they were to be our welcome guests for 
such a long time .. . we were now discussing arrangements which would have 
to stand the test of ninety-nine years, and . . . it was in my opinion essential 
that these arrangements should contain no germs of future friction or 
hostility." 
Accordingly he (i) resisted the choice of Chaguaramas, (ii) advocated a combined 
base, and (iii) advocated a Joint Commission to deal with the entire matter. 
1 Gov of Trinidad, 1938-1942. 
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(i) Chaguaramas 
On the U.S. desire for Chaguaramas, the Governor's view was as follows:-
"To anyone acquainted with Trinidad and the way of life of its inhabitants this 
suggestion is revolutionary. I am informed that for the past hundred years 
this particular area has been the recognised holiday area not only for all those 
who have not the opportunity of going elsewhere but for every class of the 
community. There is no other place in the Colony in which anything 
approaching the same amenities and facilities could be provided and I should 
be quite unable to agree to this suggestion unless it were proved that the 
requirements of the naval and military situations could be met in no other 
way ... the cutting off of these amenities from the people who at present 
enjoy them and from the increasing number who might potentially enjoy 
them in future would cause friction which it was desirable to avoid." 
The Governor was particularly opposed to the inclusion of the northern part of 
Tucker Valley in the United States proposal, and was obviously not impressed with 
the United States reply to his question on this point:-
"Why does the area in Tucker Valley cross to the eastward of the road leading 
to Macqueripe, and what are the reasons for desiring the valley." 
Answer: 
"In the valley we intend to locate quarters for housing and stores ... " 
(ii) A combined base 
In the Governor's view it was "highly desirable that the United States base should be 
in one area and not dotted about in different localities all over the Colony." 
The Governor's choice was the Caroni Swamp, and he recommended, on the basis 
of the advice of his technical experts (one an American engineer) that it be reclaimed. 
He saw in this many advantages "from the administrative and political point of view", 
the most important being 
"that the association between the two Governments in Trinidad would start 
upon a basis of mutual benefit and goodwill, whereas the adoption of the 
(U.S.) proposals put forward . . . would, I fear, involve the risk of steadily 
increasing friction between the two Governments, which might in the end 
lead to serious results." 
The United States took the opposite view. As reported by the Governor by telegram 
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on October 14, 1940, they were 
"inclined to pooh-pooh any suggestions of political difficulties if U.S. soldiers 
and sailors are dotted all over the island and do not understand that what can 
easily be done in Canada and Newfoundland cannot be done with equal ease 
in a place like Trinidad." 
With the approval of the United Kingdom Government, the Governor subsequently 
went to Washington to develop his ideas and the reports of his technical advisers who 
were of the opinion that it would take two years to reclaim the Swamp as against the 
U.S. estimate of 15 years. The Governor met representatives of the British Embassy 
and of the State, Navy and War Departments of the U.S. His account of the meeting, 
180 THE DISPUTE OVER CHAGUARAMAS AND US BASES [64] 
transmitted to the. Secretary of State for the Colonies on December 28, 1940, 
reads:-
"! ... suggested that the United States Government should send a competent 
representative down to examine (the) scheme and present an agreed report 
with (the Trinidad advisers) in order to satisfy the people of Trinidad that it 
had received proper consideration . . . I said that . .. it did seem to me 
reasonable to ask that their views should be examined with rather more care 
than was possible during the visit of the ... Mission. I pointed out that the 
objections raised . . . on the ground of the unsuitability of the soil to bear 
heavy weights had already been disposed of by subsequent boring, and it 
seemed to me that further investigation might still more strongly bear out 
the views of my advisers. Alternatively, I was ready to send (them) to 
Washington to discuss the matter with United States engineers. Neither of 
these proposals found favour with the United States delegation . . . The 
question of expense was then raised . . . the people of the United States had 
unfortunately assumed that they would be called upon to incur no 
expenditure upon the bases in view of the fact that fifty destroyers had been 
handed over in exchange for them . . . I then threw out the tentative 
suggestion that if their own proposals were accepted the Trinidad 
Government might be prepared in due course to refund to the United States 
Government the difference between the actual cost of their operations in the 
Caroni area and an agreed estimate of all the operations that they would 
otherwise have carried out in the neighbourhood of the North-West 
Peninsula and the Cumuto area, but this suggestion was brushed aside." 
The Governor, in insisting on the reclaimed Caroni Swamp as the site of a 
combined base, bore in mind the analogy of Singapore, another base built on a 
reclaimed swamp. 
(iii) Joint commission 
In his despatch of October 22, 1940, the Governor advocated 
"the immediate appointment of a Joint Commission to recommend (a) what 
immediate measures are necessary in order to ensure that Trinidad is 
adequately defended not only for the period of the present war but for the 
whole period of the least [sic: lease]; (b) by which government each of these 
measures should be taken; and (c) whether it is necessary or desirable to 
decide immediately what shall be the area or areas to be permanently leased 
to the United States Government under the agreement of the 2nd September, 
or whether . . . it would be wiser for the two Governments to content 
themselves with the continuance on a temporary basis of the immediate 
measures referred to in (a) above until they have examined the position more 
closely and agreed exactly what the permanent facilities should be." 
What the Governor was opposed to was, as he phrased it in his telegram to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies on October 14, 1940, that 
"It seems hardly reasonable for a foreign power to expect to find a suitable site 
for the 99-year lease of a combined Singapore and Aldershot in a closely 
populated island like this in ten days." 
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He himself saw the explanation of the haste in the fact that the United States 
Mission which arrived in Trinidad on October 10, 
"did not regard the object of the Mission as the quest of a naval and air 
base for the United States in a part of the British Empire, for the security 
of which the British Empire was and would remain responsible, so much 
as that of a naval, military and air base in an outlying island of the South 
American continent, for the defence of which the United States 
Government would assume responsibility, and which was to serve if neces-
sary as a jumping-off ground for operations by the United States Army in 
South America." 
2. The governor is overruled 
Sir Winston Churchill, in his war memoirs, makes mention of certain things done by 
the United States Government which were "harsh and painful" to us. These are the 
precise words to be applied to the 1941 Agreement. 
It is certain that the United States brought very heavy pressure to bear on 
Trinidad, which was regarded as representing forty of the fifty destroyers. Admiral 
Collins has stated that if the Trinidad base were not available, Venezuela might pro-
vide the site of a suitable alternative. The facts are that the pressure on Trinidad 
was due precisely to the fact that Venezuela would not provide a base. On 
November 29, the British Ambassador in Washington cabled Sir Hubert Young as 
follows:-
"It is practically impossible for the United States to get any equivalent 
facilities in Venezuela or other parts of the north of South America because of 
the sensitiveness of all South American Republics to give the United States 
permanent facilities on their own territory. That is why United States 
Government is so concerned that the work at Trinidad should be begun and 
completed as soon as possible." 
The Governor complained in a telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
on December 21, 1940, that the American attitude "is all take and no give". But the 
British Government yielded to the pressure. The Governor was advised by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies on January 2, 1941 that 
"War Cabinet ... have decided that United States wishes in matter of site to 
be leased must be met in full ... United States Government will appreciate 
that this decision involves people of Trinidad in great sacrifices and is taken 
in many respects of contrary to views of local Government." 
A fuller explanation was tendered by the British Ambassador in Washington who, 
in a personal letter on January 20, 1941, wrote to Sir Hubert Young as follows:-
"! am afraid that you must have felt that some of our telegrams showed little 
appreciation of the local difficulties and that we harped too much upon the 
necessity of meeting the American wishes in toto. As you know, we believed 
that we had substantial grounds for fearing that there would be trouble with 
the Administration and with the Press if there were any prolonged delays in 
settling the question of the location of the bases in Trinidad, and that this 
would react badly on some other very important issues." 
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3. The political aspect 
The 1941 decision reacts particularly badly on the most important issue today, the 
political. 
The Governor's views were fully endorsed by his Executive Council, which 
advocated a combined base, opposed the cession of Chaguaramas or [sic] at least for 
99 years, and supported the view that the siting of permanent facilities should be 
carefully considered before a decision was reached. On December 10, 1940, the 
Council decided 
"we are not convinced that proposal of Trinidad Government is impracticable 
but if U.S. Government whose whole hearted cooperation is necessary to its 
success decline even to examine it seriously and His Majesty's Government do 
not feel able to insist upon this we <;:an only accept the position." 
Sir Hubert Young expressly warned of the Constitutional aspect of the problem. 
He made it clear in Washington that the British Government was even then 
considering constitution reform proposals recommended by the Moyne Commission, 
and accordingly expressed the view 
"that in making arrangements which were to hold good for a century it would 
be prudent to bear in mind the degree of self-government which might be 
attained by the people of the Colony before the end of that long period." 
Even in the absence of self-government in those days, it would have been prudent 
to take the local viewpoint into consideration. On January 18, 1941, the Governor 
advised the Secretary of State for the Colonies with respect to extra-territorial rights 
that the Executive Council regarded the American draft as 
"quite unsuitable and wholly unacceptable and are profoundly shocked both 
by the American attitude and by the concessions which H.M. Government 
appear to be ready to make . . . it will in their opinion entirely stultify the 
constitutional reforms which have just been effected and will sow the seeds of 
that very friction between the United States and Trinidad which, as you know, 
I have worked so hard to avoid by putting forward my alternative proposals 
... They . . . are clearly apprehensive as to what may be agreed to in London 
without their being consulted." 
The Governor added:-
"My own view is that it is essential that any agreement between H.M. 
Government and the U.S. Government affecting Trinidad must command the 
consent not only of the present Legislature but so far as can reasonably be 
foreseen of future Legislatures throughout the 99 year period." 
But the U.S. Government was prepared to exert pressure on the West Indian 
Governments as well as on the British Government. On January 16, 1941, the 
Governor of the Leeward Islands cabled as follows to the Governor of Trinidad and 
Tobago:-
"I feel their attitude indicates that American Service interests will be put fi rst, 
second and last with disregard of West Indian political conditions 
constitutions and outlook." 
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4. The present position 
The United States Document indicates that, in 1957 as in 1940, West Indian political 
conditions, constitutions and outlook are disregarded and subordinated to the 
service interests and the military rather than the diplomatic mentality. 
For, according to the document, everything is impossible. It is impossible to give 
up Chaguaramas because of its deep water harbour. It is impossible to find another 
base. It is impossible to move from Chaguaramas because it is too costly. It is 
impossible to surrender Tucker Valley which has a beach house, golf course, 
plantation, hospital, radio station, etc. One is tempted to ask after reading the 
document, what is possible? The document disregards entirely the only thing that is 
really impossible- that is to ask Trinidad people in 1957 to put the seal of approval 
on what was done in 1940 in defiance of the Governor's views. 
The document places considerable emphasis on the financial aspect of the 
question. It would cost, we are told, $100 millions to move Chaguaramas. What does 
that mean? This is equivalent to 34 cents a year per head of the Federation 
population of 3~ million for the unexpired portion of the lease, 83 years. One would 
have thought this a small price to pay for West Indian goodwill and the avoidance of 
friction. Certainly no amount of money would be able to buy that goodwill if the West 
Indian people learn how the rights of Trinidad were trampled upon in 1940. 
For friction there will be, and an intensification of it. Some of those who went 
through this period are still alive. One of the newspapers in Trinidad is today 
advocating exactly what the Governor advocated in 1940. What appears to the 
Americans as only a base, what the S.F.C. sees as the only capital, I see as an 
explosion of the first order. 
For the people will get to know. They are well informed of these matters. They 
know that the British were compelled to abandon their base in Ceylon, and will want 
to know whether they are to be penalised because they are not yet a Dominion or 
whether in order to achieve their rights they must have an election fought on the 
issue of driving out the Americans. They know that the British are now 
contemplating removal of their Cyprus base to East Africa, and will want to know 
~hether they are to be penalised because they don't have an emergency. They know 
of developments in Egypt, Jordan and the Panama Canal. They know how the phrase 
used by one of my British friends opposite, "concepts about modern warfare", have 
changed in the light of political developments in the past few years. They will see in 
the whole American document nothing but military pressure, and I deeply regret the 
advice I have just received, that as we sit here in conference, arrangements are being 
made for shore leave in Trinidad for American troops on such a scale that it can only 
be regarded as a demonstration calculated to influence the Government. I ask you 
seriously, Gentlemen, if you seek to create disturbances in Trinidad? 
5. The solution 
The time has clearly come to reconcile, in the Ambassador's phrase, our mutual 
defence and our mutual political interests. 
Article 28 of the 1941 Agreement provides:-
"The Government of the United States and the Government of the United 
Kingdom agree to give sympathetic consideration to any representations 
which either may make after this Agreement has been in force a reasonable 
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time, proposing a review of any of the provisions of this Agreement to 
determine whether modifications in the light of experience are necessary or 
desirable." 
You note the complete disregard of the Government of Trinidad. 
In accordance with Article 28, I now call upon the United Kingdom Government, 
after the reasonable time of 17 years, to propose the following modifications of the 
Agreement which in the light of experience are necessary and desirable:-
!. The evacuation by the United States of Chaguaramas. 
2. An amicable agreement between the Governments of Trinidad, the United 
Kingdom and the U.S., on a footing of equality, regarding an alternative base in 
Trinidad. There was no time for this in 1940. We have the necessary time in 1957. 
Conclusion 
It would be unreal to the participants in this conference not to leave them clearly 
aware of one fundamental consideration which must under no circumstances be lost 
sight of. 
The other representatives of S.F.C. are dealing with the question of a site for the 
Federal Capital. In my position as representative of Trinidad and Tobago on the 
S.F.C. I am also dealing with the same thing. But I am also concerned with another 
question which does not concern them, at least not directly, and that is the question 
of the disposition of Trinidad's territory. In this connection I wish to inform the 
conference that, as the Chief Minister of Trinidad and Tobago at the present state of 
constitutional development with the perspectives for the future, I could not possibly 
put myself in a position in 1957 of being less concerned and less vigilant in defence of 
the fundamental interests of the people of Trinidad than a British Colonial Governor 
and the Executive Council of the period of 1941. To do so would not only be a gross 
betrayal of the confidence which the people of Trinidad have so generously placed in 
me, my Party and my Government. It would also be political suicide. I intend neither 
betrayal nor self-destruction. 
65 CO 968/565, no 84 25 Nov 1957 
[West India Regiment]: CO note for Lord Hailes on the reformation of 
the regiment and the financial implications 
One of the most intractable difficulties since the last war has been the provision of 
local troops for the security of the colonies in the Caribbean area. As long ago as 1949 
the Chiefs of Staff assessed the local defence and internal security requirements of 
the West Indian territories as a force of two battalions. This requirement still stands 
(see the joint Colonial Office/War Office appreciation at Annex A), 1 and the raising of 
a local force is now urgent because, as a result of wider defence decisions, the British 
troops in the Caribbean are due to be removed at the beginning of 1960, leaving the 
area virtually denuded of troops. 
2. This defence requirement is at present met by a British battalion and a 
1 Annexes not printed. 
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battalion of the Jamaica Regiment, both under the operational control of the War 
Office acting through the Commander, Caribbean Area. The Commander's 
Headquarters, the Jamaica Battalion, and two companies of the British Battalion are 
stationed in Jamaica, and of the rest of the battalion one company each is located in 
British Guiana and British Honduras respectively. The cost of Headquarters and the 
British Battalion is met from War Office votes; as a temporary expedient the cost of 
the Jamaica Regiment is also met by the United Kingdom but from the Colonial 
Services Vote on the understanding that the Government of Jamaica pays the War 
Office an annual defence contribution of £50,000. This agreement was made in 1947 
when it was considered a local battalion should be raised in Jamaica, but the colony 
was not in a position to meet the whole cost. 
3. The original West India Regiment (which formed part of the British Army) was 
first raised at the end of the eighteenth century and existed until 1927 when it was 
disbanded for reasons of economy. It was felt that for reasons of tradition, etc., the 
raising of a local Caribbean force could best be achieved by re-forming the West India 
Regiment. Proposals to this effect have been under consideration since 1947, and 
following lengthy semi-official and official correspondence firm proposals were 
worked out by 1954 for submission to West Indian Governments and Legislatures. 
These proposals were addressed to West Indian governments in WICIR despatch No. 
53 of the 11th October, 1954 (copy attached at Annex B) . This despatch asked the 
West Indian Governments and Legislatures whether they would accept the financial 
commitment; whether they agreed that the War Office should be asked to start 
raising the Regiment; and whether they agreed to the necessary legislation being 
introduced into the United Kingdom Parliament. 
4. Consideration of this despatch by the seven Governments (many with 
advanced constitutions) and the thirteen Legislatures (all but one with unofficial 
majorities) inevitably took time. By October, 1956, however, all territories 
concerned, with the exception of St. Kitts and British Honduras, had accepted the 
Secretary of State's proposals. At this point it is relevant to point out that the West 
India Regiment is as a result sponsored by all except one of the territories comprising 
The West Indies, British Guiana, and the British Virgin Islands. It is therefore not an 
exclusively Federal force. The then Chancellor of the Exchequer however queried the 
desirability of raising the Regiment at that point and instructed that further action 
should be suspended until he had been satisfied that its re-formation should not 
prove an undue burden on the U.K. taxpayer (this information has not of course been 
passed to governments). 
5. This difficulty was not resolved until the spring of this year. By this time the 
advent of West Indies Federation had to some extent overtaken the original proposals 
for re-forming the West India Regiment, which had been framed on the assumption 
that the Regiment would come into existence before the Federation. In order to avoid 
further delay through protracted correspondence the Secretary of State proposed in 
his circular despatch No. 331/57 (Annex C) a conference of officials to be held in 
June, which would discuss the outstanding issues, and whose recommendations 
could then be submitted to a subsequent meeting of the Standing Federation 
Committee for endorsement. The conference of officials took place at Barbados in 
June,2 and copies of its two reports are at Annexes D and E. 
2 See 56. 
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6. Although the officials at the Barbados Conference disposed of most of the 
outstanding problems there remained the fundamental questions of how The West 
Indies should finance its share of the Regiment; whether the Federal Government 
should assume this responsibility, and if so what the level of the Federal contribution 
should be. H.M.G.'s views on these points were that as under the Federal 
Constitution "Defence" was to be an exclusive responsibility of the Federal 
Government the Regiment would be a Federal force and its financing a Federal 
responsibility, and that despite the changed circumstances the Federal contribution 
towards the Regiment should continue to be an amount equal to the aggregate of 
one per cent of annual revenues of the unit territories at the time of forming the 
Regiment. This financial commitment was foreseen by the Fiscal Commissioner 
when drawing up his Report on the allocation of revenues to The West Indies during 
the first quinquennium, and he included a sum equivalent to one per cent of unit 
revenues for 1954/55 in his calculations of Federal expenditure. You will be aware of 
the decision S.F.C. took to fix a ceiling to the Federal Government's mandatory levy 
and of the difficulties which this has caused. The position was further complicated by 
the fact that whereas H.M.G. expect an annual Federal contribution rising 
concurrently with revenues, the Fiscal Commissioner recommended in his Report 
that the Federal contribution should be fixed for a term of years. The United 
Kingdom views regarding the financial arrangements for the Regiment were put to 
the Barbados Conference in paper W.I.R.(57)7 (copy at Annex F). The position is 
therefore that H.M.G.'s present view is that the West Indies' contribution to its 
Regiment (which has to be met from Federal revenue) should be calculated on 
present-day unit revenue figures, whereas the mandatory levy is calculated on earlier 
and lower figures . This creates a serious financial problem. You will note the views 
expressed by the Barbados conference in AnnexE on this point. These views were due 
for discussion by the Standing Federation Committee at its October meeting. 
7. Before passing to the next stage in the negotiations it is relevant to look at the 
Jamaica Regiment. This Regiment is intended to be absorbed into and to form the 
nucleus of the West India Regiment when raised. Unless this is done it would be 
exceedingly difficult to raise and train a two-battalion force from scratch, particularly 
if this is to be done before the final departure of the British Battalion and 
Headquarters Caribbean Area in 1960. With the re-formation of the West India 
Regiment in the offing very little has been spent on the Jamaica Regiment. Its 
present terms and conditions of service are consequently most unsatisfactory and its 
accommodation deplorable, and there is every indication that a large number of the 
personnel of the Regiment, including most of its senior N.C.O.'s, who are essential to 
the reformation of the West India Regiment, will not renew their engagements when 
these expire during the first quarter of 1958, unless either the West India Regiment 
is re-formed soon or the Jamaica Regiment is radically improved. Sir Hugh Foot was 
in fact very concerned about this and when he was in London during last July and 
August he devoted a great deal of attention to devising some formula which would 
enable the Jamaica Regiment to be improved and brought up to strength (in effect as 
a disguised battalion of the West India Regiment) if the Standing Federation 
Committee should fail to approve the early raising of the West India Regiment. 
8. It was clear that as far as H.M. Treasury was concerned the sands were 
running out and that if the Standing Federation Committee should fail to agree to 
raising the West India Regiment it would be extremely difficult to achieve anything 
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much in respect of the Jamaica Regiment. A determined effort was therefore made at 
the October meeting of the Standing Federation Committee to get a decision, even if 
this meant tailoring the size of the force to suit the sum used by the Fiscal 
Commissioner in his calculations (see paragraph 6 above). The circular despatch No. 
1038/57 of the 24th September (Annex G) was presented to the Committee in the 
hope that this would stimulate the Committee and encourage it to take a decision. 
9. Paragraphs 19-21 of this despatch put two alternatives to the Committee, but 
unfortunately they chose neither. The Committee considered that when the Federal 
Government came into being it should be left free to decide, in consultation with 
H.M.G. and unit governments, what sort of force it should have and how this should 
be used, and resolved as follows:-
"This Committee, considering it essential that the Federal Government 
should set up and maintain a defence force during the first five-year period; 
and recognising that an annual provision of $1,536,000 in the Federal Budget 
will suffice to enable a force of the size recommended in the report of the 
Barbados conference of officials to be established in the four-year period 
commencing in 1959 and ending in 1962; but considering it appropriate, 
however, that the Federal Government should be given the opportunity to 
discuss with H.M. Government the arrangements involved in the proposed 
formation of the West India Regiment, and with the Unit Governments 
questions affecting the use and disposition of the Regimental forces; 
Recommends 
(a) that the setting up of the West India Regiment be regarded as deferred 
until January, 1959; and 
(b) that in the meantime 
(i) H.M. Government be invited to proceed in consultation with the 
Federal Government to arrange for the raising of the Regiment and the 
meeting of the capital and recurrent cost; 
(ii) that Her Majesty's Government be requested to continue the 
existing arrangements with the Jamaica Government in regard to the 
Jamaica Battalion, on the basis of the offer of the Jamaica Government to 
increase its contribution towards the cost of the Jamaica Battalion, for 
the year 1958 only, by the amount needed to improve the Battalion's 
conditions of service and raise its strength to 520 men, which offer the 
Committee accepts, (the increase in the contribution being estimated at 
$240,000); and that 
(iii) provision should be made in the Federal Budget for 1958 of a sum 
of $1,536,000 for defence expenditure, this being the amount included 
by the Fiscal Commissioner in the computation on which the mandatory 
levy was based." 
10. The implications of this resolution so far as the United Kingdom is 
concerned are that:-
(i) Her Majesty's Government is to negotiate with the Federal Government (i.e. 
from about May, 1958) questions concerning the re-formation of the Regiment; 
(ii) Her Majesty's Government, would during the coming United Kingdom 
financial year continue the existing arrangements for the Jamaica Regiment, i.e., 
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at a cost of three-quarters of £245,000 to cover the period 1st April-31st 
December, 1958, and 
(iii) while provision would be made in the 1958 Federal budget for$ 1,536,000 for 
defence expenditure, nothing would be paid by the Federal Government towards 
defence costs until1959. (The actual intention behind this is to raise $1.5 million 
per annum over five years but to spend the money over the last four at an 
increasing rate to enable Federal defence expenditure to reach a figure of $2.2 
million by 1962). 
11. If H.M.G. accepted the arrangements contained in the above resolution it 
would mean assuming an additional financial commitment of about $900,000 (West 
Indian) in respect of the Jamaica Regiment for the period 1.4.1958-3.12.1958, and 
foregoing over the quinquennium some $3.5 million in contributions from the 
Federation. In return the Federal Government could claim that by the end of the 
quinquennium it would be spending a sum equivalent to its proper share of 1% of 
present-day unit revenues and that it would therefore be entitled to a two-battalion 
Regiment and that H.M.G. should still be bound to meet the whole capital cost as 
well as forego substantial sums from the Federation. 
12. The Standing Federation Committee resolution substantially alters the 
nature of the agreement reached between H.M.G. and the participating governments 
on the proposals covered in WICIR No. 53. This can, however, be discussed with the 
Federal Government during 1958; what is of immediate urgency is the future of the 
Jamaica Regiment pending the outcome of this discussion. No provision has been 
made for this force in the Colonial Services Vote Estimates for 1958/59 and there is 
no prospect of such provision being made considering that there is an unused 
provision of $1.5 million in the Federal Estimates. The only alternative to the 
disbandment of the Regiment after the 31st March, 1958, would be for the Federal 
Government to meet its cost from the Federal defence vote for 1958. A 
straightforward request to do so would be unlikely to achieve the desired result if 
only because your Advisory Committee may well feel itself unable to commit the 
future Federal Government in this way, and it is therefore intended to propose that 
the cost of the Jamaica Regiment should for the time being be met by the Federal 
Government from an "advance account" out of the $1.5 million defence vote, this 
being taken into account without prejudice to the Federation's case during its 
discussion with H.M.G. on the re-formation of the West India Regiment. A draft 
despatch has been prepared and now awaits Treasury concurrence (we have been 
informed orally that they only propose to suggest some alterations of detail and not 
of substance). A copy of this draft despatch is attached (Annex H). 
13. Although this despatch will be addressed to the Chairman of the Standing 
Federation Committee and repeated to the unit governments (and the participating 
governments outside the Federation) it is anticipated that this item will come before 
your Advisory Council at its first meeting. There will undoubtedly be much (and no 
doubt angry) criticism of the line taken by the Secretary of State, but it represents 
the only possible way now of salvaging a project which is essential to the internal 
security and defence of the West Indies and which provides you in the last resort with 
the necessary sanction to maintain the authority of the Federal Government. Unless 
the Advisory Committee accept the proposal in Annex H the Federal Government will 
have to be resigned to losing the West India Regiment and probably the Jamaica 
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Regiment now, and losing the British garrison in 1960 or possibly even earlier (since 
it will no longer be required to train either the West India or Jamaica Regiments). 
66 CO 1031/2025, no 250 19 Feb 1958 
[Federal capital]: letter from SirE Beetham (Trinidad) toP Rogers 
on the response in Trinidad to the US stand over Chaguaramas 
[Concern over the US attitude was not confined to Trinidad. In Aug 1957 Luke forwarded 
to the CO complaints made by those West Indians who had attended the London 
discussions in July about statements made by US base officials, including the base 
commander. The statements included comments to the effect that the naval facilities at 
Chaguaramas could not be duplicated elsewhere in the Caribbean, that the western 
hemisphere's chain of defence would be seriously weakened if Chaguaramas were handed 
over, and that 'aside from strategic considerations men stationed here would be very 
sorry if the United States ever (repeat ever) has to leave it'. Such comments seemed to 
invalidate the statement made by Whitney at the London discussions about not 
prejudging the outcome of the inquiry to be undertaken by the joint commission (see 64) . 
Through Luke, the West Indian delegates asked HMG to convey a strong protest to the US 
government. They also expressed their concern over reports in the US press that the US 
government was now proposing to build (or actually building) a guided missile tracking 
station at Chaguaramas (CO 1031/2025, no 201, inward savingram no 27, Luke to 
Lennox-Boyd, 30 Aug 1957).] 
Public controversy about the United States Naval Base at Chaguaramas, to which you 
refer in your letter WIS 30/375/02 of the 11th of February has caused us all here a 
great deal of embarrassment. 
We must, however, face certain ineffaceable facts, the most important of which 
are:-
(a) the acute sensitivity of the Americans to any form of public criticism, no 
matter from what source it comes (e.g. Dr. Billy Graham, the American Evangelist, 
who stated in a Press interview that the Base would make an ideal Federal Capital, 
may, according to an American Consular Officer, be called to account when he 
returns to the United States); 
(b) the equally extraordinary belief by the Americans that the taking of any one 
into their confidence and giving such information as security allows, is a sign of 
national weakness, with their consequent reluctance to give quite harmless 
information to those politicians with whom, in a very few years, they will have to 
deal direct as leaders of an independent nation. This has, since the Commission 
started working, caused Arden-Clarke1 to speak his mind to his American 
colleagues in no uncertain terms on more than one occasion; 
(c) the violent antipathy of the Trinidad Guardian-the most widely read daily 
newspaper in Trinidad and the Eastern Caribbean-to anything American m 
general and the American Base at Chaguaramas in particular; 
1 Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, formerly governor of the Gold Coast, was chairman of the joint commission 
investigating Chaguaramas. Members of the commission were, for the UK, Vice-Admiral W K Edden, 
representing first sea lord as naval adviser to the West Indies, and R W Taylor, engineering adviser to CO; 
for the US, Rear Admiral J H Wellings, US Navy, assistant chief of naval operations, Rear Admiral M K 
Kehart, US Navy, director, Atlantic Division of US Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks, and E E Seelye, a 
senior partner of a consulting engineering firm; for Trinidad, A H Richard, consulting engineer, and Lt 
Comdr L H Geofroy, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. 
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(d) the approach of the Federal Elections and the intended use by the Opposition, 
not by the Government, of the Chaguaramas Base question as political 
ammunition. This means not only that the Government must join issue but also 
that the matter will not be allowed to recede into the background; 
(e) the Americans' lack of any sense of timing and their reluctance to give the 
Press a statement which would take all the heat out of a particular incident until it 
is too late and the pot has already boiled over-and this in spite of strong advice by 
Arden-Clarke; 
(f) the repeated mis-quotation in the local Press of statements made by the Chief 
Minister-see also (c) above; and 
(g) the understandable difficulty of the ordinary Trinidadian in believing that the 
starting of "the third phase", indeed the speeding up, of the construction of the 
Missile Tracking Station is not prejudicial to the work of the Commission. The 
Press did not, of course, do anything to clear this misunderstanding. 
When, therefore, the Trinidad Government made its protest which it had to do in the 
prevailing atmosphere, regarding the work on the Missile Tracking Station-which 
protest you will notice was classified as secret-discussions were held between 
Arden-Clarke and Edden and myself, and immediately after with Arden-Clarke, 
Edden and myself, and Lord Hailes. As a result of these discussions and further 
discussions between Arden-Clarke and Edden with the Americans it was decided that, 
provided permission could be obtained from Washington, Wellings (with Arden-
Clarke and Edden present) should give a confidential talk to the Trinidad Executive 
Council on the over-all defence strategy of the Western Hemisphere. The meeting 
was held (I was in the chair) on the 5th of February. While it did not do an awful lot 
of good it has at least strangled at birth the possibility of any member of the 
Government saying that he has been kept in the dark about the general defence 
planning. Wellings was good and answered questions well, though I do not myself 
think that the elected Ministers understood much of it, not because it was difficult to 
understand, but because their minds were on the pin-point of Chaguaramas and not 
on the over-all picture. Williams did not cut a very intelligent figure when he implied 
that he believed that Trinidad could stand alone no matter what the United States 
and the United Kingdom may do. One question that was somewhat pressed was "we 
understand that the Gulf of Paria is vital to the supply needs of America during a war, 
but why, in that case, doesn't America consider leasing a portion of the Venezuelan 
peninsula which sticks out on the north of the Gulf opposite Chaguaramas and 
release Chaguaramas?" At the end of the meeting the Chief Minister made a 
statement (which he later put in writing and a copy of which I enclose)2 denying 
certain remarks in the Press attributed to him under the headlines "Chag. or 
Trinidad walks alone". 
In the meantime on the 21st of January, the Commission sent a very prompt reply 
to the Trinidad protest which, for the time being at any rate, seems to have satisfied 
the Government that the continuation of work on the Missile Tracking Station is not 
prejudicing the work of the Commission. 
There was a good chance that members of the Government would have felt that 
they had registered their point and would not pursue the matter any further. The 
2 Enclosures not printed. 
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Press, however, continues to publish articles daily and there is nothing in this 
instance that we can do. Indeed, in all the prevailing circumstances, we must do 
nothing as the matter is resolving itself into an open political controversy. This is 
evidenced by the following Opposition motion which is on the order paper for the 
sitting of the Legislative Council the day after tomorrow:-
"Be it resolved that this Honourable House has no confidence in the recent 
statements and actions of the Honourable the Chief Minister in dealing with 
matters of national and international interest." 
The Opposition will, I expect, attack the Government on its taxation policy from the 
national point of view and, internationally, on the Chaguaramas issue. 
You will appreciate, therefore, that there is nothing more we can do at this 
juncture which could be of any material advantage: we cannot muzzle the Press or 
the politicians any more than you in the United Kingdom can do so. I enclose a Press 
report which appeared in today's Trinidad Guardian purporting to give the Secretary 
of State's reply on the Chaguaramas question. The last sentence of this report which 
reads: "The site was in a high ridge, which would probably not be suitable for 
buildings for the Capital" is, whether reported correctly or incorrectly, perhaps a 
little unfortunate since we have been informed that should the Base be handed over 
to The West Indies, the Americans would move the Missile Tracking Station to 
another site and it is for this very reason that the continuation of its construction is 
not prejudicial to the work of the Commission-this information was, of course, 
given to us by the Americans under cloak of secrecy. 
I have talked all this over with Arden-Clarke, and should it become advisable, as 
time goes on and as the Federal election campaign becomes hotter, either he or I or 
both of us will have a talk to Williams, but it must be clearly understood that 
Wellings will never be able to tell Williams or the members of the Government 
anything more than he has already told them. 
67 CO 1031/2025, no 264 7 Mar 1958 
[Federal capital]: letter from HA A Hankey1 to P Rogers on the US 
stand over Chaguaramas and the most appropriate UK response. 
Enclosure: letter from Lord Hood2 (Washington) to FO (1 Mar 1958) 
I enclose a copy of a letter to Sir F. Hoyer Millar3 from Lord Hood at Washington, 
about Chaguaramas, forwarding a copy of the American aide memoire4 referred to in 
Washington telegram No. 473 of February 27 and commenting on it. As you will see, 
the aide memoire more than bears out the indications given in the telegram about 
the concern felt by the State Department over the danger of a serious deadlock 
arising after the Joint Commission has reported. In particular, the State Department 
make certain specific requests: however anxious we may be to go along with them as 
far as possible in the interests of defence and harmonious relations in general, it may 
1 Head of American Dept, FO. 
3 Permanent under-secretary of state, FO. 
2 H M minister, Washington. 
4 Aide memo ire not printed. 
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be hard to comply with these at the present stage without compromising our 
position with the West Indians. 
2. As regards the renewed plea from the State Department for further pressure 
on our part to moderate the expression of local feeling, the letter from Sir E. 
Beetham to you of February 195 provides a clear account of what has already been 
done in this direction and the limits beyond which it is practically and 
constitutionally impossible to go. As I think you know, we showed this letter to the 
United States Embassy informally, and I believe that it may already have had a 
salutary effect on them; they now appear to realize that there is very little more we 
can do at this stage. Nevertheless, it would be too much to hope that they will be able 
to convince the State Department of this. I suggest therefore that our best course 
will be to prepare a memorandum embodying Sir E. Beetham's material for 
communication to the State Department by our Embassy in Washington. It will be 
necessary at the same time for the Embassy to give our considered replies to the 
requests made in the aide memoire. 
3. A new and unpleasant factor in the situation, of which we need to take 
account, is the indication in paragraph 2 of Lord Hood's letter that the United States 
Government intend to stand firm in their possession of the Base no matter what the 
Commission recommends, and that in any case they believe the Commission's report 
will be against release or partition. We had always feared this might be the case, but 
had supposed that there was a fair chance that the Commission might report that at 
least partition was practicable from the defence angle provided the costs involved 
could be met. Foster, of the United States Embassy, who called under instructions 
from Washington to make to us the same points that Mr. Herter6 had made in his 
conversation with Lord Hood, expressed the view in this connexion that while the 
State Department fully appreciated the political case in favour of meeting the West 
Indians, the Defense Department were quite impervious to any political 
considerations and would decline to volunteer a cent to contribute towards a 
settlement based, for example, on partition. 
4. The arguments advanced by Lord Hood in his paragraphs 9 and 10 in favour of 
deciding here and now to come down firmly on the American side in this dispute are 
powerful. Nevertheless, it seems abundantly clear from Sir E. Beetham's letter that 
our opportunities for guiding the opinions of the West Indians are far more limited 
than the Embassy believes. If only for this reason we may, however reluctantly, have 
to postpone finally making up our minds what our position is to be (or at least 
postpone appearing to do so) until the Commission has made its report and we can 
gauge the impact on the West Indians. With these considerations in mind, I would 
tentatively suggest that our reactions to the points in the last paragraph of the State 
Department's aide memoire should be on the following lines:-
(a) We have always recognized the importance of the Base from the point of view 
of defence, and we have always acknowledged the validity of the United States' 
legal position. On these points our policy will remain unchanged. We do not think, 
however, that we can commit ourselves in advance of the Commission's findings. 
(We have in fact always hoped, and cannot refrain from continuing to do so until 
the Joint Commission makes its report, that a compromise based on partition 
5 See 66. 6 CA Herter, US under-secretary of state, 1957- 1959; secretary of state, 1959-1961. 
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might be found which would continue to meet the United States' defence 
requirements and avoid any serious clash with the West Indians) . 
(b) We have been doing all we can. We should of course inform the Governor of 
the renewed representations by the Americans on this point. But at the same time, 
for the reasons advanced in his letter of February 19, he is debarred from going 
further than he has already gone. Furthermore, it would be tactically unsound for 
us to over-emphasize our support of the American case at least until the 
Commission's report is available. The most critical moment, when the need for 
our restraining influence will be at its greatest, will presumably come after the 
Commission has reported and when it becomes clear that whatever the nature of 
the report the Americans intend to remain inflexible; by taking the American side 
now, far from swaying the West Indians in the right direction, we would be 
undermining our capacity for influencing them when and if this crucial moment 
arrives. 
(c) We should certainly not ourselves put forward any such suggestion. Our 
information, however, does not confirm the American theory that partitioning of 
the Base would be unacceptable to the West Indians in the last resort. Even if we 
have to accept the fact that partitioning is out of the question at this stage, the 
United States may be faced with a request to release part of the area in, say, 1961 
or 1962, by which time they should have been able to make alternative 
arrangements. In that event, we should have to invite the State Department to 
consider with the Defense Department whether the political advantages of 
retaining friendly relations with the Federation in its early years might not be 
worth the cost involved; they would also have to take into account other political 
considerations, such as that the nascent Federation might collapse altogether on 
the capital issue, with all that this would involve in giving propaganda material to 
anti-American elements all over the world. 
(d) The Governor should be informed of this, but we have no reason to believe 
that he is not already fully aware of the importance of maintaining the non-
political status of the Commission. 
5. I should be glad to know what you think about all this. As we should send a 
reply soon to Washington, it would perhaps be best if we were to discuss the matter 
further at a meeting of representatives of our two Departments. 
Enclosure to 67 
As you will have seen from our telegram No. 473 Mr. Herter saw the Ambassador on 
February 26th and handed to him copies of the enclosed Aide Memoire on 
Chaguaramas. The Ambassador, who left Washington early the next morning, asked 
me to write in his absence. 
2. The main point made by the Americans both in the Aide Memoire and orally is 
that they want our active support for their retention of the base. Although they seem 
fairly confident that the Commission's report will in fact be against release or 
partition, it is now plain that the United States Government intend to stand firm in 
their possession of the base no matter what the Commission recommends and that 
they will resist all attempts to persuade them to abandon it. What they are in effect 
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asking us to do is to take a decision now in principle to support them and, in the 
intervening period before the time comes for formal consideration of the 
Commission's report, to take what action we can to prevent a possible explosion over 
this issue. In particular, they are perturbed at the way in which Dr. Eric Williams 
and, probably, the whole West Indies Federal Labour Party are bent on making the 
base an election issue, regardless of what the Commission recommends. They ask us 
to use whatever influence we may possess with the West Indian politicians to 
persuade them not to inflame the situation by making a political issue of it in this 
way. 
3. Before considering the merits of the American position, there are certain 
criticisms of it which I should like to dispose of. 
4. The first is that it is now plain that the United States Government have been 
less than frank with us about the full implications of establishing the missile 
tracking station. Although it remains true, as stated by the Colonial Secretary in the 
House of Commons, that the missile tracking station will not prejudice the findings 
of the Joint Commission on the Capital Site, it was somewhat disingenuous to have 
led us to believe that this was because it was (again to quote the Colonial Secretary) 
"on a high ridge in a remote and undeveloped part of the leased base." The briefing 
which they gave the Ambassador showed clearly that in fact the missile tracking 
station will depend for its effectiveness on certain ancillary installations which are 
within the Tucker Valley areas. The reason for this lack of frankness is that until the 
last few days the Air Force had not explained the situation fully to the State 
Department. The State Department have subsequently told us that in fact the Air 
Force speeded up the construction of the tracking station as part of a crash 
programme set off as a result of the arrival of Sputnik. Quite apart from the 
dependence of the missile tracking station upon ancillary facilities in the main base 
area, a further factor in the situation now is that any interruption of its construction 
or subsequent operation would seriously affect the installation in Thule of an 
effective ballistic missile early warning system for the whole of the North American 
continent. We believed that the Ministry of Defence already know something of this. 
Despite these new elements in the situation, however, the main point-happily-
remains as stated in the Colonial Secretary's reply, that the decisions of the 
Commission will be based upon the importance of the Naval Base alone, and the 
missile tracking station will have no bearing upon the final recommendations. 
5. A second point of criticism can be made against the suggestion in their Aide 
Memoire that we "urge British officials ... to assist the Commission in maintaining 
its non-political status". As far as we are aware there is no evidence to suggest that 
the Commission has allowed local political considerations to influence it in the 
slightest. We might, if we felt so inclined, take some umbrage at the American 
suggestion that this were even a possibility. The State Department in subsequent 
discussions have made it plain that they did not intend the comment to reflect upon 
the Commission; but they had misunderstood the role which Trinidad officials had 
played last month in the lodging of the protest to the Commission about the missile 
tracking station. They thought that these officials were in some way acting on the 
orders of the Colonial Office. They have been put right on this point, and the last 
sentence of their aide memo ire can therefore be ignored. 
6. A third possible point of criticism is that they may be taking an unduly 
alarmist view of the political situation in Trinidad and the West Indies generally. We 
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notice, for example, that the Governor of Trinidad's Intelligence Report for January 
says that Dr. Eric Williams denied some earlier inflammatory statements attributed 
to him in one of the local newspapers. The same report does not indicate that the 
Chaguaramas issue is receiving any great attention in the speeches of the politicians 
and also records that "there appears to be no anti-American feeling by the general 
public" despite the renewed interest in the capital site question. The State 
Department sources of information however are very much more up to date and 
detailed than our own, and we are in no position here to criticise their assessment of 
the position. They have shown us a number of extracts from the speeches of Dr. 
Williams which appear to support their point of view. 
7. A fourth criticism could be that it is wrong of the Americans to have made an 
approach to us of this kind before the Commission has reported. We could argue that 
we should all suspend judgement until we have seen what the Commission has to 
say. The American reply to this would be that the West Indian politicians themselves 
have not suspended judgement or shown themselves willing to await the verdict of 
the Commission. Dr. Williams for example is on record as saying that they "have 
decided on Chaguaramas and it is nobody's business but the West Indies' where the 
capital should be". The Americans are confident that any objective assessment of the 
situation would leave them in possession of the base. It is in the light of such 
objective considerations that they intend to stand pat. All they are asking us to do is 
to take preventative action now in view of the situation which is obviously 
developing, so that we can avoid a head-on clash later and achieve a solution which 
would be in the best interests of all of us-the West Indies included. This is surely a 
sensible exercise of foresight and not a prejudgment of the issue. 
8. There is one final point of criticism of the American position, which we have in 
fact made to the State Department, and which Dr. Eric Williams was equally quick to 
seize upon, when he said: "The Americans, who are the great anti-colonial nation of 
the world, should be the last to defend (the agreement of 1941)." This, however, 
though a good debating point, is not very relevant to the objective merits of their case 
for retaining Chaguaramas or to the situation which is now so clearly developing. 
9. So much for the points of criticism. The fact remains that we have now been 
invited to make up our minds what our position is to be on the whole Chaguaramas 
issue, and to decide that this should be to support the American stand. We realise 
here, of course, that H.M.G. may well feel that it already has its hands full enough 
with disputes and arguments with the West Indian politicians over such things as 
increased U.K. aid and the Jamaica Regiment, and may be extremely reluctant to 
embark upon another. Nevertheless we feel that on the Chaguaramas issue, H.M.G. 
should now give serious consideration to supporting the American position despite 
any temporary hard feelings which this may cause with the West Indies. To give this 
support would, it seems to us, be in the best interests of all concerned. In the first 
place, quite apart from the obvious embarrassment for us, a head-on clash will do 
serious material damage to the West Indians themselves. It seems fairly clear from 
the recent talks which have taken place in Washington that the United States 
Government are sympathetic towards extending United States aid to the British 
Caribbean. I think that as far as officials are concerned this sympathetic attitude may 
well remain no matter what happens over Chaguaramas, but clearly for political 
reasons all hope of their translating this sympathy into concrete terms would 
disappear if too much bad feeling were stirred up over the base. 
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10. Secondly, there seems to be little argument about the fact that a base in that 
part of the world is of vital importance both to the defence of the Caribbean and to 
the defence of the Western Hemisphere. If the Commission reports as expected that 
there is no alternative site for the base, surely we have a responsibility to ensure that 
the West Indians do not act in a way which would be so seriously prejudicial to all 
our interests. After all we are not giving them complete independence at this stage. 
We retain control of their external affairs and have certain responsibilities for their 
defence. We also have a clear legal obligation to the Americans under the 1941 treaty. 
It surely behoves us to act up to these responsibilities in our own interests as well as 
theirs. 
11. I realise that it may not be easy to decide what in practice we could do to 
damp down the flames of controversy during the election. Perhaps the Colonial 
Office could bring some influence to bear on the Governor-General and the local 
Governors, who, in turn, even in the changed constitutional situation, could have 
some influence on some, at any rate, of the local politicians. It might perhaps be 
possible to do something with the local press. These are matters which it is extremely 
difficult to judge from here, but on which London may have ideas. 
12. We should be grateful if you would keep us fully informed of your reactions 
to this American approach. 
68 CO 1031/2025, no 283, enclosure 21 Mar 1958 
[Federal capital]: letter from Sir F Hoyer Millar to Sir H Caccia1 
(Washington) on how the UK should respond to the US request for 
support over Chaguaramas 
We have been considering the American approach to us over the Chaguaramas affair 
which was the subject of Hood's letter to me, CA/7001/58 of March F and yours of 
March 8. In the process, we have felt it desirable in view of the political issues 
involved to submit the file to the Secretary of State. His personal comment is 
reflected in paragraph 10 below. 
2. We too have heard from our representatives on the Commission that the 
report is likely to be unfavourable to the West Indian point of view. We fully share the 
concern felt by the State Department about the danger of an explosion of public 
feeling in the West Indies, and particularly Trinidad, when the Commission's 
findings become known. Quite apart from the desirability of avoiding a row on 
general grounds, we do not want repercussions of this problem to bedevil the 
celebrations for the inauguration of the Federation, which are due to begin on April 
22 with the presence of Princess Margaret, and we should not like anything to 
happen which might prejudice the Federation's prospects of receiving American aid. 
In order to ensure the full success of the inauguration celebrations and the Royal 
visit, Lord Hailes has gone so far as to suggest that no announcement should be 
made by any of the Governments concerned of the Commission's findings until, say, 
the middle of May. But we do not believe that a leakage, at any rate from West Indian 
sources, could be avoided for so long. While, therefore, we agree with the idea 
1 UK ambassador, Washington, 1956-1961. 2 See 67, enclosure. 
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underlying Lord Hailes suggestion, it is being proposed to him that, subject to his 
and Sir C. Arden-Ciarke's views, the Governments concerned should agree to refrain 
from any public comment for only a fortnight after the Commission has presented its 
report. This would at least lessen the danger of immediate ill-considered expressions 
of opinion on the part of the West Indians, and would give us and the Americans a 
little time to prepare our own public reactions. 
3. However, it is clear that you need, in answering the State Department, 
something more than a rehearsal of our good intentions. We need to dispel the 
illusion that we have not exerted ourselves sufficiently in restraining political 
agitation about Chaguaramas in Trinidad. One of the difficulties we have to face here 
is that the State Department are evidently not aware of some of the reasons why it is 
very difficult for the Governor and his staff to do more than they have done. 
However, I hope that the information with which we have been provided by the 
Colonial Office will help in giving the State Department a clearer understanding of 
the realities of the position. 
4. I suggest that in your reply to Herter (which, subject to your views, we think 
need not be in writing) you should begin by emphasizing that we have always 
recognized the importance of the Base from the point of view of defence and have 
always acknowledged the validity of the United States' legal position. On these points 
our views remain unchanged, however great the political difficulties may be. 
Furthermore, it has always been our intention to abide by the agreed findings of the 
Commission (and until receiving Mr. Herter's aide memoire we had always hoped 
that the Americans would feel bound to do the same). Should the Commission's 
findings indeed be unambiguously opposed to the siting of the capital in the Base, we 
shall do our best to persuade West Indian and Trinidad opinion to accept the 
inevitable and settle on another Trinidad site, probably, as we see it here, with as 
good a grace and as little delay as possible; above all we shall wish to avoid a 
reopening of the whole question of which island should have the capital. Obviously 
we are as concerned as the State Department over the dangers of serious political 
trouble arising over this question in the West Indies, and particularly Trinidad. At 
your discretion you may wish to illustrate this by the special considerations in 
paragraph 2 above; and at the same time request their views on the proposal that the 
Commission's findings should not be made public until a fortnight after they have 
been communicated to all concerned, and that no public statements should be made 
about them during that period. 
5. You might then go on to say that, because of our anxiety that political 
emotions in the West Indies should be tempered so far as possible, we have done all 
we can to achieve this end through the Governors of the colonies concerned, and 
particularly Trinidad. Sir E. Beetham has indeed gone to the length of arranging and 
presiding over a meeting at which Wellings, the American representative on the 
Commission, gave a confidential talk to the Trinidad Executive Council about overall 
defence strategy in the Western hemisphere. We are in fact satisfied that the 
Governor and his staff have done all they reasonably can to exercise influence in the 
right direction, by personal contacts with the Chief Minister, Dr. Eric Williams, and 
the other principal politicians. Unfortunately, the position has not been made any 
easier by the genuine difficulty of explaining away the fact that construction of the 
guided missile tracking station was being pushed ahead while the Commission was 
sitting. Undoubtedly the assurances given from the United States side that the 
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continuation of work on the tracking station was not prejudicing the Commission 
had a beneficial effect. But the fact remains that the area which is being covered by 
the tracking station is a good deal larger than had at first been anticipated and is 
apparently not limited to a high ridge of ground which would be unsuitable for the 
capital site, as was at first stated. There are other difficulties in the way of 
tranquillizing opinion, of which the State Department may not be fully aware. The 
"Trinidad Guardian," the most widely-read daily newspaper in Trinidad and the 
Eastern Caribbean, appears unfortunately to harbour a violent antipathy to the 
United States activities in Trinidad. This newspaper, and others, have repeatedly 
misquoted statements made by the Chief Minister; and the press in general continues 
to fan public interest in the Chaguaramas affair. Yet it is no more possible for the 
Governor to muzzle the press in Trinidad than it would be for the Administration to 
do so in the United States-nor, presumably, would the State Department wish him 
to try. Another serious obstacle is the fact that, for security reasons which may or 
may not be well-founded, it has not been found possible (even at the meeting with 
the Trinidad Executive Council referred to above) to give the West Indians a full 
exposition of the defence considerations involved. (For your own background 
information I enclose a copy of a letter from Sir E. Beetham of February 193 which 
gives further details; this letter was shown in confidence to the United States 
Embassy here, where we believe it had a very salutary effect). 
6. A further point worth making to the State Department is that in our view it 
would be tactically unsound for the Governor to give strong support to the American 
case, at least until the Commission's report is available. The most critical moment, 
when the need for our restraining influence will be at its greatest, will presumably 
come after the Commission has reported, and when it becomes clear that whatever 
the nature of the report the Americans intend to remain inflexible; by coming out too 
strongly on the American side now we would, far from swaying the West Indians in 
the right direction, be undermining any possibility of influencing them when the 
crucial moment arrives. 
7. There are certain ways, however, in which we believe the United States 
Government could assist us in our task. Much would depend, for example, on the 
manner in which the inevitable agitation in the West Indies is handled by official 
spokesmen and in the press in the United States. It would also help to make an 
unfavourable decision less unpalatable to the West Indians if the Americans could 
make some economic concessions which would be valuable to the Federation and the 
Trinidad Government; for example, an offer to forego some of their duty-free rights 
(paragraph 4 of your letter of March 8) would be very welcome in Trinidad (the 
Federation itself would not benefit but the most serious problem is in Trinidad); the 
opportunity might also be taken for the United States Government to make known 
locally, in a suitable manner, their offer of economic aid, although, in order to avoid 
the impression that a bribe was being offered, the timing of any announcement 
would have to be carefully co-ordinated with the Governor and Lord Hailes. Finally, 
it would also help if the Americans were to follow up Admiral Davis'4 suggestion that 
they should send warships more often to the naval base in order to show that it was 
in serious use as such; it would, of course, be important not to overdo this, especially 
3 See 66. 
4 Admiral Sir William Davis, c-in-c, Home Fleet and NATO c-in-c, Eastern Atlantic, 1958-1960. 
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during the difficult period immediately following the publication of the 
Commission's findings. 
8. In reply to the American request that we should refrain from suggesting a 
compromise which would result in the partitioning of the Chaguaramas Base, you 
can say that we should certainly nbt ourselves put forward any such suggestion. Our 
information, however, does not confirm the American theory that partitioning of the 
Base would be unacceptable to the West Indians in the last resort. We had always 
hoped indeed that the Commission might be able to recommend a solution based on 
partition, practicable from the defence angle and not necessarily involving 
unacceptable expenditure by the United States. We do not know what shape the 
Commission's report will take. But if the report does not on defence grounds exclude 
a compromise solution based on partition, we could not justifiably resist an initiative 
from the West Indian side to invite the State Department to consider, with the 
Defense Department, whether the political advantages of meeting the Federation's 
wishes might not be worth the cost involved. It might be worth while reminding the 
State Department of these political advantages, which are in brief those of retaining 
friendly relations with the Federation in its early years; avoiding the danger of the 
Federation being seriously weakened by a revival of inter-island dissensions on the 
capital issue; and the desirability of not giving propaganda material to anti-American 
elements all over the world. 
9. We regard it as inevitable that there should be more or less serious trouble in 
Trinidad if and when it becomes known that the capital cannot be sited at 
Chaguaramas. But I hope that this letter will give you enough material to satisfy the 
State Department at least that we have acted in accordance with our degree of 
responsibility for keeping the agitation within manageable proportions if possible, 
and that they can count on us not to let them down over the defence aspect of the 
problem. The American Embassy here have spoken to us in the same sense as Herter 
did to you, and the Ambassador has gone so far as to mention the subject to the 
Prime Minister; we are informing the Embassy therefore of the general substance of 
this letter. 
10. As I mentioned above, this file has been seen personally by the Secretary of 
State, who has given his general approval to this letter. I think you should know his 
general feeling, which connects up incidentally with paragraph 8 of Sammy Hood's 
letter of March 1. He feels that the Americans want it both ways, in both encouraging 
anti-colonialism of all kinds and then lecturing us for not behaving as colonialists. 
Against this background, he feels that we are able to help much more if we can be 
rather detached and take the line that our good offices are always available in what is 
becoming a matter between the Federation and the United States. One realizes of 
course that you cannot apply this argument literally to every element in the case; the 
point, I think, is that if we go too far overboard on the American side now, any efforts 
on our part to exercise a moderating influence later will be quite useless. 
11. Finally, with regard to Admiral Davis ' suggestion (penultimate paragraph of 
your letter of March 8) that Sir C Arden-Ciarke might travel back to London via 
Washington when the Commission has concluded its work. I entirely agree that this 
would be a good idea, and the CO have put the idea to him through the Governor of 
Trinidad. We will let you know the outcome. 
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69 Co 103112961, no 5 Mar 1958 
'The West Indies': CO note for the War Office on the finances of the 
federation and the federal prime minister [Extract] 
... Finance and economic 
12. The Federation will not have an easy passage economically or financially. For 
the first five years its own revenues will be chiefly in the form of a mandatory levy on 
the federating territories. The total revenue from this levy, which has a fixed annual 
ceiling of £1,900,000, and from other sources is little greater than the estimated 
Federal expenditure and leaves only a small margin for the building up of capital 
reserves. Economically the region as a whole is not wealthy, although better off than 
it sometimes thinks it is and West Indian leaders are very keenly aware of these 
difficulties an awaremess [sic] which sometimes results in extravagant demands for 
financial aid from Her Majesty's Government. In fact Her Majesty's Government has 
given and will continue to give for some time grants to assist those territories within 
the Federation that cannot meet their own administrative expenses annually, 
assistance through Colonial Development and Welfare funds, through the Colonial 
Development Corporation, in the raising of loans etc. It is a fact that the West Indies 
have received proportionately more aid from Her Majesty's Government in the last 
twelve years than any other part of the United Kingdom Dependencies. 
13. The maximum amounts payable annually by territories under the mandatory 
levy are as follows:-
£ 
Antigua 25,400 
Barbados 162,600 
Dominica 20,900 
Grenada 32,200 
Jamaica 819,100 
Montserrat 5,200 
St. Kitts 32,800 
St. Lucia 33,000 
St. Vincent 24,900 
Trinidad 733,900 
(It should be noted that these sums do not represent merely the cost of "federation" 
to the individual territories, for they include elements in respect of annual 
contributions that the territories have been accustomed to paying since long before 
federation became an accomplished fact, towards the maintenance of regional 
educational and technical institutions and advisory and other services.) Under the 
terms of the Constitution the Federal Government is not permitted to levy income 
tax during the first five years; it may levy customs and excise duties (though it has 
not yet decided to do so) provided that the total revenue from these and the 
mandatory levy does not exceed £1,900,000 annually during the first five years. 
The federal prime minister 
14. There has been much speculation lately as to which, if any, of the three 
leading West Indian politicians would become Prime Minister. They are Mr. Norman 
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Manley, Chief Minister of Jamaica, Dr. Eric Williams, Chief Minister of Trinidad and 
Sir Grantley Adams, Premier of Barbados. All three not long ago announced their 
intention not to stand for the Federal elections, and had this been so the success of 
the Federation would have been greatly endangered for there are, so far, no other 
politicians of their stature on the horizon. Dr. Williams' decision was taken on the 
grounds of the need for Trinidad to improve her economic position as speedily as 
possible and in the light of his own fairly recent accession to the Chief Ministership 
of the territory. Mr. Manley's reasons are his concern that anti-Federal forces in 
Jamaica should not get the upper hand in his absence and the need for economic 
strength in Jamaica and Trinidad, the two biggest members of the Federation. After 
Mr. Manley's decision was announced, Sir Grantley Adams changed his mind and 
decided to stand for the Federal elections and there is very little doubt that, as the 
leading candidate of the stronger of the two Federal Parties, the Federal Labour 
Party, he will be returned and elected Prime Minister. If this proves to be so there 
will be some advantage in having a Federal Prime Minister who is backed in their 
Territories by both Mr. Manley and Dr. Williams. The fact that Mr. Manley remains in 
Jamaica as a pro-Federationist may hold Jamaica within the Federation, for there is 
little doubt that Mr. Manley's fears for his own territory are substantiated; the power 
of a Federation that lacked Jamaica's financial and economic resources would be 
sadly weakened .... 
70 CO 1031/2026, no 315A 25 Mar 1958 
[ Chaguaramas Joint Commission]: chapter VII of the report, summary 
of the commission's conclusions 
115. The principal conclusions are summarised as follows:-
Strategic and military considerations 
(1) Strategically the Naval Base in the Eastern Caribbean should be on the Gulf of 
Paria. (Paragraph 37.) 
(2) The site selected for such a base must be capable of conforming to the military 
requirements. (Paragraph 45.) 
United States Naval Base, Trinidad 
(3) The present Base at Chaguaramas fulfils the strategic and military 
requirements for a naval base in the Eastern Caribbean. (Paragraph 60.) 
Possible alternative sites for a naval base in the Eastern Caribbean 
(4)(i) The only alternative sites in The West Indies which fulfi l the strategic 
requirements and can be made to conform to the military requirements for a 
United States Naval Base in the Eastern Caribbean are the Caroni Swamp, 
Waterloo North and Waterloo South, Savaneta and Irois Bay, all situated on the 
west coast of Trinidad on the Gulf of Paria. (Paragraphs 66- 67.) 
(4)(ii) The cost of development to provide what exists at Chaguaramas today on 
these sites would vary from 226 to 425 million W.I. dollars (£47 to £88~ million 
sterling or U.S. dollars 132 to 248 million approximately) and the time required to 
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construct these facilities would vary from five and a half to ten years. (Paragraphs 
75-77.) 
(5) The United States and United Kingdom Naval Representatives agree that if the 
Governments concerned agree in principle to move the Base, and if the necessary 
funds are made available, from military considerations IROIS BAY would be the 
preferable choice of the alternative sites. But in their opinion Chaguaramas is the 
most suitable site for a naval base on the Gulf of Paria. (Paragraph 96.) 
Investigation of possible release of portion of the United States Naval Base 
(6) There is no significant portion of useable area within the Chaguaramas Naval 
Base that is not essential to the Base's mission. (Paragraph 100.) 
(7) The release of any portion of the Chaguaramas Base as a prelude to its 
ultimate total release is impracticable. (Paragraph 104.) 
(8) The partition of the Chaguaramas Base is not practicable. (Paragraph 109.) 
7 1 CO 1031/2628, no 54 3 Apr 1958 
[Federal elections]: letter from K D Law1 to A R Adair2 on the results 
of the March elections 
You asked for a short piece about the results of the Federal Elections in The West 
Indies for circulation, confidentially, to Commonwealth Governments. The full 
results are annexed,3 and so far as we know they are accurate although they were 
compiled from various sources, not all official. The following briefly summarises the 
position. 
The results of the Federal Elections held on the 25th March show that, apart from 
the possibility of further recounts in individual constituencies or of defection among 
the successful local parties (particularly in Grenada, where it has been rumoured 
that the two members elected are thinking of transferring their allegiance to the 
"Opposition" party), Mr. Manley's West Indies Federal Labour Party has gained 254 of 
the available 45 seats and Sir Alexander Bustamante's Democratic Labour Party of 
The West Indies 19. The remaining seat has fallen to the Barbados National Party, 
which is not affiliated to either of the two Federal parties, but it seems probable that 
the candidate returned will side with Sir Grantley Adams' Barbados Labour Party and 
hence with the Federal Labour Party; if so, Mr. Manley's party would have a majority 
of seven5 in the Federal House of Representatives. 
While the smaller islands have remained, in general, true to the Federal Labour 
Party, in both Jamaica and Trinidad, where both parties put up candidates in each 
constituency, there were stinging defeats for the parties locally in power (Mr. 
Manley's People's National Party and Dr. Williams' People's National Movement), 
both of which are affiliated to the Federal Labour Party. Only four members of the 
1 Higher executive officer, CO. 2 Principal, CRO. 3 Not printed. 
4 Subsequently reduced to twenty-three when the two Grenada members declared themselves 
independents. 
5 Subsequently reduced to one, the member from the Barbados National Party also being regarded as an 
independent. 
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former Standing Federation Committee have been returned, and of ·these Sir 
Grantley Adams seems certain to be elected the first Prime Minister; if so, he will 
probably have as leader of the Opposition either Mr. Albert Comes or Mr. Ashford 
Sinanan, both of Trinidad. 
The Governor-General has issued a Proclamation summoning the Legislature to 
meet for the first time on the 18th April, when the Senate will elect a President and 
Deputy President and the House of Representatives a Speaker (either from among 
their members or from outside the House) and Deputy Speaker. Then, or shortly 
afterwards, the House will elect a person for appointment as Prime Minister. 
I hope this will suffice? 
72 CO 103112026, no 321 3 Apr 1958 
[Federal capital]: letter from Mr Selwyn Lloyd to Sir H Caccia 
(Washington) on the American response to the findings of the 
Chaguaramas Joint Commission1 
The United States Ambassador called on me to-day. 
Mr. Whitney said that the United States Embassy would be sending a note about 
the Chaguaramas dispute. The note would refer to their previous note of last June 
which had stressed the necessity for keeping the United States base at Chaguaramas. 
It would also cite United States participation in the conference and in the 
Commission as evidence of American recognition of the seriousness of the situation 
concerning both our Governments and the West Indies. The note would refer to the 
Commission's conclusions which supported the United States point of view about the 
impossibility of releasing the base. Finally, the note would ask Her Majesty's 
Government, in the light of the Commission's report, to advise the West Indies that 
Her Majesty's Government could not request the United States Government to 
release the base and that this request should therefore be withdrawn. 
The Ambassador said that it was hoped this action could be taken before the report 
was released, since the United States Government at that stage would have to make a 
public statement of their position. He added that the recent elections in the West 
Indies has [sic] provided no evidence that there was any popular demand there for 
the release of the base. 
I said that we were anxious to help in any way we could but the basic difficulty was 
that once people were given independence we could not then simply order them 
about. It might well make the situation more difficult if we were to tell the West 
Indies that they must accept the Commission's report. 
I told the Ambassador that we had been very distressed to hear from the Chairman 
of the Commission that the United States members had made it quite plain that they 
thought the British members, including the Chairman himself, had orders from 
London to support the West Indian position. This was quite untrue. Our whole 
purpose was to have an objective study made and we were very conscious of the 
importance which the United States attached to the matter. The problem had been 
under constant review at the highest levels. 
1 See 70. 
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I said that before giving any formal reply we should of course have to study the 
United States note. My preliminary reaction was that our advice to the West Indians 
might well be that it would pay them to accept the Commission's report 
magnanimously. We had in fact been advised by Sir Arden-Clarke that an offer of 
substantial United States financial assistance for building the capital elsewhere 
might help to resolve the problem. Our advice to the United States Government must 
be that they for their part should act generously towards the West Indies and thus 
"sugar the pill." 
73 CO 103112022, no 2 12 May 1958 
[US bases]: letter from J E Marnham to Lieutenant-Colonel A 
Lovelace1 on the functions of the various US defence facilities in the 
West Indies 
Would you please refer to Wallace's letter to Luke of the 26th August, 1957, about the 
handling of questions connected with the United States Defence facilities in the West 
In dies? 
2. The end of the enclosure to that letter mentioned the need to provide the 
federal headquarters with detailed background information about the U.S. facilities 
and the terms on which they are held, and the main object of this letter is to forward 
copies of a Memorandum2 on the subject which is intended to present a 
comprehensive picture of the present position and to serve as a basic document for 
the Federation's future activities in this sphere. (We intend to supplement this with a 
set of printed copies of the various Agreements. Some of these are now difficult to 
come by but we shall do our best to provide a complete series which I will forward as 
soon as possible.) 
3. The Memorandum is divided into three main parts. The first contains a survey 
of the different categories of bases which at present exist, their relative importance, 
and the Agreements which relate to them. The second part examines those 
Agreements in some detail: in the first place distinguishing between the provisions of 
the Leased Bases Agreement 1941 and those of the later Agreements; going on to 
discuss the most important provisions which are common to all the Agreements; and 
finally touching briefly on the administrative arrangements which supplement the 
terms of the Agreements themselves. The third main part lists the various matters on 
which action is outstanding. 
4. You will see that the Memorandum is graded "Secret" only. This means of 
course that it can if necessary be shown to Ministers, or its substance quoted to 
them, although naturally we should not wish this to be done unless there were good 
reasons for doing so, and while Chaguaramas remains a matter of controversy you 
may well want to think hard before drawing attention to the question of the 
outstanding formal leases (see comment on Part IIA below). There is however 
additional information on one or two points which has been deliberately excluded 
from the Memorandum so that there would be no chance of Ministers seeing it. It 
1 Defence officer to the federal government. 2 Not printed. 
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will perhaps be simplest if I discuss this additional information in relation to those 
parts of the Memorandum in which it would otherwise have appeared. 
Part I(ii) 
The Missile Tracking Station in Trinidad is regarded as a project of the utmost 
importance. It is an experimental station on which the development of a system of 
defence for the whole Western Hemisphere against Inter-Continental Ballistic 
Missiles largely depends. The chain of stations which it is hoped to establish as a 
result of the work to be carried out in Trinidad will be very widely flung, e.g. 
including a station in northern Scotland. 
The U.S. have recently shown signs of wanting another station in Grenada or 
Carriacou. If they present us with a firm request, they will of course be asked to 
demonstrate the need for it by giving some information about its function. 
Meanwhile they have hinted that it would have some connection with the work to be 
carried out in Trinidad. 
Part I(iv) 
The description of functions quoted in the Memorandum is that given for public 
consumption and deliberately conceals the real significance of these stations. The 
true purpose of the Oceanographic Research Stations is the detection at long range 
(sometimes hundreds of miles) of snorting enemy submarines by the use of very low 
frequency underwater sound techniques. The Stations in The West Indies form part 
of a chain stretching as far north as Bermuda. This defence activity, the high 
importance of which is obvious, has been given the code name "Caesar". 
Part I(v) 
The chief reason why little progress has been made in regard to Loran Stations at St. 
Kitts and Tobago is the unwillingness of the Governments concerned to enter into 
Agreements similar to those proposed for the South Caicos and San Salvador 
Stations. The St. Kitts Government stipulated conditions (especially in connection 
with jurisdiction) which were unacceptable to the U.S. The Trinidad Government, 
while prepared to allow the U.S. the usual powers and privileges, were unwilling to 
accept the publicity which would attend a formal cession of rights. (This was before 
the Chaguaramas issue arose: it seems doubtful whether the Trinidad Government 
would at present permit any new U.S. activity.) 
Part IIA-Title to land 
The area for which the lack of a lease is most significant is the Tucker Valley which 
forms part of the Chaguaramas Base. There is however an undoubted commitment to 
iease this addition to the original base and for practical purposes it must be regarded 
in exactly the same light as that part of the base covered by a formal lease. 
Part !!A-Use of evacuated land 
The fact that the former Bases can be reoccupied at short notice is a major deterrent 
to the development of the areas. This is particularly unfortunate in St. Lucia where 
the disused naval base occupies one of the few areas which are well suited to tourist 
development and one in which potential developers have shown considerable 
interest. Since the strategic need for the base has apparently disappeared, an 
approach has been made to the U.S. for its unconditional release. Their response is 
still awaited. 
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Part Ill 
The original causes of the delay in executing formal leases and enacting 
comprehensive legislation were largely technical but the major obstacle today is a 
political one. It would for example clearly be impracticable at the moment to suggest 
to the Trinidad Government the execution of a lease covering the Tucker Valley and 
the introduction of legislation formally granting the U.S. special powers and 
privileges. Nor is the Jamaica Government likely to consider this an auspicious time 
to make such a public concession to the Americans. 
5. The primary purpose of this letter and its enclosure is of course to give general 
background information, which would not otherwise be readily available to you, on 
all the U.S. defence activities in the Caribbean. As Wallace mentioned in his letter, 
however, it seems to us that the Federal Government must play a bigger and bigger 
part in these matters as time goes by; and we therefore hope that, given the 
background information, you will be able to give some consideration fairly soon to 
the way in which the Federal Government should assume responsibility. As a first 
step it has occurred to us that the Federal Government might be brought into the 
question of the new Granada [sic] station mentioned under Part I(ii) above. This 
project is of course only in the survey stage at the moment, but it is likely to be the 
first completely new U.S. Bases issue to arise in the Federal Government's lifetime. 
We have it in mind that, should the survey result in a formal request for a new 
station, H.M. Government (to whom the formal request will be addressed) should 
forward the information which the U.S. give to justify the request, together with a 
British assessment of the strength of the U.S. case, to the Governor-General in the 
first instance, asking him to consider, in consultation with the Governor of the 
Windward Islands, whether the request should be granted. Obviously the attitude of 
the Grenada Government would be one of the important factors to be taken into 
account and initially we expect that the Federal Government would not be able to do 
much more than transmit the correspondence and take a friendly interest, including 
participation in the local discussions. Even that however would be a start, and we 
would hope that as soon as possible the Federal Government would take over the 
complete responsibility for negotiations at the West Indian end. Later we must 
consider what part the Federal Government will play in tying up the various loose 
ends mentioned in Part Ill of the Memorandum. Though the time for this has not yet 
arrived, and for the moment we can confine ourselves to repeating to the 
Governor- General any correspondence about the more straightforward matters in 
which the knot is practically tied already, it may well be that some of the more 
difficult unresolved issues can in fact only be solved by the Federal Government 
taking over the sole West Indian responsibility for dealing with them, e.g. where 
legislation has to be passed it would seem to us not only constitutionally correct that 
it should be Federal legislation, as dealing with a matter of defence and international 
relations, but also that this would be the only possible way politically of getting the 
matter dealt with at all. However, that is looking a bit to the future, and to come back 
to the present, we propose to offer the Federal Government its second U.S. Base issue 
(the first being Chaguaramas!) by sending you in due course any formal request 
there may be for a new station in Grenada. 
6. I am sorry to inflict all this on you in your first few days as Federal Defence 
Officer. However, as you will see, no immediate action is necessary. Perhaps when 
you have settled into your post you will be able to give some thought to the subject. 
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We shall be very interested to hear your views; and we shall of course be very glad to 
provide any additional information you would like, as far as we are able. 
7 4 CO 968/563, no 3 4 June 1958 
[Defence]: letter from A Campbelll to Major-General 1 RC Hamiltonz 
on the defence outlook in the West Indies 
Now that Rogers has returned from the Caribbean we have discussed the long-term 
garrison requirements for the area, and I am able to give you our views on Gregson's 
letter of the 3rd April. 
2. The minimum internal security and defence requirement of the Caribbean 
was assessed at two battalions in the joint Colonial Office/War Office memorandum 
of January, 1957. The proposed withdrawal of the British battalion in February 1960, 
as part of the planned reduction of the British Army to 165,000 men, was linked with 
plans for forming and training a two-battalion West India Regiment from amongst 
the West Indian territories. But since the decision was taken there have been changes 
of such a nature in our plans for the Regiment, and other developments in the area 
(particularly the unrest in the Bahamas),3 as to oblige us to re-examine the proposed 
withdrawal. 
3. In our joint memorandum we envisaged a fully-trained two-battalion West 
India Regiment which would serve the requirements of all the West Indian territories 
(with the exception of the Bahamas); one battalion being primarily for use in the 
Western Caribbean whilst the other would operate in the Eastern Caribbean. It was 
not then envisaged that the Regiment would be solely a force of those territories 
which have now formed themselves together in the Federation of The West Indies: 
British Guiana had at that time agreed to participate, and we hoped that British 
Honduras would also. We, in fact, had seen this force as a regional force which would 
come into existence before Federation. But it now looks like becoming, at least 
initially, an exclusive force of the Federal Government. We certainly see no prospect 
of British Honduras participating at the moment, and British Guiana, although it 
agreed to participate in the Regiment in 1956, has since got cold feet. This is partly 
due to a change of government but chiefly, we feel, because Federation has preceded 
the re-formation of the Regiment so that there is a reluctance to identify the Colony 
with what everyone will regard in the West Indies as a Federal force. In the 
circumstances we judge that the wisest policy is not to force the issue, but to leave 
the door open for British Guiana to join at a later date, which may be subsequent to 
their possible inclusion in the Federation. 
1 Assistant secretary, CO, head of Defence Dept. 2 Director of military operations, War Office. 
3 Long standing dissatisfaction over labour conditions in the Bahamas led to a general strike in Jan 1958. 
The immediate cause was a union dispute over taxi services to the new International Airport. The 
nineteen-day long strike by the Taxicab Union closed the airport and affected the tourist industry. Sir 
Raynor Arthur, the governor, thought the situation so serious that he telegraphed Jamaica for British 
troops. A company of the Worcester Regiment arrived in Nassau on 14 Jan and remained there for the next 
year. The labour unrest prompted Lennox-Boyd to visit the Bahamas. The constitution was reformed and 
majority rule introduced. 
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4. The exclusion of these two territories and, even more important, the limited 
sum made available by the Federation for defence, mean that we cannot plan on the 
Federation forces consisting of much more than one full-strength battalion, which 
itself might not be fully trained by February, 1960. This itself is disturbing enough, 
although (with the possibility of reinforcement from the U.K., and the frigates on the 
West Indies station) I do not think that on that account alone we would have asked 
for reconsideration of your plans. We are however greatly concerned about the 
territories outside the Federation, and the Bahamas. None of these will be able to call 
on the West India Regiment. 
5. The position in British Guiana has been quiet for some time, but although the 
local politicians might argue that the territory could well do without the present 
company of British troops or a company of the West India Regiment, we do not feel 
able to accept this view and we doubt whether the position will have changed 
much-for the better, at least-by 1960. We are further advised that, if the British 
Guiana Volunteer Force is to be kept up to its present standards, it will be necessary 
for it to have the assistance of British officers and NCOs for training purposes after 
1960. In British Honduras, as recent events have shown, Guatemalan pretensions are 
still strong and liable to manifest themselves in various ways. We think that the need 
for a U.K. garrison there is likely to persist after 1960. In the Bahamas we cannot be 
sure how long the requirement for a company will last, but the situation has the 
ingredients of recurrent trouble. 
6. We therefore think that we should ask you to plan on the assumption that 
detachments of British troops be made available to British Guiana, British Honduras 
and possibly the Bahamas after February, 1960, leaving the Federal area itself to the 
West India Regiment. We realize, however, the difficulties of maintaining detached 
companies of troops in such widely separated spots, and if from your point of view it 
was desirable to locate Battalion Headquarters in the area, we should be quite happy 
for it to remain in Jamaica, where facilities and accommodation already exist. But I 
should make it clear that, even if for convenience troops continued to be based 
within the Federal area, we would not consider it justifiable to approach the Federal 
Government for a contribution towards costs, except if British troops were called 
into action in the Federation. What contribution the outlying territories should pay 
for the detachments they need will be for consideration. As you know, at present the 
Bahamas are paying full excess costs and British Guiana excess costs as compared 
with Jamaica. 
7. We would not propose at present to look beyond 1963 in our planning because 
by that time the position of the Federal Government is to be reviewed and it is 
possible that independence might not then be far away. By that time too the security 
situation may have changed. 
8. I might perhaps mention that Mr. Profumo, our Parliamentary Under-
Secretary, who has a special responsibility in the Colonial Office both for the West 
Indies and for defence matters, is personally interested in this whole question. He 
was in the Caribbean a short time ago and has heard at first hand how much 
importance the Area Commander and our Governors attach to an early and 
favourable decision by the War Office. 
9. I have sent a copy of this letter to Cough in the Ministry of Defence. 
[75] AUG 1958 209 
75 CO 1031/2028, no 548 6 Aug 1958 
[Chaguaramas]: letter from D Williams (Washington) to J E Marnham 
criticising the behaviour of US officials in Trinidad 
I have just got back from a fortnight in Trinidad. It was almost entirely taken up with 
work on the Caribbean Commission but I did have a chance to discuss the 
Chaguaramas issue with the Governor General, the S.L.O, and Orebaugh,1 as well as 
with a number of other people. You may be interested to have my reactions on one 
aspect of the problem which concerns me most closely. 
This can be very shortly summarised by saying that I am frankly appalled at the 
way the Americans are mishandling the situation locally. The fault lies, I feel sure, in 
the joint firm of Messrs. Orebaugh and Habib.2 The latter I did not see since he was 
on leave in Barbados but I have met him in Washington. Orebaugh I have not met 
before and although I find him personally much more likeable a character than 
Habib, his whole background and approach to problems make him quite unfit for the 
present situation in Trinidad. 
You may remember that in his letter of July 8th the Governor General referred to 
Orebaugh's "distinguished war record". The significance of this was lost upon me at 
the time but it now seems the clue to the whole situation. Apparently Orebaugh 
spent part of the war on "special operations" in Italy and was later with C. I.A. He has 
a mentality adapted to that sort of an approach and I think in his heart of hearts 
really sees the situation in Trinidad entirely in those terms. If he could take to the 
hills and organise an anti-PNM movement with Mr. Habib stowed away in some 
bazaar in Port of Spain as his local intelligence agent, he would be perfectly happy 
and would probably do a thoroughly good job. What he lacks is any idea of how to 
employ diplomacy, tact and patience in a situation where those are the only qualities 
which are ever likely to get him anywhere. He keeps on harping on the fact that 
"somebody must do something". He is not prepared to leave the situation to time and 
the influence of good personal relations and good sense. He thinks of it entirely in 
terms of fostering counter movements and of somehow trying to buy off the 
agitation. The effect of his efforts is in consequence always the very opposite of what 
he intends them to be, and the mistrust of him and of the whole American Consulate 
in Port of Spain is very considerable. 
I propose to say all of this privately to my contacts in the State Department and do 
not suggest that you do anything about it in London. This background, however, may 
be useful to you because it now seems to me that Orebaugh's personal approach to 
the local situation in Trinidad is colouring the whole of the American attitude over 
Chaguaramas, with results which could be unfortunate for all of us. 
1 Waiter Orebaugh, US consul-general, Trinidad, 1957-1958. 
2 Philip Habib, US consul-general, Trinidad, 1958-1959. Later special representative of President Reagan 
in the Middle East, 1981-1983. 
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76 CO 103112447, no 12 9 Aug 1958 
'Abandoning us': editorial from the Jamaica Times on the question of 
UK financial assistance to the Federation 
[Manley echoed the sentiments in the editorial reproduced here in his speech at Hailes's 
inauguration in Jan 1958. On that occasion he said: 'But you will forgive me if I complain 
about what is regarded throughout the West Indies as a parsimonious attitude towards 
this new Federation'. Recalling that the Jamaica delegation had asked for a loan at the 
1956 conference (see 44), he continued: 'That request was rejected almost with scorn. 
And yet, already we find that such things as the University College of the West Indies and 
the West India Regiment are making larger claims on us than we can meet' (CO 
1031/2447, no 9).] 
Viewed with a practical eye, the trend of Colonial Office policy towards The West 
Indies, whether so intended or not, appears to be leading inevitably to eventual 
abandonment of United Kingdom interest and influence in the Area. It is a most 
peculiar fact that despite the unquestionable and traditional affection of West Indians 
for the Throne, despite our known and continuing objective of remaining in the 
British Commonwealth if and after Dominion status is achieved, British attitudes 
and actions toward us are by no means encouraging, while they should be 
increasingly preferential. 
There is no greater fountain of goodwill in the Western Hemisphere for Britain 
than exists in The West Indies. Yet, on the economic side, what is the position? With 
the Launching of Federation, the United Kingdom promised a grant towards 
construction of the Federation Capital-money which we cannot spend since we 
haven't yet found a site. As one wit said, Britain was in a hurry to say we couldn't get 
Chaguaramas because her Treasury officials saw where they could save some money 
(the construction grant) if we had no place to build the Capital! 
A very serious aspect of the matter, however, is that the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies has made the firm ruling that there will be no increase in CD&W grants-in-
aid to the Units in the Federation, which means that Britain has not contributed a 
single penny of new money to the W.l., bearing in mind that the Capital site grant 
(the only proposed new contribution) is still in the British Treasury and will remain 
there for a long, long time. It is open to suspicion whether all this is not being 
deliberately done to delay indefinitely the final steps to full autonomy. It was only 
recently that the Secretary of State declared that before the granting of Dominion 
status, the W.I. would have to stand on its own legs, forgetting it seems, that in a way 
Britain is standing on America's legs and also using up some of the dollars being 
earned by The West Indies to keep up her hard currency position while we have to 
bear the hardships of restrictions. 
Left as it were to paddle its own canoe, the fledgling Federal Government has to be 
oaring in other directions. At the moment the general belief is that the effort will not 
survive unless we can secure substantial assistance particularly from Canada and also 
from the United States. Naturally the more we strengthen our ties with these 
countries, the less the people will think of Britain. A great pity in view of what is 
happening in other parts of the British Caribbean Area. Britain may well be fighting a 
losing battle in British Honduras; reports are current that certain U.S. sources are 
secretly backing Guatemala's claim to the mainland territory. In the case of British 
Guiana, who can tell? Jagan at an opportune stage may well think of closer 
attachment to South America. 
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Even in Mrica, Nkrumah1 has talked of making Ghana a Republic, a course which 
in time would almost certainly be followed by vast Nigeria. So in the Commonwealth 
and Empire, in the way of loyalty and belief in a straight British future, few other 
territories can today equal The West Indies in sincerity. Yet we are the people that 
Britain, it appears, has chosen to leave to swim if we can, or sink if we can't. 
1 Kwame Nkrumah, prime minister of Gold Coast, 1952-1957, of Ghana, 1957-1960; president of Ghana, 
1960-1966. 
77 CO 103112064, no 41 27 Aug 1958 
[ Chaguaramas]: letter from D H T Hildyard1 to J E Marnham on how 
best to approach the question of revising the 1941 agreement 
[The federal government did not accept that the report of the Chaguaramas Joint 
Commission was the end of the matter. At the beginning of June it put out a statement 
insisting that there should now be a conference of the parties concerned to consider the 
issue further. It accepted the defence arguments about the necessity for a base in the 
Eastern Caribbean, especially in 'the present state of world tension' , but it did not agree 
that a final decision should be taken which would effectively confirm the perpetuation of 
a lease for ninety-nine years even though during that time world tensions might 
disappear. The federal government would remain in its temporary headquarters in 
Trinidad until the matter had been resolved (CO 1031/2027, no 412, enclosure, Hailes to 
Lennox-Boyd, 30 May 1958). There was also the position of the government of Trinidad to 
consider. In Aug 1958 the CO informed the FO that Beetham was of the view that Eric 
Williams now realised the difficulty of his own position and that he was casting around for 
possible ways of retreating without losing face. Williams, it was suggested, might be 
prepared to make a public statement to the effect that the government of Trinidad 
recognised that it was impracticable to expect the US to relinquish Chaguaramas, at any 
rate for the next ten years, on condition that a conference, as was provided for under 
article 28 of the 1941 agreement, could be held to review the terms of the agreement. The 
justification now for a review was that conditions were very different from those existing 
in 1941. Account had to be taken, not only of political advances in the West Indies but 
also of the more recent, and far less stringent, agreements concluded between the US and 
other foreign countries for the provision of facilities for US forces. In the letter 
reproduced here, Hildyard is responding to a CO draft of how this proposal might be put 
to the Americans. Even before Hildyard's letter was received, the CO was aware of the FO 
position. Marnham had minuted on 20 Aug: 'The F.O. start from the basic assumption 
that it would be catastrophic in the present state of the world to do anything which 
appeared to "undermine the main pillars of Western defence", among which the 1941 
Bases Agreement looms in their eyes, I gathered, as large as NATO and similar major 
undertakings. Any suggestion that we and the Americans were considering revising the 
Agreement would on this thesis be disastrous. I gather that this view is held with great 
vigour at at least Deputy Secretary level in the Foreign Office and that it would take a 
near-earthquake to shift it' (CO 1031/2064) .] 
In your letter to Hankey, WIS 37/881/01 of August 6, you suggested that we might 
seek the agreement of the Americans to a conference to review the provisions of the 
1941 Bases Agreement on condition that Dr. Williams, the Chief Minister of Trinidad, 
agreed to shelve the Chaguaramas issue at least for the next ten years. 
2. As you know, we have always been opposed to suggesting a conference to the 
Americans as a safety valve for the ill feelings aroused since the publication of the 
report of the Chaguaramas Commission. We are, moreover, particularly strongly 
opposed to anything which might give the impression that we were questioning one of 
the basic agreements for Western Defence at a moment when Anglo-American 
1 American Dept, FO. 
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solidarity on defence matters and a united front towards the rest of the world are vitally 
important. Nor, indeed, do we think that we can press the review of the agreement 
without at least a prime facie case that some of its provisions are anachronistic. 
3. We appreciate, however, the advantages to be gained from a deal of the kind sug-
gested by the Governor if it would lead to a detente in Trinidad. We have given con-
siderable thought to the ways in which we might ask the Americans to assist us in 
securing such a detente and forestalling an outburst of feeling which might follow the 
publication of the report of the legal committee set up by Dr. Williams. Rather than 
make an approach on the lines which you suggest we think that the best procedure 
would be to discuss the state of affairs in Trinidad with the Americans and to suggest 
to them that they themselves should review the 1941 agreement in the light of com-
parable agreements concluded recently with other powers. If this review showed that 
some of the provisions of the 1941 agreement were both out of date and onerous we 
should hope to be able to persuade the Americans to agree to invite us and represen-
tatives of the West Indies to join them in revising the agreement. I enclose a draft of 
the letter2 we would propose to send to Viscount Hood in Washington, if you agree. If, 
of course, the Americans' review concluded that Trinidad has no cause for complaint, 
we should have to stand out against Dr. Williams and the deal would fall through. I 
understand, however, that you believe that there are various provisions or at least reg-
ulations governing the status of United States forces which are in need of revision. 
2 Not printed. 
78 CO 1032/196, no 123 24 Sept 1958 
[Immigration]: circular letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Lord Hailes 
and West Indian governors and administrators on constructive 
measures to improve conditions for West Indians in the UK [Extract] 
[Racial disturbances broke out in the UK in Nottingham on 23 Aug 1958. They were 
followed by outbreaks in London, mostly in the Notting Hill area. A number of West 
Indian ministers visited the UK where their presence was said by Lennox-Boyd to have 
restored 'confidence among the coloured community'. In discussions the CO realised 
that it would not be acceptable to West Indian ministers to ask them to 'turn off the 
passport tap completely', but Manley in particular recognised that the present 
employment prospects were dubious and that an 'uncontrolled flow of persons seeking 
work' would do a 'grave disservice' to the West Indians already in the UK, especially the 
8,000 unemployed. Manley himself had explained that 'administrative measures' might 
be used in the West Indies to slow up the procedure for issuing passports, and the 
proposals now put forward for an increase in community development work stemmed 
largely from Manley's ideas (CO 1032/196, no 149, Lennox-Boyd to Hailes, West Indian 
governors and administrators, 25 Sept 1958).] 
. .. 3. For some time before the disturbances broke out, Her Majesty's Government had 
felt some concern about the possibility of immigration from the West Indies territories 
continuing at its present scale, especially because there had recently been a marked 
change in employment prospects. Until very recently it has proved possible for most male 
immigrants, who come here to seek work, to obtain it within a reasonably short time after 
arrival. There are now, however, unmistakable signs that, for the present, saturation point 
for the employment of immigrant workers has been reached. There is of course no offi-
cial quota system, nor, I am glad to say, is there evidence that the disturbances have led 
to any discrimination against immigrant workers by employers, Trade Unions or the gen-
eral public. West Indian workers are indeed popular. Nevertheless, there has been for 
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some time an observed tendency for employers to set their own upper limit on the num-
ber of immigrant workers whom they consider it politic to employ; and the Ministry of 
Labour consider that, at present, prospects for the employment of further immigrant 
labour in the foreseeable future must be regarded as virtually nil. Indeed there are signs 
of a modest industrial recession in the United Kingdom during the autumn and winter 
which has already resulted in some increase of unemployment with more United 
Kingdom workers becoming available; thus some of the organisations which have hith-
erto been the biggest employers of West Indies labour are no longer so eager to have them. 
Furthermore, a larger number of women West Indians have been arriving here in 
1957-58, and it has not been found easy to offer them jobs which they are willing to take. 
They will not as a rule go into such occupations as laundry work and domestic service, 
where there are still vacancies, but will only offer themselves for industrial tasks for which 
they are usually not equipped. At present the number of unemployed West Indians in the 
United Kingdom is estimated at some 8,000-that is about 7% of the total West Indies 
population or about one-third of the total West Indies immigrants into the United 
Kingdom in 1957. This figure compares with a national unemployed figure of about 2%. 
There is little prospect of this large number of unemployed being absorbed into employ-
ment in the foreseeable future, and even less prospect of further immigrants being suc-
cessful. Indeed it would seem likely that the arrival here of West Indians seeking work, on 
the present scale, would add to the difficulties of the West Indians already here and as yet 
unemployed. The prospect of an increasing number of unemployed West Indians in this 
country is a disturbing one which it is in the interests of West Indies Governments, of Her 
Majesty's Government and of the West Indies peoples concerned to avoid. I therefore 
regard it as in the interests of the West Indians themselves that everything possible should 
be done to discourage from emigration at present those whose object is merely to seek 
work in the United Kingdom. 
4. Our discussions with the West Indies Ministers have covered all aspects of the 
social welfare of the West Indies community as well as the employment situation, 
and I am glad to say that a substantial measure of agreement exists between us as to 
the main steps which should be taken, here and in the West Indies, to improve 
matters. Her Majesty's Government made it clear to the West Indies Ministers that 
they would be loth[sic] to take legislative steps to control immigration from the 
Commonwealth; such a measure, by interfering with the traditional rule of 
unrestricted entry into the United Kingdom of any of the Queen's subjects from any 
part of the Commonwealth, would be a serious departure from established principle. 
It was agreed that there were more constructive measures which might be taken, 
both here and in the West Indies, to improve the lot of West Indians in this country 
and strengthen inter-community relations, and, at the same time, to influence the 
rate of emigration so that it reflected more accurately the prospects of employment. 
The West Indies Ministers made the following proposals:-
(1) That the British Caribbean Welfare Service should be expanded and 
strengthened by attaching to it trained Community Development officers who 
would, in turn, train West Indians in Community Development work in the 
various parts of the country where there are concentrations of West Indian people. 
(2) That the local authorities in these areas should take more active steps to foster 
inter-racial community development, and pay greater attention to those social 
problems which have shown themselves apt to cause friction. 
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(3) The West Indies Governments should, where necessary, extend and expand 
their publicity measures to bring home to intending emigrants the present grave 
unemployment situation for West Indians in this country. 
(4) The West Indies Governments should, in considering applications for 
passports from persons intending to come to the United Kingdom to seek work, 
bring home to each individual the desirability of having reasonably confident 
prospects of a job and of suitable accommodation; and that such administrative 
action as is practicable be taken to regulate the pace of the issue of passports in 
such cases. 
(5) It is already the practice of the Jamaica Government, and possibly of other 
Governments although I am not aware of this, to refuse passports to persons 
known to have been convicted of certain serious criminal offences. Police reports 
here suggest that a number of known criminals are however slipping through the 
net even from Jamaica, and I hope all Governments will agree that there should be 
rigorous examination of applicants to ensure that no one known to have been 
convicted of serious criminal offences, in particular those involving violence, 
should receive a passport to come to the United Kingdom. 
5. These are the main steps which I commend to your Government. Her 
Majesty's Government are considering what additional educational and publicity 
measures can be taken here to emphasize generally the theme of inter-racial 
harmony, and the appropriate Departments of Her Majesty's Government are already 
consulting with local authorities concerned about the possibility of improving 
housing conditions and extending welfare arrangements in collaboration with the 
British Caribbean Welfare Service. The Deputy Prime Minister of The West Indies 
Federation assured me that the services of the Federal Information Service would be 
made available to co-ordinate publicity measures in The West Indies, and I am 
confident that this assurance will be given effect with thoroughness and imagination. 
I therefore commend these proposals to you as the main points of policy which our 
Government should begin to put into effect as early as is practicable, and I shall be 
glad to exchange views with you about their implementation .. . . 
79 CO 103112039, no 3 16 Oct 1958 
[ Chaguaramas]: letter from P Rogers to H A A Hankey proposing an 
initiative on the part of the federal government as a means of lifting 
the general bases problem from the purely Trinidad level 
[The earlier assumption that Dr Williams might be prepared to compromise over 
Chaguaramas proved false. Shortly after the federal government issued its statement on 
the conclusions of the Joint Commission (see 77, note), Orebaugh, the US consul-general 
in Trinidad, stated in public that the US could see no useful purpose in a further 
conference. In what was taken as a calculated insult because it seemed to emphasise the 
still colonial status of the federal government, he also said that the lease question was a 
domestic issue in Britain's relations with the West Indies; the UK, which was responsible 
for the foreign relations of the West Indies, had not put forward a conference request to 
the US. The situation was retrieved when the US, taking up a proposal which originated 
with the governor-general, offered to have the Chaguaramas question reviewed in ten 
years. Adams accepted the offer on behalf of the federal government but he did not 
consult Williams who regarded this as an act of betrayal. Williams's resentment was not 
only directed at the federal prime minister; as the Governor's Office in Port of Spain 
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reported, he was now 'very bitter ... and alleging insincerity' on the part of the UK. 
Moreover: 'The fact that no copy can be found in our records of the Principal Lease 
supposed to have been signed on 22nd April, 1941, between H.M.G. and U.S. Government, 
to give effect to the agreement, and of supplementary leases relating to Tucker Valley, 
have planted seeds of suspicion in his mind that even the administration is not anxious to 
assist' (CO 1031/2064, no 47, inward telegram no 63, acting governor to Lennox-Boyd, 20 
Sept 1958). The proposal put forward in the letter reproduced here to remove the issue 
from the purely Trinidad level to a regional one was suggested by Ellis Clarke,l the 
attorney-general of Trinidad (CO 1031/2039, minute by 1 E Whitelegg,2 13 Oct 1958).] 
May I refer to the correspondence resting with Hildyard's letter to Marnham of the 
27th August,3 about the proposal that we should seek the agreement of the 
Americans to a conference to revise some of the provisions of the 1941 Bases 
Agreement? 
2. Following that letter Whitelegg had a talk with Hildyard and Andrews,4 as a 
result of which it was agreed that in view of the apparent change of attitude on the 
part of Williams, the Chief Minister, Trinidad, as reported in the Acting-Governor's 
telegram Personal No. 57, the most that we could hope to ask the Americans to do 
would be to look at the Agreement in the light of subsequent agreements which they 
had concluded with other countries, in the hope that they would come to a 
conclusion that some revision was called for . To that end the draft letter to Hood in 
Washington was revised and a copy sent to us on the 11th September. Since then, 
however, Williams has again created difficulties in Trinidad, which we feel make it 
desirable to reconsider the whole matter. Briefly, he seems to have intensified his 
campaign in order to make things as uncomfortable as possible for the Americans. 
The Chaguaramas fruit plantation dispute,5 reported in the Acting-Governor's 
telegram Personal No. 66, has led the State Department to consider making 
representations to H.M.G.-see Leishman's6 letter to Andrews of the 3rd October-
and it seems therefore that from Williams' point of view, his campaign may be 
achieving his aim, which as well as creating difficulties for the Americans, is to keep 
the whole Bases problem a live political issue in Trinidad. 
3. Williams is an unpredictable sort of individual and it is difficult to assess with 
any certainty what his reaction may be to any particular set of circumstances. It is, 
however, all too clear that in this case he is distressingly consistent and is 
determined not to let the Chaguaramas issue drop during the next ten years. To 
some extent his campaign can perhaps be divided into two parts, in that he is seeking 
a general revision of the 1941 Bases Agreement, which would, he hopes, lead to the 
reopening of the Chaguaramas issue-in other words, to nibble away at the 
Agreement until the Chaguaramas questions is more or less isolated. Politically, too, 
it is quite unrealistic to leave things as they are and hope that all will blow over. In 
practice, so far from this happening Williams is continually finding new points with 
1 (Sir) Ell is Clarke (Kt 1963); attorney-general, Trinidad, 1957-1962; acting governor, 1960. 
2 J E Whitelegg, principal, CO, West Indian Dept 'A'. 3 See 77. 
4 E G Andrews, American Dept, FO. 
5 Williams argued that the concessions granted to the US in the 1941 agreement had never been approved 
by the Trinidad legislature and set up a legal commission to investigate. Pending investigation of US 
commercial activities in the base, a cheque for BWI $25,700 payable to the base authorities by the 
government-sponsored Citrus Growers' Association for the delivery of citrus from Chaguaramas in 1957 
was withheld. 
6 F J Leisham, 1st secretary, British embassy, Washington. 
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which to upset the Americans and they, on their part, seem to be increasingly 
sensitive to his attacks. Sooner or later, unless H.M.G. are prepared to act in some 
conciliatory way, we shall be faced with an impossible position, with Williams 
pressing on the one side and the Americans on the other. The longer things continue 
as they are, therefore, the more difficult is the situation likely to become. So far as we 
in the Colonial Office are concerned, the United States Bases problem, and 
Chaguaramas in particular, is likely to have increasing repercussions on our general 
relations with the Trinidad Government, and we are therefore most anxious to find a 
solution before things become critical. 
4. We fully agree that there can be no question of reopening the Chaguaramas 
issue at this stage, and, indeed, H.M.G. could not support any approach to the 
Americans designed either directly or indirectly to achieve that end. It seems to us 
most unlikely that the United States Government would be prepared to agree to a 
conference unless they were quite certain that in so doing they would not be 
confronted with Chaguaramas. Until that particular matter has been cleared out of 
the way therefore, there is no point in seeking a conference under Article 28 of the 
agreement since to do so would be to court a negative answer. 
5. Nevertheless, we feel strongly that the time has come when H.M.G. should 
take some positive action, and it seems to us that an essential first step is to clear 
away the difficulty over Chaguaramas, which is the particular point Williams is 
labouring. That might best be done by lifting the general bases problem from the 
purely Trinidad level, by seeking to get Grantley Adams, the Federal Prime Minister, 
to take the initiative in requesting a conference under Article 28. The Federal 
Government earlier this year announced their acceptance of assurances that the 
Chaguaramas issue would be reviewed in 10 years time and that meanwhile H.M.G. 
and the United States Government would give sympathetic consideration to any 
representations for a conference under Article 28 of the agreement. A request from 
the Federal Government for a review conference could therefore be regarded as a 
logical next step. It would also have the advantage of virtually doing away with the 
Chaguarmas difficulty since the Federal Government have agreed that that problem 
should remain in abeyance for ten years and also get us away from the purely 
Trinidad aspects in that the review conference would not be limited to the Trinidad 
problems but would consider the 1941 agreement as it affected all the West Indian 
territories concerned. At the same time it would remove the initiative from Williams 
and increase the political prestige of the Federal Government in general and Adams 
in particular. I should perhaps mention here that if we get to the stage where an 
approach to the Americans is feasible we consider that, in addition to H.M.G. and the 
United States Government, the Federal Government would have to be directly 
represented, but not the other territories of The West Indies such as Trinidad, etc: 
the latter might however attach advisers to the Federal Government delegation. 
Indeed we think it quite possible that the outcome might be a new Agreement to 
which the Federal Government would be a party. 
6. While we were glad to learn that the Americans have agreed that the review of 
the Chaguaramas question in ten years' time should be accompanied by a 
conference, we would prefer not to pass this on to The West Indies or Trinidad at 
present. It would, we feel, be undesirable to let them know the news at present since 
Williams might well conclude that the Americans were weakening and step up his 
campaign for a Chaguaramas conference as soon as possible. 
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7. We have accordingly drafted two telegrams in the personal series, to the 
Governor-General's deputy and to the Officer Administering the Government of 
Trinidad. These will, I think, explain themselves in the light of this letter. We should 
be grateful for your comments on them. I hope you will feel able to agree that they 
should issue very soon since we should like to discuss this whole question with you 
and with Lord Hailes and Sir Edward Beetham some time in the last week in October 
when both Lord Hailes and Sir Edward will be here. It is very desirable that we 
should have before then the views of their two deputies in Trinidad. 
8. I would only add that while we do recognise that the approach we have 
suggested does raise very grave difficulties from the Foreign Office point of view, we 
are convinced that any less forthright approach to the Americans such as that 
envisaged in discussions referred to in paragraph 2 of this letter, will fail to meet the 
case. We believe that it is greatly in the Americans' own interests to agree to an 
approach on these lines. We hope the Foreign Office will feel able to agree with our 
drafts. 
80 CO 103112311; no 20 28 Oct 1958 
'West Indies': minute by Lord Home to Mr Lennox-Boyd expressing 
concern about the prospect of an early conference to review the 
federal constitution 
I understand that early next week you are to have a talk with Lord Hailes about the 
desire of the Federation Government to review their present constitution with you 
next summer. The constitution provides in terms for a review within 5 years. But it 
came into force only in the spring of 1958, and the Governor-General is, I believe, of 
the view that there can be no question of "dominion status" for the West Indies 
within the next four years, and that the review now demanded can be confined 
mainly to the question of relations between the centre and the units. 
If this is possible and if it can be made clear that the review now demanded is not 
the longer term review envisaged by the constitution no difficulty will of course 
arise. But in the light of past experience can we be confident that it will in fact be 
possible? The motion in the Federal Legislature calling for a conference next year 
specifically mentions as one of its purposes the achievement of the goal of "dominion 
status" at the earliest possible moment. Is there not the risk, therefore, that if we 
concede the request for a review as early as next year, unless in doing so we make the 
limitation of its scope quite clear, the West Indies politicians may, when the time 
comes, feel it necessary to press then for a date to be set for independence? Surely 
this would be embarrassing, particularly as we cannot yet be sure when the 
Federation will be able to do without our grant in aid, and so be economically self-
supporting. It would arouse difficulties too in relation to the Rhodesian Federation, 
where the first review of the constitution is not due until late in 1960. 
These issues are of some moment, and I think that, if you see any danger that the 
review could not be restricted to local matters in the way foreseen by the Governor-
General, it would be of value if we could have an opportunity of considering the 
matter in the Colonial Policy Committee. 
I am sending a copy to the Prime Minister. 
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81 CO 103112573, no 45 1 Nov 1958 
[Powers offederal government]: inward telegram no 412 from 
Sir K Blackburne (Jamaica) to Mr Lennox-Boyd on a dispute between 
Sir Grantley Adams and Mr Manley over the authority of the federal 
governmentto levy incometax 
In case questions are asked about recent statements here by Adams and Manley about 
the levy of income tax on Federation, following are statements as reported by the 
Gleaner: 
(a) Prime Minister at press conference on 31st October made the following three 
points:-
(i) That notwithstanding any tax holiday granted by the unit governments the 
Federal Government can levy its own income tax after five years and make it 
retroactive to the date of Federation. 
(ii) That the Federal Government will proceed at the earliest opportunity to free 
itself from restriction of mandatory levy on which it now operates by legislating 
independent tax revenue. 
(iii) That the Federal Government must have an income and it must come from 
taxation either before the first five years are up, if the units agree, or after five 
years; and most equitable taxation is income tax. 
(b) Manley, in statement released yesterday, has stated:-
(1) Federal Government has no power to levy income tax for the first five years 
and there can be no question of the Federal Government doing anything of the 
sort let alone making legislation retrospective. 
(2) Policy of Federal Labour Party emphasises the fact that the Federal 
Government will devote itself to fostering economic and industrial development 
of all the units. Incentive legislation is a necessary part of that policy and 
income tax concessions are an accepted part of the incentive legislation. 
(3) It is a matter of high policy that the Federal Government should honour all 
obligations entered into by unit governments in regard to matters which may 
now or subsequently come under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government. 
(4) He would never under any circumstances be party to any policy that 
contemplated interfering with the development programme of Jamaica or 
Trinidad or any other unit, or repudiate arrangements made in unit territories 
under law properly passed, or dishonour agreements honestly negotiated 
between unit governments and investors. 
(5) He gives the assurance that, if ever there should arise any possibility of the 
Federal Government contemplating policy outlined in (4), Jamaica would be 
forced to reconsider her position in regard to Federation itself. 
2. Adams is reported as having since assured Manley that the Federal 
Government would not contemplate disavowing income tax or other concessions 
granted by existing tax law or exchange control assurances given in existing 
territorial legislation. 
3. There has been considerable concern here, particularly in commercial circles, 
about Adams' statement and the Gleaner has warmly welcomed Manley's declaration. 
[82] NOV 1958 219 
It seems as so often happens undue emphasis has been given to extract from the 
press conference taken out of the context; but result is most unfortunate here having 
regard to the fact that federation may well be important issue for the next general 
election. 
82 CO 103112573, no 46 4 Nov 1958 
[Jamaica and federation]: letter from Sir K Blackburne to P Rogers on 
the feeling in Jamaica that the federal government is 'empire 
building' 
With reference to my telegram of the 1st of November1 about the stir created by the 
press conference given in Jamaica by Sir Grantley Adams, I think that you may like to 
hear something of the resulting difficulties and trends of thought here. 
2. I gather that our Industrial Development Corporation is receiving enquiries 
from potential investors in the United States who are considerably shaken by the 
thought that the Federal Government can impose income tax retrospectively. I 
gather that Manley has been told in no uncertain terms by many people that it does 
not matter what assurances he may give to outside investors, since his policies can be 
overriden by the Federal Government. And I also gather that Manley has been under 
pressure from his own Party to announce the secession of Jamaica from the 
Federation. Wills Isaacs (who lunched here yesterday) was jubilant and told me that 
Federation was dead. 
3. Manley had told me earlier in the day that he would not contemplate secession 
at present and, indeed, during this conversation he produced suggestions whereby 
more Jamaicans might be recruited for the Federal Service. Later in the conversation 
he commented, though not very seriously, that Trinidad and the smaller territories 
might make a very convenient national unit, adding "you would have been horrified 
by that remark a year ago, but no doubt you think differently now". 
4. But, whatever views may be expressed at this moment of some indignation and 
excitement, the facts are that this matter may well have serious implications. 
5. As you know, there has always been a school of thought in Jamaica that has 
resented the financial burden falling on Jamaica as a result of Federation; and it is 
not easy to find arguments to deal with those who ask why the taxpayers in Jamaica 
should help the smaller territories to exist and develop. Bustamante has not been 
slow to climb on this very comfortable bandwaggon, and there is good reason to 
believe that the J.L.P. will fight the next Jamaica elections in 1959 on this platform. 
As one commentator put it to me-"there is not much else that they can use with 
effect in their election programme"-because there is no doubt that there has been 
rapid progress and comparative prosperity under the present Government. 
6. If the J.L.P. do fight the election on this basis, they will get great support from 
the public-both from businessmen and from workers-all of whom are far less inter-
ested in Dominion status through Federation than in the impact of further taxation 
and the possibility of the industrial development programme being slowed up. The 
J.L.P. will indeed be batting on an easy wicket in the present mood of Jamaica. 
1 See 81. 
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7. What then is Manley to do? As I have said, it is not easy to find good arguments 
as an academic exercise; and it is impossible to find arguments which will convince 
the electorate that Federation is in their interests. When one considers that he is up 
against increasing pressure from his own Party, it is difficult to see how he will be 
able to deal with the situation-even though he himself is personally still behind 
Federation. 
8. I have naturally wondered what answer there can be to all this. 
In the short term two things would seem to be of help:-
(i) The issue of a statement of economic policy by the Council of State, making it 
clear that the Federal Government will honour all commitments entered into 
legitimately by the Unit Governments in regard to investment, etc. I know that 
Adams issued a statement on these lines when he got back to Trinidad; but I think 
that a formal declaration of policy by the Council of State will carry much greater 
weight. 
(ii) The convening of an early meeting of the proposed Council of Ministers. 
During his visit to Jamaica Adams agreed to do this, and I am sure that he 
appreciates the need for the meeting even more now. 
It is perhaps not too much to say that there is some degree of antagonism between 
Manley and himself, as we all noticed when the two of them dined at King's House 
quietly together. I think that it may have some bearing on this point if I mention that 
there seems to have been a marked lack of Federal party activity ever since the 
Federation was established. In the case of the D.L.P., this may well be a deliberate 
omission on the part of Bustamante if he is sincere in his statements that Federation 
on its present basis must be brought to an end. (Incidentally Bustamante declined 
my invitation to meet Adams at lunch at King's House, though Sangster2 did come). 
It should strengthen Manley's hand in Jamaica, (and perhaps Adams' position in the 
Federation) if the F.L.P. Ministers can now get together and iron out their 
differences in connection with the holding of a meeting of the Council of Ministers. 
9. In the long term it has occurred to me that there may be three possible lines 
of approach:-
(a) The execution of some careful economic planning by the Federal Government 
in collaboration with the Units. Unless this is done I cannot help feeling somewhat 
apprehensive about the future. The impression in Jamaica-however wrong that 
impression may be-is that the Federal Government has concentrated rather too 
much on "Empire building" by searching for fields of activity which will show to 
the public that the Federation is really getting a grip on things. I cannot myself 
offer concrete examples, though Manley has mentioned to me one or two 
instances, including broadcasting. I can only say that this impression exists here. I 
can well understand that the Federal Government, being based in Trinidad, must 
be under the continued pressure of the press and of public opinion to produce 
results, because Trinidad has always regarded itself as the potential "mother" for 
the smaller territories of the Eastern Caribbean. If the headquarters of the 
2 D B Sangster, deputy leader of JLP since 1950; minister of social welfare, 1950-1953, of finance, 
1953- 1955; acting prime minister, 1965-1967; deputy prime minister and minister of finance, 
1962- 1967; prime minister, Feb-Apr 1967 (deceased). 
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Federation had been in Jamaica, perhaps a different approach would have 
developed since the Federal staff would themselves have had a different outlook. 
But, whatever may be the reasons, there is a feeling in Ministerial and official 
circles in Jamaica today that there is too much "Empire building" and too little 
thought for planning-particularly economic planning for the region as a whole. 
There is also the impression-however wrong this may be-that the Federal 
Government is attempting to undertake such economic planning as has been done 
without sufficiently full consultation with the Unit territories, and particularly 
with Jamaica. Several people have said to me that it is a great pity that the Federal 
Government did not start its operations by convening a meeting or meetings for 
the sole purpose of economic planning before doing anything else. If that had 
indeed been a possible approach, we here are as much to blame as anyone for not 
suggesting it at the time. But even now, it may not be too late to think in these 
terms, and I hope that such an approach may emerge from the proposed meeting 
of the Council of Ministers. 
(b) The grant of substantial loan aid from the United Kingdom to the Federation 
so as to make it clear that someone else, besides Jamaica, (and Canada to some 
degree) is helping the smaller territories in their economic development. The 
promised Canadian aid has been much welcomed here as elsewhere, but there is 
some feeling that this aid will be devoted largely to Federal projects and that the 
richer territories will still have to continue to carry the smaller ones. I believe that 
a paper3 on this subject was handed to the Secretary of State by Manley at the last 
Federation Conference in London, and I have no doubt that it was fully considered. 
It is, I imagine, impossible to contemplate further financial aid from the United 
Kingdom in this way, and I only mention this possibility as it is one that has been 
ventilated here. 
(c) The recognition that some completely new approach may be needed to the 
type of Federation which ought to exist-a Federation designed to accommodate 
territories like Jamaica which can go ahead on their own, and also the smaller 
territories which need help from the others. Manley talked on these lines to me 
yesterday, and I hope that we may yet get him to agree to the terms of reference of 
the proposed Constitutional Commission for this very reason. But he is up against 
strong opposition from his own Party at the present time-and that may make it 
impossible for him to go further than to agree to a Commission for the smaller 
territories only and to a separate expert investigation of the whole framework of 
Federation. 
10. I am afraid that I have gone very much beyond my brief in this letter. I have 
done so not in any spirit of criticism. I have merely tried to reflect the views of those 
with whom I have discussed the developments of last week, and to put forward some 
ideas which are being ventilated here. 
11. I myself continue to be a believer in Federation, and I still hope that the 
troubles which we are having at the present time are the normal, and necessary, 
teething troubles which always seem to beset the establishment of Federations. 
12. I am sending a copy of this letter to Lord Hailes. 
3 cf 42, annex. 
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83 CO 1031/2311, no 21 5 Nov 1958 
'West Indies': minute (reply) from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Lord Home on 
the possible repercussions of early dominion status for the West Indies 
Your minute of 28th October1 referred to the possible repercussions of early 
"dominion status" for The West Indies. 
2. The present Federal Constitution in the West Indies, and particularly the fixed 
Federal income of less than £2 million a year, means that the Federal Government is 
hardly worth the name. We knew this when agreement was reached to set it up; it was 
a price we knew we had to pay to get West Indian agreement. For the first year it does 
no harm when the Federal Government must concentrate on establishing its adminis-
trative machinery and finding its political feet. But unless we can increase the powers, 
and above all, the revenue, of the Federal Government very soon we run a grave risk of 
Federation failing, with all that that implies to our policy in that part of the world. The 
preponderance of political and financial power remaining with the unit territories means 
that some of them, and particularly Jamaica, may yet revive separatist tendencies. 
3. The conference proposed for next year will, I hope and expect, concentrate 
primarily on relations between the Federal Government and the unit Governments, 
though the relationship of the Federal Government with H.M.G. is bound to come 
up, with a call for some changes. The conference will not only be the only way in 
which there will be a chance of increasing the powers of the Federal Government vis-
a-vis the units, but it will also give H.M.G. an invaluable opportunity of making clear 
to all the delegates from the West Indian territories just how far they have to go 
before the Federal Government could be considered one that can properly be 
sponsored for full membership of the Commonwealth. I do not expect a demand for 
very early independence; the political sentiment on this in The West Indies is very 
different from that in say, West Africa. I have always made it clear, moreover, that 
there can be no question of independence for The West Indies until they are viable 
both financially and in other respects. I did this both during the 1956 London 
Conference2 and when piloting the present Federal Constitution through Parliament. 
The West Indies are very conscious of the financial and other burdens that 
independence involves and none of the present members of the Federal Government 
are at all anxious to press for an early date for it. 
4. As far as I can possibly foretell, therefore, I do not think you need be unduly 
concerned about the effects of this conference on the Rhodesian Federation. I will, of 
course, always have this in mind, but the extent to which we can control the pace of 
the movement towards independence in the West Indies by reason alone of possible 
reaction in Central Africa is very limited. I know there is some risk in having the 
conference but I do not believe it to be great; and the advantages of and indeed the 
need for it, are so great that I am sure we ought not to seek a postponement. 
5. I have discussed all this with the Governor-General, who agrees with my 
assessment. 
6. I would welcome a discussion in the Colonial Policy Committee if you wish 
but there is little I could add to what is in this minute. 
7. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Prime Minister. 
1 See 80. 2 See 4 7, annex. 
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84 CO 103112573, no 48 10 Nov 1958 
[Federation]: letter from R Kirkwood1 to Mr Lennox-Boyd on the 
importance of UK financial aid. Minute by P Rogers on financial aid 
and dominion status 
You asked me the other night about Federation; how's it going. I told you I thought 
all would be well in the end-given men and measures. 
Since we met, disturbing cuttings (a couple only are enclosed),2 prompt me to 
write you about measures-which I now conceive to be urgent; having regard to next 
year's General Election-and the fact that Busta is sure to win it. 
Positive. H.M.G. must make really generous direct grants to the Federal 
Government. An attempt to tax Jamaica etc for additional sums is political dynamite, 
and would probably bring about secession. 
Negative, (and very confidentially) H.M.G. should make it as easy as possible for 
the Federal Government to borrow money-here, in Canada, or anywhere else-and 
as difficult as possible for the unit Governments to do so; for obvious reasons which I 
need not elaborate. 
In other words, all financial assistance, and far more of it, should be channelled in 
through the Federal Government exclusively (so far as this can be done) . This 
Federal ship may really sink without that proverbial ha'porth (read a million or two) 
of tar. 
Thanks so much for a delicious and most entertaining dinner. 
Minute with 84 
Sir H. Poynton 
On the evening of Wednesday the 3rd December the Secretary of State had a 
discussion with Sir Jock CampbelP and Mr. Kirkwood about Federation, at which Mr. 
Amery, you and I were present. A number of issues affecting the Federation were 
raised and I have summarized these below. You will see from it that in fact all the 
ideas which have been put forward except that mentioned by Sir Jock Campbell of 
setting a specific date for the achievement of Dominion status had in fact already 
been raised in the Department and discussed with Lord Hailes. I did not however 
mention this in the discussion since frankly Mr. Kirkwood is not invariably discreet 
and it would be extremely unfortunate if there were to be any public talk in the West 
Indies at this stage about the lengths to which the Colonial Office had already carried 
these ideas. Mter the meeting I mentioned this point both to Sir J. Campbell and Mr. 
Kirkwood. 
We were all concerned in the discussion with ways of strengthening the Federal 
Government both positively, i.e. by supplying it with additional funds, powers, or 
prestige, and negatively, i.e. by taking a deliberately narrow view of the extent to 
1 (Sir) Robert Kirkwood (Kt 1959); member of Legislative Council, Jamaica, 1942-1962; chairman, Sugar 
Manufacturers' Association, Jamaica, 1945- 1974; chairman, West Indian Sugar Association, 1942-1962. 
2 Not printed. 3 Chairman, Booker Brothers Ltd. 
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which the unit Governments should have a separate standing in current issues. The 
particular points raised were as follows:-
(1) Funds for the Federal government. At present the revenue of the Federal 
Government is limited under the Constitution to £1.9 million a year derived either 
from a mandatory levy on unit Governments as at present or alternatively from 
certain limited and specific customs dues, also specified in the Constitution. In 
addition the Federal Government has been promised an annual grant of £1,750,000 
from the U.K. from which to meet the grants-in-aid to unit territories which cannot 
balance their budgets. This is a relatively generous grant which should be ample to 
meet calls upon the Federal budget for this purpose in the quinquennium, as far as 
we can foresee, but it is, of course, limited to the specific purpose for which it was 
granted and cannot be used to strengthen the Federal Government in other respects. 
The Federal Government is also eligible, like the unit Governments, for assistance 
from the U.S.A. either from the Development Loan Fund or from the I.C.A., but 
·experience so far suggests that little more than technical assistance is likely to be 
forthcoming from such sources. The Federal Government has also been promised aid 
of $10,000,000 over five years by the Canadian Government, most of which will go in 
the purchase and operation of two ships for an inter-island service, and in the 
improvement of port and harbour facilities in connection with it. 
As far as assistance from the U.K. is concerned, the Federal Government has been 
promised a grant of up to £1 million towards the cost of the capital (a considerable 
proportion of which has already been expended on buildings which will later be sold 
to the Trinidad Government when the permanent capital site is settled for the sums 
which have been expended on the building, and the proceeds used for permanent 
building). Short of a special grant from the Colonial Service Vote which is 
theoretically possible but for which I personally could see no sufficient justification, 
the only other source of U.K. assistance to which the Federal Government can look is 
the monies provided under the C.D. and W. Acts. The Federal Government has a 
small balance inherited from the Comptroller under the present Act but we cannot 
do anything really considerable in this sphere until the new Act is passed, we hope, in 
April. The proposal which we have discussed both with Lord Hailes and with Mr. 
Bradshaw is that the whole of the allocation to West Indian territories under the new 
Act should be allocated initially to the Federal Government. That Government would 
in turn allocate, subject to the Secretary of State's approval, between its own needs 
and those of the units. Furthermore, from the time the new Act comes into effect the 
Secretary of State would not propose to approve applications from the unit territories 
for schemes within their own allocations unless these applications were supported by 
the Federal Government (in this respect the Federal Government would therefore 
inherit the position of the Comptroller in respect of C.D. and W. applications). I have 
no doubt that this will cause a howl from some of the unit territories, particularly 
Jamaica, but I am convinced that it is desirable from the broadly economic point of 
view and essential from the political point of view. This will in fact meet what was 
discussed under this head. 
(2) The raising of loans. We have again discussed both with Mr. Bradshaw and 
with Lord Hailes the proposal that in future the raising of loans in respect of any of 
the West Indian Governments should be done only by the Federal Government. The 
procedure would be that the Federal Government should be empowered by 
amendment of the Federal Constitution to raise loans on the security of the revenue 
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and assets of all the Governments in the Federation (it would not be in a position to 
raise any loans on its present revenues). A Loans Council, on the lines of that in 
existence in the Commonwealth of Australia, would be set up on which all 
Governments would be represented. This would be advisory to the Federal 
Government. The Federal Government would thereafter raise all loans whether on its 
own behalf or on behalf of the unit territories, the charges for any particular loan 
falling, of course, on the revenues and assets of the territory immediately concerned. 
A similar procedure is proposed for loans from the International Bank. 
This proposed procedure is in any case necessary on strictly financial grounds. 
Firstly it is not normal U.K. policy that subordinate Government authorities should 
have access to the London Market (in this respect, for example, Jamaica would be in 
the same position as, say, the State of New South Wales). Moreover, the failure of the 
recent Jamaica loan shows that even the strongest of the West Indian units is not in a 
position to raise Market loans on its own security, and that there would be a better 
prospect for the raising of a loan based on the security of the revenues and assets of 
the entire West Indies. Politically, also, I am convinced that this step is necessary, for 
reasons which were obvious from the discussion, though it will be again a very 
difficult political matter to put across in The West Indies. We have agreed with Mr. 
Bradshaw and the Governor-General that in the first instance we should put this 
proposal formally by despatch to the Federal Government before raising it with any 
of the units, and a draft is now in preparation for this purpose. 
(I have released the file in order not to delay the consideration of the drafts). 
(3) A promise of "Dominion status". We have known all along that the prime 
reason for Federation is the enhanced political status which it will enable the West 
Indies to obtain. Going right back to Colonel Stanley's despatch of 1945, from which 
the official consideration of Federation starts, we spoke then of "the ultimate aim of 
any Federation which may be established (being) full internal self-government 
within the British Commonwealth". That was as far ahead as we could look then and 
it meant a lot at the time. The Report of the Standing Closer Association Committee, 
which laid the foundations of the Federal Constitution, again declared forthrightly 
that the aim was Dominion status, and it may be useful to recall their words since 
they are the best definition of the political need for Federation and are words 
moreover signed by many leading West Indians of the day. The relevant extract from 
the Report is attached opposite.4 Going further ahead it will be recalled that this 
again was one of the most important aspects of the London Conference of 1956, and 
that the Secretary of State's Opening Address to the Conference on this subject 
contained a passage which had been very carefully weighed and approved by a 
Cabinet Committee beforehand.5 Again it may be useful to have the relevant passage 
available for reference, and it is quoted on the sheet opposite following the quotation 
from the S.C.A.C. Report. 
What holds The West Indies back from full Dominion status is essentially not our 
reluctance to grant independence on political grounds, but the financial weakness of 
the Federal Government and the reluctance of many West Indians, a reluctance 
which is quite understandable, to assume the full burden of independence. Because 
there are a number of West Indians who claim that the idea of Dominion status is 
merely a device on the part of H.M.G. to avoid their financial responsibilities, we have 
4 See 4. 5 See 47, annex. 
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always been careful, as for example in the extract quoted opposite, to avoid the 
impression that H.M.G. is urging the West Indies on this path faster than they 
themselves wish to go. It is for that reason that I am very doubtful about the wisdom 
of Sir Jock Campbell's proposal that we should ourselves propose a definite date as 
[a] target for independence. There is, moreover, the difficulty of the reaction of what 
we do here on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Secretary of State 
will recall his recent exchange of minutes with the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations on the subject.6 It is true that that correspondence was 
primarily concerned with the outcome of a revisionary conference next year and the 
embarrassment which that might cause to the negotiations with Sir R. Welensky7 in 
1960. The setting of a target date for West Indian independence of say, 1963, would 
not be so embarrassing on that score, but I am inclined to think that it would still 
raise difficulties. Nevertheless the idea is one that needs further consideration and, I 
suggest, consultation with the Governor General. 
(4) Revisionary conference. We cannot avoid a Conference next year to revise the 
Federal Constitution and in fact, despite the embarrassment vis-a-vis the Central 
African Federation, we do not wish to avoid such a Conference as the correspondence 
referred to in (3) above shows. There is, however, a new complication since that 
correspondence in the shape of a proposal within The West Indies that what one 
might call the Conference proper, at which the U.K. should be represented, should be 
preceded by a regional conference, which presumably means a Conference of West 
Indians alone. The date which has been suggested by the Governor General for that is 
April or May of next year. I am very doubtful about the wisdom of that Conference as 
it was originally proposed and had put my doubts on a purely personal basis to the 
Governor General the day before we had our meeting recorded in this minute. It may 
well be, however, that the principal doubt which I felt about the regional conference, 
namely, that the Federal Government would face the units without the U.K. as their 
ally, would be overcome and indeed turned to positive advantage by the proposal 
which emerged in the course of our discussion (the other doubt raised in my letter to 
Lord Hailes about the timing in relation to the advice of the expert on Federal 
matters is, I think, less important, particularly in relation to the matter mentioned 
below). The idea which the Secretary of State raised in the course of discussion was 
that he might himself visit The West Indies to open this regional conference and 
there make a public statement which would say in effect that only the West Indian 
reluctance to endow the Federal Government with proper powers was holding the 
region back from Dominion status. If I may say so I think that this would have a 
tremendous effect in The West Indies and indeed, I do not think it is going too far to 
say that it might transform the whole situation in respect of Federation. 
I do not know how far the Secretary of State will feel able to commit himself now 
about a possible visit next year, but I suggest that as a next step he might write to 
Lord Hailes putting the idea to him. I submit a draft accordingly. 
6 See 80 & 83. 
P.R. 
8.12.58 
7 Prime minister and minister of external affairs, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1956- 1963. 
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85 CO 1031/2573, no 58 26 Nov 1958 
[Federation]: letter (reply) from P Rogers to Sir K Blackburne 
(Jamaica) on the position of Jamaica within the federation 
Many thanks for your letter of the 4th November1 about Grantley Adams Press 
Conference and Federation in general. Your report of how things stand at the 
moment in Jamaica is most useful, but we are particularly grateful for the way in 
which you have gone on to make some very helpful and constructive proposals for 
furthering Federation. I know your own belief in it and I think you know how 
strongly we here feel about it. So far from feeling that you have gone beyond your 
brief, may I say at once with the Secretary of State's approval that it is most helpful 
when Governors put forward this kind of suggestion. 
2. The first part of your letter about the situation in Jamaica does not really call 
for any comment from me except on what you say in paragraph 5 about the diffi-
culty of finding arguments to deal with those who ask why the taxpayers in Jamaica 
should help the smaller territories to exist and develop. Surely the answer to that 
depends entirely on whether Jamaicans think of themselves as West Indians. If they 
do, then there is just as much reason why the richer taxpayers in Jamaica should 
help the poor in the smaller territories, as there is why they should help the poor in 
Jamaica itself. If they do not think of themselves as West Indians, and I quite under-
stand that in fact most of them do not, then it reduces itself to a naked argument of 
self-interest of what Jamaica "gets out" of Federation. My own answer is that in 
material things alone I believe Jamaica has a good deal to gain, though one could 
not measure it. I am convinced that other countries, by which I mean the U.S.A. and 
Canada, as well as the U.K., will definitely be more inclined to help financially a West 
Indian Federation than they would Jamaica alone. Secondly, Jamaica needs security 
for its exports and there can be no doubt that it is in a much better bargaining posi-
tion if it comes forward with other West Indian territories, whether it be for sugar, 
bananas or citrus, than if it comes forward alone. Of course, if Jamaica feels it can 
stand on its own in all these things, there is no more to be said, but I don't think it 
does. On the non-material side, again I do not think that Jamaica could look to be a 
full member of the Commonwealth by itself. Surely what the S.C.A.C. report has to 
say on this is a classic statement of the position as justifying federation, and cannot 
be bettered. 
3. Naturally I accept that these are arguments which, however valid we believe 
them to be, are not very effective in the middle of an election: It is, as you say, 
difficult for Manley. The Secretary of State is writing to you separately about 
Manley's letters on the proposed Constitutional Commission, but it may be helpful if 
I say a little here on how we feel about Manley's present attitude, since this is the 
background against which your helpful suggestions must be considered. 
4. First of all there is no doubt that, as you say, there is some degree of 
antagonism between Adams and Manley. This goes back at least to the 1956 London 
Conference when Adams considered (with some justice in my own view) that Manley 
let him down about the site of the Federal capital. Furthermore, I have always 
1 See 82. 
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suspected myself that while Manley gave up the Federal Prime Ministership, he has 
never really liked or been generous enough to accept gracefully anyone else holding 
the first Ministerial position in The West Indies. 
5. We get the impression from your letter and from Manley's own letters about 
the Constitutional Commission that he seems to be thinking exclusively in terms of a 
slow start to Federation and of a considerable period ahead in which the Federal 
Government will be deliberately kept weak and relatively powerless. Eric Williams we 
know holds the same view, until the next Federal election when he hopes to become 
Federal Prime Minister himself. We are convinced that even if these points of view 
are sincere, they are totally misguided. If the Federal Government is kept an 
ineffective body for five years, it seems to us doubtful in the extreme whether it will 
survive. Certainly there can be no prospect whatsoever of it looking to Dominion 
status until it is radically transformed and becomes a much more powerful and 
financially stronger Government. If it is kept weak for five years I do not see the unit 
Governments agreeing suddenly to change their attitude completely towards it at the 
end of that time and endow it with the powers and money which will be necessary for 
a Government of Dominion status. We are convinced that we must seek to build up 
the Federal Government steadily and the complaints about the Empire building 
which we know are made in Jamaica seem to us quite misconceived. The Federal 
Government really cannot begin to tackle problems until it has built up an 
organisation to cope with them. Any such building up may be termed Empire 
building at the outset but surely it is because the Federal Government is rightly 
seeking to do its job. Certainly, to come now to your own suggestions, it cannot 
begin to do any kind of worthwhile economic planning until it has got the staff to do 
it with, i.e. built its Empire. 
6. You suggest:-
(1) The issue of a statement of economic policy by the Council of State, making 
it clear that the Federal Government will honour all commitments entered into 
legitimately by the unit Governments in regard to investment. This of course is for 
the Federal Government itself to consider but for our part we agree that it would 
be very helpful as a formal declaration by the Council of State. But I would myself 
go on to say that I think there is great force in what Adams has already said about 
the ability of the Federal Government honestly to say this depending on the fact 
that unit Governments do not in the meantime enter into commitments which 
will make effective Federation impossible. In particular they must not make a 
Customs Union impossible. Surely it would only be right that the unit 
Governments should consult the Federal Government before undertaking 
commitments which come into this sphere if they demand that the Federal 
Government should honour them? 
(2) The convening of an early meeting of the proposed Council of Ministers. I 
know Lord Hailes has this very much in mind and if I may say so we too agree that 
it would be very helpful. Again, however, it is surely fundamental that this Council 
should not attempt to usurp the functions of the Council of State in directing 
Federal activities, and I would not be surprised if Manley and Williams try and urge 
it that way. 
(3) Some careful economic planning by the Federal Government in collaboration 
with the units. I entirely agree and I am sure Lord Hailes would too but it is 
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subject to three things. First the Federal Government must as I have already said 
have an organisation with which to do this. Secondly, they must have financial 
resources to use for their plans, and while the Canadian aid, and what we hope will 
be forthcoming under the next C.D. and W. Act will be a useful start, the units 
must not leave it all to outside aid! Thirdly any effective economic planning must 
surely be based on the existence of a Customs Union. Until such a union exists, I 
feel that economic planning cannot be fully effective. 
(4) The grant of substantial loan aid from the U.K. to the Federation. I think you 
will agree that we have done the Federal Government pretty well over the 
agreement on the five year grant-in-aid. The possibility of other forms of aid from 
the U.K. depends of course on the passing, and on the form and size, of the next 
C.D. and W. Act. We all hope that that will provide the occasion for aid such as you 
have in mind. 
(5) The recognition that some completely new approach may be needed to the 
type of Federation which ought to exist. Again I think we would all agree that a 
Federation containing a unit as small as Montserrat and one as large as Jamaica 
must differ in some respects from a Federation like, say, Australia. But frankly my 
own fear about what is meant by Jamaicans who urge this is that they contemplate 
a weak Federal Government with really no say about what Jamaica itself should do. 
That, for reasons which I have touched on in the first part of this letter, I regard as 
a profound misconception. 
7. I am sending a copy of this letter to Lord Hailes. May I end by saying that I am 
sure that he would agree with me in saying that the kind of helpful suggestions you 
have made are most timely and that the continuance of this kind of approach to 
Federation on your part and that of Governors will make a major difference to the 
objective in which I know you believe as strongly as we do. 
P.S. Since this was first drafted I have received your letter of the 13th November 
enclosing a copy of a note of your talks with Sealy2 and Manley. I am sure there is a 
very great deal in what Sealy said about the attitude of Adams to Manley over the 
Prime Ministership, and again my sympathies are with Adams over this. For the rest, 
it is clear that Manley is pursuing the hint which you mentioned in your earlier letter 
about a Federation in the Eastern Caribbean alone. I hope you will agree that is quite 
essential to jump on this before Manley himself gets wedded to the idea or it spreads. 
I am convinced that it is not a starter. By way of background I think I ought to add 
that we here do not think Manley has ever really fully understood the Eastern 
Caribbean scene and I believe that this idea of his bears out our view. I do not think 
that either Trinidad or the small Islands would accept any such idea today. Moreover, 
even if such a Federation were to be possible, I do not think that either it or (and here 
is the important thing from Manley's point) Jamaica could possibly look to Dominion 
status. You have already made this point to him but I think it is worthwhile 
emphasising whenever you get the chance since I suspect that it may be the decisive 
factor in Manley's thinking. 
2 T E Sealy, editor of Daily Gleaner in Jamaica. 
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86 CO 968/563, no 10 2 Dec 1958 
'West Indies garrison': minute by Mr Lennox-Boyd to Mr Duncan 
Sandys on the reasons why a UK battalion should remain in the West 
Indies until1963 
The reasons why I asked for the retention of the U.K. battalion in the Caribbean until 
1963 are rather stronger than you suggest in the second paragraph of your minute of 
24th November.1 
2. Under the Federal Constitution the revenue which the Federal Government 
can raise, either as at present by mandatory levy from the Unit Governments or by 
specific taxation, is fixed at a maximum of £1.9 millions a year. The Federal 
Constitution must be reviewed by the end of the fifth year of its operation and in fact 
we hope for an interim review some time in the second half of next year. On both 
occasions we shall try and help the Federal Government to raise this ceiling on their 
expenditure but I certainly cannot say at present what prospect of success there is. 
Present omens are far from hopeful. In the light of this the Federal Government have 
agreed to provide £320,000 for defence expenditure for the quinquennium 1958/63, 
which is a very high proportion of their total budget. We obviously could not get 
them to provide any substantially higher sum and what they can do will be barely 
sufficient to pay for one full -strength battalion. 
3. I hope that the West India Regiment, even at one-battalion strength, will be 
just capable of maintaining internal security within the Federation. The prospects of 
British Honduras and British Guiana joining the Federation before 1963 are remote; 
but even if they did, the West India Regiment would certainly not be capable of 
looking after the mainland territories as well. 
4. We must therefore plan for a situation in February 1960 (which is after all 
only 14 months hence) which is not significantly different from the present; namely 
a Guatemala whose threats to British Honduras may at present be only verbal but 
which would certainly be likely to turn words to deeds if it saw any prospect of 
success e.g. through our disinteresting ourselves in British Honduras (and the 
withdrawal of the garrison might be taken as a sign of that in present circumstances) 
and a small but highly influential Communist group whose activities represent a 
standing threat to British Guiana. In the interests of stability and confidence in both 
territories, I must urge that a decision should be taken now to retain the British 
Garrison until 1963. 
5. There is also the problem of Bahamas. Although it is hoped that the build-up 
of the Police Force there will enable the British company to be withdrawn next year, 
the knowledge that the British Garrison is still available as a long-step will be both a 
deterrent to agitators and an encouragement to the police themselves. 
6. There is of course no question of the difference of opinion between certain 
unit governments and the Federation over the procedure for summoning military 
1 Duncan Sandys had suggested two reasons in his minute of 24 Nov which were (1) that although the 
federation intended to form two battalions of the West Indies Regiment, the first of which would start 
from Jan 1959, it would be some time before a second battalion could be raised, and (2) that some West 
Indies colonies would remain outside the federation (CO 968/563, no 10, Duncan Sandys to Lennox-Boyd, 
24 Nov 1958). 
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assistance in aid of the civil power affecting the issue. The only relevance of this to 
the retention of the British battalion was that the Governor-General thought it 
would help him if the decision to retain the battalion could be announced sooner 
rather than later. 
7. In the light of these considerations, I hope that you will be prepared to agree 
to the Governor-General announcing that the British battalion will remain until 
1963. 
8. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Secretary of State for War. 
87 CO 1031/2039, no 21 3 Dec 1958 
[US bases]: letter from HA A Hankey toP Rogers on the initial US 
response to the suggested review of the 1941 agreement 
As we agreed at our meeting on November 26 I was eventually able to have a long talk 
with Dale1 of the State Department about the possible revision of the 1941 Leased 
Bases Agreement on Friday November 28 at dinner. As you know Dale is the official 
in the State Department who deals, among other things, with the United Kingdom 
and the U.K. island colonies all over the world wherever they may be situated. 
2. I need not perhaps go into too great detail of what I said to Dale. I began by 
describing our overall view of the problem, more or less in the terms which you had 
used at our meeting last week; I said that our main interest was to ensure that the 
Americans were able to continue to use all the facilities which they required in the 
West Indies for purposes connected with defence and security within the limits 
imposed by the need to observe the legitimate aspirations of the West Indies and to 
ensure that relations between the Americans on the one hand and the Federal 
Government and individual island governments on the other were as friendly as 
possible. I then spoke on the lines of the material contained in our several drafts in 
order to emphasize our belief that in the long run U.S. interests as well as those of 
the West Indies would be best served by an early meeting to consider the revision of 
the 1941 base agreement. I said that such a meeting need not necessarily be 
described as a conference, although it would be difficult to prevent this term being 
used in the West Indies. I then explained that the view was strongly held by those 
here best fitted to judge the situation in the West Indies, that it would be preferable 
for the initiative to come from the Federal Government, and I explained why. I 
admitted, however, that we were concerned least such a request, transmitted as it 
would be through the Foreign Office, might (a) be misinterpreted as an attempt on 
our part to wriggle out of one of the basic defence agreements between us for the 
defence of the West, and (b) be a less favourable method of approaching the problem 
than if, for example, the Americans were themselves to propose that the review took 
place. We had seen from the Chaguaramas affair that very strong views were held in 
Washington on the subject of the various agreements under which the Americans 
operated in the West Indies. We had therefore decided, before pursuing the matter 
any further, to take the opportunity of Dale's presence in London to ask him if he 
1 W M Dale, Bureau of European Affairs, US State Dept; deputy director, Office of British Commonwealth 
and North European Affiars, 1958-1960. 
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believed the various departments concerned in Washington would respond 
favourably to a request from us for a joint review of the 1941 agreement at which the 
West Indies Federal Government would be represented; in making such a request we 
should be able to say that the question had been raised with us by the Federal 
Government. 
3. The answer was rather surprising. Dale first said that he agreed entirely with 
my statement of our long term policy, which he said sounded like an extract from a 
State Department policy paper. He said that the State Department had for some time 
been increasingly concerned about the serious discrepancies between, on the one 
hand, the 1941 agreement and the later agreements and the practices which had 
grown up in connexion with them, and on the other the principles and practices 
which had become standardised in the various agreements between the U.S. and 
other countries belonging to NATO. In their reply to our omnibus Note of May 22 last 
which was on the point of being delivered in Washington, they were in fact proposing 
that we should undertake a joint review of the jurisdictional clauses in the later 
(L.R.P.G. and O.R.S.) agreements (though not the 1941 agreement). As regards the 
1941 agreement he agreed entirely with the arguments I had used to demonstrate 
the need for a review to take place soon rather than late when it might be more 
difficult than now for agreement to be reached with the West Indies politicians; he 
had only one reservation on this score, which I shall mention later. He confirmed 
our fear that the feeling in Washington on this whole subject was very sensitive, but 
believed that this being so we must not in fact expect that the initiative for a review 
of the 1941 agreement could ever come from the American side. Those concerned, 
particularly in the Pentagon, would never be able to defend themselves adequately 
against public criticism if they were to take such a step. However he thought that if 
the request came from our side, backed up with a sufficiently convincing display of 
arguments along the lines which I had followed, it should be possible to secure 
agreement in the State Department and Pentagon to the required review, and the 
fact that we had made the request would provide answer enough to any criticism 
from outside. He preferred to avoid the word "conference" if possible, but recognised 
that it would inevitably be given that name in the West Indies. He also recognised 
that however limited the terms of reference for such a conference might be, it was 
only too likely that the opportunity would be taken for all kinds of unacceptable 
proposals to be put up by the West Indies, for example completely re-writing the 
periods for which the leases would run etc. But he agreed that as these difficulties 
would have to be faced sooner or later, it was probably better to do so now rather 
than put off the evil day until independence was imminent. However, he pointed out 
that a good deal of preparatory work would still be necessary in Washington before a 
statement of the necessary facts could be compiled, and he could not say there and 
then whether it would be possible for them to inform us that they agreed to a review 
in reply to a request from our side until they had had time to go into the question in 
the necessary detail; he did not seem however to exclude the idea. He suggested that 
a suitable opportunity for us to raise the question of a review of the 1941 agreement 
might be in our reply to their Note to which he had referred. But he would like to 
think this question over and said that he would write a personal letter to me on the 
subject on his return to Washington, giving us his further views on the best way in 
which we might raise this question having regard to the circumstances in 
Washington. On this I said I had deliberately not put anything in writing myself, and 
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hoped that he did not in any way regard what I had said as a demarche; it really was 
only an attempt to use the opportunity of his presence in London to ascertain the 
best way for all concerned of raising this delicate matter. He understood this clearly 
enough and said that his letter would be an entirely personal one. 
4. Dale's reservation to which I referred above was, that while recognising 
Williams himself as being in a fairly strong position in Trinidad, the State 
Department's impression derived from their Consul General's reports, was that a 
very much less strong feeling existed in Trinidad on the subject of the 1941 
agreement than would seem to follow from what I had said. This, however, did not 
appear to have affected his views about the agreements which were evidently in much 
closer agreement with ours than any of us had thought likely. 
5. I hope that Dale's promised letter is not unduly delayed, and that he does not 
have cold feet meanwhile. I should naturally have preferred to have nothing [?sic] in 
writing. However, the conversation took place during drinks and dinner with a 
member of the American Embassy, and Dale could hardly be blamed for wishing not 
to commit himself too completely when he was clearly tired and preoccupied after 
his efforts to brief Mr. Nixon2 for his radio and television interviews. If there is undue 
delay in my hearing from him (i.e. after the beginning of next week) I shall remind 
him through our Embassy in Washington. But it does look as though the way will 
very shortly lie clear for an approach along the lines which we have all agreed would 
be the most favourable from the angle of the Federal Government. 
2 Richard Nixon, vice-president of the US, 1953- 1961. 
88 CO 103112573, no 64 5 Dec 1958 
[Jamaica and federation]: letter (reply) from Sir K Blackburne to 
P Rogers on the current state of anti-federation feeling in Jamaica. 
Enclosure: note by the governor of his latest discussion with 
Mr Manley 
Many thanks for your letter WIS 175/01 of the 26th November about Federation.l I 
have today also written to the Secretary of State in reply to his letter of the 25th 
November on the same subject. 
I enclose for your information a copy of a note which I recorded after my last 
discussion with Manley on this subject. I think that three points emerge from this 
discussion and from other talks which I have had with people recently:-
(a) Manley is still a believer in the idea of Federation, even though he is perhaps 
thinking, albeit mistakenly, in terms of a weak form of Federation, 
(b) Though Jamaican politics-through Bustamante-aggravated the present 
anti-Federation feeling, that feeling now represents popular opinion and cannot be 
lightly dismissed as "Jamaican politics", 
(c) There is still every hope for the future of Federation, though we are not likely 
to see much change in the Jamaican outlook until after the elections.2 
1 See 85. 
2 A reference to the forthcoming Jamaican elections which were held in July 1959. Manley won 29 out of 
45 seats, Bustamante 16. 
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I sense both in your letter and in the letter from the Secretary of State that it is felt 
that Jamaica is being un-cooperative, and that the fault lies at our door. I have no 
doubt that this is partly true. In the first place the great strides made by Jamaica in 
recent years have inevitably gone slightly to the heads of those responsible for them. 
Secondly, the ministerial and official teams in Jamaica are inevitably somewhat 
better than those in the Federation. This is no reflection on the Federal Government; 
the politicians decided (probably wrongly) to put their 2nd XI in to bat; and the 
Federal official organisation (although it has many top class men) cannot yet have 
the same background and general level of staffing as the larger territories. All this 
adds up to a strong feeling of superiority in Jamaica, coupled with great irritation 
(often over small and trivial details) when the Federal Government starts to make a 
move in any particular field. 
But, in fairness to Jamaica, I do think that there is another side to the picture. The 
most vital target of the Federal Government (particularly as they were the 2nd XI) 
should surely have been to proceed in the first instance on the basis of close 
collaboration with the unit territories through the Regional Consultative Council. 
One can only assume either that Grantley Adams was determined to rule the roost by 
himself, or else that he does not appreciate the importance of carrying Manley and 
others with him. The second view is supported by the astonishing statement by 
Grantley Adams that he has had to postpone the first vital meeting of the Regional 
Consultative Council (proposed for December) because of a by-election in Barbados! 
Finally, one cannot help sensing that there is an absence of leadership on the part of 
the Prime Minister, which has resulted in what are sometimes unfairly felt here to be 
unrelated moves by Federal Ministries to justify their existence. 
I am, of course, now a somewhat biased party, but I do most strongly feel that the 
fault is not all on the side of Jamaica, and that the Federation has not been given the 
needed leadership by its Prime Minister. 
I am sending a copy of this letter to Lord Hailes. 
Enclosure to 88 
I asked Mr. Manley today for his thoughts on Federation. He confirmed that his 
recent statements about Customs Union and about Federation were designed with 
the objects of playing for time and of trying to remove the issue of Federation from 
Jamaican internal politics. 
He hoped that he might persuade the opposition in Jamaica to join an all-party 
Committee of the House of Representatives to try and reach an agreed position in 
regard to amendments to the Federal constitution. He was afraid that he might not 
succeed and that the opposition might make a definite anti-Federation stand-
simply to strengthen their position in the next Jamaica elections. He thought that, if 
they won the elections on this platform, they might later find a loophole through 
which they could still keep Jamaica in the Federation at the end of the five-year 
period; but he thought that it was equally likely that secession would be the outcome 
under a J.L.P. Government. (My own bet is that a J.L.P. Government will not readily 
secede from Federation; it is noticeable that even Sir Alexander Bustamante is at 
pains to say that he is not against the principle of Federation, but is merely opposed 
to the present system). 
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Mr. Manley went on to say that he felt that the close-knit form of Federation on the 
Australian model was not suitable for the West Indies, although he admitted that he 
was as much to blame as anyone for its adoption. 
When questioned as to his ideas for the need for Federation he said that it was not 
only the road to nationhood, but was also needed for practical reasons of 
organisation and co-ordination, and he cited the U.C.W.I. as an example. He went on 
to say that it was probably a mistake for the Federal Government to have embarked 
on "economic planning and development" without adequate staff rather than to have 
concentrated on the task of regional organisation. He wondered what in fact the 
Federal Government could do in order to raise the levels in the smaller islands, and 
he quoted Antigua as an example of what could be achieved by local leadership. 
In reply to questions he said that this state of affairs would probably not have 
happened if others had been at the helm of the Federal Government. There was a 
clear lack of leadership. Why had Sir Grantley Adams made no attempt to visit the 
Units and to "sell" Federation? Why had he wasted his opportunities on his only brief 
visit to Jamaica by not talking about nationhood and about the success of his visit to 
Canada? How could any leader with a grip on the situation permit such an incident 
as the attempt to unseat Mr. Cargill from the Federal Parliament? 
In his view it was now "touch and go" whether Federation would survive. The tragic 
part was that no one outside Jamaica seemed to realise that the anti-Federation talk 
and the opposition to Customs Union as set out in the Commission's Report3 was not 
local politics; it was an expression of public opinion. (This was forcibly brought home 
to me later in the day by a talk with the Canadian Commissioner (Mr. R.G.C. Smith) 
who had just arrived from Trinidad and was obsessed with the political aspects of the 
Jamaica attitude. I have invited him to tell me his impressions after he has spent a 
week here and obtained the views of ordinary people) . 
Mr. Manley went on to say that it was astonishing that Sir Grantley Adams should 
postpone the proposed meeting of the Regional Consultative Council because of a by-
election in Barbados. It showed clearly that he had no idea of the gravity of the 
situation. 
3 A further commission on customs union chaired by Sir William Croft reported in Oct 1958. It examined 
the problem of how unit governments should be compensated for the loss of customs revenue under a 
common tariff and suggested that they should be given the right to levy consumption taxes on both 
domestic production and imports (The West Indies: Report of the Trade and Tariffs Commission in 2 
parts, W.l. 1/58, Government of the West Indies, 1958). 
89 CO 103112573, no 63 10 Dec 1958 
[Federation]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Lord Hailes on the 
question of dominion status 
Last week I had a very interesting talk with Jock Campbell and Bobby Kirkwood 
about the prospects for Federation, particularly in the light of opposition in Jamaica.1 
They had both "opened up" on this subject in an informal conversation a few days 
earlier and I thought it would be useful to have any ideas they might produce from 
I cf 84. 
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their own position in the West Indian scene on the way in which the United Kingdom 
might strengthen the standing of the Federal Government. Most of the discussion 
turned on the question of financial assistance and in particular on C.D. & W. 
assistance being channelled through the Federal Government and loan raising power 
resting solely in the hands of the Federal Government. Nothing emerged here which 
went beyond the points discussed with you during your last visit; and I did not of 
course think it right to tell them just how far we had already gone in agreement with 
you to adopt a policy in these two matters which I think we all feel should strengthen 
your hand greatly. 
The other major issue on which we touched was that of the prospect of Dominion 
status, which I know you feel as we do is the major political attraction for West 
Indians in the whole idea of Federation. At present it seems to me that it is not 
exerting its full force because Jamaica is dallying with the idea of separate political 
existence, and we discussed ways in which I might re-emphasise the aim of 
Dominion status in a way which would put the supporters of unit rights on the spot. 
Jock Campbell suggested that I might propose a date, say, 1962 or 1963, as that on 
which H.M.G. would be prepared to grarit independence to The West Indies, and to 
sponsor its submission to full Commonwealth membership. This undertaking would, 
of course, be conditional upon the Federal Government having by then been 
endowed with the necessary powers and finance to make it able to stand among its 
peers at a Commonwealth gathering. I am a little doubtful about Jock's suggestion, 
partly because of our critics in The West Indies who maintain that the idea of 
Federation is a device on H.M.G.'s part to escape its financial responsibilities, and 
partly because the setting of a date by us might have the effect of arousing opposition 
on the score that this was something that West Indians should themselves suggest to 
us, and not one to be bustled into by H.M.G. However, it is certainly an idea worth 
thinking of and I should be grateful for your views on it. We should have to see how 
any date proposed fitted in with plans for other territories particularly Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland. 
In the course of our discussion we touched on the forthcoming regional 
conference which your Government has proposed as a preliminary to the full 
revision conference next year. I have seen Philip Roger's letter to you of the 2nd 
December about the doubts which he felt. It occurs to me, however, that one might 
actually make use of such a conference to get across the main point which he makes 
in his letter (and which Jock Campbell raised in our discussion) if I were to visit The 
West Indies at the time on a general tour and in the course of it, perhaps open the 
conference or certainly make a speech at it, on the following theme. (I would not, by 
the way, suggest that I should take part in the conference but only that I should 
make a speech which would, I hope, put the opponents of Federation on the spot). I 
might recall what I said at the London Conference of 1956 and make it very clear that 
Dominion status was something to which The West Indies could look in the very 
near future (or perhaps mention a specific date) if they wished. It was not, however, a 
status which any of the units by themselves could obtain and even for The West 
Indies as a federal entity it would depend on the Federal Government being a 
Government which other Commonwealth Governments would accept as their peer. 
Independence is something which the United Kingdom can grant: full membership 
of the Commonwealth is a matter for all Commonwealth Governments. In other 
words, the Federal Government would have to have the attributes of power not only 
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vis-a-vis the United Kingdom, but also in its own house, and financial powers within 
the West Indies comparable with those which every other Commonwealth 
Government possessed in its own territory. The decision on that was something for 
West Indians themselves to take, but those who deny the Federal Government those 
powers must take the responsibility for holding the West Indies back from its goal of 
political independence as a full member of the Commonwealth. 
I should be most grateful if you would let me know what you think about this idea, 
both of a visit at all at that time, if I can possibly get away, and of my speaking on 
these lines if I do so. You will, of course, understand thaU could not yet say whether 
it would be possible for me to come out in April or May (I am firmly committed to a 
visit to Nigeria in mid-May) but if you think it would be useful, and if the 
Parliamentary situation here permits, I should very much like to.2 
2 The regional inter-governmental conference to undertake a preliminary review of the federal 
constitution, which was scheduled to be held in Trinidad, did not take place until the autumn of 1959. In 
May 1959 Hailes and the CO exchanged views over what might be said in an opening statement. Hailes 
submitted a draft which followed closely the arguments put forward by Lennox-Boyd in his statement to 
the 1956 conference (see 4 7, annex) and which reiterated dominion status as the goal to which all 
concerned were aiming. However, 'Since independence within the Commonwealth means at once 
burdens as well as privileges, let me repeat that H.M.G. would not think it right to urge the West Indies 
towards this status faster than West Indians themselves wished to go'. The Hailes draft added: ' . .. in the 
wider international sphere a nation state has to have certain minimum attributes of statehood if it is to be 
an acceptable member of the community of nations and to play a worthy part in the United Nations 
Organisation. I must say frankly that the Federal Government of the West Indies has not yet got those 
attributes and that the major obstacle in the way of its attaining them is not its constitutional ties with the 
U.K. but its Governmental weakness within the West Indies itself' (CO 1031/2311, no 36, enclosure, Hailes 
to Rogers, 9 May 1959). In the event Lennox-Boyd did not attend the Trinidad review conference. Hailes 
opened the proceedings and spoke along the lines of his May draft. 
90 DO 35/8061, no 7 23 Dec 1958 
'Some observations on the Jamaican economy': despatch no 403 from 
R G C Smith to the Canadian Ministry of External Mfairs, Ottawa 
[Smith was commissioner for Canada in Trinidad and DO 35/8061 contains copies of the 
reports he sent to Ottawa between Apr 1958 and Aug 1960. The reports were sent to the 
CRO by FE Cumming-Bruce, deputy UK high commissioner, Ottawa, 1958-1959. The 
CRO decided not to forward them to the CO on the grounds that the latter would send 
them to West Indian governors, that this might come to Smith's attention and that in 
consequence Smith would be more inhibited in his reports (DO 35/8061, no 2, G W StJ 
Chadwick to Cumming-Bruce, 1 July 1958). Chadwick, an assistant secretary at the CRO, 
found the reports much more informative than anything received from the CO: 'In fact 
this is virtually the only news which we are receiving about Federation, since, despite 
earlier promises, the Colonial Office have so far sent us nothing of value' (ibid, minute, 
14 Jan 1959). Deputy undersecretary of state, Sir H Lintott, at the CRO agreed: 'The 
Canadian Commissioner in Trinidad is indefatigable. We learn much more from him than 
from Church House' (ibid, minute, 22 Apr 1960).] 
This despatch is not intended as an economic review of Jamaica, but rather to give 
some general observations based on my brief visit to that island. Because Jamaica is 
so different from the rest of the colonies making up the Federation, such a cursory 
review may be useful in setting the economy against the background of the West 
Indies as a whole. 
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2. In the first place, Jamaica has not developed economically, politically or 
socially as a partner of the other islands. It is, of course, a partner in several of the 
commodity agreements- sugar, fats and oils for example-but because of its 
isolation and its nearness to the United States, it had tended to look northward and 
westward rather than eastward to a considerable degree more than do the other 
islands. Moreover the discovery and exploitation of bauxite and the development of 
the tourist trade have both tended to intensify this northward drift. It is also said that 
ethnically the Jamaicans are different, springing from war-like tribes in Africa that 
have little connection with the more peaceful tribes that made up the forebears of 
the eastern islanders. Necessarily that is part conjecture, but there is no conjecture 
in the fact that many of the most prominent business leaders are of Assyrian, 
Lebanese, Jewish or other Middle East origin with little natural affiliation to the 
United Kingdom-elsewhere the great families and estate are almost entirely of 
British origin and ownership. 
3. In common with the other islands, but to a greater extent, Jamaica is 
experiencing a remarkable economic development. Although there are grounds for 
questioning if the direction of the development is sound in all respects, there can be 
no doubt that it is booming-gross domestic product is reported to have more than 
doubled from 1950 to 1956, sugar exports have increased four-fold by volume since 
the pre-war average (although other agricultural production, such as bananas, 
coffee, pimento, ginger are considerably below pre-war standards, these crops 
compared to sugar are relatively insignificant except for bananas), alumina and 
bauxite production (and exports) have shot ahead yearly, so that in 1957 exports of 
the two combined were nearly eight times the 1955 figures and now make up about 
44 percent of total domestic exports. Industrialization is "rampant" and the tourist 
trade has become one of Jamaica's major industries-although the past season was 
relatively poor reflecting the recession in the United States. 
4. Jamaica has developed an interesting method of attracting greater tourist 
expenditure. Behind its high tariff protection under normal circumstances the 
tourist would not regard Jamaica as a suitable hunting ground for "goods". However 
the island has set up a widespread system of "in bond" shops, whereby anyone may 
buy a wide assortment of imported goods- clothing, perfumes, accessories and so 
on-at duty and tax free prices, the goods being delivered at the port of export. This 
would seem to be an ingenious way of having one's cake and eating it, and it is 
strange that others of the islands have not followed suit-unless it is that the 
relatively lower tariffs would not support the cost of the operation of the scheme. 
(Some time ago I suggested a similar plan for Canada in order to reverse the adverse 
balance of tourist expenditure. I wonder if it might be useful to study in detail the 
results of the Jamaica scheme?) 
5. I had a brief insight into what appears to be a most intelligent and far-sighted 
agricultural programme. Strangely this part of the Government programme seems 
to have been much less publicized than the more "flashy" and spectacular industrial 
development or tourist trade. Yet it would appear as if the agricultural policies, 
particularly in relation to the beef and dairy cattle industry, surely must be of the 
profoundest importance to the future of the colony. 
6. Jamaica has almost succeeded in developing new cattle breeds that are 
thought to best suit local conditions. In the dairy field there is the Jamaica Hope, a 
cross between the Jersey and the Sebu. These small animals need little care, stand 
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the heat well, and go on producing satisfactorily over a long period of years-all 
prime requisites to a cattle industry that is still based to a considerable extent on 
peasant agriculture rather than on herd management (although there are some 
properly organized herds in Jamaica, notably by the Aluminum Companies) . In beef 
cattle there is the Jamaica Red, a cross between the Red Poll and the original 
"Spanish" cattle found on the island. It is a fine looking animal, that now strikes 
almost true to form, hardy, heat resistant and capable of being brought into 
condition on a diet of pasture alone. Similarly the Jamaican Black, a more recent 
cross between the black Angus and the Sebu, shows great promise. In both of these 
breeds the hump and dewlap of the Indian cattle (through the "Spanish" cattle in the 
Red) have been almost bred out, but the stamina and hardiness evidently retained. 
7. It would be interesting to find out why Jamaica has · started out on its own 
instead of adopting the Santa Gertrudis breed from Texas, which has shown such 
remarable [sic] results under fairly similar conditions-! propose to explore this 
question further. 
8. Coupled with this breeding programme Jamaica has gone in for a systematic 
pangola grass pasture development. For example, all lands strip mined in the bauxite 
operations must be put back with pangola grass, or payment made to enable the 
Government to convert other similar acreage to pasture. This grass has proved to be 
all but immune to drought and to support such an increased number of head of 
cattle (without any auxiliary feed or concentrates) that this policy is bound to have 
important long term results for Jamaican agriculture. 
9. There is also a programme of production subsidies, helped out by Colonial 
Development and Welfare grants, in exchange for the introduction of approved 
agricultural practices. The Department of Agriculture carries on vigorous fertilizer 
programmes, although statistically there does not appear to be any increase in 
fertilizer use. 
10. All crops are sold by marketing boards in an effort to improve quality and 
grading. Jamaica is, of course, the largest banana producer in the Federation, but 
production is only increasing very slightly (in contrast to the Windward Islands 
where production is coming ahead by leaps and bounds). It also produces superb 
quality coffee, but its export is relatively small and has fallen rapidly since 1953. 
Smaller crops that are Jamaican specialties [sic] are pimentos and ginger, both of 
which are world famous. 
11. Perhaps the most interesting development in recent years, apart from 
bauxite mining, is the industrialization of Jamaica. It is of interest because it is the 
result of a deliberate programme for attracting foreign investment in manufacture 
and in encouraging local capital to manufacture by a policy of high protection, 
through import duties, quotas or outright prohibition of imports, tax concessions 
and help by the Industrial Development Corporation which will build factories and 
lease them under favourable terms. The results are quite spectacular, but the proce 
[sic] paid in increased living codts [sic], high production costs, and the elimination 
of the basic competitive urge are [sic] much more questionable. 
12. The increase in manufacturing may be illustrated by considering the 
increase in the gross domestic product produced by manufacturing- 21 million in 
1956 against 8 million in 1950. Industries have included tectiles [sic], shoes, soap, 
condensed milk (monopoly), cement, cigarettes and cigars, beer, and others of minor 
importance apart from the natural products such as sugar, rum, alumina. Although 
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there appears to be a continuing interest in investment from abroad, the present rate 
of increase can hardly be continued indefinitely. 
13. There is cause for some alarm at the development of this policy. Jamaicans in 
general seem to be over-confident that they can solve their problems of 
unemployment by "more and more of the same". No figures of numbers of persons 
employed in secondary manufacturing are available, but they · probably make only a 
dent in the steadily growing work force. In the meantime the rapidity of development 
has undoubtedly out-run the availability of skilled man-power, so that costs .of 
production are high and maintenance poor. It is not encouraging that, so it seemed 
in this cursory examination of the problem, Jamaican industrialists do not seem 
overly concerned with their higher costs, but tend to seek solutions through the 
maintenance of unassailable protection or other Government hand-outs. They do not 
appear to be interested in solutions that lie in greater markets (through customs 
union for example) or by increased efficiency-they just do not want competition, 
and one wonders how far such a policy can be pushed successfully. 
14. In many respects the structure of the economy appears to resumble [sic] a 
South America rather than a North America (or other British West Indian) pattern. It 
is anomalous that under a socialist government the pattern seems to have been 
devised to benefit a few influential and very wealthy people. It is claimed that wages 
have been raised and that standards of living improved by these policies. It is open to 
question if real wages have been increased significantly (except in a few cases such as 
in the bauxite and alumina industries), and certainly not to the same extent that the 
"capitalists" have been able to add to their already considerable fortunes. 
91 CO 103112603, no 42 17 Feb 1959 
[British Honduras]: letter from Governor Sir C Thornley toP Rogers 
proposing a statement to the effect that the colony is free to choose 
whether it wishes to join in a relationship with Guatemala. Minutes by 
Rogers, HT Bourdillon, Sir J Macpherson, Mr Amery and Mr Lennox-
Boyd 
[Guatemala claimed to have inherited sovereignty over British Honduras from Spain but 
in 1859 it signed and ratified a treaty with Britain recognising the boundaries between 
the two countries. The treaty contained an article calling on both parties to use their best 
efforts to build a means of communication between Guatemala City and the Caribbean 
coast. Claiming that the UK had not fulfilled its obligations under this article, Guatemala 
denounced the 1859 treaty in 1939.] 
Thank you for your letter of the 19th of January about our telegraphic 
correspondence on the broadcast which I was considering making following the 
debate in the Legislative Assembly on the dispute with Guatemala. 
I fully realise that I was asking a great deal of Ministers to give me an answer on so 
important a matter at such very short notice and I perfectly understand the difficulty 
in which Ministers were placed. It was however only during the meeting of Executive 
Council on the morning of the day on which I sent my telegram No. 14 that I realised 
the line which the People's United Party were probably going to take in the debate 
and it seemed to me then that the point which I put to you was of sufficient 
importance to try and obtain your reactions to what I had it in mind to do. I also had 
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at the back of my mind discussions which I had with you and the Secretary of State 
himself when I was in London with one of the Delegations at the end of 1957 or 
the beginning of 1958 when your reactions did not seem to me to be so strongly 
opposed to the idea as they clearly are now. The line which the Secretary of State 
X then took was that any such statement about British Honduras could not but run 
the risk of unfortunate repercussions in Malta, Cyprus and elsewhere where for 
other reasons not applicable in British Honduras, H.M.G. could not adopt a similar 
approach. However, I appreciate that I did not press the matter then as it did not 
seem to me then to be as important as I believe it now is-and it might well be that 
had I done so the Secretary of State's reactions would have appeared as strongly 
opposed to it then as they clearly are now. This was however a factor in my mind 
when thinking that you might be prepared to go with me on this even with the short 
notice which I was able to give; and I do hope that I shall be forgiven of any intention 
deliberately to rush something through about which more time should have been 
given to Ministers to consider all the various factors involved. 
I was however sorry to learn from your telegram No. 33 that the more the 
Secretary of State has thought about it the more convinced he has become that a 
statement on the lines which I recommended would be a mistake. Frankly, and with 
the greatest respect, the more I think about it the more convinced have I become 
that it is really important that such a statement should be made and that it should be 
· made before we reach the anniversary month of the signing of the disputed Treaty 
100 years ago in 1859. The purpose of this letter is therefore to ask that further 
consideration may now be given to this matter in the light of the reasoned 
arguments which follow. 
In the first place, I honestly believe that most thinking people here have it in mind 
that one day, however far ahead in the distant future, this country will be able to 
make the choice as to whether it remains within the Commonwealth or goes outside. 
I do not therefore think that it would come as a particular shock to them if such a 
statement were to be made in Parliament or by myself, always so long as it was at the 
same time made perfectly clear that we cannot yet foresee the day when the country 
will be firmly on its own financial and economic feet and resting on equally firm 
democratic foundations; and always so long as it is made equally clear that H.M.G. 
has no intention of giving up its responsibilities towards this country until that time 
arrives and we have fully discharged our obligations under Article 73 of the United 
Nations Charter. After all, we are all agreed as you made clear in your telegram No. 
33 that strategically and economically the British Commonwealth has nothing to 
gain from continued association with British Honduras, and we are all agreed that 
there can be no question of our handing over our responsibilities to any other 
country or group of countries even after financial and economic self-sufficiency and 
the build-up of democratic institutions have been satisfactorily accomplished so long 
as the great majority of the people here desire to remain associated with the 
Commonwealth. If all these facts are made perfectly clear I cannot see how a 
statement on the lines which I have proposed could possibly be interpreted in any 
way as an intention to abandon this country. 
I believe also, with respect, that the fear that such a statement would discourage 
even further private investment in this country is being rather exaggerated. There 
has after all been precious little private investment here over the past few years with 
the notable exception of course of the activities of the Sharps and others associated 
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with them in the sugar factory, the citrus factory and the Hummingbird cocoa 
development. Furthermore I see no prospect whatsoever of the situation in this 
respect improving if we are simply to go along as we are doing at present. The main 
reasons for this are, I feel almost sure, the hotting up of Guatemalan propaganda on 
the subject of their claim and the ambiguous position of Price1 and the P.U.P. 
towards this issue. Anything therefore that we can do to take the heat out of this 
issue will of itself be an encouragement to private investment which is not likely to 
be scared off by the highly unlikely contingency that the day will ever come when the 
substantial majority of the people of this country will ever choose to join up with 
Guatemala in preference to maintaining the Commonwealth link. In this connection 
it is, I think, of some significance that the Chamber of Commerce, on which is 
represented people with a fairly large stake in this country and to which many 
potential overseas investors come for advice, have themselves sought an assurance 
from H.M.G. the implication of which is that a plebiscite should at some stage be 
held. It seems to be a reasonably safe conclusion from this that these people whom it 
was suggested in your telegram No. 13 would be dismayed by a statement on the 
lines I have proposed, do not in fact have any fears about what the peoples' decision 
on this issue would be and that they could presumably be relied upon to reassure any 
potential investors who might have doubts on this score. The best thing I am 
convinced that we can do to encourage private investment short of persuading the 
Guatemalan Government to give up their claim (which is obviously impossible) is to 
take whatever measures we can to take the heat out of this issue now. 
There is also a hint in your telegrams on this matter that what I am proposing 
would amount to a reversal of present policy. I cannot honestly see it in this light. I 
have myself never understood our policy here to be that never in any circumstances 
will we be prepared to grant this country the same sort of independence as has been 
granted to the great dominions. When a few people associated with George Price here 
have doubted the sincerity of H.M.G's policy towards dependent territories I have 
roundly charged them with paying no regard whatever to the historical facts of the 
development of the Commonwealth and asked why in the face of these 
incontrovertible facts of history they should have any doubts about the intentions of 
H.M.G. to fulfil their obligations under the United Nations Charter. Up to now I have 
not been pressed to go beyond this point but I may be asked the direct question at 
any time, or it might be asked in the Legislative Assembly, as to what the position 
will be when those obligations have been fulfilled. I would not of course ever say 
bluntly that H.M.G. could simply not foresee that the time would ever come when 
they would be prepared to relinquish charge of this country. Were I to do so all the 
political parties would most certainly unite in condemnation of us. But it will not be 
easy to go on stalling on this question particularly during this very important year in 
our relations with Guatemala. 
On the other hand the advantages of a statement on the lines which I have 
proposed seem to me to be great and urgent. The supporters of Price might come to 
see that he really might one day be able, if allowed to pursue his course unrestrained, 
to lead them into the arms of Guatemala which I am absolutely certain the great 
1 George Cadle Price, former city councillor and mayor of Belize City; founding member of PUP, 1950; 
party secretary, 1950-1956; leader from 1956; elected to National Assembly, 1954; first minister under 
ministerial system, 1961; prime minister under 1964 self-government constitution. 
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majority of them would detest. The many loyal people who at present stupidly declare 
themselves uninterested in politics would, I hope, come to realise that in the 
interests of their own future and the future of their children it was time that they 
began to play a part in politics and to play their part in steering the future destiny of 
the country along the path of their own choosing. It would completely undermine 
the position which has been taken up by President Ydigoras2 by cutting the ground 
from under his feet; and it would become very difficult for the Guatemalan 
Government to find much support either in Guatemala itself or in the other Latin 
American countries or indeed in the United Nations Organisation for any aggressive 
measures which Y digoras may be contemplating in this year of the recovery of Belize. 
There is also, I feel, a good chance that if such a statement is made we shall find the 
Americans on our side as allies on this issue instead of adopting the role which they 
now do of neutrality in the dispute; and it might even provide an avenue of escape for 
President Ydigoras from the prison in which he has incarcerated himself by his 
outspoken public statements of his intentions towards this country during this 
fateful year which has now dawned. In the discussions which I had with Wikelei 
here a fortnight ago he mentioned to me that the President may quite possibly be 
casting around for some means of extricating himself from the stand which he has 
publicly taken and that he might possibly see in such a statement just the escape 
route which he was seeking. It seems to me also that such a statement would put us 
in an impregnable position in the United Nations if the Guatemalan charges are 
pressed this year in that particular forum. 
In short I do not know of anyone here who is capable of independent thought on 
this matter who would not regard such a statement of long term policy as entirely 
consistent with the policies which have been adopted in other parts of the 
Commonwealth and, as such, entirely reasonable. 
Both the American Ambassador to Guatemala and the American Consul here have 
both mentioned to me in conversation that it must be a great many years before this 
country will be able to stand on its own feet but that neither of them doubt that when 
the time comes H.M.G. will act true to form and allow the people to chart their own 
course as they think best for themselves. They have both told me that some such 
statement as I have suggested would be much the best answer to the impetuosity of 
the President and some members of his Government in Guatemala towards their 
claim to sovereignty. This also is the very strong view held by Wikeley as was 
indicated in his telegram addressed to the Foreign Office as No. 9 of the 13th of 
January last. In our talks while he was down here as my guest a little over a fortnight 
ago he stressed even more strongly the importance which he attached to a statement 
on these lines being made from his own view-point in Guatemala City. 
I am enclosing4 with this letter leading articles which have recently appeared in 
the "Belize Billboard" and in the "Belize Times" which show that both the principal 
political parties take it for granted that the day will come when these people will have 
freedom of choice in regard to their future destinies. As I have already mentioned the 
Chamber of Commerce are clearly of the same mind in requesting the assurance of 
H.M.G. that they will reject any attempt by any country to alter the present status of 
2 Gen Miguel Ydfgoras Fuentes, president of Guatemala, 1958- 1963. 
3 T Wikeley, HM minister and consul-general, Guatemala, 1957-1960. 4 Not printed. 
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British Honduras against the will of the people as expressed through a plebiscite. I 
have also, without of course mentioning that I have had any correspondence with 
you on this matter, in private discussion with Macmillan5 led him up to the point at 
which he has told me that in his judgement it would be quite a good thing if the 
people were now told something of the kind by myself or by the Secretary of State. 
He, as you know, is my most valuable unofficial adviser and it was interesting that 
without any direct lead from me he should have come to the same conclusion as I do. 
I should add that I had a long talk with Montgomery Hyde6 and Llewelyn 
Williams7 before they saw the political parties last Friday afternoon when I gave 
them as an aide memoire the statement included in paragraph 1 of your telegram 
No. 33 without of course indicating to them that we had had any other correspon-
dence in the matter. They replied that it correctly recorded the views expressed to 
them in their talk with you. For the reasons given in this letter you will appreciate 
that I could not bring myself to stress to them the "disadvantages" attaching to my 
own proposition to you. I was however extremely careful in what I did say not to 
indicate anything of my own thoughts as set out in this letter. But they did ask me 
what reply I thought they should give if they were asked a direct question arising 
out of a suggestion in the "Times" leading article. This was a difficult one for me in 
the circumstances. I suggested, and they accepted, that much the best line was to 
invite reference to H.M.G's wonderful record in the development of the 
Commonwealth and to stress the need for faith. This, I felt, was the least that I could 
do. In fact no such direct question was raised with them at the meeting with any of 
the political parties. 
I am sorry that I have felt the need to write at such length about this and to press 
you so hard to have this question reconsidered by Ministers. I have done so because I 
believe that the time has come when it is urgently necessary to make a statement on 
the lines which I have suggested as giving us much the best chance of taking the heat 
out of the Guatemalan dispute in this important year and restoring a measure of 
stability into the political scene here. 
I hope you will not feel, because it would not be correct, that I am being unduly 
influenced by American opinion in this matter. No one feels more strongly on the 
point than Wikeley and myself; but situated as we are in the middle of this continent 
it is, as I am sure you will realise, of considerable importance to us that we should 
have American opinion on our side. At the moment it is correctly neutral. I believe 
that a declaration in such terms as I have recommended might well tip it over on to 
our side in the influence which the United States is undoubtedly able to exercise on 
the Guatemalan Government. 
I believe that the best time to have made this statement would have been over the 
broadcast on the evening of the day on which the debate took place in the Legislative 
Assembly. But I perfectly understand that it was asking too much to expect the 
Secretary of State's authority to make it at such short notice. I do however feel that it 
is important that a statement on these lines should be made not later than the end of 
March before we enter the centenary month of April. 
5 J W Macmillan, nominated member, Executive Council, British Honduras. 
6 MP (Unionist) , North Belfast, 1950-1959. 
7 MP (Labour) , Abertillery Division of Monmouthshire, 1950- 1965. 
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Feeling as strongly as I do on this matter I should greatly appreciate the earliest 
indication from you of the Secretary of State's view in the light of the arguments put 
forward in this letter. 
I am sending a copy of this letter to Wikeley. 
Minutes on 91 
Sir J. Macpherson (through Mr. Bourdillon) 
Sir Colin Thornley in his letter at (42) makes a strong plea for the reconsideration of 
the attitude which we have taken so far about his saying publicly that the people of 
British Honduras will eventually be free to decide to join up in any relationship they 
like with Guatemala. You will recall that Sir Colin proposed that he should make this 
statement in a broadcast in January and that we declined to agree, primarily because 
we feared the effect of such a statement on investment in British Honduras. On your 
instructions I followed our telegram up with a personal letter about the short notice 
which Sir Colin had given us on so major an issue. 
There was a further exchange of telegrams about what might be said by and to the 
M.P.s which you also saw. 
Sir Col in presents a forceful and closely reasoned argument for reconsideration on 
this point in a letter which is typical of the integrity and honesty of purpose with 
which throughout he has approached the difficult political issues arising from the 
activities of Mr. Price. I think you and Ministers should read it in full , the more 
especially since I much regret that I find myself in disagreement with it. 
To clear first the question of the short notice given us by Sir C. Thornley, the 
second paragraph of his letter explains the circumstances in which he was placed. It 
is very understandable that in these circumstances he felt bound so to put the matter 
to us, and I think we should accept this unreservedly in our reply. I would add as far 
as the passage marked X in that paragraph is concerned, that while the minutes of 
the meetings with the Secretary of State at that time do not record this point in 
detail, my recollection accords with that of Sir Colin that the point we were primarily 
concerned with then was the risk of repercussions in Malta, Cyprus and elsewhere. 
On that I would only add that while we need not presumably consider the effect on 
Cyprus, the possibility of repercussions elsewhere must still be borne in mind. We 
might well find it embarrassing that anywhere where a foreign country lays a claim 
to a British Colony, we should have the precedent of saying that of course the people 
of that Colony will be free to choose in due course whether they should join the 
foreign country in question. Such repercussions would be still more damaging if any 
question of a plebescite [sic] were to arise and I deal with this point in respect of 
British Honduras below. 
As far as British Honduras alone is concerned, and Sir Colin quite rightly restricts 
his own arguments to that field , the following are the arguments which he puts 
forward:-
(1) Provided it is made clear that H.M.G. has no intention of giving up its 
responsibilities until the country is "firmly on its own financial and economic feet 
and resting on equally firm democratic foundations", he believes that most thinking 
people in British Honduras believe that the country would be able to make a choice 
as to whether it remains within the Commonwealth or goes outside, and that a 
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statement to that effect now would be no "particular shock to them". This may be so, 
but I do not think that even from the internal point of view it is the full story. Firstly, 
when statements such as this are made, the qualifications embodied in them, such as 
that proposed by Sir Colin, tend to be forgotten or ignored and only the nub of the 
statement publicised. That can well be used by ill-intentioned political leaders such 
as Mr. Price for their own purposes and constant reiteration of the theme could in 
my view well have an important effect in weakening confidence both within and 
without British Honduras that the Colony will stay in the Commonwealth, 
particularly if one is at any time driven to further stages such as a plebescite [sic] (I 
comment further on this later) . Furthermore it seems to me that this statement of 
Sir Colin's rests on the unspoken assumption, which indeed I think has dominated so 
much of his thinking about the future of the Colony, that one day it could hope to 
I 
have an independent existence. I just do not see this as a possibility and while 
obviously no one can be absolutely certain about what may be possible in this 
A respect in 50 or 100 years time, I believe that it would be a most dangerous course 
I 
to base our statement of policy now on an assumption which we do not ourselves 
believe. 
(2) Sir Colin then goes on to contest our view that private investment would be 
deterred by a statement such as he proposes. He points out firstly that there has been 
little private investment except for that of the Sharps and that, moreover, private 
investment is already deterred by the uncertainty arising from the dispute with 
Guatemala. He suggests that a statement about the ability of British Honduras to 
join Guatemala at some later date will "take the heat out of the issue" and therefore 
be an encouragement to private investment, and as evidence and support he quotes 
the fact that the local Chamber of Commerce have themselves "sought an assurance 
from H.M.G. the implication of which is that a plebiscite should at some stage be 
held". I am not sure of the details of the latter but I surmise that what is sought by 
the Chamber of Commerce is an assurance that British Honduras would not be 
handed over to Guatemala without a plebiscite-a proposal which is different from 
Sir Colin's in a subtle but still very important way. Sir Colin is right in saying that 
there has been little investment apart from that of the Sharp group, but they are, 
after all, about to invest a further £1 million in British Honduras, which is in itself a 
very sizeable sum for so tiny a place and my belief is that they would certainly be 
upset by a statement of the kind contemplated. Furthermore, I do not believe such a 
statement would, as Sir Colin surmises, "take the heat out" of the Guatemalan issue. 
My own belief is that it would have the contrary effect, for the reasons in paras 4 and 
5 below. 
(3) Sir Colin then reverts to his favourite theme, which I have mentioned in 
(1) above, that he has never himself "understood our policy here to be that never 
in any circumstances will we be prepared to grant (the Colony) the same sort of 
independence as has been granted to the great dominions". For the reasons given 
B above I certainly think that that in fact is our policy as long as a totally 
independent existence is in question. As part of the West Indian Federation, on the 
other hand, British Honduras could certainly look to independence in the sense of 
independence from U.K. control. 
(4) Sir Colin believes that a statement such as he proposes would arouse those 
in British Honduras who value the British connection from their present 
indifference towards the antics of Mr. Price, by making them realize that they must 
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fight to defend their future. I wish I could be so optimistic, but while one can never 
be certain either way on such an issue, I would at least add that there is no evidence 
to show that it will have this effect in any greater degree than the manner in which it 
might well strengthen the hands of Mr. Price in harping publicly on the theme of 
eventual union with Guatemala. My own fear is that it would enable Mr. Price to 
make much important play with this than he can at the moment and that it might 
well dismay many of those who are our friends. 
(5) Sir Colin then suggests that a statement such as he proposes would cut the 
ground from under the feet of the President of Guatemala, and would make it very dif-
ficulty for the Guatemalan Government to find support either in Guatemala itself, or 
among other Latin American countries, or in the United Nations, for any aggressive 
measure which he may contemplate this year for the "recovery" of Belize. He suggests 
that such a statement might bring the Americans on to our side as allies on this issue, 
instead of adopting the role of neutrality as they do at the moment, and furthermore 
that it might provide "an avenue of escape" for the President from the impasse he has 
created by his public statements. Mr. Bourdillon, through whom I am passing the file, 
will be in a better position than I to judge about all this, but subject to his views I do 
not myself believe at the moment that the statement will produce all, or indeed, any, 
of these advantages. I do not believe that the attitude of Latin American countries is 
dictated primarily by the merits of the case, and in any case we already have so much 
material on this, including the two debates in the House of Assembly about the wish of 
British Honduras not to associate with Guatemala, that I do not feel the statement would 
add substantially to our case. As far as the Americans are concerned, I believe that pri-
vately they recognise the overwhelming strength of our case but that they have never 
been willing to come down on our side in it because of their quite understandable, 
though from our view very tiresome, need to stay on good terms with Guatemala. That 
need would in no way be lessened by the statement. Finally, as far as Guatemala itself 
is concerned, I frankly do not see how such a statement would cut the ground from 
under the feet of the President. I would have expected that his next move would be to 
make great play with the statement, claim that Guatemala should be allowed opportu-
nities to advance its case in British Honduras, and perhaps then demand a plebiscite. 
While we could, of course, in the face of that fall back on the qualifications to the state-
ment to which I referred in (1) above, I would have thought that this would not stand 
in the say [?way] of quite an effective little campaign by Guatemala for such a plebiscite. 
The rest of the letter does not add to the reasons for the course Sir Colin 
advocates, but sets out something of the local background and ends up by saying that 
he thinks it important that a statement on these lines should be made not later than 
the end of March. 
I regret that my own view remains that for the reasons I have attempted to explain 
above, such a statement should not be made. I propose that subject to Foreign Office 
concurrence we should reply accordingly. 
?So proceed. 
Sir J. Macpherson 
P. R. 
6.3.59 
Sir Colin Thornley argues his case very well, and this is a matter on which he 
obviously feels deeply. It is difficult to go against the view of the man on the spot 
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when he clearly feels that the local situation makes a certain course of action 
overwhelmingly necessary. All the same, I am bound to agree with Mr. Rogers that 
the statement suggested by Sir Colin should not be authorised. 
2. The fatal flaw in the case advanced in No. 42 seems to be that the proposed 
formula, while it would make a definite reference to ultimate self-determination and 
would thus arouse all sorts of expectations, would not foreshadow self-determination 
for British Honduras in the immediate or even the near future. On the contrary, it 
would link the exercise of self-determination specifically with the attainment of 
financial viability (see paragraph 3 of No. 27)-a happy state which British Honduras 
may not achieve for a very long time. I do not dispute that this connection between 
viability and independence is right and proper, but I am afraid it would rob the 
proposed statement of almost all of its political advantages. I concede that the initial 
effect of the statement might be to embarrass our adversaries (a term which is meant 
to include President Ydigoras and George Price), but they would not take it lying 
down. They would be bound to regard it as a challenge, and I am afraid they would 
quickly see the opportunities for counter-attack which a statement on these lines 
would offer. They would surely fasten on to the offer of self-determination implied in 
the statement and would challenge HMG to prove the sincerity of their intentions by 
arranging for an early plebiscite. I am afraid they would have an easy answer to the 
argument that British Honduras cannot choose its own future until it is financially 
viable, since they could say that the present inability of British Honduras to pay its 
own way need be no obstacle to a choice between the United Kingdom and 
Guatemala. President Ydigoras would no doubt improve the occasion by making 
lavish promises of aid from the Guatemalan Treasury-promises which he would 
doubtless have no intention of keeping but which would nonetheless have their 
immediate effect. By these means HMG would before long be forced back on the 
defensive, and the fact that the offer of ultimate self-determination had been 
specifically made would only add to our embarrassments. 
3. I am the more reluctant to reach this conclusion because I see great force in 
Sir Colin Thornley's contention that the many loyal people in British Honduras will 
not bestir themselves until they are faced with the possibility of the British 
connection coming to an end. I also think-this is a point on which I do not quite 
agree with Mr. Rogers- that the Americans might welcome a chance to come out 
somewhat more openly in our support and to fend off the inevitable onslaught of 
President Ydigoras by telling him that they would have been only too happy to 
support Guatemala but that they could not resist the obvious justice of the British 
case. I am afraid, however, that the absence from the statement of any early promise 
of self-determination would prevent the achievement of these objectives just as 
surely as it would prevent the achievement of those mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph. The initial effect of the statement might be to galvanise the loyalists into 
some kind of activity, but they would relapse as soon as they discovered that the 
Colony was not going to be required to choose its own destiny either at once or even 
within a set period of years. As for the Americans, the initial reaction in their case 
might also be favourable, but how long would this last? Would they not find it 
difficult, before very long, to avoid being caught up in the counter-attack? In other 
words, would we not soon find the Americans joining the Guatemalans in urging us 
to institute an early plebiscite in order to demonstrate the sincerity of our 
intentions? 
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4. The truth is, I am afraid, that Sir Colin Thornley has made a number of 
extremely good points but that his proposal will not work unless it is driven to its 
logical conclusion. Either it goes too far or else it does not go far enough. If the 
display of the prospect of ultimate self-determination is to have the desired effect on 
all concerned, it must be accompanied by a definite forecast of the actual exercise of 
choice, preferably at the end of a stated (and quite short) period of years. Given the 
complete strategic unimportance of British Honduras, one is sorely tempted to 
advocate that course; but this would at once land us in the familiar difficulty that we 
can hardly offer an early plebiscite in British Honduras without making the same 
offer for other places whose strategic importance is considerable. 
5. We seem, therefore, to be driven back to the conclusion that Sir Colin's pro- · 
posal is a non-starter. On the other hand we must not conceal from ourselves the 
dilemma with which he is faced. In No. 42 he drives home the point that everyone in 
British Honduras in fact assumes "that the day will come when the people will have 
freedom of choice in regard to their future destinies." He cannot directly deny this, 
since to do so would create a storm and would play straight into the hands of the 
Guatemalans and George Price. On the other hand he is not authorised specifically 
to confirm that the day of choice will come, so he has to take refuge in references to 
the past record of British Colonial policy (references which must, incidentally, rein-
force the general belief every time they are made). It seems to me that this is a most 
dangerous position which cannot be held indefinitely or indeed for very much 
longer. Unless we are to do what Sir Colin wants (with knobs on}, it seems to me 
that the only possible answer is to devise for British Honduras and for other territo-
ries in a broadly similar position a new status short of independence which will 
nonetheless satisfy nationalist ambitions and remove the taint of "Colonialism". A 
I 
new study of the future of the "Smaller Territories" is fortunately just about to be 
inaugurated by a Working Party under Sir Norman Brook's chairmanship, on 
C which I am to be the Colonial Office representative. I will keep you and Mr. 
I 
Rogers fully informed of developments in the Working Party, and I am not 
unhopeful that something of interest to British Honduras will emerge. 
Meanwhile I can only suggest that Sir Colin Thornley should be given a reasoned 
rejection of his present proposal, coupled with the assurance that his dilemma is 
fully appreciated here and that we shall be giving further urgent thought to the 
future of British Honduras in the context of the Smaller Territories generally. I am 
afraid he will regard this last assurance as cold comfort, but it is the best we can do 
for the present. 
Mr.Amery 
H.T.B. 
11.3.59 
. . . 2. I agree with Mr. Rogers and Mr. Bourdillon that we cannot give the Governor 
the green light on this. But Mr. Bourdillon raises a very important point in para 5 of 
his minute-touching on A & B of Mr. Rogers' minute-as to whether we can 
contemplate British Honduras ever becoming independent on its own. We hope that 
in time B.H. may see the advantages of joining the West Indies Federation (and 
achieving independence in that way) . If their objections to this are sustained there 
are only three choices: -
(i) continued dependent status which is not in line with our declared policy, or 
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(ii) independence-but this would not be viable and would be swallowed up by 
neighbouring countries, or 
(iii) some new status, short of independence, within the Commonwealth. 
3. The first meeting of the Working Party referred to at C of Mr. Bourdillon's 
minute is being held as I write & we will follow this up. 
Approve (subject to F.O. concurrence), reply as proposed by Mr. Bourdillon? 
S. ofS. 
J.S.M. 
11.3.59 
I agree with Mr. Rogers and Mr. Bourdillon; though I do not think the Governor's 
position is quite as awkward as Mr. Bourdillon suggests at para. 5 of his minute. 
We should, therefore, reject the Governor's proposal on the lines suggested. 
J.A. 
13.3.59 
P.S. I only burden you with this because the Governor feels strongly & has, I think, a 
right to appeal to the summit. 
I agree, reply as suggested by Mr. Bourdillon. I'd like to see the draft. 
A.L.B. 
17.3.59 
92 CO 103112326, no 13 8 May 1959 
[Canadian-West Indian relations] : letter from G W St J Chadwick to 
P Rogers on the Canadian attitude towards the federation 
Francis Cumming-Bruce has been over here on a very brief visit from Ottawa. I took 
the opportunity of having a few words with him about Canadian!West Indian 
relations generally. 
Cumming-Bruce said that, broadly speaking, the present Canadian attitude 
towards the Federation was one of conscious big brother with a suspicion that 
grandma was not quite doing her job on the financial front, and should be written 
down as the continuing major influence in the area. This was not an opinion held at 
the expert desk level in the Department of External Affairs, but one which had been 
expressed in rather vague but by no means unfriendly terms by pol iticians who were 
far from familiar with the overall situation. Otherwise there was little to report about 
relations between Canada and the Federation generally save that we might at a later 
date be in for some difficulties in regard to the proposed free trade area. 
On the question of political misunderstandings of our continuing financial 
contributions to the Federation, I suggested to Cumming-Bruce, and he agreed, that 
it might be useful to our Office in Ottawa to have a statement showing what in fact 
Her Majesty's Government had done since the end of the war through grants, loans 
and assistance of all kinds to help the development of the British West Indies. This 
would be of value from time to time in refuting the grosser misapprehensions of 
inexpert Canadians. Do you think it would be possible for us to be supplied, on behalf 
of the High Commissioner, with some talking points along these lines? 
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93 CO 1031/2574, no 103 28 May 1959 
[Jamaica and federation}: letter from Sir K Blackburne toP Rogers. 
Enclosure: Jamaican Ministry Paper No 5, 'The Federation of the West 
In dies' 
[Over the twelve months before Manley put forward the proposals reproduced here, 
Jamaica had been in dispute with the federal government and Trinidad over the measures 
intended to protect a new oil refinery which it was proposed to build in Jamaica. The 
Jamaican government insisted that it should have the power to levy a consumption tax 
which would then be refunded to Jamaican refiners. The proposal contradicted Manley's 
previous insistence upon free movement of goods within the federation and was clearly 
designed to protect local production against competition from Trinidad oil, hitherto the 
traditional supplier. In 1958 the Jamaican government entered negotiations with the 
Esso Corporation to build a refinery which would attract capital investment of about $5 
million to the federation's key territory. Aware of the still unresolved issue of a customs 
union and also of the controversy over income tax (see 81), Esso insisted that the federal 
government approve the refinery project from the outset. The matter was not resolved 
until May 1959 when the federal government approved the concession but made clear at 
the same time that it would view with disfavour any attempt to apply similar expedients to 
other industries in the federal area. Williams protested, arguing that if a customs union 
was to be delayed until the requirements of every vested interest had been met, Trinidad 
would retain its freedom to safeguard its own interests in relation to freedom of 
movement. In the event the refinery was built after 1962 and the referendum which took 
Jamaica out of the federation. John Mordecai, The West Jndies: the federal negotiations 
(London, 1968), pp 124-150 records the details. See also, CO 1031/2750, 2751.) 
Please refer to your letter of the 19th February about Federation. I now enclose a 
copy of the Ministry Paper laid on the Table of the House of Representatives on May 
the 27th by Manley, setting out in detail the proposed changes in the Federal 
Constitution which he proposes to advocate at the forthcoming Conference. I expect 
that he will give his views on the timing of the Conference early next week. 
It is possible that these proposals are partly framed with an eye on the forthcoming 
General Elections. I doubt whether Manley really expects to obtain all the points 
which he has put forward, though I expect that he will strongly urge the revision of 
the Concurrent List as specified in "B" of the proposals. In any event, the proposals 
may be modified before they go forward in final form from Jamaica, as it will be seen 
that it is suggested at the end of the Ministry Paper that the proposals should be 
debated at a later date. 
I am sending a copy of this letter and the enclosures to Lord Hailes. 
Enclosure to 93 
The establishment and the Constitution of the Federation of the West Indies were 
planned, devised and agreed at all stages with the joint agreement of both parties 
represented in this Honourable House. 
2. All the major elements in the Constitution itself were decided in 1953 when 
the Jamaica Labour Party was in power and the delegation, a joint delegation of both 
parties, that went to England in 1956 had a mandate by unanimous vote of this 
House to approve of those agreed measures which were necessary to enable the 
Federation to come into actual being. 
3. In November 1958 this Government gave the country the following 
assurances:-
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First, that it does not contemplate and will not agree to any review of the 
Constitution except in the manner provided by the Federal Constitution itself. 
Second, that it will not agree to any proposal in regard to taxation which would 
interfere with the economic development of Jamaica and demands that all 
agreements made in good faith with investors and all laws passed granting 
concessions to investors should be honoured at all times by the Federal 
Government. 
Third, that in regard to any proposal which may be made for the establishment 
of a Customs Union this Government will insist on a policy that preserves and 
encourages economic and industrial development for the West Indies as a whole 
and for Jamaica and all the Unit territories. 
4. It is right and proper now that proposals for amending the Federal 
Constitution should be placed before this Honourable House in the belief that, as in 
the past we were able to resolve all differences and proceed on a common ground, so 
in the future Jamaica will present a united front in regard to those matters which 
experience has proved require to be done. 
5. The underlying assumptions on which this Ministry Paper is presented are as 
follows:-
First, it is assumed that we agree that Federation itself should be preserved. 
Second, it is assumed that this Honourable House will seek to achieve 
unanimity on all proposals that are to be made. 
Third, it is assumed and understood that there will be a conference of Unit 
Territories this year, and not later than August or September when the Federal 
Constitution will be reviewed. 
Fourth, it is assumed that it is our common desire to ensure that Federation 
shall in no way injure or impede the development of Jamaica. 
6. Constitutional matters 
The Federal Constitution is unsatisfactory in two respects. 
The Constitution of the Federation is colonial in character and does not accord 
with the political development of the peoples of the West Indies. 
On the other hand, the Constitution gives the Federal Government too large a 
power to interfere with the industrial development of each Unit and with its powers 
of taxation, and does not take note of the unique character of the Federation in 
regard to the relative sizes of the different territories . 
7. The West Indies is not yet and will not in the foreseeable future be able to 
avoid dependence on the vitality and progress of its major Units and they must be 
free to develop themselves both in their own interest and in the interest of 
Federation as a whole. 
8. The concrete proposals for change in the Federal Constitution follow directly 
from the foregoing statements. 
9. Proposals 
A.(l) That the Federal Government seek to achieve Dominion Status as soon as is 
practicable and possible. 
The precise timing will depend on when the Units can achieve a substantial 
measure of agreement on Constitutional changes and on the period that will 
necessarily be occupied in negotiation with Her Majesty's Government. 
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(2) Representation: Subject to ensuring that each small Unit preserves its 
present representational rights, representation should be on the basis of population. 
The present arrangement is not fair to the people who are to be represented in the 
Federal Parliament and does not do justice to Jamaica which has more than half the 
population of the area. 
B. The Concurrent List in the Federal Constitution must be revised so as to 
exclude from the possibility of Federal control and leave in the control of each Unit 
the following matters which are all interrelated:-
(i) The development of Industry; 
(ii) The power to levy Income Tax; 
(iii) The power to levy Excise Duties and Consumption Taxes. 
C. Aside from all the foregoing, in regard to specific items on the Concurrent 
List this Government further considers that an entirely new concept should be 
introduced in regard to Federal Affairs and Federal development. 
It should be possible for a group of territories to establish a closer relation with the 
Federal Government and to entrust the Federal Government with a greater range of 
Federal powers, leaving a Unit like Jamaica or any other Unit free to have a looser 
association with the Federal Centre. 
This will involve a detailed examination of the Concurrent List removing all those 
items which a Unit like Jamaica can take care of for itself. 
The existing Constitutional provision whereby a Unit can agree to transfer any 
power if and when it wishes so to do to the Federal Government would then be left to 
operate over a wider range of matters and services in the future. 
D. So long as there is a common policy in foreign affairs, a common range of 
services which can best be provided for all by the Federation itself and a policy for 
economic development which is bold and imaginative and recognises that this 
Federation is not like any other to be found in history and that we should seek to find 
unique and creative solutions to our problems, there is no reason to doubt that 
Federation can achieve Nationhood and a place in the world for all our people and a 
growing and developing economy and at the same time impose no undue burden on 
and in no way hamper the development of each and every one of its Units. 
E. Customs Union 
(1) The Government of Jamaica has always, and as far back as the London 
Conference in 1956, made it clear that while it agrees that a Free Trade area should 
at an early date be a part of Federation it is not possible to achieve Customs Union 
without proceeding slowly and carefully and taking care not to allow theoretical ideas 
to override practical considerations. This stand was repeated and confirmed when the 
Croft Commission1 came to Jamaica at the invitation of this Government over a year 
ago. 
(2) It is the view of Government that the following basic proposals must be 
accepted if the general plan for ultimate Customs Union is to be a real benefit, as it 
can be, to the West Indies as a whole:-
(i) A larger measure of free trade within the area can be achieved in advance of 
Customs Union; 
1 See 88, note 3. 
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(ii) It should be our aim to increase free trade as much as possible. in regard to 
agricultural and manufactured products originating within the Federal area. 
(3) It is in the interest of all the Units that each Unit should be allowed now and 
hereafter to protect particular industries which are designed for and dependent on 
their own home market. The rest of the area would be left free to admit the products 
of such industries from the outside world with different tariff levels to suit their own 
convenience. There will always be a hard core of industries that will have to exist 
entirely outside the range and scope of Customs Union. 
(4) It is the view of this Government that Customs Union should be reached in 
stages by agreement between the Units and the Federal Government. This 
Government rejects, as it has always rejected, the proposal that the Federation 
should enact laws in regard to customs duties or take over the business of Customs 
collection throughout the area. 
(5) It should be basic policy: -
(a) that a main objective is to secure the largest measure of Free Trade in the area; 
(b) that the main purpose of Customs Union is to aid industrial development; 
(c) that no undue loss of revenue must result from Customs Union; 
(d) that no worthwhile industrial development in any Unit should be damaged or 
impaired by Customs Union. 
10. At the proper time it is expected that the House will wish to discuss fully the 
proposals that are to go forward from Jamaica to the conference which, as already 
stated, is expected to take place in August or September this year. 
94 CO 103112541, no 12A 2 June 1959 
[Immigration]: Home Office record of a meeting of ministers chaired 
by Mr Butler to discuss the situation in the Notting Hill area of 
London [Extract] 
[This meeting, chaired by Butler, the home secretary, was held in the aftermath of the 
murder of a West Indian in Notting Hill. Other ministers in attendance were those for 
housing, education, pensions and national insurance and health. Sir Joseph Simpson, 
commissioner of the metropolitan police, also attended.] 
Inquiry into racial tension etc 
Mr. George Rogers, M.P., had proposed the appointment of a Select Committee or 
other ad hoc body to examine the problems of the areas which had received large 
numbers of coloured immigrants. It was agreed that a Select Committee would be 
inappropriate for this purpose. A possible alternative might be to set up an 
independent body, associated with a steering committee of officials, to examine the 
problems and make recommendations. Such an inquiry might, however, make 
recommendations unacceptable to the Government; alternatively it might indicate 
that there was little or no scope for Government action. Ministers were also informed 
that the Government of the Federation of the West Indies would probably dislike any 
form of inquiry unless it should enjoy the status of a Royal Commission. 
[94] JUNE 1959 255 
In further discussion it was agreed that the existing machinery within the 
Government was sufficient to give adequate consideration to the problem. This 
machinery could be referred to in Parliament in general terms; and the case for 
setting up any independent inquiry might be reviewed later. 
Ministers:-
(2) Decided that there was no adequate case, at the present time, for setting up 
an independent inquiry into the situation. 
Housing 
The Minister of Housing1 said that this was the crux of the problem in the Notting 
Hill area. The main difficulty was to find lodgings for single men. Lack of suitable 
accommodation had led to gross overcrowding and exploitation by unscrupulous 
landlords. In his view the ultimate solution lay in controlling immigration, although 
he recognised that this was out of the question at the present time. Urgent interim 
measures should be taken, and efforts had been made to persuade the Federation 
Government to set up a housing association to provide hostel accommodation. These 
efforts had failed, and it was now for consideration whether funds should be provided 
for this purpose by the United Kingdom Government. A sum of the order of £200,000 
to £250,000 would be required. 
In discussion it was argued that a scheme of this kind might have the effect of 
increasing the attractiveness of this country in the eyes of prospective immigrants 
from the West Indies, and might be resented by the white population living in the 
Notting Hill area. On the other hand, the Government could not remain indifferent 
to the squalid housing conditions in the area. It was generally agreed that any project 
for providing hostel accommodation should be established under West Indian 
auspices, and that if financial assistance was required it should take the form of a 
loan from Colonial Office funds. 
Ministers:-
(3) Authorised officials to explore with the Treasury the possibility of the United 
Kingdom Government making an advance to assist in the provision of hostel 
accommodation for coloured immigrants in the Notting Hill area. 
Law and order 
The Commissioner of Police reviewed the problems confronting the police in Notting 
Hill in maintaining law and order. He recalled that the area was traditionally 
disorderly, and the concentration of Colonial immigrants had aggravated existing 
problems. The police were regarded as enemies; intimidation was common; sources 
of information were elusive; and the coloured people were suspicious of the police 
and regarded them as hostile to their own interests. Despite these difficulties, the 
resources and capability of the Metropolitan Police were sufficient to maintain law 
and order unless there were to be widespread simultaneous outbreaks of racial strife 
in other parts of London. He was opposed to the recruitment of Special Police in the 
area, nor was it desirable to recruit coloured policemen. Efforts were being made to 
establish some sort of liaison between the police and the agents of the Commissioner 
for the West Indies Federation,2 which might lead to better understanding. 
1 Mr H Brooke. 
2 Mr Garnet Cordon, who attended a meeting at the CO chaired by Rogers on 21 May 1959 to discuss the 
situation in the Notting Hill area and related issues (CO 1031/2541, no 11). 
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The Commissioner quoted figures illustrating the incidence, as between the white 
and coloured population, of crimes involving personal violence. These figures 
indicated that crimes of violence involving white persons only vastly out-numbered 
those involving black persons only; and there were still fewer such crimes recorded 
which involved a white and coloured person. 
Ministers:-
(4) took note of this statement. 
Immigration control and deportation 
In discussion it was recognized that there was a case for taking power to deport 
undesirable Colonial immigrants. It was, however, clear that the Opposition would 
oppose such a measure and there was no question of introducing it during the 
present Parliament. A case could also be made out for taking powers to control the 
influx of Colonial immigrants to this country, and there were indications that such a 
course would command fairly widespread support, particularly in the areas in which 
Colonial immigrants had chosen to settle in substantial numbers. This question had 
been thoroughly reviewed from time to time by a Committee of Ministers under the 
Chairmanship of the Lord Chancellor, and the Cabinet had recently re-affirmed their 
decision to take no action at the present time. There was reason to think that the 
public were misinformed about certain aspects of Colonial immigration. Irritation 
that coloured people should enjoy the full benefits of the social services, for example, 
tended to obscure the fact that such immigrants were necessary to our labour 
force-for example, for employment as nurses or by the British Transport 
Commission. 
Ministers:-
(5) re-affirmed that no action should be taken at present regarding the 
deportation of undesirable Colonial immigrants or the control of Colonial 
immigration to this country. 
95 CO 103112956 15 June 1959 
'American bases-Chaguaramas': minute by Mr Amery on how to 
'soften up' the Americans 
Mr. Rogers 
Mr. Carstairs 
I was struck during my recent visit to the West Indies by the strength of feel ing, 
particularly among members of the Trinidad Government, about the American bases 
and particularly Chaguaramas. 
2. One of the troubles of West Indian politicians is that none of them have had to 
fight in any serious sense for constitutional progress and none have therefore had 
much opportunity of becoming national figures as distinct from local bosses. The 
American bases would seem to offer just this kind of opportunity; and I would judge 
therefore that the agitation against them will not lightly die away. 
3. The Americans have, of course, a strong legal title to Chaguaramas; and I 
imagine that it is of some importance to them both for the protection of their 
Venezuelan oil interests and for global war purposes. It has also a routine value for 
missile tracking and anti-submarine purposes and even more perhaps-or so my 
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private enquiries suggest-as a leave centre for the American Navy. It seems to me 
unlikely that the Americans will agree to get out of Chaguaramas. At the same time, 
if they make no concessions to West Indian opinion, they may have to face a good 
deal of trouble particularly when the Federation becomes a Dominion. 
4. I have accordingly been wondering whether the time is not coming when we 
might begin to 'soften up' the Americans and persuade them to some compromise 
which would be to our own and the West Indian advantage as well as to the 
American. 
5. Would it, for instance, be possible to persuade the Americans to associate the 
United Kingdom and the Federation with Chaguaramas? I am increasingly of the 
opinion that if the Federation is to hold together once it has obtained dominion 
status it will have to have some kind of fleet, however rudimentary. You can't run an 
island state without a navy. The West Indian Regiment and British West Indian Air 
Lines will not be enough. It is too easy to obstruct airfields. In the ordinary way the 
cost of building and running a West Indian Navy would be prohibitive. Were this 
Navy however to be trained by us and based on the American installations at 
Chaguaramas the cost would be immensely reduced and the scheme might become 
practical. 
6. I put this idea to the Governor-General and the Governor of Trinidad. Both 
thought it would be attractive to the West Indians and · have advantages for us, 
though the Governor-General was inclined to doubt whether the Americans would 
accept it. 
7. I would be grateful if you could examine this idea in the Department and 
advise me whether you think it could usefully be taken further. 
96 CO 1031/2039, no 96 15 June 1959 
[US bases]: letter from J E Marnham to H A A Hankey urging the FO 
to support the federal government's request for a review of the 1941 
agreement! 
You will by now have had a copy of despatch No. 392 of 5th June from the Governor-
General of The West Indies, asking H.M.G. to consider the Federal Government's 
request for the holding of a conference with representatives of the Governments of 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America to discuss revision of the 1941 
Leased Bases Agreement between the Governments of the U.K. and U.S.A. This 
clearly overtakes my letter of 8th June, which, except in so far as some of the ideas in 
it may still be relevant, can be disregarded. 
1 The FO had earlier, in Mar 1959, suggested that the Americans would have to choose between three 
courses of action: (a) having considered what their real defence interests were in the area and compared 
the 1941 agreement with more recent agreements concluded with other countries, they could themselves 
draft a new agreement which the West Indies would find hard to reject; (b) they could provide the UK with 
material from their more recent agreements and leave it to the UK to produce an acceptable new draft; (c) 
they could wait until the federal government produced its own proposals or registered its objections to the 
present agreement The FO was anxious to avoid the second course and much preferred the first (CO 
1031/2039, no 39, Sir P Gore-Booth (deputy under-secretary of state, FO, 1956-1961) to Lord Hood in 
Washington, 3 Mar 1959). 
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2. In the light of developments in recent weeks the despatch comes as no sur-
prise to us or, I think, to you. Once the Trinidad request had been made officially 
to the Federal Government it was virtually impossible for them to refuse to for-
ward it in some form even if they had wanted to. They have in fact done so with 
studied moderation and with, it seems to us, scrupulous regard for the proprieties. 
They recognise the position of British Guiana and Bermuda without trying to drag 
them in; much more important, they have declined to endorse the Trinidad 
request for a four-power conference, which it must have taken some political 
courage to do; and they sensibly propose a preliminary conference of their own to 
do their homework. 
3. We ourselves think that besides being correct in form the West Indies 
request is from their point of view eminently reasonable in substance. Even if one 
accepts that the 1941 Agreement was a fair bargain in the circumstances of the 
time, and accepting in any case that, hard bargain or no, it must be honoured, the 
West Indies can fairly point out that it is now 1959 and peacetime, and that some of 
the terms of the agreement accepted 18 years ago in circumstances which ruled out 
lengthy negotiation may well call for review to-day in the spirit of good-neigh-
bourliness stressed in the Preamble. And it is not on the face of it unreasonable of 
them to suggest that such review can best be done in a conference in which they 
could take part, particularly when it is common knowledge that they hope to 
become an independent member of the Commonwealth in the not too distant 
future . 
4. We therefore think not only that it would be politically almost impossible for 
us to refuse to put this request formally to the Americans, but that on straight mer-
its it is a perfectly reasonable thing for us to do. Admittedly the Americans will not 
like it, but we have taken considerable trouble to warn them that it was likely to 
come and to give them the chance to take the initiative themselves, and if they are 
now going to refuse it we think it right that the onus of doing so should be placed 
squarely on them, where it belongs, rather than on the U.K. We therefore hope that 
you will agree to forward the request to the Americans. We also think that in doing 
so it would be right to make a really serious effort to get them to agree. We could 
stress once more the arguments we used in our earlier approach (which may have 
more force now that the request has actually come than when they may have 
thought that by standing pat they could head it off); we could point to the very real 
effort which the Federation have made in rejecting separate Trinidad representa-
tion; we could re-emphasise that we have no intention whatever of reopening the 
Chaguaramas question; and we could rub in the disastrous effect on Federal-U.S. 
relations (as well, if you thought it would be any use, as the effect on the U.S. repu-
tation in the eyes of the "emergent" world) which would result from a refusal. It 
might well be desirable to warn the Americans not to under-estimate the strength 
of feeling on this issue, particularly in Trinidad. Mr. Amery was made very con-
scious of this on his recent visit; he thinks that West Indian politicians are begin-
ning to take themselves seriously as figures on the international stage and he is 
quite sure that the Americans would be wrong to think that this agitation will die 
down easily.2 
2 See 95. 
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5. If the Americans reacted adversely, as they probably would, we would hope you 
could urge them at least not to slam the door. They might, for example, reasonably 
take the line that they could not commit themselves to a conference until they knew 
in some detail what it would be asked to discuss. They could note that the Federal 
Government propose to convene a preliminary conference with representatives of the 
unit governments concerned and thereafter to forward a full statement of the 
matters arising out of the Agreement which it is desired to discuss. If the Americans 
were to say that they would prefer to see this statement before considering what 
would be the best method of discussing it, then provided they said it in terms which 
did not preclude an eventual three-power conference I think we could put this to the 
Federal Government with some hope of acceptance. I am less sure that this would do 
more than buy time, and it would be infinitely better if the Americans would accept 
the idea of a conference straight away, bearing in mind the Governor-General's view 
that if they did so there would be far less urgency about the timing of the conference 
itself. But at least the compromise would be better than a flat refusal. 
6. You mentioned orally that if you did agree to put the request to the Americans 
you would want to let them know unoffically that it was coming. We should naturally 
have no objection at all to this, though we hope you would do so in a way which left 
them in no doubt that coming it was! 
7. We ought to let the Governor-General know fairly soon what we are thinking of 
doing, at least for his personal information and that of the Governor of Trinidad; and 
we think it desirable to send at least an interim official reply to the despatch saying 
that the request is being earnestly considered. May we do the latter straight away? 
8. I enclose a duplicate of this letter in case you want to send it to Washington. 
We didn't send you a spare of the despatch as we thought it better not to delay to 
make one; but we should welcome your copying it also to Washington if you thought 
that would help to keep the Embassy abreast of the news. 
97 CO 103112040, no 103 18 June 1959 
[US bases]: minute by P Rogers reporting a meeting with Mr Rose on 
the difficulties caused by the 'secretiveness' of the federal prime 
minister 
Mr. Rose, the Federal Minister of Communications, came to see me this morning. He 
spoke most frankly and in confidence about the difficulties in Trinidad between the 
Federal Government and the Trinidad Government, particularly over Chaguaramas. 
He began by making it clear in terms which were entirely proper in such a private 
talk, but which I am here recording in terms which make it clear what he obviously 
had in mind, that much difficulty was caused by Sir G. Adams' secretiveness, 
unwillingness to work closely with his ministerial colleagues, and frequent changes 
of mind. He also said that difficulties were caused by the way in which the Prime 
Minister conferred so closely with the Governor-General and from time to time 
appeared to commit the Federal Government and the Council of State to a view, or a 
line of action, without consulting his colleagues. 
2. Mr. Rose also referred delicately to the difficulties between the 
Governor-General and the Governor of Trinidad, and between Lady Hailes and Lady 
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Beetham, which he regarded as being very natural in the circumstances, but 
nevertheless unfortunate in their repercussions on the relations between the two 
Governments, each of which regarded it as a point of loyalty to support the 
Governor-General or the Governor as the case might be. 
3. This emerged from the midst of considerable talk about the details of what 
happened between the two Governments over the proposal to revise the 1941 Bases 
Agreement, but I have set it out separately for purpose of convenience. As regards the 
revision of the Agreement, Mr. Rose told me that the following was briefly the course 
of events. 
4. The Trinidad Government had raised with the Federal Government a proposal 
for a conference between them on the revision of the Agreement without the issue of 
the release of Chaguaramas being raised, and had indeed gone so far as to appoint 
their own delegation for this purpose. The Federal reply had been somewhat evasive, 
and had suggested that certain matters mentioned by the Trinidad Government 
should be raised in the current talks between the U.S. Authorities and the Trinidad 
Government. The Trinidad Government had then proposed a Four-Power Conference 
to revise the Agreement, and had not, as in their first proposal, expressly excluded 
the release of Chaguaramas as a basis of discussion. There had been a meeting of the 
unofficial members of the Council of State (Mr. Rose referred to this as a "Cabinet" 
Meeting), without the P.M. being present, since they could not get at him, and after 
much discussion, and indeed dissension, the Cabinet had agreed to accept the 
proposal for a Four-Power Conference. When the Prime Minister had been informed 
of this by Mr. Richards of Antigua, one of the Cabinet Members, he had purported to 
accept it and had so informed Dr. Williams, but at the meeting of the Council of State 
the next day to consider it, the Prime Minister took a completely different attitude, 
and the Council of State had rejected the idea of Trinidad having a seat at any 
conference as well as the Federal Government. 
5. Mr. Rose made it clear that he was not in any way expecting me to do anything 
about all this, but he wished me to know the facts, and how difficult things were. He 
then proceeded to discuss the question of the U.S. Government. releasing 
Chaguaramas and building a base elsewhere, and of Trinidad's right to an equal seat 
at a conference table to revise the Bases Agreement. 
6. I spoke at some length in reply, but what I said may be boiled down to:-
(i) I did not regard it as being practical politics to accept for one moment that the 
U.S. Government would be willing to build another naval base elsewhere in 
Trinidad and give up Chaguaramas; and 
(ii) The United Kingdom could not accept the view that if there were any 
international conference to revise the Bases Agreement at which the West Indies 
were represented, it would be possible for Trinidad to have separate and 
independent representation as an equal party with the Federal Government. I said 
that in the case of such a conference our view was that only the Federal 
Government would represent The West Indies, though it was of course open to the 
Federal Government if they so wished, to include representatives from Trinidad in 
their delegation. That would be quite acceptable to us provided they recognised 
that they were Federal and not separate Trinidad delegates. For the rest I made use 
of the same arguments as I used in speaking on the same subject to Dr. Solomon 
yesterday, and the record of them need not be repeated here. 
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98 CO 103112311 26 June 1959 
'Dominion status': minute by G W Jamieson on the growing tide of 
opinion in the West Indies in favour of early dominion status 
Mr. Rogers 
I have had a number of conversations in the last ten days with members of the 
Federal Delegation to the Leewards/Windwards Constitutional Conference, 1 with a 
view to discovering how things might go at the Federal preliminary Constitutional 
Conference beginning on 28th September. 
2. There is, as you know, a Federal Committee sitting at present, to consider how 
the constitution might be improved comprising half-dozen of the most senior 
Federal Ministers, and the three senior Federal officials. The Prime Minister is a 
member, but rarely attends. 
3. The Committee has made very slow ground, as much of its time has been 
spent in examining the present Federal Constitution line by line with extensive and 
time-consuming reference to various other constitutions, including those of Ghana 
and Singapore, as well as those of the older Dominions, which are Federations. It 
was, however, apparently decided by this Committee at the outset of its life, that it 
would work on the assumption that the task of the Federal Constitutional 
Conference was to produce a constitution for The West Indies as a Dominion, and 
furthermore that this final step would be taken with all speed, after the conclusion of 
the Conference with H.M.G. 
4. I have been told this in conversations in the last few days with Mr. de Freitas, 
Acting Federal Attorney-General, who is on the Federal committee and Mr. Phillips, 
the Federal Secretariat officer who deals with constitutional matters in his govern-
ment, and who is very close to Federal thinking on this subject. It only reinforces, 
moreover, the view I formed during the visit with Mr. Amery to the Federation last 
month that West Indians now have a greater sense of urgency than hitherto about fu ll 
independence. Lord Hailes does not appear to doubt that Dominion status will be 
called for at the Federal Constitutional Conference. As we know, Mr. Manley has con-
demned the present Federal Constitution as "colonial in character"2 and Dr. Eric 
Williams has been going about saying that independence ought to be proclaimed on 
the 22nd April next year, the second anniversary of Federation. 
1 The establishment of the federation in 1958 stimulated feeling in the Leewards and Windwards that when 
the federation achieved independence the constitutional status of all units should be equal. To facilitate 
the transition to independence, it was felt that the constitutions of the smaller territories should be 
brought as quickly as possible into line with each other and with those of the three major units. A 
conference in Trinidad in Mar 1959 made recommendations for constitutional changes and this was 
followed by a conference in London in June attended by representatives of the Leewards and Windwards 
and the federal government over which Amery presided. Agreement was reached on a number of 
constitutional changes in both groups, including the appointment of chief ministers and ministerial 
systems of government in each territory, which were intended to be implemented by Jan 1960. The posts 
of governor for the two groups were to be abolished, so that the individual units would stand in direct 
relationship to the federal government as did the other units. The new constitutions were not as advanced 
as those of the three major units, but the gap would now be narrower (Report of the Leeward and 
Windward Islands Constitutional Conference held in London, June 1959, published by the West Indies 
Federal Government, 1959). 
2 See 93, enclosure. 
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5. Our view in the Department has been hitherto that Dominion status is 
nothing like as close as the above would make it seem. This view-which I shared-
was based in part on the recongnition [sic] by us that it ought not to be rushed; it was 
furthermore reinforced by Sir Grantley Adams' near distaste for the subject when we 
tried to discuss it with him in April. He, I am sure, is no sound guide at present to 
feeling on this subject. His views are markedly more moderate than those of most of 
his government, and I submit that he will shortly have to come into line with the 
thinking of others on the subject in The West Indies, or risk being left out on a limb. 
6. We should, I suggest, be prepared at least in our own minds for the worst. This 
could be a demand for Dominion status in Trinidad in September, repeated here a 
few months later, together with a demand that full independence be achieved within 
perhaps a year or eighteen months. It could indeed mean a demand for the 
introduction of Dominion status before the end of 1960, or perhaps early in 1961, 
which is a good deal earlier than we are geared to. 
7. Such a demand would of course ignore the need to prepare the administrative 
structure of the new Dominion, enlarge its diplomatic apparatus, and build up its mili-
tary forces, and it might be possible to delay it on such arguments. On the other hand, 
we are on something of a runaway train, the brakes of which are not very powerful. 
8. I suggest that apart from simply taking the aforesaid into account in our 
calculations, the time has come to speed up action on the following questions, on the 
first two of which we have made a little progress, on the third none. 
(a) the training of a Diplomatic Service and agreeing on interim foreign 
representational arrangements, should Dominion status overtake the Federation's 
ability to establish its network of missions; 
(b) the examination of the need for Armed Forces including the question of a Navy 
as well as the terms of such defence agreement as we and The West Indies may 
jointly require for our purposes. 
(c) an examination of what forms of financial assistance H.M.G. can consider after 
Dominion status, and of what sums. 
9. I hope this does not sound all too alarmist. On the other hand I feel that we 
will do best to start early with these preparations. If our predictions prove unduly 
pessimistic, we will have a bonus of time at our disposal. We must in any case have 
firm views on all three matters in para. 8 in advance of the main Federal 
Constitutional Conference in London, probably in January: and it would be desirable 
to have got the main lines sorted out before the September conference. 
10. A major unstated assumption in the above is, of course, that the Federation will 
survive the September conference. This is being discussed separately on WIS 175/01. 
99 CO 103112956, no 4A July 1959 
'Chaguaramas': memorandum by Mr Amery for Mr Lennox-Boyd 
reviewing the history of the dispute and suggesting a possible solution 
I. Background 
In July 1957 the U.K. and U.S. Governments and the Federation Standing Committee 
of the West Indies held a conference in London to discuss the issue of Chaguaramas. 
This led to the appointment of a fact-finding Commission on which the Governments 
of the U.S ., the U.K., the West Indies and Trinidad were all represented to enquire 
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into the question whether the U.S. naval base at Chaguaramas could be moved to an 
alternative site. The Commission found that no equally satisfactory alternative site 
for a base could be found and that the cost of moving would in any case be 
prohibitive. These findings were accepted by the U.S. Government and by H.M.G. The 
Federal Government accepted them with some reluctance; the Trinidad Government 
refused to accept them. The Americans, however, gave an assurance that the 
continued need for the base would be reviewed after ten years. 
2. On the 28th November 1958 the Trinidad Government approached the Federal 
Government and asked that a conference should be convened, consisting of Federal 
Government, Trinidad, U.K. and U.S. representatives, to revise the 1941 Agreement. 
The Federal Government accepted the idea of a conference but considered that 
Trinidad should not be represented separately but simply as part of the Federal 
delegation. The Colonial Office has supported this view. 
3. At the beginning of March 1959 the Foreign Office made an informal approach 
to the State Department, through the Embassy in Washington, suggesting that the 
Americans themselves should propose a review of the Agreement.! The American 
reactions were distinctly negative. 
4. The formal request for a conference in which the Federal, U.K. and U.S. 
Governments should take part was received from the Federal Government on the 9th 
June 1959. This request has since been forwarded to the British Ambassador in 
Washington, with instructions that every effort should be made to persuade the 
Americans to agree to a conference. A reply from the Americans is now awaited. 
5. Since then a further cause of friction between the Americans and the Trinidad 
Government has arisen as a result of the operation of a high-powered radar tracking 
station in Chaguaramas. 
Il. My talks with Dr. Williams on Chaguaramas 
6. When I visited Trinidad during the Whitsun recess, Dr. Eric Williams spent 
several hours expatiating on the Chaguaramas problem. His observations then were 
of a general character and called for no action. More definite proposals on the subject 
both of radiation and of a revision conference were made by Messrs. Solomon and 
O'Halloran2 when they came to the Colonial Office in June. When I returned to 
Trinidad my early discussions on the control of the police3 were interspersed by 
1 See 96, note 1. 
2 John O'Halloran, minister of industry, commerce, tourism and external communications, Trinidad, 
1956- 1961; minister of agriculture, industry and commerce, 1964- 1970. 
3 Control of the police was one of several controversial issues in the protracted discussions over the reform 
of the Trinidad constitution which preceded the introduction of internal self-government after the 
elections in Dec 1961. Governor Beetham supported the transfer on the grounds that it should take place 
while the UK still had responsibility and could act to check any abuses. The opposition Democratic Labour 
Party opposed the transfer, as in 1958 did the CO. Rogers minuted in Oct: 'Dr. Williams is showing all too 
many signs of the paranoia of a dictator. (I use the word loosely, not in any precise medical sense.) He runs 
his own spy service (the term is not an exaggeration) and it is commonly said by really responsible people 
in Trinidad, Mr. Ellis Clarke included, that the telephone operators are mostly P.N.M. supporters and relay 
to Dr. Williams important conversations. Furthermore there can be no doubt that the racial situation in 
Trinidad is a tense one and though it may have improved somewhat since the Federal elections, there has 
been a general increase of tension over the last few years' (CO 1031/2287, minute by Rogers, 21 Oct 1958). 
In the face of determination on the part of Williams and the PNM over control of the police, and continued 
support for the transfer from Beetham, the CO relented. For reform of the Trinidad constitution, see CO 
103112286- 2292, 3220- 3222; also Report of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitutional Discussions held in 
London in November, 1959, and in Trinidad in June, 1960 Cmnd 1123, 1960. 
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diatribes from Dr. Williams about Chaguaramas. Dr. Williams indeed affected to 
believe-and may really have believed-that our attitude over the control of the 
police was somehow connected with the problem of Chaguaramas. 
7. After the police issue had been settled, I had a more formal discussion of the 
Chaguaramas problem with Dr. Williams and some of his colleagues. Our talks 
ranged over the composition, location and agenda of the conference. Dr. Williams 
also discussed ways of bringing the U.S.A. to agree to such a conference. I will 
summarise his views under these four heads. 
(i) Composition 
Discussion between the Trinidad Government, the Federal Government and the 
Colonial Office about the conference has so far concentrated on the question of its 
composition. The Federal Government want the West Indies to be represented by a 
single Federal delegation. Williams wants separate Trinidad and Federal delegations. 
The Department has leant strongly to the Federal Government's point of view. 
One at least of Dr. Williams' arguments in favour of separate representation 
seemed to me worthy of consideration. He claims that any revision of the 
Agreements will raise two different sets of issues. There are the major issues of policy 
which belong properly to the Federal Government, e.g. should American troops be 
stationed in the West Indies at all? How long should they remain? What control 
should the Federal Government have over their operations? Then there are the 
detailed administrative issues, including the extent of the leased areas, the means of 
access to them, the revenue and jurisdictional provisions, and the reservation of 
mineral rights. Dr. Williams claims that these are matters on which the Federal 
Government is not competent to negotiate and that they must be dealt with by a 
separate delegation of the Unit Government concerned. Since Chaguaramas is now 
the only activated base, apart from the tracking stations in St. Lucia and Antigua, Dr. 
Williams concludes that Trinidad at least deserves separate representation. 
In the 1957 conference Dr. Williams really wore two hats. He sat as a member of 
the single West Indian delegation-this was before Federation-but he attended with 
his own advisers and was recognised as enjoying a distinct position from the other 
West Indian leaders. It may be that some such compromise could be worked out to 
turn the present difficult corner. 
(ii) Location 
Dr. Williams insists that the conference be held in Trinidad. He claims that neither 
the Trinidad Government, nor the Federal Government can spare their top men for 
long enough to hold a successful conference in London or Washington. He also 
argues that it is only in Trinidad that the delegates can fully understand what the 
different local issues mean. If in doubt they have, as he puts it, only to jump into a 
car and see for themselves. No doubt he also hopes to put pressure on the conference 
by organising demonstrations of public feeling for their benefit. 
(iii) Agenda 
Dr. Williams has so far been very coy about the agenda of the conference. I explained, 
however, that the Americans were very unlikely to agree to come to a conference 
unless they had a good idea of what was likely to be discussed. After some argument 
on this point Williams provided the following as at any rate the main topics, which he 
would like to see discussed:-
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(a) The duration of the leases. 
(b) The extent of the leased areas. 
(c) The provisions relating to de-activated areas. 
(d) The revenue provisions. 
(e) The enforcement of the conditions of the agreement. 
(f) Jurisdiction. 
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(g) Terms of the lease, e.g. restriction on use of radio-active equipment, and the 
exploitation of mineral rights. 
Dr. Williams also suggested-and this may prove a useful suggestion-that the 
underlying purpose of the agreement should be re-examined. The bases had 
originally been regarded as part of the defence of the United States. Had not the time 
come when they should be seen in the wider context of general Western defence? If 
so, perhaps the West Indies should be associated with the agreements. For example, 
the West India Regiment might train in the Chaguaramas area and the Federal 
Government might have some say in the uses to which the bases were put. 
(iv) How to bring the U.S. to the conference 
Dr. Williams recognised that it may not be easy to bring the Americans to attend a 
conference. He believes, however, that we are on good grounds in calling for one, 
seeing that most of the agreements governing other American bases overseas are 
very different from, and much less "colonial" in type than the 1941 agreements. He 
also argues that we can put considerable pressure on the Americans. He claims, for 
instance, that they have no right under the agreement to instal a tracking station in 
Chaguaramas. The advice of the Departments here is far from clear on this issue. He 
also believes that American planes have no right to land at Piarco airport and could 
be stopped from doing so at any moment.4 Here, I understand, he is probably in the 
right. Dr. Williams in any case maintains that if we are not prepared to bring 
pressure to bear on the Americans to bring them to a conference, he will seek to do 
so himself. To this end he could search their aircraft, impound American goods in 
transit to the base, and set up a check-point at the base boundary to obstruct traffic 
between the base and the rest of the island. With the transfer of control over the 
police it will be easier for him to do all these things. 
Ill. Dr. Williams' motives 
8. Now that Dr. Williams has achieved a Cabinet system, including control of the 
police, he has to look for a new "cry". He knows that social and economic issues are 
more easily exploited in opposition than in power, and he sees in Chaguaramas a 
political platform which can carry him through the next couple of years. It is 
politically an attractive platform. For one thing there is a good deal of local 
resentment against the Americans. For another, the American bases afford a target 
4 The US never had the specific right to operate military aeroplanes into and out of Piarco, although since 
the war there had been a general UK-US understanding that the US could make 'occasional' use of British 
airfields in the Caribbean. In fact US traffic at Piarco had been much more than occasional; over 2,000 
American military aircraft landed at Piarco in 1958. The Americans were also said to have ignored both 
traffic control and immigration procedures and generally to have behaved 'as if they owned the place' . 
With effect from 1 May 1960, Trinidad closed Piarco to US American military transport planes 
(CO 103113025). 
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for "anti-Colonialist" emotions such as we no longer present. Above all, an anti-
American campaign offers Dr. Williams a chance to become a West Indian national 
leader instead of just a local boss. His ambitions undoubtedly extend beyond Trinidad 
and a successful campaign against the Americans would probably make him 
something of a hero in the other islands. At the very worst, he can hope to extract a 
sizeable sum from the Americans for calling off the campaign. 
9. How far does Dr. Williams mean to go against the Americans? He claims that 
his purpose is to get them out of Chaguaramas and to build the Federal capital there. 
He also says that the time has now gone by when it would be possible to get Trinidad 
opinion to accept the construction of an alternative American base elsewhere in the 
island. Whether his real objects are as extreme as this is hard to tell. He certainly has 
a strong anti-American bias of his own derived from his experiences in the U.S.A. For 
what it is worth, however, my own hunch is that Chaguaramas is first and foremost a 
political cry for him. He will press it as far as he profitably can but he is probably 
quite prepared for some compromise at the end of the day. 
IV. The U.S. interest in Chaguaramas and ours 
10. I had a short briefing in London on the strategic importance of the base by 
representatives of the Admiralty and the Ministry of Defence. Later during my visit to 
Chaguaramas I had a fuller briefing from Rear-Admiral E.C. Stephan, U.S.N., 
COMSOLANT, (Commander, South Atlantic Forces, Trinidad). I drew the following 
conclusions from these briefings. 
11. The Gulf of Paria is one of the very few good natural harbours on either side 
of the South Atlantic. In the last war it proved a very valuable assembly area for 
convoys. Whether conveys will be practicable in another war is hard to say; but the 
Soviets have built up a very large submarine fleet; and an area like the Gulf to Paria 
which can be insulated against submarine attack may again prove to he of 
considerable strategic importance to the U.S. It would also be of importance to us in 
so far as we depend in another conflict on supplies-including oil-from South 
America and the Caribbean. 
12. Chaguaramas is also important to the Americans for another reason, which 
they seldom mention. It provides them with a base from which, in time of crisis, they 
could probably control events in Venezuela and the Venezuelan oil fields. It is 
probably to our interest that they should retain this capability. 
13. The United States Air Force showed me over the new tracking station which 
has caused the increased radiation discovered by Dr. Williams.5 From what I was told, 
the station appears to have an important role in the American development of anti-
missile techniques. They say it is the biggest of its kind in the world. To move it and 
re-erect it elsewhere would put their anti-missile programme back two years, with all 
that this could mean for the general defence of the West as well as of North America. 
14. Chaguaramas is thus important to the United States on three main 
grounds-as a harbour, as a means of influencing events in Venezuela and as a site 
for an anti-missile development station. Other things being equal, it is in our general 
interests that the U.S. should continue in Chaguaramas for these purposes. West 
Indian opinion, however,-in Trinidad and outside-is growing increasingly 
5 See 100, note 2. 
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resentful of the 1941 agreements and of the American insistence on the letter of 
these agreements. We have to avoid getting into a position where we might seem to 
be ganging up with the U.S. against a member of the Commonwealth. 
15. The Americans have a choice. They could stand pat on the 1941 agreements 
and resist any major revision. If they do this they will certainly be subjected to 
considerable inconvenience. There is no airfield within the base perimeter and all 
goods and personnel, unless seaborne, have to come through Trinidad territory. 
Williams would thus be in a strong position to apply a policy of pinpricks and 
pressures. 
16. Williams could not, of course, drive the Americans out of Chaguaramas; but 
a long drawn wrangle over this question could create a running sore between the 
U.S. and the whole West Indies Federation. This in turn would give an opening to 
Communist and neutralist influences which are already beginning to spread through 
the Caribbean. 
17. If the Americans decide to stand firm and "sweat it out", we could not oppose 
them. They would be standing on the letter of the 1941 Agreement. We should, 
however, make it clear that we could not publicly support them. Still less, could we 
use our reserve power and suspend the constitution of Trinidad simply to keep the 
Americans comfortable in their base. 
18. The alternative course open to the Americans is to accept a conference to 
consider the revision of the agreements. This course also has its dangers for the 
Americans; and the Pentagon may well fear that it would lead them down the slippery 
slope of concessions to final abandonment. On the other hand, a conference might 
well result in bringing the 1941 agreements closer into line with more modern 
agreements. This might for a time at least make the American presence more 
acceptable to West Indies opinion. 
19. Such a result could be the avowed aim of the conference. I rather doubt, 
however, whether it would produce a lasting solution. Whether such a solution can 
be found at all is questionable; but the following suggestion is perhaps just worth 
examining. 
V. A possible long term solution 
20. The United States have a major interest in retaining Chaguaramas for 
reasons which we have already considered. 
21. Britain has cut her defence establishments in the Caribbean to the bone. 
Nevertheless if we are to protect our interests there and if we are to influence U.S. 
policy and strategy in the area, it will be to our advantage to "be in on" the major 
American projects, provided we can do so at little cost to ourselves. 
22. The West Indies Federation need a navy. You cannot have an island state 
without ships. Without them they will not be able to overawe dissident units and 
impose the authority of the Central Government. The West India Regiment and the 
British West Indian Airways are not enough. It is too easy to block runways and 
prevent troops from landing. The Caribbean, moreover, seems to be in for "troubled 
times"; and the British West Indies territories may well feel the need of some local 
naval capability over and above what we can provide there. But the cost of 
maintaining a fleet, however small and simple in design, is very great. 
23. Could we kill two birds with one stone? Could we solve the political issue of 
Chaguaramas and overcome the economic obstacles to a West Indian Navy by 
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associating Britain and the West Indies with the U.S.A. in the control of the 
Chaguaramas base? The Royal Navy could have access to the base on the same terms 
as the U.S. Navy. We might provide the West Indies with one or two ships and the 
necessary training staff. The Americans could maintain these ships in the base, partly 
or wholly at U.S. expense 
24. The Americans would have to accept some British and West Indian control 
over the uses to which they put the base, just as they do with their bases in the U.K. 
We are unlikely, however, to disagree with them in the Caribbean. The Federal 
Government meanwhile would find itself committed to the Western Alliance. 
25. Nor should there be any problem of security for the Americans. Most of 
Chaguaramas is strictly conventional and there seems to be little to hide. The secret 
installations are relatively remote and access to them is already forbidden to most 
American personnel in the base. 
26. I doubt whether the time has yet come when we should speak on these lines 
to the Americans. The right moment might be if a conference were held and ended in 
deadlock. I cannot help thinking, however, that a proposal on these lines might still 
be acceptable to the West Indies, and even to Dr. Williams, today. Later on it may no 
longer command enough West Indies support. 
27. The Department are looking into the implications of these ideas. 
VI. Postcript 
28. As you know, I had hoped to visit Washington on the way back from Trinidad 
to let the State Department have my impressions on developments concerning 
Chaguaramas. The Foreign Office supported this project (F.O. telegram 129 of 27th 
June to Washington) . On the 2nd July, after making arrangements for me to visit the 
base at Chaguaramas, the Embassy telegraphed to say that the Americans would like 
to see me and they had made a appointment with Mr. Robert Murphy.6 Murphy is an 
old friend; and the opportunity seemed a good one. I then received your telegram 
(No. 144 to Trinidad) sent on the same day urging me not to go to Washington. 
29. I was not clear whether the puropose of your telegram was to bring me back 
to London or to keep me away from Washington. Nor was I sure whether you had 
seen a copy of the Washington telegram to me about the arrangement for a meeting 
with Murphy. I accordingly rang up and spoke to John Moreton.7 It was at the 
weekend, and you were on your boat. John Moreton seemed to think that you had 
seen all the relevant telegrams and that you thought it better that I should not go to 
Washington just now. I accordingly telegraphed Caccia8 cancelling my proposed 
visit. From something you said the other day I think all this may have been a 
misunderstanding and that had you known of Murphy's invitation you would have 
wished me to go to Washington. 
30. I have spelt this out in detail as I think there is just a chance, after all the fuss 
Dr. Williams has made about Chaguaramas, that the Americans may attribute some 
sinister motive to my change of plans. The risk of their misinterpreting my action 
6 Deputy US under-secretary of state for political affairs; under-secretary of state of political affairs, Aug-
Sept 1959. 
7 Principal private secretary to Lennox-Boyd. 
8 See 68, note l. 
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has, I fear, been slightly increased by my twice having to cancel lunch with their 
Minister here on account of our African pre-occupations. 
VII. Conclusion 
31. The question arises-what should we do now? The matter is beginning to be 
urgent. Williams has been talking to all and sundry about Chaguaramas for some 
months and has now made formal representations to us as well as to the Federal 
Government. He has also committed himself in public. American interest has 
likewise been stirred. We have made a formal request to them for a conference and 
they are doubtless expecting some follow-up. It is, accordingly, important that we 
should make up our minds (i) whether we want a conference; (ii) if so, how far we are 
prepared to press the Americans on this issue; and (iii) what we would like the 
outcome of the conference to he. 
32. My own view is that (i) we do want a conference; (ii) we should advise the 
U.S. that it is only at a conference held before the West Indies get Dominion status 
that we can help them: (iii) that we want to aim at the kind of result suggested in 
paragraphs 20-26 above.9 
9The CO consulted the FO about Amery's proposed solution. The FO thought it unlikely that the US would 
object, provided the security of their secret installations could be ensured, to the use of the Chaguaramas 
base by Royal Navy and West Indian ships. The Americans might even agree to maintain West Indian naval 
vessels at US expense. But joint control of the base was a much more difficult question, involving two 
aspects, jurisdictional and operational. It was highly unlikely that the US would accept joint operational 
control, although they might be brought to recognise the need for some form of UK and West Indian veto 
power over the use of the base in an emergency (particularly if the use of nuclear weapons were ever 
envisaged) along the lines of the Attlee-Truman understanding of 1948 covering US bases in the UK. Over 
the question of jurisdiction, events in Japan in 1958 and in Turkey in 1959 had shown strong 
Congressional and public feeling in the US against concessions which would leave US servicemen at the 
mercy of foreign courts. With regard to the point made by Amery in para 17 of his memo, the FO argued 
while the UK should not use its reserve powers 'simply to keep the Americans comfortable in. their base', if 
local agitation developed to the extent that its actual operation were imperilled, HMG would find itself 
under strong US pressure to go to their aid. As long as HMG was still responsible for defence and foreign 
affairs , the UK was under an obligation to see that the terms of the 1941 agreement were fulfilled 
(CO 103112040, no 3, Hildyard (FO) to Whitelegg (CO), 2 Sept 1959). 
100 CO 1031/2065, no 132 31 July 1959 
[US bases]: inward telegram no 249 from SirS Hochoy1 to Mr 
Lennox-Boyd on the measures contemplated by the Trinidad 
government should the US persist in its refusal to review the 1941 
agreement 
Your secret telegram No. 180 of 21st July. 
Radiation at Chaguaramas. 
Premier has asked me to communicate to you the following views with which 
O'Halloran and Solomon are in full agreement. 
1 Acting governor, Trinidad. 
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In the light of your statement regarding H.M.G.'s interest in this matter in view of 
similar installations elsewhere, he is prepared to agree that Evans2 should arrive by 
direct flight leaving 6th August, notwithstanding the reports of dismantling of the 
station and shipment of installations, for example on 24th July (?of) two special 
containers of electronic tubes each valued at $30,000. But he is of the opinion that 
the cost of Evan's [sic] visit or visits should be shared between both Governments, a 
copy of his report being naturally made available to us. 
He wishes however, to impress upon you that the urgency and gravity of the entire 
situation far transcend visit of Evans. For exactly two years now United States 
Government has maintained its adamant stand on his request for a revision of 1941 
Agreement. Its role had been one of uncompromising resistance to the request, and 
the direct discussions which it agreed on what it is pleased to call euphemistically 
day to day difficulties in his opinion serve no useful purpose whatsoever. The open 
allowance of inept interference of American domestic politics by seeking to apply 
pressure on Trinidad to waive its claim to direct, equal and separate representation at 
the Conference prohibits a serious examination and resolution of the problem. In the 
meantime abuses continue to multiply and he wishes to bring to your attention the 
fact that time has now arrived when we can refrain from taking action within our 
legal and moral rights to correct these abuses only at the cost of prestige of the 
Government, not only in the eyes of those abroad but in the eyes of the party and 
people at home. 
He has so far refrained from any overt act which might interfere with delicate 
process of inducing a more reasonable attitude on the part of the Americans, but 
their attitude has made it impossible for the present situation to continue. It is 
unreasonable for the Americans, in the position in which they find themselves today 
as persistent and contumacious violators of an agreement whose validity in the 
present altered circumstances is challenged by us, to continue after two years to 
refuse to get around a table to negotiate issue. It is the Americans who have rejected 
our offer of a new site for the base. It is the Americans who have unilaterally decided 
they will be prepared to review the need for Chaguaramas after say ten years. It is the 
Americans who claim the privileges which lack the sanction of Trinidad law required 
by the Agreement. It is the Americans whose planes land at will in defiance of any 
agreement with Trinidad and in contravention of the informal arrangements with 
the United Kingdom. It is the Americans who use the leased areas for purposes for 
which they were never intended and contrary to the very specific conditions laid 
down by the Foreign Office as far as tracking station is concerned. It is the Americans 
who may even now be using or be planning to use the base for the purposes and for 
weapons with respect to which the recent revelations have created the present state 
of grave uncertainty and even apprehension among the population which should be a 
matter concerning not only Trinidad Government but also H.M. Government and 
even to the Americans themselves. 
2 Evans was a physicist from the UK Ministry of Supply who visited Trinidad after Williams raised a 
radiation scare over the working of the high-powered radar tracking station which the US had built at 
Chaguaramas. He reported that no radiation hazard existed to the population of Trinidad, except perhaps 
in the Morne Pierre area which was itself within the boundary of Chaguaramas. Even there, however, the 
report concluded that the risk was remote because of the difficulty of the terrain and the density of the 
vegetation (CO 1031/3025). 
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It must be clearly understood by all parties concerned that a definitive agreement 
concerning the revision of the 1941 Agreement must now be reached. Failing such 
agreement it will not be possible for him to postpone further the necessary steps to 
maintain self-respect of his Government and protect the rights of the Trinidad 
people. These steps will include, but will not necessarily be restricted to: -
(a) a control point outside of Chaguaramas for checking of all vehicles and 
persons entering or leaving the base, including controls of immigration, health, 
currency, customs, fire-arms, narcotics, animal and plant quarantine, licences of 
drivers and cars, registration of cars; 
(b) the fencing of Piarco Airport with the necessary precautions against 
unauthorised entry or exit; 
(c) the boarding and rummaging of all planes, without prejudice to Trinidad's 
protest against the practice whereby these planes have (corrupt grp. ?boldly) 
arrogated to themselves the right to land at will and act as they please; 
(d) the immediate resumption of Wailer Field, Carlsen Field and dock site, with 
implementation of the plans for their full and permanent incorporation in the 
development programme of the country; 
(e) the immediate cessation of all duty-free imports into Chaguaramas and the 
institution of rigid customs inspection and examination of all materials consigned 
to the base; 
(f) a ban on all non-licensed and non-registered vehicles on the roads of the 
country. 
In his discussions with McGregor Grant, the out-going Acting Consul General, the 
latter requested to be advised of any action with respect to (a) and (c) before the new 
procedures are instituted, and Moline,3 the present Consul General, has expressed to 
O'Halloran his opposition to (b). The Premier considers this attitude of the American 
authorities an unwarranted interference in the clear responsibilities of his 
Government and he has made it clear that he will entertain no protests. No self-
respecting Government can indefinitely be expected to turn the other cheek and 
manifest continued forbearance in the face of what amounts to complete contempt 
for authority of the Trinidad Government. 
The Premier has thought it best to deal in detail with the issue as he sees it so that 
you will be advised in advance of measures on which his Government and his party 
are unanimous and on which he is confident that he will have the unreserved 
support of the majority of Trinidadians and West Indians. You will note from the 
above that the Americans have not been left in the dark as to his intentions and he 
has taken other measures to advise them of what he considers to be his inescapable 
duty. 
If this intransigence and disregard for all accepted courtesies and procedures of 
civilised relations between peoples should continue, the ultimate result will 
inevitably be the total rejection by the population of Trinidad and Tobago of any 
compromise with the Americans such as this Government has consistently advocated 
in spite of the immense provocations it has had to endure. 
3 E G Moline, US consul-general, Trinidad, 1959- 1961. 
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101 CO 103112311 6 Aug 1959 
[Independence[: minute by Mr Amery on why at present it would be 
'absurd' to embark on independence 
[The CO warned the CRO at the end of July 1959 about the likelihood of a much earlier 
demand for independence in the West Indies than the CO had hitherto thought likely. Eric 
Williams had already spoken of '22nd of April 1960 at 11 o'clock in the morning': this in 
itself need not be taken seriously but it remained true that many West Indian leaders were 
now thinking of 1960 or 1961 as dates to be aimed at. It was conceivable that a demand 
for early independence might be put forward at the Trinidad conference to review the 
federal constitution which was scheduled to open on 28 Sept. The conference would not 
commit the UK in any way (observers only would be sent) but if the demand was made, and 
repeated at a conference in London which might follow next year, HMG would find it very 
difficult to resist. The CO was mindful of the difficulties such an outcome might pose for 
the CROon Central Africa and admitted that the anxieties expressed by Home in Oct 1958 
(see 80) were more justified than the CO had thought at the time or until very recently. 
However, repeating the argument that it had used then to the effect that the UK's ability 
to control the pace of the movement towards independence in the West In dies by reason 
of the possible reaction in Central Africa was very limited (see 83), the CO now asked the 
CRO to consider sounding out Commonwealth governments about eventual West Indian 
membership. One problem in this respect was the trade ban imposed by Jamaica against 
South Africa which made the present an inauspicious moment for any approach to South 
Africa (CO 1031/2311, no 43, Marnham to Sir C Dixon, assistant under-secretary of state, 
CRO, 27 July 1959). Home responded with a minute to Lennox-Boyd expressing concern. 
His earlier exchange with the CO had led him to believe that the earliest date for 
independence would be 1964. The CO's latest assessment would be awkward for other 
parts of the Commonwealth. A conference to review the constitution of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland was contemplated for Oct 1960. It would be embarrassing if a 
date had already been fixed for West Indian independence. The South African difficulty 
would become that much greater if other West Indian governments followed Jamaica's 
line and imposed trade embargos. While not wishing to delay West Indian independence 
unduly, Home therefore felt there was 'a strong case for playing for the maximum time' 
(ibid, Home to Lennox-Boyd, 31 July 1959). 
I return Lord Home's minute and the file. 
2. In view of Lord Home's minute the question will now have to be dealt with at 
Ministerial level. I should, therefore, be glad of a discussion with the Department-
say, next Monday afternoon, with perhaps a further talk next day with the 
Department, plus Lord Hailes. We can consider how best to reply to Lord Home after 
these talks. 
3. Meanwhile my first reactions are:-
(1) It would be absurd to embark on independence when: 
(a) there are no means of defence, 
(b) no provision for finance for the central government, 
(c) even no freedom of movement for goods or persons within the Federation, 
and 
(d) no provision yet for staff for overseas representation. 
(2) It would be very difficult to "sell" this one to the rest of the Commonwealth. 
(3) The West Indies and Central Africa must each be judged on its merits. Central 
Africa could be independent in the sense that it's got the ships (guns and planes), 
it's got the men, it's got the money too. There are good reasons for withholding 
independence in Central Africa but we must be careful not to make the contrast 
with the West Indies absurd, by giving the latter a purely fictitious Commonwealth 
status when they have none of the means of supporting it. 
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(4) If faced with a demand in January for independence within twelve months; I 
should have thought we should be prepared to counter with a planned programme 
which would give the West Indies the chance of achieving the necessary criteria of 
independence by 1965. In practice we might be able to settle for 1963 or 1964; but 
I do not think that we should consider a further fall back position at this stage. The 
West Indies themselves still have plenty of hurdles to jump at the Conference and 
may not be in a position to put a united demand for full dominion status, quite so 
soon as some fear. 
(5) Meanwhile I would be against sounding other Commonwealth Governments at 
this stage. The Commonwealth has become a great whispering gallery and 
consultations are sure to get back to West Indies' ears. This will only encourage 
them in their demand. If the C.R.O. feel they must consult their High 
Commissions, they should be asked to do so in the strictest secrecy. 
4. These are only provisional and first reactions but the Department may like to 
take account of them before we hold our meeting. 
102 CO 103112311, no 47 14 Aug 1959 
'The West Indies: independence and Commonwealth status': CO 
record of a meeting between Mr Amery and Lord Hailes on 11 Aug. 
Minute by Sir H Poynton 
The discussion centered around possible means of reconciling the likely desire of The 
West Indies for independence as early as is practicable (a desire that cannot be 
withstood on grounds of social or political immaturity, but only on the grounds of 
financial inability and the unsuitability of the present internal powers of the Federal 
Government in relation to the units) with the need to avoid embarrassment in 
relation to the discussion of full independence for the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland which would inevitably be raised at the next constitutional conference for 
Central Africa due to be held in October, 1960. Mr. Amery was anxious that no date 
for West Indian independence should be announced or even, if possible, publicly 
proposed before then. The possibility of embarrassment on this score would lessen 
somewhat after 1960, but it must be remembered that the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland already possess [sic] the physical attributes of independence. He 
thought it doubtful whether, taking into account the need for the West Indies to 
achieve the basic requirements and the time required for bringing new 
constitutional instruments into operation, independence could be granted to The 
West Indies before 1964 or 1965. 
2. Lord Hailes accepted that H.M.G. must pay due regard to the situation in 
Central Africa, but felt that independence for The West Indies could not be withheld 
for as long as 5 or 6 years. The Central African argument would cut no ice with The 
West Indies and could not even be whispered to them. Nor was it much use to point 
out that other territories that had recently been granted independence had had 
greater resources with which to meet the obligations of Commonwealth status. 
There had been the greatest admiration in The West Indies for the achievement of 
independence of the Gold Coast, but this had diminished considerably when certain 
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individuals had visited the new State of Ghana and found how less advanced it was in 
many respects than The West Indies. 
3. As far as the obligations required of The West Indies were concerned-control 
of Defence, External Affairs, revenue raising powers and freedom of movement of 
persons and goods-Mr. Rogers expressed the view that it would just be possible for 
them to accomplish these things by 1961, provided that the larger territories were 
prepared to give way on Customs Union and movement of persons and to assume the 
burden of recurrent financial assistance to the smaller territories. If Jamaica were 
agreeable, the first stage of Customs Union could be introduced within two years, 
and this could be regarded as satisfying the obligation, even though the full stage 
might have to last for five years (as recommended by Sir William Croft). On 
movement of persons some measure of relaxation of the present restrictions could be 
reached within that time. On defence it would be possible to have in existence one 
fully trained battalion of The West India Regiment possibly with the second being 
formed and some sort of embryo naval force, even if it consisted only of vessels and 
trained personnel made available by H.M.G. during the time required for the training 
of West Indian personnel. But mere promises by The West Indies to be able to stand 
on their own feet in these respects eventually, or even before independence was 
granted, would not be adequate security for a firm offer of independence by H.M.G; it 
would be necessary for them to show that the required legislation in all these fields 
was in force and that some steps at least had been taken to implement them before 
independence could be granted. As to the demands to be put forward as a result of the 
September conference, we could not control these (though the UK observers would 
naturally counsel common-sense) and if these demands were to be published, 
uninstructed opinion in the West Indies would view them as virtually having already 
been achieved, a fact which would make it very difficult for the delegates at the 
London conference to withdraw very far from them. 
4. Mr. Amery hoped that every endeavour would be made to avoid naming a date 
for independence within the next year or so. It had to be accepted, however, that Dr. 
Eric Williams had already spoken of the 22nd April, 1960, and that he might well 
announce this publicly, perhaps even at the opening of the September Conference, 
without warning the Federal Government, or even his own Government, in advance. 
If this happened, it would be difficult for H.M.G. to expose the announcement to 
ridicule, the more so because they would be represented at the Conference only by 
observers and not by delegates. Mr. Manley might oppose Dr. Williams, since Jamaica 
was in no particular hurry for independence, and he might get some backing in 
doing so from the other territories on the grounds that Dr. Williams' date would have 
to be discussed again at a London Conference some time between January and 
March, 1960, and that it would be impossible then to achieve independence within 
one or two months and impossible to complete the necessary constitutional 
processes before a further year, say by April, 1961. Accordingly, a compromise date 
might be reached which might fall not far short of acceptance by H.M.G. If, however, 
there was pressure for very early independence, or for the fixing of a date at the 
September Conference, and if this was subsequently put forward at the Conference in 
London, H.M.G. would have to enumerate the obligations that would be required of 
The West Indies before independence and ask for a precise statement of how soon 
The West Indies expected to be able to assume each of them. 
5. Three further possibilities were discussed. Firstly, The West Indies might go 
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for independence alone to start with, leaving the question of Commonwealth status 
until a little later, in the hope that the United Nations would recognise its 
independence more easily than the Commonwealth members would admit it to their 
club. Secondly, The West Indies might not take lying down suggestions that if such 
and such were not done H.M.G. could not put them up for the club. Their answer to 
this might be to canvass for sponsorship by Commonwealth countries whom they 
believed to be sympathetic to their cause, such as Canada (Mr. Diefenbaker1 might 
lend a willing ear), Ghana, Malaya or Ceylon. In the latter case H.M.G. would no 
doubt be informed of the move by the Commonwealth governments concerned, but 
there was no precedent for such a happening, which would cause an extremely 
difficult situation. Thirdly, we could not assume that our "minimum criteria" for 
sovereignty would be accepted by the West Indians who might not agree that all the 
steps we thought desirable were essential. These criteria would require careful 
consideration. 
6. It was agreed that it could not be foreseen just which way events would turn, 
but that the U.K. observers at the September conference should do all they could by 
private persuasion to discourage any early announcement of a target date for 
independence, and if possible to postpone the announcement of any date until after 
the Central African conference was due to take place. It was also agreed that the 
Department would prepare a draft reply to Lord Home2 in the light of the above views 
and of the briefing exercise now being undertaken for the U.K. observers and discuss 
this with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State and Lord Hailes as soon as 
possible. 
Minute with 102 
Independence of the West Indies 
We [Poynton and Hailes] did not discuss this in any great detail but Lord Hailes was 
extremely anxious that we should not hold back longer than was necessary on purely 
practical grounds. He was evidently a little disappointed that Mr. Amery had not been 
more encouraging at the meeting yesterday. He thought that The West Indian 
Ministers themselves were almost certain to announce a date as their goal during the 
preliminary Conference in the autumn, and it would be very difficult for H.M.G. to 
put the brakes on for any other than purely practical reasons. If we wanted to play it a 
bit slowly the best hope was that Dr. Williams would advocate so early a date as to be 
ridiculous (e.g. April 1960, which he has already mentioned) and that this would 
bring Mr. Manley into opposition and result in some compromise that might be more 
reasonable. He was aware of the timing difficulty with the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland but while he seemed to appreciate the difficulty of The West Indies 
attaining independence (or having a date fixed) ahead of Rhodesia and Nyasaland he 
could not really see why it should be damaging in the Rhodesian context if The West 
Indian constitutional conference were held before the Central African Conference, 
the latter, I understand, being due for the autumn of 1960. He thought it would be 
1 Prime minister of Canada. 2 ie to his minute of 31 July, see 101, note. 
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impossible to defer The West Indian Conference later than March or April, i.e. pretty 
well immediately after the Princess Royal 's visit if that took place in January or 
February. I reminded Lord Hailes that in the case of Nigeria the date of independence 
had been fixed almost exactly two years ahead of the final constitutional conference, 
that the working out of independence was, in fact, quite a long drawn out process, 
not only in the preparation of constitutional instruments but in a whole lot of 
preparations that have to be made in the international field, including the training of 
diplomatic staff and the getting ready for the C.R.O. and a United Kingdom High 
Commissioner to take over. Anything less than two years seemed to me to be rushing 
it unduly, even if we should get reassured that the Federal Government would be 
sufficiently in control to take over. I instanced one or two examples including 
Chaguaramas, of the difficulties we found at this end over the perpetual jealousy 
between the Federal Government and the Unit Governments. On this latter point 
Lord Hailes expressed complete agreement. ... 
A.H.P. 
13.8.59 
103 CO 103112040, no 185 Aug 1959 
[US bases] : CO aide memoire for Mr Amery in discussions with US 
representatives on 20 Aug [Extract] 
Mr. Amery is of course fully aware of the strong feeling aroused in Trinidad by the 
American reluctance to agree to a Conference to revise the 1941 leased Bases 
Agreement. He may, however, wish to make use of some of the following points to 
reinforce our plea for an early conference:-
(a) We had recently reached the stage where two agreements (the Antigua Missile 
Station and the Antigua Satellite Station Agreements) and an exchange of notes 
defining the extent of the privileges enjoyed by United States Military aircraft at 
airfields in the Caribbean, could be completed. In each case the drafts had been 
cleared with the local governments concerned and with the United States' 
authorities. Recently, however, the local governments concerned have had second 
thoughts and with the strong support of the Federal Government have requested 
the postponement of signature until the wider questions of the United States bases 
in general and the revision of the 1941 Agreement in particular have been settled. 
It will of course be necessary to inform the Americans through diplomatic 
channels of our intention not to proceed with these Agreements and exchange of 
notes for the time being, but the Foreign Office have agreed that this action should 
be delayed so that Mr. Amery may, if he wishes, make use of this in his talks with 
the Americans. 
This attitude of the local governments is indicative of the strong feelings 
aroused in The West Indies over the bases issues generally and illustrates the 
difficulties the Americans may have in the future in obtaining concessions from 
The West Indies unless and until a revisionary conference is agreed to. 
(b) The Federal Government and through it the Trinidad Government have not 
yet been informed of the unfavourable American reply to the formal request for a 
revisionary conference. Unless the Americans can be persuaded to change their 
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minds we shall have to inform the local governments of this and the Americans 
should be left in no doubt that if and when Dr. Williams has to be informed of the 
American rejection of the request, he will almost certainly feel that the gloves are 
off and proceed to make life as difficult as possible for the Americans in Trinidad. 
In point of fact he has already outlined some of the steps he proposes to take in 
such circumstances; these include: . . . . 1 
Some of those actions would probably amount to no more than the strict 
observance of the legal position, but it is quite possible that in the heat of the 
moment the Trinidad Government would contravene the terms of the 1941 
Agreement. 
(c) The Americans on several occasions have implied that if, in fact, matters got 
out of hand in The West Indies they would look to and expect H.M.G., as ultimately 
responsible for Trinidad's foreign relations and for the observance of the Treaty, to 
take suitable measures to maintain public order and to protect their position. At 
the same time the Americans have given as one of their reasons for not agreeing to 
a revisionary conference now that when The West Indies achieves independence 
they are confident that they will be able to negotiate satisfactorily without our 
assistance. The first part of this seems to us only too likely to make the second 
impossible. Our position vis-a-vis the Federation (which it seems the Americans do 
not fully understand) is that although H.M.G. are fully conscious of the need to 
fulfil their obligations under the 1941 Agreement, it is not possible at this stage to 
treat the Federal Government or the Unit Governments as though they were at a 
much earlier state of development; nor can we proceed on the basis of keeping 
them in complete tutelage in so far as Defence and Foreign Affairs are concerned 
right up to the date on which Independence is achieved. They have to be put 
increasingly into the picture in these matters. Many of the spheres in which they 
might take action to embarrass the Americans are moreover internal matters 
under purely ministerial control e.g. control of civil airfields, customs etc. The 
Americans should not assume that H.M.G. would be prepared to suspend the 
Trinidad Constitution, for example at the request of the United States 
Government, unless they were completely satisfied that the vital defence interests 
of the United States and the Western Hemisphere would otherwise be gravely 
prejudiced. H.M.G. would require the very strongest and compelling reasons 
before suspending the Trinidad Constitution or indeed using any of the remaining 
reserved powers, since to do so would precipitate a crisis probably necessitating 
the landing and maintenance of British Troops in the Island-this moreover 
would take place in the face of strongest adverse public opinion locally and, 
perhaps to a lesser extent, in this country also. Furthermore, even if the 
constitution were suspended, it could not remain suspended indefinitely and the 
position in Trinidad and the West Indies of the Americans, and of ourselves too, 
would be likely to be much worse when it was eventually restored. 
(d) The Americans are under the impression-and this is another of their reasons 
for refusing a Conference-that nothing could be worse than to hold a Conference 
which failed. While it is true that a "failed" conference would lead to a deadlock 
with consequent ill feeling in The West Indies, ill feeling would be much greater if 
1 The steps proposed are not repeated here. They are itemised in points (a) -(f) in lOO. 
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Williams could accuse the Americans of having been so unreasonable that they had 
actually refused to discuss the questions at issue. If, on the other hand, a 
Conference was held and broke down because of Dr. Williams' intransigence, the 
Americans would be in a much stronger position in that they would be able to 
claim that they had bent over backwards in order to meet West Indian wishes. 
Thus, they would be in the best position to enlist the sympathy of all reasonably 
minded opinion in Trinidad and in the Federation. It is just such opinion which is 
at present in danger of being alienated by a refusal to confer with the West Indies. 
(e) The American offer to consider specific proposals through diplomatic channels 
for the revision of such articles of the Treaty as H.M.G. may wish to put forward 
does not in any way meet The West Indies request for a conference with the 
prospect of their being a party to a subsequently revised agreement. Moreover, no 
conference could be held at which Dr. Williams was not present in one capacity or 
another and to try to do so would only encourage dissensions inside the 
Federation and weaken the position of the Federal Government. This latter point is 
of particular concern to H.M.G. although the Americans will doubtless appreciate 
the importance of doing nothing to lessen the stature of the Federal Government. 
If Dr. Williams continues to be unreasonable, the only prospect of holding him is 
by meeting the reasonable wishes of the Federal Government and other members 
of his own Party, so that they can overrule him. At present they are being driven to 
side with him. 
(f) It is the considered view of H.M.G. that until and unless the Americans agree to 
a revisionary conference at which the Federal Government will be a participant, 
their relations particularly with the Government of Trinidad will go from bad to 
worse and life will become increasingly difficult for them in Chaguaramas and 
perhaps elsewhere in the Federation, in Antigua and St. Lucia for example. There 
seems to be a fundamental difference of opinion between H.M.G. and the United 
States Government in that the latter seem to believe that if they continue to do 
nothing, the strong feelings aroused over the 1941 Agreement will eventually die 
down. We, however, are convinced that the opposite is true and it is doubtful 
whether even now the Americans appreciate the full significance of the mess they 
are landing themselves in. We have had many years experience of affairs in The 
West Indies and our representatives on the spot have had very considerable 
experience of reporting and assessing events. The Americans on the other hand 
have to depend on reports received from a Consul-General in Trinidad who is new 
to the area and on their service experts in Chaguaramas who have not the 
necessary political background to enable them to read the local signs right. 
(g) The Americans may mention their concern over reports in Trinidad 
newspapers about their Radar Tracking Station activities. The local press are 
apparently running a story that the visit of the British expert2 is being delayed so 
that the Americans may remove from Trinidad certain incriminating equipment. 
This, of course, is very far from the point which is that the expert's visit has been 
delayed until such time as the Americans can tell us when the station is resuming 
low power operation-now expected about the 25th August. Arrangements are 
accordingly being made for the expert to arrive in Trinidad on the 21st August. It 
2 See 100, note 2. 
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is not improbable that much of the difficulty which has arisen over the tracking 
station could have been avoided if the Americans had not been so completely 
ingenuous when we first asked whether there was any radiation from 
Chaguaramas. Then they answered that the only source of radiation they could 
think of would be from hospital equipment and domestic appliances-this at a 
time when the Trinidad Government were fully aware that the Radar Tracking 
Station was operating and indeed since it is situated on a hill in Chaguaramas, it is 
plain for all to see. It is just this kind of action which ruins the Americans' position 
with West Indians-and seriously embarrasses H.M.G. too. 
104 CO 103112311, no 50 27 Aug 1959 
'The West Indies': minute by Mr Amery to Lord Home responding to 
CRO concerns over the prospect of early independence 
As Alan Lennox-Boyd is away until the end of this month I am replying to your 
minute of 31st July about the West Indies.1 
2. The position is that the Federal Government has invited all the units of the 
Federation to take part in a preliminary constitutional conference in Trinidad on the 
28th September. Subject to the agreement of the unit governments (and Trinidad 
has already expressed its opposition) the Federal Government has invited Her 
Majesty's Government to send two observers. 
3. The relevant resolution of the Federal House of Representatives describes the 
purpose of this conference as: "to achieve the goal of self-government and Dominion 
status (sic) within the Commonwealth at the earliest possible moment". It is the 
present West Indian intention that this September conference, which is to be a 
purely West Indian affair, should lead up to a full dress constitutional conference 
with Her Majesty's Government in London early next year. The present Federal 
constitution provides that such a conference should be held within five years of the 
inauguration of the Federation; and although 1960 is rather on the early side we do 
not think it would be politically possible to refuse a request for a West Indian 
conference on this ground alone. 
4. The West Indian delegations to the September conference will have to deal 
with the highly contentious question of how power is to be distributed between the 
Unit and the Central governments. They will also have to resolve the differences that 
have arisen between Jamaica and the rest over customs union. We cannot foretell 
what the outcome of their discussions will be. It is possible that the conference will 
break down, in which case the request for a constitutional revision conference may 
be postponed for some time. It is equally possible that the degree of agreement 
reached may not be sufficient to justify the West Indian delegations in asking for 
Dominion status by a fixed date. My advisers, however, and the Governor-General, 
consider that the September conference is just as likely, if not more likely, to end in a 
demand for independence at once (by which they will mean as soon as the necessary 
legal and legislative steps can be taken) or by a definite date. We do not take the 
Premier of Trinidad's statement about independence by Aprill960 very seriously. We 
1 See 101, note. 
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would not, however, be surprised if the date proposed were 18 months or two years 
from the Constitutional Review conference in London. Assuming this conference was 
held in the spring or early summer of 1960, this would mean independence some 
time in 1962. 
5. Our observers at the September conference will not have the same status as 
the other delegates. Assuming, however, that they are invited it is our intention that 
they should in so far as the opportunity presents itself, make it clear that Her 
Majesty's Government cannot agree to sponsor the West Indies for Commonwealth 
membership unless they have fulfilled certain conditions with regard to the weight of 
powers and revenues in the hands of the Central Government, the progress towards 
customs union, the provision of certain military and naval forces, and the 
strengthening of their administrative and diplomatic apparatus. These criteria are 
being worked out in greater detail in the brief for the United Kingdom observers at 
the September conference, and an advance copy will shortly be sent to your Office in 
case you wish to comment. This approach is in keeping with the Report of the 1956 
London Conference on British Caribbean Federation, which said, in reference to the 
eventual independence of the Federation: "a country must be able to stand on its own 
feet economically and financially ... finance its own administration and (be) able and 
prepared to assume responsibility for its own defence and its own international-
relations to the extent that was involved by its geographical or international 
standing". 
7. I recognise that early independence for The West Indies would not make our 
task easier in relation to Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This factor is being given due 
weight in our thinking. But you will appreciate that it will not count for much with 
West Indian opinion. The West Indies are in many respects (not least their standards 
of political life and internal stability) in advance of the general run of Latin-American 
states in their immediate neighbourhood who already enjoy full international status. 
This is the criterion that counts most with them. 
8. I also appreciate what you say about the views of South Africa and how this 
might affect the reception of West Indian candidature for the Commonwealth. I 
made this point firmly to Mr. Manley and his ministers when I discussed the boycott 
of South African goods with them last May in Jamaica. The United Kingdom 
observers at the September conference will naturally lose no opportunity to reiterate 
Her Majesty's Government's views on the undesirability of any extension of the 
boycott by the rest of the West Indies. I doubt, however, whether the fear of a South 
African "blackball" will do much to restrain the West Indians. They are more likely to 
put their faith in Ghanaian and Indian support and if necessary even turn to them to 
sponsor their membership of the Commonwealth. 
9. I agree with you that there is much to be said for playing for time in dealing 
with any demand for West Indian independence; and as you will see from the line we 
are proposing to take, we shall certainly do nothing to hasten the process. Our power 
of putting on the brake, however, is now very limited. Moreover, even where we still 
have it, we have to be very careful how we use it. The Federation is still a delicate 
plant and any excessive check at this stage to West Indian aspirations could have 
grave repercussions on the standing of the Federal Government and even 
compromise the existence of the Federation. While, therefore, we shall not neglect 
reasonable opportunities for delay, I am sure you would not wish us to pursue these 
to a point which risked injury to the Federation itself. 
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9. [sic] The September conference is due to meet in less than a month from now. I 
would, accordingly, submit that we should review the whole problem again as soon 
as the outcome of that conference is known. I do not know whether you will wish, 
meanwhile, to let our High Commissioners know our preliminary views. It might, 
however, be wiser not to discuss the problem at this stage with other Commonwealth 
Governments. Any leakage of such discussions which reached the West Indies would 
only spur them on in their quest for early independence. 
105 PREM 1112880, pp 25-27 28 Aug 1959 
[US bases]: FO record of a meeting between Mr Selwyn Lloyd and Mr 
Herter on the question of a revision conference 
Mr. Herter said that as he understood it the West Indies regarded the whole bases 
agreement as outmoded and would like a revision conference to be held before the 
Federation became independent. The West Indian bases were of first-class 
importance to the United States and they were doubtful about making concessions to 
pressure, particularly from Dr. Williams in Trinidad, since they thought that his real 
aim was to get the United States out altogether. Mr. Gates1 explained that the West 
Indian bases were the focal point for the whole United States naval defence of the 
South Atlantic. They felt that if the agreement were seriously called into question it 
might radically affect United States bases elsewhere, e.g., Argentia [sic]. 
The Secretary of State said that we had the fullest sympathy with the American 
position and completely understood the importance of the bases to them. The 
question was of how best to play the hand. We had ourselves had unhappy experience 
of foreign bases, e.g., in Ceylon, and in general we thought it was impractical to 
attempt to bind in advance a Government which was about to become independent. 
In the case of Malaya we received only an oral assurance from the Tungku before 
independence and were then able to negotiate a defence agreement with the new 
Malayan Government after it became independent. In the West Indies we thought 
that there was a risk that if the United States refused to discuss revision now, they 
might enable Dr. Williams and other extremists to put pressure on the Federal 
Government so that it would be almost impossible for internal political reasons for 
them to negotiate a reasonable agreement when the Federation became independent. 
We would not necessarily concede the point that the existing agreement would not 
be binding on the Federation; indeed, we would make the best case we could for this. 
But in practice we could not prevent the new Government from denouncing the 
existing agreement almost immediately after they became independent. 
Mr. Amery said that he hoped the Federal Government on attaining independence 
would make a statement accepting existing obligations. We ourselves intended to 
negotiate a defence agreement with the new Government after independence, but 
this did not involve major issues comparable to those of the United States bases. In 
answer to a question from Mr. Herter about the powers which the Federal 
Government would have over the Government of Trinidad, Mr. Amery said that the 
Federal Government could suspend the Constitution in Trinidad. It also controlled 
1 T S Gates Jnr, US deputy secretary of defence, 1959 (June-Dec) . 
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the armed forces, but control of the police was in the hands of the Trinidad 
Government. Although Dr. Williams had initiated the present pressure the Federal 
authorities had taken it up to a considerable extent, partly at least because of genuine 
pressure of public opinion. 
The Secretary of State said that Mr. Dulles had used the argument that if the 
Americans were to negotiate now and to make certain concessions, these would be 
pocketed and they would then be asked to make further concessions in new 
negotiations after independence. He saw the force of this, but the other argument 
was that if the position was allowed to deteriorate too badly it might become 
impossible ever to get a satisfactory new agreement. Mr. Amery said that the Colonial 
Office view was that if talks were refused now, public opinion would back Dr. 
Williams. If, however, there were talks and his attitude was seen to be unreasonable 
moderate opinion in the West Indies would be strengthened. The Colonial Office 
thought that it would be better to agree to talks now and that this course incurred 
less risk of building up Dr. Williams' prestige. The request for talks had come from 
the Federal Government, and if the request were accepted there would be a single 
Federal Delegation, though it would of course include representatives from Trinidad. 
Before approaching the Federal Government formally we had asked the Acting 
Governors of the Federation and Trinidad what agenda they thought would be 
proposed and we should get their answer in about a week. 
Mr. Herter said that the United States Government were not encouraged to accept 
a conference, since the discussions they were already having on day-to-day matters 
had virtually reached an impasse owing to the unreasonable attitude of the West 
Indian authorities. They would prefer to negotiate with us rather than have a 
conference with full publicity. Mr. Amery said that United Kingdom control was 
passing very rapidly and he thought that it would already be almost impossible for us 
to negotiate with the Americans without bringing in the West Indians. 
The Secretary of State said that it must be a matter of judgment whether it would 
be best for the United States to negotiate direct with the Federation after 
independence, or to negotiate now while we would be there to help. If independence 
was to come in six months, he would advise waiting, but in fact the period was to be 
two to five years. The Secretary of State thought that there were four questions:-
(i) What would be the legal position as regards the existing agreement when the 
Federation became independent? 
(ii) Would it be better to postpone a revision conference until independence or to 
agree to one now? 
(iii) Would negotiations now increase or decrease Dr. Williams' prestige? 
(iv) If there were to be a conference, what would it be about? 
The Secretary of State said that he thought the United Kingdom could take the 
line at a conference that the existing agreements should bind the Federation after 
independence. In practice, however, the legal position was probably less important 
than the political, since whatever the legal position at the time of independence, if 
the new Government was unfriendly it could denounce the agreement almost 
immediately afterwards. Mr. Amery explained that no date had been set for 
independence, but the West Indians could ask for a review of the constitutional 
position within five years and were likely to make such a request next year. 
Independence might be achieved at any time from the beginning of 1962. 
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Mr. Herter said that he thought it would be very helpful if the United Kingdom 
Government took the position that the existing agreement should remain legally 
valid after independence. The United States Government always required that any 
new Government should accept the international obligations of its predecessor 
before recognition was granted. He thought that this was not an unreasonable 
position to take. 
The Secretary of State said that one possible course for us would be to make the 
acceptance of the existing agreement a condition for the grant of independence. He 
doubted, however, whether this was wise since such a condition was not likely to 
endure. Mr. Herter agreed that it might be better for the United Kingdom to assume 
that the agreement would remain in force rather than to insist on it doing so. 
The Secretary of State suggested and it was agreed that a United Kingdom 
statement on the legal position would be produced. We should also wait for the West 
Indian suggestions about the agenda for the proposed conference. The Colonial 
Office should produce a political appreciation of the tactics to be pursued and of the 
effect of such tactics on Dr. Williams' prestige. The Colonial Office should also 
consider the arguments for and against making acceptance of the existing agreement 
a condition for the grant of independence. In conclusion the Secretary of State said 
that he thought the United States Government should not assume that the outcome 
of a review conference would necessarily be adverse or that the majority opinion in 
the West Indies was against the United States. The United States were in a strong 
position to bring economic pressure to bear, and the more moderate elements in the 
West Indies might appreciate the necessity for the Federation to remain on good 
terms with the United States. 
106 CO 1031/2956, no 26 22 Sept 1959 
'Military implications of the attainment of independence by The West 
Indies Federation': COS memorandum for Mr Dun can Sandys (COS 
(59)227 (Revise), annex B)l 
Introduction 
In a recent letter the Colonial Office assess that the Federation of the West Indies will 
almost certainly achieve independent status within the Commonwealth by 1963 and 
possibly even as soon as 1961. The colonies of the Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, 
British Guiana and British Honduras will remain outside the Federation and their 
status will not change. 
2. The Colonial Office state that a conference to review the Constitution of the 
Federation of the West Indies is to be held in September, 1959 and suggest that it is 
important that the United Kingdom representatives who are likely to attend that 
conference as observers should be briefed on United King<;lom military interests and 
obligations in the West Indies. The Colonial Office request that in order to guide 
them in determining their policy, a study should be made of the military 
implications of an independent Federation. 
1 The CO had requested that the COS prepare an assessment before the opening of the Trinidad review 
conference at the end of Sept 1959. 
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Aim 
3. The aim of this paper is to consider United Kingdom defence interests and 
obligations in the Caribbean area and to review the military implications of 
independence of the Federation of the West Indies. 
United Kingdom aims in the area 
4. We assess the main United Kingdom interests in the Caribbean area as:-
(a) The maintenance of stable governments friendly to the United Kingdom. 
(b) The peaceful evolution of the Federation and of the United Kingdom 
territories outside the Federation. 
(c) The protection of the Federation and the colonies against external aggres-
sion. 
(d) The maintenance of internal security in the British colonies. 
(e) The continuance and protection of trade. 
There might also at some future date be a requirement to disperse components of 
the United Kingdom's deterrent forces in the territories. 
5. The forces now in the area consist of two frigates based on Bermuda, Army 
Headquarters Caribbean Area in Jamaica and one British infantry battalion of five 
rifle companies deployed among the territories. In addition the West Indies 
Regiment, consisting of one battalion which is under strength and non-operational, 
is based on Jamaica. 
The threat 
Internal security 
6. Possible threats to internal security are:-
(a) Political differences which may be exploited by communist or other outside 
influences. 
(b) Unrest caused by industrial grievances. 
(c) Unrest fostered by neighbouring countries. 
(d) Communist attempts to disrupt the newly formed Federation. 
Limited war 
7. Although we cannot discount the possibility of a Latin American dictator 
being tempted to embark upon hostilities against a neighbour, we can see no threat 
of limited war involving the United Kingdom. We consider that the presence of 
United Kingdom and United States forces in the area coupled with United States 
political and economic influence would discourage such adventures. We therefore 
discount any limited war threat in the area. 
Global war 
8. The only global war threat is that posed by possible submarine operations. 
However, United States influence would be predominant and the United Kingdom 
government would not attempt to reinforce the area. At some future date the 
United Kingdom might wish to disperse components of her deterrent forces in the 
area. 
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Federation defence requirements after independence 
Federation defence forces 
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9. The risk of interference or unrest in the West Indies Federation is liable to 
increase unless an efficient minimum security force is maintained by the Federation 
government. 
10. Navy. The Federation has no navy but will need a force of a small number of 
armed launches and patrol boats based on Jamaica and Trinidad for local harbour 
defence, patrol of territorial waters and anti-smuggling and fishery protection. 
11. Army. Mter independence the Federation forces will be responsible for 
internal security within the Federation. For this task we consider that the battalion 
of the West India Regiment must be maintained at at least one full strength battalion 
and be suitably trained. Since it is at present administered by the United Kingdom 
Army Headquarters in Jamaica, early measures will be necessary to ensure that the 
West India Regiment is completely self-administering by the date of independence. 
United Kingdom defence requirements after independence 
United Kingdom forces 
12. Navy. Mter West Indian independence there will be a need, for as long as can 
be foreseen, for two Royal Navy frigates to be maintained on station in the West 
Indies to assist in internal security in the unfederated colonies, for trade protection 
and for politico-naval duties in the area. 
13. Army. United Kingdom troops will still be required for internal security 
duties in the remaining British colonies. We assess this requirement at a [sic] 
infantry battalion. At present the battalion HQ and two companies of the United 
Kingdom battalion are stationed in Jamaica. We should prefer to leave the battalion 
in Jamaica after independence, but must face the possibility of having to move out of 
the Federation at some future date. Furthermore from the moment of independence 
there will be the risk of our forces in Jamaica being prevented from undertaking 
operations elsewhere if the operations meet with the disapproval of the Federal 
Government. We consider the best alternative location would be the Bahamas. There 
is no plan for the accommodation of a United Kingdom infantry battalion in the 
Caribbean in the long term. The United Kingdom have undertaken to make available 
to the Federation for their forces the accommodation now occupied in Jamaica. New 
building will therefore be required whatever the location decided upon for the 
battalion. 
14. RAF. The RAF's immediate interests are mainly concerned with staging and 
overflying rights which are discussed separately in paragraphs 15 and 16 below. 
There is also a requirement for occasional deployment of Coastal Command 
Shackleton detachments in this area. However, a long term requirement exists to 
retain a maximum capability to disperse components of the deterrent forces for 
which the Caribbean area is considered to have a potential. 
Staging and overflying 
15. Mter independence the United Kingdom will no longer have the automatic 
right to overfly or stage through Federation territory. However, the remaining 
colonies in the area i.e. Bahamas, British Honduras and British Guiana, will still 
provide a reasonable chain of British airfields from which to operate should the 
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occasion arise. Nevertheless, it would be desirable to seek staging and overflying 
facilities within the Federation. 
16. If, after independence, the use of Jamaica for staging purposes should be 
denied to us, other arrangements will have to be made. Adequate fuel stocks and 
facilities for Britannias and Comets at British Guiana, and for Comets, Britannias 
and Hastings at Nassau would have to be assured. The development of Belize to 
Britannia standards though ideal, is not essential, since reinforcement to this Colony 
could be undertaken from Nassau by Hastings aircraft, for which fuel and facilities 
must also be assured. 
Reinforcement 
17. A plan exists for reinforcing the area with a battalion by air from the 
United Kingdom. Under present timings and without prior warning troops would 
begin to arrive in about eight days from the time the executive order to move was 
given. Commander Caribbean Area's concept of operations is that in the event of 
serious disturbances or aggression requiring theatre reinforcement, he would in 
the first instance concentrate the local United Kingdom battalion at the trouble 
spot, using local civilian aircraft. After independence the Federation may refuse to 
allow British troops to be carried in local civilian aircraft for internal security 
operations with which the Federal government is not in sympathy. Arrangements 
must therefore be made to provide R.A.F. lift for one company as quickly as possi-
ble. These aircraft could leave the United Kingdom within 24 hours of the receipt 
of a request. The timing of their availability for onward movement in the 
Caribbean will depend upon the type of aircraft used. Whilst overflying and staging 
facilities are not essential for the reinforcement plans for the remaining colonies, 
it is clearly desirable from the military point of view to retain the right to have 
such facilities. 
Command and military advice 
18. After independence there will be no local officer of sufficient experience to 
command the new Federation forces. It would be in the United Kingdom interests to 
have British Officers appointed in command of both naval and land forces and in any 
military advisory capacity which may be required. 
Defence agreement 
19. We suggest that the United Kingdom Defence requirements listed above 
should be incorporated into a Defence Agreement with the Federation. They are not 
however so important or so irreplaceable that the United Kingdom should insist 
upon them in the face of strong political opposition. 
Conclusions 
20. We conclude that:-
(a) After Independence it will remain a United Kingdom interest to foster stable 
and friendly governments in the Caribbean. 
(b) The main danger to the area after Federation [sic: independence] will be 
political unrest. 
(c) To maintain internal security the Federation will need a small naval force and 
at least a battalion of infantry. It would be desirable for the United Kingdom to be 
associated with the development of these forces . 
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(d) The United Kingdom will require to maintain two frigates in the area and a 
battalion for use in the remaining colonies. 
(e) If we cannot rely on retaining our existing headquarters and troops on Federal 
territory, which would be preferable, then the Bahamas, where good staging 
facilities exist, would offer the most suitable alternative. 
(f) Plans which rely on the chartering of local civil aircraft for movement of 
reinforcements within the area would have to be revised. 
(g) We should seek staging and overflying facilities within the Federation. 
(h) A Defence Agreement should be concluded to incorporate the United 
Kingdom's defence requirements in the Federation. 
107 CO 1031/2326, no 31 6 Oct 1959 
[Federation]: letter from P Rogers (Port of Spain) to Sir H Poynton 
on the failure of the Trinidad inter-governmental constitutional 
review conference 
[Rogers was one of the UK observers at the. Trinidad conference. Forwarding a copy of his 
letter to Poynton to the CRO, Jamieson commented that the CO was now 'filled with 
gloom about the prospect ahead' because the chances of Jamaican secession had 
increased considerably. Manley would try to counter the tendency but he might not be 
strong enough to control it. Jamieson concluded: 'Perhaps the greatest danger at the 
present is not precipitate secession by Jamaica but a loss of the Federal Government's 
confidence and a kind of Marxist withering away of its influence with Federation making 
less impact on the region resulting in a growing sense of that insularity which is never far 
below the surface in the West Indies' (CO 1031/2326, no 31, Jamieson to Chadwick, 19 
Oct 1959).] 
We are due to have one more meeting of the Conference tomorrow to discuss terms 
of reference for the committees to be set up. But effectively the Conference is ended, 
indeed broken up, as the Trinidad Guardian puts it with its occasional apt quotation, 
"not with a bang but a whimper". Yesterday morning's and afternoon's meetings of 
the Conference were squalid in the extreme and reached rock bottom in my own 
experience of conferences anywhere. This report may well be coloured by gloom as 
reaction, though I hope not unduly so. However, to go back to the beginning. 
The Secretariat will be sending a complete set of the records of the Conference 
which indeed will already be reaching the office in the shape of the daily issues of the 
Trinidad Guardian and the Jamaica Gleaner, which with their usual efficiency 
secured very full and by and large accurate reports of what happened throughout, so 
that the minutes of the morning's conference were available to delegates in the 
afternoon in the local newspaper. This was much more than the usual overhearing of 
gossip in hotel lobbies-it was a technically admirable piece of reporting by at least 
one member of the Conference. Ken Hi!Jl of Jamaica, who sat as one of the Federal 
Opposition members, is generally regarded as the most likely source. 
The Conference opened in a very bad atmosphere. Manley had been manoeuvred 
by Bustamente into being on the defensive about Federation during the Elections, 
partly at any rate through the effect of Grantley Adams' ill-judged remarks about 
1 K G Hill, journalist, associate editor of Daily Gleaner, member of Federal House of Representatives for 
Surrey constituency. 
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retroactive taxation in Jamaica sometime ago.2 The Jamaica paper prepared for the 
Conference was written solely with an eye to Jamaican opinion and had much the 
same effect in the Eastern Caribbean as some of the late Mr Dulles's more 
unfortunate speeches to American audiences had on us. Even in that context it was a 
badly drafted paper for I found in discussion with Jamaican delegates that it even did 
not mean what it appears to say. Moreover, it resulted in Manley coming with very 
little freedom to manoeuvre at all, especially on the issue of representation. 
Eric Williams, on the other hand, who, as you know, produced an impressive paper 
and speech on the economics of nationhood and the need for a strong Federation, 
had overdone it politically. Although his paper is in my own view an admirable 
academic statement, it was politically ill timed and frightened not only the Jamaicans 
but quite a few others and left only the impression that it was part of a bid for power 
by Eric Williams in the Federation, i.e. he was striking an attitude over independence 
in a bid to attract widespread West Indian support. I do not believe this view to be the 
whole truth and I am sure he is sincere in his wish for early independence, but again 
the effect on the Conference was unfortunate. 
Very few of the other islands had done much work (except that Barbados had done 
a lot of solid homework but produced no papers). St. Lucia however circulated an 
early paper to the Conference which I can only describe as astonishing. It advocated 
what was practically a unitary state and the impression it gave was that this was 
advocated so that St Lucia should get doles from the richer islands to bring its 
standard of living up to theirs. This frightened the Jamaicans at least as much as the 
Trinidad paper. 
Even so, all this might well have been overcome if the Conference had not started 
off in an atmosphere of bitter political antagonism, both personal and insular. It had 
been preceded by a meeting of the West Indian Labour Party which had apparently 
gone very smoothly and in which Williams had, I understood, promised to support 
Manley over the issue of representation. In a sense he did, but obviously he had left 
too much unsaid for Manley regarded Williams's attitude at the outset of the 
Conference as a double cross and reacted accordingly. 
The row started, as so frequently at conferences, over the order of items on the 
agenda. The Jamaicans demanded that representation be put first and said that they 
were unwilling to discuss any other items at all unless they got satisfaction over 
representation. I gather that in the Steering Committee the Jamaica representative, 
Glasspole, put this across moreover in a very bullying manner. The other delegations 
quite naturally wanted to know, to use their own words, "representation for what?"; 
in other words they wanted to know that if they met Jamaica on representation, 
Jamaica would meet them in giving adequate powers to the Federal Government and 
in particular agree to a customs union. A not unusual dilemma open to be met in any 
one of half a dozen ways well known to all of us who have the misfortune to attend 
conferences, but it went astray. There was a long debate in plenary session on this 
with Jamaica adamant and the other islands opposing. Finally, in an intervention 
which was absolutely masterly in timing and tactically successful, but strategically 
disastrous, Eric Williams accepted, and got the Conference to accept, that 
representation be discussed first in a speech which reserved his right to talk about 
2 See 81. 
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anything on the very first item. The effect on the Jamaican delegation was not only 
one of profound resentment at Eric Williams's tone, but also emphasized their 
feeling that the other islands were ganging up against them and would do everything 
that Eric Williams told them. 
All this was reported in the pages of The Daily Gleaner in the most poisonous 
manner by Simmonds,3 the Gleaner correspondent, and inevitably the attitude of the 
Jamaicans over representation stiffened under a barrage of letters, telegrams, and 
telephone calls from Jamaica to all its delegates. Jamaica's own paper proposed a 
formula for representation which gave Jamaica about 49 per cent of the seats on the 
basis of each island keeping its present number of seats as a minimum, but accepting 
one seat for each 50,000 of the population as the basis of representation subject to 
that. Manley had told me privately on the first day that he would be prepared to 
compromise on one seat for each 60,000 of the population which would have 
effectively reduced Jamaica's representation to something like 46 per cent. I myself 
felt fairly sure that one could have got a compromise on that basis after some 
discussion, if it had been talked over amicably. After three days hard talking the other 
delegates, most of whom had come quite unprepared for this, had come a very long 
way to meet Jamaica's demand and I believe would have accepted one seat for 60,000. 
By that time however, Manley told me, when I asked him again privately if this could 
not be put forward as a compromise, that it was no longer possible for him to accept 
it because of a terrific build up of pressure in Jamaica. Moreover, by this time the 
Jamaican delegation were scared of compromising over representation because of the 
demands with which they thought they would then be faced over taxation powers for 
the Federal Government. In fact I know that the Jamaican delegation discussed the 
compromise at length amongst themselves, and Manley at any rate would almost 
certainly have been prepared to accept it but he could not get the other members of 
the delegation or rather, in particular, Wills Isaacs and the two Opposition members 
to do so. Because of the build up in Jamaica Manley could not afford to break with 
them. 
It seemed already as if the Conference was about to break down and we were 
talking privately at that stage about the idea of at least saving face and doing some 
useful work by setting up a series of committees (what has in fact proved to be the 
eventual outcome of the Conference) when Eric Williams came forward with an 
ingenious formula that each island should have one basic seat in the House of 
Representatives and that the whole of the rest of the seats should be on the basis of 
one for each 50,000 of the population or any additional fraction thereof over half. 
This seemed to me a most admirable way of meeting Jamaica's principle about a 
strictly proportionate representation, in the sense that it could have been presented 
as such and given Jamaica in practice about 46 per cent of the total seats. 
Unfortunately again, Eric Williams mishandled the discussions. It was only after 
considerable pleading with him that I got him to mention it to Manley at all before 
he put it in plenary conference and he would not agree to talk privately with Manley 
and get him to accept it before it ever came out in the open. Even so, it was a very 
reasonable way of meeting Jamaica, and, had relations between Williams and Manley 
and the atmosphere surrounding the Conference been better, I believe it would have 
3 U D Simmonds, political and industrial relations correspondent of Daily Gleaner. 
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gone through. The other islands could have been got to accept it particularly as it 
gave one or two of them an extra seat as a sweetener. But Manley came back with a 
formula that there should be no extra seat for any fraction of 50,000 over half. The 
effect of this was to take away the extra seat for one or two of the islands and to bring 
back the percentage to 49.5 of the seats for Jamaica. This very understandably 
infuriated all the other delegates (except Antigua and St. Vincent), and it was only 
one or two calming speeches at the end (one from Lightbourne4 of the Jamaica 
delegation in a reply to an attack about "money-lenders" after a very fortunate 
intervention by Cato,5 the Chairman of the Conference) which reduced the 
temperature and enabled the Conference to adjourn on the Friday evening on a note 
which left some ground for optimism as the Governor-General's telegram No. 171 
Personal had stated. 
Williams had arranged to have private talks with Manley and Adams, bringing in a 
little later Cummins of Barbados and one or two others of the Jamaica and Trinidad 
delegations, on Sunday. It was at these that the Conference finally broke down. I do 
not know the details of what happened, but I gather that the Trinidad delegation felt 
that they were not going to get adequate satisfaction from Jamaica on other issues 
like customs union and therefore their own attitude towards representation stiffened 
in turn. With an ineptitude which characterised his performances throughout the 
Conference, Grailtley Adams failed to turn up at this meeting on the score that he 
had had a telephone conversation with Eric Williams the previous evening and had 
agreed everything with him, so that there was nothing left to discuss. It was most 
unfortunate that there was no mediator at this meeting. I cannot believe that, if one 
had been present, it would have been impossible to reach compromises on 
something effective as regards the other very difficult issues in dispute. The personal 
feeling between Manley and Williams must have undoubtedly been a factor. Manley 
told me that he had spoken to Williams the previous evening on the telephone and 
that the latter had then been in a most friendly mood, but by the Sunday morning 
Williams had read some of the Gleaner articles and was in one of his very worst 
moods and quite impossible. I expect there is something in this, though I think 
Manley must probably be held to blame too for being uncompromising. Anyway the 
outcome was undoubtedly disastrous. In the meantime Cato and I had been 
discussing with other delegates a compromise based on the Trinidad principle but 
with one seat for each 55,000 of the population, and no seat for fractions thereof. 
This would have given Jamaica about 48 per cent of the seats. Manley told me that 
Jamaica would accept it and pretty well all the other islands would have accepted it 
except that Dominica would have reserved its position (which need not necessarily 
have mattered very much). Cummins of Barbados was, after a long talk with Cato, 
Grantley Adams, and myself, prepared to put it forward, but Cox6 of his delegation 
was adamant. Nevertheless we reassembled on Monday morning with just a prospect 
4 RC Lightbourne, lived in England; chairman, Juney Iron and Steel, Birmingham; returned to Jamaica, 
1951; managing director, Jamaica Industrial Development Corporation, 1951- 1955; entered politics, 
1958, and elected to Federal House of Representatives as member for St Thomas; resigned 1959 and 
elected to Jamaican House of Representatives in same year; minister of trade and industry in Bustamante 
government after 1962 election in Jamaica. 
5 Dr AS Cato of St Vincent, president of the West Indies Senate, 1958-1962. 
6 M E Cox, minister for trade, industry and labour, Barbados. 
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that the compromise formula might get through. In the meantime, however, 
pressure in the other islands, particularly Barbados, to resist Jamaica's demand had 
been mounting, and as I have said, the Sunday morning meeting had really destroyed 
the prospect of agreement based on a compromise between Jamaica and Trinidad. 
Eric Williams came to the meeting determined to put Jamaica on the spot by 
producing a clarion call for independence and withdrew his own proposal of the 
previous week over representation. 
There then ensued a whole day's discussion in which Eric Williams never quite 
succeeded in getting his point about independence launched~ No one quite knew 
what they were supposed to be talking about and at one point the Conference found 
that it would have to settle a matter by voting when it had not yet settled how it 
should vote if the need arose. The dispute was over whether to set up a series of 
committees or whether to bypass representation and go on to discuss other matters 
as Eric Williams wanted. There was then a sordid scene of uncertainty ending with a 
ruling from the chair that voting should be on the standing Federation Committee 
principle on this occasion (three votes for Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad, and one 
for the rest, leaving the Federal Government out of it) . I am sure it was totally 
inappropriate as a ruling, but anyway it produced the astonishing spectacle of the big 
three abstaining and pretty well all the smaller islands voting for the Federal 
Government's proposal to appoint a series of committees. 
We have now adjourned while the Federal Government drafts terms of reference 
for the committees, and the Conference reassembles tomorrow to discuss them. I 
should not be in the least surprised if there are more fireworks then, more especially 
as Jamaica, in order to avoid getting drawn by Eric Williams into discussion of 
"principles", has withdrawn pretty well all of its delegation, leaving only an adviser, 
to discuss the terms of reference. 
The only other thing I should add about the Conference is to comment on the 
performance of Grantley Adams. It is true that today's Guardian credits him with 
having saved the Conference from break-down and that it was his motion for the 
appointment of the committees which succeeded in doing this. I am bound to add, 
however, that that proposal is not his own idea, but was put to him by others, that he 
put it across very badly as far as any conciliation of the Trinidad delegation is 
concerned, and that every other one of his interventions in the Conference has been 
unfailingly inept and irritating to all the delegates. His own Ministers are 
murmuring very loudly. Cato has worked terribly hard as Chairman trying to 
conciliate everyone and behind the scenes has done admirable work in trying to work 
out compromises, but he has lacked firmness in the chair and has missed several 
occasions of bringing the Conference on to right lines. 
There is now a real danger that the Federation will split up. There is certainly 
strong pressure in Jamaica for it as we all knew before. But what has surprised me is 
the strength of the pressure in certain groups in the Eastern Caribbean to "go it 
alone". It is difficult to know just how the strength of this pressure has grown as it 
has. There is certainly the sentiment of which we have been aware for some time 
among the Indians in Trinidad that they will be better off with Jamaica out and 
British Guiana in. There is also misunderstanding on the part of many about the 
absence of advantage in having Jamaica in and the economic advantage of having 
British Guiana in on the score that the latter, unlike Jamaica, can provide an outlet 
for surplus population. This, to my astonishment, was put to me by someone as 
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intelligent as La Corbiniere [sic]. I find it difficult to believe that this is his real 
motive for putting this point of view. Finally, there is the sentiment among some of 
the small businessmen who, as we know from elsewhere, always form effective 
pressure groups and who may fear competition from Jamaican industries. Finally, 
perhaps the most important of all, is the plain exasperation of those with strong 
nationalist sentiments at what they consider to be the delaying tactics of Jamaica. 
It is difficult to gauge just how great this danger is. I had an hour's talk with 
Manley this morning in which I spoke very frankly about our wish to keep it 
together, the investment we have made on the basis of a Federation of the West 
Indies as a whole, and the influence I was sure any U.K. Government would continue 
to exert to maintain it, and I asked him if he would tell me frankly what his own 
views now were. I believe that those views have not basically been affected by the 
fai lure of the Conference, i.e. that he is still a Federationist and though he thinks in 
terms of a weaker Federation than we believe to be practicable, he is prepared to 
discuss the degree of power to be given the Federation. When I put it to him that it 
would be impossible for fore ign policy to be conducted by a Federal Government 
without control of those aspects of internal affairs which are the raw material of 
foreign policy, he said frankly that he did not know about this side but was very 
willing to discuss it with those who did. I found much the same sentiment among the 
very able group of Jamaica officials with the delegation. On the other hand the 
Conference will undoubtedly have stimulated the anti-Federation forces in Jamaica 
and there is certainly no doubt that Manley will never now either forgive or trust Eric 
Williams. 
Federation, for immediate purposes at any rate, has had a big setback. (Lord Hailes 
feels that the word "shock" would possibly be a better word than "setback"). It is 
important that we should indirectly stimulate all those forces in the West Indies 
which favour Federation, which I believe to be very powerful potentially and get 
them to come out in the open. Indeed, I put this equally frankly to Manley and he 
agreed. To the extent that he is politically able I believe that he will try to do this . He 
said, for example, that the Jamaica Agricultural Society, which is a very influential 
body, had come out strongly in favour of Federation, and he thought would continue 
to do so. This Society is just about to join with that of Trinidad and some others in 
the West Indies to form a West Indian Agricultural Society. I think this is one source 
that can be used and I talked with Harold Robinson7 this morning about it. He feels, 
like nearly all the big agriculturists in the West Indies, that they have much to gain 
from Federation and he is quite prepared to see if those with like minds can be 
induced to say this through the Agricultural Society or otherwise. I also had a long 
talk with Hochoy and Ellis Clarke on this and put it that it is essential firstly to 
prevent Eric Williams and his Ministers saying things which will exacerbate the 
situation and secondly to counter those of the Eastern Caribbean who for one reason 
or another are not unwilling to see Jamaica leave the Federation. They will do their 
best to stimulate to public utterance those who are prepared to say that there are 
great advantages to the Eastern Caribbean in their remaining in the Federation in 
conjunction with Jamaica. 
7 Sir Harold Robinson, company director, managing director, Woodford Lodge Estates, Trinidad, 
1944- 1961; president, Agricultural Society of Trinidad and Tobago and British Caribbean Citrus 
Association; vice-president, West India Committee; member of Legislative Council, Trinidad, 1946- 1961. 
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There are two other issues which I think we ought to consider although, after 
sleeping on them overnight, I would recommend that we take no action. The first is 
the C.D. & W. Allocation to the West Indies. This was made on the assumption that 
Federation would continue at least as it is now, and almost certainly grow in strength 
in the next five-year period. If there should be a break-down of Federation, we should 
have to look at the C.D. & W. Allocation again in theory, but by then it would be too 
late to withdraw any allocations made to the Eastern Caribbean in order to review 
the allocation to Jamaica. However, I think it would be quite wrong for us to raise 
this point now and I think we are bound to continue in the hope that Federation will 
in fact grow. 
The second, and in some ways more difficult point, is that of whether or not we 
should continue with the abolition of the governorships of the Leeward and 
Windward Islands.8 Our agreement to the abolition of the posts at the Leeward and 
Windward Islands Conference was expressly made conditional upon the outcome of 
this Conference not so weakening the Federal Government that it would not assume 
those functions in aid of the Leeward and Windward Governments which were at 
present performed by central staffs of those Governments. Our Ministers were 
insistent on this reservation. The outcome of the conference has not explicitly 
weakened any of the powers or resources of the Federal Government, but it has 
certainly weakened its standing and its ability to function effectively. I doubt however 
if it has done this to an extent which will justify reversing our provisional decision 
about the abolition of the two governorships. It certainly would be extremely 
embarrassing and very harmful to Federation for us to say this openly, as we could 
not avoid doing if we were to try to change the decision. Moreover, I doubt if we 
could in fact now re-establish the effectiveness of the two governorships once their 
death sentence has been even provisionally decreed, particularly in view of the 
attitude of Bradshaw. Here again, therefore, I recommend that the decision of the 
Leeward and Windward Islands Conference should be confirmed. 
10 Oct 1959 
P.S. There was no time to revise the above letter and have it typed before 
Wednesday's Bag, so I am adding this to complete the account of the now adjourned 
Conference. 
It reassembled on Wednesday expecting fireworks by Eric Williams. He made an 
able speech suggesting that the Federal Government's paper went further than the 
Conference had agreed to go (as indeed it did-deliberately in order to provide the 
basis for the completion of the discussions). He then asked:-
(i) that the next Conference should be with H.M.G. (i.e. should not be the present 
one reassembled) and should be held before 31st March, 1960. The point of this 
was to give him the opportunity of re-launching his "independence by the 22nd 
April, 1960, at 11 a.m.". 
(ii) that there should be no committees but that the Federal Government should 
"collate the views of other governments on the items on the agenda". 
I had some sympathy with his first point, except for timing. I think it might well be 
more effective if there could be a U.K. Minister in the chair who could act both as a 
8 See 98, note 1. 
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mediator and as a tougher chairman than Cato. As I have already said, the latter has 
worked tremendously hard and had been admirable as the conciliator behind the 
scenes, but his weakness in the chair has been so marked that at one moment one of 
the delegates appealed Uustifiably) to the chair to bring some point to the 
proceedings. 
However, the obviously political manoeuvre over dates brought a strong attack 
from Antigua. The Conference then went on to a further spell of futile debate and we 
adjourned until Thursday. Two delegations then produced papers (one fair and the 
other admirable) to resolve the difficulty over drafting the conclusions. After further 
confused debate the Conference eventually adjourned. 
The one bright spark in the last few days has been Manley's forthright statement 
on his return to Jamaica that he did not intend to lead them out of the Federation. I 
got the impression that this had a considerable effect on the last day of the 
Conference in making some of the delegates from the smaller islands take a more 
responsible line. 
I am seeing Eric Williams this morning and will report separately on that, but 
there will be no time to record it before the Bag closes.9 
9 The Trinidad conference appointed two inter-governmental committees to examine the contentious 
issues. In turn the committees appointed two working parties of officials-ALPHA, to examine the 
political and constitutional aspects of federation (for the proceedings of which see CO 1031/3334), and 
ORlON- to examine the customs union and financial policy, including CD&W allocations and concessions 
and incentives to industry (see CO 1031/3335- 3336). 
108 CO 103112574, no 121 20 Oct 1959 
[Federation]: minute by P Rogers to Sir H Poynton on the measures 
needed to generate support for federation 
[Upon his return from the Trinidad conference Rogers took the lead in suggesting that 
the CO should mobilise behind-the-scenes support for federation in a discreet campaign. 
His ideas are set down in this minute. They involved enlisting Canadian support, not by 
way of further financial aid to the West Indies-that would not solve the immediate 
problem- but by means of formal and informal contacts during which Canadian 
ministers and officials would point out to West Indian leaders the dangers that would 
result if federation broke down. This idea was discussed with N Robertson, the Canadian 
high commissioner in the UK, at a meeting at the CRO in Nov 1959. Rogers and Poynton 
represented the CO and explained the background. While agreeing generally that 
Canadian support would be desirable, Robertson argued that he could not commit his 
government, felt sure that it would be unwise for Canada to link itself too closely with 
constitutional issues in the West Indies, and questioned whether any arguments which 
might now be put forward to forestall a separate application by Jamaica for 
Commonwealth membership had not been weakened by the recent moves made by the 
UK to associate Cyprus with the Commonwealth. CRO officials were adamant that Cyprus 
was in a unique position because of its relations with both Greece and Turkey; it was not 
the intention to extend to any other small territories the Cyprus precedent (CO 
1031/257 4, no 124, note of meeting, 3 Nov 1959). Hailes was not informed of this meeting 
until after the event. His reactions to this, and to the proposals outlined in Rogers's 
minute to engage the expatriate business community, were entirely negative. He stuck to 
his view, reported by Rogers in his account of the Trinidad conference (see 107), that the 
outcome was a 'shock' and not a 'setback'. To the governor-general, Rogers 's proposals 
sounded like panic measures which were unnecessary; West Indian politicians had seen 
the 'abyss' opening up before them and they were now pulling back and determined to 
put federation on the right road. Hailes believed that discreet lobbying was a 
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contradiction in terms and he argued that West Indian politicians were far too advanced 
to be influenced by outside advice. Indeed they would resent pressure being brought to 
bear by persons who would be identified as belonging to 'the same class as the 19th 
century power group or West Indian lobby in London'. He therefore advised that Rogers's 
policy should be reversed; the future of the federation would be decided by the West 
Indians themselves (CO 1031/2574, no 139, Hailes to Rogers, 25 Nov 1959). Hailes's 
comments were received awkwardly in the CO. Poynton defended Rogers. Amery, while 
admitting that it had been wrong not to keep Hailes informed, was anxious not to make 'a 
mountain out of a molehill'. Macleod, new to the department and unable to read the West 
lndies Federation 'tea-leaves', fell back on the suggestion that if somebody wrote a long 
letter of complaint 'it is a good thing to send a long reply in return' (ibid, minutes by 
Poynton, 23 Dec 1959, Amery, 30 Dec 1959, and Macleod, 31 Dec 1959). Rogers therefore 
wrote again to Hailes, making it plain that the CO did not claim to know more about the 
local situation than the governor-general. However, reports arriving in London suggested 
that opinion in Jamaica was hardening against federation and Rogers repeated his 
concerns about the weakness of the federal government and the federal civil service (ibid, 
no 144, Rogers to Hailes, 7 Jan 1960). Hailes was not persuaded. The important question 
was not the situation at the end of 1959 but what would happen in coming months. On 
this he declared there was 'some ground for sober optimism' (ibid, no 3, Hailes to Rogers, 
5 March 1960).] 
Since my return from the disastrous Federation Review Conference in Trinidad I 
have been giving some further thought to the issue which I touched upon in my 
report1 to you at the time, i.e., how to repair the damage which has been done and in 
particular how to encourage the supporters of federation and stimulate them to 
greater activity. 
2. The core of the matter is the inefficiency of the Federal Government and here, 
I am afraid, we can do little. It stems essentially from the appalling inadequacy of Sir 
Grantley Adams. We can ourselves do nothing to displace him and although his 
colleagues are only too anxious to do so, they may well be stultified by the absence of 
a generally acceptable alternative Prime Minister. Mr. McPetrie2 and I discussed with 
the Governor-General and his Attorney-General before we left the question of what 
discretion he had under the constitution if it came to a question of a dissolution. The 
Governor-General is bound to act in accordance with U.K. conventions and it is not 
open to him therefore to take arbitrary action to force a dissolution. We agreed 
however that at any time after the next month or two, when we hoped the position in 
Jamaica would have shaken down somewhat, a dissolution would be in the public 
interest if it could be brought about constitutionally e.g. by the Governor-General 
persuading the P.M. to advise one. 
3. Another difficulty is the relative weakness of the administrative machine of 
the Federal Government. Essentially this stems from the lack of leadership on the 
part of the Prime Minister but there are certain weaknesses among Civil Servants 
also. Mr. Mordecai has been a very able political adviser to the Governor-General and 
is a very likeable officer. He is not however a clear-headed or incisive administrator. I 
discussed his position with the Governor-General and we agreed that if, as seems 
quite likely, Federal Ministers decide that Mr. Garnet Cordon should be replaced as 
Commissioner in the U.K., Mr. Mordecai would be a very good successor to him on 
merits. Such a move would moreover afford an opportunity of bringing in someone 
who on the Civil Service side would be abler if such an officer could be induced to 
make the move when the future of the Federal Secretary's post is very much in 
1 See 107. 2 J C McPetrie, assistant legal adviser, CO. 
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doubt. One officer who would, I think, do it very well and whose move would be a 
great contribution to federation generally is Mr. Arthur Brown3 of Jamaica. 
4. A much more marked weakness in the Federal Government is the inadequacy 
of Mr. Blache Fraser as Financial Secretary. I fear we must admit that, basing 
ourselves admittedly on the reports from Trinidad of his work, we made a bad 
appointment there. He again would be a very honourable and suitable representative 
of The West Indies overseas in a post which did not demand great initiative. Lord 
Hailes and I agreed that he would not be up to what is needed in either Canada or the 
U.K. In a lesser post overseas should one be created he would however be very good 
and so would his wife. He would not, however, in my view, be a suitable 
Administrator of one of the Leeward and Windward Islands, which is what Lord 
Hailes originally had in mind. If he is moved there is the ideal replacement available 
for him in the shape of Mr. Frank Williams, at present Permanent Secretary to the 
Prime Minister. 
5. The other ranks of the Federal Service need strengthening in quality though 
not yet in numbers, but one of the great difficulties will be to keep even the good 
men there, let alone bring in others, in view of the discouragement produced by the 
Federal Conference. I had long talks both with Mr. Mordecai and Mr. Maynier4 about 
"pep" talks to keep up morale, particularly through the Civil Service Association, of 
which Mr. Maynier is Chairman, but we cannot hope to do much here until there is a 
change of the political scene. 
6. The next issue is how we can encourage the supporters of federation to greater 
activity, both vocal and otherwise. I suggest that we should first consider whether 
there is anything which outside governments can do. This means essentially the 
U.K., Canada and the U.S.A. 
7. I do not think there are any steps which the U.K. Government can take at 
present other than those proposed in this minute, i.e. I do not think that any talk 
about financial assistance, greater assistance in respect of markets and so forth can 
or should be made. Some time early next year it is possible that a ministerial tour of 
The West Indies might be useful but I suggest that on this we should wait and see 
how the situation develops, and then consult the Governor-General about the 
possibility. For the rest I think that for the time being we must confine ourselves to 
supporting the Federal Government wherever this is politically possible and to 
stimulating indirectly support for federation. 
8. As regards Canada, Lord Perth suggested in discussion, and if I may say so, I 
very much agree, that it would be useful for a Minister to have talks with the 
Canadian High Commissioner here (presumably after consulting the Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations) about the attitude of the Canadian Government. 
They are already very well disposed towards federation and I think there will be no 
difficulty in getting the Canadian Government to agree that they should continue 
their present line in assisting the Federal Government wherever possible, both 
directly and indirectly, e.g. by emphasising its status whenever possible in their own 
dealings. I suggest that a report of such discussions with the Canadian High 
Commissioner should go to the U.K. High Commissioner in Ottawa for him to take 
3 G A Brown, director, Planning Unit, Jamaica Secretariat. 
4 EA Maynier, permanent secretary, Federal Ministry of Trade and Industries. 
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similar action there. I should also add that Sir Saville Garner5 is contemplating a 
tour of The West Indies in about February of next year and I suggestthat we should 
ask him specifically to look out for ammunition then for further approaches on these 
lines to the Canadian Government. 
9. Since I began this minute I have also seen Sir Stephen Luke and had a long 
talk with him about the position generally. He agreed generally with the ideas 
mentioned in this minute but himself independently proposed an apporach [sic] to 
the Canadian Government and added some further thought on it which I think is 
most useful. He suggested that we try and induce the Canadian Government to press 
the advantages of federation through their own official and semi-official contacts 
with The West Indies, e.g. through visiting Ministers and otherwise. He said that he 
thought the Canadian Government might be very ready to do this and also that in 
some respects at any rate their advice would be more acceptable to West Indians than 
advice direct from us. I suggest that we discuss initially with the Canadian High 
Commissioner here accordingly, subject to the consent of the C.R.O. 
10. I do not think we can expect more of the U.S.A. than benevolent neutrality at 
this juncture but I think we should emphasise to them the importance of doing 
nothing which will disturb or weaken the position of federation. I have already had a 
preliminary attempt at this in a talk with Mr. Moline the U.S. Consul-General in 
Trinidad and with Mr. Galbraith of the U.S. Embassy here. I suggest that, subject to 
consultation with the Foreign Office, we should now send copies of my letter to you 
reporting the outcome of the Conference and of this minute to Mr. Douglas Williams 
at Washington asking him to take all possible opportunities for talking in this strain 
to the U.S. Government. If at any time they themselves can offer suggestions for 
strengthening the position of the Federal Government, I think we should be very 
much on the look-out for ways of following them up. 
11. As regards stimulating unofficial support for Federation in the U.K. our 
potential field of activity is inevitably restricted. Lord Perth suggested that a suitable 
leader from time to time in the "Times" would be helpful. It so happens that Mr. 
Oliver Woods has just left on a tour of The West Indies and this should provide an 
admirable opportunity for such press articles. I was able to have a short talk with him 
just before he left and found him most sympathetic. In so far as he feels he properly 
can, I am sure we can rely on him to publish articles favourable to federation and 
make it clear that the U.K. is very much in support of it. 
12. There will also be tours of The West Indies this Autumn by Mr. Roy Lewis of 
the Economist and Mr. Clark of the Observer. Mr. Clark is now in the U.S.A. and we 
cannot get hold of him but I propose to see Mr. Lewis, who I know fairly well, and 
talk to him in the sense in which I talked to Mr. Woods. 
13. The British Caribbean Association can, I think, be relied upon to be generally 
helpful but I doubt if it would be wise to stimulate it to particular activity in this 
connexion. The only other organised body of importance in this connexion is, I 
think, The West India Committee and I believe that it would be best that they should 
be asked to be active primarily through the organisations in The West Indies with 
which their individual members are concerned, rather than as a body. I am lunching 
with Sir J. Campbell in a week's time and I shall shortly see Mr. Barton the Secretary 
5 UK high commissioner to Canada, 1956- 1961. 
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of the Committee. I propose to ask if both of them will agree to stimulate such 
action. 
14. The remaining field, (and the most important one, of course) is The West 
Indies itself. Here I think we must concentrate primarily upon stimulating 
organisations which have a real interest in federation to vocal support of it instead of 
leaving the field open to pressure groups opposed to it. I think it is particularly true 
to say that the biggest West Indian economic interests all support federation as being 
in their view of economic advantage to them. This group comprises the West Indian 
producer associations and some of the bigger insular associations. The Agricultural 
Society in January has already been stimulated to such activity and can I believe be 
stimulated again. I suggest that we should work primarily through such persons as 
Sir Robert Kirkwood, Sir Harold Robinson, Sir Jock Campbell, Mr. Hugill6 and 
perhaps one or two more such as Mr. Sharpe.7 I have already spoken with Sir Harold 
Robinson in Trinidad as recorded in my report to you of the time. By great good 
fortune Sir Robert Kirkwood is over here at the moment and invited me to lunch 
with him on Friday 16th October. I took the opportunity to enlist his sympathy in 
this project and found, as was to be expected, a very ready response. Naturally and 
properly he wishes to clear his path with Mr. Manley first and indeed the campaign 
might be more of an embarrassment than otherwise if he did not, but from my talks 
with Mr. Manley in Jamaica I believe he would be sympathetic. Subject to that Sir 
Robert is prepared to try and initiate resolutions in favour of federation both through 
the agricultural associations in Jamaica and in The West Indies as a whole and 
probably also to campaign more widely in Jamaica. He discussed various points that 
might be made in such a campaign, and I have asked him to lunch with me in about 
a fortnight to discuss them further. 
15. The only remaining field which I think we might possibly influence is the 
Press, i.e. particularly the Daily Gleaner in Jamaica, and the Guardian in Trinidad. It 
is possible that Lord Hailes might be able to influence Mr. Hitchins of the Guardian 
but that would have to be done most discreetly in view of the latter's attitude towards 
the P.N.M. As regards the Daily Gleaner, Mr. Simmonds is the political reporter who 
did all the damage at the Federal Conference but he is a nasty little twerp who is 
subject to the views of his masters. Mr. Sealy is the Editor and is, I believe, favourab le 
to Federation, but at present he has little say in the editorial policy of the paper. Mr. 
Fletcher, the Managing Director of the Gleaner is, Sir Robert tells me, also 
favourably disposed to federation but has not been allowed a free hand in any such 
policy. The real villain is Mr. Ashenheim,8 the Chairman of the Board and one of the 
leaders of the Kingston Group of merchants who look at their narrow interests and 
think that these are best served by Jamaica isolation. I discussed with Sir Robert 
whether or not Mr. Ashenheim might be influenced to change his views. Mr. 
Ashenheim is closely connected with the Jamaican rum and cigar interests and I 
suggested to Sir Robert that the argument could be put to him that while Jamaica 
rum interests might be scared of competition from other West Indian rums it was far 
6 J A C Hugill, director, Caroni Sugar Estates Ltd, Trinidad. 
7 AS Sharpe, managing director, Sharpe Construction Co Ltd, Jamaica. 
8 (Sir) Neville Ashenheim (Kt 1963); chairman, The 'Gleaner' Company, 1946-1947; chairman, Jamaica 
Industrial Development Corporation, 1952-1957; Jamaican ambassador to US, 1962-1967; leader of 
government business in Senate and minister without portfolio, Jamaica, 1967-1972. 
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more important to them in the long run to retain and increase their market in the 
U.K., and perhaps even to extend it in the U.S.A., if the U.S. duty on rum could be 
lowered (Sir Robert told me that some recent soundings there offered just the 
possibility that this might be done). It might be made clear to Mr. Ashenheim that 
any efforts which the U.K. Government made to help either in the U.K. or vis-a-vis 
the U.S.A., would be much greater for West Indian products as a whole than for 
Jamaica products alone, particularly if the Jamaica interests concerned were to try 
and break up the federation. In short I suggested to Sir Robert that we might, as it 
were, show Mr. Ashenheim which side his rum and cigars were buttered on. Mr. 
Ashenheim visits the U.K. from time to time and I would suggest that when we see 
him we might talk to him in similar fashion. I have also considered whether we 
should attempt anything with Sir A. Bustamante through the Governor or otherwise, 
but this seems to me too dangerous a game to be worth the risk of the very doubtful 
prospect of success. If Sir Alexander were to visit the U.K. it is just possible that we 
might get Members of Parliament of both parties to urge on him a change in his 
political line, and to work on his vanity to that purpose. 
16. For the rest I have no suggestions to offer at present. I believe that Ministers 
wish to discuss this. Subject to your views and to theirs I suggest that action proceed 
in the light of this minute and that we consult Lord Hailes and Sir K. Blackburne 
about the possibility of any further action, and in particular, the advisability of action 
in respect of the proposals in paragraph 15 of this minute. We should, of course, 
make it clear in writing to them that any approaches we make will be done with the 
utmost discretion. 
17. To sum up, the specific action now proposed is:-
(a) Ministerial discussion with the Canadian High Commissioner, subject to the 
approval of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations which should be 
sought in the first place. It is suggested that the discussion should be on the lines 
of paragraphs 8 and 9 of this minute; 
(b) a letter to Mr. Douglas Williams at the Washington Embassy, subject to prior 
consultation with the Foreign Office, on the lines of paragraph 10; 
(c) an approach to Mr. Lewis of the "Economist" as in paragraph 12; 
(d) discussions with various persons prominent in West Indian life as in 
paragraphs 13 and 14; 
(e) letters to Lord Hailes and Sir K. Blackburne informing them generally of the 
action which we are taking as above, consulting them about the possibility of 
action as in paragraph 15, and asking if they have any further ideas about action 
which they or we can usefully take. 
109 CO 103112326, no 34, enclosure 29 Oct 1959 
'Question of Jamaica's candidature for membership of the Common-
wealth': CRO memorandum 
[The CO had asked the CRO to provide material on the significance of Commonwealth 
membership, explaining: 'The school which believes that Jamaica can go it alone is 
certainly pretty vocal at present, and there is a very real danger of the pro-Federation case 
going by default owing to the belief that Jamaica could seriously expect "to make a go of 
it" as a Dominion on her own'. Blackburne, the governor, had been asked to encourage 
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those in favour of federation to speak out but his ability to bring direct influence to bear 
was limited because under a new constitution, which came into force in July 1959, 
Jamaica was now internally self-governing (CO 1031/2326, no 33, Marnham to Chadwick, 
19 Oct 1959).] 
The grant of independence to a United Kingdom dependency is a matter for decision 
by the United Kingdom Government alone in view of its administrative responsibility 
for the territory concerned. But, if, when a date for independence has been fixed, 
Ministers of the future independent state should express a wish for it to remain 
within the Commonwealth and for it to be recognised as a Member country, the 
United Kingdom Government can do no more than agree to sponsor the territory for 
Membership. The decision whether or not to accept the newly independent State as a 
Member rests not with the United Kingdom alone, but with all existing Members, 
and convention demands that their decision should be unanimous. 
2. The hallmark of Membership is the right of the Member country to be 
represented at meetings of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. But Membership 
also carries with it the benefits, as well as the obligations, of consultation with all 
other Member countries on the whole range of international affairs insofar as they 
affect the Members either jointly or severally. Equally a Member country must be 
ready to inform, if not to consult, other Members at any time where policies which it 
intends to follow are likely to affect or to conflict with the policies of those other 
Members. It is equally an accepted convention that no Member country will in any 
way interfere or involve itself in the domestic policies of another Member. 
3. Thus Membership, which is in the collective gift of all the existing Members, is 
not a lightly given prize. Not only will the countries concerned wish to satisfy 
themselves that the new candidate for Membership will be ready and able to adhere 
to the above unwritten rules. They will also need to be convinced that the prospective 
Member is both politically and economically viable and that by its size and weight of 
population it will be capable of playing its role in international affairs and of assuring 
its internal and external defence. 
4. No attempt has yet been made to define these criteria for Membership. Indeed, 
since the strength of the Commonwealth lies in its flexibility, it would be 
unrewarding to set forth any precise definition. Nor, of course, could the United 
Kingdom Government alone purport to express the general Commonwealth view in 
this matter. 
5. The fact remains, however, that New Zealand with a population of 2~ million 
is the smallest Member country in terms of population and that the one instance of a 
territory of lesser size achieving "Dominion Status"-Newfoundland-ended in 
failure. Again Singapore, a wealthy territory with advanced administrative and social 
standards, but with a population of less than 1~ million, has neither claimed nor 
been considered for Membership of the Commonwealth-and this despite the fact 
that her new Constitution makes the State of Singapore virtually self-governing. 
6. While, in modern times, independence can only survive through 
interdependence, and newly independent countries need not hesitate to accept help 
for capital development projects from international agencies or from nations 
wealthier than themselves, the fact remains that all existing Member countries are in 
a position to finance unaided their annual budgetary programmes. Indeed, they 
could hardly have attained the stage of independence if this were not the case. And 
the United Kingdom Government itself would not feel able to relinquish control 
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until it was satisfied that the emerging territory would be able to stand on its own 
feet without grants-in-aid of administration and contributions from C.D. Funds and 
other Colonial types of aid. It is certain that other Member Governments would 
equally wish to satisfy themselves that the country which they were being asked to 
accept as a fellow member was in a position to satisfy those minimum requirements. 
7. The criterion of "international personality" is more difficult to define. The 
United Nations, which may be taken as the yardstick in this context, has admitted to 
membership countries as small as Iceland (population 160,000) or as unstable 
financially and politically as certain of the Central American Republics. But these 
analogies would not necessarily satisfy the Commonwealth. While the 
Commonwealth is bound together by no formal treaties, alliances or obligations and 
eschews all thought of a common foreign policy, each Member is expected to be 
ready and able to play a constructive role in international affairs and to be able to add 
its contribution of experience and advice to the inter-Commonwealth discussions 
and consultations which are continually taking place. Thus, a prospective Member 
country must not only be ready to assume this international role but must be seen to 
be in a position to assume it. In other words the Government concerned must, as 
from the date of its independence, have at least the nucleus of a trained and 
competent External Affairs Department and Foreign Service, and must at once be in 
a position to set up missions in a minimum of important foreign capitals and at 
United Nations Headquarters. 
8. Viewed against the above arguments, any claim from Jamaica for membership 
of the Commonwealth in her own right must be marginal. With her population of 1.6 
million and a national income of about £165 million (cf Ghana £270 million and 
Malaya £780 million) she would scarcely measure up to the standards of existing 
Member countries. 
9. But there are above all, important political and constitutional factors which 
would weigh in the minds of other Commonwealth Governments if Jamaica's 
candidature were ever to be referred to them. Hitherto United Kingdom policy has 
been to lead the West Indies islands (and it is hoped eventually British Honduras and 
British Guiana) towards independence as a Federation. That policy has been stated 
on many occasions. Other Commonwealth Governments are well aware of it, and it 
may be taken that it has their support; they might well be critical of action by the 
Jamaican Government to break up the Federation and be unwilling to appear to 
condone-and perpetuate-it by accepting Jamaica as a Member. (Canada is, of 
course, very closely interested in and well informed about the West Indies and would 
almost certainly be distressed at the breaking up of the Federation.) Further, should 
Jamaica secede from the Federation and seek Membership of the Commonwealth in 
her own right, other Commonwealth Governments might quite properly ask whether 
they would then be faced not only with Jamaican candidature, but successively with 
those of even less viable independent units of the previous whole and by demands 
from British Honduras and British Guiana for similar treatment. This in itself would 
make Jamaica's candidature a very doubtful starter. 
10. Finally, it must be borne in mind that through her unilateral action in 
boycotting South African goods, Jamaica is now in the black books of the Union 
Government. If asked tomorrow to admit the Federation as a whole to Membership, 
her attitude could not safely be forecast. If pressed to admit Jamaica alone, it is 
almost certain that she would refuse. And, by this present Commonwealth 
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convention, our [?one] refusal would be enough to bring Jamaica's ambitions to 
naught. 
110 CO 103112326 3 Dec 1959 
[Jamaica]: minute by P J Kitcattl disputing the views of the CRO on 
Jamaica's eligibility for Commonwealth membership 
I am afraid that I don't think this paper2 is suitable for its purpose. To my mind it 
fails to get to the heart of the matter, but rather to consist of a few random shots 
round an ill-defined target. Despite its rather pretentious atmosphere (as if it had 
originated in a cloud on Mount Sinai or Delphi), it seems to me badly drafted and 
badly argued. Frankly, I feel that it reveals a depressing absence of clarity of thought 
on a subject which I would have thought of fundamental importance to the C.R.O. 
2. Perhaps I might make some detailed comments:-
(i) I agree that paragraph 1 should be amended as proposed; I have no comments 
on paragraph 2. 
(ii) Paragraphs 3 and 4 appear to harbour the idea that H.M.G. might grant full 
independence to a territory which was not politically and economically viable, and 
at least as capable of looking after internal security and defence as, say, the 
Federation of Malaya. Surely the only useful assumption to make in this context is 
that H.M.G. will not grant independence until they are satisfied that the basic 
criteria for independence are satisfied? 
(iii) Paragraph 5 read with paragraph 8 appears to suggest that Jamaica is too 
small in terms of population and national income to qualify for membership of the 
Commonwealth in her own right. But the comparisons on which this conclusion 
is apparently based do not necessarily support it. New Zealand with a population of 
2J.f million is described as the smallest member country. But this was not the 
population of New Zealand when she became a member. For example the 
population of New Zealand in 1911 was just over 1 m., in 1921 it was 1.2 m and in 
1935 it was 1.5 m-smaller than Jamaica now. In 1935 the population of 
Newfoundland was 277,283. That may have been too small for Dominion status, 
but they were in fact given it; and in any case the figure is hardly comparable with 
Jamaica's 1.6 m. As for the national income figures quoted, that for Jamaica works 
out at about £100 per head; that for Ghana at about £60 per head, and that for 
Malaya at about £140 per head. Again, I don't think any very significant argument 
can be based on this. Finally, I cannot see the relevance of the example of 
Singapore, for whose defence and external affairs H.M.G. are still responsible. 
(iv) Paragraphs 6 and 7. As I have said above, I do not think that H.M.G. would 
grant independence to Jamaica unless these criteria were satisfied. 
(v) Paragraph 9. I am very doubtful of the validity of the argument that Jamaica 
might be denied membership of the Commonwealth to punish her for seceding 
from the Federation. 
(vi) Paragraph 10. I don't see much force in this argument, the more so as India 
was admitted while just such a ban was in operation-as it still is. Possibly 
1 Principal, CO, West Indian Dept 'A'. 2 See 109. 
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S. Africa might maintain a refusal to accept Jamaica for this reason while the rest 
of the members wanted her in. But it would be foolish for the U.K. to take up a 
false position. Personally, if forced to choose, I would rather belong to a 
Commonwealth that included Jamaica than South Africa. 
3. I can very well understand the feeling that Jamaica is too small for full 
Commonwealth membership, and that if Jamaica comes in others, even smaller, will 
have to come in too. The question of where the line should be drawn is a very 
important general one which H.M.G. must obviously face pretty soon. Equally I 
understand and share the feeling that it would be infinitely preferable for Jamaica to 
achieve Dominion status within the Federation rather than that we should be faced 
with granting Jamaica independence, and sponsoring her for Commonwealth 
membership, outside the Federation. But I do not believe that Jamaican individual 
membership must be ruled out categorically. 
4. Given reasonable luck, within, say, the next four years, Jamaica will operate 
the "full internal self-government" constitution with a fair degree of competence. At 
the end of that time Jamaican Ministers will have been responsible for internal 
security for some years, and local public service commissions will have had 
responsibility for the public services. There is no prospect of a painful transition from 
an expatriate to a local civil service, since the transition has already been made. The 
economic picture is reasonably healthy, and should continue so if proportionately 
more is earned by the bauxite and tourist industries as compared with agriculture. I 
would expect Jamaica to be able to build up a competent, if small, Foreign Service, 
for which the nucleus already exists among those who have served in the 
Commissioner's offices in London and Canada, and also to be able to raise a one or 
two battalion defence force-for which, again, there is a nucleus. In about four year's 
[sic] time, therefore, Jamaica might well have quite a good case for independence, 
and it would not be unreasonable for them to raise the subject with H.M.G. in about 
two year's [sic] time, so that H.M.G. could say in what circumstances they would be 
prepared to consider such a step. 
5. The question of independent membership may therefore become a live one if 
the Federation is not making visible progress towards Dominion status within the 
next two years, or if Jamaica leaves the Federation, or if it is seriously claimed, as Sir 
A. Bustamante has done-that Jamaica can achieve Dominion status just as easily 
outside the Federation as within it. This last seems to me a particularly difficult 
argument to counter. For example, I doubt whether one could say that the additional 
financial burdens of independence would be greater for Jamaica outside the 
Federation than inside it. I have a hunch that there would not be much in it either 
way. The best argument, I think, is that The West Indies can exercise greater 
influence in world affairs collectively than singly. 
6. I suggest that we should deal with this situation as follows. Firstly, we should 
neither raise the question nor give any hint that we have been considering even the 
possibility. But if asked whether Jamaica could achieve Dominion status on her own, 
we should say that this was a hypothetical question with far-reaching implications 
which would be of concern to all the members of the Commonwealth; and that it 
would throw into the melting-pot the whole political future of the West Indian 
territories. I would contrast these difficulties and this obscurity about the future with 
the much clearer (relatively) path to independence and Dominion status within the 
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Federation. And I would say quite positively that, assuming for the sake of argument 
that an independent Jamaica could be admitted to full Commonwealth membership, 
it should certainly not be assumed that Jamaica would progress towards that goal 
more quickly outside the Federation than inside it. Indeed, I would indicate pretty 
plainly that the reverse could be expected to be the case. 
7. I would rather take this line than say that Jamaica on her own could never 
achieve full Commonwealth membership. (Never say "never"). First, I don't think the 
arguments so far advanced in support of this conclusion are valid. Second, I think 
that if this really must be our considered view we should not state it unless all the 
other members of the Commonwealth share it, because of the very awkward 
situation that would arise if we refused to sponsor Jamaica, but some other member 
were prepared to do so. Third, although this might tend to keep Jamaica inside the 
Federation I don't think it is better argument than that independence and 
Commonwealth membership would come more quickly inside the Federation than 
outside. And it could have the very dangerous consequence that Jamaican Ministers 
might decide that if they couldn't have independence inside the Commonwealth they 
would jolly well have it outside, and the sooner the better. In other words we might 
find ourselves having to concede independence prematurely, earlier than we would 
have to if we could hold out the prospect of eventual Commonwealth membership. 
The consequences of granting premature independence in such an atmosphere could 
be serious, not only for Jamaica, but elsewhere in the Caribbean. Indeed they could 
be serious for the Commonwealth if it began to be thought that small white 
countries were welcome, but not small coloured ones. 
8. Finally, we ought not to forget that we have quite a strong card in our hand. 
The advantages to Jamaica of remaining within the Commonwealth are greater than 
they are for some other potential members. Apart from the importance of the U.K. 
market for Jamaican exports, there is the important fact that Jamaican immigrants 
can now enter the U.K. freely, and could not do so if Jamaica were outside the 
Commonwealth. 
9. Personally, I would be inclined to scrap the C.R.O. paper; to draft a letter to Sir 
K. Blackburne on the lines suggested in this minute, including such parts of the 
C.R.O. paper as are of general validity; and send it to the C.R.O. for concurrence, 
explaining our doubts about their own paper. 
I apologise for the length of this minute, and for the time it has taken to produce it. 
Ill CO 103112311, no 63 11 Dec 1959 
[Dominion status]: letter from Lord Hailes to Mr Macleod on Sir G 
Adams's resolution 
At the Council of State last Tuesday, 8th December, Adams came out with the 
suggestion of making an immediate declaration of intent with regard to Dominion 
status. I used all the obvious arguments against this, pointing out that the substance 
of such an intent was already contained in paragraph 67 of the Report of the 
Intergovernmental Conference. The feeling of the Council was against Adams and I 
thought the matter was settled. However he no doubt lobbied and returned to the 
attack yesterday with a form of words, which he got the Council to accept in spite of 
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very strong opposition from the Jamaican Members and myself. Da Costa1 also made 
a strong plea not to anticipate the deliberations of the Intergovernmental 
Committees. 
2. Adams however made the following announcement yesterday evening in the 
House of Representatives amidst general applause: 
"Consistent with the motion that I have just moved in this Honourable House 
I should like Honourable Members to know that the Federal Government 
proposes to approach Her Majesty's Government as early as possible in 1960 
with a view to considering the fixing of a date for the inauguration of 
Dominion status in The West Indies." 
3. As you know, Adams has always been an apostle of "make haste slowly" in this 
matter and contemptuous of Williams' target of Dominion status next April. The 
reasons for this volte face are not clear but it seems likely that it is due to one of the 
following considerations or a mixture of all:-
(a) It has seemed to be an easy and popular way-though obviously short term-
to restore his own position. He is I think really shaken by criticisms, and has 
arranged to pay visits to the Windward Islands next week-for the first time since 
he has been Prime Minister. 
(b) It may be that he wishes to out-flank Williams. 
(c) He may have been made to feel during his recent travels in Australia, etc., that 
West Indians are taking far too long to advance in comparison with other countries. 
4. None the less, this is irresponsible. I used every argument I could privately 
and in the Council. He was at his most mulish! 
5. While it would not be helpful to me for the Secretary of State to return a reply 
which, in view of my strong opposition to him, might appear to have been inspired by 
myself, I think the time may have come to make a firm blunt statement of fact on the 
matter of Dominion status. I did this myself in opening the Intergovernmental 
Conference; but this has clearly not been enough, and in any case is not the same as 
a statement from yourself. Will you kindly think this over and let me have your view 
in due course?2 
1 H L Da Costa of Jamaica, attorney-general, West Indies Federation. 
2 Hailes sent another letter on 18 Dec explaining that Adams had changed the wording of the resolution. As 
amended, the resolution was now in two parts, the first of which requested 'the introduction of a complete 
Cabinet system of Government at the earliest possible date in 1960'. The second part transposed the clause 
'at the earliest possible date in 1960' in the original resolution so that it now read 'to approach Her Majesty's 
Government with a request to consider the fixing of a date for the inauguration of Dominion status in The 
West Indies as early as possible in 1960'. This, according to Hailes, made the resolution 'worse', and it 
remained to be seen how the other units- especially Jamaica- would react. Adams was 'quite irresponsi-
ble' in his disregard of Jamaican and other reactions. The governor-general concluded: 'One does feel more 
than ever what a pity it is that Manley is not at the centre of things at this juncture in the Federation's his-
tory. He seems to be the only leader whose attitude to Dominion status is not charged either with emotion 
or political manoeuvre' (CO 1031/2311, no 65, Hailes to Macleod, 18 Dec 1959). The government of Jamaica 
lodged a protest against the resolution in Jan 1960, describing it as 'premature' and declining to be associ-
ated with it until such time as the committees appointed by the inter-governmental conference (see 107, 
note 8) had reported. With regard to the proceedings of the committees, the Jamaican government also 
warned that Jamaica would have 'to consider whether it is worthwhile to continue to take any further part 
in these activities which the Federal Government, having initiated and planned, is now flouting and ignor-
ing' (CO 1031/3258, no 1, inward tel no 10, Blackburne to CO, 7 Jan 1960). 
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112 CO 103114233, no 1 23 Dec 1959 
[Defence]: letter from Sir K Blackburne to P Rogers on the special 
defence risks to Jamaica 
[The enclosure to this letter, entitled 'Defence problems of Jamaica', is not reproduced 
here. Assuming that the US, as the dominant power in the Caribbean, could be expected 
to take responsibility for the defence of the region as a whole from external attack in the 
event of global war, Blackburne's analysis concentrated on local defence problems. 
Troops were needed for internal security purposes, although there was as yet no reason to 
anticipate disorders in Jamaica which would require military assistance. More pressing 
was the potential external threat; Jamaica and to some extent the whole Federation were 
in a vulnerable position. 'A glance at the map shows that the Federation (and particularly 
Jamaica) is "between the jaws" of far larger independent Republics, all of which are to 
some degree in a state of political unrest' . Venezuela lay to the south; Cuba, Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic to the north. Cuba and Haiti were, respectively, 90 and 125 miles 
away from Jamaica, 'trifling distances in terms of jet flight'. The danger, peculiar to 
Jamaica and its former dependencies (the Cayman and Turks and Caicos Islands), was 
that they might 'become embroiled in internal revolutions in the three Republics to the 
north, and may become similarly embroiled in the event of hostilities breaking out 
between these three Republics' . Even before the accession to power of Fidel Castro in 
Cuba, several hundred of his supporters had sought refuge in Jamaica and attempts had 
been made to steal weapons. The Turks and Caicos Islands were especially vulnerable; 
there were many deserted and isolated islands in the Turks and Caicos group which could 
be used as arms dumps or as observation points. The Dominican Republic had made 
attempts early in 1959 to purchase the deserted island of West Caicos-140 miles off 
Cuba. Blackburne then examined the defence forces currently available and 
recommended (1) the re-establishment of the Jamaica Regiment, possibly on a territorial 
basis; (2) the retention of a British Battalion in Jamaica at least until the 2nd Battalion, 
the West India Regiment, had been formed and was operational; (3) the negotiation of a 
defence treaty between the UK and the dominion of the West Indies. In the sense that 
there was a long-term threat arising from a clash of political ideologies in the region, 
Blackburne concluded:' ... the only action needed now is for Jamaica and the West Indies 
to continue with their programmes of development and of education so as to strengthen 
the belief of the peoples of the West In dies in the democratic way of life. The existence of 
the problem may indeed result in material assistance being given from the United States 
to the West Indies, both for economic development and for such institutions as the 
University College of the West Indies, since the present instability of the Caribbean 
Republics presents a direct threat not only to the West Indies but also to the United 
States'.] 
When Manley first wrote to me to suggest a visit to England he included in his letter 
a somewhat cryptic statement to the effect that he would like to raise with the 
Secretary of State the Special defence risks to which Jamaica is peculiarly exposed in 
the interval unti l an adequate Federal defence force has been built up. 
I discussed this matter with Manley and ascertained that he personally was not the 
originator of the idea, but that it had been included in the draft of the letter to me by 
the officials who had prepared the draft-Richardson1 (Financial Secretary) and 
Arthur Brown. I then had a talk with Richardson and Arthur Brown to find out 
exactly what was in their minds. I gathered that they were concerned (as indeed are 
all of us) about the situation in the Caribbean Republics. 
I told Manley that I would prepare a paper for him on this subject, and I have now 
done so, and I enclose a copy for your information. The paper has been prepared in 
consultation with the Area Commander. 
I am, of course, aware from the Area Commander and from various m ilitary 
visitors from the War Office about the discussions which have been going on in 
LE R Richardson, financial secretary, Jamaica (for Brown, see 108, note 3) . 
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London about the future of the British battalion in the West Indies. The Brigadier 
and I thought that the preparation of this paper would provide a good opportunity 
with which to enlist the interest and support of Manley in the idea that a British 
battalion should be maintained in Jamaica for some time to come. I have not, of 
course, disclosed to Manley that the British Government may well of its own volition 
be wishing to approach the Federal Government in regard to this matter. It seemed 
better that I should encourage him to think that the initiative comes from this side. 
Manley has not yet had an opportunity of commenting on the enclosed paper, and 
I shall not be seeing him again until the 5th of January. If he then has anything 
further to say, I will let you know. But I thought that I ought to let you have the 
paper at once as you may wish to consider with the War Office the best way of 
handling the discussions with Manley on this subject of defence. 
I am sending a copy of this letter to the Governor-General. The Area Commander 
and the Senior Naval Officer, West Indies, are also, of course, being given copies of 
the paper. 
113 CO 1031/3264, no 2, enclosure 2 Jan 1960 
[Jamaica and federation]: resume by the government of Jamaica of 
points to be raised with the CO by a Jamaican government delegation 
to London 
[Blackburne commented that para C was the most significant part of this resume; it 
raised the possibility of Jamaica 'going it alone'. The governor also reported that Manley 
had been 'thoroughly depressed' about federation when he discussed it with him on 5 Jan. 
Popular support for secession was growing in Jamaica and the actions of the federal 
government were making life more difficult. Manley described the dominion status 
resolution (see 111) as 'little short of lunacy'; the federal government was playing into the 
hands of Eric Williams. Blackburne was convinced that Manley remained personally 
committed to federation but some of his Cabinet colleagues were 'hardening against it' 
(CO 1031/3264, no 5, Blackburne to Rogers, 5 Jan 1960).] 
A. Constitutional and political points 
(1) The Government wishes to know what are the tests which are applied in 
determining whether a Government which is a Federation would be accepted:-
(a) by other members of the Commonwealth as a Dominion; 
(b) by the United Nations and other international organisations as a sovereign 
independent Government. 
Do the tests applied by outside parties relate to the internal constitutional 
arrangements which are agreed between the Federal Centre and Units. 
Would there be a difference in approach if Units already independent had decided 
to federate and reached agreement as to the range of powers which should be 
taken over by the Centre, compared with the situation where the Units being 
federated are not sovereign nations but would hope that the Federation being set 
up would become sovereign. 
Finally, there will be a presentation of Jamaica's views as to why it considers that a 
Federation with a minimum allocation of powers to the Centre should not on this 
account only be barred from obtaining independence. 
(2) The Government wishes to discuss the practical problems which flow from 
308 THE DISPUTE OVER CHAGUARAMAS AND US BASES [114] 
the geographical and cultural factors which are peculiar to the West Indies 
Federation. It will wish to show that the Federation in these circumstances is a 
unique experiment to which very few precedents can be found. 
The separation of Units by large stretches of water not only makes 
communications difficult but has acted as a powerful divisive force and as a result 
there was a minimum of contact between the Units which it is now sought to bring 
close together. 
In view of these circumstances, any attempt to proceed too hastily with a close 
welding together of these units could set up stresses and strains which could 
imperil the existence of Federation itself. 
Apart from this such a process could, it is believed, so disrupt the Development 
programme in Jamaica and other Units that the area as a whole would suffer. 
A full statement of the local political problems arising from Federation and the 
attitude of the Jamaican people to Federal affairs will be made as it is considered 
essential that any discussion of Jamaica's point of view on Federal-Unit 
relationships must of necessity take into account the views and desires of the 
Jamaican people. 
(3) A statement will be made as to the sort of Federation which in these 
circumstances Jamaica envisages-a Federation commencing with the minimum 
of powers necessary to enable it to function as an independent political unit, 
providing for great flexibility and differences in the relationship between particular 
Units and the Federal Centre and leaving it to the historical, political and 
economic forces to shape its change and growth in the future. 
B. The views of the Colonial Office on this structure will be invited. The 
Government would wish to have the views of the Colonial Office on the financial, 
economic and other implications of independence for the Federation touching on 
such matters as external financial aid, special trading agreements, etc. 
C. The Government will ask the Secretary of State to consider the possibility 
that Jamaica may find itself in the position of having to seek early indepen-
dence apart from the rest of Federation, because of failure to reach agreement 
with other units about the form which the federation should take after the first 
five years. 
114 CAB 134/1630, DP(60)4 6 Jan 1960 
'Financial assistance to the West Indies Federation after indepen-
dence': CO note for Cabinet (Official) Committee on Development 
Policy. Enclosure 
The political leaders of the West Indian Federation are studying the implications of 
independence in the near future. Mr. Norman Manley, Premier of Jamaica, is visiting 
London from the 9th-14th January, with the approval of the Federal Government, to 
discuss with the Colonial Office the financial and economic consequences of 
independence. He is certain to ask searching questions as to what assistance Her 
Majesty's Government is prepared to give the Federation after independence. 
2. The discussions to be held during the four days of Mr. Manley's visit may well 
be crucial to the development, and indeed to the very continuance in its present 
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form, of Federation. There is already a serious danger of Jamaica seceding, and this 
will be much increased if Mr. Manley feels that too much of the burden incurred by 
the Federation on independence will fall on the shoulders of Jamaica. Secession, if it 
came about, would be a serious misfortune to The West Indies as a whole, but it 
would also be a considerable disadvantage to Commonwealth interests and to United 
Kingdom interests. 
3. The financial implications of West Indian independence are set out in the 
accompanying paper. The broad conclusion is that the only problem likely to stand in 
the way of independence is that of financial self-sufficiency; on every other score it is 
as much in the interest of the United Kingdom as it is in that of The West Indies that 
independence should not be withheld or postponed. Financially, the granting of 
independence in two or three years' time would mean that The West Indies would 
lose assistance from Her Majesty's Government on their recurrent and development 
budgets to the extent of about £6 million per annum. We see no chance, within that 
time, of their absorbing such a loss through their own resources, especially since the 
additional costs arising through independence will amount to at least a further £1 
million a year. 
4. If, as is likely, The West Indies wish for independence and provided that they 
can agree among themselves to give the Federation the political and economic 
powers which are necessary for it to sustain sovereign status and improve their 
financial viability, we think the advantage lies in agreeing to independence and 
affording them some temporary financial aid. Obviously we cannot determine at this 
t ime what order of assistance may be needed so far ahead, but we believe it necessary 
at least to promise to consider it sympathetically when the time comes. 
5. It is therefore proposed to recommend to Colonial Office Ministers that when 
they discuss with Mr. Manley the implications of independence they should speak on 
the following lines. The West Indies on becoming independent will continue to be 
eligible for assistance from international bodies, including the projected 
International Development Authority when established. In addition they will become 
eligible for Commonwealth Assistance Loans. We realise however that even so they 
are unlikely to be able to assume at once the whole weight of the financial burdens 
which would normally fall to an independent member of the Commonwealth. If this 
proves to be so, Her Majesty's Government will consider sympathetically ways of 
helping them over the transitional period. 
6. Some ways of help would of course be easier than others. For example The 
West Indies could reasonably hope to get the unused balance of the current five 
years' block grant-in-aid and of their allocation under the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act. Her Majesty's Government would also be prepared to provide a 
substantial share of expenditure required for rehabilitation in the event of a nat-
ural disaster. Other ways, involving something corresponding to the present forms 
of assistance over a longer period, would be much more difficult. If however it 
were clear at the time that there was still a shortfall, Her Majesty's Government 
would, in consultation with the United States and Canadian Governments, consider 
how it could be met, possibly with a tapering grant for a limited period. This 
would of course require Parliamentary approval and the amount and manner of 
any such assistance that might prove to be required could only be determined at 
the time. 
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Enclosure to 114 
The West Indian Federation was established in January 1958 with independence and 
Dominion status as its avowed aim. It had long been clear that the small territories com-
prising the British West Indies could only advance towards independence in associa-
tion; and in the years after 1945 their degree of political maturity made prolonged 
colonial status both unacceptable and undesirable. The Federation has suffered the 
teething troubles which seem to beset all new federations . There have been jealousies 
between the Federal and Unit governments, and between the Units themselves, while 
the domination and aloofness of Jamaica has provoked much resentment in the Eastern 
Caribbean. It was decided to give the Federal Government very limited powers and 
tightly restricted financial resources and this has made it hard for the Federal 
Government to make its mark. The result has been that the Federation has made slow 
progress to its goal of independence during the first two years. It is certainly in no con-
dition now to take up the burden of sovereignty, and clearly a number of problems will 
have to be solved before it can be independent. There will have to be a considerable shift 
of taxing powers to the centre; a start, at least, on the introduction of Customs Union; 
time is needed for the organisation and training of a foreign service; and some addi-
tional defence forces will have to be established. Her Majesty's Government has always 
taken the line that they would not be justified in agreeing to independence until these 
"minimum conditions" are met. Political pressures have now begun to build up and the 
drive behind demands for independence has begun to have more urgency behind it than 
hitherto. Because of this the West Indians are now preparing to tackle these practical 
"minimum conditions" with determination. It must therefore be assumed that Her 
Majesty's Government will shortly be faced by a demand from the West Indies for inde-
pendence. The advantages to the U.K. of granting this and the dangers of withholding 
it are detailed in paragraph 12 below. There are however serious financial implications 
in that the Federation would not be able to pay its way at least for the first few years. 
2. As a dependent territory the Federation1 has received considerable financial 
assistance from the United Kingdom. This is now running at the following annual 
rates:-
Colonial Development and Welfare . . . . . . 
Grant-in-aid for the small islands who cannot 
balance their budget . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Ad hoc disaster relief (average last 5 years) 
£millions 
3.25 
1.752 
1.0 
£6.0 millions 
3. In addition to these direct subsidies to governments the West Indian sugar 
growers benefit to the extent of £600,000 per annum from their entitlement to 
Colonial Sugar Preference Certificates. The citrus and banana growers also benefit by 
the existence of price support schemes, financed by Colonial Development and Welfare 
funds. Prices for these products have for some time been high, and because of this no 
actual payments out of the schemes have had to be made. The high prices have been 
due inpart to $ discrimination, which has provided a further concealed supporting 
factor, and if as a result of present consideration$ discrimination against these prod-
1 
"Federation" meaning Federal and Unit Governments taken together. 
2 Ysth of amount provided for 5 years. 
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ucts comes to an end, there may be a sharp fall in price. It is difficult to estimate the 
call that may be made for U.K. assistance in this eventuality but it could well amount 
to as much as £1.5 million in a very bad year. An average future liability of £500,000 
per annum over the next five years would probably be a reasonable estimate. 
4. None of the forms of assistance set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 are given to 
other independent Commonwealth countries. Colonial Development and Welfare 
assistance has not previously been given to members of the Commonwealth on 
independence beyond allowing them to complete schemes already started or to spend 
allocations already made. There is no precedent for Grant-in-aid to an independent 
member of the Commonwealth. There would not be the same moral obligation to 
give such substantial assistance as in the past in respect of hurricanes and other 
disasters. It is difficult to see how the Colonial Sugar Preference Certificates could be 
justified, likewise the citrus and banana and price support schemes hitherto under-
written by Colonial Development and Welfare funds . Although however, it has always 
been the U.K.'s policy that political independence necessarily involves financial 
independence there have been occasions in the past when Her Majesty's Government 
has agreed to give financial assistance to an independent power. Sometimes there 
has been a strategic interest behind this as in the cases of Libya and Jordan, though 
in the latter case it has been found necessary to continue the subsidy after the 
original military reason has ceased to apply because we could not discontinue it 
without putting the stability of Jordan in hazard. We have given Malaya a 
considerable measure of defence assistance but this has been accounted an 
exceptional step due to her involvement in the Cold War. A more clear departure has 
been the case of Somaliland, which is grant-aided to the extent of about a third of its 
budget. This territory is overwhelmingly poor but at the same time there are fairly 
generally recognised special circumstances which make it necessary to give them 
independence prematurely. It has therefore been publicly stated that Her Majesty's 
Government would give "sympathetic consideration to the continuation of U.K. 
financial assistance within the limits of the amount at present being provided". But 
nowhere else has it been necessary to grant or promise independence to a territory 
which has not been financially self-sufficient. It is possible that in the case of Sierra 
Leone, likely to be independent in the next few years, there will have to be some 
exceptional treatment, though here again we have a strategic interest in Freetown. 
5. At the same time as she loses the aid formerly received from the U.K., the 
Federation will have to meet additional financial burdens. Some of these will be 
"once for all" items, such as the cost of their independence ceremonies and the 
essential minimum subscription for membership of the l.M.F. and l.B.R.D. 
(approximately £0.8 millions). But apart from these there will unavoidably be the 
following additional recurrent burdens:-
diplomatic services . . . . . . . .. 
additional defence forces3 . . • • .. 
membership of international organisations 
£.millions 
0.5 
0.6 
.16 
TOTAL £1.26 million 
3 She has at present one battalion but a second battalion is to be formed. A small navy will also have to be 
built up. 
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6. The total net worsening of the financial position of the Federation on 
recurrent account if all Her Majesty's Government's present forms of assistance 
cease is likely therefore to be in the neighbourhood of approximately £7 to £7Y, 
millions a year. There will also be a further loss from the end of the sugar, citrus and 
banana arrangements. The total governmental revenues of the Federation including 
its units was [sic] estimated at £66 million in 1959. These revenues are unlikely to 
increase fast enough to bridge the gap resulting from the termination of United 
Kingdom aid. Taxation is already high and most expert opinion is that it cannot be 
further increased without adverse effect on overseas investment. 
7. Apart from the assistance set out in Paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the Federation 
can expect, so long as it remains dependent, to receive development assistance 
through exchequer loans under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, and to 
benefit from the activities of the Colonial Development Corporation. The Exchequer 
loans arrangements are intended to provide loan finance to Colonial Territories who 
find difficulty in borrowing on the London market. No fixed allocation of the total 
sum available for this purpose (£100 million) has been made to individual territories, 
but it has been expected that the Federation as a whole might receive loans of about 
£8 million in the next three years. Over the last three years, the Colonial 
Development Corporation has invested an average/capital sum of £0.95 millions a 
year in the Federation. Apart from the completion of projects already initiated by the 
C.D.C., both these forms of assistance end at independence. 
8. If we treat The West Indies as generously as we can but still on the basis of the 
precedents of what has been done for other emergent territories we can justify 
assistance after independence as follows:-
(a) Colonial development and welfare. Practice has varied somewhat and the 
decision in each case has been governed to some extent by the point in the period 
of the then Colonial Development and Welfare Act at which the territory became 
independent. The West Indies is likely to become independent somewhere towards 
the middle of the duration of the forthcoming Act. Her allocation for the period is 
£9 millions and it is estimated that a balance of about £3.5 millions will be carried 
over from the previous period giving a total sum of £12.5 millions. She is likely to 
have between £6-£7 millions still to her credit, which would not all be committed 
to specific schemes though it would certainly have been earmarked for the 
development programme of the Federal and Unit Governments. It would not be 
politically possible to do anything other than agree to make this sum over to the 
Federation at independence. Indeed if we did not do this the West Indian 
Governments would naturally make haste to embark on as many schemes as 
possible to get as much as possible of "their" money, with probable waste of 
resources and little saving to us as the outcome. 
(b) Technical assistance. The United Kingdom is already providing this for other 
newly independent members of the Commonwealth and it will also be available to 
The West Indies. Ghana is receiving assistance of approximately £75,000 in the 
current year from this source and The West Indies might expect a somewhat larger 
annual sum. 
(c) Commonwealth assistance loans. These loans were introduced at the 
Commonwealth Economic Conference in Montreal in 1958 and are intended to be 
available for Commonwealth countries for development purposes. Nigeria has 
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been promised a loan of £12 millions from this source and we could make a similar 
commitment for The West Indies though probably of a somewhat smaller sum. 
The loans bear interest at about the market rate and are usually for medium term 
periods (10-20 years) . They could not in West Indian budgetary circumstances be 
used to finance other than revenue earning projects. For the purpose of this paper 
Commonwealth Assistance loans can be regarded as replacing Exchequer Loans 
when the Federation becomes independent. 
(d) Colonial preference sugar certificates. Neither South Africa nor Australia, the 
only major sugar producers who are full members of the Commonwealth, receive 
this form of assistance. It is possible they will object if The West In dies continue to 
receive such preferential assistance. On the other hand they might agree that an 
immediate withdrawal of this arrangement would cause undue disturbance to the 
West Indian sugar industry. We might therefore be able to continue it at least for 
some years. 
(e) Disaster relief. Because of its geographical position the Federation is 
peculiarly liable to very destructive hurricanes, earthquakes and, in addition, it's 
towns have frequently been devastated by severe fires. Although no commitment 
could be made the United Kingdom should, we suggest, still be ready to consider 
ad hoc assistance if the Federation was sorely stricken by any such natural 
disaster, though we could not underwrite virtually the complete bill for repairs as 
has been our practice hitherto. 
(f) Defence. We have already agreed to consider assistance for the capital cost of 
constructing barracks for the Federal Army. We are also considering the possibility 
of assisting the formation of a navy by the presentation of absolescent [sic] 
warships. Assistance of this kind is unlikely to total more than £1~-£2 million, 
which would be for capital and not recurrent purposes. 
9. But even if we take all these steps, which are the most we can do without 
breaching our present principles governing forms of assistance to dependant [sic] 
and independent territories, the independent Federation will be in receipt of much 
less external assistance than at present. She will, of course, be eligible to raise loans 
on the London and other markets. Jamaica recently succeeded in raising a loan at 
New York. These sources of credit are unlikely to prove particularly easy to tap. 
Independence will itself tend to make West Indian stocks less attractive, and the 
proposed legislation to allow United Kingdom trustees to enter the equity market 
will reduce demand for public stocks as a whole. Apart from this, public borrowing 
cannot be regarded, granted the budgetary position of The West Indies, as an 
adequate substitute for grant assistance. International organisations, such as the 
l.D.A., can be expected to help, but their resources are small in comparison with the 
demands likely to be put upon them in coming years by other undeveloped countries. 
There is, indeed, something of a danger that the Federation may tend to fall between 
these two stools, being neither lush enough to attract a great amount of private 
capital, nor dramatically poor enough to coax soft loans or grants out of the 
international organisations. Compared with most tropical countries the Federation 
is relatively rich. Gross domestic product per head was £130 in 1958 compared with 
£22 in India (1957), £25 in Nigeria (1958) and £85 in Mauritius (1958). On the other 
hand The West Indies is a neighbour of much richer territories and it would be 
impossible for them to return to the standards of a subsistence economy. 
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10. This relatively high standard of living may indeed be something of an 
albatross round the necks of her leaders in the future, for while economic appraisal 
may show that she has in some sense less "objective" claim to priority in assistance 
compared to those countries whose economies teeter on the starvation level, this 
kind of criterion ignores the larger reality. Despite their colour, and aura of calypsos, 
the West Indians are a sophisticated Western people, who take their standards from 
North America and Europe. The problem her leaders have to face is not so much that 
of absolute dire poverty (though there are certainly large patches of this especially in 
the small islands) but the economic and social expectations of a population long 
accustomed to semi-European standards and attitudes. The premature withdrawal of 
the United Kingdom aid will almost certainly make it impossible to retain the 
standards achieved with the help of our assistance, and the rate of development will 
certainly slacken. The present level of aid has indeed barely averted decline in some 
of the smaller islands, and their future would be in real hazard. 
11. The cumulative effect of a decline of social standards because of 
governmental impoverishment, together with a falling off in the rate of economic 
development, would almost certainly be disastrous. The democratic institutions now 
working so relatively maturely might not survive. The existing distrust and 
animosities between the units would grow and it would be very doubtful if the 
Federation would hang together in such circumstances. If it were to break up it 
would be in much greater danger of involvement with the nearby independent 
republics. Venezuela still has irredentist aspirations towards Trinidad. Cuba, Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic are unpredictable neighbours whose activities have 
even now to be watched in the Turks and Caicos Islands. The Federation is almost 
free of serious Communist activity at present but this could not be relied on if 
conditions worsened. Communism is a danger in nearby British Guiana and there is 
some evidence of Communist influence in Fidel Castros's [sic] government. 
12. The United Kingdom has, of course, undoubtedly an interest as well as a 
moral obligation to ensure that independence is achieved only in conditions which 
make collapse unlikely. We would certainly be widely criticised if the Federation 
collapsed or got into serious difficulties because of the termination of U.K. aid. World 
opinion would not appreciate the argument that political independence necessarily 
involves the end of financial aid. It would be disadvantageous to attempt to defer 
independence for the Federation. The Federation is already so politically advanced 
that what power we have left can almost never be effectively exercised. On the other 
hand the nominal existence of that power makes it possible for local political leaders 
to explain away their failures by reference to our continued power. This gives us the 
worst of all worlds. In the eyes of the world we are still responsible, while in practice 
decisions are made locally. There are hardly any advantages to the U.K. in continuing 
sovereignty over the Federation; in particular there are no strategic reasons to hang 
on. At the same time, we have to support them with heavy subsidies. Even if it were 
necessary to give them substantial assistance as an independent country this would 
almost certainly be cheaper than at present, though we should have to weigh this 
against any repercussions of continuing to give the independent Federation forms of 
assistance hitherto only given to dependent territories. Finally there is the argument 
that unless Federation can successfully move into independence fairly soon there will 
be a danger that the larger territories, such as Jamaica and Trinidad, will grow 
impatient and as they, in any case, will have to carry the burden of the other small 
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Islands, they might in the end decide they would "better go it alone" and secede from 
the Federation. On the positive side, a successful Federation would continue to 
represent an achievement of British colonial policy and an example of successful 
multi-racialism, which would be valuable not only in Commonwealth Councils, but 
also in the wider international sphere. It would be particularly valuable for this to be 
created in a traditionally anti-colonial area, i.e. in close proximity to the United 
States and Latin America; and to have two independent members of the 
Commonwealth in the Western Hemisphere. 
13. The conclusion which we draw from this analysis is that the Federation will 
have to be assisted after independence to a greater extent than the "normal" 
assistance set out in paragraph 8 above. It must however, be fully realised that this 
may involve a break with our present policy regarding financial assistance to 
independent members of the Commonwealth who are expected to be self-supporting 
political entities at least in regard to their budgetary finance. It could have 
repercussions in relation to other dependent territories since:-
(a) those who are granted independence might use it as a precedent for claiming 
forms of assistance hitherto reserved for dependent territories; 
(b) in territories to which we are at present unwilling for other reasons to grant 
independence it would tend to undermine arguments based on the need for 
financial viability. 
14. If the United Kingdom has no real alternative but to accept an element of 
contingent liability for the financial and economic stability of the Federation for 
some years after her independence, obviously this obligation must be reduced to the 
smallest extent consonant with its being effective and our assistance be framed in 
such a form that we can be sure it is a diminishing burden. Moreover, we should, if 
possible seek to associate others in sharing it. The needs of the Federal Government 
have to be looked at under two heads:-
(a) the budgetary difficulties likely to arise immediately after independence; 
(b) the longer term need for development finance to expand her economy. The 
problem here is essentially a question of how to replace the present capital 
assistance given by C.D. & W. and other existing sources by some other form of 
assistance which, in view of the Federation's probable inability to service any large 
additional volume of "hard" loans, would inevitably have to be in the form of "soft" 
loans or grants. 
15. The most immediate financial strain will result from the cessation of Grant-
in-Aid, C.D. & W., and the other forms of assistance set out in paragraph 2. The 
resultant gap cannot be closed immediately, or quickly from local resources. The Act 
of Parliament4 which authorised Her Majesty's Government to pay the Federal 
Government an annual sum for the purpose of Grant-in-Aid to the small islands 
provided for a period of ten years but this Act will no longer be in force after 
independence. From a legal point of view, there is no reason whatsoever why we 
should continue such payments and, from the point of view of general policy, it 
would be most undesirable for us to do so. On the other hand we know that although 
4 British Caribbean Federation Act 1956, section 3(b). 
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the Federal Government realises that there is no actual obligation on Her Majesty's 
Government to continue Grant-in-Aid after independence they believe they have a 
very strong moral claim to the outstanding balance of the £8.75 millions already 
negotiated for the first quinquennium of the 10 year period (1959-63); and probably 
a somewhat lesser but still arguable claim to the money they might have received 
during the second quinquennium (1964-8) due to be negotiated in 1963. It would be 
certainly possible to pay over the outstanding balance of the £8.75 millions already 
negotiated without forming an undesirable precedent. The amount involved would 
be about £2 millions if independence was attained in 1962. 
16. This amount of budgetary assistance would almost certainly be inadequate 
and we believe that in addition a tapering grant for the remainder of the 10 year 
period will be necessary. This might start at a figure in the sixth year not far short 
of their present annual £1.75 million but it should be reduced yearly on a sharply 
sliding scale. The total period of this grant should not continue beyond the end of 
the period of grant-in-aid envisaged in the British Caribbean Federation Act, 1956, 
i.e. December, 1968. This arrangement would enable the Federation to assume 
gradually the obligation of financial self-sufficiency. A further advantage would be 
that an agreement to pay them a subsidy for a number of years would make it diffi-
cult for them to importune us while this agreement lasted, and that by the time it 
was ended they might to some extent have lost their present habit of looking to the 
U.K. for assistance, and found it possible to tap other sources of bounty, either 
international organisations or possibly the United States, as a quid pro quo for the 
continued use of bases. Precisely how the total of this grant should be calculated, 
and at what rate it should be disbursed, are questions which would have to be the 
subject of careful study. For political reasons and in order to deal with the unfold-
ing situation it would be necessary to let The West Indians know well in advance of 
independence that we are prepared to give a measure of aid of this kind but we 
would be fully justified in refusing to discuss its quantum until a much later date 
probably not until quite close to independence and in the light of the then financial 
situation. 
17. The proposal in the previous paragraph could make a substantial 
contribution to the financial problem but it would not (and is not designed to) cater 
for the provision of development funds, particularly soft loans and grants. This is a 
longer term problem. In order to minimise the burden on the U.K. and increase the 
funds available to The West Indies, we should attempt to associate the United States 
and Canada with this form of aid. This would certainly appeal to the West Indians and 
a recurrent theme in their political discussion over the last few years has been that 
there is a need for some kind of international plan to deal with their development 
problems. Mr. Manley, in particular, has strongly supported this suggestion. In the 
course of the 1956 London Conference (at which the final decisions leading to the 
establishment of the Federation were taken), we agreed to explore with the 
Americans and Canadians the possibility of some joint assistance arrangements. Our 
approaches at the time were not well received; but since then, the Canadians have 
given the Federation a gift of ten million Canadian dollars (£3.7 millions) and the 
U.S. have agreed a £160,000 programme of assistance through the I.C.A. Assistance 
to The West Indies has, therefore, developed bilaterally and not on a joint basis as 
originally hoped, and indeed requested, by The West Indians. We propose, however, 
to seek once again to associate the Americans and Canadians with the development 
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needs of the Federation; and it is suggested that an approach should be made to these 
Governments on the lines that the development assistance requirements of the 
Federation are considerable, for various reasons are unlikely to be met, and that we 
suggest that it would be in the interest of all of us to deal jointly with this problem. 
There is a fair chance that the Canadians would be ready to give their future 
assistance as part of a joint effort while the Americans, faced with the probability of 
serious difficulties over their occupation of their important bases in the Federation 
after independence, may be more ready than hitherto to devote money to such a 
purpose if they thought it could have the effect of doing something to secure their 
occupancy and yet be done without any suggestion that they would be having to pay 
some kind of rent for the bases. An opportunity to test American and Canadian 
reactions to this suggestion may arise at the time of the quadripartite discussion 
which we are to propose should be held between these governments, the Federal 
Government and ourselves on the problem of the effects of U.K. import liberalisation 
on West Indian exports. (It is not however proposed that the Federal Government 
should take part in these discussions as distinct from those on liberalisation). In the 
light of these discussions we shall also have to consider whether further price 
support schemes are necessary for West Indian exports of bananas and/or citrus, and 
whether they should be continued after independence. 
115 T 220/941, ff 3-8 6 Jan 1960 
[Aid to the West Indies after independence]: Treasury minutes by 
L Pliatzky1 and A W Taylor2 on the CO proposals3 
. . . 3. At such short notice I have not attempted to form a judgment on the merits 
of the case but have addressed myself solely to the problem which would arise if a 
precedent on the lines of these proposals were set for aid to the independent 
Commonwealth. To the best of my knowledge the position about United Kingdom aid 
to other territories which have recently become or are about to become independent 
is as follows:-
Ghana received an ad hoc grant of £350,000, more or less in lieu of a carry-over of 
C.D. and W. assistance, and otherwise nothing so far. 
Malaya4 has been given aid since independence in four forms:-
(a) Carry-over of C.D. and W. allocation, about £4 million in total, spread over a 
period of years. See Item 6 of Table 1 of the Draft White Paper, and the note on 
this item. 
1 Assistant secretary, Treasury. 2 Under-secretary, Treasury. 
3 Both minutes are commenting on the proposals put to the Development Committee by the CO, see 114. 
4 On the financial settlements with Ghana and Malaya at independence, see BDEEP series B, vol1, Richard 
Rathbone, ed, Ghana, part II, chapt 9 and, in the same series, vol 3, A J Stockwell, ed, Malaya, part Ill, 
chapt 12. 
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(b) Military assistance, which is to continue for a few more years, subject to a 
fixed total limit. See Item 2 in Table 4 of the Draft White Paper and the note on 
it. 
(c) Military assistance, for internal security, which is to come to an end in 1961. 
See Item 4 of the same table and the note on it. 
(d) A Section 3 loan of £2~ million for telephone equipment. 
Nigeria is to have a Section 3 loan of £12 million on becoming independent, and 
there may be some small C.D. and W. carry-over. 
Cyprus will certainly be given some aid after independence. The details are now 
being considered. Something more than a straight Commonwealth assistance loan 
is quite possible, but we hope that anything special will so far as possible take the 
form of, and be presented as, payments for services rendered or facilities provided 
under the Treaty with Cyprus. 
4. It is true that the security assistance given to Malaya is regarded as being on 
the generous side, and thus concealing an element of special economic assistance, 
and the same may prove true in the case of Cyprus. Nevertheless it seems clear that 
the Colonial Office proposals, especially if the amounts were substantial, would 
involve an important new departure in the matter of straight-forward economic 
assistance to an independent Commonwealth country. This would clearly set a 
precedent for future cases of colonies achieving independence, and could react on 
questions of aid to Commonwealth countries already independent. Divisional 
responsibility for such expenditure lies with I.F. if it is from Votes, and probably the 
whole of what the Colonial Office envisage would have to come from Votes. But I.F. 
have brought us in on the basis that there is an O.F. interest, as well as a Committee 
interest, and from this point of view the desirable outcome for the time being would 
be: -
(a) That the Colonial Office should for the time being commit H.M.G. to nothing 
going beyond a C.D. and W. carry-over or the equivalent, and consideration of a 
Commonwealth assistance loan in whatever form may be appropriate under 
general policy when the time comes. 
(b) Commissioning of a further and more general paper about future aid to newly-
independent Commonwealth countries and the financial implications. This should 
bring out whether we have to anticipate merely a switch of disbursements from 
the Colonial Office to some other Department, or an addition to the total bill. It 
should also discuss the extent to which it is practicable to give newly-independent 
Commonwealth countries aid in forms which would not be extended to other 
existing members of the Commonwealth. 
L.P. 
6.1.60 
We have persuaded the Colonial Office to agree that this question should be 
considered by the Development Policy Committee tomorrow, 7th January. 
2. The Colonial Office will be circulating a paper, the gist of which will be that 
the West Indies Federation is at present benefitting very substantially from the 
various forms of help available to Colonial territories and that it would be politically 
and economically impracticable to discontinue this help as soon as the Federation 
becomes independent. 
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3. This special financial assistance is made up broadly as follows:-
Colonial Development and Welfare grants 
Additional grants for the Budgets of the 
smaller islands 
"Disaster Relief' Grants (average) 
Colonial Sugar Preference Certificates 
Special arrangements for Citrus Fruits 
and bananas costing nothing at the 
moment, but potentially involving 
C.D.C. 
Prospective loans under the recent extension 
of the Colonial Development & Welfare Acts 
(i .e. "Commonwealth Assistance Loans" under 
the procedure adopted for the Colonies) 
£3Ji m. a year 
£1%m. 
£1m. 
" £600,000 
" 
£500,000 
" £1m. 
" 
about£8 m. 
over the next 
3 years. 
" 
" 
" 
" 
319 
4. Any cut in these forms of assistance would come at a time when, as a result of 
independence, the Federation is incurring additional expenditure, put by the 
Colonial Office at about £800,000 non-recurrent, plus £1Ji m. a year. 
5. The Colonial Office proposals are:-
(a) An annual financial grant to the Federation after independence on a declining 
scale for 5 to 10 years, the amount to be negotiated later. 
(b) Assurances that the Federation will be eligible for Commonwealth Assistance 
Loans under the terms available to independent Commonwealth countries. 
(c) An approach to the United States and Canada to help in the provision of 
development funds on "soft loan or grant terms". 
(d) Early and encouraging assurances to the West Indians to the effect that 
H.M.G. has decided, in principle, to make special arrangements. 
5. [sic] Looking at these proposals individually:-
(a) It is probably inevitable that there will be transitional grants to the Federation 
in some form, and the responsibility for keeping the period and amount of such 
grants within proper limits and for having regard to the precedents that will be 
created, rests primarily with I.F. 
(b) Prima facie, it is quite proper that, on becoming independent, the Federation 
should be entitled to apply for a Commonwealth Assistance Loan in the form of a 
credit under Section 3 of the Export Guarantees Act. On the other hand, they 
ought not to be given too much encouragement. The amount they are likely to 
expect will be embarrassingly large when compared (by tests of population, 
poverty, scope for economic development, position in the Cold War, etc.) with 
what we are able to do for other territories. 
(c) I see no objection to seeking the help of the United States and Canada on 
behalf of West Indian development, though we ought not to take the initiative in 
suggesting that such help might be given in the form of soft loans. 
6. Viewed on broader lines, however, the proposals carry some unwelcome 
implications. We have been trying hitherto to maintain certain distinctions in our 
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financial policy between Colonies and independent countries. It is true that the 
distinction has become a bit fuzzy at the edges. The broad idea has been, however, 
that when a Colonial territory becomes independent it can no longer expect as a 
matter of course any of the grants, or other special aid, extended to the Colonies, but 
in return it can apply for credits under Section 3 of the Export Guarantees Act. In 
one sense it does not matter whether any particular territory receives a loan under 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts or under Section 3. The change means, 
however, an additional demand on the inadequate margin of funds available for 
lending to independent countries-India, Nigeria, Ghana, etc.-with no reduction in 
the overall figure which the Colonial Office have by statute at their disposal for loans 
to territories still remaining dependent. Where such a change is accompanied by the 
termination of colonial grants, we are (through the I.F. side) getting something in 
return. But, if the grants are to go on and in a round about way there is to be an 
effective addition to the allocation for lending to the Colonial Office's proteges, the 
Treasury is getting the worst of both worlds. 
7. There is here an important general problem calling for fuller consideration-
i.e. what transitional arrangements are required when Colonial territories become 
independent. The Colonial Office ought to avoid commitments meanwhile. I should 
have thought that on purely tactical grounds, it would be undesirable to begin 
passing encouraging messages to the West Indies at this early stage. In particular, we 
might try to dissuade the Colonial Office from the desire they are said to cherish to 
say something pretty definite to Mr. Manley on his visit here within the next week or 
so. 
A.W.T. 
6.1.60 
116 CAB 134/1629, DP 2(60)1 7 Jan 1960 
'Financial assistance to the West Indies Federation after indepen-
dence': Cabinet (Official) Committee on Development Policy minutes1 
on the CO proposals2 [Extract] 
.. . In discussion, there was general agreement that Ministers must be able to offer 
some encouragement to Mr. Manley. But some doubts were expressed about the form 
our assistance to the Federation after independence should take and the extent to 
which we should be committed to it now. The following were the main points 
made:-
(a) The continuance of grants to the West Indies after independence might create 
an awkward precedent, even though some assistance was likely to be given 
indirectly to Pakistan in connection with the Indus waters scheme. On the other 
hand, assistance for non-military purposes had already been given to Somaliland; 
1 The meeting was chaired by Sir D Rickett, 3rd secretary, Treasury, 1955-1960, and attended by officials 
from the Treasury, CO, CRO, FO, Board of Trade and the Bank of England. 
2 See 114; not printed here is that part of the minutes in which Gorell Barnes summarises the proposals 
put to the committee by the CO. 
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and the proposed assistance to the West Indies up to 1965 represented no increase 
on what had already been budgeted for. Assistance after 1965 might be regarded as 
a special case in view of the political problems involved. It might be possible to 
prevent existing independent members of the Commonwealth from using the 
precedent set by continued assistance to the West Indies to justify grants from the 
United Kingdom by presenting it as applicable only in the transitional stage 
immediately after independence. 
(b) Assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts should be related 
to particular projects, perhaps by tying it to the new development plan which was 
likely to be prepared by the Federation after independence. In any case it might be 
preferable that our share of any assistance given jointly with the United States and 
Canada should be confined to the balance of the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Acts allocation. In addition, we should start negotiations with the West 
Indies from the position that any grants should be tapered from the date of 
independence, not from 1965. 
(c) The United States and Canada might be willing to provide the West Indies with 
disaster relief when the need for this arose after independence. 
(d) Since the Montreal Conference,3 when Commonwealth Assistance Loans had 
been inaugurated, there had been a considerable improvement in the economic 
position of the West Indies, who had been generously treated in the past. At the 
same time our own balance of payments position had deteriorated, and it was 
doubtful whether the recent increase in our rate of assistance to less developed 
countries could be maintained. So far as possible this assistance should be 
confined to commitments to Colonial territories and lending through 
international organisations. Independent members of the Commonwealth should 
not assume that they would qualify automatically for Commonwealth Assistance 
Loans, and the Treasury considered that Exchequer assistance to colonies in 
general should be reduced if Commonwealth Assistance Loans were made to newly 
independent countries. The Colonial Office reserved their position on this point.4 
(e) Though it was desirable that the West Indies Federation should achieve 
independence quickly, because we would gain greater goodwill from this and 
might be able to reduce the burden on our economy, it was doubtful whether the 
proposed formula for use by Ministers in their discussions with Mr. Manley, which 
was set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 of D.P. (60) 4, was altogether appropriate, 
especially as there would be no more than a moral obligation on us to provide 
assistance after independence. Mr. Manley represented Jamaica, not the 
Federation, and we should be careful not to go too far in our discussions with him. 
In particular, we could not commit the United States and Canada to any particular 
3 1958 had been, in the words of a CO circular letter to colonial governors, an 'annus mirabilis '. For the 
first time for a century, the UK had a surplus on its visible trade account, and this enabled the reserves to 
be strengthened by as much as £284 million. This was the climate in which, at the Commonwealth Trade 
and Economic Conference in Montreal in Sept 1958, the UK announced its intention to introduce a new 
system of Exchequer loans to the colonies and Commonwealth Assistance Loans for independent 
Commonwealth countries. But 1959 witnessed a sharp down turn on both visible and invisible trade 
accounts. Imports increased by £275 million but exports by only £119 million. At the same time the 
overseas aid budget continued to rise, from £86 million in 1955-1957, to £95 million in 1958, to £130 
million in 1959 (T 296/62, Gorell Barnes to colonial governors, 10 June 1960). 
4 On CO-Treasury differences, see 117, note and 132, note 3. 
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form of assistance, and the reference to a tapering budgetary grant might be 
omitted. 
The Chairman said that the Colonial Office, in consultation with the Treasury and 
the Commonwealth Relations Office, should re-draft the statement to Mr. Manley in 
accordance with the views expressed by the Committee. A note embodying the 
revised formula and bringing out the main points made in discussion should then be 
submitted to Ministers by the Departments concerned. 
The Committee:-
(!) Invited the Colonial Office, in consultation with the Treasury and the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, to revise the formula, for use by Ministers in 
their talks with Mr. Manley, on the lines indicated in discussion. 
(2) Instructed the Secretaries to prepare a note incorporating this formula, and 
taking account of the points made in discussion, for submission to Ministers by 
the Departments concerned. 
117 T 220/941, pp 48-49 11 Jan 1960 
'Financial assistance to the West Indies after independence': Treasury 
note on the proposed statement by CO ministers to Mr Manley 
[Following discussion in the Development Policy Committee (see 116), a revised version 
of the CO note on financial assistance (see 114) was drawn up by the Treasury after 
consultation with the CO and CRO. The revised version is not reproduced here in its 
entirety, only that part on the proposed statement to Manley. In arriving at this formula, 
the Treasury and the CO continued to disagree about how the provision of a 
Commonwealth Assistance Loan to the West Indies would affect loan arrangements for 
the colonies more generally. Their disagreement was explained thus in the revised version 
of 114: 'The Treasury consider that if in the event the West Indies receive a 
Commonwealth Assistance Loan after early independence, the total amount devoted to 
Exchequer loans for the colonies generally should be reproduced by a corresponding sum; 
and that in general it would be wrong for the total originally envisaged to be distributed 
to a reduced number of colonies in spite of an increase in our liabilities for independent 
Commonwealth countries. The Colonial Office do not agree with this view and consider 
that the total available is in any case inadequate to meet the needs of the colonies' 
(T 220/941, p 39; also CAB 134/1630, DP(60)6, 11 Jan 1960).] 
1. The West Indies on becoming independent will continue to be eligible for 
assistance from international bodies including the projected International 
Development Association when established (on the assumption that, as we hope, the 
West Indies join the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association). 
In addition, they will become eligible for Commonwealth assistance loans or any 
such system as may be generally in operation at the time, on the same footing as 
other less-developed independent members of the Commonwealth within the 
sterling area. 
2. We realize that even so the West Indies may not be able to assume at once the 
whole weight of the financial burdens which would normally fall to an independent 
member of the Commonwealth. If this proves to be so, H.M.G. will consider ways of 
helping over a transitional period and will be ready to approach the United States and 
Canadian Governments (though, of course, we cannot speak for them) with a view to 
considering with them what assistance could be given. 
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3. The West Indies may be faced both with a budget problem and with a 
development problem. 
4. As regards development, one contribution which H.M.G. might be expected to 
be willing to offer would be to continue to make available to the West Indies the 
substantial amount still likely to be unspent in their C.D. and W. allocation at the 
time of independence. 
5. Again, as a contribution towards meeting immediate budget difficulties the 
West Indies could reasonably hope that H.M.G. would be willing to continue to make 
available the unused balance of the current 5 years bloc grant-in-aid and to consider 
some continuation of this grant-in-aid on a tapering basis for a further limited 
period. The outside limit in time would have to be the 10 year period mentioned in 
the British Caribbean Federation Act and we would hope that this form of assistance 
would cease to be necessary in a shorter time than this. 
6. Any proposal to continue to make available the unspent balance of the C.D. 
and W. allocation or to provide grant aid after independence would require 
Parliamentary approval. 
118 CO 1031/3264, no 18 16 Jan 1960 
[Jamaica and federation]: joint memorandum by the CO and a 
delegation from the Jamaican government summarising talks on 
federal matters in London 
The Premier and Minister of Finance1 of Jamaica, accompanied by officials, visited 
London between 9th and 16th January, 1960 for discussions with the Secretary of 
State and officials of the Colonial Office. The object of the Jamaican Delegation's visit 
was to discuss the special problems of Jamaica in relation to Federation and certain 
other problems arising from the approach of the Federation to independence. The 
visit was undertaken with the knowledge and concurrence of the Federal 
Government and the opportunity was also taken by the Jamaican Delegation to 
assemble data for those portions of the work of the Inter-Governmental Committees 
which had been assigned as their task. Certain matters of purely Jamaican concern 
were also discussed during the visit. 
Statement by the Jamaican delegation 
2. The Jamaican Delegation explained the nature of the Federal problem in 
relation to Jamaica as follows:-
lt was only at the West Indian level, between the Unit Governments of The West 
Indies and the Federal Government, that the basic problem which concerns the 
character and structure of the Federation, after it achieves independence, could be 
resolved. 
It was well to bear in mind that Federation started on the basis that for the first 
four years, or so, policy should be devoted to the building up of the idea of Federation 
and West Indian nationhood, and to an examination of the practical problems 
involved in working together. A beginning would also be made with the fundamen-
tal matter of Customs Union. However, no sooner had the Federal Government been 
1 V LArnett. 
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constituted than there arose a demand for an immediate review of the Constitution, 
with the object of achieving Dominion status as early as possible. 
It was this demand which led to the early calling of a Conference of the Units of 
the Federal Government for deciding on the changes needed in the Federal 
Constitution to achieve independence, before a beginning had been made with 
such fundamental problems as Customs Union, or before any significant 
contribution had been made to the development of the idea of Federation and West 
Indian nationhood. 
In the meanwhile, important events had been taking place in some of the Units, 
and in particular tremendous changes had taken place in Jamaica since the begin-
ning of 1955. Jamaica has embarked on a long term economic policy, designed to 
modernize her economy and to tackle the enormous problems of unemployment 
(greater in Jamaica by far than in any other territory), and social need, which are 
involved. This policy is to a large extent summarized in a ten-year plan of develop-
ment and the institution on every level of national life of the things which were 
required for the putting of this plan into effect. The development of the necessary 
institutions, the evolution of economic and fiscal policies, were all geared for the 
effective implementation of this long range programme, which had put a maximum 
strain on the country's internal resources and its capacity to borrow in the world 
markets. The Jamaica Government was very strongly of the view that any policy 
which would cause a disruption of this programme would have disastrous conse-
quences, not only for Jamaica itself but also for the Federation. In fact, it would be 
impossible for Jamaica to continue in this situation in the Federation, and indeed 
it would be wrong to launch an independent Federation on such a basis as might 
lead to its own destruction by disrupting Jamaica's economy. 
It was in these circumstances that two diametrically opposed views on the future 
character and structure of the Federation, conceived as a Dominion, have emerged. 
On the one hand there is the view put forward by Trinidad that full control over 
the economy of the entire Federal area should be vested in the centre, on the 
Nigerian pattern; this view asserts that only a powerful and centrally directed 
economic coordination and interdependence can meet the needs of The West 
Indies at this time. 
On the other hand, there is the Jamaican view that the Federation should start 
with the minimum powers needed to gain recognition as an independent political 
entity, acceptable to international agencies, such as the United Nations and the 
International Bank, and more particularly acceptable to the Commonwealth. Such 
a Federation would have built into the Constitution, machinery to enable it to 
grow, so that it could expand as convenience and necessity dictates, and as regards 
some Units, take over the administration of special services where it can be 
demonstrated that such administration can be carried out more efficiently and 
economically, and the Units concerned so agreed. 
The principal purpose of the visit to London was to examine the requirements 
that must be fulfilled by the Federal Government claiming to be recognised as an 
independent political entity in the Commonwealth. In addition to this purpose of 
fact-finding, the Jamaica Delegation wanted to make it clear that Jamaica's policy 
was to use every honest endeavour to reach agreement with the Federation and 
other Units as to the nature of the Constitution which should be in force after 
independence, but that, in no circumstances, would it agree to enter an 
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independent Federation with large central powers of direction over the general 
economic development of Jamaica, and with the power to disrupt the Jamaican 
policy for economic development. 
It was the Premier's view that no country in the Colonial Empire was more fit 
for independence than The West Indies, on the basis of any of the tests which could 
be applied, and in the event of failure to reach agreement Jamaica could therefore 
be no party to holding back the demands of The West Indies for independence. If, 
however, it was impossible to reach agreement on the character and structure of 
an independent Federation, Jamaica would insist on withdrawing from the 
Federation and would seek independence as a Dominion on her own, leaving 
Trinidad and the other islands free to form a smaller, but perfectly logical and 
viable Federation by themselves. 
The Jamaica Delegation further undertook that in these circumstances they 
would at once seek, by negotiation, agreement and treaty, to preserve all the levels 
of common action, and all the common institutional activities now existing or that 
might hereafter be desirable for The West Indies as a whole. It was the view of the 
Jamaica Delegation that quite apart from political federation, it has been proved 
that the West Indies can, and must, work together on many levels. 
In this connection, it was emphasised that both British Guiana and British 
Honduras have found it necessary to continue to be associated with the rest of The 
West Indies, and it was impossible to conceive of a West Indian future without that 
association continuing, bearing in mind, however, that that association does not 
depend upon, and indeed it does not need, to be backed up by the existence of a 
political Federation as such. 
Questions arising 
3. The Jamaica delegation therefore posed two questions on which they sought 
the views of Her Majesty's Government:-
(A) What were the minimum powers and capabilities which the Federal 
Government of The West Indies should have in order to satisfy the requirements of 
effective sovereignty and achieve membership of the Commonwealth? 
(B) What in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government were the financial 
implications of independence for the Federation? 
Essential attributes of sovereignty 
4. A clear distinction was drawn in discussion between the powers which it 
might be thought desirable for the Federal Government to possess and the minimum 
powers which it must possess to qualify for independent membership of the 
Commonwealth. Her Majesty's Government naturally had their own views as to the 
range of powers and distribution of Federal resources between the Federation and its 
Units which were likely to prove most suitable in the circumstances of The West 
Indies. It was however for West Indian Governments themselves to determine these. 
Before Her Majesty's Government could sponsor the Federation for independent 
membership of the Commonwealth they would however have to be satisfied that the 
Federal Government possessed at least the minimum powers necessary to sustain 
sovereignty. 
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5. These, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, could be defined as:-
(i) the possession of a defence force capable of keeping the peace within the 
Federation's boundaries and posing at least a deterrent to any minor incursion by 
an outside aggressor; 
(ii) a diplomatic organisation capable of maintaining the external relations of the 
Federation with the United Nations and the more important friendly and 
neighbouring countries, especially of course the Commonwealth; 
(iii) an effective central administration capable of executing the policy of the 
Federal Government within the field of activity given it by the constitution; 
(iv) adequate financial resources, based on independent taxing and loan raising 
powers, sufficient to enable it to finance its own recurrent expenditure and 
obligations as those develop; 
(v) a start with a workable programme for a Customs Union; 
(vi) central control of the currency; 
(vii) Freedom of Movement of peoples within its boundaries; 
(viii) the constitutional right and ability to negotiate and implement international 
treaties and agreements in the principal fields in which sovereign states normally 
negotiate with one another. These include the regulation of overseas trade; tariffs 
and other restraints on trade such as quantitative restrictions; commodity 
agreements; arrangements whereby the Federation would receive economic and 
financial assistance from international agencies including the I.M.F. and l.B.R.D.; 
postal matters, shipping, civil aviation and telecommunications; and double 
taxation agreements. 
Financial and economic implications of independence 
6. As a dependent territory the Federation (meaning Federal and Unit 
Governments taken together) was now receiving financial assistance from the United 
Kingdom at the following annual rates:-
(a) Colonial Development and 
Welfare (including carry 
over funds and allocations 
£million 
from central funds.) 3.25 
(b) Grant-in-aid for the small 
islands who cannot balance 
their budget 1. 75 
(c) Ad hoc disaster relief 
(average last 5 years) 1.0 
£6.0 million 
The grants shown at item (b) above are paid under the British Caribbean 
Federation Act, 1956, which makes provision for a period of ten years if the 
Federation remains as a colony, but this Act will cease to be in force after 
independence. A total of £8.75 million has been negotiated for payment under these 
arrangements over the five years 1959-63, but no amount has yet been negotiated 
for the subsequent five years. 
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7. The Federation could also expect, so long as it remains dependent, to receive 
development assistance through Exchequer loans (under the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Acts) which are intended to provide loan finance to Colonial Territories 
who find difficulty in borrowing on the London market. 
8. In addition to these forms of direct assistance to governments the West Indian 
sugar growers benefited to the extent of £600,000 per annum from their entitlement 
to Colonial Sugar Preference Certificates. The citrus and banana growers also 
benefited by the existence of price support schemes, financed by Colonial 
Development and Welfare funds; no actual payments under these schemes have had 
to be made so far, but they might become necessary in the future. 
9. Her Majesty's Government expected that it would be possible to continue the 
increased preferences that had been introduced in the United Kingdom for the 
benefit of colonial territories on bananas and lime oil, and that which it was hoped to 
negotiate for fresh grapefruit, though there was no precedent either way for such a 
situation in the G.A.T.T. The possibility of any future preferences being negotiated 
under the colonial waiver would however cease on independence. Her Majesty's 
Government undertook to examine the questions which would arise with regard to 
the timing of quota restrictions on dollar imports competing with West Indies 
products, and to inform West Indian Governments of this position. 
10. The Secretary of State had been informed that the Jamaican section of the 
official Working Party set up by one of the Intergovernmental Committees had been 
charged with the task of enquiring what forms of financial assistance the Federation 
might expect from Her Majesty's Government after independence. He took the 
occasion of the presence at the talks of the officials concerned to make the following 
statement. ... 2 
11. The Jamaican Delegation, in taking note of this statement for the purposes 
of the Working Party, emphasised that they were not, as a delegation, seeking to 
deal with this question. This would be for the Federal Government to pursue in 
due course. The delegation, however, recorded the view that there was an obliga-
tion on Her Majesty's Government to continue the Grant-in-Aid payments for the 
remainder of the ten-year period specified in the British Caribbean Federation Act. 
The commitment entered into at that time by Her Majesty's Government was not 
in any way conditional on continued dependent status. It was rather the recogni-
tion of a hard economic fact which was that the area did not yet have enough 
resources to take over this responsibility and was unlikely to be able to remedy this 
deficiency for some years . The Jamaican Delegation also considered that there 
would be need for a further measure of special assistance to the Federal 
Government to enable it to fulfil its obligations and responsibilities for the first few 
years of independence. 
12. The Secretary of State explained that Her Majesty's Government did not 
intend to allow the Federation to begin as an independent state without the means to 
avoid any danger of collapse. On the other hand it was not possible to measure what 
the Federation's financial position would be until much closer to the time of 
independence, and in the light of the financial arrangements then subsisting 
between the Federal and Unit Governments. 
2 Not printed here is that section of the memo which repeats the formula on financial aid, see 117. 
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119 CO 103113264, no 19 19 Jan 1960 
'Consequences of Jamaican secession': CO note of a discussion with 
the Jamaican delegation in London 
1. The Jamaica Delegation sought a frank expression of view from H.M.G. as to 
what might take place in regard to H.M.G. itself, the Commonwealth and 
International bodies, if after the Inter-Governmental Conference Jamaica found it 
impossible to continue within the Federation. 
2. H.M.G. explained that in their view international conditions and the 
circumstances relating to membership of the Commonwealth made it necessary for 
sovereign states to be of and have a reasonable size, population and resources. 
Jamaica by itself was perhaps in a marginal position in this respect but in addition 
other aspects of the situation in The West Indies must be borne in mind. 
3. A decision by Jamaica to leave the Federation would be a severe 
disappointment to all those who had hoped that its formation would result in The 
West Indies coming forward to take its proper place as both an independent nation 
and member of the Commonwealth. 
4. H.M.G. could not, of course, anticipate what the attitude of the other members 
of the Commonwealth would be to a proposal that Jamaica should be admitted into 
full membership but the concern of those members at the break up of the Federation 
was a factor to be taken into account. 
5. Furthermore in considering the admission of Jamaica, the other members of 
the Commonwealth would be bound to ask whether this foreshadowed a series of 
applications for membership from the smaller states whether within or outside the 
West Indies, and the progressive dilution of the effectiveness of intra Commonwealth 
consultations. 
6. The Jamaica Delegation stated that Jamaica would be prepared to face 
whatever difficulties might then exist and was satisfied that it was accepted that no 
threat, undue pressure or punitive action was contemplated. It repeated its assurance 
that every honest effort would be made to reach agreement with the Federation and 
the other Units. 
120 CO 103114270, no 6, enclosure 3 Mar 1960 
[Antigua]: CO record of a meeting between A R Thomas and Mr Bird 
and I G Turbuttl 
Mr. Bird opened by referring to the difference of view between Jamaica and Trinidad, 
as to what should be the scope of the powers of the Federal Government. He feared 
there were elements in Trinidad who would not be sorry to see a worsening of this 
conflict leading to Jamaican secession. He wished, however, to point out that Antigua 
had only agreed to enter the Federation because it knew Jamaica would also be a 
member. In the present Federation Jamaica acted as a balance to Trinidad. 
Furthermore, the ways and habits of thought of the people of Antigua were much 
more similar to those of Jamaicans than to those of Trinidadians. It was, in fact, 
1 Administrator of Antigua. 
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widely felt in Antigua that their ways were very different from those of Trinidad. This 
feeling was not a new one but of long standing. Because of all this Antigua would not 
wish to be compelled to remain in any Federation from which Jamaica had seceded. 
Such a Federation would inevitably be dominated by Trinidad and this would be 
inimical to Antigua's economic interests. Some years ago the Trinidad Economic 
Mission had urged that Antigua should abandon sugar and other industrial efforts 
and concentrate instead on cattle rearing for supplying the larger islands. It was also 
the Trinidad view that Coolidge Field2 should not be regarded as an international 
airport but should be served by feeder services linking to the international routes at 
Piarco. These views showed what would be the fate of Antigua in a Federation 
controlled by Trinidad. If Jamaica were to secede, there would be no effective barrier 
to a near-unitary state of the kind advocated by Trinidad. Antigua would not accept 
this. Another point influencing Antigua is the growing similarity of certain 
communal conditions in Trinidad to the situation in places like Fiji where special 
measures have to be adopted to protect the people of that Colony; this was true also 
in Mauritius and to an extent in British Guiana. Without the balancing effect of 
Jamaica, Antigua fears before long that the same state of affairs as in Fiji would exist 
in Trinidad and that Trinidad would then wish that same pattern to be followed 
throughout the Federation. Antigua would instead prefer to be associated with 
Jamaica. In reply to a question from Mr. Thomas, Mr. Bird said that he would not 
welcome the admission of British Guiana to the Federation as he did not consider it 
to be in the interest of the West Indies even if Jamaica remained a member. On the 
other hand, a Federation without Jamaica but with the addition of British Guiana 
would be totally unacceptable to Antigua. Further he did not believe that British 
Guiana is in fact desirous of entering the Federation. 
Mr. Bird said he was pleased by the agreement of the Inter-Governmental 
Committees regarding the question of further representation in the Federal 
Parliament. He thought agreement would be reached on a form of customs union 
and also on the question of what independent taxing power should be given to the 
Federal Government. He believed that the right solution of this was to give the 
Federation a percentage of the Customs duties, this percentage being subject to 
periodic review. He sympathised with Jamaica's determination to keep industrial 
development in her own hands. Unlike some of the small Units who seemed eager to 
share in the revenues of the richer territories, Antigua agreed that income tax should 
not become a federal responsibility. 
Mr. Bird said that Antigua supports the form of Federal Constitution as envisaged 
by Jamaica and insists upon equality of constitutional status for all units as originally 
agreed upon when entering the Federation. 
Mr. Thomas thanked Mr. Bird and Mr. Turbott for their frank expression of 
opinion. It was now in the hands of West Indians themselves to determine the precise 
form they wished the Federation to take. It was not for H.M.G. to intervene in this 
debate except in order to be satisfied that the Federal Government was going to have 
adequate powers to assume effective sovereignty. The points made by Mr. Bird would, 
however, be brought to the attention of Ministers. 
2 Coolidge Field in Antigua was an airfield built by the US army airforce as a military airfield in 1942. A 
civilian airfield in 1960, it was used mainly by Pan American, British West Indian Airways and Air France 
with direct services to other West Indian islands and to the US. 
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121 DO 35/8061, no 105 7 Mar 1960 
'Prospects for federation': despatch no 96 from R G C Smith1 to 
Canadian Ministry of External Affairs, Ottawa 
Mter my return from a most informative trip to Jamaica and after discussing the 
progress of the committees that have been working in Port of Spain on the various 
aspects of Federation, I am more than ever confident that Manley has no intention of 
taking Jamaica out of the Federation unless he is driven to it by the intransigence of 
Trinidad and unless he is convinced that the other small islands are unalterably anti-
Jamaica. Unfortunately, I was not able to see Manley himself since he was in Trinidad 
attending the Regional Council of Ministers. However, I did see a number of Cabinet 
Ministers, including [Vernon] Arnett, Minister of Finance; Wills 0 . Isaacs, Minister of 
Trade and Industry; Keeble Munn, Minister of Agriculture; and Jonathan Grant, 
Minister of Labour. I also saw Bustamante, the redoubtable Leader of the Opposition; 
and Sangster, his heir-apparent and former Minister of Finance. Of the officials, 
Brown, the Head of the Planning Unit, and Richardson, the Permanent Secretary of 
the Ministry of Finance, were most helpful. On the civilian side I saw Sealy, Editor of 
the Gleaner, Abrahams, Editor of the Jamaican Economist, and Sir Robert Kirkwood 
of the Jamaica Sugar Producers' Association. I also called on the Governor and his 
Chief Secretary, Mr. Lawrence Lindo who, until recently, was Administrator in 
Dominica. From this wide coverage I was able to obtain a much clearer conception of 
what I believe is Mr. Manley's intention with regard to Jamaica's future role in the 
Federation. 
2. I was particularly struck with the number of people in Jamaica who suggested 
that Manley's ultimate objective was a Federation not far different from the strong 
centralized government visualized by Dr. Williams of Trinidad. However, this is not 
to say that Manley is prepared to back Dr. Williams' demands for this kind of 
Federation now. He is, on the contrary, looking to a loose Federation to begin with 
that will gradually accumulate power as it puts on weight and experience. It is 
possible that he visualizes the ultimate objective being as far off as fifty years. He 
argues that there are historical precedents for Federation starting out in this way and 
gradually accumulating power as it grows older. In suggesting that that is Manley's 
ultimate objective it should be clearly understood that this in no way diminishes his 
uncompromising opposition to a strong Federation in the early stages of its life. 
3. When Manley went to the United Kingdom his objective seems to have been to 
find out from the United Kingdom how loose a Federation would be accepted in the 
Family of Nations as making up an independent nation. In his report to the House of 
Representatives in Jamaica at the end of February he is said to have reached 
agreement with London on the following eight essential points:-
(1) The possession of a defence force capable of keeping the peace within the 
boundaries of the Federation and imposing at least a deterrent on any minor 
incursion by an outside aggressor. 
(2) A diplomatic organization capable of maintaining the external relations of the 
Federation with the United Nations, the more important friendly neighbouring 
countries and especially with the Commonwealth. 
1 See 90. 
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(3) An effective central administration capable of executing the policy of the 
Federal Government within the fields of activities given to it by the Constitution. 
(4) Adequate financial resources based on independent taxing and loan-raising 
powers sufficient to enable it to finance its own expenditure and obligations as 
these develop. 
(5) A workable programme for a customs union. 
(6) Central control of currency. 
(7) The freedom of movement of its peoples within the Federation's boundaries. 
(8) The constitutional right and ability to negotiate and implement international 
treaties and agreements in the main fields in which sovereign states normally 
negotiate with one another. 
These latter include arrangements whereby the Federation would receive economic 
and financial assistance. 
With these he is entirely satisfied. 
4. He also seems to have wanted to satisfy himself that the Colonial Office was 
not ganging up with Trinidad and the eastern islands against Jamaica. It seems as if 
he has resented bitterly the apparent grouping of the rest of the Federation against 
Jamaica and to have suspected that the Colonial Office was aiding and abetting such 
a union. Apparently he came away from London convinced that there was no such 
support by the Colonial Office for any such plot against his Jamaica. 
5. I suppose that one can say that Manley has three basic objectives that he must 
achieve as the conditions for continuing to support Federation:-
(!) Representation by population, which he has already achieved to all intents and 
purposes. 
(2) A gradual approach to customs union, taking into account the necessity for 
recognizing the need for protection of Jamaica's nascent industrialization. (As I 
shall explain later, there would appear to be a more than even chance that a 
solution to this problem will be found.) 
(3) That most taxation should remain the exclusive prerogative of the units. 
(Again, there is at least a hope that this will be achieved.) 
6. I have not listed a gradual approach to Dominion Status as one of the 
objectives since this is implicit in the working out of the second and third conditions 
I have mentioned above. Perhaps one should add to these three basics the fact that 
Manley will not accept the Trinidad proposal for Dominion Status now and 
Constitution later. 
Customs union 
7. Jamaica's fears of customs union logically appear to be unjustified. It has 
always seemed to me that Jamaica stands to gain most from customs union, if they 
will accept the fact that such a union will provide a breath of competition, to 
which, it may be admitted, the Jamaican industry might be peculiarly vulnerable. 
Moreover, big business in Jamaica, which has waxed sleek and rich in the hothouse 
climate of almost unbridled protection has been unalterably opposed to allowing 
draughts to wither or weaken their hothouse plants. It is probable that people like 
Arnett and his officials are well aware of the danger of continuing to build up 
Jamaican industry in such an enervating climate. They argue, however, that there 
are certain special considerations that apply to Jamaica and that tend to nullify the 
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more conventional types of protectionism. For example, nearly all of the big mer-
chants in Jamaica control both the import and the retail trade. They know that at 
this point in history the Jamaican public tends to regard Jamaican-made products 
as of inferior workmanship. They believe, therefore, that these merchants will 
always advise their foreign connections of the prices being quoted by Jamaican 
manufacturers and use this information to obtain minor price concessions from 
foreign manufacturers that will be sufficient for them to under-cut the Jamaican 
manufacturer. 
8. In short, these more liberal-minded members of the Jamaican Government 
are prepared to risk the consequences of over-protected industry in order to sustain 
and build up a Jamaican manufacturing industry. 
9. On the other side of the fence remains the super-protectionists such as Wills 
0 . Isaacs who is not concerned with economics and not much concerned with the 
future. He has a powerful political following and is obsessed with the idea that unless 
he provides jobs for Jamaicans through industry, no matter how inefficient that 
industry may be, he cannot justify his existence. Isaacs goes so far as to say without 
qualification that Jamaica will have nothing to do with customs union and that at the 
end of the five-year period Jamaica will pull out of the Federation. It does not appear 
to worry him that when he makes such statements he is clearly going against the 
policies of his leader. (As an aside, I might also say that Grant, the Minister of 
Labour, and Keeble Munn, the Minister of Agriculture, are similarly opposed to 
Federation.) It is interesting to find that a man like Munn, who is intelligent and 
who, by the way, served in the Canadian Forces during the War, should not be more 
scrupulous in following the party line. 
10. In trying to work out a policy for customs union, therefore, Manley must 
keep in mind that he is heading a basically anti-Federation and anti-customs union 
party. He can count on the support of few of his senior Ministers. Glasspole, Minister 
of Education, will support him and, of course, Arnett. [W M] Seivwright, the former 
Minister of Agriculture and now Minister of Public Works will also support Manley 
but he is not generally regarded as a particularly powerful influence. 
11. In the face of this, Manley and Arnett have sent their teams to the 
committees2 working on this problem with a fairly inflexible proposal. Arnett 
admitted that the Jamaican proposal provided for full customs union at the end of 
ten years but that they might settle for a period of seven years. At the last meeting of 
the committee dealing with this question, which has just concluded its session in 
Port of Apain, the Jamaican delegation agreed to recommend to Cabinet a formula 
that will provide for customs union on a great majority of the items that are not large 
revenue earners or that do not directly compete with local industry, within two 
years. Thus, items that are large revenue earners but which still do not compete 
directly with local industry, would be brought into the scheme within another three 
years. Finally, those items which are regarded as threatening local industry would be 
introduced in another four years. Thus, there would be complete customs union in 
nine years. We do not know how the Jamaican Cabinet will accept this formula but 
both Richardson and Brown, the two members from Jamaica on the committee 
exercise considerable influence on their Ministers and in the Cabinet. 
2 ie the committees appointed by the Trinidad constitutional review conference in Sept 1959, see 107, 
note 9. 
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12. In addition, Jamaica has agreed to the principle that a Federal Government 
no matter how weak, must have the right to bargain for the territory as a whole and 
consequently to amend rates of duty for the customs union. 
Taxation 
13. The Jamaicans will not agree that at this time income tax should be 
surrendered to the Federal Government. They recognize, however, that a Federal 
Government must have a source of revenue other than the levies now provided for 
under the Constitution. They have therefore agreed that the customs revenues 
should be surrendered to the centre to the extent that they are necessary to meet the 
functions that the central government will exercise. 
General 
14. It is interesting to note that Manley has agreed to these concessions in the 
face of what he regards as continued provocation from the islands and, particularly, 
from Trinidad. There is no doubt that he resents bitterly the attacks by Dr. Williams, 
whom he still regards as his pupil. He is particularly resentful of the ridicule that Dr. 
Williams is so fond of aiming at him and others in the Federation in his 
performances at the "University" of Woodford Square. The little Doctor seems to be 
particularly adept at antagonizing those from whom he should be looking for 
support. In a clumsy attempt to bypass the Government of Jamaica he published in 
the Jamaica Gleaner a summary of his efforts in Woodford Square when he suggested 
that Jamaica was being too emotional over the question of Federation and not 
sufficiently trustful of its partners. Apart from the fact that the printed version of his 
speech did not include the asides and innuendoes which are the particularly 
irritating features of any speech made by the little Doctor, Manley undoubtedly 
resented this invasion of Jamaican politics by trying to get at the public through the 
use of the press. 
15. Moreover, Manley is also reported to be furious at the decision to establish an 
agricultural school and subsequently an engineering school of the University College 
of the West Indies, in Trinidad. Here again the Jamaicans tend to see the University 
as a personification of the ganging up of the other islands against Jamaica. The new 
principal of the U.C.W.I. is a St. Lucian and the registrar is a Barbadian. Now, 
Trinidad is to receive two of the new and important schools of the University. This is 
resented, particularly since the decision to establish these schools in Trinidad 
followed on the offer of a heavy financial contribution by Trinidad to the U.C.W.I. 
Although this was made without strings, it is generally believed that the Trinidad 
contribution was made on the supposition that these two schools would be set up in 
Trinidad. 
16. I have discussed in this despatch the attitude of Jamaica towards these 
problems. I do not mean to imply that all the Federation needs is for Jamaica to agree 
to a policy for it to be acceptable to the others. Such a course is very far from the 
case. However, the Jamaicans have been working hard and intelligently and appear to 
have convinced most of the small islands, if not Barbados and Trinidad, that their 
approach to these problems is not only fair but logical. The small islands tended, at 
the start of this controversy, to back Trinidad's point of view without much thought 
as to the effects of customs union, Dominion Status now, etc. The Ministers and 
officials that the small islands have sent to these meetings have been educated to a 
surprising extent with the result that Trinidad may find itself virtually in isolation 
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when the plenary constitutional review conference meets. (It is unlikely that the 
committee's work will be finished by March 31st and it is doubtful if the plenary 
session will now be convened before May.) 
17. The Trinidad officials appear to have cooperated well in the committees and 
recently Dr. Williams has remained surprisingly silent and in the wings. Indeed, he is 
seldom seen in public and one can hardly help but wonder what surprises he is 
"cooking up" in his fertile brain. We have heard nothing more recently about 
Dominion Status on April 22nd and there is no doubt that this date will come and go 
before the plenary session has been able to consider the reports of its committees on 
this question. 
18. It may be that Dr. Williams' silence and general withdrawal from the battle is 
nothing more than his preoccupation with his budget, but I do not think that there is 
much doubt that if the plenary session runs into difficulties it will be because of 
Trinidad rather than of Jamaica. Certainly Dr. Williams has gone out on a limb to the 
point where it would be difficult for any normal person to climb back safely and 
without losing dignity and prestige. We have seen enough of his method of working, 
however, to know that this is precisely the sort of operation at which he is 
particularly clever. The Jamaicans seem to feel that the committees will have worked 
out so much evidence in support of the gradual approach to these problems that Dr. 
Williams will have no alternative but to agree. 
19. I cannot find any suggestion that Manley has any firm ideas for the timing of 
Dominion Status. I rather imagine that once the questions of representation, 
customs union and taxation are decided Jamaica and the other islands will then take 
into account the various problems that independence will present to them-
economic and political-and set about trying to make the necessary adjustments 
with the United Kingdom that will enable them to bring Dominion Status to the 
Federation as soon as possible. I am sure that Manley, and others of a conservative 
turn of mind, must be well aware of the danger of holding off too long, even though 
there may be good economic reasons for doing so. 
20. As a matter of interest I have obtained a copy of the Report on the Ministerial 
Working Party of Ministers that agreed on the formula for representation by 
population. You might like to have a copy of this for your files and it is attached.3 
3 Not printed. 
122 CO 103113505, no 19 28 Mar 1960 
[US financial assistance]: CO record of a meeting with I White1 on the 
question of US financial assistance to the federation [Extract] 
... 15. Mr. Gore!! Bames set out the future economic problems of The West Indies 
as now seen by H.M.G. There would be both a budgetary and a development aspect 
and the financial gap to be covered would be larger than the U.K. was likely to be able 
to deal with single-handed. We had had in mind to suggest to the U.S. and Canadian 
1 Ivan Bertis White, US deputy assistant secretary of state for European affairs, 1959- 1962. White 
represented the US in the negotiations over bases and it was envisaged that he would be appointed US 
ambassador to the West lndies Federation when it achieved independence. 
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Governments that we should examine this problem together, and the Canadian 
Government had asked to be informed of the outcome of the present talk. Any multi-
lateral aid which it might be agreed to provide would presumably have to be on the 
basis that the budgetary deficit would be. solved by The West Indies within a 
reasonably short time. 
16. Mr. White said that the region was viable in the long run. It was not starting 
from scratch. His Government hoped that the U.K.'s development programme would 
continue. They were, however, anxious lest the appurtenances of sovereignty, 
particularly in the field of defence, which could make almost limitless demands, 
should consume a disproportionate share of the Federation's resources. 
17. Mr. Mamham explained that it had always been intended to provide a two 
battalion land force of which one battalion had already been formed. It had now 
become accepted that they would also need a small Navy to patrol their waters and 
ferry troops. This would be very small consisting of minesweepers or similar craft. 
We had never expected they would provide more than a trip-wire defence force, and 
we had in mind a U.K.-West Indies Defence Agreement which would safeguard them 
and at the same time give us the continued use of facilities needed for our continuing 
commitments in the non-federated territories. Mr. White said it would be interesting 
to know if the Federation intended to join the Organisation of American States, and 
assume the complicated defence applications of membership of that body. 
18. Mr. Gore!! Bames asked what economic assistance the Americans might give. 
Mr. White said it would be supplementary to what the U.K. gave and on the same 
lines as now. For reasons of Congressional control it could only be given from year to 
year: no longer-term commitments would be possible. Mr. Gore!! Bames said it 
should not be assumed that it would be easier to get money out of the U.K. 
Parliament than out of Congress; in this respect both of us were in the same position. 
He asked, however, whether it would help Mr. White if we were to send him a Note on 
the emerging West Indian financial problem. Mr. White said that it would, 
particularly if it could indicate what our plans were for future aid. The U.K. had a 
long tradition of association with The West Indies and had considerable 
achievements in recent years. His Government hoped we would continue our efforts 
in this direction, while they would be glad to assist in a supplementary role. Mr. 
Gore!! Bames said we should certainly play our part but that it would be wrong to 
assume that we would be able to continue help after independence on the present 
scale. Mr. White said his Government did not want to give budgetary assistance. Mr. 
Mamham said that the budgetary problem was probably soluble in the long term if 
political decisions led to the re-mobilisation of the resources of the Federation. We, 
however, were certainly in for difficult negotiations in the period leading up to 
independence. Mr. Gore!! Bames asked if further U.S./U.K. discussions on this 
matter could usefully proceed. Mr. White thought that they could if carried out 
unostentatiously .... 
123 CO 103113521, no 21 [Mar 1960] 
'Colombo Plan for the Caribbean': CO note for Sir J Martin 
At a special session of the West Indian Conference in 1959, held under the auspices of 
the Caribbean Commission, a resolution was passed recommending that "the 
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Council of the Caribbean Organisation (when it is established) consider ... ways and 
means of developing for the Caribbean area a plan similar to the Colombo Plan". The 
moving spirit in getting this resolution adopted was Dr. La Corbiniere, the Deputy 
Prime Minister of the Federation. He reverted to the subject at the 30th meeting of 
the Caribbean Commission in 1960 and succeeded in persuading the Commission to 
give an instruction to the Secretary-General to make "all possible preparations . .. as 
a matter of urgency ... for consideration at an early date of ways and means" of 
developing a Colombo type plan for the Caribbean area. A resolution to the same 
effect was also adopted by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Atlantic 
Regional Conference meeting in Trinidad in Aprill960 and the matter has also been 
the subject of consideration in Parliament. 
Under arrangements made by the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Commission 
the subject is to be further discussed at a meeting of the Working Committee to be 
held in Washington on March 28th and 29th and at a meeting of the Working Group 
(which represents the island governments) in Puerto Rico in April. The Secretary-
General has asked Metropolitan Governments to indicate at the Working Committee 
meeting:-
(a) whether they would be prepared to participate as donors in a Caribbean plan; 
(b) whether they would like to invite other Governments to join them as donors 
in such a scheme, and 
(c) whether they would agree to appoint experts to the Secretariat of the 
Commission to work out the type of scheme which would meet the needs of the 
area and the wishes of the Governments concerned. 
The idea of a Colombo type plan in the Caribbean has never been welcomed with 
any enthusiasm in the Colonial Office. In the Caribbean itself Governments have only 
imperfectly understood how the Colombo plan itself works. Undoubtedly in the 
minds of Dr. La Corbiniere and others it would be a device for pouring into the area 
technical assistance and financial aid which would otherwise not be available. 
In a telegram which we have addressed to the Governor-General and the Governor 
of British Guiana we have referred to the paper produced by the Secretary-General 
and invited their comments. A copy of this telegram is attached. 1 
In any discussions with them on this subject the line to take is that we should have 
no objection to a Colombo type plan in the Caribbean provided that the following 
conditions were satisfied: -
(a) any aid we gave to the West Indies would have to be on a bilateral basis. We are 
not prepared to contribute to yet another international organisation which might 
pass aid to the West Indies on a multilateral basis; 
(b) the condition at (a) however is compatible with a Colombo type organisation. 
In fact this is the way the Colombo plan works. The West Indians however must 
understand that we should not be prepared to increase our aid to the Caribbean 
area simply because a new organisation was set up to channel it. It might simply 
mean that the aid which we were prepared to give to the West Indies might have to 
be shared around the Caribbean area generally. As compensation the West Indies 
of course might gain access to aid coming from other sources, e.g. France or 
Holland and it is for them to decide whether on balance they would be the gainers; 
1 Not printed. 
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(c) it is in our view an essential feature of the Colombo plan that all Governments 
should be donors as well as receivers. The West Indies might have something to 
offer to the other territories in the Caribbean (e.g. through the facilities of the 
University College of the West Indies or the Imperial College of Tropical 
Agriculture). They themselves already draw upon some of the facilities of Puerto 
Rico and may in future draw upon other facilities in the French and Dutch Islands. 
We however should like to know what are their views on this point; 
(d) it would hardly be possible to operate a Colombo type plan in the Caribbean 
unless this task were either made the principal job of the Secretariat of the 
Caribbean Organisation or given to a separate secretariat. Is this what the West 
Indies want? (From our point of view it might not be a bad thing if the principal 
task of the new organisation did become the running of a Colombo type plan. It 
would give them something specific to do which might prevent the organisation 
sinking to the level of an international debating society passing resolutions on all 
kinds of subjects embarrassing to the Metropolitan Powers). 
124 CO 103113058, no 11 9 Apr 1960 
[Chaguaramas]: letter from SirE Beetham (Trinidad) to Dr Williams 
urging caution over the proposed demonstration for the return of 
Chaguaramas 
[A PNM convention in Mar 1960 decided on a public demonstration to dramatise 
Trinidad's demand for the return of Chaguaramas. Militants wanted a march on the base 
itself or perhaps an 'invasion' launched from a fishing fleet. Instead it was decided to 
march to the US Consulate. The date chosen was 22 April. Vast crowds, estimated at 
between 15,000 to 35,000, one of the largest demonstrations ever seen in Trinidad, 
assembled in the rain in Woodford Square. The Trinidad flag was raised and the 'seven 
deadly sins', documents symbolising colonialism and including the 1941 lease 
agreement, were ceremonially burnt. From Woodford Square, Williams led a procession 
to the US Consulate where he read and presented a petition demanding the release of 
Chaguaramas. Despite the vast crowds and a heavy police presence, the demonstration 
passed without incident.] 
I feel that I should write to you personally about the enclosed letters1 regarding the 
proposed demonstration on the 22nd April, and let you have my own personal views. 
Let me say at the outset that there can, in my view, in a democratic country, never 
be any objection whatever to public demonstrations, provided that they do not lead 
to a breach of the peace or to other citizens being caused to apprehend that there 
may be a breach of the peace. I am sure that so far we are on common ground. 
I am sure also we are on common ground in desiring that any demonstration that 
may take place should not cause any injury to persons or property-in other words 
that the demonstration should be "peaceful". 
I understand that a very considerable number of people are likely to take part. I do 
not know whether it is the intention that the demonstration should take place in 
Woodford Square or other large space, or whether there will be a march to the United 
States Naval Base or to the United States Consulate-General. In the case of a 
demonstration, say, in Woodford Square, I see no difficulty in view of the peaceful 
1 Not printed. 
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and orderly manner in which the P.N.M. have held meetings attended by enormous 
numbers of persons in Woodford Square for over four years. 
If, however, the intention is "to march", I think I must point out the difficulty 
there must inevitably be in ensuring that a very large crowd of people who are "on 
the move" all behave in an orderly manner. It is certainly not impossible to keep 
order and discipline, but it is not nearly so easy, and I would hope therefore that it 
might be possible for the demonstration to be held in Woodford Square and for small 
delegations to be despatched from that meeting to present themselves to the United 
States Consul-General or any other person or persons. 
There is something else I feel that I must add. It is to endorse the remark of the 
Consul-General that any disorderly conduct directed at the United States 
Government must have the effect of nullifying to a great extent the efforts being 
made to settle amicably the problems which confront us vis-a-vis the United States. 
Having worked in the States you will know Americans far better than I, but I 
personally believe that little could be more calculated to make them "stick their toes 
in", so far as Trinidad is concerned, than an unfriendly demonstration directed 
against them. And this would make our task of reaching agreement on our 
outstanding problems a hundredfold more difficult. I realise that the question of 
holding a demonstration and whether it will be static or "on the move" and where it 
will be held is solely a matter for your Party, but I should not feel at all happy-for as 
you know, I am a great believer in the future of Trinidad and Tobago-if I did not 
take the liberty of giving you such advice and counsel as I am able. 
I know full well that you and your colleagues are worried about the position vis-a-
vis the Americans. I share fully your anxieties and appreciate the weighty and 
difficult problems with which you are faced. I am off for the week-end to Tobago to 
get some of my own belongings sorted out and packed up, but I shall be returning on 
Tuesday evening, and I shall be only too glad to give any advice that I possibly can. 
Finally, should it be decided that a march should take place, may I ask you-as you 
did so effectively on the night of the 1956 General Election-to use all the influence 
at your command to ensure that the demonstration is orderly and peaceful? 
125 CO 103113261, no 43 15 May 1960 
[Federation]: outward telegram no 248 from Mr Macleod to Lord 
Hailes on the introduction of Cabinet government in the federation 
and the question of financial assistance over a transitional period 
Constitutional Proposals. 
Following is text of despatch which I am sending on this subject. 
Begins. I have the honour to inform you that in the course of discussions with the 
Prime Minister of The West Indies during his recent visit to London I undertook at 
his request to join with your Government in drawing up a statement, in terms agreed 
by us both, which could be made to the Federal Legislature and which would indicate 
the position now reached in regard to the introduction of Cabinet Government and 
the achievement of independence. This despatch, in the terms of which your 
Government has concurred, reflects that undertaking. 
2. It will be recalled that in January I agreed in principle and indeed welcomed 
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the introduction of Cabinet Government subject to the concurrence of the govern-
ments of the federated territories and to agreement on the details of the Federal 
Government's proposals. I understand that the governments of the federated terri-
tories have agreed to the proposal. I received an advance copy of the Federal 
Government's detailed proposals earlier this month. These are now being urgently 
studied and I hope to send you my comments in the near future . I fully appreciate 
the importance attached by the Federal Government to an early settlement of this 
matter, and will do my utmost to facilitate an early implementation of the 
decisions. 
3. The final constitutional goal of the Federation is, of course, the achievement 
of independence within the Commonwealth. However, the Conference of West Indian 
Governments which was held last autumn in Trinidad disclosed considerable 
differences of opinion between the political leaders of The West Indies on the 
constitutional framework of the Federation. These problems were remitted to Inter-
Governmental Committees which I understand have made steady progress towards 
their solution. I greatly hope, therefore, that when the Conference of West Indian 
Governments meets again it will be possible to reach agreement on all the 
outstanding issues including the proposal of a date for independence. I assume that 
the next step- and one which need not be long in following-would be to convene 
the Constitutional Conference provided for in Article 118 of the Federal 
Constitution. The concern of H.M.G. at this Conference will be not to urge that the 
Federal constitution should take one form rather than another, which is a question 
for West Indians to determine, but rather to satisfy themselves that the chosen form 
of federation is one capable of assuring effective sovereignty and that the date 
proposed for independence is practicable in the light of the time required to carry 
out the legal and other steps necessary for the transfer of sovereignty. I have 
informed your Government of the criteria which would enable H.M.G. to be so 
satisfied. 
4. The question of admission to membership of the Commonwealth is, of course, 
one which must, as in all previous similar instances, be decided by the existing 
members of the Commonwealth as a whole. As soon as a date for independence has 
been agreed, H.M.G. in the U.K. is willing and ready to sponsor the federation for 
membership. 
5. I am aware of the concern which is felt in some quarters in The West Indies 
lest independence should be delayed by the financial problems to which it may well 
give rise. On becoming independent The West Indies will of course continue to be 
eligible for assistance from international bodies, and they will also become eligible 
for Commonwealth assistance loans or any such system as may be generally in 
operation at the time, on the same footing as other less-developed independent 
members of the Commonwealth within the sterling area. 
6. While independence implies an ability to stand on one's own feet financially as 
well as politically, and it is understood to be the intention of the Government of The 
West Indies to do so as soon as possible, H.M.G. recognise that The West Indies may 
not be able to assume at once the whole weight of the fi nancial burdens which would 
normally fall to an independent member of the Commonwealth. If this proves to be 
so, H.M.G. will be ready to consult with the Government of The West Indies and to 
consider with them ways in which help might be given over a transitional period. 
Ends. 
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126 CO 103114269, no 26/27 2 June 1960 
[Federation]: outward telegram no 138 from Mr Macleod to Lord 
Hailes on how the secretary of state proposes to respond to questions 
during his visit to the West Indies1 
[At the Jamaican elections in July 1959 (see 88, note 2), Bustamante made federation an 
election issue and threatened secession if he won. Manley took the line (a) that seats in 
the federal assembly should be allocated according to population, and (b) that federal 
control should not extend to economic development or taxation. In Nov 1959 Manley 
rejected a call for an immediate referendum in Jamaica on federation which he said would 
be 'a betrayal of responsibility'; a referendum would be held only if the Jamaican 
government decided to 'get out'. Manley urged Hailes in May 1960 to resist any move to 
dissolve the federal assembly and to hold new elections. This he said would mean the end 
of federation as eighty per cent in Jamaica would vote for secession. Matters came to a 
head in Jamaica on 31 May 1960 when Bustamante announced his resignation as 
president of the FDLP, the withdrawal of his candidature for a federal by-election and his 
'irrevocable decision' to take Jamaica out of federation. On the same day Manley 
announced in the Jamaican House of Representatives his government's decision to 
introduce a bill to provide for a referendum in Jamaica (in 1961) after the inter-
governmental conference had completed its business. Manley argued that the 
opposition's decision to oppose federation had created a new situation in Jamaica and it 
was now appropriate that the issue should be put before the people (CO 1031/4269, CO 
summary of events leading to the Jamaican referendum, nd) . A Jamaican intelligence 
report for May-June 1960 commented on the decision to hold a referendum: 'One thing is 
certain-for those who believe in the future of Federation it is a gamble. It is stating the 
obvious to say that a referendum held now could only have one result, a vote against 
continued participation, and almost certainly by a wide margin' (CO 1031/3708, no 28). 
In the debate on the referendum bill in July 1960 Manley made it clear that his party 
would not regard the referendum vote as one of confidence and that his government 
would not resign if the decision were in favour of secession. Before the referendum was 
held, he promised that he would place before the country a statement on the estimated 
cost of independence for Jamaica alone compared with that of membership of the 
federation and he ended with 'a rousing call for the establishment of a West Indian nation' 
(ibid, no 34, Jamaican intelligence report for July 1960).] 
My immediately preceding telegram. 
After saying that I am anxious to see for myself how things are going on in West 
Indies and also to resume discussions on Trinidad constitution I would continue on 
following lines. 
Begins. One thing I should like to make clear, particularly in view of developments 
in last few days, is that I have not (repeat not) come in any way to urge any particular 
view about shape of Federation or pace at which it should advance to independence. 
That is something for you in West Indies to settle. I and my colleagues are of course 
concerned that any country which we are asked to sponsor for membership of the 
Commonwealth should have at least the essential attributes of sovereignty for it to be 
recognised by the Commonwealth and the world as a sovereign nation. But if those 
conditions are met, as I am quite sure they can be, then as soon as you in The West 
Indies are agreed on the kind of independent Federation you want you will find us 
ready and willing to help you achieve it. Ends. 
2. Supplementaries would be dealt with on following lines. 
Q.l. Does this apply to Jamaica if it decides to secede. 
A.l. U.K. Ministers are notoriously reluctant to answer hypothetical questions. 
1 Macleod visited the West Indies in June 1960. 
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Q.2. Does this mean you will not discuss future of Federation at all. 
A.2. It looks as if a good deal of discussion among yourselves is needed before I 
take a hand. But if any of those whom I shall be meeting want to tell me 
what they think I am sure you will not (repeat not) want me to refuse to 
listen. 
Q.3. What do you think of proposed referendum. 
A.3. That is decision for Jamaica and not one for me to question. 
Q.4. What are essential attributes of sovereignty. 
A.4. See Jamaica Ministry paper No. 3 of 22nd February.2 
Q.5. Will H.M.G. help financially after independence. 
A.5. See despatch read in Federal House by Prime Minister on 16th May, (my 
telegram No. 248).3 
2 cf ll8, para 5. 3 See 125. 
127 CO 1031/4269, no 35 4 June 1960 
[Jamaica and federation]: CO record of a meeting in Jamaica between 
Mr Macleod and a JLP delegation led by Sir A Bustamante 
The Secretary of State said that he had no agenda for the meeting. He wanted to hear 
the views of the J.L.P. 
2. Sir Alexander Bustamante invited Mr. Lightbourne to speak on behalf of the 
J.L.P. with special reference to Federation. 
3. Mr. Lightboume said that the smaller Islands seemed to regard Federation as 
a means of solving their problems overnight. The J.L.P. did not believe in Federation 
while the smaller Islands lacked the means of self-development. There was nothing 
inconsistent between earlier support of Federation and opposition now that this 
essential pre-condition had not been met. They would need to see a phased 
programme of help after independence with strong support from the U.K. as well as 
any possible help which might be forthcoming from the United States or Canada. 
4. Sir Alexander Bustamante said that the failure of Federation went right back 
to 1947. When Mr. Creech Jones was asked1 how the Federation was to be financed he 
had said that he had not come to discuss financial but political Federation. The same 
attitude had been maintained by successive governments in the U.K. The U.K. 
appeared to have more interest in Federation than Jamaica did. It looks as though 
England expected 3,000,000 hungry people to make a success of Federation without 
financial help, and nothing substantial had been done to make Federation a practical 
possibility. He was loyal to the U.K. but his first loyalty must be to Jamaica. 
5. Professor Lewis2 had said that £50,000,000 would be needed in the first ten 
1 ie at the Montego Bay conference, see 6, note 2. 
2 (Sir) W Arthur Lewis (Kt 1963); economist; born St Lucia; taught at London School of Economics, 
1938- 1947; temporary principal, Board of Trade, 1943; CO, 1944; Stanley Jevons professor of political 
economy, Manchester University, 1948- 1958; consultant to Caribbean Commission, 1949; economic 
adviser to prime minister of Ghana, 1957- 1958; principal, UCWI, 1959-1962; vice chancellor, University 
of West lndies, 1962- 1963; professor of public and international affairs, Princeton University, 1963-1968. 
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years to get the smaller Islands on a basis of economic advance and not merely on a 
basis of maintenance (which was all that was possible on existing funds) . But the 
money was not there, and Jamaica and Trinidad, already poor, could not finance the 
development of the smaller Islands. Their people were already forced to emigrate to 
the U.K. even though food and housing were difficult to come by. As Sir Alexander 
saw it, Trinidad and Jamaica would have to find £3,000,000 a year for the smaller 
Islands as a result of the argument [sic] of the grant-in-aid. It was true that the U.K. 
Government had said, and the Governor-General had confirmed, that independence 
would come only when the Islands were economically sound, but on this sort of basis 
there would be an indefinite delay. 
6. Mr. Lightboume said that the main point was that the people of Jamaica must 
be given faith that the smaller Islands would be got on their feet before Federation 
could be made to appear worthwhile to them. 
7. The Secretary of State said he would like to make it clear that Federation was 
something which should be decided about in the West Indies. He read the text of the 
short broadcast which he had recorded that morning, including the following 
passage:-
"I have not come in any way to urge any particular view about the shape of 
Federation or indeed about the pace at which it should advance to 
independence. That is something for you in the West Indies to settle. Now, 
naturally, I and my colleagues in Her Majesty's Government are concerned 
that any country which we are asked to sponsor for membership of the 
Commonwealth should have at least the essential attributes of sovereignty for 
it to be recognised by the Commonwealth and the world as a sovereign state. 
But if those conditions are met, and indeed I am quite sure they can be, then 
as soon as you in the West Indies are agreed on the kind of independent 
Federation you will find us ready and willing to help you achieve it. But the 
fi rst decisions are, let me emphasize again, for you." 
8. He was not here to reproach, or to approve, what Sir Alexander Bustamante 
and Mr. Manley had said. He accepted that the people of Jamaica would deliberate on 
these questions. He was, and would remain, a genuine neutral. 
9. The Secretary of State asked whether, supposing money to meet the status 
outlined by Sir Alexander were available, the J.L.P. would support Federation 
politically. 
10. Sir Alexander and Mr. Lightboume, in consultation and after some 
hesitation, said that their thought on this was not settled; but the availability of the 
funds might affect their view. There were, however, other difficulties in connection 
with Federation:-
(a) A Customs Union would present difficulties because Trinidad could produce 
more cheaply than Jamaica, owing to lower taxes, etc. 
(b) There was a fear that the powers given to the Governor-General in relation to 
essential services and emergencies would take the control of internal affairs in 
Jamaica out of local hands. 
(c) Jamaica was the most advanced country politically in the Caribbean (also one 
of the most advanced countries in the Commonwealth). She had had more than 
half the people in the Federation, but she would not have a majority of seats and 
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would be subject to the dictates of the smaller Islands which "had not even learnt 
to put on their nappies". Furthermore, representation on a population basis would 
not solve the problem because, as Mr. Tavares3 pointed out, the population of 
Trinidad was increasing much more quickly than that of Jamaica, and the time is 
coming when she would be outnumbered. 
(d) Federation would not make for economic strength. The U.K. could always 
obtain more cheaply elsewhere any of the products which she imported from the 
West Indies. This would be true even if (as Sir Alexander expected) British Guiana 
became willing to join Federation. 
11. In these circumstances it was difficult to see what advantages there would be 
for Jamaica in Federation. The Secretary of State asked what would happen if 
Federation did not go ahead. Mr. Sangster and Sir Alexander Bustamante explained 
that they would hope for the achievement of complete self-government within the 
Commonwealth. Jamaica was a small unit, smaller in population and resources than 
some present or immediately prospective members, but they thought that she was 
worthy of membership. Mr. Manley had been reported as saying that such a solution 
was Jamaica's for the asking and they would like to know if the Secretary of State 
agreed with this. 
12. The Secretary of State pointed out that membership of the Commonwealth 
was not a matter within the individual decision of Her Majesty's Government. The 
Secretary of State in summing up the discussion asked whether it was the view of the 
J.L.P. that because of the representation in the Federation, and the economic 
burdens which would follow, they did not feel that they could advise the people of 
Jamaica to go ahead in present circumstances. Sir Alexander Bustamante agreed 
that this represented their views. Mr. Sangster said that this was so, and that they 
were fortified by the absence of British Guiana, difficulties over the site of the capital, 
possible damage to the economy of Jamaica and the burden of administrative costs. 
13. The Secretary of State thanked the J.L.P. representatives for expressing their 
views. 
3 D C Tavares, honorary secretary, JLP. 
128 CO 103113261, no 60 15 June 1960 
[Federation]: CO record of a meeting in Trinidad between Mr Macleod 
and federal ministers [Extract] 
Item 2- Continuation of grant-aid and C.D. & W. assistance after dominion status 
The Minister of Finance opened the discussion on the matter of continuation of 
grant aid and C.D. & W. assistance after Dominion Status. He referred to Section 3 
of the British Caribbean Federation Act, 1956, which made it permissive for the 
Secretary of State to make to the Government of the Federation "a grant of such 
amount as he may, with the approval of the Treasury, determine, for the purpose of 
enabling the Federal Government to make grants to the governments of colonies 
for the time being included in the said federation whose resources are, in the opin-
ion of the Federal Government, insufficient to enable them to defray their adminis-
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trative expenses". The Minister of Finance wished to know whether it was the inten-
tion of Her Majesty's Government to extend to the Federal Government after 
Independence such necessary financial aid as has been normally accorded to other 
newly independent states. The Secretary of State in reply referred to the statement 
in his telegram of 15th May1 which he read to the meeting, and said that there was 
no change in the position. He said however that it was not in his view possible to 
determine the precise form and amount of financial assistance until the final 
Independence Conference since this would inevitably depend on the circumstances 
of the time and in particular to [sic] the nature of the Federal constitution which 
would emerge from the adjourned Inter-Governmental Conference. While 
"Colonial" types of aid must, of necessity, cease on Independence, there were sure 
to be new avenues of assistance from which the new Federation could draw: and it 
might well be that the total amount of such assistance would be no less than at pre-
sent. 
The Minister of Finance then spoke of development capital aid. He said that 
statements such as those made by the Governor-General at the opening of the Inter-
Governmental Conference2 had raised doubts in peoples' minds as to H.M.G's real 
intentions regarding financial aid to The West Indies for development after 
Independence, and this matter had been the subject of frequent references by the 
Opposition. He said that a forthright statement by the Secretary of State would go a 
long way towards meeting these doubts and criticisms with which Federal Ministers 
had to deal. The Minister also referred to the emigration of West Indians to the 
United Kingdom, which was regretted by Federal Ministers as much as by the United 
Kingdom since it deprived the area of much of its best material. He said that this 
reflected an urgent need for development in the territories, especially those with a 
shortage of labour such as Montserrat and Dominica. 
The Secretary of State in reply referred to his statement made to the Jamaica 
delegation to London in January 1960,3 which he thought was sufficiently 
reassuring, but promised to make a further statement to the same effect at his Press 
Conference on 18th June. He said that while he had no doubt that The West Indies 
would eventually achieve financial independence, this would inevitably take time, 
and Her Majesty's Government would certainly not abrogate their responsibilities to 
The West Indies when political independence (which must take place in advance of 
finanCial independence) was achieved. 
Referring to the Secretary of State's remark that decisions on the precise nature 
and amount of United Kingdom aid must await the results of the Inter-Governmental 
Conference one Minister pointed out that customs union would inevitably entail a 
loss of revenue for the Units. Taken together with H.M.G's original undertaking to 
allocate grants in aid for a 10 year period, he felt that this justified a continuation of 
such grants in aid for the full period. Another Minister stressed that it was important 
to dispel the impression being created by the anti-federation group in Jamaica that 
all financial aid would be lost to The West Indies on Independence. 
One member referred to the amount of C.D. & W. assistance which had been 
granted to Jamaica for the current five-year period and said that grave concern had 
been caused by the smallness of this amount, and that this had done harm to the 
1 See 125. 2 cf 89. 3 See 117. 
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cause of federation in Jamaica.4 He pointed out that Jamaica was faced with serious 
financial and economic problems, and mentioned the much higher degree of 
unemployment compared with other territories. He urged that everything possible 
should be done to help Jamaica in view of its special difficulties. The Secretary of 
State replied that he felt it was important for the Federal Government to retain 
responsibility for the allocation of C.D. & W. monies to The West Indies, and in 
discharging this responsibility to assess priorities for development capital as between 
the various Units. Another member said that there was general dissatisfaction in The 
West Indies over the tapering of C.D. & W. monies and suggested that there should 
be an increased allocation. The Secretary of State said that he feared there was no 
prospect of this. 
Item 3 - United Kingdom assistance for West India Regiment accommodation at 
Longdenville 
The Secretary of State said that a draft despatch had already been prepared in the 
Colonial Office to the effect that H.M.G. would be prepared to assist towards the cost 
of the construction of barracks, subject to certain conditions such as that the 
estimates should not exceed a ceiling of £1.2 millions and that the largest practicable 
Federal contribution should be made towards the cost. 
The Minister of Finance said that he welcomed the Secretary of State's statement 
and would look forward to receiving the despatch. He referred to certain reports from 
the "Jamaica Gleaner" to the effect that Russia was building a base for jet aircraft in 
Cuba, and that Cubans were believed to be implicated in the Henry treason5 case in 
Jamaica. He said that because of the disturbed state of affairs in Cuba and certain 
4 The West Indies were awarded £9,000,000 under the 1959 CD&W Act. The federal government's 
allocation to Jamaica was £250,000. Only Trinidad (£100,000), the Cayman Islands (£50,000) and the 
Turks and Caicos Islands (£100,000) received less. The main beneficiaries were the federal government 
(£2,115,000), Dominica (£1,000,000) and St Lucia and St Kitts (£900,000 each). It had been deliberate 
policy on the part of the CO to make the whole allocation to the federal government; this was intended 'to 
strengthen its power and authority and status vis a vis the unit Governments' (CO 103112955, minute by 
Macpherson, 23 Apr 1959). When details of the sub-allocations to the units reached the CO, Marnham 
minuted: ' . .. the Federal Government proposes to be far more drastic towards Jamaica and Trinidad than 
we in even our fiercest moments had ever contemplated. This is undoubtedly a justifiable and indeed 
praiseworthy application of the pure milk of economic doctrine, and if after full consideration the Federal 
Government want to stick to it and face the flaming row which it is practically certain to provoke in 
Jamaica and Trinidad I think we should probably agree. But I doubt whether we ought to do so without 
spelling out the consequences officially . . . .' (ibid, minute by Marnham, 7 Sept 1959). Jamaica did lodge a 
protest (ibid, no 65, Blackburne despatch no 499 to Hailes, 27 Oct 1959) but the allocations remained 
unchanged. 
5 C V Henry was a fifty-seven-year-old Jamaican who left Jamaica for the US in 1956 but who returned a 
year later to lead the Rastafarian 'Back to Africa' campaign which threatened violence if its demands for 
government assistance were not met. With thirty-eight followers , Henry was arrested in Apr 1960 and 
charged under the Treason Felony Law. He had been found in possession of home-made weapons and 
correspondence from his son, Reynold Henry, containing references to plots and risings. At C V Henry's 
headquarters the police claimed to have found a letter to Castro inviting him to take over in Jamaica but 
Reynold Henry was not one of the letter's signatories (CO 103113708, no 18, Jamaica Intelligence Report, 
Apr 1960). CV Henry and fourteen of his followers were found guilty and sentenced to varying terms of 
imprisonment (ibid, no 41, Jamaica Intelligence Report, Oct 1960). In June 1960 Reynold Henry was 
arrested with four others and charged with the murders of three Rastafarians and two soldiers from the 
Royal Hampshire Regiment. He was found guilty, sentenced to death and executed (ibid, nos 38 & 39, 
Jamaica Intelligence Reports, May-June & Aug-Sept 1960). 
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other non-British territories in the Caribbean, the defence of The West Indies must 
be a matter which was already claiming H.M.G's urgent attention, and that he felt it 
called for early discussions between Her Majesty's Government, the United States of 
America and the Federal Government. The Minister also referred to Her Majesty's 
Government position vis-a-vis British Guiana and British Honduras and to the 
possibility that a small sea force might also be required as well, particularly for the 
protection of Jamaica, Trinidad having already taken steps to obtain some patrol 
vessels for its own use. 
The Secretary of State agreed that the provision of accommodation for the West India 
Regiment was only one aspect of the overall defence situation. He said that H.M.G. would 
be willing to have discussions with the Federal Government as soon as the latter were 
ready. Such consultations could take place separately from the negotiations connected 
with the Inter-Governmental Conference and the final Independence Conference. The 
Minister of Finance felt that it might be necessary to hold such discussions even before 
the resumption of the Inter-Governmental Conference .... 
Item 5- Protective devices for West Indian commodities in United Kingdom market 
consequent on dollar liberalisation 
At the invitation of the Secretary of State the Minister of Trade and Industry 
introduced these matters and suggested that they be taken together. He said that at 
the outset he wished to make clear two points:-
(a) that the Federal Government was fully aware of the difficult position in which 
Her Majesty's Government were placed vis-a-vis the special trade situation in 
Europe and world trade as a whole; 
(b) that, while it was generally agreed that some form of continuing financial 
assistance would be needed by The West Indies on the attainment of 
Independence, it was often not fully realised, even in the United Kingdom, that it 
would be equally important to have assurances as to the marketing of West Indian 
products in the United Kingdom. Otherwise the whole stability of the Federation 
would be threatened. 
The Minister then turned to the effects of dollar liberalisation on West Indian trade 
and said that he had constantly pointed out to the Colonial Office and the Board of 
Trade that dollar liberalisation would affect The West Indies considerably and would 
lead to severe competition from the United State. Owing to the size of the American 
citrus industry, and the advantages which it enjoyed of a large domestic market and a 
government subsidy, American citrus was able to undersell West Indian citrus even 
in The West Indies although the West Indian product was in no way inferior. The 
American surplus for export was only a small fraction of the total production but 
even this represented a much larger quantity than the whole of The West Indies 
production. In these circumstances it was not possible to invoke the provision under 
GATT for unfair treatment and some other way must be found of dealing with the 
problem. He felt that it was a responsibility of Her Majesty's Government, having 
encouraged development in The West Indies, to assist in keeping open the markets 
for West Indian products. This constituted The West Indies case against complete 
dollar liberalisation on the part of the United Kingdom. 
The Minister also pointed out that dollar liberalisation would also have serious 
effects in respect of The West Indies banana industry, in that it would enable 
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American fruit to be imported more freely, and although such imports would not 
include bananas their effect would be to depress the consumption of West Indian 
bananas in the United Kingdom. From all angles, therefore, dollar liberalisation 
presented a serious challenge to the economy of The West Indies. 
He then referred to the European market, and said that it was appreciated that the 
United Kingdom Government had been concerned to avoid becoming involved in a man-
ner which would prejudice the position of Commonwealth producers. However, it now 
appeared uncertain whether the United Kingdom would be able to remain outside the 
European association. The West Indies were accordingly anxious to know what Her 
Majesty's Government would be able to do in respect of these two problems which he 
had described. This led to the suggestion contained in Item 4, namely, that considera-
tion should be given to the establishment of a Free Trade Area with the United Kingdom. 
The Federal Government had no authority from any unit territory to pursue this mat-
ter, but they would like to examine the possibility with Her Majesty's Government on a 
purely exploratory basis as a possible way of meeting the problems which he had men-
tioned. They would also like consideration to be given to a similar proposal for Canada. 
The Secretary of State said that he fully agreed with the Minister as to the 
importance of the matters which he had mentioned to the economy of The West 
Indies. He referred to the United Kingdom Government's original attitude towards 
the proposal for a Common Market and the efforts which had been made to widen the 
scope of the proposal into one for a Free Trade Area. Unfortunately it had not proved 
possible to gain acceptance of this wider proposal. The present situation was 
admittedly very serious, and it was likely to prove most difficult to reconcile the 
United Kingdom's desire not to lose its share of the European market on which it was 
to a large extent dependant [sic] with the maintenance of Commonwealth interests. 
As regards the suggestion of Free Trade Areas between The West Indies and the 
United Kingdom, and The West Indies and Canada, he was inclined to doubt whether 
this could present a full answer to the problems. In point of fact he did not think that 
the Common Market represented a really significant danger to The West Indies. 
There was comparatively little trade between the countries concerned at present and 
The West Indies, apart from the special connection between France and the French 
territories. Moreover, the position of sugar was safeguarded by the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement and that of oil by international understandings, neither of which 
would be affected by the establishment of the Common Market in Europe; and indeed 
in some cases the position of these industries might be strengthened. Bananas and 
citrus were at present protected by dollar quotas, and although Her Majesty's 
Government had gone a long way towards liberalisation they would not remove these 
quotas unless alternative arrangements could be made. In this connection the 
Secretary of State said that the position of the West Indian industries concerned had 
constantly received special consideration by the British Cabinet whenever this 
question had come up. He mentioned that in the case of bananas the preference had 
already been increased in anticipation of liberalisation. 
The Secretary of State concluded by saying that his answers to the Minister's 
remarks could be summed up as follows:-
(a) he agreed with his analysis of the situation and the increasing difficulty 
presented to The West Indies, and that it was essential to safeguard the interests of 
Commonwealth producers; 
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(b) as regards the dangers posed by the establishment of a European Common 
Market, he and his department would gladly engage in talks with representatives of 
The West Indies as to the possible establishment of a Free Trade Area, but 
although there was no objection in principle it did not appear to him that this 
would provide the right approach to the difficulties; and 
(c) it seemed to him more important to consider the position of specific products 
such as citrus and how they could best be protected. 
The Minister of Trade and Industry, in reply, thanked the Secretary of State for his 
remarks and stressed that it was essential to think ahead in this matter to the 
attainment of Independence. He pointed out that apart from the products mentioned 
by the Secretary of State The West Indies had embarked on a programme of 
industrialisation which might well "snowball" into a considerable development, 
when entry into the United Kingdom markets for a number of other products would 
become increasingly important. He felt that no single solution could provide a 
complete answer to the various problems involved, and that a combination of 
measures would be necessary. The Secretary of State accepted the point made by the 
Minister, agreeing that this was of great importance . ... 
Item 8 - Other matters 
Senator Byfield raised the question of migration of West Indian labour to Britain. 
He said the Government were grateful to Her Majesty's Government for the fine 
work they were doing to assist the migrants, and that the territories were not 
unmindful of their responsibility in the matter and were doing their best in the 
screening of emigrants. Another Minister stressed that until The West Indies were 
able to produce more and thus raise standards of living, migration would con-
tinue. He felt that the basic need was for increased production and guaranteed 
markets. 
The Secretary of State said that he was not in any sense critical of the migrant 
problem and had indeed not initiated any discussion on it in any of the territories 
visited. He wished only to make two observations:-
(i) The state of the economy in Britain must be constantly borne in mind. It had 
been shown that there was a definite relation between the graph of economic 
activity and that of immigration. The trend was therefore not due only to 
economic factors in The West Indies. 
(ii) He was a great believer in Britain continuing its open-door policy. 
The Secretary of State was sure, however, that the Federal Government and other 
Governments in The West Indies would take note of some of the economic clouds on 
the horizon in Britain. The indications were that economic circumstances would 
shortly be less favourable for immigrants in view of a lower level of economic activity 
and the operation of the established "last in, first out" policy of employers and trade 
unions. In answer to a question from a member, the Secretary of State replied that 
the employment record of West Indians was good, and that there was no evidence of 
discrimination on the part of employers. A member referred to reports of political 
pressure being brought to bear on West Indians, but the Secretary of State said that if 
there was anything of this kind it was confined to very small political groups of no 
real significance. 
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129 CO 1031/3932 20 June 1960 
[Immigration]: minute by Miss M Z Terry1 arguing that the problem 
is one for the UK government, not local governments in the West 
Indies [Extract] 
Last December the Ministry of Labour made strong representations at our 
Committee on West Indian Immigrants about the unfavourable long-term prospects 
for the employment of unskilled coloured immigrants in this country and it was 
agreed that warning noises should be made to West Indian Governments. The 
Ministry of Labour considered the position to be potentially dangerous because 
employment prospects at present are exceptionally good and (probably because of 
this) there has been a sharp increase in West Indian immigration to this country in 
recent months. They feared that this might lead West Indian Governments to 
conclude that there was no need for the time being to discourage emigration to this 
country. The Ministry of Labour therefore thought it very important to draw 
attention to the less favourable long-term prospects and to suggest that because of 
them, local administrative measures to reduce the flow of migrants to this country 
should be maintained and if necessary strengthened. As a result of these 
representations we sent a despatch to all West Indian Governments on the 14th 
March. 
2. The Governor of British Guiana now tells us in hisS. and P. letter at (46) that 
when our despatch was discussed by his Executive Council it emerged that the 
measures on which local Ministers had agreed towards the end of 1958 had not been 
implemented by them: and the attitude was taken in regard to our current despatch 
that not only would Ministers not take the discouraging action which we have now 
suggested but that some of them at least would deliberately encourage would-be 
immigrants to come to the U.K. in order to relieve unemployment in British Guiana. 
The reactions of the Executive Council are summarised in paragraph 3 of (46). In 
short there is to be no local publicity by the B.G. Government about the 
unfavourable long-term prospects for the employment of unskilled immigrants in 
the U.K. 
3. This attitude is regrettable but not disastrous because taken on its own 
emigration from British Guiana to the U.K. is not greatly significant. I have not 
checked whether the figures quoted by Sir Ralph Grey in paragraph 4 of (46) tally 
exactly with our own records but they must be approximately correct and as such 
form a fairly negligible proportion of the total (the total excess of arrivals over 
departures was 23,016 in 1957, 15,023 in 1958, 16,393 in 1959 and 9,804 for the first 
four months of 1960). It would be very unfortunate if there should be a sudden sharp 
increase in emigration from British Guiana, but for the present I do not think that 
there is very much further that we can do to forestall such a development. ... There 
is no U.K. 1.0. in British Guiana itself but the U.K. 1.0. in Trinidad covers inter alia 
British Guiana. I am sure that he could not be asked to distribute publicity material 
about the unfavourable long-term employment prospects for unskilled coloured 
immigrants in the U.K. because it would obviously be dangerous to U.K. trade and 
1 CO from 1949; temporary principal, 1951; principal, 1961. 
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employment generally for U.K. Government officials to make public statements to 
this effect. In any case I understand that the possibility of using U.K. I.O.'s to 
discourage Colonial emigration to this country has been carefully examined and 
rejected in the past on other papers. For this and also other reasons the idea of 
distributing information through British shipping companies seems equally 
unacceptab I e. 
4. It is particularly difficult for us to press this further with British Guiana at 
present because the position is not (as Sir Ralph Grey suggests) that employment 
prospects here are already worsening. On the contrary, current reports from the 
Ministry of Labour show that unskilled coloured male immigrants are still finding 
jobs with relative ease (although the same is not unfortunately true of women). The 
real problem lies in the future . What is feared is that if the employment position 
should deteriorate in the future (and a significant deterioration is not anticipated 
until 1961 or even 1962, when the country will be faced simultaneously with the 
bulge in school-leavers and the end of National Service) not only will it then be 
difficult for new immigrants to find jobs, but those already in employment may very 
likely lose their jobs. In such circumstances there would very probably be a pressure 
campaign to the effect that "the blacks should be the first to be sacked" and this 
could easily spark off more intense racial friction than has so far been experienced. It 
is precisely because of this potential danger that the Ministry of Labour and other 
Departments are anxious to avoid the building up of an over-large coloured 
population now when times are good, which would become a potential source of 
racial friction later on. But it is still a potential rather than an actual danger and to 
this extent we are inhibited in our dealings with the Governments of non-self-
governing territories. 
5. In general it seems to me that there are considerable limitations to the extent 
to which West Indian Governments can help to solve this problem and accordingly to 
the extent to which we can usefully press local Ministers to adopt locally unpopular 
policies. The existence of large numbers of unskilled coloured immigrants in the 
U.K. is after all primarily a U.K. problem and as such it will in the long run almost 
certainly have to be faced by the U.K. Government itself. If U.K. Ministers should 
become convinced that the coloured population here is becoming too large for safety 
and that it is essential that the numbers of such immigrants should be substantially 
reduced, then I feel pretty certain that we shall have to take our courage in our hands 
and openly take powers to restrict the intake of coloured or other immigrants from 
within the Commonwealth. I do not think that any amount of persuasion by 
ourselves or by the local Governments is likely to have a really major effect on the 
scale of emigration from the West Indies to this country in the foreseeable future-
because of the strength of the natural incentives to emigrate from the West Indies. If 
therefore U.K. Ministers should at some future date decide that it is essential to bring 
about a really big reduction in immigration from the West Indies I think that legal 
powers will be required. I also think that it would be necessary for such legal powers 
to be taken by the U.K. Government itself because legal measures to restrict 
emigration to this country could not be made locally without the willing cooperation 
of local Ministers and it seems highly unlikely that such willing cooperation would 
be forthcoming, either now or after the West Indies become independent. The whole 
situation in regard to emigration is so very different in the West Indies from that in 
India and Pakistan that I very seriously doubt whether, even after independence, the 
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West Indian Governments would be prepared to adopt the same kind of restrictive 
measures as in India and Pakistan. 
6. Although we understand that U.K. Ministers are watching the situation very 
carefully they have not yet decided that the situation is so dangerous or potentially 
dangerous that legal measures to restrict immigration from within the 
Commonwealth must be taken. That being the case, our efforts for the time being 
must be limited to explanation and persuasion, to explaining the present difficulties 
and future fears and to seeking the cooperation of West Indian Governments in 
bringing similar explanation and persuasion to bear upon would-be emigrants. So 
long as our efforts are limited in this way there seems little that we can do in the face 
of refusal to cooperate by any given Government such as British Guiana .... 
130 CO 103113724, no 7 22 Aug 1960 
[Industrial development and income tax]: letter from SirS Hochoy 
(Trinidad) to A R Thomas on the Antigua talks between Mr Manley 
and Dr Williams. Enclosure 
You may have heard that Manley and Williams met in Antigua a couple of weeks ago. 
This stemmed from their talks in June last during the Secretary of State's visit to 
Trinidad and the somewhat better understanding on Federal Constitution Reform 
which they reached at that time. This last meeting was to review the developments 
which had since taken place, chiefly the problems of the Working Committees of the 
Inter-Governmental Conference and to evolve some new agreed approach to close 
the gap which separates Jamaica and Trinidad. 
You will recall that there were four major subjects at issue namely:-
Representation; 
Customs Union; 
Industrial Development, and 
Income Tax. 
The problem of Representation seems to have been settled and there is a fair 
chance that the difficulty over Customs Union may be resolved. The two remaining 
questions i.e. "Industrial Development" and "Income Tax" still provide serious 
obstacles. On these two points Manley remains firm acknowledging that he would 
otherwise forfeit the support of his people. 
Williams has returned from these talks more convinced than ever that unless some 
means can be found to meet Manley, there is every likelihood that Jamaica would 
secede. He is equally satisfied that Manley desires to have Jamaica remain in the 
Federation. He realises also that it is for Trinidad to find a way to assist Manley if 
Federation is to remain intact and I would say that Williams is quite sincere. 
Manley and Williams are thinking of an additional list to the present Exclusive and 
Concurrent Lists. I would call it a "suspense" list. They feel that both these subjects 
can be transferred to this new list. Manley goes further to suggest that they should 
not be removed unless by majority recommendation of the Council of Ministers and 
at least a two-thirds majority of Parliament. 
Williams and I have since discussed this new approach with Solomon and 
O'Halloran who are most sceptical. They feel that a two-thirds majority, having 
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regard to the present or envisaged composition of Parliament is quite impossible and 
that the industrial development of the other territories would be exposed to 
Jamaica's whim and caprice. Solomon was very strong. He declared it would mean 
destruction of Trinidad's future with which he could never be a party. His view was 
supported by O'Halloran. However, they are all to think it over and I shall let you 
know how this matter develops. 
The discussions were held in a very friendly atmosphere and generated no heat 
whatever. They are all hoping that the results of these friendly Working Committee 
meetings would clear the air. 
I enclose my aide-memoire of the talks between Williams, Solomon and 
O'Halloran. This was dictated from memory and is not intended to be a verbatim 
report. It just includes the highlights. 
I have copied this letter to the Governor-General and am supplying him with a 
copy of my aide-memoire. 
Enclosure to 130 
H.E.: Well, I suppose you have some good news for us? 
Williams: You all are aware of the developments regarding the Federal 
Constitution talks. Our "Economics of Nationhood"1 was badly received by Manley 
who protested vigorously against the ideas Trinidad put forward. He now finds 
himself out on a limb and appreciates that he cannot get back easily. When we met in 
May last he admitted to me that he would welcome some overture from Trinidad 
which would assist him to keep Jamaica in the Federation. In June last he confirmed 
this in his talks with Mr. Macleod, making the point that there were only two 
subjects which are the real obstacles. These were the questions of "industrial 
development" and "income tax". Manley expressed the view that they should remain 
within the discretion and the authority of the unit territories. At that time Manley 
and I reviewed the position when he suggested that the solution may be found in the 
provision for a third list to which these two subjects could be transferred. In that way 
they will be preserved to the territories. I had been giving this suggestion serious 
thought and I felt that it was a most valuable contribution by Manley and would 
provide the escape which Manley was seeking without alienating the support of 
Jamaica. I had been trying in my way to accommodate Manley and had instructed the 
Trinidad representatives on the working committees to explore every means by 
which common agreement could be reached with Jamaica. A snag arose, and still 
exists, when Trinidad officials at one stage proposed with regard to Customs union 
that the items which were causing difficulty from the Jamaican standpoint should be 
put on a separate list and that a maximum period of seven years be agreed, by which 
time the items on that list would be removed. The Jamaica team was not prepared to 
accept any proposition which defined a time limit. 
In my most recent talks with Manley in Antigua this month which lasted over 
three hours, Manley repeated this view and appeared to be more anxious than ever 
for every help Trinidad could give. Manley emphasised that he would be unable to 
carry Jamaica if the subjects of "industrial development" and "income tax" were to 
L The Economics of Nationhood (Office of the Premier, Trinidad and Tobago, Port of Spain, 11 Sept 1959). 
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remain on the Federal list. Manley expressed his belief that Customs revenue was 
quite adequate to meet all foreseeable Federal expenditure and in elaborating his 
proposal stated that these two particular subjects could eventually be transferred to 
the exclusive or concurrent list on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers 
to which Manley attaches the greatest importance, and the agreement of a majority 
of not less than two-thirds of the population of the Federation. Manley considered 
that the maximum expenditure of the Federation could not possibly exceed $30 
million and he had every feeling that the actual figure would be substantially less. 
Manley added that in his view "education" and "external borrowing" could also be 
conveniently transferred to that special list. I promised Manley that I would discuss 
this with my colleagues. 
Solomon: I cannot agree with Manley's proposal. It is impossible for there ever to be 
a two-thirds majority. It is tantamount therefore to Jamaica saying that they will be 
able to do what they like for as long as they like. Trinidad will in these circumstances 
be unable to withstand the competition which could come from Jamaica, if that 
territory enjoyed full freedom to grant concessions and in addition safeguard their 
local industries by a high protective tariff and even quantitative restrictions leading 
towards total prohibition. Jamaica was not a member of the GATT while Trinidad is. 
The position in which Trinidad will find itself will be unwarranted. 
O'Halloran: This is a very serious matter, even dangerous. Jamaica would be able 
in those circumstances to promote industrial development at the expense of the 
remaining territories within the Federation, as there would be no limit to the 
attractions she could offer in complete disregard to the interests of the other units. 
Trinidad must expect more and more other West Indians coming in. This will not 
obtain in Jamaica. There will be nothing to prevent pioneer industries after enjoying 
the concessions in Trinidad shifting the operations to Jamaica to enjoy another life of 
concessions. Further Jamaica wants a uniform freight tariff within the region. This 
could not but mean that Jamaica's manufactured goods could flood the other 
territories and undersell those territories. Trinidad may not have any outlet for her 
products. Trinidad proposed a ton mile freight formula with which Jamaica 
disagreed. Already Jamaica has a domestic market of 1~ million people. Trinidad has 
only half of that figure. Trinidad cannot count too heavily on the other Eastern 
Caribbean islands as a market, as the purchasing power of those islands is low. There 
is also the question of Customs Union. It is true that Jamaica has advanced that 78% 
of the items can be harmonised, but Trinidad is yet to learn of the items which 
comprise the remaining 22% which, it claims, call for some kind of special 
treatment. Even so, Jamaica has indicated that there are some items in this group 
which from their point of view could never be harmonised. Manley refers to external 
borrowing. If the West Indies were to become independent it would be a normal 
requirement by lenders that loans should be underwritten by the Federal 
Government as is now done by Her Majesty's Government. On assuming 
independence, will the Federal Government not be required to underwrite all 
external debts due at that time by the unit territories? How will it work? 
Williams: These are all valid observations, but we are faced with one real issue. 
Either Trinidad goes more than half-way to meet Manley and so make it possible for 
Jamaica to stay in the Federation, or risks a complete breakdown. Once the future of 
the Federation is assured, time, public opinion, and the growth of a favourable 
Federal climate could all serve to lessen the dangers which you now seek. Manley is 
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anxious to stay in the Federation. Perhaps he has now seen, he has not disclosed it to 
me, the new pattern of external trade and regional groupings which are being formed 
in other parts of the world. I think that Manley is aware of Puerto Rico's position. 
This island has done well over the last decade or so but seems to have nowhere 
further to go. Perhaps Manley is aware of the school of thought in Jamaica which 
voices the hope that Jamaica will become the 52nd State. We must take the risk, if we 
want Federation to survive. 
H.E.: I agree with the Premier. I feel that in the course of time all these inequal-
ities will even themselves out. I cannot appreciate the fear that Trinidad would be 
placed in such a dangerous position. After all, Trinidad is sufficiently strong eco-
nomically to match Jamaica's concessions. Manley could wish to do so but there is 
a point or ceiling beyond which Jamaica would not find it worthwhile to go by way 
of concessions to industry. I admit that, until freedom of movement of goods 
becomes a reality, we may be at a disadvantage insofar as trading within the West 
Indies is concerned, but I am hoping that there would be an agreement on this 
point. I thought also that too much importance was being attached to this ques-
tion of industrial development and that wise statesmanship in the future would 
prevail. 
Williams: That is the way that I look at it. It is also a question of saving Manley's 
face. In the process we may be ridiculed, even told that Manley has got everything he 
wanted, but I am willing to put up with this to save the Federation. 
Solomon: I cannot agree with you nor Manley. If the facts are put fully now to the 
Jamaican people, I am sure they will see it our way. How can Trinidad agree to a 
suggestion which is not feasible? How can we ever get a two-thirds majority? In fact, 
by agreeing with Manley's proposition, we are saying that Jamaica could have all the 
benefits that Federation could offer but at the same time the liberty to safeguard her 
own interests at the expense of the other unit territories. 
Williams: I cannot agree with you. The Jamaicans today are still suspicious of 
Federation. It is as you all know most difficult for politicians to back down. They 
must find some avenue which will not give that appearance. That is Manley's 
position. He hit the ceiling when he was faced with our "Economics of Nationhood". 
Up to today I do not know with what he agrees and with what he disagrees. I do not 
know what are the precise items which Jamaica is finding it difficult to harmonise. As 
regards the two-thirds majority I envisage British Guiana joining the Federation, in 
which case Manley's two-thirds proposal will then be not so difficult, but I am relying 
on the change of climate which will follow a new Federal Constitution. A change of 
climate which will alter the Jamaican attitude. Manley and I are thinking whether it 
will not be possible to obtain the substantial grant from Her Majesty's Government 
to the Federal Government, as well as some assurance that exchequer loans will be 
available to the unit territories. 
Solomon: We can never secure that margin even if British Guiana joined the 
Federation and I cannot agree with such a proposal. The furthest I can go is for 
Jamaica to agree that within a certain specified period, say five years, the subject of 
"industrial development" will be restored to the Federal list. 
H.E.: Is it impossible to find a formula within the boundaries of these two 
thoughts? Could Manley's two-thirds be whittled down to some figure with more 
realistic meaning to Trinidad? 
Solomon: Manley is still thinking as a Jamaican and I do not trust him. Trinidad 
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can find itself in the disastrous position from which the Government may be unable 
to extricate it and I would have none of it. I cannot agree to destroying Trinidad. 
O'Halloran: I feel likewise. 
Williams: Let us think it over. I am merely reporting my talks with Manley in 
Antigua. I also am not out to destroy Trinidad. Perhaps it may be better to await the 
result of the next meeting of the working committees. 
Solomon: I agree that we should do that. I am not so sure that Manley is not 
playing a game. Otherwise why should he fix the referendum to take place after the 
inter-Governmental conference? 
O'Halloran: All that I am prepared to say now is that we have to think this over 
quite seriously. There is too much at stake and Trinidad, if we are not careful, will 
lose out. The only two territories affected by this are Jamaica and Trinidad. 
H.E.: Perhaps then it may be better for us not to force any decision but to keep 
these working party talks going, no matter for how long until the air becomes 
clearer. It would be disastrous to the Federation to make any precipitate or firm 
declaration which would tend to drive Manley further away from us. I am a bit 
confused. Admitting that we cannot agree on a complete uniform external tariff, do 
you say, Dr. Solomon, that complete freedom of goods will not be possible? 
Solomon : Quite so. There will be restrictions of imports of certain items into 
Jamaica from the other units. Those items which Jamaica claims cannot be 
harmonised. As an example: shoes, the importation of which is now not permitted, 
will remain on Jamaica's list of prohibited imports whether or not they are 
manufactured in one of the unit territories. 
O'Halloran: Take an actual example. Trinidad crude cannot now enter Jamaica. 
Williams: If we accept Manley's view that Customs revenue will more than meet 
Federal needs, will that not mean that our envisaged contribution to the Federal 
Government would be substantially reduced? We had proposed a figure of over $130 
million, while Manley feels that Federal expenditure will not exceed $30 million. I 
realise that this new thought will involve Trinidad maintaining those services which 
it had advocated should be transferred to the Federal Government. But could not this 
offset some of the disadvantages? I think that we should take time and think this over 
fully . I quite agree with what H.E. has said that we should avoid forcing any issue. 
Solomon: I agree. 
H.E.: That would suit us all. But let us try to find a formula which could help Manley.2 
2
· On 19 Aug Hailes wrote to Macleod explaining that Adams was incensed by the Antigua talks to which he 
had not been party; the federal prime minister was not only resentful but 'rather scared' for his own 
position. Hailes did not take this seriously and was rather more concerned about the other federal 
ministers who were 'jumpy about their own futures' and who might try to influence Adams 'in the wrong 
way for selfish reasons' . The governor-general added: 'It would help if Manley and Williams were a little 
more considerate to Grantley. It would cost nothing and I will try to put that idea over' (CO 103113724, no 
10) . On 3 Sept Hailes wrote again to the effect that the storm had not blown over and that there was 'some 
sort of anti-Manley move' in the federal Cabinet, with Adams's resentment being fanned by Bradshaw and 
De La Corbiniere. Adams and his colleagues 'do not see why everything should be done to suit Jamaica at 
the expense of others' . A dams was quite capable 'if his position is assailed, of trying to pull down the pillars 
of the temple. In his muddled head he flirts with the idea of a Federation without Jamaica, in which-so 
he thinks- he could more easily hold his own'. Hailes suspected that Bradshaw, the finance minister, saw 
Williams, 'whom he hates', as a personal threat; Bradshaw had made 'sneering references in public to the 
"proposed Finance Minister" '. It had been, according to Hailes, 'short-sighted of Manley and Williams not 
to play, at least superficial ball, with Adams . . .. A simple message from Antigua might have prevented all 
this. They are a little too contemptuous to appreciate the wrecking potentialities' (ibid, no 14) . 
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131 CO 103113708, no 39 Aug-Sept 1960 
[Jamaica and federation]: Jamaica intelligence report on the creation 
of a 'reserved list' and the prospects for the referendum [Extract] 
2. Federation 
In July officials of the Jamaica and Trinidad Governments held lengthy discussions in 
an attempt to narrow the differences between these two Governments on what 
should be the division of powers between the Federal and Unit Governments. Early in 
August the Premiers of both territories met in Antigua, accompanied by these 
officials, to examine the remaining points of disagreement. The agreement reached 
at this meeting reflects the principal objectives of the Jamaican Government. The 
most important feature of the understanding arrived at was that, in addition to the 
Exclusive and Concurrent legislation lists, there should be a third, described as the 
"Reserved" list, consisting of two items only, industrial development and income tax. 
It is proposed that either item on the Reserved list should be transferable to one of 
the other two only by agreement of the Council of Ministers representing the Unit 
territories and then only if Ministers representing territories comprising two-thirds 
of the total population of the Federation concur in this transfer. 
It was proposed also that the Federal Government should have a single source of 
revenue and that this revenue ·could expand only as that Government took over 
services more efficiently operated at that level than by the units themselves. Further, 
express provision for full consultation between the Units and the Federal 
Government is contemplated. 
The above is merely an outline of the agreement reached at these meetings and the 
mass of detail involved is not immediately relevant. It has been endorsed in principle 
by the Cabinet, with the modification that an attempt should be made to ensure that 
the transfer of a subject on the Reserved list should be conditional on the legislatures 
of the Unit territories expressly ratifying, on the same basis, the agreement reached 
in the Council of Ministers. But this endorsement was secured with some difficulty 
and only after much discussion. It seems clear that, certain public statements 
notwithstanding, the Ministers of Trade and Industry1 and of Education2 at least still 
have deep-seated reservations on the whole subject. Judging from some public 
utterances of the former, he seems often to forget essential points of this 
Government's attitude towards the revision of the Federal Constitution on which the 
Cabinet has already agreed: it is probabie that he regards this agreement as less 
important than his own prejudices. At the end of September the details of the 
approach in Committee I had still to be settled. 
In spite of a number of lofty sentiments to the contrary which were expressed 
shortly after the Premier's announcement of the Federation referendum, it has 
always been clear that the issue would be decided on party lines. No one is better 
aware of this than the Premier; and no one recognises more fully the need of raising 
his Party's morale before the referendum is held. In the pressure of Government's 
business after last year's General Elections many of the Party leaders have, inevitably, 
lost some touch with the middle and lower ranks. This has been most apparent in the 
1 Mr Isaacs. 2 Mr Glasspole. 
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deterioration of the Government's relationships with several local Government 
bodies, to which some political and administrative ineptitude has contributed. In an 
attempt to correct this situation Mr. Manley has held one major meeting with 
delegates from Parish Councils. The danger is that, as occurred at the time of the 
elections to the Federal Parliament, large numbers of the People's National Party's 
supporters will abstain from voting in the referendum, while the adherents of the 
Opposition will turn out in force. The annual Party Conference will be held shortly 
after the meetings of the two Ministerial Committees on the development of the 
Federation and the Premier hopes, assuming the successful results of these 
meetings, to be able on that occasion to do much to ensure sufficient support for 
Jamaica's continued membership of the Federation .... 
132 CO 103113724 3-7 Oct 1960 
[UK financial assistance]: minutes by G W Jamieson, HA Harding1 
and A R Thomas 
[Referring to his account of the Antigua talks (see 130), Hochoy reported to the CO in 
Sept 1960 that Manley and Williams now felt that their differences could be overcome if 
HMG made a substantial grant to the federal government for the economic development 
of the region. Williams believed that a suitable opportunity to raise this issue would be at 
the bases talks with the Americans in London (CO 1031/3724, no 15, Hochoy to Thomas, 
6 Sept 1960).] 
The draft opposite is self-explanatory but Mr. Harding will have views about my 
suggestion that we could give Mr. Manley and Dr. Williams a hint about a 
Commonwealth Assistance loan when they come over for the Bases Conference next 
month. If he feels that we have not in fact got Treasury authority to go this far, I 
would be glad if he could say whether it would be possible to approach the Treasury 
to try and get their agreement to making this hint. 
2. It seems to me that it may make our discussions with them a good deal easier 
if we can say something positive in addition to the Statement of Intent (copy at 
(21A))2 made to Mr. Manley, in January. This is beginning to look a bit dusty and it 
seems to me that the time has come when we ought, if possible, to try to be a little 
more forthcoming. 
Mr. Thomas 
I fear we cannot say anything about a Commonwealth Assistance Loan. 
G.W.J. 
3.10.60 
There are two difficulties. First, the Treasury have just circulated a paper3 which 
takes the line that the demands for overseas aid are bigger than we can afford to 
1 Assistant secretary, CO, head of Finance Dept. 2 See 117. 
3 T 296/l, 'Problems of the emergent territories', draft Treasury paper for Cabinet (Official) Committee on 
Development Policy, Oct 1960. This paper was an attempt by the Treasury to resolve its difference with the 
CO over eligibility for Commonwealth Assistance Loans (see 116, note 3, and 117, note). As a result the CO 
appealed for restraint in its explanation of the UK's financial position to colonial governments {T 296/62, 
Gorell Barnes to colonial governors, 10 June 1960). 
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meet, that the Colonies get too large a share of the aid which can be made available 
and that to remedy this situation inter alia any Commonwealth Assistance Loans 
granted to emergent territories shortly after independence should be offset by a 
corresponding reduction in the Exchequer Loan finance available to the Dependent 
territories. The time is therefore most inopportune for an approach to the Tsy on a 
Commonwealth Assistance Loan for the West Indies. 
Second, the W. I. area contains the only dependencies which have some prospect 
of meeting their requirements for external loan finance by borrowing on the open 
market in London and in the U.S. Federation should strengthen their position in this 
respect. Public borrowing on their own credit is likely not only to be cheaper than 
Commonwealth Assistance Loans but also to lead to a larger supply of finance; the 
Federation should therefore be encouraged to look to public borrowing rather than 
U.K. Govt. Loans for external loan finance. 
Sir Hilton Poynton 
I think you should see No. 15 and the draft reply. 
H.A.H. 
4.10.60 
During the meeting which Dr. Williams had with Mr. Manley in Antigua he 
appears to have gone very far to meeting Mr. Manley's point of view on the form of 
federation. On his return he got into trouble with two of his own leading supporters, 
namely Mr. O'Halloran and Dr. Solomon for going too far to meet Jamaica. This in 
itself was an interesting development as we had pictured Dr. Williams as something 
of a dictator. In No. 15 the Governor warns us that the West Indies leaders, when 
they come to London for the Bases talks, are likely to raise the question of securing a 
substantial grant from H.M.G. for the economic development of the area. The S. of S. 
has already given assurances in general terms both to Mr. Manley when he visited 
London early in the year and at various meetings when he (the S. of S.) was visiting 
the West Indies to the effect that the West Indies will be able to count on continuing 
financial assistance from H.M.G. after independence although the form in which it is 
given must necessarily be different from what it is at present. He had in mind that 
C.D.W. and grant aid assistance could continue for a transitional period only and that 
Commonwealth Assistance loans and various forms of technical assistance (some by 
the U.K. Government, others from international bodies) would be available to replace 
"Colonial" types of assistance. 
Although it would be nice to be more specific in this reply I do not see that this is 
possible. I think however that you should see since the proposed reply holds out no 
hope of our being able to meet the request of Dr. Williams and others that at the 
London Bases talks we should get down to promising specific sums of money. 
It is a pity that we cannot refer to Commonwealth Assistance loans but I quite 
appreciate the difficulties of doing so at present, explained in Mr. Harding's minute. 
It would however be very serious if for the reasons given it in fact proved necessary to 
withhold this type of assistance from the West Indies after independence, not least 
because it would involve going back on a specific reference by the S. of S. to these 
loans as a type of help they could expect to receive. 
A.R.T. 
7.10.60 
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133 CO 103113505, no 64 7 Oct 1960 
[US financial assistance]: letter from D Williams (Washington) to G W 
Jamieson on US policy towards financial assistance for the Federation 
Will you please refer to your letter WIS, 1211117 4/02 of September 26. On October 6 
I called on Adam Foster at the State Department to discover whether the State 
Department had yet reacted to Colonial Office paper1 of July 1960 on the economic 
and financial implications of independence for The West Indies, and also to try to 
discover the implications of Mr. Dillon's2 inclusion of The West Indies in the Bogata 
Social Development Program for Latin America. 
Foster explained that the State Department did not consider the inclusion of The 
West Indies in the Social Development Program as their sole response to your paper. 
The West Indies had been included in Mr. Dillon's remarks purely on the merits of 
the case-that is to say, on the ground that they are geographically located in the 
Latin American area and should be approaching independence about the time when 
the Social Development Program might be expected to come into effective operation. 
(Indeed Mr. Dillon's speech had been made before your paper had been received.) 
Although, therefore, monies made available under the Social Development Program 
might be used to deal with some special aspects of the financial problems of The West 
Indies after independence, they were not to be regarded as the sole source of 
assistance for this purpose. 
Before going on to discuss your paper and the American reactions to it, we had 
some further discussion about the Social Development Program and the 
mechanisms through which assistance from it might be made available. No final 
decisions on the point have yet been taken by the Americans; but the trend of their 
present thinking is that the bulk of the money would go into the Latin American 
Development Bank for the purpose of making soft loans. Under present United States 
legislation The West Indies, given their present constitutional position, would not be 
eligible for any funds which went through this channel. It is, however, proposed in 
addition to make a portion of the funds available to the I.C.A. The I.C.A. in turn will 
be empowered to make grants-not loans-from them for development purposes. 
This is the part of the scheme under which The West Indies would qualify and-if Mr. 
Foster's section of the State Department have their way- so would British Guiana, 
British Honduras and the British Virgin Islands. Nothing however, should be said on 
this point to the Governments of these territories at this stage since it may only 
arouse false hopes. 
We then went on to discuss the problems raised in the Colonial Office paper of July 
1960. The State Department have carefully considered the paper and what follows 
represents their present reactions. 
The first point is that they stand by their previous proposal that there should first 
be informal private talks between the United States, the Canadians and ourselves on 
the whole problem, to be followed later by joint talks with the West Indians. On 
1 The CO paper of July 1960 was a revised version of the paper submitted by the CO to the Development 
Committee in Jan (see 114). It was entitled 'Economic and financial implications of independence for the 
West Indies' and circulated to the US and Canadian governments (CO 103113505, no 345). 
2 C Douglas Dill on, US under-secretary of state for economic affairs. 
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present thinking they would prefer the three-power talks to take place in Ottawa and 
on their side would propose that they should be represented by Ivan White. The 
reason for holding them in Ottawa would be that it should serve to stimulate 
Canadian interest and could be expected to attract less attention than if they were 
held in Washington since Ivan White frequently goes to Ottawa on other business. I 
said that this proposal seemed reasonable to me. 
We next discussed the question of the timing of these three-power talks. We agreed 
that your paper was drafted on the assumption that the Federation would continue to 
exist in its present form and that Jamaica would not secede. There seemed, therefore, 
to be little point in having talks with the Canadians until the Jamaican issue was 
definitely settled one way or the other, since the economic problems of The West 
Indies would be very different if Jamaica were excluded. This suggested a date as soon 
as possible after the Jamaican referendum, which would also have the advantage of 
postponing the talks until a new United States administration was in the saddle. 
The third point to emerge was that the Americans did not consider that their 
Congressional procedures would make it possible for them to provide any form of 
budgetary support for The West Indies. This aspect of the problem would have to be 
primarily our responsibility and perhaps that of the Canadians. As they saw it at 
present, the Americans envisaged that their help would take the form of an increased 
flow of development capital, preferably in the shape of soft loans, if possible made 
through existing agencies. They would also hope to increase their flow of technical 
assistance but would prefer that this should be related to their loan programs or to 
any capital programs which we or the Canadians might be prepared to undertake. 
I told Mr. Foster that as far as I could see at the moment this approach seemed 
very sensible, though of course much would depend upon how much additional 
capital would be forthcoming and the extent to which the "existing agencies" could 
adapt their lending criteria to suit West Indian needs. I said, however, that I thought 
we ought to consider how any discussions we were having on aid (whether with or 
without The West Indies) should be related to the discussions on the bases; since, as 
the State Department already knew, The West Indies themselves were linking the two 
things. Foster said that it would be quite contrary to American policy to come up 
with any positive aid proposals during the course of the bases talks; they would not 
be prepared to offer a definite increased sum of aid in return for West Indian 
concessions over bases. I said that I fully appreciated that point. I was sure it was 
appreciated in London and nobody would expect anything so crude. Indeed, I added, 
in view of Dr. Eric Williams' statements in the past that he was not prepared to sell 
the sacred soil of Trinidad for American dollars, he might himself react adversely to 
any such direct linking of the two issues. Since The West Indies themselves, however, 
were apparently going to raise the question of aid during Stage I of the talks,3 it did 
seem to me desirable that the Americans should be ready on their side at that stage 
to make some positive reaction. This might take the form of indicating that they 
would hope that considerably more U.S. aid should flow into this region in the future 
than had flowed in in the past. As evidence that this was not just a pious hope, they 
might then go on to say that they felt , however, that the whole question of aid to The 
West Indies should be discussed jointly by them with the United Kingdom and 
Canadian Governments as well as with The West Indies, so that a coordinated 
3 For the various stages envisaged in the forthcoming bases talks, see 134. 
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program of assistance might be worked out. Foster replied that the Americans had 
themselves been thinking on similar lines. He said that if the idea of a four-power 
approach to the aid problem proved attractive to The West Indians, then the 
Americans could perhaps go on to make a definite proposal that, if all else went well, 
such discussions might start co-incidentally with Stage III of the bases talks. Before a 
• proposal on these lines could be forthcoming, however, it would be necessary to clear 
it with the Canadians. We decided that this was a point to which we should give 
further consideration though, of course, if it is to be taken up in Stage I of the talks 
and put by the Americans in the form suggested immediately above, then we must 
clear it with the Canadians within the next three weeks. 
I should be interested to have your reactions and to learn whether you have heard 
anything from Ottawa showing how the Canadians have reacted to our paper and 
whether prima facie they would be prepared to participate in three-power 
conversations to be followed by joint talks with the West Indians. 
I am sending three copies of this letter so that you can send one to the F.O. and 
C.R.0.4 
4 The CO replied to Williams declaring itself to be encouraged by US readiness to assist the federation and 
sharing US reluctance to see the question of financial aid entangled with the bases conference. 'We do 
however question wisdom of linking start of financial talks with stage III Bases. We think financial talks 
should, and will inevitably, run their course at different tempo. It would also be unfortunate if such a 
suggestion was interpreted as hint of "no bases, no aid"' (CO 1031/3505, no 66, outward tel no 116, 
Marnham to Williams, 28 Oct 1960). 
134 DEFE 7/1475, no 26 19 Oct 1960 
[Defence]: minute by C E F Gough1 to Mr Watkinson2 on the base 
negotiations and defence arrangements 
The approach of independence for the West Indies Federation has brought to the fore 
two important issues. In the first place, the Leased Bases Agreement of 1941 gave the 
United States, for a term of 99 years, a number of naval and air bases, some of which 
will be within the future West Indies territory and some of which (in British Guiana, 
the Bahamas and Bermuda) will remain outside. It follows, therefore, that the 
Americans will have to re-negotiate the lease and the West Indies will, in effect, 
become the new "freeholder". In the second place, the West Indies have told the 
Colonial Office that they will hope to receive help from the United Kingdom in 
building up their own armed forces, and we are at present in the process of 
discovering whether there are any reciprocal benefits which it would be wise for the 
United Kingdom to secure in a Bilateral Defence Agreement with the West Indies. 
2. The immediate problem is the re-negotiation of the Leased Bases Agreement 
of 1941. For well over a year the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office have been 
trying to persuade the United States Government that it would be to their advantage 
to join in a conference with the United Kingdom, with the West Indies as observers, 
with a view to re-negotiating the Bases Agreement in advance of independence. In 
theory, this will be a conference between the United Kingdom and the United States 
1 Under-secretary, Ministry of Defence, 1958- 1964. 
2 HA Watkinson (1st Viscount er 1964), minister of defence, 1959- 1962. 
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but, in practice, it will be a conference between the West Indies and the United 
States, with ourselves as honest brokers. The United States were slow to appreciate 
that they are themselves about to be in much the same position as we were with 
Cyprus. They have, however, been persuaded that this is a real issue and have agreed 
to participate in a series of tripartite discussions. The series will be as follows:-
Stage I. The three parties will state their various points of view and the issues for 
discussion will be identified. This session will begin in London on the 2nd November 
and will probably be opened, on our side, by the Lord Privy Seal and wound up by 
the Colonial Secretary. On the West Indian side, there will be representatives of the 
Federal Government and of the Prime Ministers of the Unit Governments. 
Prominent among the representatives will be Doctor Williams, Prime Minister of 
Trinidad, where the most important American base is (Chaguaramas). 
Stage If. A series of discussions to be held in the West Indies, in the course of 
which the 1941 Agreement will be examined and re-negotiated in detail, clause by 
clause and base by base. This is expected to take place in February 1961. 
Stage Ill. The final stage, at which a revision of the Leased Bases Agreement of 
1941, in some appropriate form, will be finally negotiated. 
3. In parallel with these preparations for revising the Leased Bases Agreement of 
1941, work is beginning on our side in preparing ourselves for the negotiation of a 
Bilateral United Kingdom/West Indies Defence Agreement. The Chiefs of Staff are 
shortly to be invited to say what facilities, if any, we shall require from the new West 
Indies Government. We shall not require anything so specific as we have in Cyprus, 
Malaya or even Nigeria, but no doubt we should be prudent to try to reserve some gen-
eral right of staging the passage of troops, and so on. In essence, however, this will be 
a negotiation in which the West Indies will be asking something from us-i.e. assis-
tance in building up the West Indian forces. The financial cost of this will fall, pre-
sumably, on the Commonwealth Relations Office, and from the defence point of view 
our contribution will be physical rather than financial. This bilateral negotiation is 
going forward, however, at a slightly slower pace than the Bases Agreement. 
4. This morning I was invited to attend a meeting at the Colonial Office, at which 
an entirely new aspect of the problem was put to us. It appears that as long ago as last 
June the West Indians were turning their thoughts to how to justify to their own 
people the continuance of the American bases, in whatever form and to whatever 
extent will be justifiable in the strategic circumstances of 1960. This has apparently 
led the West Indian leaders to toy with the idea of a rather ambitious regional 
defence pact, the signatories to which would be the West Indies, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Canada, France and the Netherlands.3 The principal 
contribution of the West Indies would be making available base facilities to the 
United States, but the West Indian leaders would hope to be able to demonstrate to 
their population that they would be receiving, in return, all the benefits of a regional 
defence pact. I was surprised to learn this morning that the Colonial Office were 
warned, as long ago as last June, that the thoughts of the West Indian political 
leaders were turning in this direction, but they have only just realised that we may 
3 Eric Williams had raised the question of a 'Caribbean NATO' during Macleod's visit to the West Indies in 
June 1960 (CO 103113040, minute by Thomas, 24 Oct 1960). In Nov 1960 the Cabinet Defence Committee 
recommended that any proposals for a regional defence organisation in the Caribbean should be resisted 
(DEFE 7/1475, no 33, D 11(60)1, 2 Nov 1960). 
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hear a lot about this aspect of the problem during the course of the first stage of the 
Bases Agreement early next month, 
5. I suggested at this morning's meeting that our objectives should be as follows, 
viz:-
(a) The United States should be encouraged by us to work towards a Bilateral 
Agreement with the West Indies in which the United States would, in return for 
the continued use of bases (on modified terms), commit themselves perhaps in 
very general terms to assisting in the defence of the West Indies. 
(b) We should also keep our Defence Agreement with the West Indies on a 
bilateral basis. 
(c) If possible, we should leave it at that, on the grounds that the West Indies 
would be able to present to their people two Bilateral Agreements, each of which 
would be of benefit to the West Indies. 
(d) If, however, the West Indies want something more, we should aim in the first 
instance at a tripartite declaration of common purpose, to be signed by the West 
Indies, the United States, and the United Kingdom, referring ("whereas etc.") to 
two Bilateral Agreements and reiterating our common interest in the preservation 
of peace, mutual defence in the area, and so on, 
(e) If the West Indies are not satisfied with this as a quid pro quo for continuing 
the grant of bases to the United States, we should then have to consider turning 
the declaration of common purpose into treaty form. 
(f) We should resist any form of regional pact which entailed the setting up of 
formal machinery (Secretary-Generals, Command Structures, and so on) or the 
commitment of forces and detailed military plans. 
6. I also suggested that it was high time that the Colonial Office and Foreign 
Office recommended to their respective Ministers that they should jointly circulate a 
note to their colleagues telling them that this issue might come up at the 
forthcoming talks and suggesting what line should be taken. My recommendation 
was that the line to be taken should be that sketched out in paragraph 5 above. 
7. The meeting concluded with a promise by the Colonial Office and Foreign 
Office officials to recommend to their respective Ministers that a note in this form 
should be circulated to other Ministers as soon as possible, so that other Ministers 
would know what is going on and have a chance to express their views. 
8. I am sending you this minute so that you may be given good notice of what is 
coming along, and to recommend to you that you could go along with the line 
suggested in paragraph 5 above. I do not think at this stage we need make a detailed 
study of the pros and cons of a regional defence pact. If in Stage I discussions this 
becomes a real issue, it will suffice if there is clear agreement on the United Kingdom 
side that we would discuss terms with them but enter into no commitment. 
135 CO 103114276, no 9 24 Oct 1960 
[British Guiana]: letter from Sir R Grey to Lord Hailes on relations 
between British Guiana and the federal government 
[The Robertson Commission (see 17) recommended an indefinite period of 'marking 
time' in British Guiana's advance towards self-government. For the next two and a half 
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years the territory was governed by an interim administration consisting of the governor, 
officials and nominated members on both the executive and legislative councils. It failed 
conspicuously in its efforts to command public support, to generate economic growth or 
to reduce the PPP's political influence. Under Sir P Renison, who replaced Savage as 
governor in July 1955, consideration was given to the gradual restoration of 
constitutional government. The split in the PPP and the emergence of moderate parties 
capable of challenging the PPP, were identified as favourable circumstances. Elections 
were held in Aug 1957. The pro-Jagan PPP won 9 of the 14 elected seats with 47.50 per 
cent of the vote. The pro-Burnham PPP won 3 seats with 25.48 per cent of the vote. The 
NLF and UDP each won 1 seat with 11.51 and 8.18 per cent of the vote respectively. It was 
after the election that Burnham broke with the PPP and formed the PNC, from which 
point politics in Guiana divided increasingly on racial lines. Jagan returned as minister of 
trade and industry in a government in which officials held the key portfolios and the 
governor exercised extensive reserve powers. Pressure grew for internal self-government 
and this was reflected in the proceedings of a constitutional committee which sat in 1958. 
This was then advanced by the PPP to a demand for independence within the 
Commonwealth by Aug 1961. The opposition suggested that the movement to 
independence should be in measured stages. A constitutional conference, held in London 
in Mar 1960, revealed significant differences between the PPP and the opposition over 
such issues as the voting system, the number of chambers within the constitution and 
control of the police. Agreement was eventually reached on a form of internal self-
government, with first past the post as the voting system, a bicameral legislature, and a 
bill of rights. The governor would retain responsibility for defence, external affairs and 
law and order. The leader of the majority party would become premier and ministers 
would be appointed on his advice. Elections to give effect to the new constitution would 
be held in 1961. After six months the police would be transferred to ministerial control 
but not before a Police Council, consisting of the governor, members of the majority 
party, the chief secretary and chief of police, had been appointed to advise on the 
administration and maintenance of the force. Upon this basis Macleod accepted the 
principle of British Guiana's independence at the London conference and issued a 
statement which the conference endorsed to the effect that 'if at any time not earlier than 
two years after the first General Election held under the new Constitution or upon it 
being decided that the West Indies Federation should attain independence', HMG would 
be prepared to convene another conference to fix an independence date. The provisos 
were that the grant of independence should command support in both houses of the 
British Guiana parliament and that the existing constitution of the territory had been in 
force for not less than one year (Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Conference 
held in London in March 1960, Cmnd 998, Apr 1960).] 
On October 19, I returned to my office after a meeting of Executive Council to find a 
telegram saying that Dr. LaCorbiniere [sic: throughout] proposed to arrive in 
Georgetown that day. He had in fact already arrived. He listened to a debate in our 
Legislative Council that afternoon (and later spoke to me in well-justified criticism of 
the style of what he heard) and had discussions with Dr. and Mrs. Jagan thereafter. 
On the following morning, October 20, Dr. Jagan telephoned me and said that Dr. 
LaCorbiniere [sic] was returning to Port of Spain later in the morning but wished 
first to make a courtesy call on me. This was arranged. 
Dr. LaCorbiniere [sic] told me that he had come to Georgetown in order to secure 
from Jagan an invitation for your Prime Minister and LaCorbiniere [sic] and 
Bradshaw to come to British Guiana "to discuss matters of common concern". 
Federal Ministers had, he said, come to the view that their plans should, if possible, 
be based on a strong Federation of all British territories in this area-the present 
Federation, British Guiana, British Honduras and (to my surprise) the Bahamas. 
Discussions with Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were imminent; 
it would be ridiculous to suppose that Her Majesty's Government would evolve one 
Defence policy for an independent Federation of the West Indies and another (or 
others) for fringe areas like British Guiana and British Honduras outside the 
Federation-Defence was not planned in that way. British Guiana was already 
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sharing in some common services with the West Indies-the University College, the 
Commissioners' Offices in the United Kingdom and in North America, etc. These 
could not go on after West Indian Independence just precisely as they were now-
changes ought to be planned now, not later. He and his colleagues were not asking 
British Guiana to enter into negotiations about such matters now; but they were 
asking British Guiana to exchange views at Ministerial level. Dr. and Mrs. Jagan 
showed by their reactions that they had never thought of these things. Dr. Jagan had 
promised to consult his colleagues and to write to Dr. LaCorbiniere in a few days but 
the latter wished me to impress on Jagan that a decision was urgent. The Federal 
Ministers had their plans to make: they wanted to come here first, but if they were 
not to come here they would have to go to British Honduras. 
I asked my visitor frankly what his relations were with the Jagans. Were they 
personal friends? He said that he was very friendly with Dr. Jagan and implied that he 
was even more friendly with Mrs. Jagan. They had been very frank with him. They 
had told him that the time for a visit was inopportune as they were preoccupied with 
attacks on them by the Roman Catholic Church, the development of the "Third 
Force" and so forth. He had replied that these were no concern of his, these were 
internal problems that they had to solve for themselves; he was concerned with 
external affairs, with the maintenance of close relations between British territories 
throughout the Caribbean that had interests in common. I asked whether he thought 
that Jagan really intended to consult his colleagues and come to an objective 
decision or whether he might not think that this was just a polite brush-off. It was 
not unusual for Jagan, who was not, as LaCorbiniere very readily agreed, one readily 
given to taking a decision in any matter of difficulty, to say he would consult his 
colleagues and decide later, when in fact he wanted to say "No" but could not bring 
himself to it there and then. LaCorbiniere said that he thought it much more likely 
that the formula used meant that Jagan would not send the invitation, but he wanted 
me to secure a decision one way or the other quickly. He stressed, somewhat to my 
mystification, the immediate urgency of the matter, said that it must be within the 
next ten days, and added that if the British Guiana Ministers said "No", then the 
Federal Ministers would wash their hands of them, let it be known that they had 
offered friendship but had been spurned and there would be no further opportunity. 
This seemed an unjustifiably hasty line to take but I did not comment on it. 
An opportunity occurred at a social function on October 21 for me to ask Jagan 
what he intended to do about it. With me too, he was frank enough. He said that he 
intended to write and say that it was impossible for him and his colleagues to give 
any formal invitation to a party of Federal Ministers to come at this time. The PPP 
were busily engaged in preparing themselves for a stiff electoral campaign. They 
would not be advocating Federation during that campaign. If three Federal Ministers 
came to Georgetown on the invitation of the Government of British Guiana or of the 
PPP members of that Government, the PPP would be accused of having changed 
their stand on the issue of Federation. The whole thing was a racket by Grantley 
Adams and LaCorbiniere [sic]; they were in trouble over Jamaica-Wills Isaacs was 
going to split the PNP and lead a wing against Manley; the Federal Ministers were 
looking for something to show how strong and successful they were; they wanted to 
capture British Guiana. If all that was needed was an exchange of views about 
Defence, the University College and so forth, that could be achieved in Port of Spain 
or in London. (Trouble over Jamaica would certainly supply the explanation for 
366 FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND THE 1961 AGREEMENT OVER BASES [135] 
LaCorbiniere's insistence on the need for action within ten days, which otherwise has 
no meaning for me.) 
I said to Jagan that I appreciated his political difficulties over inviting a party of the 
leading Federal Ministers to come here just now. If Grantley Adams, LaCorbiniere 
and Bradshaw all came, it could hardly be claimed that they were not coming for 
"negotiations" of some sort, but only for an exchange of views. On the other hand, I 
thought it would be sensible of him to reply saying that he would welcome a visit by 
Sir Grantley Adams. It is reasonable for the Prime Minister of the Federation, with 
which British Guiana has so many ties even if it is not at present seeking to join, to 
visit this neighbouring British territory-it would be reasonable even if we were not 
British. And although Jagan might suffer political disadvantage if he invited a party 
of Federal Ministers to come, he could also suffer political disadvantage if it became 
known that he had declared himself and his Party unwilling even to receive a friendly 
visit from Sir Grantley Adams. (I admit to some doubt in my own mind whether if 
Jagan asked Sir Grantley alone, the latter's colleagues would think this satisfactory 
and if a visit would result from it; but it would at least avoid a slamming of the door.) 
Jagan said he would think over what I had said. No doubt this is much the same 
treatment as LaCorbiniere was to get-however, we shall see. 
By pure chance, I had raised with Jagan on the morning of LaCorbiniere's arrival 
my wish to return a little of your hospitality by inviting you to Georgetown for a 
private visit. Jagan had welcomed the idea. Lest he should think that my enquiry of 
him had anything to do with the LaCorbiniere [sic] visit, I raised the matter again on 
October 21 and he laughingly acquitted me of any sinister plans and again said that 
he would be very pleased if you and Lady Hailes would come. 
On September 13, MacKintosh1 wrote to me (WIS 1381120/02) about Eric 
Williams's remarks to the Secretary of State and in Woodford Square in June about 
the need for British Guiana to join the Federation. He said: 
"I take it that you would agree that our own attitude should be to hope that 
British Guiana will come in to the Federation (on the ground that 
independence will make better sense on that basis than in isolation) and to do 
nothing which would prejudice that aim, but to avoid saying anything 
ourselves in favour of it which might produce an opposite reaction among 
British Guiana politicians, and hope that the advantages of Federation may 
come increasingly to be seen spontaneously by the latter." 
I agree that the C.O. should do as MacKintosh says; and, as I have told you, and as I 
told LaCorbiniere, [sic] although I think that British Guiana will have a pretty sad 
future if it does not join the Federation, I can not do much to preach the advantages 
of Federation lest I defeat my own cause. It will be a pity, however, if the issue goes by 
default. Jagan purports still to believe in the advantages of Federation ultimately-
"when we both are free and there has been a referendum"-but is keeping well away 
from it now; the PNC have abandoned Federation as a plank in their platform for the 
next election; and even conservatives like Robin Davis see some lessening of such 
popular support for Federation as there was. (Eric Williams's pretensions do not 
always commend him to Guianese as a desirable associate and a potential master.) 
There is little "hope that the advantages of Federation may come increasingly to be 
1 A M Mackintosh, private secretary to the secretary of state. 
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seen spontaneously by" Guianese politicians: the realities of next year's internal self-
government are still largely ignored here and, as LaCorbiniere told me he had heard 
for himself in one afternoon in our Legislature, schoolboyish debate and the 
exchange of personal vituperation substitute for serious planning for the imminent 
switch of responsibility. A visit from Grantley Adams would not damage the chances 
of Federation, however ill he was received-and I do not think that he would be ill 
received: and it might improve them. 
I am sending a copy of this letter to Ambler Thomas. 
136 CO 1031/4270, no 25, enclosure 25 Oct 1960 
[Montserrat]: minute by Mr Bramble to D A Wiles1 on the financial 
and economic concerns of Montserrat 
[E G Donohoe, principal, CO, West Indian Dept 'A', had earlier minuted on Montserrat: 
' ... in Montserrat, perhaps more than any other of the small islands, the idea of living on 
the dole is most firmly implanted. I can trace this to the days when Sir Kenneth 
Blackburne had to fight hard to overcome Mr. Bramble's opposition to schemes for self-
help ("Do it yourself") housing. At that time Mr. Bramble played on the popular notion 
that it was for Her Majesty's Government to do things for Montserrat rather than help it 
to help itself. The remaining Federated Leeward Islands-St. Kitts and Antigua-perhaps 
because of better resources, have in recent years tried much harder to be self-sufficient. 
This year when Mr. Bramble became Chief Minister his illusions have grown. His 
megalomania and inefficiency have hindered the territory from making any plans for a 
C.D.&W. programme. There is moreover a risk that C.D.&W. expenditure already 
approved will be misapplied on the departure of the virtually sacked Director of 
Agriculture. At some time or other Mr. Bramble will have to realize (perhaps made to 
realize) that a "public assistance" outlook is incompatible with constitutional advance but 
we have not yet made up our minds who is to tackle this job or when' (CO 1031/4270, 
minute by Donohoe, 12 Oct 1960).] 
I have the honour to refer to your letter No. P/C.lS, dated 18th October, in which you 
informed me of the Secretary of State's reply to my telegram concerning 
apprehension here with regards to the financial and economic conditions of this 
colony upon the attainment of West Indies Independence. 
I do agree that there may be some substance in what the Secretary of State has 
said. He considers "that the right place to discuss the problem, in the first instance, 
is at the Inter-Governmental Conference, and at the Independence Conference, 
which it is hoped will follow next year". With regards to the meeting2 of the Secretary 
of State with Premiers and Chief Ministers and my own meeting with him, in my 
view, nothing more was extracted from the Secretary of State than what could 
possibly be expected from a trained English diplomat. The vague promises that the 
West In dies will get help, regardless of what it is called, did not in any way answer my 
questions as to what will become of this grant-in-aid colony after Independence, or 
whether it was consistent with British policy to grant Independence to people whose 
economy is of [sic] such, that they are unable to pay for their essential public services. 
I deliberately muffled myself on the subject of Independence at all past conferences, 
and have been determined to continue doing so until I have had the full opportunity 
of putting certain proposals before the Colonial Office, for the simple reason that my 
1 Administrator, Montserrat, 1960-1965. 2 See 128. 
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own views are exactly the same as those of Sir Alexander Bustamante, namely, that the 
British Government is smartly throwing off the burden of these exploited and 
neglected colonies on the shoulders of Trinidad and Jamaica, under the guise of 
Independence. Things will go very well for a short time until the elation of being an 
Independent nation has subsided, then the people of these poor grant-in-aid colonies 
will hear from their two wealthiest partners, "We are not the ones who have exploited 
you. We cannot carry you." The British Government, at such time, will tell us, "You 
are the ones who have asked for your Independence." The Right Honourable P. Gordon 
Walker,3 writing in a Commonwealth review in 1955, hinted this when he said inter 
alia: "The British Government has certain selfish aims in Federation." Mr. D. J. 
Morgan4 of Manchester University made it clearer in his letter to "The Economist" 
(November 21st, 1959) when he spoke of Jamaica's unreadiness to take over from the 
United Kingdom the subsidization of those units still unable to balance their budgets. 
From the short discussion in your office, I believe you should be fully aware of the 
fact that members of the Chamber of Commerce and leading people of this commu-
nity are quite conscious of what is coming. In the absence of any further opportunity 
to put the views of this colony before the Colonial Office, and in the light of what the 
Secretary of State has said, I take it that I am free to state my views publicly. 
I do not know what was the nature of your covering telegram in this case, but I will 
not hesitate to say that this system of covering telegrams is rank colonialism, and 
fully reveals the insincerity of the British Government while pretending that we are 
granted internal self-government. 
I am enclosing a copy of this minute to be forwarded to the Secretary of State.5 
3 P Cordon Walker, formerly S of S for Commonwealth relations, 'No easy path of Caribbean Federation', 
New Commonwealth, 17 Oct 1955, copy in CO 1031/1695, no 281. 
4 DJ Morgan, author of The official history of colonial development, in five volumes (London, 1980). 
5 Bramble had wanted to visit London but he was told that ministers could not find the time to see him. A 
R Thomas visited the West Indies in Nov-Dec 1960 and had a meeting with Bramble which he recorded in 
a diary of his stay. Upon being told that if Montserrat were to continue as a subsidised British colony its 
constitutional status might have to be revised, Bramble surprised Thomas by saying 'he wouldn't mind 
that! ' 'Bluff called', Thomas played his 'second card' to the effect that HMG could not contemplate 
colonial status indefinitely for a territory which could conveniently group itself with others in an 
independent federation. If Montserrat stayed out and then had to reapply, it would be in a far less 
favourable position. Federation would bring benefits in the form of greater outside aid; secession would 
lose benefits such as shipping and air services. 'Bramble protested but I said that Montserrat must grow 
away from a dole economy. Bramble said that thi~ was tantamount to forcing Montserrat to join some 
other Power- U.S.A., Spain, etc.! Not easy, but I got a lot of points across' (CO 103114270, no 29, extract 
from Thomas's diary). 
137 CO 1031/4234, no 90 25 Oct 1960 
[Defence]: letter from R J Vile1 to C W Wright2 on the question of 
stationing British forces in the federation after independence 
At our request, the Chiefs of staff last year considered U.K. defence interests and 
obligations in the Carribean area in the light of the approaching independence of the 
1 Assistant secretary, CO, head of Defence Dept. 2 Assistant secretary, Ministry of Defence. 
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Federation of the West Indies (COS(59)227).3 They concluded inter alia that a 
battalion of U.K. troops would still be required for the British territories outside the 
federation (Bahamas, British Guiana, British Honduras) after The West Indies 
became independent; that the most convenient location for the battalion HQ and 2 
companies would be in Jamaica, where accommodation was available; that staging 
and overflying facilities in the Federation were desirable, although not essential; and 
that these U.K. requirements should be incorporated in a Defence Agreement with 
the Federation. 
2. In recommending that our troops should remain in Jamaica after the 
Federation becomes independent, the Chiefs of Staff drew attention to two 
disadvantages viz, that we must face the possibility of having to move out of the 
Federation at some future date (possibly at short notice), and that there was a risk 
that our freedom to use our troops outside Jamaica might be inhibited if the 
operations met with the disapproval of the Federal Government (e.g. racial troubles 
in Bahamas). 
3. Since then, a number of other difficulties have become apparent. The most 
important of these is the fact that the continued presence of British troops in 
Jamaica after independence will inevitably lead the Federal Government (consciously 
or unconsciously) to rely on their assistance in maintaining internal security or 
essential services. Within the last twelve months, U.K. troops have assisted in the 
Rastafarian operations and have been asked to man the fire brigade services in the 
event of a strike of the fire brigade. The performance of duties such as these after 
independence by British troops might in some circumstances be politically 
embarrassing, and the situation would be even more delicate if the Federal 
Government wanted either to intervene in an internal security crisis in a unit 
territory against the advice of the local government, or (to take an extreme case) 
prevent a unit territory from seceding. The temptation to the Federal Government to 
call in British troops, and the political embarrassment to the U.K. if such aid was 
granted or refused, would be avoided if no British troops were stationed in the 
Federation. This question is discussed further in paragraph 7 below. 
4. The other difficulties arise over the Defence Agreement, which will have to be 
far more detailed and complicated if British troops remain. It would in fact have to be 
on the Malayan or Cyprus model (complete with a Status of Forces Agreement, which 
always leads to lengthy negotiation) rather than on the shortened Nigerian or Sierra 
Leone pattern. The fact that we required this major concession would put the West 
Indians in a far stronger bargaining position with regard to financial assistance for 
their forces. In addition, the West India Regiment have been counting on taking 
possession of the barracks in Jamaica at present occupied by our troops, and we 
might well be faced by a request for capital assistance towards alternative 
accommodation for the Jamaica battalion. 
5. These various considerations have led us to examine afresh the need for the 
British Battalion, which has been retained since 1960 at the request of our Secretary 
of State. Added point is given to this examination by the heavy costs of stationing this 
battalion in the Caribbean, estimated at some £600,000 a year above its normal cost, 
which will doubtless be even greater if the base is moved to the Bahamas. The 
situation in the non-Federal territories is as follows:-
3 See 106. 
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(i) Bahamas 
Until July 1960, the company garrison was found from the Caribbean battalion. It is 
now found from a U.K.-based battalion, on a six-months tour basis. The Commander 
Caribbean area has now recommended that a garrison of platoon strength should be 
found from the Caribbean battalion. The Governor would like to retain a small 
garrison. 
(ii) British Guiana 
As a result of the Constitutional Conference held earlier this year, British Guiana is 
due to have elections before August 1961, which will give British Guiana full internal 
self-government; and independence may follow within as little as two years after that 
(i.e. by mid-1963). The Governor has recommended that the British garrison should 
not be withdrawn until the elections had been held and the new Government has 
shown that it will function adequately. 
(iii) British Honduras 
In contrast to the other two territories, the threat to British Honduras is external, 
not internal, and at least for so long as Ydigoras remains President in Guatemala, 
there is a possibility that he may use force to achieve his aims (JIC(60)46, Appendix 
D). We therefore see an indefinite requirement for a company here. 
6. To sum up, the essential requirement is two companies (one each for British 
Guiana and British Honduras) until after the British Guiana elections (autumn 
1961), and one company in British Honduras thereafter. Bearing in mind also that 
the battalion costs £600,000 in excess costs to maintain in the Caribbean area, there 
is a case for considering whether from the point of view of strict U.K. military 
requirements our commitments after The West Indies achieves independence can be 
met without stationing a full battalion, with extensive military backing, in the 
Caribbean area. 
7. There are wider political considerations which may point to a different 
conclusion. As you know, the Governor-General has warned us that we may be faced 
with a definite request to assist the West Indies, by special agreement and for a 
limited period after independence, in carrying out internal security responsibilities 
and to relieve the Government of responsibilities for external defence. It is our 
general object to be as helpful to the independent West Indies in their early years as 
we reasonably can, bearing in mind that independence is likely to come about before 
they are fully equipped to shoulder all its burdens. Provided that it was at the direct 
request (made known publicly) of the Federal Government, on terms freely 
negotiated with them, the political difficulty of meeting such a request even for 
internal security purposes (cf paragraph 3 above) should not be insuperable and it 
may be that, if it is pressed, it will be less embarrassing to accede than to refuse. The 
question will then arise whether we should keep troops stationed in the Federation 
for this purpose or whether we could rely on bringing in troops from outside when 
we agreed to give such help. The former arrangement would no doubt be more 
convenient for the West Indies, as would similarly be the latter for the U.K. We 
should of course make it clear that any extra cost would be a liability on The West 
Indies, and this would have to be taken into account in the overall financial 
settlement which we shall in any case have to negotiate with them. 
8. This question will call for Ministerial decision, but in considering if it will be 
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important to know whether, as suggested in paragraph 6 above, our commitments in 
the area after The West Indies achieves independence could in the absence of such a 
request be met without stationing a full battalion with its administrative backing in 
the area; and if so, what forces would in fact be necessary. We should be grateful if 
you could arrange for this examination to be carried out.4 
4 The view of the Joint Planning Staff on this, as submitted to the Chiefs of Staff, was as follows: 'Militarily 
we would like to maintain our land forces at about their present strength and to continue to station 
Headquarters Caribbean Area and part of the garrison in Jamaica, if we could be assured that there would 
be no restrictions on their use elsewhere. If, for political reasons, it does not prove practicable to retain 
United Kingdom troops in the Federation, the alternative with the least political and military 
disadvantages appears to be the Bahamas. However, since overseas expenditure is likely to be an over-
riding consideration and the cost of building and living in the Bahamas is particularly high we would 
accept the disadvantages of having no locally available and acclimatized reserves, relying on reinforcement 
from the United Kingdom. The Caribbean garrison would then consist of an under-posted battalion with 
battalion headquarters and at least one platoon in the Bahamas, one company in British Honduras and 
one company in British Guiana' (DEFE 6/65, 'Military implications of the attainment of independence by 
the West Indies', Annex I to JP(60)116(Final), report by JPS to COS, 4 Nov 1960). 
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[Planning]: minute by G W Jamieson on the case for UK financial 
assistance put forward by the Trinidad government [Extract] 
[Jamieson is commenting here on Economic Development of the Independent West 
Indies Federation: Part I The Case for United Kingdom Assistance (Trinidad: Office of 
Premier and Minister of Finance, Oct 1960, copy in CO 1031/3505, no 69).] 
have now gone through the Trinidad Government's publication "Economic 
Development of the Independent West Indies Federation. I-The Case for U.K. 
Assistance". 
2. This is a clear and well written document. It is persuasive. It is only when one 
reads it carefully that one realises the shaky foundations on which it is written and 
the quite unfounded assumptions which it makes. 
3. The paper has a pervasive atmosphere of mercantilist thinking. There is hardly 
any reference to the fact that economic progress (in the free world at any rate) has 
come about by the force and vigour of natural economic forces. Although it is never 
explicitly stated there seems to be an assumption that economic progress and 
development depends primarily upon governmental activity and "planning". 
Planning is indeed "a blessed word". If it is true as the sociologists argue that every 
society needs its irrational myth to provide it with a dynamic it very much looks as 
though this will be provided for the West Indies by a mystical reverence for 
"planning". This major unspoken postulate is to my mind a far more serious 
deficiency in the document than the further faults with which I deal below. The 
report also assumes that British Guiana will be a member of the Federation. There is 
no foundation at present for the assumption. The present state of play is that British 
Guiana is if anything drifting away from the Federation having been already virtually 
promised separate independence while because of Dr. Jagan's links with Castro he is 
becoming increasingly suspect to the rest of the West Indies. 
4. The paper assumes quite uncritically that a proper aim of policy is the 
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development of the small islands up to a point when they are more or less on a level 
with the larger islands. This has indeed been an assumption in West Indian political 
thinking for some years past. Whereas I have formerly regarded this as nothing more 
than an illusion which would one day be shown to be false I have not until hitherto 
realised just how dangerous a fallacy this assumption is. If it were applied to the case 
of the United Kingdom it would mean that H.M.G. would accept that it was obliged to 
develop say Denbighshire or Ross-shire to the same level of economic activity as 
Yorkshire or South Wales. To make this comparison seems to me enough to 
demonstrate the complete folly of this argument, which would obviously require 
enormous sums of money and, in the end, almost certainly not achieve ib objective. 
This would be equally true in the West Indies. It is feasible to pour large sums of 
capital into the small islands to provide the basic public utilities-roads, harbour 
facilities, electricity, etc. There is of course no guarantee whatever that these 
facilities would tempt private enterprise to invest in the islands. Entrepreneurs will 
inevitably see the solid advantages and facilities available in Trinidad and Jamaica, 
and, other things being equal, will go to these islands. The end result will be that 
money which could have achieved real ends if spent in Jamaica and Trinidad will be 
largely wasted if poured into an attempt really to develop the small islands. 
5. The time has therefore come, I suggest, when we must make it clear to the 
West Indians that we do not share the view that the proper aim of policy is to seek to 
develop the small islands to the position of the large ones. This does not mean that 
we think that there should be no further development of these islands. There will 
inevitably have to be social investment (schools, hospital, etc.) because of the 
population [increase] in these territories . The population is likely to rise 50% within 
the next fifteen years unless some new factor, falling birthrate or rise in emigration, 
offsets this. We should put it quite clearly to the West Indians that we regard the 
position of, say, Montserrat as no different in principle from that of our own poorer 
counties. It is because Montserrat and the other small islands are separate political 
entities that their poverty and dependence is shown up. If some of our counties in the 
less developed parts of the U.K. were in the same position constitutionally as the 
small West Indian islands, the same would be shown to be true of them. This, indeed, 
is of course inevitably the case in any country. It is true of some of the poorer states 
in the United States. It is true of the smaller provinces of Canada. No country can 
avoid having richer parts and poorer parts and it has to be faced simply as one of the 
facts of life that the richer will have to support the poorer. If one compares Tables VI 
and VII in the paper (one is tempted to ask whether the use of different units of 
account is an attempt at camouflage) it is clear that several of the units of the 
Federation are within striking distance of the standard of living of European 
countries. It is clear that Trinidad's gross domestic product per capita of $W.I.822 is 
not at all bad compared with France's figure of $U.S. 7 41. I think we might find (and I 
intend to set in train some research towards this end) that the Trinidad figure might 
be as high as several European countries, e.g., Portugal or Greece. 
6. This problem has of course two aspects to it. On the one hand there are some 
kinds of objective standards in that India is so obviously so very much poorer than, 
say, the U.K. On the other hand (as we argued in our paper1 for the Americans and 
1 See 133, note 2. 
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Canadians) the new problem is not so much one of absolute need or otherwise as of 
expectations. The West Indies have near-European expectations and do not compare 
themselves so much with Africa or Asia as with Europe and North America. 
Nevertheless, it is not necessarily the case that we must go along with them in these 
expectations. My own view is that when it comes to the negotiations on the financial 
settlement we must talk out quite plainly and remind them of the fact that the U.K.'s 
responsibilities are worldwide, that there are many countries much worse off than 
they, and that when it comes to splitting up the cake of available U. K. assistance they 
must expect to get a relatively small slice. I am convinced that we must meet head-on 
this attitude of self-pity which creeps through documents such as this with a 
forthright assertion of the fact that the West Indies are at least lower middle class in 
the nations of the world and not, as this paper tends to argue, among the under-paid 
and underprivileged .... 
139 CO 103113505, no 79 3 Nov 1960 
'Visit of West Indian ministers: financial assistance at independence': (al 
CO memorandum for UK delegation on the 'most important single 
question' still to be answered in relation to West Indian independence 
The West Indian leaders who are coming to London for the Stage 1 United States 
Bases Conference opening on 3rd November have asked for a general discussion of 
United Kingdom financial assistance after independence. We have replied as in 
telegram No. 594 attached.1 
2. This settlement is almost certainly the most important single question still to 
be answered in relation to West Indian independence. Our political position vis-a-vis 
the West Indies is now such that there is little else constructive that we can still do. 
They still look to us for advice and assistance in the defence field, with the creation of 
their diplomatic machinery, and in various other directions. But none of these 
matters has the same importance, or arouses the same emotional response, as that of 
what direct aid the U.K. will still give them after independence. lbl 
3. Many West Indians suspect that the U.K. wishes to get rid of them as an 
embarrassment and cause of expense. Inevitably the period around independence will 
give further grounds for these suspicions. We may have to tell them before long that 
the last British battalion in the Caribbean is to be withdrawn, leaving a single 
company in British Honduras. They have already seen the strength of the Royal Navy 
gradually diminish. There are now only two frigates in the area. They already know 
that we have told the Americans and Canadians that we do not regard the problem of 
ensuring a continued flow of development capital after independence to the 
la) The Treasury and C.R.O. have agreed this brief at official level. 
ib) One complication is that several of Dr. Williams' ministers remain opposed to his intention of "a deal" 
with Mr. Manley, which would produce a Federation which would at least initially be on the weak 
Jamaican pattern. The Governor of Trinidad believes that their fear can only be allayed, and their support 
obtained for the "deal" by a generous financial settlement by the U.K. which would assure them that the 
new federation will have sufficient resources [see 130 and 132] . 
1 Not printed. 
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Federation as solely a U.K. responsibility. Our approach to the financial settlement 
should take account of these suspicions. 
4. Naturally the West Indians will pitch their claims high. In 1956 a meeting of 
the political leaders of the West Indies concluded that the new Federation would 
need a "float" of £100 million from Her Majesty's Government but they subsequently 
doubled the figure! Our only indication so far of their present hopes for post-
independence aid has been the publication of a Trinidad Government memorandum 
(copy attached) 2 which argues that the U.K. should provide a ten-year programme of 
development grants totalling £66 millions, or an average rate of approximately £6.6 
millions a year. The Federal Government have not yet said what they think of the 
Trinidad proposals, but it is safe to assume that they will not regard them as 
unreasonable and they can argue that such a volume of assistance could be profitably 
used, especially if a serious attempt is to be made to float the small islands out of 
grant-in-aid. There seems no prospect that the U.K. will be able to give anything 
approaching these sums, as is shown by the following table of economic aid 
expenditure already incurred in recent years for all overseas countries including the 
colonies: 
£Million's 
Average 
1955/57 1958 1959 
Current grants to Governments 50 51 53 
U.K. Government lending 19 21 50 
Subscriptions to International 
lending Agencies. 8 17 23 
C.D.C. Loan's 7 5 5 
Total: 84 94 131 
Apart from claims for general development assistance, there may also be requests for 
further help with the cost of the Federal capital (particularly if the Bases Conference 
raises any likelihood of release of part of Chaguaramas). There may also be 
suggestions that the Federal Government needs a cash reserve to weather the early 
years of independence. 
5. The following statements have already been made:-
(a) The Statement of Intent made by the Secretary of State to Mr. Manley in 
January (copy attached).3 This envisaged that, subject only to proof of need nearer 
the time and Parliamentary approval where necessary, 
(i) we should hand over at independence the entire balance of their Colonial 
Development and Welfare allocation. Generally; emergent territories have only 
been given the balance on schemes already approved, and what is proposed for 
the West Indies is therefore an improvement on what has been enjoyed in 
earlier cases. 
(ii) we will continue grant-in-aid until the end of the 1959/63 quinquennium. 
This means honouring the figure of £8.75 millions (£1.75 millions per annum) 
which we negotiated with them in 1958. We shall also be prepared to consider 
continuing this assistance for the further quinquennium 1964/68, but on a 
2 See 138. 3 See 117. 
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tapering scale. (The West Indians will argue that, as the 1956 British Caribbean 
Federation Act envisaged grant-in-aid for ten years (i.e. the two quinquennia) 
after the federation came into being, H.M.G. are under a moral obligation to 
continue the payments without any attempt at tapering despite the fact (which 
has already been put to them) that the items of that Act could only relate to the 
period before independence. This question is one we shall have to negotiate with 
them in due course.) 
(iii) We agreed to discuss with the Americans and Canadians the possibility of a 
joint programme of development assistance. This is dealt with more fully in 
paragraph 6 below). 
(b) The Secretary of State took the opportunity to give assurances during his visit 
to the Federation at Whitsun4 that independence did not mean the end or even 
necessarily any reduction in the volume of assistance from the United Kingdom.5 
The Secretary of State did not speak in concrete terms or go beyond what he had 
already said in the Statement of Intent, and these assurances were necessary at 
that point to assist in restoring political confidence in Her Majesty's Government's 
good intentions. On the other hand the publicity given to these public assurances 
(the Statement of Intent was circulated only to governments on a confidential 
basis) may have built up a climate of greater expectancy then previously existed. 
(c) A despatch issued in June informed the Federal Government that H.M.G. were 
willing, on certain conditions, to provide up to £1.2 millions for the construction 
of barracks in Trinidad necessary for the expansion of the West India Regiment to 
its planned two-battalion strength. 
Although the West Indians will no doubt regard all this as small beer, in fact 
considerable sums are involved. 
6. In pursuance of our undertaking to seek to associate the Americans and 
Canadians with a joint programme of development assistance (paragraph 5(c) (iii) 
above) we have already provided these governments with a memorandum6 setting 
out the probable financial and economic situation of the Federation after 
independence (NOTE: This should not be disclosed to the West Indians.) The 
Canadians have not yet reacted, except to seek some additional statistical 
information, and it is possible that their own domestic financial difficulties are acting 
as a restraint. They are already operating a $10 million aid programme to the 
Federation, which they had announced as aimed to cover the period up to the end of 
1962. They are however anxious to maintain their close links with the Federation and 
are unlikely to refuse to enter into discussions. The Americans, on the other hand, 
have already announced that their $500 millions Social Development Programme for 
Latin America will also benefit the Federation, though this decision was in fact taken 
before our memorandum was received.7 The Americans have also indicated that this 
is not necessarily their sole response to the needs of the Federation, but we are not 
free yet to disclose this (except on a private basis to the Prime Minister and the 
Premiers). 
7. The Americans anticipate that they may be faced with demands for assistance 
during the Bases Conference. Neither we nor the Americans wish to see the Bases 
4 Emphasis throughout in original. 
6 See 133, note 2. 
5 See 128. 
7 See 133. 
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Conference entangled within the aid issue. It is probable that some of the West 
Indians will feel likewise; Dr. Williams has gone on record as refusing to consider any 
suggestion that he might sell "the sacred soil of Trinidad". The Americans propose to 
deal with any such intrusion of this subject by reference to the probability that there 
will be discussions between the three donor countries to consider the West Indian 
needs. We agree with this. It is, however, possible that the Americans may also wish 
to go on to say that "if all goes well" they may propose to the other governments 
concerned that a start on the aid discussions might be made concurrently with the 
Stage III Bases Conference. We think (and have told the Americans) that this is 
suspiciously like the "No bases, no aid" approach, that we are all agreed would be 
undesirable.8 In any case we believe the two sets of talks will each have its own 
tempo, and that it would not be desirable, and may not be possible, to attempt to 
dovetail them together. 
8. In addition we hope to obtain Treasury agreement to giving a further measure 
of assistance to the Federation either before, or shortly after, independence, 
including, 
(a) A Commonwealth Assistance Loan.9 
(b) Technical Assistance (though the Treasury have agreed up to now that this 
should not come into effect until they have used up their Colonial Development 
and Welfare balance (paragraph 5(a)(i)). 
(c) possibly further capital assistance for defence. They will require further 
barracks in Jamaica and we may either have to assist this construction financially 
or make a gift of the existing War Department barracks when the United Kingdom 
battalion is withdrawn. In addition they aim to form a Navy and we may have to 
assist them to acquire one or two small warships (e.g. minesweepers or similar 
vessels) . 
(d) assistance in training diplomatic staff and in providing training facilities for 
their armed forces. 
They will almost certainly benefit in most of these ways but these questions have not 
yet been considered or approved by the Treasury and nothing can be said to the 
delegation on them . 
9. We are in no position to make any additional concession or promises at this 
juncture. It is therefore suggested that the Secretary of State should take the 
following line:-
(a) Repeat his general assurances of the United Kingdom's continue readiness to 
help the Federation, adding that to this end we shall try as energetically as possible 
to persuade Americans and Canadians to join us in a common endeavour. 
(b) Seek West Indian agreement that it will be best to discuss this in detail when 
the shape of the Federation is clearer after the Inter-governmental conference and 
perhaps also after the Jamaica referendum. (The West Indians might be asked for 
their views on the last point: we could begin to discuss confidentially before the 
referendum on the assumption that Jamaica still stays in, but if this leaked it 
might affect the referendum in some way. Mr. Manley's views would be welcome). 
We could then aim to complete our discussions by the time of the London 
independence conference. 
8 See 133, note 5. 9 But see 132. 
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(c) Meanwhile it will be valuable to us to know the lines of West Indian thinking. 
Mr. Williams has given a stimulating impetus to all our thinking with his recent 
paper, which we and no doubt his colleagues will want to study much more closely 
than time has allowed so far. He might be asked to talk about his paper (and his 
colleagues might be asked for their own ideas bearing in mind that Mr. Bradshaw 
does not like Dr. Williams and may be disposed to regard it as a piece of 
interference). 
10. The main aim, in short, should be to draw the West Indians. But it will do no 
harm if the realities as seen by the "givers" begin to be realised by the West Indians. 
The Secretary of State might therefore, if it seems propitious, make some of the 
following points also:-
(a) The United Kingdom has world-wide responsibilities, among which is her 
cardinal duty to maintain the stability of Sterling. What assistance we can give the 
world is largely dependant [sic] on our balance of payments. In any case the 
amount of aid is limited, and there inevitably has to be a choice of priorities 
between claimants. 
(b) The Federation is in fact one of the middle class countries of the World 
(Trinidad's Gross National Product per head approaches that of the poorer 
European countries). While we appreciate that the problem cannot be seen solely 
in these terms-it is as much one of expectations-it must nevertheless weigh 
with us. 
(c) The West Indian problem does not seem to be so much one of general overall 
financial difficulty as a question of the position of the small islands. To a point this 
is a problem in every country. If some of our poore.r counties (e.g. Denbighshire, 
Ross-shire) were separate political entitles like the Leeward and Windward islands 
they too would become problem territories living on some form of grant-in-aid. In 
a federation this problem is simply revealed by separate accounting, whereas it is 
concealed in a unitary country. Our hope is therefore that the richer units will 
accept an obligation to assist the poorer ones. 
140 CO 103113506, no 86 22 Nov 1960 
[Finance]: CO record of a meeting with West Indian ministers at 
Lancaster House on 8 Nov1 
Lord Perth referred to the communique issued at the conclusion of the Bases talks, 
in which the U.K. and the U.S. reaffirmed their continuing interest in assisting 
towards the economic development and stability of The West Indies during the 
difficult period following the attainment of independence. The West Indies had 
already had an indication of the U.K.'s position from the statement2 made to Mr. 
Manley by the Secretary of State in January, 1960, in which he said that subject to 
proof of need and Parliamentary approval where necessary:-
1 The meeting was chaired by Lord Perth and attended by officials from the CO, CRO and Treasury. 
Delegations from the federal government and from the governments of Antigua, Barbados, Jamaica, St 
Lucia and Trinidad represented the West Indies. 
2 See 117. 
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(i) Her Majesty's Government might be expected to hand over at independence the 
entire balance of the Colonial Development and Welfare allocation, 
(ii) H.M.G. would be willing to continue to make available the unused balance of 
the current five year block grant-in-aid and to consider continuing this assistance 
on a tapering basis for the following quinquennium. 
(iii) H.M.G. would discuss with the Americans and Canadians the possibility of a 
joint programme of development assistance. 
In addition, the Secretary of State had made statements during his Whitsun visit 
to the West Indies which reaffirmed this position. 
With regard to point (iii) H.M.G. were anxious to enlist the interest of the 
Americans and Canadians, since the U.K. could not hope to provide all the 
Federation's needs in the years following independence. The U.K. would stretch 
itself, but there were, of course, many other claimants for aid among the 
undeveloped countries. Financial assistance would have to take different forms from 
that given before independence. For instance, exchequer loans under the C.D. and W. 
Act would no longer be available, but Commonwealth Assistance Loans could be 
considered. The U.K. would be willing to help as far as possible in trade matters, e.g. 
with sugar, citrus and bananas. This was often as important as direct financial help. 
Consideration should also be given to the question of timing. He hoped that it 
would be possible to hold a conference with The West Indies, Canada and the U.S., 
but it would be difficult to have this before The West Indies had held their Inter-
Governmental Conference, planned for January or thereabouts. Bearing this in mind, 
it might be possible to hold a meeting of Ministers or officials early next year, but it 
would be necessary to do some thinking about the agenda. We knew that the 
Americans, in principle, would be ready to come, and we hoped the Canadians would 
also be willing to be present. 
2. Sir Grantley Adams said he could speak not only for the Federation, but for 
Jamaica, Trinidad and the other units, when he said that he hoped the meeting would 
set the general policy for post-independence aid. Assistance should be of a substantial 
order, as the position ofThe West Indies was a special one: they were poorer than any of 
the dependent territories which had so far achieved independence, most of which, such 
as Malaya and Ghana, had substantial resources. They needed something over and 
above what had been done for them. He did not wish to go into details, but The West 
Indies had a particularly strong claim on the United Kingdom. Unlike the Mrican 
territories they had no tribal tradition, or indeed any national tradition different from 
that of the U.K. Although The West Indies were poor agricultural countries, they did 
not have to worry about revolts, etc. They hoped for generosity. If they seemed to be 
asking for more than other emergent territories, they were not asking in the dark. 
Trinidad had probably studied the problem in more detail than the other Unit 
governments, and if the broad principles set out in the Trinidad memorandum3 could 
be accepted, that would be the minimum The West Indies expected to get. If they 
succeeded in convincing H.M.G. that the Trinidad figure was the one to work to, he did 
not think they could expect to get very much further at the present meeting. 
3. Dr. Williams said that, without prejudice to what the Prime Minister had just 
said, he would like to put forward on behalf of Trinidad and Tobago certain ideas 
3 See 138 and 139. 
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which perhaps the U.K. might like to consider. He was happy to know that the U.K. 
were thinking of handing over the entire balance of the C.D. and W. allocation, and 
would be prepared to provide grant-in-aid until 1968, and he was interested in the 
proposal to provide joint aid with the United States and Canada. Trinidad and Tobago 
would, however, like to see assistance from the U.K. separated from that from the 
United States and Canada. The question of grants should be kept distinct from that of 
exchequer loans, and the emphasis should be on grants rather than loans. Mr. Bird 
would wish to speak about the necessity for providing cheaper money. The West 
Indies needed loans at reasonably low rates of interest for unreasonably long periods. 
He wished to suggest that in addition to the Prime Minister's statement, certain 
general principles should be accepted:-
(i) U.K. assistance to the Federation and its constituent territories over the 10-
year period after independence should be not less than the U.K. assistance given to 
The West Indies for the ten-year period 1950 to 1960. This would be of the order of 
£25.6 m. ($123 m. W.I.). 
(ii) Any assistance from the U.K. should follow as closely as possible the quantum 
given to other emergent territories. 
(iii) Assistance should be on a scale which would enable The West Indies, 
especially the smaller territories, to make up the deficiencies in their essential 
services, which the present governments had inherited from their predecessors. 
For instance, Antigua had put a 5-year development programme amounting to 
$4~ m. which, however, excluded the cost of the deep water harbour, sewerage 
scheme and electricity distribution. The St. Lucia allocation of just over $4 
millions over a 5-year period was no more than a drop in the bucket. What was 
likely to be available was a mere 20% of what was required. The deficiencies were 
an obstacle to social progress and economic development. He had been closely 
concerned with development and welfare planning and was convinced that it was 
not sufficient to say that education and the provision of hospital beds were social 
services-they were primarily aids to production. 
(iv) The emphasis should be on the provision of further employment facilities, 
which was related to the question of migration both in and outside the area. The 
efforts made in Puerto Rico had not been sufficient to give them the higher 
standards at which they aimed. In any case this was not a cure for migration. It 
would be a great mistake to attempt any restriction of the urge to migrate. He 
hoped the capital of the Commonwealth would not accept the backward 
emigration concepts of some other parts of the Commonwealth. Territories were 
being denuded rapidly of their manpower. 
In addition attention must be paid to the prospects of the European Common 
Market which he assumed the U.K. would join. This would inevitably disrupt the 
West Indian economy. Without in any way attempting to state what U.K. policy 
should be, he wished to emphasise that the U.K. had a direct responsibility for 
ensuring the least possible economic disruption to The West Indies. It would be 
useful if the meeting could have some positive reaction from the U.K. to those four 
basic principles. 
4. Mr. Manley said that at some stage they would have to have the reactions of 
the U.K. to the ideas which had been put forward. He welcomed the Prime Minister's 
and Dr. Williams' statements. These set out principles, which it was necessary to put 
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into a framework of purpose and scale, the latter being perhaps the more important. 
The West Indies had made a great effort to develop its own economy, but as a force in 
the world economy it had barely begun. 
Jamaica had committed itself to a programme which had been carefully worked 
out, but which was not large enough. It would strain their own resources to the limit 
and for years to come they would require aid, in the shape of exchequer loans, 
Commonwealth loans and a special approach to the London market. This latter point 
was a special concern of Jamaica. 
The need for special assistance to the whole area was tremendous. The figures 
quoted by Dr. Williams were the minimum required. It would be disastrous if The 
West Indies failed to achieve economic stability; political instability would follow. At 
some stage, all West Indian Governments would have to collaborate in a more 
general study requiring greater detail. He was however anxious to get the whole 
question of financial assistance after independence put on a new basis of thinking 
applicable to The West Indian scene. 
He wished to keep these discussions with the U.K. quite separate from those with 
the U.S. and Canada. The West Indies was about to become a member of the 
Commonwealth and had a special position vis-a-vis the U.K. over the first few vital 
years. Discussions between the U.K. and The West Indies and between The West 
Indies and the U.S. and Canada were not inter-dependent in any way. 
5. Mr. Bird said he was fully in accord with the principles enunciated by Dr. 
Williams. The question of loans and cheaper money was especially important to the 
smaller territories. Jamaica had a sizeable local market, but the smaller territories 
could not compete in getting such investiment [sic]. He would like the needs of the 
Leeward and Windward Islands to be borne in mind, with a view to their getting 
loans at a cheap rate of interest. 
6. Mr. Charles said he would like to support Mr. Bird's plea for greater 
development of the smaller islands. 
7. Dr. Cummins said he wished to mention the movement of population to the 
U.K. He was sure more than half of the migrants would prefer to stay in Barbados, 
but conditions prevented them from doing so. He would like to see more done to 
keep people at home, especially the skilled workers. 
8. Mr. Bradshaw made two points:-
(i) he wished to know whether any approach had already been made to the 
Governments of the United States and Canada with respect to the proposal put 
forward in the Chairman's opening address. 
(ii) What would be the future of the Colonial Development Corporation after 
independence? They had several schemes operating in The West Indies, e.g. , 
electricity in Grenada, St. Vincent and Dominica. Would their operations cease on 
independence? 
9. Lord Perth , in answering Mr. Bradshaw's queries, said:-
(i) whilst no specific proposals had been made to the U.S. and Canada, there had 
been an approach suggesting the possibility of a discussion. 
(ii) Schemes on which the C.D.C. was engaged would continue after 
independence, and new capital might be available, if demanded for their extension. 
But generally there would be no new C.D.C. projects after independence. 
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He thought there was room for doubt whether The West Indies were really worse 
off than other territories. For example, the Gross Domestic Product per head for 
1958 in The West Indies was £130, but in Nigeria it was £25. 
10. Lord Perth emphasised that the amount of aid the U.K. could give under-
developed countries was limited. Too much would threaten the stability of ster-
ling, and the amount we were at present making available was stretching our 
resources to a greater extent than was comfortable. Despite our particular regard 
for The West Indies, we were reluctant to accept the suggestion that U.K. aid 
should be separated from any other aid. The U.K. Government would be bound to 
take into account what might be available from outside sources, including Canada, 
the U.S. and international institutions. If this were not done, other U.K. depen-
dent territories could justifiably complain. He agreed what was needed was a pro-
gramme which would enable The West Indies to stand on its own feet, but each 
country's assistance could not be given in a vacuum. With regard to Dr. Williams' 
points:-
(i) on his question of the volume of aid in the period 1950-60 H.M.G. hoped, 
subject only to proof of need and Parliamentary approval where necessary, to hand 
over the entire C.D. and W. balance and to continue grant-in-aid at its present 
level till the end of 1963; and they would be ready to consider the necessity of 
further grant-in-aid for 1964-8 on a tapering basis, 
(ii) the U.K. were ready to draw up a paper for early circulation concerning the 
"quantum" given to other territories, although comparisons with Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone and Malaya, would not be encouraging, 
(iii) the distribution of aid among the territories of The West Indies would be for 
the Federation itself to work out, 
(iv) emigration was a mutual problem, which we all recognised, 
(v) as regards sugar, the arrangement concerning the Commonwealth Agreement 
would continue. On the European Common Market, Mr. Bradshaw had attended 
the meeting of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers, and it was well-known that 
in any future negotiations with "the Six" the U.K. would consult with the 
Commonwealth beforehand. It would be wrong to say there might not be some 
change, although The West Indies could be sure they would come off no worse 
than other Commonwealth territories. Furthermore, over a period of time, a wider 
market of goods for the Commonwealth could be envisaged. 
Dr. Williams and Mr. Bird had mentioned the question [of] loans at low rates of 
interest. If grants and loans were put together, and not considered separately, it 
would be seen that U.K. assistance to the overseas territories would stand 
comparison with anything from other sources. 
11. Mr. Manley said that to compare the "national incomes" of different 
countries would be fallacious. The relevant comparison must be between countries 
which had reached the same stage of economic development. A country with a low 
national income might still have a self-sustaining economy. It was right to ask how 
far The West Indies had strained itself in developing its own resources, and what were 
the results of the efforts made. It would be found that even so there was more poverty 
in Jamaica than Nigeria. Without aid, there was a danger The West Indies would fail 
to take off, which might lead to total economic collapse, which would be inevitably 
followed by widespread social disruption. 
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12. Lord Perth agreed that comparison of the National Income with other 
territories was not conclusive. Nevertheless it was not an entirely irrelevant 
consideration. He would be prepared to produce a paper on the subject. Sir Grantley 
Adams said that Committee I and the Inter-governmental Conference would benefit 
from a statement about financial aid given to other emergent territories. 
13. Mr. Bradshaw said that the Canadians expected their $10 million aid to last 
till 1963. When he discussed the question of the residue with them in September, 
they were very unwilling to commit themselves to the $400,000 contribution 
towards the Antigua harbour project. Their experts, too, were expensive. The West 
Indies should not expect too much aid from Canada. 
On the "limited cake", he asked whether there would not be more cake for the 
West Indies to cut, after so many territories had become independent. Lord Perth 
agreed that the Canadian experts were expensive. He drew attention to the possibility 
of The West Indies obtaining U.K. experts by special arrangements which would not 
effect their main C.D. and W. allocation. 
On the "limited cake", as more peoples had become independent, the demand for 
money for big development programmes has increased, and there was if anything an 
even greater pressure on the limited resources available. 
14. Mr. Manley said that assistance given for the West India Regiment, which 
had been discussed now for 8 years, should not be in the context of financial aid. Lord 
Perth said he would ensure that the question was taken during the discussion on 
defence the following day. (The meeting then adjourned at 12.45 p.m., and resumed 
at 2.30 p.m.) 
15. Lord Perth said that if those present agreed, he might say something more 
now about the question of U.K. assistance towards the capital costs of the West India 
Regiment. In a despatch to the Federal Government in June, the Secretary of State 
had said that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to contribute on certain 
conditons[sic] towards the cost of constructing barracks in Trinidad, such cost to be 
limited to £1.2 million. In the absence of a reply to this the Federal Government had 
been asked at the end of October whether allowance would need to be made in the 
coming U.K. budget for any part of the proferred assistance. The reply from the 
Federal Government indicated that construction was expected to start in 1961/62 and 
that they wished to discuss the matter in London. Mr. Bradshaw explained that the 
Federal Government had replied, and that there would be a contribution from 
Federal reserves, with a suggestion that unit Governments should also contribute. 
Mr. Manley said that The West Indies could not go ahead with the expansion of 
military forces until barracks had been built in Trinidad. He said that when the U.K. 
troops moved out, The West Indies would welcome the gift of the barracks in 
Jamaica. They were also interested in the procurement of supplies such as naval 
vessels, a helicopter, landing craft and other equipment. He understood the present 
re-equipment of the U.K. forces, and their reduction in strength, might lead to the 
availability of much serviceable equipment which he hoped would be going at knock-
down prices. Lord Perth suggested that the question of equipment should be 
discussed at the defence talks on the following day. 
16. Lord Perth said he had given further thought to the question of possible 4-
power talks in the light of views expressed at the morning session and he did not 
wish to press the suggestion. He was bound to emphasise however that a programme 
of what the U.K. could do after independence could not be worked out in a vacuum. 
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Sooner or later what came from other sources would have a bearing and importance. 
No doubt The West Indies would wish to work out their overall requirements after 
independence; he understood a comprehensive tabulation of their needs was still to 
be made. He did not want to press our services, but if The West Indies required 
assistance in this field the U.K. had experts who could assist in the formulation of 
programmes. In any case, when the overall programme was ready we could put our 
heads together on it and consider what should be done. There was however no 
certainty that all that was wanted would be forthcoming; these programmes were 
like jigsaw puzzles and the pieces were never quite complete. 
17. Mr. Manley asked if note could be taken of certain important aspects. We 
were all united in wishing at some time to explore a programme of U.S. and Canadian 
aid. Jamaica had proposed as far back as 1956 a Colombo-type plan based on U.S., 
Canadian and U.K. participation. It had been left for the U.K. to explore the idea but 
nothing had happened. The West Indies were just as keen on this as formerly. The 
Jamaican position on federation was not yet finalised and as the U.S. and Canada 
could not yet be informed of the date of independence, we should wait until the 
actual date was known and we should then be in a better position to talk. This did not 
mean that the time between now and the Inter-Governmental Conference could not 
be used to explore whether the U.S.A. could be persuaded to alter the type of aid they 
had so far given. At present there were two types of aid:- (a) Colombo-type plan, 
which provided technical assistance and (b) financial aid for a specific project, such 
as that given by the Development Loan Fund. The provision of an adequate amount 
of assistance for general development purposes was vital to the needs of the 
Federation. He did not think the United States or Canada would wish to talk, until 
they knew the scale of U.K. aid. Canada would not talk so far ahead on aid without 
considering trade first. If the United States and Canada knew .that the United 
Kingdom had given special consideration to the needs of The West Indies, this might 
spur them on. The United States was likely to insist on aid by way of technical 
assistance and special projects, but nothing could take the place of the basic 
requirement of The West Indies for long-range aid for development. This was not 
likely to be forthcoming except from the United Kingdom, which had special 
knowledge of the type of aid provided by C.D. and W. (the value of which lay in the 
method by which it was given). After the job of building up basic facilities had been 
completed, it would be possible to turn to other people for supplementary aid. For 
these reasons it was essential for the U.K. and The West Indies to talk first, in order to 
provide a framework for talks with the U.S. and Canada. 
18. Lord Perth said that in view of these statements he would not press the 
question of an early 4-Power Conference. It might however still be useful to make 
discreet inquiries to the U.S. about the type of aid given. Meanwhile the Federal 
Government might aim at producing a programme or plan, in the preparation of 
which the U.K. would be very ready to help. But there must be some regard to what 
may be possible from other people. 
19. Dr. Williams said he wished to reinforce the point of view put by Mr. Manley. 
The West Indies could not agree to any suggestion that there should be a 
combination of what they considered to be two quite separate claims for help, that 
from the U.K. and that from the U.S. The British Government had a direct 
responsibility to The West Indies; defence and external aid were U.K. problems and 
the U.K. must accept responsibility for current markets in The West Indies. But the 
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U.K. connection with the Common Market, and their concern with banana/citrus 
trade, had nothing whatsoever to do with the U.S. The insularity and parochialism of 
The West Indies were the result of British policy over several centuries. All assistance 
the U.K. could give would be welcomed, but The West Indies did not agree to such 
assistance being related to what had been done for other emergent territories, e.g., 
Nigeria and Ghana. He could not agree that deficiencies that had been inherited from 
the U.K. should be met by aid from the United States. The hands of Trinidad and 
Tobago were tied in dealing with the United States by military considerations and the 
Chaguaramas question, as they would also be when they came to discuss the 
question of joining the Organisation of American States. He would, however, 
welcome U.K. help in improving their relations with the U.S. and Canada. 
20. Lord Perth said the meeting had been most useful; indicating the 
programme to which they should work and giving us all a chance to think out loud 
on the economic problems of the Federation at Independence. The special 
responsibility of the U.K. to The West Indies had already been recognised in the 
Statement by the Secretary of State in January. He was, however, pleased that it had 
been recognised that the possibilities of assistance from other sources should 
continue to be explored. 
I 
141 CO 103113506, no 98c 20 Dec 1960 
[Finance]: minute by A R Thomas toW L Gorell Barnes clarifying the 
US position on financial aid 
Following the talks which we had with West Indian Ministers on financial aid at the 
Stage I Conference on U.S. Bases in London, 1 and the subsequent meeting in your 
room on the 14th November, I was charged with discussing the matter further with 
Mr. Ivan White during the Stage II Talks in The West Indies, and, if possible, 
ascertain more of U.S. intentions in the matter. 
1 Stage I of the talks on bases opened with a conference (3-6 Nov 1960) in London attended by delegations 
from the UK, US, the federal government and the governments of Jamaica, Trinidad, St Lucia and Antigua. 
In December Stage II talks were held in the Caribbean, first in Tobago, where an agreement over US 
installations in Trinidad was negotiated, and then in St Lucia, Antigua and Jamaica. The release of the base 
areas in these latter three islands was a formality as they had long been deactivated and in St Lucia and 
Antigua the US agreed to contribute to local development projects. Stage Ill completed the process when a 
new base agreement was signed in Port of Spain in Feb 1961. The US agreed to release unconditionally 
most of the unused land surrounding Chaguaramas (some 21,000 acres). US facilities at Chaguaramas 
would be retained until1977 although provision was included for a review at the end of 1967 and then at 
five-year intervals to determine if modifications were necessary. Facilities were to be made available for 
federal marine forces and a Trinidad marine police at Teteron Bay, an inlet of the North West Peninsular, 
and the US agreed to provide vocational training in machine shops at Chaguaramas. Agreement was also 
reached that the US would participate in the improvement of Trinidad's port, road, rail and air facilities 
and in the development of an arts faculty of the Trinidad branch of the University of the West Indies. US 
withdrawal from Trinidad in 1977 would not be automatic but contingent on the state of global tension. In 
the event the US closed its operations in mid-1967. See CO 1031/3034, no 19, Agreement between the 
Government of the Federation of the West Indies and the Government of the United States of America 
concerning United States Defence Areas in the Federation of the West lndies (Cmnd 1369, June 1961). 
Also CO 1031/3039 (whether agreement is legally binding in West Indies after independence); CO 
103113040 (joint control and question of regional defence organisation); CO 1031/3041 (UK representation 
at bases talks). 
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It was in fact extremely difficult to get an opportunity to raise this matter since we 
were all concentrating exclusively and intensively on the Bases question. I also felt 
some hesitation in raising it with Mr. White in view of the hard bargain which was 
being driven by West Indian delegates to the Bases talks with the Americans, who 
were feeling rather rueful about the extent of economic aid which was being wrung 
out of them! At one stage I heard Mr. White telling a Trinidad representative that 
they had "taken the shirt off his back" and I think the Americans were forced in the 
course of the negotiations to put their hands deeper in their pockets than they had 
expected. 
The extent of U.S. assistance promised in the course of the Bases negotiations is 
shown in the attached press communiques.2 Their general approach-or at least 
their "end position"-was a three-pronged one, viz:-
(i) they made it clear that the West Indies would receive their share of I.C.A. 
assistance which was generally available to under-developed territories (N.B. in 
fact quite a number of I.C.A. schemes have already been implemented, or are being 
implemented under I.C.A. agreements with West Indian Governments); 
(ii) as a result of discussions with the four Governments concerned, they singled 
out particular projects which would receive special and sympathetic consideration, 
generally on a grant basis. (N.B. although these are not commitments there is 
clearly a very strong obligation on the Americans to treat them as such, e.g. the 
I.C.A. representative assured me that they would see to it that Mr. Bird got the 
whole of his deep-water harbour in Antigua); 
(iii) more particularly, the Americans undertook specifically to allocate funds in 
their current fiscal year to the end of June, 1961, for particular projects in St. 
Lucia, Antigua and Jamaica. The sums amount respectively to $.U.S.350,000, 
$.U.S.350,000 and $U.S.500,000. 
The Americans emphasised repeatedly and strongly that these forms of economic 
aid were in no sense a quid pro quo for the past and future services of the West Indian 
islands in respect of Bases. The connexion between the two was however very thinly 
veiled! 
During our last night in Jamaica I was able to discuss the question, of future 
financial aid with Mr. Ivan White. I recapitulated our own intentions as follows. On 
Independence The West Indies would qualify for the normal C.R.O. treatment to 
under-developed Commonwealth countries, viz. Commonwealth Assistance loans 
and Technical Assistance schemes. In addition, because of their special needs, they 
would be allowed to keep the balance of their present C.D.W. allocation and I hoped, 
(although this had not yet been confirmed) that we should be able to give them 
corresponding development aid on a tapering basis during the following 
quinquennium. Grant-in-Aid would continue on the present basis for the present 
quinquennium and on a temporary basis for a further 5 years. We had already 
committed ourselves to the grant of £1.2 millions for the Longdenville Barracks and 
might help in other aspects of Defence, e.g. the provision of mine-sweepers. We 
should also be providing diplomatic and service training facilities. 
Mr. !van White commented that this sounded pretty good. 
2 Not printed. 
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I then told him of our meeting under Lord Perth's chairmanship at Lancaster 
House3 and the preference there expressed by the West Indian Ministers for having 
separate talks with us and with the Americans and the Canadians rather than 
arranging a quadripartite Conference. I told him that quite frankly I thought there 
were two elements in this, namely, that they thought the U.K. Government had a 
special first duty towards them and that they had a right to see what "Daddy" could 
do first before taking the hat round to wealthy Uncles. Secondly, they no doubt 
thought that they would do better by dealing with us separately. Nevertheless, we 
clearly could not press them into quadripartite talks and we ourselves had no 
strong views. Indeed, we understood the Canadians to be in favour of separate 
approaches. I explained that you had recently visited Ottawa and had been intend-
ing to sound out the Canadians. Meanwhile, I told Mr. White that we had empha-
sised to the West Indians that the U.K. cake was limited in view of our balance of 
payments problems, and our other widespread commitments, and that it was neces-
sary for us to take U.S. and Canadian contributions into account in finally deciding 
what we could do. 
I said that so far as we were concerned the ball was with The West Indies but 
that we nevertheless were trying to get our own ideas straight. It would probably 
not be possible to reach any final conclusions until we were better informed about 
W.l. defence needs and nearer the time of Independence: there would clearly be 
no question of further talks with the West Indians until after the Inter-
Governmental Conference in January but we thought we ought to be ready to 
meet a request for talks sometime between January and May and in any event not 
later than the Independence Conference which might be about the middle of next 
year. 
Mr. White seemed to agree that the idea of quadripartite talks should not be pur-
sued. He confirmed that the U.S. Government expected to be able to help but made 
it clear that this would have to take the form of project assistance, either under 
I.C.A. or through one of the Lending Agencies. There was no prospect of general 
budgetary or developmental assistance unrelated to particular projects. Within this 
range Mr. White thought that U.S. assistance might run to the amount of $.U.S.3~ 
million per annum to The West Indies as a whole, of which $U.S.2~ million might 
be in the form of l.C.A. project assistance and $U.S.l million in the form of 
enquiries, loan of experts, technical assistance etc. In addition, he envisaged that up 
to $U.S.8 million might be available in loan form to the "key units" viz. Trinidad 
and Jamaica but he emphasised that this was very much of a guess. (Stupidly, I did 
not get clear from him at the time whether this meant $U.S.8 million per annum 
or in toto). 
In addition to the above Mr. White thought they might be able to help in building 
up and training a West Indian Navy and Marine Force but emphasised that they 
would not be able to provide any ships, in the absence of a Military Assistance 
Agreement. (N.B. we have in any case to be a little careful about this since there is a 
risk that The West Indies Navy will not develop along the right lines if it is regarded 
as largely a U.S. responsibility). 
I hope that the above is of some help in clarifying the American position. 
3 See 140. 
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142 CO 103113932, no 184 Dec 1960 
'West Indian immigration': minute by Miss M Z Terry on the current 
situation 
West Indian migration to the United Kingdom became fairly heavy by 1955, the total 
for that year being 27,551 and for 1956 29,812. In 1957 the total fell to 23,016 and in 
1958 it fell even lower (to 15,023) following racial disturbances in August and the 
recession in United Kingdom employment which set in about the same time. The 
figures remained relatively low for the first seven months of 1959, but (presumably 
because of the improvement in the employment position which became apparent in 
the late spring) the numbers began to increase in August and the total for the year 
was 16,395. The increase has continued very much more strongly throughout 1960. 
The total for the first ten months of 1960 was 43,450 and seems likely to be of the 
order of 50,000 for the whole year. It is estimated that there are at present about 
180,000 West Indians living in the United Kingdom of whom roughly 155,000 are 
classified as "working population". 
2. The Home Secretary has recently drawn the attention of the Cabinet to the 
sharp increase in West Indian immigration. In his paper he particularly drew 
attention to the following:-
(i) Employment difficulties 
Out of an estimated total West Indian working population of about 155,000 only 
8,000 were registered as unemployed on the 1st November, and the most striking 
feature of the present figures is the comparative ease with which the very large 
number of new arrivals from overseas are finding employment. However, the 
Ministry of Labour are seriously concerned about the longer term prospects. 
Because of a number of general factors (which have nothing to do with 
immigration) the Ministry of Labour consider that the demand for coloured 
immigrant labour in the relatively near future will fall significantly. They are 
specially concerned about the deteriorating prospects for unskilled labour, the 
category into which most West Indians fall. 
(ii) Housing difficulties 
West Indian immigrants have not created new housing difficulties but have 
undoubtedly considerably aggravated the acute housing difficulties which already 
exist in London and in some of the large industrial towns of the Midlands where 
West Indians tend to congregate. 
(iii) The increase in the coloured population of the U.K 
The Government Actuary has recently estimated (on the basis of a number of 
arbitrary assumptions) that the coloured population of this country could reach 
800,000 in 1970 and 1,520,000 in 1980 representing 1.6 per cent and 2.7% 
respectively of the total population and a far higher percentage in those towns 
where they are concentrated. 
3. A recent reassessment of the position by the Colonial Office in consultation 
with West Indian Governments has indicated that (failing a serious recession in 
employment) migration is exp~cted to continue at the present or even increased 
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rate. Most West Indian Governments take active steps to make known to intending 
migrants the kind of difficulties respecting housing and employment which they 
are likely to encounter in the United Kingdom. They also restrict the issue of pass-
ports to those convicted of crimes of violence and (in some territories) to unac-
companied juveniles and the elderly and infirm. These measures have however 
been found to have relatively little effect so long as U.K. employment remains 
buoyant. 
4. It is clear from the latest information that there are only two ways in which 
the present flow of migration could effectively and substantially be reduced. The 
first would be by restricting the issue of passports in the country of origin and the 
second would be by imposing restrictions on entry to the United Kingdom. For the 
former to be effective it would be necessary to restrict the issue of passports in 
respect of persons travelling to any destination outside the home territory and no 
West Indian Government would be prepared to contemplate such a drastic 
infringement of individual liberty. It would be unreasonable to ask them to do so 
in order to serve directly United Kingdom interests and it would almost certainly 
be politically impossible for any West Indian Government to introduce such 
unpopular restrictions at a time when it was known that the U.K. door remained 
wide open. 
5. The Home Secretary has recently proposed and the Cabinet have agreed that 
the Cabinet Committee on Commonwealth Immigrants (which last met in July, 
1959) should be reconstituted with the following terms of reference "to consider and 
keep under review the problems caused by the uncontrolled entry into the United 
Kingdom of British subjects from overseas". 
6. It is now recognised that there are only two courses of action available: 
either to allow the flow to continue unchecked or to introduce restrictions on entry 
into the United Kingdom. The Home Secretary is known to be very reluctant to 
introduce such restrictions because of the importance which is attached to the 
principle of free entry into the U.K., which is the heart of the Commonwealth, for 
all Commonwealth citizens. Inter alia, there are the following objections to U.K. 
restrictions:-
(i) However disguised, such restrictions would be interpreted as anti-colour 
measures and this would weaken the Commonwealth and damage the reputation 
of the U.K. internationally; 
(ii) Such restrictions would cause political and economic difficulty to the West 
Indian territories, and 
(iii) Such restrictions would run counter to the concept (embodied in the British 
Nationality Act of 1948) of a common citizenship for the United Kingdom and 
Colonies. 
7. The merits and demerits of introducing restrictions were considered very fully 
on an interdepartmental basis some years ago and two draft Bills are ready on the 
stocks (one of which would introduce general restrictions and the second which 
would make it possible to deport undesirables etc). At that time it was felt that the 
objections to introducing restrictions were stronger than the arguments in favour 
and it was decided to continue the traditional open door policy. 
8. There is little that can be said at this stage to the West Indies Commissioner in 
London. There are obvious dangers in mentioning either publicly or on a 
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confidential basis to West Indian Governments the possibility of legal restrictions on 
entry to the U.K. because this in itself may reasonably be expected to lead to an 
immediate increase in the flow (since many intending migrants would come as 
quickly as possible before the door was shut). The Commissioner (Mr. Garnet 
Gordon) is however an intelligent and well informed person and knows full well that 
in present circumstances the U.K. Government must be considering the possibility of 
introducing restrictions. There can be no harm in confirming to him that the whole 
question is now under close Ministerial consideration. 
143 CO 103113315, nos 47 & 51 18-20 Jan 1961 
[Jamaica and federation]: minutes by D Williams and Mr Fraser on 
Wills Isaacs and his three conditions for Jamaica remaining in the 
federation [Extract] 
I had an interesting conversation this morning with Mr. Wills Isaacs. 
On the question of the referendum he said the delay was caused entirely by Sir 
Grantley Adams who had put Dr. Cummings [sic: Cummins] up to creating 
difficulties. Jamaica firmly believed that the reason for this was that Sir Grantley 
wished to hang on to power as long as possible. It now seemed most unlikely that the 
Inter-governmental Conference would take place until May and the best estimate 
that he could give for the Jamaican referendum would be in October. This, he said, 
was very disappointing. His party, with his concurrence, had worked out a timetable 
in which the Conference would take place in January; the Jamaican budget would be 
introduced in April and would be such as to create a good deal of employment and a 
generally favourable atmosphere to Mr. Manley's party, in which the referendum 
could be held. 
I questioned him at some length about his own attitude now towards Federation. 
He said that he had originally been opposed to it because support for the idea had 
come from ~members of his own party whom he regarded as Communist or 
Communist sympathisers. These were the people active in the Caribbean Labour 
Congress who, he claimed, saw in the idea of Federation an opportunity to extend 
their activities to the whole of the British Caribbean. He had however now recon-
sidered the matter and was prepared to support a scheme for Federation provided 
three conditions were met. The first was that the Federation should have no power 
to interfere with Jamaica's industrial development. The second was that the 
arrangements in the Federal constitution for the admission of new members should 
be such that Jamaica would have a right of veto. He himself was particularly anx-
ious to keep British Guiana out because of the menace of Communism. On the 
other hand he was extremely anxious to try to bring British Honduras in; and in 
this connection he told me in the strictest confidence that the Jamaica Cabinet had 
agreed that after he got back from his present trip he should leave on a visit to 
British Honduras to talk to Mr. Price in an attempt to persuade him to bring 
British Honduras in. (He had been selected for this role because he was the only 
Catholic in the Jamaica Cabinet and he claimed that the plan had the support of the 
Catholic Bishop of Jamaica who would try to bring influence to bear upon the 
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Catholic Bishop of British Honduras). His third condition for supporting Federation 
was that the Federal Government should have no powers over income tax. He 
thought the Federal Government should derive its revenue from having exclusive 
control over customs duties and he envisaged that the Federal area should move 
fairly rapidly to a Customs Union. 
He made the point several times that the referendum in Jamaica could not hope to 
succeed without his support and he said that unless his conditions were met he 
would break with his party and oppose it. 
He several times reverted to the question of communism in the Caribbean. He 
said that he was convinced that the Communists were gaining control of the 
Rastafarian movement and he said that if he became Premier of Jamaica (as he 
clearly had every expectation of doing) he would take a very much tougher line 
with the Rastafarians and with the communist element than had been done in the 
past. ... 1 
D.W. 
18.1.61 
I agree that the delays over the intergovernmental conference are very trying. I have 
however discussed this at some length with Ellis Clark whose views about what is 
going on are rather different from those expressed in earlier minutes. 
2. Ellis Clark believes that Manley and Williams agreed at their Antigua meeting 
that Jamaica should receive protection for her goods, c.f. Wills Isaacs' first condition, 
and that afterwards Eric Williams' Cabinet forced him to get concessions about 
barring free immigration into Trinidad from Manley. On the basis of this an alliance 
of the two big powers has been created. 
1 Sir R Grey was sent a copy of Williams's note of his meeting with Isaacs and replied that if British Guiana 
were kept out of the federation or made this decision for itself (no local politician would advocate joining 
until the federation 's own future was more certain and the question mark hanging over Jamaica was 
removed), then the UK might have to implement and not just consider granting British Guiana 
independence in 1963. The moves by federal politicians to advance the federal cause (see 135) had come to 
nothing. Grey concluded: 'What future can this country have as an entirely "independent" country-and 
how long would its "independence" last? I fear that Communism is much more likely to prosper in the 
Caribbean pace Mr. Wills Isaacs, if there is an impoverished and unsuccessful British Guiana (by whatever 
name then known) that is denied admission to the West Indies Federation, than if British Guiana, even 
under its present political leadership, is freely admitted if she wishes to join' (CO 1031/4276, no 20, Grey 
to Mackintosh, 3 Feb 1961). 
Comment was also invited from British Honduras and M S Porcher, the chief secretary, replied: 'The 
situation here is very different to British Guiana where at least one section of the population, those of 
African origin, were actively and vocally in favour of Federation although the East Indians were not. Here 
virtually no one, except possibly a few of the better educated people of African origin, appear to have the 
least interest in developing closer political association with the West Indies. The people of Spanish origin 
are actively opposed to the idea. George Price of course forms the spearhead of this school of thought. It is 
quite likely that his opponents ... would accept the idea of Federation if they thought that by doing so 
they could upset Price. But . . . for any political party to advocate Federation with the West Indies is to 
invite political suicide and I believe that lesson has been well and truly learnt and digested'. Porcher 
concluded that Isaacs should concentrate on improving trade relations. He also suggested that if Isaacs 
used his influence to induce BWlA to provide a better, cheaper and more frequent air service between 
British Honduras and Jamaica, the inhabitants of the former would have more access to schools and 
hospitals in Jamaica and more opportunities would be available for the creation of a better understanding 
between the two countries (CO 1031/4277, no 5, Porcher to MacKintosh, 7 Feb 1961). 
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3. Grantley Adams and the small islands are aware of this alliance (though 
possibly not of its terms) and are anxious to break it. This they think they can do by 
holding out on the intergovernmental conference until after the Jamaican 
referendum. Once the referendum is out of the way Manley will they hope be no 
longer able to claim that he has to tread so softly with the Jamaicans and might then 
be susceptible to pressure for concessions to the Federal conception which Williams 
might be forced to reciprocate. 
4. Whether this is all true is another matter but I have considerable confidence 
in Ellis as an observer and his view of Grantley's motives seems to me more plausi-
ble than Wills Isaacs'. Whether, if it is true, Grantley and the others have much 
prospect of success I would doubt; if Manley stands firm I believe it might be possi-
ble to get the others to agree to hold the intergovernmental conference earlier 
than May. It is less certain that this would be altogether a good idea-these two 
protectionist dictates by the major islands could go far to wreck the realities of fed-
eration. 
5. As I see it, our aim remains to get things moving as swiftly as possible and 
some final form of federation established. I do not think Ellis' ideas are the sort of 
thing we could send out to Hailes and Blackburne etc. for their views; the only thing 
I think is for me to speak to the chief actors in Port of Spain next month and see 
whether we can get ahead on the conference and jockey the leaders into some form 
of federation which will not be completely gutless. Once established I hope that a 
first eleven, as opposed to the second eleven team we have at the moment in office, 
can make federation work. But for a long time to come I fear it will be a weak 
federation and not the sort of federation the theorists would desire. Our main card at 
the moment is that I think we have an atmosphere in which no one wants to be 
responsible for wrecking federation. 
6. I would like a meeting on this before I leave for Trin idad. I do not think any 
telegraphing at this stage would be wise: we must find out in Port of Spain what the 
political situation really is. 
H.F. 
20.1.61 
144 CO 103113506, no 108 7 Feb 1961 
[Finance] : letter from A W Taylor to Sir W Gorell Barnes urging the 
Treasury view that no further commitments should be made to the 
West Indies beyond 1964 
I am glad that we reached agreement at our meeting yesterday on the general lines of 
the brief which Mr. Hugh Fraser will be taking with him for the discussions on U.S. 
financial aid to the West Indies. Some of the points which I mentioned are, however, 
of considerable importance from the Treasury angle and I should therefore like to set 
them down specifically. 
I recognise that we cannot ask you to go back on the "Statement of Intent" given 
to Mr. Manley in January 1960.1 Nevertheless, if the West Indies are to get additional 
1 See 117. 
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U.S. assistance on the scale now under consideration2 (with just possibly something 
more from Canada) it will mean, as the brief says, that for at least a few years the 
West Indies will be receiving a generous and preferential share of the total volume of 
U.K./U.S. resources available for all under-developed countries. 
There is also the danger that they will become accustomed to a disproportionate 
level of aid and that it will be more difficult to adjust the position after 1964, without 
on the one hand political disappointment in the West Indies or dissatisfaction in 
other territories whose deserts may well be greater. 
We feel, therefore, that it is important that no fresh commitments should be 
entered into, or hopes raised, beyond what has already been promised, without our 
having a further opportunity to go into the implications with you. In particular:-
(a) on any proposal for additional aid, whether before 1964 or thereafter, we 
should want to maintain the position propounded by Lord Perth at the Lancaster 
House meeting on 8th November, 19603 that "the U.K. Government would be 
bound to take into account what might be available from outside sources, 
including Canada, the U.S. and International Institutions". 
(b) the U.K. aid to the West Indies after 1964 should, in any case, be tapered down. 
(c) the West Indies should be given no reason to expect aid for "natural disasters" 
on anything like the scale of the past; the scale for independent Commonwealth 
countries generally is very much lower. 
I am aware that you wish to keep open the question of giving part of the post-1964 
aid in the form of grant; equally I explained that this is a proposition which presents 
a good deal of difficulty for us on general grounds, and we must therefore ask that 
nothing should be said to exclude a switch from grant to loan after present 
commitments expire. Here again, it is a matter of holding on to what Lord Perth said 
at the November 1960 meeting, i.e. that "financial assistance would have to take 
different forms from that given before independence". 
I have already suggested to Hugh Harding that the minutes of the meeting last 
November, which contain a statement of the U.K. position in very apt wording, 
should be treated as part of the brief for Mr. Fraser. 
2 See 141. BriefingMacmillan for the prime minister's visit to the Westlndies over Easter 1961, the CO revealed 
that the US government had pledged, up to 1964 and provided the necessary appropriations were forthcom-
ing from Congress, to 'match whatever assistance the U.K. gives the Federation on a pound-for-pound basis'. 
For the present the Americans did not want this formula divulged to West Indian politicians. The CO confessed 
to being 'frankly surprised' at the volume of aid the US had now decided to give. 'The reason clearly is their 
unease about the whole situation in the Caribbean. They obviously reckon that an independent West Indies, 
as yet untainted by Communism and unimpressed by Castro, may be one of the few stable countries in the 
area' (CO 103114189, no 4, briefWIT(61)4, 14 Mar 1961). In a similar brief for the prime minister on Canadian 
aid to the federation, the CO explained that Canada was the largest market for the West Indies after the UK 
and US and that the bilateral assistance programme, announced at the Commonwealth Economic Conference 
in Montreal in 1958, would provide 10 million Canadian dollars for the federation between 1958 and 1963. 
This was a tied gift, of which two-thirds would be spent to build two ships in Canada for the inter-island ship-
ping service. The brief added: 'One cause of the Canadian interest in The West Indies may be that they look 
forward to the time when there will be tWo independent Commonwealth countries in the Western hemisphere, 
though clearly The West Indies, like themselves, cannot avoid falling under considerable American economic, 
military and cultural influence . . . . It is in the United Kingdom's interest to encourage the Canadian-West 
Indian relationship. It will be easier for us to disengage from the burden we now carry in the Caribbean if 
Canada takes a greater share of the responsibility' (CO 1031/3574, briefWIT(61)10, 20 Mar 1961). 
3 See 140. 
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145 CO 1031/4282, no 4, enclosure 21 Mar 1961 
'The constitutional position of the British Virgin Islands': memo-
randum by G J Bryan1 
1. Present position 
The British Virgin Islands has opted definitely and uncompromisingly not to join the 
Federation of the West Indies (cf Resolutions of the 14th September, 1951 and the 
19th September, 1955 (copies attached as Annexures A and B).2 Principal reasons 
being:-
(i) fear of prejudicing 
(a) existing social and economic ties with the United States Virgin Islands 
(b) possible closer associations in future 
(ii) opinion that direct contact with the Colonial Office would be more 
advantageous than control by other West Indians, especially in regard to the 
provision of grant-in-aid funds (which presently amount to 73rL in every dollar) . 
From 1st January, 1960, the Colony has been administered direct from London 
through an Administrator having the powers usually assigned to a Governor. 
2. Courses open 
There are only three courses which apparently merit consideration at this stage. 
They are:-
(i) to continue as at present on the analogy of St. Helena, the Falkland Islands, 
etc. 
(ii) to enter into closer association with either:-
(a) the United States Virgin Islands 
(b) the Federation of the West Indies. 
3. Relevant factors 
(i) Before the Americans acquired the United States Virgin Islands from 
Denmark in 1917 there was complete freedom of movement between the British and 
Danish Islands and there is hardly a family in the British Virgin Islands today which 
does not have close relatives liying in the United States Virgin Islands. The former 
free association between all the Virgin Islands irrespective of nationality strongly 
influences the present desire for the re-establishment of a similar situation. 
(ii) A decision having been taken in 1951 not to join the Federation, confirmed 
in 1955 and re-confirmed by representatives of the Legislature in London In July, 
1959, there is no reason to suppose that local opinion would favour any change in 
this regard in the absence of compelling factors which were not apparent when the 
earlier decision was arrived at. 
, (iii) No fresh factors have arisen which would cause re-consideration of the 
decision not to join the Federation. The position might be affected if services 
presently provided by the Federation were to be denied the British Virgin Islands 
after independence unless she federated. Attempted coercion of this sort would 
however be more likely to cause a violent reaction away from Federation and might 
1 Administrator, British Virgin Islands, 1959-1962. 2 Annexures not printed. 
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well cause an embarrassing and widespread demonstration in favour of early union 
with the United States Virgin Islands. A sustained attempt to encourage the British 
Virgin Islands to join the Federation by offering assistance on beneficial terms might 
ultimately (but not in the foreseeable future) cause reconsideration of the earlier 
decision, especially if it could be clearly shown that by joining the Federation the 
British Virgin Islands could be offered recognisably greater financial and other aid. 
(iv) In the absence of any declared policy by Her Majesty's Government in regard 
to the constitutional future of the British Virgin Islands the aggregate of a series of 
administrative actions (or inaction) might produce a definite reaction on the part of 
the people of the British Virgin Islands, in favour of one or other of the courses 
mentioned in paragraph 2(i) and (ii)(a) above e.g. greater attention given to the 
British Virgin Islands by United Kingdom agencies and institutions such as the 
United Kingdom Trade Commissioner, British Council, Colonial Development 
corporation, etc. plus a sympathetic and helpful attitude on the part of the Colonial 
Office including the provision of an adequate grant-in-aid and allocations of Colonial 
Development and Welfare funds would tend further to consolidate the present 
position. Inactivity and neglect would undoubtedly reinforce the desire for closer 
association with the United States Virgin Islands and if carried to extremes could 
produce a marked reaction on the part of the people away from the British towards 
the Americans. 
(v) The influx of American capital has and will continue to produce pressure for 
political stability which from the point of view of the investors can best be obtained 
by increased American control. Though there is no reason to think at this stage that 
the Americans would wish to add to their overseas commitments and indeed it has 
been suggested that because of the cost of the United States Virgin Islands to the 
American tax payer in the past proposals to add to their obligations in the Virgin 
Islands would not be well received at present.3 
(vi) Tax concessions and low rates of estate duty for which Americans qualify at 
present in the British Virgin Islands (and which are likely to be made more attractive 
before long) may however influence American capitalists to try to ensure that the 
British Virgin Islands remain outside the American tax area. 
(vii) British Virgin Islanders have undoubted loyalty to the Crown resulting from 
very nearly 300 years of uninterrupted British associations and there is an element 
especially among responsible and established persons which would probably resist 
change either for sentimental reasons or because:-
(a) they appreciate and prefer the British system of Government, or 
(b) they fear that a change would adversely affect their personal status. 
Nevertheless the American influence is a factor which must be fully recognised. The 
contrast between development and living conditions in St. Thomas and Tortola is 
constantly before the people. It is obvious that the people in the United States Virgin 
Islands enjoy a much higher standard of living than those in the British Virgin 
3 But on this see CO 103114282, no 1, minute by Williams to Thomas, 24 Jan 1961 in which Williams 
reports a conversation in Washington with J D Merwin, governor of the US Virgin Islands. Merwin is 
reported to have raised the question of the US taking over the British Virgin Islands with Herter, the 
secretary of state, who thought it would a sensible solution but who wanted the UK to make the first move. 
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Islands and the projection of this fact to the assumption that if the British Virgin 
Islands were to become American they would obtain similar standards of living is 
understandable (but of course not necessarily correct). 
(viii) There is a determined desire by a substantial part of the community to 
obtain American nationality. Mothers try to ensure that their babies are born in St. 
Thomas so as to confer American citizenship on them which is later used to obtain 
entry to St. Thomas or the States. There are large communities of British Virgin 
Islanders living in North America at a standard which far exceeds anything they 
could hope to attain in the British Virgin Islands. There is constant pressure to 
emigrate to North America. The quota of permanent entry visas (100 a year) is 
competed for fiercely and others obtain entry by other means e.g. marriage. 
Emigration to North America is on a sufficient [sic]large scale at present, even with 
immigration restrictions, as to keep the population at about the same level i.e. the 
relatively high birth rate is offset by emigration. A referendum held in 1960 by the 
Anglican Church gave a majority in favour of transferring from the diocese of 
Antigua to the diocese of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. 
(ix) Subject to the influences referred to at paragraph (iv) above a referendum at 
this time would almost certainly indicate a majority in favour of becoming American, 
if the opportunity presented itself and other conditions of continued financial aid and 
political representation were favourable. Local opinion might however be affected by 
the results of political changes in the United States Virgin Islands during the next 
few years, but could probably be influenced at this stage especially if additional 
economic aid was made available from the United Kingdom. 
(x) Any deterioration in relations between the United States Virgin Islands and 
the British Virgin Islands could have serious consequences on the latter and could be 
used as a bargaining point by the Americans if they ever wished to press for the 
transfer of the British Virgin Islands e.g. refusal to admit British Virgin Islanders for 
work in the United States Virgin Islands could seriously affect the economy of the 
British Virgin Islands which is at present so much dependent on the large number 
who find work in the United States Virgin Islands (estimated at more than 1 in 10 of 
the overall population) and would bring an immediate reaction for union with the 
United States Virgin Islands. 
146 CO 103113315, no 132 11 Apr 1961 
[Mr Macmillan in the West Indies]: minute by Sir J Martin to Mr 
Fraser on issues raised during the prime minister's tour of the West 
In dies 
In preparation for tomorrow's discussion on The West Indies it may be helpful if I 
circulate this brief note recording general impressions of the Prime Minister's tour 
and the principal points raised with him. 
2. The tour was a great personal success. In spite of his preoccupation with other 
responsibilities, especially the situation in Laos which involved his interruption of 
the Trinidad visit to fly up to Florida to meet President Kennedy (surely the first time 
anyone has gone 1300 miles for lunch), Mr. Macmillan gave himself unsparingly to 
the heavy programme of engagements arranged for him, involving meetings with 
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Federal and Territorial Ministers, the press and many other people. He was received 
everywhere with the greatest friendliness and sometimes enthusiasm and, apart from 
a few isolated demonstrations by extremists demanding the release of Kenyatta1 and 
a critical letter in the Gleaner from Sir Alexander Bustamante (who refused an 
invitation to meet the Prime Minister), there was no hostile note anywhere. 
3. The principal points raised with Mr. Macmillan were:-
(1) Financial aid after independence 
There seemed to be widespread fears lest United Kingdom aid may cease or be 
seriously diminished and more than once the suggestion was made that it was in 
order to be relieved of the burden of supporting them that H.M.G. were thrusting 
independence on The West Indies. The Prime Minister's reply was to the effect that, 
although the existing machinery of C.D. & W. and C.D.C. would no longer be 
appropriate, H.M.G. would certainly continue their support after independence and 
the precise arrangements for this would be worked out in discussions in London 
following the Constitutional Conference. Where appropriate, he also referred to the 
intention to continue grants in aid to the smaller territories for a period. He pointed 
to the example of the generous assistance we had continued to give to other 
countries after independence, but also sounded a note of warning about the load 
falling on the United Kingdom and mentioned the importance of securing the 
cooperation of other countries, such as the United States and Germany, in sharing 
the burden. There is no doubt that anxieties on this subject colour the attitude of 
many people to independence, especially in the smaller territories, which fear that 
their interests will be neglected by the Federal Government, but also in Jamaica, 
where there is a fear that the responsibility for supporting the less viable islands will 
bear more heavily on Jamaican resources. It would, I am sure, be helpful in securing 
agreement to go forward to independence if the extent of the aid which will then 
become available from the United States Government could be announced and 
publicised. 
(2) Migration 
There is general fear that the door may be closed against free entry into the United 
Kingdom. On this point, although indicating a sympathetic attitude, the Prime 
Minister generally confined himself to a reference to the Ministerial statement in the 
debate in the House of Commons on the 17th February,2 to which he indicated that 
he was not prepared at present to add. He was repeatedly asked to take the 
opportunity of his meeting with President Kennedy to urge the free admission of 
immigrants from the West Indies in the United States. This he undertook to do and, 
although I do not know what was actually said on the subject in the Washington 
talks, I know that a discussion of West Indian affairs was arranged for Saturday 
morning and it was the Prime Minister's intention to leave an aide memoire with the 
President with a view to further discussions through the diplomatic channel. I attach 
at Annexe N a minute recording a talk I had with Mr. McGregor, the United States 
Consul General in Jamaica, on the possibility of extending to The West Indies the 
exemption from the quota system at present enjoyed by the independent countries of 
1 Jomo Kenyatta, imprisoned president of the recently formed Kenya African National Union. 
2 H ofC Debs, vol 634, 17 Feb 1961, cols 1929-2024. 3 Annexes not printed. 
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the Western Hemisphere. I was told, when I raised this point in the State Department 
·on the 7th April, that the first problem, on which they were now working, was to 
ensure legislation to prevent reduction of the present quota of 100 for each Unit 
Territory to 100 for the whole Federation, which would apparently be the effect of 
independence under existing legislation. One specific suggestion made to Mr. 
Macmillan was that the United States Government might be persuaded to arrange a 
special system for domestic servants similar to that under which temporary farm 
workers are at present admitted. The Prime Minister was also asked to take up with 
the Canadian Government the possibility of relaxation of restrictions in Canada. 
(3) Sugar 
Many representations were made about the importance of securing the continuance 
of the United States purchases from The West Indies which have followed the 
cessation of purchases from Cuba. It was suggested that the United States 
Government should be asked to grant a permanent quota, but on this Mr. Macmillan 
gave the reply (suggested to him by Sir Solomon Hochoy) that the United States 
could not be expected to write off Cuba entirely for the future as the grant of 
permanent quotas would imply. During our visit there was a flurry about a 
suggestion in the relevant Senate Committee that United States purchases should in 
future be at the world price instead of the special subsidy price (as previously allowed 
to Cuba and in the recent purchases from the West Indies), but before leaving 
Jamaica we heard that this proposal had been dropped. I was told in the State 
Department that it would be politically impossible to secure extension of the special 
quotas to Commonwealth countries outside the Western Hemisphere. 
4. As regards the prospects of agreement on independence in 1962, I hesitate to 
express a firm opinion. Clearly Dr. Eric Williams and Mr. Manley are in agreement 
and ready and anxious to go forward, but there are considerable hesitations in some 
of the smaller islands; Sir Grantley Adams has probably not yet exhausted his 
delaying tricks and there is considerable doubt about the prospects of the 
referendum in Jamaica. On the latter the Governor's view was that the result of a 
referendum at the present time would be against independence, but Mr. Manley 
seems hardly to have started his campaign and no doubt much depends on the 
outcome of the two Conferences. As regards the smaller islands, something could 
probably be done by clearer undertakings of future financial support. As for Sir 
Grantley Adams, Mr. Manley threw out, in his first conversation with the Prime 
Minister, the suggestion that if he could be told that he would be the first West 
Indian Governor-General that might go a long way to help towards a solution. The 
Prime Minister indicated that he thought there was no insuperable objection from 
the point of view of H.M.G. and promised to speak about this to the Secretary of 
State. I interjected a reference to the alternative suggestion that Sir Grantley might 
be offered the governorship of Barbados. Mr. Manley indicated that he thought this 
might be attractive to Sir Grantley and that it was worth considering. It appears from 
Mr. Manley's recent letter to the Secretary of State that the Prime Minister must in a 
subsequent conversation have thrown out the idea of an honour for Sir Grantley, but 
I was not myself present on that occasion. Lord Hailes later told me that Mr. Manley 
had informed him that he had mentioned the idea of the Governor-General 
appointment to the Prime Minister but that the Prime Minister had not seemed to be 
very responsive. Mr. Manley also mentioned the Barbados idea. (Lord Hailes told me 
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that he himself was not anxious to stay on after independence.) Although Mr. Manley 
himself professed confidence, there seemed to be some uncertainty in the general 
atmosphere of Jamaica. Perhaps it is partly the proximity of Cuba (less than 90 miles 
away) though there is little evidence of direct intervention from there. Perhaps the 
recent rapid industrial development with the very unequal distribution of its benefits 
has paradoxically increased political instability. 
5. For some more general impressions you may care to glance at the draft (at 
Annexe B) of material I prepared at the Prime Minister's request for a letter he 
proposed to address to The Queen. 
6. I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Pearson (for the Secretary of State), 
Lord Perth, Sir Hilton Poynton, Sir William Gorell Barnes, Mr. Thomas and Mr. 
Williams. 
147 CO 1031/4274, no 5 Apr 1961 
'Jamaican secession from the West Indies Federation': draft CO 
memorandum for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee 
[Document 148 and its second annex explain the origins of this memo. It was drafted by 
Jamieson who minuted: 'Somewhat regretfully I have marked the draft "For C.R.O. 
concurrence". Obtaining such concurrence to this paper may be a greater task than 
getting it approved by the C.P.C. The C.R.O. line 18 months ago was that Jamaica simply 
could not be allowed to go it alone [see 109- 110). Since then the emergence of Cyprus 
and Sierra Leone have made it impossible to support this view but I am sure the C.R.O. 
will have many alarmed noises about Commonwealth relations. I understand their 
difficulties but I just do not see what we can do to help them. They would just have to 
make it their business to explain to other members of the Commonwealth why the 
present federation failed, and try to drum up as warm a welcome as possible to the 
unexpected twins' (CO 1031/4274, minute by Jamieson, 7 Apr 1961). In the event this 
draft was not submitted to the Colonial Policy Committee, nor sent for comment to the 
CRO.] 
After a series of constitutional conferences in May and June of this year in Trinidad 
and London I hope that it will be possible for The West Indies Federation to achieve 
independence about April 1962. (Annex shows those Caribbean territories which are 
members of the Federation and those which are non-federated).l There is, however, 
still a possibility that Jamaica might secede from the Federation. This danger can 
arise at several stages:-
(a) the form of Federal Constitution that emerges from the May/June conferences 
may not be acceptable to the Jamaican Government, who may decide to secede; 
(b) Mr. Manley has promised that the final decision on Jamaica remaining in the 
Federation must be by a referendum. This will take place after the May/June 
conferences, (probably in September) . Thus, even if the Government of Jamaica is 
satisfied with the results of the May/June conferences the electorate may decide 
against federation; 
(c) there is such deep suspicion of federation in Jamaica that any new political 
crisis at any stage before independence could generate a wave of popular hostility 
that could force the Jamaica Government into secession. 
1 Not printed. 
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2. At present there seem at least even chances that the form of Federal 
Constitution chosen by the May/June conferences will be acceptable to Mr. Manley's 
Government, and that they will be able to win the referendum by making it a vote of 
confidence in themselves. Moreover once the referendum hurdle is over there is 
much less chance that some political crisis could force secession on the Jamaican 
Government. Jamaican secession, however, remains a real possibility during the next 
year, and we must prepare in advance to deal with the situation that would follow it. 
3. It would not be possible for the United Kingdom to insist that Jamaica 
remained in the Federation against her will. The West Indian territories agreed 
voluntarily to federate and we could hardly insist that it was not permissible for them 
to change their minds, even at this late stage. An attempt to do so would probably be 
met by an outright declaration of secession which we would be unable to contest 
without precipitating a serious security situation in a territory which is exceptionally 
friendly to the United Kingdom and whose constitutional advance hitherto [has] 
been remarkably painless. Nor, after the examples of Cyprus and Sierra Leone, can it 
be seriously argued that Jamaica is not capable of maintaining independence on her 
own. With a population of 1.6 millions, a budget of £31 millions (as large as Kenya's) 
and a very considerable economic potential, she could well manage as a separate 
state. We have therefore no alternative but to accept that Jamaica can in fact "go it 
alone", and be prepared to grant her a separate independence. We should also have to 
agree to sponsor her for Commonwealth membership. 
4. We do not however exactly know how the other members of the Federation 
would react to Jamaican secession. Possibly they do not even know themselves for 
sure. They might close ranks and simply decide to struggle on without Jamaica. On 
the other hand many of the small units undoubtedly fear that a Federation 
dominated by Trinidad, without any make-weight by Jamaica, would lead to their 
becoming virtual dependencies of Trinidad. If this fear were uppermost at the point 
when Jamaica seceded there might be widespread defections and a virtual 
disintegration of the Federation into its component parts. On present information 
the most probable result of the secession of Jamaica would be the defection of 
Antigua who we understand would then seek some kind of "Channel Islands" 
relationship with Jamaica; that Montserrat might then follow Antigua; that Barbados 
might also secede, though not with the intention of joining Jamaica but of keeping 
out of any residual grouping; but there would be a reasonable chance that the 
remaining units would probably be willing to remain in an Eastern Caribbean 
Federation. This too, would be viable enough for us to grant independence and 
sponsor for the Commonwealth. In place of the existing federation the following 
pattern might therefore emerge:-
Jamaica (plus Antigua & Montserrat) 
Eastern Caribbean Federation 
Barbados (if she stayed outside 
the Eastern Caribbean Federation) 
Population 
1,714,000 
1,417,000 (1 ,180 if without Barbados) 
237,000 
This would enable us to grant independence to two separate states in place of the 
existing Federation, and leave us with Barbados which might eventually graduate to 
a Singapore or Malta type constitution. 
5. I must however emphasise that it is in fact quite impossible to predict how the 
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territories would react in this situation. The result could be a more or less complete 
break up of the existing Federation, with only Jamaica and Trinidad going forward to 
independence. This would be a major failure of our colonial policy, and it would be 
open to Castro and the Communists to accuse us of imperialist machinations to retain 
our colonial position. In fact the Caribbean is an area of the world where there are no 
vital United Kingdom interests and few strategic considerations, and where our 
fundamental aim in the area since 1945 has been political disengagement. This being 
so our principal objective following secession by Jamaica must be to avoid any situation 
which results in our being left with any of the present federated territories on our 
hands for which we can see no obvious future except as colonies. Of the ten territories 
only two (Jamaica and Trinidad) are really viable with economies which are within 
sight of "take off' into self-sustained growth. None of the others are in this position. 
Barbados is grossly over-populated, and depends almost entirely on sugar. The other 
seven are small, poor, and incapable of development from their own resources. Almost 
all depend on grant-in-aid even to balance their budgets. We must therefore at all costs 
ensure that as many as possible of the federated territories remain in some way 
grouped with either Jamaica or Trinidad who alone have the resources and 
sophistication of governmental apparatus to "carry" pensioner territories as satellites. 
6. A more serious situation would be if none (or perhaps only one or two) of the 
smaller territories were willing to remain grouped with Trinidad and at the same 
time we were faced by a demand from Trinidad (as we almost certainly should be) 
that because of the impending independence of Jamaica she too should be allowed to 
achieve early independence. The result of this would be that whereas both Jamaica 
(perhaps with Antigua and Montserrat in train) and Trinidad (with or without one or 
two satellites) became independent we might be left holding Barbados and several of 
the remaining Leeward and Windward Islands. Theoretically this residue of 
territories could be grouped together into some fresh grouping. There would 
however be no hope that this grouping could achieve any kind of economic or 
financial viability that would enable it to achieve independence in the foreseeable 
future, though like Barbados it would probably be quite suitable for a very 
"advanced" colonial constitution. We could, therefore, be left with this residue of 
territories on our hands for a very long time to come. 
7. The danger is that a very confused situation might develop very rapidly 
following the announcement of secession by Jamaica. A great deal might depend on 
our being able to intervene rapidly in order to stop the rot and try to prevent a chain 
reaction of further secessions in the Eastern Caribbean. It is impossible at this stage 
to predict in what form I might have to intervene but it might be necessary in this 
situation that I should make one or all of the following pronouncements on behalf of 
Her Majesty's Government:-
(a) Jamaica can become independent. 
(b) the present Federation (less only Jamaica and such territories as go with her) 
or any lesser Eastern Caribbean grouping which includes Trinidad can become 
independent. 
(c) Trinidad alone can become independent (I would of course hope to avoid this 
one). 
(d) in each of the above cases Her Majesty's Government would sponsor for 
Commonwealth membership. 
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(e) no one of the smaller territories or any grouping of smaller territories could 
expect to achieve independence for some time to come; but that nevertheless such 
a grouping could be accorded a pretty "advanced" constitution. 
8. I therefore seek the authority of my colleagues that I should as and when 
necessary be prepared to make appropriate statements on the basis of propositions 
(a) to (e) in paragraph 7 above. 
148 CO 103113316, nos 139 & 140 Apr 1961 
'West Indies Federation: a political appreciation': memorandum by 
Mr Fraser on the prospects for federation. Annexes 
Minute by Sir W Gorell Barnes 
Below I have divided the approach to Independent Federation into five or more steps 
or sequences. For our discussion it would perhaps be best to proceed by considering 
what action we can or should take at or before each sequence. 
But before doing this I think it is worth making a general appreciation. In spite of 
reports of mounting pessimism I still believe that Federation has a more than fair 
chance of succeeding. Firstly, because the two men who can make the concessions to 
make it work want it. Manley, because he is conservative enough to see that 
Jamaica's best chance of identity and survival is within a Federation and because he 
is generous enough to see that a Federation without Jamaica could be a disaster, and 
Williams because he is radical enough to see Federation as a dynamic and expanding 
force to which he is publicly dedicated. 
Secondly, because the alternatives to Independence within Federation are inferior 
and in the course of debate will become even more clearly so. 
Thirdly, because the world climate favours the larger unit. 
Fourthly, because the post-Castro Caribbean climate in particular must force good 
men to combine and the U.S.A. to finance such combinations. 
And, fifthly, because we sfill have power, influence and skill in the area. 
Not only are we committed to action, our chances of success with a Manley still on 
the scene will never again be higher, nor will inaction by us mean for the West Indies 
a continuance of a gentle drifting sideways in a para-federal political twilight. 1962 
will either see an independent West Indies Federation or a series of independent 
explosions for independence within these Colonies with troublesome, if not grave, 
results. We are therefore totally committed to Federation and must be prepared to 
take all reasonable risks, even if most of those risks are the unglamorous ones of the 
back seat driver. Presentationally this may have advantage; vitally it will probably 
have none. 
The future steps in the independence process for the West Indies Federation fall 
into five or more sequences:-
(1) The Inter-Governmental Conference to be held in May in Port of Spain to 
attempt to define the final shape of Federation. 
(2) H.M.G.'s conference to be held in London in May/June to ratify or complete 
the final shape of Federation and to fix a date for Independence. 
(3) This will be followed by debates in various legislatures and by a referendum in 
Jamaica, probably about September. 
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(4) A final London Conference to be held in the late Autumn to deal with finance, 
trade, defence and Commonwealth matters. 
(5) Depending on the nature of the agreements achieved, a general election for 
the Federal Parliament prior to an official ceremony of Independence in the West 
In dies. 
This sequence of events and subjects, except for the fifth item, was agreed at the 
instance of Manley when I was in the West Indies in February. Williams may try and 
raise detailed financial matters in London but I think in general the subjects and 
their sequence should be preserved, clumsy and complicated though they are, with 
the exceptions, first that if things start going badly in London we should be prepared 
to make some financial statement in very general terms to satisfy the smaller islands, 
and that secondly, at an appropriate moment we should ask the Americans to let 
something be known of the extent of their proposed aid for an independent 
Federation. 
The inter-governmental conference 
Most reports received prophesy that the atmosphere is unlikely to be salubrious. The 
recent debates in the Federal Houses have pin-pointed the hostilities of individuals 
and of the islands and the ideological differences between the hard and soft federal 
schools, indeed only one possible consolation can be drawn from the exercise and 
that is that Sir Grantly's [sic] power and influence seems to have suffered an even 
further diminution. More serious perhaps are the Federal Cabinet's machinations 
reported by Lord Hailes and the fact that the Grenada March election was won on a 
straight "freedom of movement" anti-Williams ticket. 
In view of the portents it might seem probable that the I.G.C. would either explode 
or achieve nothing whatsoever. Providing we do not interfere directly and leave 
honour, onus and discussion entirely to the West Indians I do not believe we will be 
faced with either eventuality. For various reasons I think the West Indians want to 
come to London and will be forced to come in some sort of order by the lure of 
Independence. I would suggest therefore that at the I.G.C. this Office's activities be 
limited to: -
(a) the sending of a message by the Secretary of State (attached); 
(b) the sending of observers to keep this Office informed, to act as assistants to the 
Conference if called upon, and to explain the established facts of H.M.G.'s 
promised obligations to the West Indies after Independence especially to the 
smaller island delegations; 
(c) to advising by letter the Governor- General and Sir Solomon Hochoy, in 
determined and optimistic tones, of our general aspiration for the I.G.C. and 
through them the Chairman of the Conference, namely that maximum progress 
should be achieved to the point of the avoidance of total breakdown; 
(d) the judicious use of the U.K. press to emphasise that at this stage success or 
failure is squarely on the shoulders of the West Indians themselves; 
(e) a letter to Manley suggesting that whilst the appointment of Governors will 
essentially be a matter in which the Independent Government's wishes would be 
paramount we would be of every possible assistance in getting Sir Grantly [sic] a 
Barony. 
If of course at the I.G.C. a total breakdown is engineered by the opponents of 
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Federation a perhaps irremediable position would have arisen. Even though fai lure 
would be more at the West Indian's door than our own, and for that reason unlikely 
to occur I think that in these next few weeks it would be appropriate to submit a 
paper to C.P.C. for information on the cost and dangers of a breakup of the 
Federation. 
During this same period I suggest it would be advisable to enter into discussions 
once again with the Americans as to their infl uencing West Indian politicians and as 
to the timing of some announcement on representation and aid. Providing the I.G.C. 
survives in fairish order I suggest a suitable moment might be immediately before 
the delegates set out for London whilst the Federal Cabinet was still available in Port 
of Spain. In the context of British Guiana and Eric William's [sic] threat to merge 
with Jaganland, which will probably in some form emerge during the I.G.C. by 
highlighting a double trouble we might make them not too unamenable. 
The Lancaster House Conference 
This and the Jamaican referendum seem likely to provide the two most critical 
passages of the negotiations. 
As adjuncts and preliminaries to the arrival of delegates special care should be 
taken with hospitality (public and private), press, and T.V. programmes about the 
West Indies (Rediffusion are already active). The opportunity might also be taken for 
making the announcement of a Trade Mission to the Federation, and negotiations 
should be speeded to this effect. 
How many total deadlocks will be weighing down the West Indian delegates' 
luggage from Port of Spain and the I.G.C. it is impossible to predict. But amongst 
them are likely to be four or five. 
(1) The Reserve list as it concerns the freezing of income tax and industrial 
development to unit territories. 
(2) Freedom of movement. 
(3) Sources of Federal revenue. 
(4) Customs Union, and possibly 
(5) Federal representation. 
Innocent sounding in themselves, seemingly resoluble problems, these have become 
more than the rallying cries of factions and politicians; they have almost become the 
entrenched clauses of island constitutions. These or other apparently more trivial 
issues will be used by the three factions-the strong federation group, the loose 
federation group and what in r eality will be a wrecking, or no federation group, to 
bend the Conference to their will. 
At this distance and to such an able Chairman it would be an impertinence and a 
folly to recommend action. Nevertheless three thoughts arise. The fi rst is that there 
will be plenty of comparatively trivial matters for ratification to enable these major 
problems to be played long. The second that the "Alliance" of Trinidad and Jamaica 
may have to be publicly a little broken, and both manoeuvred into giving a little 
ground on freedom of movement and taxation. And, thirdly, that the smaller islands 
may have to be given assurances as to grants-in-aid which would go some way beyond 
the so-called "declaration to Manley" made by the Secretary of State in January 1960.1 
1 See 117. 
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Seen from this distance, detailed negotiation apart, two major problems of 
judgement and policy are likely to arise. 
The first as to what degree of weakness and unreality in Federal conception we are 
prepared to countenance. 
The second as to how far we are prepared to push Manley and Williams. The latter's 
card of a Southern (British Guiana/Trinidad) federation is probably weak and would 
favour men like Mahabir and James2 more than Doctor Eric, but Manley's hand is a 
poker hand, strong and very difficult to estimate. 
The Jamaican referendum 
This is impossible to predict. Recent estimates have grown pessimistic. There is 
always some danger that some of his Cabinet colleagues could desert Manley but 
with a Premiership about to go begging it is doubtful. There are local issues and 
promises on Federation which are supposedly infrangible. 
There is the possibility of some untoward political event, riot, rising, or some sort 
of grumbling violence of social origin. In the West Indies anything is possible. But 
the more probable facts are that Manley will not be diminished by playing the major 
role at a London conference, and so long as Bustamate [sic] stays alive his 
personalization of the opposition to Federation must play into the superior master's 
hands. Equally nothing is impossible. Perhaps Manley has left his campaign a little 
late. But providing the balance of the Lancaster House agreement is presentable and 
providing we and the Americans can give some general economic assurances and 
spell out a little more how Commonwealth assistance loans, etc., function Manley 
after a two month campaign should win. 
Between now and then we might perhaps study whether some defence matters 
could be induced or leaked into the Lancaster House conference which might be of 
some use to him. 
Economic and general conference 
To forecast so far ahead would be largely worthless but I attach a short note by 
Douglas Williams showing the sort of sums the United States and ourselves could 
offer. It is not a bad showing, and if the Canadians would come in, and at the moment 
they are not very attentive, it would be very good indeed. Nevertheless, I feel we may 
have to go marginally higher and longer in grant-in-aid. Sir William Gorell Barnes 
entirely disagrees with me, but I believe a study should now be made of how much 
further we could reasonably go. American aid is too much tied to individual projects 
to be of use to small island deficits. If we fail on federation, individual demands for 
"independence floats" will be even more exorbitant and grant-in-aid for the smaller 
islands will be round our necks not for ten years but for eternity. 
Rewards and fixings 
I have made no mention of this matter. As Federation approaches its moment of 
truth I very much doubt whether its opponents are fixable, or if fixed, of value. 
Whether they have created the forces of opposition or the forces them I am not sure. 
2 Dr W Mahabir, minister of health, water and sanitation, Trinidad; C R James, author, lecturer and 
political scientist; editor, PNM weekly, The Nation; secretary, West Indies Federal Labour Party, 
1959-1960; left PNM, 1960. Mahabir and James were left-wingers who broke with Williams over the issue 
of the bases agreement. 
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But in the few weeks ahead it is the forces which will be in control. Sir Grantly [sic] is 
a special case and no one knows his weaknesses better than Manley. It could perhaps 
be left to his advice. For the rest, it is a weapon which now, I believe, should be 
reserved for special and individual situations. 
Conclusion 
On reading this inevitably incomplete aide memoire and analysis I am struck that on 
a merely political assessment of known individuals, not only the arguments but the 
men of ability are on the side of Federation. This encourages me but it also tends to 
produce too strong an atmosphere of optimism. The opposition to Federation is 
deeper, slower and more powerful than I have given credit for. It is not unlike Sir 
Grantly [sic] himself. It is basic, lazy and inarticulate to the point of silence, but it is 
there. Because it has defied my analysis let it not take us by surprise. 
Annex [1] to 148: Draft message for the secretary of state to send to the inter-
governmental conference 
On the occasion of the resumption of the Inter-Governmental Conference, I should 
like to express to all of you my very best wishes for a successful outcome. 
It is never easy to set up a Federation. To do so successfully always requires 
compromise and adjustment. The time which has elapsed since your last meeting has 
been well used. The problems which it is now for you to resolve have been clearly 
defined. I trust that you will bring to your present meeting such goodwill and such a 
spirit of accommodation that solutions to the major points outstanding can be 
found. 
I look forward to seeing you at Lancaster House later this month. I hope you will 
bring with you a substantial measure of agreement on the kind of constitution which 
you want, so that together we can decide upon the final steps which will bring The 
West Indies to its long-sought goal of independence. 
Annex [2] to 148: Note by D Williams on financial assistance, 12 Apr 1961 
Mr. Thomas 
In preparation for our meeting this afternoon I have prepared a note of items which 
are likely to prove contentious at the Inter-Governmental Conference. This note is 
attached.3We have also prepared in the Department the first draft of a Colonial Policy 
Committee paper on Jamaican secession from the West Indies Federation.4 One of 
the things we might consider at this afternoon's meeting is whether a paper on these 
lines should be submitted to the C.P.C. forthwith . In my view we should recommend 
the Secretary of State to make this submission without any further delay. We have 
marked the paper "for C.R.O. concurrence" and this is not likely to be easy to obtain, 
but I think we ought to try to get C.P.C. views on this problem before you go to the 
Inter-Governmental Conference. 
As Sir John Martin's note makes plain the question of aid after independence is a 
3 Not printed. 4 See 147. 
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crucial element in persuading this reluctant West Indian horse to tackle the 
Federation fences . The present position is that the amount of aid that has been or is 
likely to be made available to the West Indies in the present quinquennium is as 
follows: 
£millions 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
Grant in aid 1.5 1.8 2.0 1.8 1.6 ? 
C.D.& W 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 ? 
4.75 5.05 5.25 5.05 4.85 
In addition disaster relief has been running at the average of £1 million a year. The 
firm promises so far made to the West Indies are that at independence H.M.G. would: 
(a) hand over the unspent balance of their C.D.& W. allocations. This might be 
somewhere between £5 million and £7 million; 
(b) continue the present rate of grant in aid until the end of the 1959-63 quin-
quennium (i.e. about £1.75 millions per annum) and consider some continuation 
of this grant in aid on a tapering basis for a further limited period but in any case 
not later than 1968 (i.e. the 10 year period mentioned in the British Caribbean 
Federation Act) . In addition H.M.G. has promised £1.2 millions towards the con-
struction of the barracks in Trinidad. The Americans have said that given a U.K. con-
tribution of some $14 millions a year on grants and economic development they 
believe "that in terms of magnitude U.S. economic assistance should parallel the 
U.K. effort" up to 1964. The Americans have so far insisted that this information 
should be withheld from the West Indies. If they would agree to make some 
announcement on the subject, say, early in the proceedings of the Inter-govern-
mental Conference and say that this aid will start to flow once a firm date has been 
fixed for West Indian independence it might have a healthy psychological effect. 
We have no idea so far how much aid the West Indies are going to ask for. The 
figure which was banded about in the recent debates in the Federal Legislature, 
however, was $(BWI)300,000,000 over a 10-year period. This is approximately 
£60,000,000 on an average of £6,000,000 a year. If we can point out that with the U.S. 
and U.K. aid combined the West Indies have fairly firm promises of some £10,000,000 
a year over the first four years (always provided they get a move on to independence) 
this surely ought to change their tune considerably. If in addition we could persuade 
the Canadians to make some promises in similar terms (they need not be too precise) 
then the bandwagon might really start moving. Perhaps we can discuss this 
possibility further this afternoon. 
Minute on 48 
Secretary of State 
Mr. Fraser has very kindly sent me a copy of his memorandum about the West Indies 
Federation. 
I am sorry to be in this context "Der Geist der stehts verneint".5 But:-
5 Literally, 'I am the spirit that always denies' (Goethe). 
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(1) We have for nearly two years now been running a balance of payments deficit 
in the region of £500 million per annum, which has only been covered up by an 
inflow of capital, mainly short-term, which we must expect certainly to dry up and 
perhaps to be reversed. 
(2) Government assistance to undeveloped countries has pretty well trebled and 
it will be difficult to hold it at about £200 million per annum from this year 
onwards. 
(3) The various territories of the West Indies have national incomes per head 
varying from about £75 to getting on for £150 as compared with African and 
Indian figures of £20 to £25. 
(4) The West Indies attract far more private capital from overseas than any of our 
other charges except perhaps the Bahamas. 
(5) In spite of all this the West Indies will, under existing policies, receive from us, 
the Americans and the Canadians between £10 m. and £12 m. per annum up to 
1964 without taking any account of the subsidies they receive from the U.K. 
consumer, certainly large but of an unascertainable amount, through the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, or of anything we may eventually decide to 
have to do for bananas and/or citrus. 
(6) Strategically the West Indies are so important to the United States that we 
can be certain that they will do anything necessary. In Africa, on the other hand, 
particularly East and Central Africa, our strategic and political interests are 
much more involved than the American and we are bound to have to play the 
major role. 
If in spite of all this Ministers feel that we shall at the right moment have to 
improve on our undertakings to the West Indies, I would still hope that they 
would not try to persuade the Treasury that we should improve on our already 
very generous offers for the period up to 1964. I must admit however that there 
would be considerable difficulty (in my view rightly so) in making any further 
promises in regard to the subsequent period. Firstly the Treasury are bound to be 
reluctant to look so far ahead. Secondly, whilst it is development grants for the 
smaller islands after 1964 rather than loans which the West Indies will want, an 
undertaking to make such grants so long after the attainment of independence 
would be inconsistent with Ministers' recent decisions about the terms of aid. If 
absolutely necessary we could perhaps try to persuade the Treasury and C.R.O. 
that we should undertake to extend development grants, like budgetary aid, on a 
tapering scale during a limited period after 1964. But I must confess that I myself 
would be against even an undertaking of this kind so far in advance, at any rate 
except as part of a bargain under which the Americans would continue or increase 
their aid after 1964. 
I am afraid that the truth may be that we went too far in putting our goods in the 
shop window in the undertakings already given to Mr. Manley but at that time it was 
thought vital to say as much as we possibly could to get Mr. Manley's support for 
federation. 
I am sending copies of this minute to Lord Perth, Mr. Fraser, Sir H. Poynton, Mr. 
Thomas, Mr. D. Williams and Mr. Harding. 
W.L.G.B. 
17.4.61 
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149 CO 1031/3316, no 175 2- 16 May 1961 
[Freedom of movement]: record of the proceedings of the Trinidad 
inter-governmental conference. Appendix IX [Extract] 
188. Dr. Williams stated that he wished to deal with the matter in some detail as 
it was of very special interest to Trinidad and Tobago. He began with three basic 
facts :-
(~) the rate of population growth in Trinidad and Tobago was approximately 3% 
per annum over the past few years-about double the rate in Jamaica and much 
higher than the average for the Federation. 
(ii) the most rapidly expanding section of the population was the five to fifteen age 
group. 
(iii) of the migrants who entered Trinidad in 1958-1959, 88% of the males and 
84% of the females were under 40 years of age. 
189. He wished to draw attention to the possible effects of these facts. The upper 
and lower limits of the migration possibilities were 5,000 and 12,000 per year and he 
proposed to work therefore on an average figure of 7,500 migrants per year-a figure 
representing 1% of the total population and 33%% of the natural increase of the 
population of Trinidad and Tobago. 
190. The labour force of Trinidad and Tobago as at May, 1960 was 290,000 
persons and this force increased at the rate of something like 8,000 persons per year. 
If it was assumed that about 75% of the migrants were additions to the labour force, 
the result was an addition to the labour force of about 5,600 persons from migration 
as against the natural addition of about 8,000. The unemployment figure of Trinidad 
and Tobago varied from 50,000 to 38,000 depending upon the definitions used. The 
latter figure comprised people actively seeking work within the last few months 
before the survey and constitutes 13% of the labour force . Under-employment 
totalled some 20,200 or 9% of the labour force employed. The public Development 
Programme and the rapid increase in private investment over recent years have been 
adding to the sector of the economy relating particularly to manufacturing 
enterprises employing more than ten persons (excluding agricultural enterprises 
except sugar estates) and as a result the employment fields have increased on an 
average by about 4,000 persons per year over the past four years. 
191. The Government had reckoned that it would require a capital investment of 
$7,500 per year to employ an additional person in manufacturing industry. Thus to 
provide jobs for the 5,625 migrants annually joining [the] labour force it would 
require a private capital investment of $422 million over a ten year period. 
192. An important aspect of a Territory's development programme was the 
improvement of housing standards. By 1965, 107,000 new houses would be required 
and 43% of all accommodation units in Trinidad and Tobago were grossly 
overcrowded. The Government had embarked on an extensive programme of 
rehousing on the basis of large-scale incentives to private investment to come to 
Trinidad and Tobago, under a Government guarantee to provide the necessary 
mortgage finance. On this basis and on the basis of such Government funds as were 
available the elimination of slum areas and the construction of new blocks of flats 
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had commenced. The Government could not consider providing a standard of 
housing for immigrants different from that provided for the rest of the population. 
The cost of building two-bedroom blocks of flats in slum areas worked out at 
approximately $7,000 per family unit. Thus, assuming 75,000 migrants over a ten 
year period-or approximately 15,000 families-two-thirds of whom, it may be 
assumed, would have to be provided for, the total cost of providing two-bedroom flats 
for this additional population would work out at $70 million. 
193. As regards school places, free secondary education recently introduced in 
the heavily congested area of St. George and to be expanded to the rural areas, was 
super-imposed on a primary school pattern which was itself deficient and inadequate 
for existing needs. In 1956, when the present Government took office, there were 760 
school places for every 1,000 children of five to fourteen years. Notwithstanding the 
considerable expansion over the past four years and the increase in school places by 
about 16,000 there were now only 770 school places for every 1,000 children. 
Assuming that 10% of the migrants (that is, 750 per year) were children requiring 
educational facilities, the provision of school places for them would involve a capital 
provision of approximately $1,300,000 over a ten year period, not to speak of the 
substantial increase in recurrent expenditure. 
194. The same problems confronted the Government with respect to water and 
health services. It was in view of these facts that he had always insisted that the 
essential requirement of the Federation was economic development programmes for 
the Unit Territories. Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and, possibly, Antigua 
had been able for the past few years to find a sufficient part of the money required for 
economic development from their own resources. This was not so in the smaller 
Territories and the Development and Welfare grants on the pattern existing since 
1945 have been totally inadequate to carry out the development programmes needed. 
The Government of Trinidad and Tobago had practical experience on this matter. 
The mere expenditure of $10 million in capital works in Tobago with less than 33,000 
people had virtually stopped migration from Tobago to Trinidad and in fact 
migration had begun from Trinidad to Tobago. 
195. Certain fundamental conceptions advocated by Trinidad and Tobago as to 
the form the Federal structure of The West Indies should take had been rejected by 
the Conference. By way of compromise the Conference was now hammering out a 
Federal structure which was a mere patchwork of various Federal ideas. The 
Conference was not engaged in trying to establish some sort of structure which, 
however unsatisfactory, and whatever the compromises involved, would permit the 
Territories to see [sic] together and to develop, however gradually, over the next few 
years. In that period an indispensable requirement would be a large scale investment 
of capital principally from the United Kingdom but also from the United States and 
Canada. In the meantime, the migration to the United Kingdom would have to 
continue. Latest statistics indicate that when Trinidad and Tobago was available as a 
port of entry the migration to the United Kingdom from the smaller Territories was 
particularly small. Since 1960, the Trinidad and Tobago position, being what it is, 
migration to the United Kingdom had shot up sharply. 
196. It was important to differentiate between the position in the United 
Kingdom and that in Trinidad and Tobago. In the United Kingdom the outstanding 
vacancies in the second quarter of 1960 were 244,376. The West Indian migrant 
arrivals in that quarter of 1960 were 14,899. 
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197. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago proposed a modification to the 
recommendations of the Working Party. The Government proposed that the subject 
of control of movement of people should be on the Exclusive List but that the actual 
exercise of the power should be deferred until such time as the Federal Government 
obtained jurisdiction over customs, industrial development and income tax; and the 
Government of Trinidad and Tobago, in collaboration with the Governments of the 
other Territories and the Federal Government would approach the United Kingdom 
Government on the question of external aid for the West Indies (including aid in 
respect of housing accommodation for migrants flowing into Trinidad as a result of 
freedom of movement). 
198. Dr. Cummins pointed out that if the facts and figures presented by the 
Trinidad delegation to the Conference were correct then Trinidad would not be able 
to accept migrants for as long a time as we could foresee, and would be in no better 
position at the expiration of the five year moratorium proposed by ALPHA. 
199. Barbados was not concerned with the question of figures. They were 
concerned with the basic principle that a Federation must involve freedom of 
movement of peoples-involving, he stressed, the right to settle anywhere in the 
Federation. The United Kingdom Government had made it clear that freedom of 
movement was an attribute of sovereignty. This was ... acknowledged in the 
Constitution of Nigeria and other recent Federations. Restriction of movement 
between Territories was as objectionable as restriction of movement within a nation 
from rural to urban areas. It was the general feeling of the people of Barbados that 
Federation was unthinkable without freedom of movement of persons. Barbados was 
the only delegation that brought along a member of the Opposition. Mr. Brancker1 
would demonstrate to the Conference that the Opposition there felt as strongly on 
this matter as the Government. This issue was not one on which Barbados could 
compromise. 
200. Mr. Bird drew the attention of the Conference to the migration problem in 
Antigua. The 1960 report showed that there had been quite an invasion by migrants 
from every Territory of the Federation and a problem would be created if the existing 
pace of development were not maintained. However, a nation was being formed and 
it was to be expected that every citizen would feel that he is part of the nation. In the 
same way that West Indians said to the United Kingdom that they could [?not] agree 
to the restriction of West Indian migration into the United Kingdom since The West 
Indies is part of the Commonwealth and West Indians are British citizens, so West 
Indians expect that as difficult as it may be Territories will endeavour to 
accommodate the citizens of any other Territory. Once delegates accepted that The 
West Indies must become a nation then he felt sure that they will be able to come to 
an understanding and to reach a solution which should involve the economic 
development of the Territories. 
201. Mr. Le Blanc stated that he could not conceive a Federation without free 
movement of persons and that free movement should come together with 
Independence. If the West Indies had no free movement of persons how could it take 
a stand against a proposal by the United Kingdom to restrict West Indian 
immigration. 
1 JET Brancker, QC; member, Barbados House of Assembly since 1937; speaker, 1961. 
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202. Mr. Collymore2 considered it anomalous to create common citizenship and 
to provide for a West Indian transport service and yet deprive citizens of moving 
freely within the area. He was aware of the immediate problems involved for Trinidad 
but this merely constituted a sacrifice which it was essential for Trinidad to make in 
the interests of the Federation as a whole. He appealed to the delegation of Trinidad 
and Tobago to reciprocate the spirit of compromise which had been shown by other 
delegations at the Conference. 
203. Mr. Joshua expressed his concern over possible restrictions on freedom of 
movement within our new nation, having regard to the West Indian migration 
problem in the United Kingdom. He pointed out that there would be internal free 
trade which would mean that the people of one Territory would have to buy goods at 
a fairly high price from another Territory but would be unable to take part in the 
manufacture of those goods. Freedom of movement was a matter of national prestige 
and restrictions within the nation would put a stigma upon the people when they 
went abroad. He supported the proposal of ALPHA and deplored the suggestion from 
the Trinidad and Tobago delegation to postpone freedom of movement indefinitely. 
He was fully alive to the problems confronting Trinidad and was anxious to find a 
solution whiCh would avoid injury to the economy of that Territory. He would agree 
to any reasonable compromises that did not involve an indefinite postponement of 
freedom of movement. 
204. The Prime Minister stated that every one at the Conference, including the 
Premier of Trinidad and Tobago, must agree that the principle of freedom of 
movement is part of independence. The mere citation of statistics indicating the 
problems of migration in Trinidad did not constitute an argument against this 
principle. Similar figures had been cited in the House of Commons in February of 
this year to demonstrate the problems of West Indian migration to the United 
Kingdom. He suggested that it might be possible, in order to meet the Trinidad 
problem, to devise a provision in the Constitution which would permit a Territory in 
special circumstances to impose a quota on the admission of certain people for a 
limited time. He drew attention to the increasing pressure which certain groups in 
Britain were bringing to bear on the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to 
restrict West Indian immigration to that country. Any such restrictions would have 
catastrophic results on the Territories of The West Indies. Nothing should be done 
out here which would make it more difficult for the United Kingdom Government to 
resist that pressure. He advocated the immediate removal of all immigration 
restrictions between the Territories subject to the working out of some formula 
whereby any Territory with special problems could be protected against undue 
injury. He warned the Conference against playing into the hands of the pressure 
groups in Britain anxious to restrict West Indian immigration. The United Kingdom 
Government had declared that it had at present no plans to restrict West Indian 
immigration. However, that Government had the situation continually under review 
and would be forced to reconsider its policy if any economic recession occurred in 
that country .. .. 
207. Mr. Manley stated that he was able to approach this problem with complete 
detachment as Jamaica had no special problem with regard to freedom of movement. 
Freedom of movement was an essential part of nationhood; however, the special 
2 H B Collymore, minister of trade and industry, St Lucia. 
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problems of Trinidad had to be recognised and it was foolish for a new nation 
building itself to do anything, for purely theoretically reasons, which might inflict 
serious injury or dislocation on any Territory-particularly one on whom a major 
part of the success of the Federation depended. 
208. Having said that, he wished to say how profoundly disturbed he was over 
the note injected into the discussion by the Premier of Trinidad and Tobago-in his 
proposal that freedom of movement should be postponed until the Federation takes 
over control of customs as well as industry and income tax. This only confused the 
issue and placed Jamaica in an utterly impossible position. Even if it were true that 
industrial development and income tax were proper ultimate subjects for Federal 
control, this will have nothing to do with the problem of freedom of movement 
during the first few years of Independence. The West Indies had no spare money to 
throw about. Even if industrial development were to be put under Federal control 
tomorrow, the Federal Government would not be able to develop one single industry 
in the area. He was prepared to join in a genuine effort to find a solution to this 
matter which would take into account the special problems of Trinidad. He could 
not, however, accept a proposal which would tie freedom of movement with other 
matters which would take a long time, so that a state of bitterness and grievance 
would be built into the Constitution and Jamaica would be the target of 
indignation . ... 
213. Mr. Bramble supported the point of view of the Trinidad and Tobago 
Government, acceptance of which, he contended, would not weaken the case for 
migration to the United Kingdom. West Indians had helped to make the British 
Empire what it was and the United Kingdom Government would be committing a 
great misdemeanour in the eyes of The West Indies and the world if she closed the 
doors to West Indians. 
214. Dr. Williams, in reply to the debate, restated the position of Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
215. The present Government had taken no part in working out the proposals for 
the Federal Constitution in 1956. Anxious as that Government was to make profound 
changes in those proposals at the Jamaica Conference of 1957, nothing could be done 
without unanimous agreement and the Trinidad and Tobago Government was 
helpless. 
216. The preamble of the Constitution declared that there should be freedom of 
movement of persons and goods, but it also declared that there should be an 
integrated trade policy and as quickly as practicable a customs union, including 
internal free trade. Further, the Conference proposed by article 118 was to review, in 
the light of progress towards the Customs Union, the Federal powers in respect of 
taxes on income and profit. It was extraordinary, therefore, that certain delegates 
should talk about an unreasonable attachment when he linked freedom of movement 
with such matters as customs union, industrial development and income tax. 
217. The Trinidad and Tobago Government, in the Economics of Nationhood,3 
had presented a detailed plan of the kind of Federation which it considered would 
meet the needs of the West Indies. That Government advocated a tightly knit 
Federation adequately empowered at the centre to shape and direct the future of the 
nation. A wide range of powers relating to loan raising, customs, trade, industry, 
3 See 130, note 1. 
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economic and social planning, price and production controls, were to be allocated to 
the Federal Government. There was to be freedom of movement of persons and 
capital among Units as a necessary corollary of free trade. 
218. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago then declared what it considered 
to be the essentials of nationhood. Certain of the delegations of the Conference 
seemed to believe that nationhood meant the ability of people to move about the 
place. The Conference had repudiated the structure of Federation proposed in the 
Economics of Nationhood. They had accepted a Reserve List and rejected economic 
planning as a Federal responsibility. But the same people who did so now said that 
the Federal Government must control population. Freedom of movement was an 
essential part of the Federal plan of the Economics of Nationhood but it did not make 
sense for anyone to suggest that it must be an essential part of the patchwork 
Federation, which was emerging at the Conference. 
219. It had been acknowledged by all delegations that the problem of emigration 
from the Territories was due to underdevelopment. Listening to the speeches of the 
delegates, one would have thought that Trinidad and Tobago was responsible for 
that. The strictures of the delegates should properly have been directed at Britain 
who was responsible for the exploitation and underdevelopment of the smaller 
Territories. 
220. The whole approach of the smaller Territories to the problem of migration 
was wrong. Those Territories were being rapidly denuded of their population 
(Grenada lost 9,100 people between 1958 and 1960). The development capital 
available to these Territories was totally inadequate. The Government of Trinidad and 
Tobago spent $4 million on Tobago's capital development- a sum equal to the 
capital expenditure in Dominica over a period of three years. The road was clear; the 
United Kingdom Government must be approached for economic aid on an adequate 
scale. 
221. It had been suggested in argument that Trinidad's problem might be met by 
developing her agricultural industry. But why not develop the agricultural industry 
of Grenada and other Territories? Delegates should remember that nothing would be 
gained by jeopardising the economic stability of Trinidad and Tobago. They had 
overlooked the pressing social and economic problems with which migration would 
confront Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad and Tobago had compromised throughout 
the Conference even on matters they considered to be fundamental. Trinidad and 
Tobago was not in a position to accept the liabilities and responsibilities unrestricted 
freedom of movement would place upon her .... 
Appendix IX to 149: Statement on freedom of movement4 
1. Freedom of Movement is an attribute of Sovereignty and the right of every 
citizen, but there is no unqualified freedom of movement in any country just as there 
is no unqualified freedom of speech. 
4 This was the statement which emerged from the conference. A single vote was taken on the number of 
years stipulated in para 8(iv) and on the amendments indicated in paras 11 and 12. Delegates from 
Antigua, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Vincent and Trinidad voted in favour; those from Barbados, 
Dominica, St Kitts, St Lucia and the federal government voted against. 
414 FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND THE 1961 AGREEMENT OVER BASES [149) 
2. In all countries there is power to pass laws restricting freedom of movement-
in a country where freedom of movement is not specifically entrenched in the 
constitution this power is completely unfettered. 
3. Even in countries, such as Nigeria, Malaya and Sierra Leone, with written 
constitutions specifically protecting freedom of movement, this freedom can in fact 
be restricted in such a wide range of public interests, that in practice there is 
virtually full power to restrict freedom of movement whenever it is necessary to do so 
in the public welfare. 
4. Thus it is a reasonable proposition that in any sovereign country, whether 
unitary or federal and whether a centralised federation or a loose-knit federation, the 
power to control the movement of persons in the public interest is an essential one. 
5. The principal motive leading the majority of persons to desire to move from 
one part of a country to another is the absence of jobs in the exporting part and the 
existence, or imagined existence, in the receiving part. 
6. Large-scale movement for this motive in The West Indies will do harm to the 
exporting Territories, and will bring social problems in the receiving Territories. 
This situation will be inimical to the interests of the Federation as a whole. 
7. During the time that these problems are being solved, chiefly by economic 
development in the various Units, it would seem reasonable that not only should 
these Units have legislative power to control freedom of movement but that the over-
riding Federal power should be subject to some qualification to protect Territorial 
interests. 
8. The conclusion to which the foregoing propositions point is that the principle 
therein should be recognised in the Constitution in the following way:-
(i) The Constitution will contain a declaration of freedom of movement. 
(ii) The declaration of freedom of movement would not invalidate laws reasonably 
necessary in the public interest of the Federation or of any Unit. 
(iii) Control of the movement of persons would appear on the Exclusive 
Legislative List. 
(iv) The exclusive powers of the Federal Government would not during a period of 
nine years after Independence be exercised except with the concurrence of the Unit 
Governments. (Or alternatively, there would be a formal undertaking that the 
Federal Government would not exercise its powers in relation to any particular 
Territory without that Territory's consent during this agreed period. N.B. This 
alternative was not adopted). 
9. The question of shortening this special agreed period will be reviewed at the 
end of the fourth year by the Federal Government in conjunction with all Territorial 
Governments. 
10. During the agreed period, no Unit Territory would legislate to increase or 
expand any restrictions upon migration now obtaining without the consent of the 
Federal Government. 
11. [After the agreed period, each Territorial Government would have the right 
to consult the Federal Government regarding appropriate remedial measures 
required to deal with any economic disruption that results in a Territory from inter-
Territorial migration.] 
After the expiration of this period, each Territorial Government would have the 
right to determine, with the concurrence of the Federal Government, the appropriate 
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remedial measures required to deal with any economic disruption that results in a 
Territory from inter-Territorial migration. 
12. The Federal Government will undertake to discuss at once with those 
Territorial Governments that are most immediately concerned as a matter of the 
highest priority the establishment of a development programme aimed at increasing 
employment opportunities; [and to this end, at the conference with the United 
Kingdom to discuss economic aid special emphasis is to be placed on the need to 
obtain immediate interim aid to commence such a development programme. A 
similar approach is to be made to other aid-giving countries such as Canada and the 
United States and international lending institutions.] 
and to this end should without delay approach the United Kingdom Government 
for economic aid for the implementation of an interim development plan to be put 
into operation on 1st January, 1962, and to be agreed upon at the London 
Independence Conference next month- the interim plan to be without prejudice to 
the overall development plan for the whole area which it is proposed to draw up. As 
regards economic aid for the ovenill economic development plan for the whole area, 
the approach to the United Kingdom Government should be made about October or 
November of this year, and the approaches to appropriate foreign countries and 
international organisations should follow as soon as practicable thereafter. 
N .B. The words in brackets5 were in the paper as presented by the Chairman6 and 
were modified by the Conference by being replaced by the words immediately 
following the bracketed passages. 
5 ie the square brackets in paras 11 and 12. 6 Or AS Cato. 
150 CO 1031/4271, no 53 9 May 1961 
[Inter-governmental conference]: letter from A R Thomas (Port of 
Spain) to D Williams on discussions with observers from the Cayman 
Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands at the Trinidad conference 
[Extract] 
[The Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands originally entered the federation 
as dependencies of Jamaica but their relationship with Jamaica changed as from July 
1959 by virtue of UK legislation enacted in 1958. Both now came under the jurisdiction of 
the governor of Jamaica who exercised authority through two administrators and the 
government of Jamaica had no responsibility for or power over them. They were thus in 
the anomalous position of being in the federation but not units of it; they were not 
represented in its legislature, nor did they contribute financially. The local legislature in 
the Caymans had since passed a resolution to the effect that the Caymans wanted to 
remain a British colony, an attitude attributed by the CO to two factors. First, about one 
third of the population of 8,000 was white and in a dominant position, especially 
commercially. Secondly, the islands were self-supporting and not grant-aided. Their 
prosperity was based on remittances sent home by seamen (the majority of the adult male 
population worked on American-owned, Liberian-flagged tankers) and a growing tourist 
industry. They were developing an economy similar to that in Bermuda and the Bahamas, 
without income tax and with a law encouraging overseas companies to register in the 
islands. The Caymans feared that federal legislation would prejudice this development. 
The CO considered whether the Caymans might be persuaded to accept a relationship 
with the federation similar to that of the Channel Islands with the UK, a relationship 
which had recently been proposed for Malta. They would have sovereignty over their 
internal affairs, the federation would be responsible for their defence and external affairs 
and their connection with Britain would be only as part of an independent West Indian 
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Federation which was a member of the Commonwealth (CO 1031/4271, no 41, Poynton to 
Sir A Clutterback (CRO), 20 Mar 1961, enclosing a draft letter to Blackburne). Local 
representatives in the Turks and Caicos islands also had reservations about being part of 
the federation and feared in particular the loss of British passports. Blackburne found 
their attitude 'moving': 'No one like me who has had to compete with nationalism for 
over thirty years can fail to be touched when some people say that they want to remain 
British! '. But by contrast with the Caymans, the governor was convinced that the Turks 
and Caicos Islands should be persuaded and even told that they had no alternative but to 
remain in the federation. The islands were grant-aided and dependent on the federation 
for their external trade; they had no other outlet for their exports of fine salt. The CO did 
not agree with Blackburne that the islands should be told that they could not remain a 
colony. Not only would this be difficult to defend in parliament in the UK; it would also 
feed suspicions in the West Indies that the UK was anxious to disengage from the region 
because of the expense. The CO did, however, agree with Blackburne that every effort 
should be made to convince the Turks and Caicos Islands that it was in their own 
interests to remain in the federation (ibid, no 42, Blackburne to Thomas, 10 Apr 1961 & 
no 47, Thomas to Blackburne, 25 Apr 1961). Discussions were held with representatives 
of both the Cayman and Turks and Caicos Islands at the reconvened inter-governmental 
conference in Trinidad in May 1961 which are reported in the document reproduced here. 
Thomas attended the conference as one of the UK observers. The solution proposed for 
the Caymans was put by Macleod to the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee (CAB 
13411560, CPC (61)13, 30 May 1961) but in the event, and after the referendum in 
Jamaica, it was decided that if both the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands 
wanted to remain colonies, their wishes should be respected (CAB 13411561, CPC(62)10, 
memo by Maudling, 16 Mar 1962; ibid, CPC 6(62)1 , 30 Mar 1962 records the Colonial 
Policy Committee's approval).] 
I am writing to amplify the very brief report we sent you about the Caymans and the 
Turks and Caicos Islands in Barbados telegram No. 22. 
2. We held meetings early last week with the observers (the people whom they 
have senthere are observers like ourselves) from both groups. The Turks and Caicos 
islanders were very simple, sincere folk who wanted no more than an assurance that 
we honestly believed that it would be in their own best long-term interests to remain 
within the Federation. They said that they would place themselves in our hands and 
would accept whatever advice we gave them. Such responsibility was not altogether 
welcome, but, having swallowed hard, we told them that we felt sure that they would 
be unwise to break with the Federation. We explained that if they did not continue in 
the Federation now, there must be some doubt whether they would be able to join it 
later on as favourable terms as now seemed possible. We also sought to dispel some of 
their ignorance and, as it seemed to us, misconceptions about the Federation and its 
future prospects and attitudes. After very full discussion they accepted our advice. So 
it was agreed that they should in due course start negotiations for special treatment 
on the basis that they would stay in the Federation if their anxieties could be met. 
3. The Caymanians were altogether tougher nuts to crack. It was immediately 
apparent that they had a thoroughgoing distrust of and distaste for the Federation. 
They knew very little about most of the other islands. They were afraid that federal 
taxation might undermine the foundations of their economy. They were worried lest 
the arrangements for a special visa waiver which they have negotiated with the 
United States, (so making it much easier for their seamen to find work aboard 
American ships), would be terminated if they were part of a Federation within which 
there was freedom of movement. They wanted nothing to do with Customs Union. 
And so on, down to their insistence on retaining the identity of the Caymans on 
postage stamps. In short, they could see no advantage and every possible danger in 
any continuing connexion with the Federation. 
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4. We put to them fully the same sort of considerations that we had put to the 
Turks and Caicos people and, while we did not press them to modify their attitude, 
asked them to consider the matter carefully before resolving to sever their links with 
the Federation. After our first meeting, they left with one doubt- if they were to opt 
out of the Federation now, and if after a few years they had, for whatever reason, 
(perhaps because the United Kingdom would then no longer agree to their 
remaining a Colony), to seek to re-enter the Federation, would not a Federation 
which they had spurned be in a position to dictate terms to them? They requested a 
second meeting to explore this question further. Before this second meeting with us 
they had some private discussions with Brown, 1 from Jamaica, who made a number 
of suggestions to them. The basis of these was that the Caymans should have full 
internal self-government; that they should enter into a form of association with the 
Federation under which the latter becomes responsible for their external affairs and 
defence; and that this association should be reviewed after five years, at which time 
H.M.G. should accept the Caymans back as a Colony if the Caymans then so wish. 
5. These suggestions were discussed at a second meeting which we had with the 
Caymanians. We thought that essentially they were very similar to the proposal we 
had considered in the office, (what I might call the "Channel Islands" proposal), with 
the added complication that H.M.G. would be asked to commit themselves in 
advance to receiving the islands back on request after five years. Their readiness to 
consider these propositions seriously represented a substantial softening of the 
islands' earlier attitude, as expressed in the resolution passed by their Assembly. So 
we told them that, whilst we naturally could not commit H.M.G., there was in our 
view sufficient chance that these suggestions would be acceptable to justify pursuing 
these further. And it was agreed that the Caymanians, like the Turks and Caicos 
islanders, should start negotiations in the hope of securing the kind of association 
with the Federation which I have described. 
6. The next move we made was to suggest to Ricketts, (the Federal Minister with 
special responsibility for both these groups of islands), that two official Working 
Parties, each with Federal, Jamaican and Colonial Office representatives, as well as 
representatives from the Caymans and the Turks and Caicos respectively, be set up to 
consider the islands' special problems. He agreed to this. The suggestion was then 
put to the Conference, on the basis that, as it had decided already that these islands 
should not be represented in the Federal Legislature in the immediate future, it 
would be necessary to examine their positions; and that Working Parties should do 
this and report, making recommendations. No mention was made of whether they 
should report to the Inter-Governmental Conference or to the Lancaster House 
Conference: we quite deliberately left this open. 
7. The Working Parties have now met and made recommendations. I enclose 
copies of these.2 They do not, of course, cover every point which will arise-and in 
particular they make no attempt to examine the problems which will have to be faced 
should a decision be taken as proposed to give the Caymans full internal self-
government-but I think that they do set out the principles involved in sufficient 
detail for a decision to be taken about whether these are, or are not, acceptable. 
8. We understand that Manley will support the recommendations. The Federal 
Cabinet is soon to consider them and there seems to be a reasonable chance that it, 
1 See 108, note 3. 2 Not printed. 
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too, will support them. If it does, we would judge that they will probably be accepted, 
in the main at least, by everyone in The West Indies. 
9. This raises the problem of whether H.M.G. can also accept them. We do not 
think that there should be any difficulty over the Turks and Caicos: the 
recommendations contain nothing that is particularly unexpected or unusual. And 
the Caymans' recommendations, too, should probably be acceptable insofar as 
everything except the provision regarding their possible return to Colonial status is 
concerned. This last matter, however, will set a real problem. Our discussions with 
the Caymanians have convinced us that they will accept no compromise on this 
issue: any statement that we would in five years' time "consider" taking them back as 
a colony would just cut no ice at all. We shall have to be quite specific-or they will 
back down now and ask to be cut off from the Federation in all respects, remaining a 
Colony. 
10. We shall thus have to choose between the undesirability of making an 
unorthodox arrangement, perhaps setting an unfortunate precedent, (although I 
doubt whether in fact it would embarrass us, as I cannot think of any other territory 
which is ever likely to be in a similar position), and the undesirability of allowing the 
Caymans to break their present connexion with the Federation. My personal view is 
that we might be wise to agree to the unorthodox arrangement. If we do, I feel that 
the Caymans will gradually be drawn into the Federation; if we do not, I fear that 
they may stay out indefinitely, perhaps forever and remain a permanent U.K. 
Dependency . ... 
151 CO 103113319, no 8 10 May 1961 
[Federation]: inward telegram no 107 from A R Thomas (Port of 
Spain) to Mr Fraser on the 'thundery atmosphere' at the reconvened 
inter-governmental conference in Trinidad 
Begins. Atmosphere here remains thundery and further squalls probably lie ahead, 
but the Federal ship is still afloat and looks more like weathering the storm. 
2. Adams is quieter and temporarily appears a chastened man: he clearly feels his 
influence waning. Bradshaw has raged tempestuously on a personal issue, but has 
shown no wish to break up the Conference. Other Federal Ministers are mostly 
silent. Barbados and small islands' delegates seem increasingly anxious to preserve 
Federation and so readier to compromise: latter often voice dissent but appear 
satisfied to proceed once their protests are on record. Southwell always asks for his 
dissents to be recorded in red ink. Williams is more relaxed and effective. Manley has 
at last accepted that items can be deferred for further consideration at Lancaster 
House. 
3. Most of Monday was spent in unproductive and indecisive but happily 
unimportant squabbling. Unit rights to operate air services and broadcasting stations 
were discussed at great length with much confusion. Former matter was finally 
resolved but latter has been referred to a committee to report back to this 
Conference. Problem of taking subjects off the reserve list was reached in the late 
afternoon. Manley made Jamaica's position clear-having promised his people to 
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create this list, he could never agree that subjects be removed from it without 
Jamaica's consent. This he wished to secure by providing that no item could be taken 
off the list without, inter alia, either the consent of all units or alternatively 
agreement of two thirds of the population (or electorate) of the Federation. Barbados 
and some of the smaller units indicated opposition in principle to Jamaica veto 
before the day's session ended. 
4. On Tuesday morning it became clear although no Federal delegate had 
spoken, that majority opinion was against Jamaica. Williams then spoke for 45 
minutes immediately before lunch most clearly and impressively. He recalled 
Trinidad's earlier differences with Jamaica and the way he had compromised to 
resolve these and he urged that to avert breakdown, Jamaica accept the ten year 
prohibition on the removal of any subject from the reserve list and the provision that 
thereafter subjects be removable provided, inter alia, majority of the population of 
the Federation consent. (Even this might not in fact be acceptable to the majority of 
small islands.) 
5. After lunch interval Jamaica delegation returned to the Conference 30 
minutes late. Manley, much moved, reiterated the reasons for his stand and finally 
asked that in order that he might, on return to Jamaica, examine whether generally 
acceptable formula could be worked out, this matter be deferred to Lancaster House. 
He undertook to take into account the views expressed by the smaller units and the 
"wise" speech by the Premier of Trinidad. This was agreed. 
6. Manley has since explained privately to me that his delegation was divided on 
this issue.1 He personally thought that the Eric Williams formula (which includes the 
requirement of two thirds majority of the Federal Legislature) was satisfactory but he 
had no mandate to accept it and must put it to party conference in Jamaica. He 
naturally cannot forecast the outcome but has good hope of getting agreement. He 
knew that if as alternative he had said "no" to any compromise formula yesterday it 
would not have been politically possible for him to have varied this stand later. He 
also judged that Trinidad would have refused to the adjourning of the Conference. 
7. Later in the day, on Manley's own suggestion, (made before the subject had 
provoked any serious controversy and in order to give Constitutional lawyers time 
fully to examine the matter and to obtain the benefit of Colonial Office Legal 
Advisers' opinions) question of how unit constitutions should be amended was also 
deferred to Lancaster House. 
8. Other potentially difficult subjects resolved were amendment of Federal 
Constitution and two external affairs points previously deferred. Question of 
Regional Council of Ministers was raised again but opinion was still evenly divided so 
the matter was once more shelved. 
9. So we carry on. Nothing gets through without the utmost difficulty and 
opposition, but we are progressing slowly. Ends. 
1 Blackburne subsequently explained in more detail Jamaica's position on the reserve list at the IGC. 
Manley's delegation had suggested that no item should be transferred from the reserve list without (a) an 
absolute majority in both houses of the federal parliament, and (b) absolute majorities in a majority of the 
legislatures of units representing at least two-thirds of the federal population. Other delegations objected 
to (b) in particular and Trinidad urged acceptance of a formula based on half of the population instead of 
two-thirds, on the additional understanding that the reserve list would remain untouched for an initial ten 
years. Manley personally thought this an acceptable compromise and withdrew to discuss it with his 
colleagues, Isaacs, Glasspole and V L Arnett, the finance minister. Isaacs and Arnett were adamant that 
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Jamaica should adhere to its original position, the former arguing that the balance in the federal house of 
representatives would be upset if British Guiana joined the federation. Faced with this opposition Manley 
reported back to the conference that he would have to consult more widely in Jamaica. The issue was then 
discussed in the Jamaican Cabinet and also at a PNP conference which resolved that the items of income 
tax and industrial development should not be removed from the reserve list without the consent of not less 
than two-thirds of the federal population or two-thirds of the federal electorate. Manley told Blackburne 
that the referendum result would be placed in jeopardy unless Jamaica took this stand; the governor 
doubted this on the grounds that 'very few people know what all this is about' . Immediately after the PNP 
conference Manley broadcast a talk on federation in which he said: 'Mter all-who can tell- may be in 10 
or 15 years we will have reason to join closer with Trinidad and share some of the benefits of her economic 
strength which is greater than ours. People forget when they talk about the Small Islands being poor that 
by comparison with every other unit Trinidad is well off. The combined economy in terms of National 
Income of Trinidad and the eight smaller islands is much larger than the National Income of Jamaica 
although our population is greater than the total of all their populations'. Privately Manley confided to 
Blackburne that he was 'extremely unhappy' at his failure to carry his own Cabinet and party executive. He 
attached little importance to the inclusion of industrial development on the reserve list and thought there 
might even be a need to review the position of income tax in a few years' time. On the referendum Manley 
also told the governor that his party would need to work really hard to win (CO 1031/3319, no 14, 
Blackburne to Thomas, 23 May 1961). 
152 CO 1032/304, no 222 June 1961 
[Immigration]: CO brief no 55 for UK delegation at the Lancaster 
House conference on West Indian immigration into the UK 
Introduction 
This brief is concerned only with the immigration of West Indians into the United 
Kingdom and not with the movement of residents of The West Indies between the 
different units of the Federation. The latter subject will be discussed at the 
Conference (Brief No. 22 refers). The former has no bearing whatever on the 
constitution of the Federation or of its units and is not a subject for Conference 
discussion. This brief is prepared solely to provide members of the U.K. delegation 
with background information which may be useful if the question should arise in 
informal discussions with members of the West Indian delegations to the 
Conference. 
Extent of West Indian migration to the U.K. 
2. The migration movement from the West Indies to the U.K. in recent years 
reflects the facts (a) that the West Indies have a very long tradition of overseas 
migration and (b) that all doors other than the U.K. have progressively been closed to 
them in recent years. West Indian migration to the U.K. first started its upward turn 
in 1953, following the passage in 1952 of the McCarran-Walter Act! which almost 
stopped West Indian migration to the U.S.A. (Under the present arrangements each 
unit of the Federation is entitled to a U.S. immigration quota of 100). Table I below 
shows the total intake into the U.K. of coloured people from all parts of the 
Commonwealth and the numbers within this total who have come from the West 
Indies. All figures are net (i.e. excess of arrivals over departures):-
1 See 23. 
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Year 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
First 4 months 
of1961 
JUNE 1961 
TABLE I 
Estimated net intake of 
coloured people from the 
Commonwealth 
(approx.) 
39,400 
43,000 
40,500 
27,100 
22,000 
58,000 
30,300 
Estimated net 
intake from the 
West Indies 
27,551 
29,812 
23,016 
15,023 
16,395 
49,674 
18,554 
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The latest monthly figure for net intake from the West Indies (8,332 in April, 1961) is 
the highest on record. 
3. It is estimated that there are probably about 210,000 West Indians in the U.K. 
at the present time, although no precise statistics are officially available. The West 
Indians tend to concentrate in a few areas, the largest concentrations being in 
London (about 60,000) and Birmingham (about 26,000) . There are also sizeable 
concentrations in Manchester (7,000), Nottingham (nearly 6,000), Huddersfield 
(4,000), and Leeds, Staffordshire and Wolverhampton (3,000 each). 
4. As indicated in Table II below the majority of the West Indians who come to 
the U.K. are from Jamaica:-
TABLE 11 
Year Jamaican Total (net) West Indian Total 
(net) 
1959 10,367 16,395 
1960 31,438 49,674 
First 4 months 
of 1961 11,013 18,554 
5. As indicated in Table Ill below, increasing numbers of West Indian women 
have been arriving in the U.K. since 1960, mostly to join their menfolk (there have 
also been increasing numbers of children arriving but the official statistics give a 
breakdown only as between male and female):-
TABLE Ill 
Year Male Female 
1956 17,604 12,208 
1957 12,215 10,801 
1958 7,143 7,880 
1959 9,159 7,236 
1960 29,752 19,697 
First 4 months 
of1961 10,532 8,022 
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Employment 
6. Table IV below gives details of unemployment among West Indians. It shows 
that the large majority of West Indian immigrants have been absorbed into 
employment. The number of unemployed West Indians has risen during the past six 
months, but there is good reason to believe that the higher figures for November, 
1960, and February and May, 1961, do no more than reflect the increasing rate of 
intake (since the first thing which most immigrants do on arrival is to register for 
employment). This belief is supported by the results of a special count taken by the 
Ministry of Labour at the beginning of February, 1961, of the duration of 
unemployment among West Indians. This showed that, of a total of 9,545* West 
Indian unemployed on that date, almost a half (4,334) had been unemployed for less 
than one month: only 1,496 (15 per cent) had been unemployed for more than three 
months and only 418 for more than six months. 
TABLE IV 
Month Unemployed Unemployed Unemployed 
Males Females Total 
Nov. 1958 4,701 3,627 8,328 
Feb. 1959 4,724 3,778 8,502 
May 1959 3,217 3,301 6,518 
Aug. 1959 2,261 2,516 4,777 
Nov. 1959 2,899 2,441 5,340 
Feb. 1960 2,930 2,614 5,544 
May 1960 2,481 2,787 5,268 
Aug. 1960 2,911 2,573 5,484 
Nov. 1960 4,098 3,926 8,024 
Feb. 1961 5,129 4,774 9,903 
May 1961 5,069 5,614 10,683 
7. The majority of West Indian immigrants are employed on unskilled work. A 
few of the better educated immigrants can be found in some professional positions 
and also in nursing and various forms of clerical work. A small percentage of skilled 
men have been placed as draughtsmen, laboratory assistants, chemical process 
workers, electricians, boilermen, tool fitters, centre lathe turners, welders, building 
and civil engineering tradesmen, freight lift drivers, warehouse men and catering 
workers. Women with any previous experience of nursing, typing or the needle 
trades are usually placed quickly in employment. 
8. Otherwise West Indians are employed mainly in unskilled work. The public 
transport undertakings are probably the largest employer of coloured labour and 
have their own schemes to train men and women for permanent work in various 
occupations. (London Transport have special arrangements with the Government of 
Barbados to bring over workers on a sponsored scheme). Others are employed in 
heavy labouring jobs on roadways, building or well paid but uncongenial work in 
coalmining, iron and steel and chemical works, etc. Some are absorbed in mills and 
clothing factories where men and women have been successfully trained on some 
routine machine operations, while others have found work in the engineering and 
* There is a discrepancy between this figure and the corresponding figure in Table IV. The latter includes 
358 workers "temporarily stopped". 
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technical trades and in public utility undertakings. Nearly all the women need 
training, and light factory work with time rates is the most popular occupation. 
Laundries, transport, food processing and preserving, icecream manufacture, baking 
and catering, tobacco manufacturing, cutlery, boots and shoes, wire, rope and 
clothing trades have also engaged unskilled women workers. Very few have been 
willing to do domestic work in private houses but some have settled down in cafes, 
hospitals, canteens and institutions. 
9. The Ministry of Labour report that recent arrivals are on the whole of lower 
standards mentally and educationally than previous arrivals. They are said to come 
mainly from agricultural backgrounds, to have no useful experience to offer and 
often to be illiterate and difficult to understand. Many of these are proving slow to 
learn and unadaptable, and are said to resent correction. Nevertheless, they tend to 
expect high rates of pay as a result of information received from earlier arrivals. 
There is also a tendency for workers to leave after a short time if they hear of another 
job with a slightly higher wage or more overtime, and employers find the training 
and wastage expensive. 
10. Recently, many of the West Indian women have been in the older age groups 
and unsuitable for training in industry. Single women with young children to 
support have great difficulty in finding work for the limited hours they are available 
unless they have some previous skill which is in demand. Those who have been 
machinists are not used to power and piece work and cannot normally make the 
grade required. The fact that many of the West Indians tend to settle in certain areas 
(notably London and Birmingham) also makes it difficult to place them in work, 
while another factor which causes difficulties is that some employers impose a 
limitation on the proportion of coloured staff which they are prepared to employ. 
11. In general, however, although the placing of West Indians in suitable 
employment is said to be becoming increasingly difficult- due partly to the lower 
quality of the more recent arrivals-the vast majority of the immigrants although 
unskilled have found employment and are undertaking work-in various fields-
which is essential to the U.K. economy. 
Other difficulties 
12. Housing. The main difficulty encountered by West Indians in the U.K. is in 
connexion with housing accommodation. There is already severe over-crowding in 
many of the areas in which they tend to settle and the difficulties are aggravated by 
the barriers which are frequently raised against coloured people as such. There is a 
pronounced tendency for West Indians to be housed in large multi-occupied houses 
owned by unscrupulous landlords, often of foreign and sometimes of West Indian 
extraction. The official view of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government is that 
the conditions of over-crowding and congestion of which complaints are so often 
heard would have existed in any case without West Indian immigrants; but that their 
presence has aggravated the problem in certain areas to some degree. Attempts to 
relieve the problem by establishing a West Indian Housing Association have so far 
failed but it is hoped that legislation which the Government have in mind for the 
current session to give local authorities greater powers to control conditions in 
multi-occupied houses may help to eradicate some of the worst abuses. Housing 
difficulties are of course a potential source of social friction, which in the 
circumstances could easily involve racial friction. 
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13. Public order. In general , however, since the so-called race riots in 
Nottingham and Notting Hill in the summer of 1958,2 there have been no serious 
outbreaks of racial violence although isolated cases of racial friction have come to 
light. In some areas there is reported to be growing racial friction simmering not far 
below the surface. 
14. Health and crime. According to the evidence available these have so far 
presented no special problems. 
West Indian restrictions on emigration 
15. Following the disturbances in August, 1958, the Secretary of State invited 
West Indian Governments to seek to reduce the flow of immigrants to this country 
by imposing certain administrative controls on immigration. About a year ago the 
Ministry of Labour expressed fears concerning the long-term prospects for the 
employment of unskilled coloured immigrants in this country due to (a) the bulge in 
school-leavers expected between 1961 and 1963, (b) the ending of National Service 
and (c) the progress of automation. The West Indian Governments were therefore 
asked once again to enforce such administrative measures as they could adopt locally 
to reduce the rate of emigration to the U.K. and to impress upon intending migrants 
the difficulties regarding employment and housing which they were likely to find in 
this country. All of the West Indian Governments refuse passports to persons known 
to have been convicted of crimes of violence and the Government of Jamaica (from 
which most of the immigrants come) also place restrictions on the issue of passports 
to the elderly and infirm and to unaccompanied juveniles. Many of the Governments 
(including Jamaica) take active steps to ensure that intending migrants are fully 
aware of the kind of conditions and difficulties which they are likely to encounter 
over here. Despite these measures the rate of emigration has increased sharply 
during the past 18 months. The main reason for this is thought to be the knowledge 
that employment prospects in the U.K. are at present good. Intending migrants are 
seldom deterred by forecasts that employment may become more difficult in the 
indefinite future but they are impressed by letters from friends and relatives already 
here reporting that jobs can be obtained without much difficulty. (The rate of 
emigration is in fact very susceptible to changes in the U.K. employment market as 
was confirmed by the sharp falling-off in emigration between the autumn of 1958 
and the middle of 1959, when there was a slight employment recession in the U.K.) 
In addition, emigration to the U.K. has undoubtedly been given a special boost very 
recently by the public discussion, in press and Parliament, of the possible imposition 
of controls by the U.K. Government. 
U.K restrictions on immigration from the Commonwealth 
16. As a result of the recent sharp increase in immigration from the West Indies, 
and to a lesser extent from India and Pakistan, pressure has been brought to bear on 
the U.K. Government in recent months to impose controls on the entry of 
immigrants from the Commonwealth into the U.K. This pressure has been led by a 
small group of Conservative M.P.s and backed by certain organs of the Press. An 
inter-departmental Working Party under the Home Office has examined the whole 
2 See 78. 
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question of coloured immigrants in the U.K. and has reported in full to Ministers on 
the present position, on the difficulties which are being encountered (and those 
likely to arise in the future), and on possible methods of controlling immigration. 
U.K. Ministers have in the past been reluctant to depart from the traditional open 
door policy of the U.K. as the centre of the Commonwealth, but there has recently 
been a growing feeling among Ministers that the volume of immigration is reaching 
a scale which will oblige the Government to introduce legislation to enable them to 
restrict it. No final decision to legislate has yet been taken, but the possibility of 
introducing restrictive legislation on the basis of an ingenious scheme devised by the 
Ministry of Labour to work with sufficient flexibility to provide the U.K. employment 
market with such immigrant labour as it requires is being actively examined. 
Ministers have, however, decided that in any event no public announcement of an 
intention to legislate should be made until after the Jamaica referendum has been 
held, after which it is hoped that the future survival of the West Indies Federation 
will be assured. But the Secretary of State has told his colleagues that the question is 
bound to be raised while the West Indian leaders are here for the Conference and that 
if it is so raised it might be disingenuous for him to refrain from warning the 
Premier of Jamaica, and possibly other senior West Indian Ministers, privately that 
the Government were considering the introduction of restrictive legislation later in 
the year. 
17. The question whether such a private warning should be given, and if so 
when and to whom, is very much a matter for the Secretary of State's personal 
judgment in the light of developments during the Conference. It is, however, very 
important that, apart from any private warnings which the Secretary of State may 
decide to give, no indication should be given either in plenary session or in infor-
mal discussions with West Indian delegates that the U.K. Government is likely to 
introduce restrictions. In any such discussions we should not go beyond the posi-
tion taken in numerous recent Ministerial statements in the House that the 
Government is keeping the whole question of immigration into the U.K. under con-
stant review but has not yet reached any conclusion. West Indian opinion is, natu-
rally enough, highly emotional on this subject and West Indian Ministers would 
therefore be bound to react very strongly indeed to any suggestion that restrictions 
might be introduced. If the idea were to gain currency that the price of indepen-
dence was the closing of the U.K.'s open door to West Indian migrants it would cer-
tainly gravely prejudice the changes of reaching agreement at the present 
Conference on the early establishment of an independent Federation. It would also 
certainly make it even more difficult, and perhaps impossible, for Mr. Manley to 
obtain a vote from the people of Jamaica in favour of joining the Federation. It is 
abundantly clear from speeches made both by Sir Grantley Adams and Mr. Manley 
since their arrival in the U.K. this week that this is how they would react to any 
suggestion that the present policy of free entry might be changed. There is there-
fore a special need for caution in what is said about U.K. policy, either in plenary 
session or in informal discussions. There is not of course the same objection to 
frank discussion of the difficulties in the U.K. to which West Indian immigration at 
the present rate gives rise. Indeed, this could be a useful preparation for what may 
come later. 
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153 CO 103113321, nos 8 & 17 11- 15 June 1961 
[Federation]: outward telegrams nos 175 (personal) and 1 (federation 
personal) from G W Jamieson to MS Staveley1 on the proceedings of 
the Lancaster House conference in London 
[On the contentious issues, the Lancaster House conference adopted the formula on 
freedom of movement suggested at the IGC in Trinidad (see 149) and, on the reserve list, 
it adopted the compromise put forward by Macleod which is reported in para 6 of tel 175 
reproduced here. On representation, the conference adopted the formula, again suggested 
at the Trinidad IGC, that each territory would elect one member to the federal house of 
representatives plus an additional member for each complete unit of population in that 
territory. With agreement reached that the unit of population should be 55,000, the 
federal house would consist of 64 members (5 elected from Barbados, 30 from Jamaica, 16 
from Trinidad, 1 (with provision for an alternate member) from Montserrat and 2 from 
each of the other territories. On the issue of a customs union, it was agreed that internal 
free trade should be phased in and a common external tariff adopted within a maximum 
of nine years. It was also decided to abolish the mandatory levy and to give the federal 
government independent taxing power from import duties on customs, excluding those 
on petroleum products. With the addition of taxes on federal incomes and other 
miscellaneous receipts, it was estimated that this would provide federal revenues of 
approximately $30 million in 1961 (Report of the West Indies Constitutional Conference, 
1961, Cmnd 1417, 1961, paras 11, 20, 21,26 and 27).] 
No 175 (personal) 
London Conference. 
Conference has now completed its first full week. Items dealt with have been 
Freedom of Movement, Interim Economic Aid, Sources of Federal Revenue, 
Procedure for Amendment of Reserve List and International Treaty Obligations. 
2. No improvement was made on I.G.C. compromise on Freedom of Movement 
and there is danger this may still be breaking issue for Barbados. 2 Federal 
Government tabled paper requesting £5.8 millions interim aid. Fraser (in chair as S. 
of S. was sick) made deliberately discouraging initial response but we know we will 
almost certainly have to produce something though probably only a fraction of sum 
mentioned will be possible. Discussion ended on curious note with Williams having 
made detailed critique of Federal paper. He doubted capacity of territories to spend at 
such a rate, warned them of the heavy recurrent burden that would follow some of 
their projects, and pointed out that shortage of trained technical staff was likely to 
make it impossible to accelerate development at rate envisaged. Naturally this did 
not endear him to small islands. 
1 Secretary to Lord Hailes. 
2 Governor Sir J Stow had reported considerable dissatisfaction in Barbados after the Trinidad IGC. Adams 
and premier Cummins condemned what they described as 'a negation of Federation, a determination to 
make the Federation unworkable and an attempt to create an unworkable confederation'. The Barbados 
delegation in Trinidad had been defeated on 'practically all it sought to achieve' and feelings were running 
particularly high over freedom of movement. Barbados's case at Trinidad had been inadequately 
represented and it was 'obvious' that Adams was ill-equipped to match the debating powers of Manley and 
Williams. There was much press speculation that Barbados would make freedom of movement a breaking 
point and that without it 'too high a price would be paid by Barbados for "Independence"' (CO 1031/3319, 
no 13, Stow to Thomas, 27 May 1961). 
[153] JUNE 1961 427 
3. Long debate on sources of federal revenue did not alter I.G.C. position. Adams 
continued to press for Federal control of income tax. He was directly answered by 
Manley whose closely logical reply he did not attempt to dispute. 
4. Up to this point atmosphere of conference was curiously lifeless. Few delega-
tions seemed to have really understood vital nature of proceedings and that 
Federation would be made or broken at this conference. They wearily repeated all 
old arguments. On Thursday Secretary of State told conference he had grave doubts 
about the possibility of its success if delegates continued to take up rigid positions. 
He reminded them of what was at stake, that continuation of the Federation must 
be the supreme objective and that a new spirit must appear if this was to be 
ensured. 
5. This appears to have sobered them for they approached next item, Procedure 
for Amendment of Reserve List, in chastened spirit. Manley explained he had been 
unable to change his position in face of overwhelming opinion in Jamaica that 
formula could not be eased. He pointed out that there was no real problem at issue 
and appealed to conference not to break federation. 
6. Following discussion S. of S. submitted alternative proposal that there should 
be no Reserve List. Instead income tax and industrial development should be on 
Concurrent List but would not become federal subjects until such proposal approved 
by 2/3rd majority of each Federal House and by absolute majority of each Unit 
Representative House. There would be review after nine years. 
7. Manley welcomed this and said he would accept simple majority of Federal 
houses. Conference accepted compromise with visible relief except Williams who 
recorded dissent. This however may be largely tactical move. 
8. Highlight of coming week likely to be Secretary of State's reply on interim 
economic aid on which final decisions have not yet been taken. We will also have to 
hear them out on Emigration to U.K. We hope to fix date of Independence on 
Tuesday or Wednesday. 
9. Aim is to produce report of conference which all heads of delegations will 
sign by end of week and thus (we hope) commit their governments to seeking sub-
sequent legislative endorsement to package deal. This may be tricky stage and 
Adams (who has made little impact hitherto) may make last stand. He has already 
warned conference that Federal Parliament is unlikely to ratify unsatisfactory deci-
sions. 
10. There is however now atmosphere among some delegates that we may be 
over the hump. Barbados is possibly most immediately dangerous risk. 
11. Will telegraph again next week. Conference documents will be in Monday's 
bag. 
No 1 (federation personal) 
London Conference. 
We are now considering Draft Report. The Secretary of State has proposed 
independence date of 31st May, 1962, to be followed within six weeks by Federal 
Elections; the economic conference to start in London on 8th January, 1962. 
2. On interim aid Secretary of State has proposed small Anglo-American 
Economic Mission should visit West Indies in immediate future to consider "any 
particular short-term projects (in the Leewards and Windwards) which are of special 
urgency or importance to the smaller islands but which for one reason or another 
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have not found' a place within the existing approved development programmes ... 
the mission would, of course, have to limit its scope to a relatively small number of 
short-term projects". 
3. State Department agreed to participate at very short notice and have in mind 
matching U.K. contribution up to limit of about $(U.S.)3 million. We are also 
informing Canadians in case they may wish to be associated with mission. 
4. We hope to finish Friday depending on how we work through draft report. 
This will offer further opportunity for delegations to reopen issues, but at least they 
appear to have agreed that the published report should not spell out individual 
territorial reservations. 
5. We think this Conference is probably in the bag. Adams repeats that Federal 
Parliament is unlikely to ratify and clearly certain territories (particularly Barbados, 
Grenada and St. Lucia) remain risks until ratification complete. Some territories will 
delay ratification until after economic conference.3 
3 Reporting on the Lancaster House conference to the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee, Macleod 
explained that the main problem would be the likely insistence of the small islands on prior discussion of 
an interim plan for economic development as the price for their continued support for an independent 
federation. In discussion in committee it was suggested that an independent federation would not 
necessarily reduce the financial burden on the UK; it might be less expensive to keep the small states and 
to give independence to Jamaica and Trinidad than to give considerable financial and economic help to an 
independent federation. However, this was not advocated as policy. The committee recognized that the US 
had a vested interest in the launching of a strong and independent federation and was prepared to donate 
considerable financial aid for that purpose (CAB 134/1560, CPC 7(61)2, 2 June 1961). 
154 CO 852/2060, no 11 15 July 1961 
[EEC]: report by Lord Perth on his discussions with West Indian 
ministers in Trinidad and Jamaica. Annex C 
I first had a meeting-easy and relaxed-with Grantley Adams and the Federal 
Cabinet; then, over two days, three long sessions with the Federal and Unit 
Governments--40 delegates, weak, ignorant of the subject and hostile to each other. 
The final outcome was the Press Communique on the lines of the New Zealand 
communique (Annex A)l which states that they would understand if the United 
Kingdom decided to enter negotiations provided their interests were fully protected! 
Even this took an hour to achieve because they were afraid lest some day this 
"understanding" would be held to be approval of the fact that the United Kingdom 
could not expect to join without some changes in the present Trading arrangements! 
The list of their interests (vital?!) range from Arrowroot to Tonka Beans (Annex B) 
and with it there is a memorandum stating their requirements (Annex C). 
2. Subsequently I had meetings with Eric Williams and his Trinidad Cabinet and 
then travelled to Jamaica to do the same with Manley and his Cabinet. Both were 
concerned that I should again hear of their islands' interests. Otherwise the meetings 
passed happily. I spoke at a Trinidad Chamber of Commerce lunch, 150 strong, and 
had a meeting with the leading Jamaican business and agricultural groups. 
1 Annexes A and B not printed. 
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3. I believe the visit, and the chance it gave me to explain what it was all about, 
was very worthwhile as there was no knowledge and deep concern that the United 
Kingdom was to give up the Commonwealth and sacrifice the West Indies. When I 
left there was I think appreciation that we hadn't even started to negotiate, that the 
choice for us was not Commonwealth or Europe, that we would seek to protect 
vital West Indies interests and that we would consult. The local Press were very 
helpful. 
4. What are the conclusions from the visit?:-
(a) Above all that uncertainty be removed and that we decide soon whether to 
enter negotiations and if so the shorter the negotiations the better. As long as they 
are looked after the West Indies are quite content with whatever the United 
Kingdom may do. 
(b) The West Indies would (I think rightly) like A.O.T. status-about which there 
was a very full discussion. I warned them I could not tell whether they would be 
eligible as being sufficiently undeveloped but hoped so. In this connection there is 
a point we need to watch vis-a-vis their Independence next year-if they thought 
Independence would make them ineligible some might seize on this excuse to 
postpone its happening and jeopardize Federation (incidentally Manley's campaign 
for Federation on which he shortly has a referendum is going well). 
(c) Preservation of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement is vital to the West 
Indies and British Guiana, and of course Oil is an even greater money spinner; 
citrus and bananas are also very important and lastly bauxite and alumina are of 
great value to them (the investment in Jamaica alone is £120 million) and British 
Guiana. The export of these ores is in the main to Canada and so there is deep 
concern about any arrangements made for Canada's aluminium. 
(d) The West Indies are extremely anxious that they (Federal and Unit 
Governments) should be adequately consulted on those items in which they are 
interested and I gave appropriate assurances. 
(e) In general the only concern of all the West Indians is that their United 
Kingdom markets and their special privileges therein are unaffected or if affected 
that they be compensated. Perhaps for the first time they are beginning to realize 
how much we do for them! 
5. I had two hours with Jagan of British Guiana who flew over to see me. He had 
given the question more profound thought than any of the West Indians and felt that 
if we went in, the Commonwealth over a period must feel the change. He had decided 
that for us to do so would be a mistake. After our talk, which was friendly and 
objective, in a Press interview he said he was afraid we might be choosing the shadow 
and losing the bone-so my talk appeared slightly to have raised doubts in his mind. 
I deliberately did not develop the question of A.O.T. status with him-Dutch Guiana 
has not got it. I said I was well aware of his country's main interests-Sugar and 
Bauxite-and that we would keep in touch. 
Annex C to 154 
Safeguards required by The West Indies if the United Kingdom decides to enter into 
negotiation with the Six with a view to joining the European Economic Community. 
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(a) The West Indies would wish to secure A.O.T. status. 
(b) The United Kingdom should ensure that the level of trade between The West 
Indies and E.F.T.A., EEC, and itself should not be less than the average of 
1958- 60. 
(c) The reality of Canadian trade must not be given up for the prospect of 
increased trade with E.E.C. and our Canadian trade must be maintained. 
(d) Existing quota restrictions maintained by many E.E.C. countries against 
manufactured goods from the under-developed countries (e.g. textiles) in 
contravention of GATT would have to be dismantled. This is a general 
Commonwealth problem rather than a specifically West Indian problem. Also high 
tariffs on manufactured goods of interest to the under-developed countries should 
be reduced. 
(e) There must be no involvement of the West Indies in world politics (especially 
in Africa) consequent on A.O.T. status. 
(f) The West Indies must have complete freedom in fixing the level of their tariffs 
including the levying of duties for fiscal and development purposes. 
(g) As regards freedom of movement between the West Indies and Europe the 
normal type of disability which usually faces West Indians should not exist, 
but there should be the right of freedom to seek employment in the 
Community. 
(h) Consultation on a bilateral basis is unsatisfactory since a commodity may 
concern more than one member of the Commonwealth, e.g. Petroleum concerns 
Nigeria as well as Trinidad. Multi-lateral consultation would seem to be preferable 
and if any Commonwealth Conference is convened on the question of United 
Kingdom entry into the Common Market no constitutional technicality should 
preclude West Indies representation and in particular representation by Territorial 
Governments such as Trinidad and Tobago. In the discussion of particular 
commodities e.g. Aluminium, it would also be desired that other Commonwealth 
countries such as Canada who had an essential interest in the product should also 
be associated with the discussions. 
(i) If the West Indies were to be given A.O.T. status their participation in 
control and management of the Development Fund (Art. I Con.) should be 
ensured. 
0) The West Indies should be free to negotiate commercial treaties with third 
countries subject to any international obligation such as GATT. 
(k) W.l. present trading arrangements in the sense of the long term contracts and 
negotiated prices for exports which the W.l. now enjoy (e.g. Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement and contracts relating to Citrus) must in no way be affected. Moreover, 
this must relate not only to existing contracts but also to the renewal of such 
contracts from time to time. 
(I) In the event that the United Kingdom joined the E.C.M. without being able to 
achieve for the W.l. the status of an A.O.T. with the safeguards requested by the 
West Indies, the United Kingdom would undertake to have discussions with the 
Commonwealth and the West Indies (as a member of the Commonwealth) on the 
question of compensation for any loss of preference that might ensue from Britain 
joining the Common Market. 
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155 CO 1032/305, no 280 28 July 1961 
[Immigration]: brief by R J Vile for Mr Fraser on the report of the 
inter-departmental working party for the Cabinet Commonwealth 
Migrants Committee 
The Cabinet considered on the 30th May a recommendation by the Commonwealth 
Migrants Committee that legislation should be introduced for the control of 
Commonwealth Immigration and deferred a final decision until they knew what form 
of control would be practicable. Mr. Butler has asked the Committee to report to the 
Cabinet before the Summer Recess. The report by the Interdepartmental Working 
Party discusses the reasons for imposing control and suggests a method of doing so. 
2. The first section of the report (paragraphs 3 to 18) sets out fairly enough the 
arguments of principle. It is interesting to note that the Ministry of Labour now 
recognise, as they did not before, that in present circumstances there is no case for 
restriction on employment grounds. The economic arguments in paragraphs 7 to 17 
which were prepared by the Treasury show that Commonwealth Immigration is of 
positive benefit to the United Kingdom, both in the short and in the long term. 
3. Later in the report (paragraph 58) it is argued that a case for restriction can-
not at present be related to health, crime or public order. The positive grounds for 
recommending restriction relate to the intensification of housing problems and the 
difficulties of assimilating coloured people. It is a pity that the report does not take 
the point that the restriction of coloured immigrants only would not necessarily 
ease the housing situation if the demand for labour were met by other immigrants, 
such as the Irish. It is also a pity that the report does not examine at all carefully 
the problem of assimilation. Much successful work has already been done in 
encouraging assimilation and there is no reason to suppose that more cannot be 
accomplished provided that everything possible is done to strengthen the already 
existing goodwill and to encourage firm action to uphold the law whenever it is 
challenged. 
4. It does not therefore seem possible to make out a convincing case on practical 
grounds for restricting Commonwealth immigration or to avoid the damaging 
charge that restrictions have been imposed because of colour prejudice. Even if these 
risks are accepted by Ministers, there is reason to believe that the method of 
restriction proposed in the report may not be sufficiently effective and may, in itself, 
create difficult political and administrative problems. In this connection, the effect 
on Commonwealth relations must be borne in mind. The right of free entry of 
Commonwealth citizens into the U.K. is of long standing, and its removal is bound to 
cause disturbance in Commonwealth relations in varying degrees according to the 
strength of the Commonwealth interests which are effected. Although the C.R.O. 
appear to believe that no serious strain need be expected in our relations with already 
independent Commonwealth members, it is already abundantly clear that the 
introduction of restrictions would damage our relations with The West Indies. If 
legislation were introduced before West Indian independence it might destroy our 
hopes of an independent Federation. If, however, legislation were delayed and 
provided that the restrictions were seen to be not too severe, and not directed against 
West Indians, the long term damage to relations might not be too serious. It is 
possible that other colonial territories might also be brought to accept the 
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introduction of restrictions, if, in fact, it is necessary to impose restrictions on U.K. 
and Colonies' citizens. 
5. The possible methods of control are discussed in paragraphs 20 to 40 of the 
report. The recommendations in paragraphs 20 to 32 appear acceptable. The 
recommendations in paragraphs 33 to 38 and Appendix "B" describe the method of 
control proposed by the Interdepartmental Working Party. Briefly, the report 
proposes the admission of two categories of immigrants without restriction, namely, 
those having a specific job to go to and those having qualifications accepted as likely 
to be useful in the U.K. For other immigrants seeking work, there would be a general 
quota fixed for a period for the whole Commonwealth and not sub-divided for 
individual countries. 
6. The proposal to admit people with specific jobs is acceptable and fits in with 
schemes organised by Colonial Governments (e.g., transport workers from Barbados 
and hotel workers from St. Helena and the Seychelles.) 
7. The proposal in respect of skilled workers does not seem to be sufficiently 
worked out to enable a final judgment of its merits to be reached. It would seem nec-
essary to have some clearer idea of the skills which would make a person eligible for 
entry and to know rather more about the procedure for checking on individual appli-
cations. It would not seem to be possible, for example, to leave intending migrants in 
doubt about the kind of skills which will be acceptable. Is it intended, for example, to 
restrict this category to those with professional qualifications and the more advanced 
technical qualifications, or will the category include all skilled workers? If there is any 
intention to allow skilled workmen to come in in this category, then there would seem 
to be considerable difficulty in checking on their applications. Because of the general 
level of corruption in many overseas territories it is to be expected that many appli-
cants would make out claims to much greater skills than they in fact possess, and that 
they could easily acquire supporting evidence to prove this. The only worthwhile 
check would be a certificate from a Government Department, but in many cases the 
Governments concerned might have to create additional facilities and employ addi-
tional staff for the issue of such certificates. 
8. It would therefore seem to be desirable that entry in this category should be 
restricted to those with professional and comparable qualifications which could be 
easily proved by the possession of certificates issued by a recognised authority. There 
would seem to be every disadvantage in trying to widen this category. 
9. The report does not give very much guidance about the way in which the total 
quota for other immigrants would be fixed. It seems clear that the report is mistaken 
in thinking that the total could be kept secret. In arriving at a figure Ministers would 
have to consult with local authorities, industries, trade unions and other interested 
parties and there would seem to be plenty of scope for disagreement and for bringing 
pressure to bear on Ministers to reach one conclusion or another. 
10. It is proposed in paragraphs 42 to 45 of the report that the restrictions should 
be applied to migrants from colonial territories. When this question was last consid-
ered in 1958 the position of the Colonial Secretary was reserved on the grounds that 
H.M.G. are directly responsible for the well-being of colonial territories and that it is 
not necessarily appropriate to treat the colonies in the same fashion as independent 
Commonwealth countries. These considerations do not seem to have lost any of their 
force. Indeed, if legislation is not introduced until after West Indian independence they 
would seem to have more force than before. The links binding certain colonies with 
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the U.K. are exceptionally close and of particularly long standing, e.g., Bermuda, the 
Bahamas, the Falkland Islands. Because of the smallness of their populations migrants 
from them to the U.K. could never cause any significant social problems. It is true that 
some problems in connection with migrants from Aden or Hong Kong would arise, 
but there is no good reason to suppose that such problems could not, in fact, be met 
by administrative action taken by the Colonial Governments themselves. It is there-
fore recommended that we should continue to press for the exemption of colonial 
migrants from any system of control. 
11. If the exemption of colonial migrants is agreed then we need not object to 
the proposal not to apply restrictions to Irish immigrants, and we could support a 
specific exemption in the Bill itself. 
12. The passage in the report dealing with the enforcement of immigration 
control (paragraphs 49 to 52) does not seem entirely satisfactory. While there is every 
reason to impose an obligation on carrying Companies to take unacceptable 
migrants back to their territory, this does not get over the difficulty of migrants who 
arrive by other means and are found to be unacceptable. The hope in the report is 
that repatriation of such people at Government expense would stop most would-be 
immigrants from trying it on. In practice, serious difficulties might well be 
encountered if, for example, people turned up in this country a short time before the 
end of one quota period and the beginning of another, and if the only reason for 
refusing them entry was that the quota had already been filled. Another difficulty is, 
of course, that under the proposed procedure the decision of the Immigration Officer 
would be final. It is expected that from time to time Immigration Officers may well 
be faced with particularly difficult decisions. Would, for example, a West Indian 
author be admitted? Or a Gambian painter? Or a private student hoping to secure 
admission to an educational institution after arrival in this country? Or a Mauritian 
who had resided continuously in this country for 15 to 20 years? 
13. It is a fair general criticism of the Interdepartmental Working Party's Report 
that because the principles governing restriction are not clearly defined the practical 
methods proposed are open to serious objection. If Ministers consider that, 
nevertheless, some restrictions must be imposed, there would seem to be strong 
reason for urging that colonials should be exempted from those restrictions. If this is 
not acceptable to Ministers it seems certainly very necessary to have a much more 
fully worked out plan of control before any final decision can be taken. In particular, 
it is of fundamental importance in the West Indian context that legislation should 
not be introduced until after West Indian independence. This need not, however, 
preclude consultations with Colonial Governors on a Secret and Personal basis about 
the kind of scheme which is to be introduced. 
156 CO 1031/3329, no 9A 4 Aug 1961 
[Federation] : circular letter from A R Thomas to West Indian 
governors and administrators on the outlook after the Lancaster 
House conference 
I apologise for not having written to you earlier about the Lancaster House 
Conference. As you know it ran its course without a breakdown and in the end 
produced a report the text of which is unanimous; though as you will have seen from 
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paragraph 441 there were many points of dissent. The substance of the conclusions 
was far from unanimous, and it is open to each delegate publicly to explain the stand 
which he took on particular points when presenting the report as whole to 
Legislatures. Subject however to confirmation by the various legislatures (and in the 
case of Jamaica a referendum) the conference agreed "to request H.M.G. in the 
United Kingdom to take the necessary measures to revise the Federal and Unit 
Constitutions on the basis set out in this Report". The Secretary of State gave an 
assurance that subject to such confirmation "H.M.G. will take the necessary steps to 
introduce legislation to grant the West Indies independence on the 31st May, 1962". 
A further complication is that though it had always been contemplated that we should 
need a separate conference to deal with financial and economic aid after independence 
and a number of other matters such as defence, this Conference has now been deferred 
from the autumn until January 1962. It is possible that some of the Unit Governments, 
particularly the poorer ones, may feel inclined to defer putting the Lancaster House 
Conference conclusions before their Legislatures until after the January Conference 
when, to put it crudely, they will have seen the colour of our money. 
Against this background we need to consider what if anything we can do to try and 
reach finality in sufficient time to enable us to bring about independence on the 31st 
May, 1962 on the basis of the Lancaster House Report. 
Those of us who sat through the Conference were inevitably depressed by the 
many reservations which were made by the delegations in regard to various items 
and the lack of enthusiasm which marked the fashioning of this Constitution for 
Federal independence. Although no delegation went so far during the Conference as 
to say that it would advise its legislature and people to reject the scheme as a whole 
because of its disappointment over particular items, equally they would not commit 
themselves to supporting it. Paragraph 44 was the best we could get in this direction, 
and it is clear therefore that there are hurdles ahead. In particular the Trinidad 
delegation blew unexpectedly cool over the formula of Freedom of Movement which 
they had accepted in Trinidad (their change being occasioned, it appears, by the 
acceptance at the London Conference of a revised formula for the Reserve List); 
Barbados went very near to saying that they would prefer to remain out of a 
Federation rather than go into one which did not introduce Freedom of Movement 
immediately; and several of the smaller Islands showed dissatisfaction over Freedom 
of Movement and some other issues. Manley will no doubt be watching carefully for 
any signs of weakening in the Eastern Caribbean before finally making up his mind 
on the timing and possibly even the holding of his referendum. 
In these circumstances it seems to us that all our influence should be directed to 
getting Governments to indicate publicly their support for the scheme as a whole, and 
their readiness to commend it to their legislatures and to secure its acceptance by the 
legislatures, with such imperfections as they may see in it, in the hope of working out 
improvements by proper constitutional methods later on. After all, it would be a mir-
1 Which read: 'With so many delegations present at the Conference it was inevitable that certain 
delegations should find themselves not in agreement with some of the conclusions set out in Chapter Ill of 
the Report. Many indeed recorded dissent on particular items. It was recognized that the conclusions 
reached at Lancaster House were ad referendum to Legislatures. The Secretary of State made it clear that, 
in accepting the scheme as a whole for the purpose of presentation to legislatures, delegates would be fully 
entitled to explain the stand which they had taken on particular matters during the Conference' (Report of 
the West Indies Constitutional Conference, 1961, Cmnd 1417, 1961, para 44) . 
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acle if the Founding Fathers got this right in every detail first shot! In the case of the 
grant-aided Islands we would hope that the visit of the Economic Aid Mission might 
give some encouragement to action and we would in any case hope it need not wait 
till after the January Conference. In general the danger is that the various 
Governments and legislatures will hang back and wait to see how other Units are going 
to jump. In this context it is satisfactory that Bird and Clyne at the last session of the 
Windward/ Leeward Islands Conference2 declared that they intended to recommend 
the scheme as a whole to their legislatures and this sentiment seemed to be shared by 
other delegations. This was certainly an improvement on the general attitude at the 
full Conference when paragraph 44 was put into the draft Report. A fairly rapid 
endorsement by Unit Governments and legislatures of the Lancaster House scheme 
seems likely to be infectious, just as a reluctance so to do might be equally infectious. 
It was of course made clear to the delegates at the Windward Islands/Leewards 
Islands Conference (although not in such crude terms) that the schemes which 
resulted from the Lancaster House Conference and the Smaller Islands Conference 
formed a package deal which they would have to treat as a whole. In other words the 
benefits of constitutional advance resulting from the smaller Conference were 
contingent upon the scheme for Federal independence which emerged from 
Lancaster House going through. 
We know that some of the smaller Islands fear that after Independence they may 
find themselves financially worse off than they are now since whatever arrangements 
are made at the January Conference they cannot expect to continue indefinitely to 
receive grants in aid from the U.K. We do not believe, however, that this fear is well 
founded. Experience has shown that once a territory becomes independent it attracts 
economic assistance from outside sources other than the metropolitan country 
which naturally enough before that stage is regarded by the rest of the world as being 
primarily responsible for external aid. We have already seen the beginning of this 
outside interest in the West Indies in the help being given by the United States and 
the association of the U.S. and Canada in the Aid Mission. We have no doubt that this 
interest will grow. Apart from these and possibly other countries which may become 
interested in giving help to the West Indies, it is likely that there will be increasing 
interest shown in the West Indies after independence on the part of international 
economic and financial agencies. Furthermore, it is to be expected that the 
Federation as a whole will be in a far better position to attract outside help than 
would the Islands on their own and that each unit is therefore likely to gain more 
financially by membership of this larger association than if it faced the world alone 
or continued to depend almost entirely on the U.K. 
2 A constitutional conference of the Leeward and Windward Islands took place in London after the 
Lancaster House conference. The purpose was to consider changes designed to ensure (as had been the 
case at the 1959 conference, see 98, note 1) that all units had parity of status when the federation became 
independent. It was agreed that the Leeward and Windward Islands should have full internal self-
government. Delegates from the islands pressed that the changes should be implemented forthwith but 
the CO insisted that they could not be implemented until the federation had achieved independence. The 
CO took the line that the changes were not compatible with HMG having continued responsibilities, that 
HMG had first to be sure that an independent federation would survive, and that if federation failed, HMG 
reserved to itself the freedom to review the situation anew. The CO was not saying that the changes could 
not be made, simply that they could not be made before 31 May 1962, the projected date for an 
independent federation (CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)23, memo by Macleod, 10 July 1961). 
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We fully realise that it is primarily for Premiers and Chief Ministers to determine 
the course and timing of events but anything that· you, the Governors and the 
Administrators can do to influence them along the lines of securing early 
commitments to the new Federal scheme on the part of their Governments and 
legislatures would, in the opinion of our Ministers, be of the greatest value. 
157 CO 103113329, no 22, enclosure 22 Aug 1961 
[Trinidad]: note by J A Craddock1 on Or Williams and his attitude 
towards federation 
Dr. Williams lunched with me on 15th August, 1961, to meet two British Foreign 
Office officials. Before the meeting I let him see the latest J.I.C. Paper on Cuba, and 
as soon as the preliminaries were over, I asked what he thought of the paper. He said 
that it was good and that he was grateful for the opportunity of seeing it, but that he 
doubted whether the dangers posed by Cuba to the British territories, and in 
particular Jamaica, had been sufficiently appreciated. 
2. He added that he was worried about Cuban influence and even more worried 
that the British and American Governments had put their support behind a weak 
Federation which was unlikely to be strong enough to resist a Cuban subversive 
attack, if one were seriously mounted. This onslaught on the proposed Federal 
constitution, and the part played in its creation by the British and American 
Governments and by Mr. Manley, then became the central theme of his discourse. 
The principal ways in which this theme was developed were:-
(a) that although the British and Americans had deliberately helped Jamaica 
create a weak Federation, they were now trying to weaken Trinidad by trying to 
give to the Federation powers that properly belonged to Trinidad; in addition, the 
Federal Government and its incompetent politicians were being encouraged to 
meddle in what were essentially matters for Trinidad. 
(b) that Dr. Williams himself was now only concerned with the future of Trinidad; 
in his present term of office Trinidad had under his leadership achieved a stability 
and prosperity that no-one would have thought possible five years ago. He was now 
only concerned with maintaining and consolidating the gains that he had made in 
Trinidad and was no longer interested in the Federation. He implied that he would 
not press his objections to it, provided that Trinidad's interests or stability were 
not threatened; but he was worried at the prospect of Trinidad associating in a 
weak Federation with Jamaica, if the security position of that territory were to 
deteriorate with unhappy results in Trinidad. 
(c) that the proposed Federal constitution had been supported by the British and 
American Governments solely to satisfy Mr. Manley, and that in this approach to 
the problem the true needs of the area had been sacrificed to expediency; he 
referred to a recent personal letter that he had received from Mr. Manley, which 
had not apparently affected his thinking. 
3. I do not think that our polite efforts to refute Dr. Williams' views had much 
effect, although we pointed to the even greater security dangers inherent in a 
fragmented Caribbean, and to the strength which a truly multi-racial nation could 
1 Security liaison officer, federal government. 
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bring to the area. Ultimately we turned the conversation to relations with Venezuela. 
The same anti-Federation theme ran through Dr. Williams' response, and he seemed 
to believe that H.M.G. was deliberately encouraging the Federal Government to 
interfere in what he regarded as legitimate Trinidad negotiations with Venezuela, 
notably over the surtax on those Trinidad products that enter that country. He also 
made it clear that he thought that the attitude of the Government of Venezuela was 
unsatisfactory and that the British Embassy in Caracas had done nothing to help 
Trinidad's case, and indeed he suspected that it was conniving with the Venezuelan 
authorities; in the course of this part of the conversation he said that Trinidad had 
turned down a Venezuelan suggestion that she should join O.P.E.C. 
4. I think that we had more (although limited) success in persuading Dr. 
Williams that neither H.M.G. nor the Embassy in Caracas were conspiring against 
him, either with the Federal Government or with the Venezuelans; he asked for a 
paper to be prepared on the Venezuelan attitude towards Trinidad and was told that 
this would be done. 
5. I asked him directly about his Indian trip, and it was apparent from his reply 
that although he was satisfied with his reception, he did not think either that he had 
made much impression on the Indian leaders or that he could expect much help in 
his present political troubles from that quarter. 
6. To conclude I propose to attempt some assessment of this talk, which lasted for 
two hours and which was conducted in an entirely friendly way. Throughout, my own 
approach was that I was only interested in security intelligence in its widest sense. 
Moreover, both my colleagues and I made it clear that we were not there to discuss 
the policies of H.M.G., the American, or indeed the Federal, Governments; our task 
was to introduce and to offer that part of the product of the British intelligence effort 
which might be of value to Dr. Williams; we added that it was up to him to decide 
whether to accept it or reject it. Dr. Williams seemed to accept this approach, and I 
think it accounted for his friendliness. I have no doubt, however, that he expected his 
talk to us to be reported and that to some extent he deliberately sought to create an 
impression. That impression was of a man thoroughly disillusioned with the proposed 
Federal set-up, and entirely hostile to the politicians now operating it. His disillu-
sionment also extended to Mr. Manley, to the British Government, particularly in the 
person of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and to the American Government; 
indeed, he particularly stressed his disquiet at recent manifestations of American pol-
icy in the area. Because of his disillusionment he proposed to take no further part in 
Federal affairs, but to devote himself to Trinidad. He also made it clear that he would 
work against the present Federation wherever it appeared to conflict with the good of 
Trinidad, and he implied that he did not rule out the possibility of Trinidad leaving the 
Federation if it proved inimical to the interests of Trinidad. 
7. In my own view this impression may not be too far away from Dr. Williams' 
real feelings at the present time. In the first place he seemed to speak with 
conviction, but more important, there is no doubt that his whole approach had 
changed since the London Conference. Before that date, although bitterly critical of 
some of the steps being taken, and notably of Federal Ministers, he has always 
seemed to be determined to press on to independence with the best compromise at a 
Federation that could be achieved. I have met him three times since his return from 
London and on each occasion have been struck by how listless and disillusioned he 
seemed; I do not think that it is a pose. 
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158 CO 103113270, no 43A 22 Sept 1961 
'The West Indies': minute (PM(61)73) by Mr Macleod to Mr 
Macmillan on the Jamaican referendum 
[The referendum was held on 19 Sept 1961. Voters were asked: 'Should Jamaica remain in 
the Federation of the West Indies' . The symbol on the ballot paper for a yes vote was a tree, 
for a no vote a bell. 217,319 voted yes, 256,261 voted no (CO 1031/3273, nos 6 and ll).] 
Prime Minister 
The Jamaica referendum has resulted in a defeat for Manley on the Federation issue. 
We expected and hoped for a narrow but clear affirmative. The result is a narrow but 
clear negative. 
2. This is a most grievous blow to the Federal ideal for which we and enlightened 
West Indian opinion have striven for so many years. It is certain that the Federation 
cannot continue in its present form and must be doubtful whether it can survive atall. 
3. The decision of Jamaica to quit the Federation must be taken as final. We may 
expect a demand that they should be allowed to go forward into Independence as a 
separate member of the Commonwealth. In view on the size, population (1.6 
millions) and economic viability of Jamaica this will be a demand which, with the 
precedents of Sierra Leone and Cyprus before us, we could not resist. 1 Whether there 
will have to be a General Election in Jamaica or whether Manley will successfully 
maintain that an adverse vote on this single issue does not constitute a vote of no 
confidence in his Government remains to be seen.2 
4. The question whether a Federation of most or all of the East Caribbean Islands 
can survive the defection of Jamaica depends more on the attitude of Trinidad and 
Tobago than on any other single factor. Dr. Williams (Premier of Trinidad and 
Tobago) made it clear during the West Indies Conference that, if Jamaica left the 
Federation, Trinidad would follow suit since she would not be able or prepared to 
take on the financial burden of "carrying" the Federation. (Jamaica and Trinidad 
1 Briefing Macleod, the CO reminded the S of S of the joint memo agreed with the Jamaican delegation in 
London in Jan 1960 (see 118). The memo did not state that Jamaica would be free to secede but made it 
clear that the UK would not put any obstacles in Jamaica's way and would consider the implications, 
including separate independence. The CO also provided the following (approximate) comparisons, 
requested by Macleod, of per capita incomes of the populations of Jamaica and independent or nearly 
independent countries: Jamaica £130, Greece £115, India £25, Tanganyika £20, Sierra Leone £20- 25 (CO 
1031/3200, no 25, 'Jamaica independence', CO brief forS of S [Sept 1961]). 
2 On 20 Sept Blackburne reported that Manley was in 'remarkably good heart' despite the referendum result 
which the premier viewed with 'complete astonishment', the PNP having been confident of victory. 
Blackburne advised Manley to hold an election in Jamaica as the country needed a government with a man-
date to steer the country to independence. Manley, mindful of the stand he had taken when he called the 
referendum (see 126, note), responded that this would be 'political suicide' for his government unless it 
could first demonstrate some success in the field of independence for Jamaica alone. The following day 
Blackburne reported statements made by Manley and Bustamante. Manley asked the S of S to receive a 
Jamaican government delegation to fix the earliest possible date for independence, before the achievement 
of which a general election would be held. Bustamante stated that Manley had no mandate to hold discus-
sions with the UK on his own; the premier should either hold immediate elections or place the issue before 
parliament. Describing Manley's statement as 'unconstitutional, unparliamentary, a breach of public faith, 
and political trickery at the lowest level', he demanded a joint delegation (CO 1031/3200, nos 1 and 5, inward 
tels nos 90 and 380, Blackburne to S to S, 20 and 21 Sept 1961). The CO resolved to receive Manley first, 
leaving Bustamante to lead a delegation later if he so chose, a decision which the latter hotly contested. 
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contribute about 85% of Federal revenues in roughly equal shares.) If he maintains 
this line, we can expect a demand from Trinidad and Tobago that they too should be 
allowed to "go it alone" into independent membership of the Commonwealth. This 
would be as difficult to resist as a similar demand from Jamaica. 
5. If Trinidad takes this line, it is difficult to see a "rump" Federation of Barbados 
and the smaller islands surviving. Antigua has always taken a pro-Jamaica line and is 
unlikely in any case to continue in a Federation which does not include Jamaica. She 
may well seek some form of association with Jamaica (though whether Jamaica after 
the referendum would be in a position to accommodate her is doubtful). Barbados is 
not very likely to press for independence and is more likely to want to continue as a 
separate self-governing Colony, possibly with some special status. This would leave 
us with six small Windward and Leeward Islands which have no prospect of "making 
independence" alone and all but one of which are budgetarily in the red and 
supported financially by the U.K.-a most dismal prospect. 
6. It is, however, just possible that Trinidad might be prepared to lead an East 
Caribbean Federation-on her terms. Eric Williams has always disliked the pre-
sent loose form of Federation which has been a condition of Jamaica belonging. 
The defection of Jamaica will give him the opportunity to press for the tighter 
form of Federation which he has always advocated, with strong central powers 
over taxation, development planning etc. In return for that he might be prepared 
to make a concession over his earlier stand against the early introduction of free-
dom of movement. This might overcome the prejudice of other Islands against 
continuing in a Federation dominated by Trinidad, since it is on this issue that 
they have been most bitterly critical of Trinidad. On this hypothesis we might sal-
vage a viable Federation which could go forward to independence without 
Jamaica-and relieve us of the prospect of having the smaller islands indefinitely 
on our hands. But Eric Williams will in that case make full use of his strong bar-
gaining position and no doubt demand a handsome financial contribution over the 
early years from H.M.G. on balance. However, it seems more probable that he will 
want to "go it alone." 
7. We cannot, of course, express publicly our regret at the result of the 
referendum since that could embitter our relations with Bustamante if he returns to 
power in Jamaica. Our immediate line with the Press is that it was recognised that 
the Lancaster House Agreement was dependent on the Jamaica referendum and the 
endorsement by Legislatures in other Islands; that we have always regarded the form 
of Federation as a matter for West Indians themselves to settle; and that the 
referendum result is a new factor in the situation the effects of which we are 
studying. 
8. The Americans will be extremely concerned over this development and the 
Foreign Office are sending an assessment to the Foreign Secretary in Washington. 
The Commonwealth Relations Office are also sending guidance to their High 
Commissioner in Ottawa. 
9. I have asked for immediate assessments from the Acting Governor-General 
and Governors and Administrators. Hailes has broken his holiday in Scotland and I 
have held discussions with him. The Jamaican leaders and the Federal Prime 
Minister Sir Grantley Adams wish to come to London at a very early date to confer 
with me. I will report again in a few days on the situation as I see it. 
10. I am sending copies of this minute to the Lord Chancellor, the Chancellor of 
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the Exchequer, the Foreign Secretary, the Commonwealth Secretary, and the 
Minister of Defence.3 
3 Macmillan minuted to Macleod in reply: 'I am so sorry that with all your other worries Jamaica has voted 
wrong. I had a word with Hailes who tells me that he is in close touch with you. When things are a bit clearer 
perhaps you could let me know how you see the future. Meanwhile I suppose this has some bearing upon 
the Immigration Bill on which the Cabinet has still to make a final decision' (CO 1031/3278, no 44, PM's 
personal minute M284/61, 22 Sept 1961). 
159 . CO 103113200, no 35A 25 Sept 1961 
[Jamaican referendum]: letter from Sir K Blackburne to A R Thomas 
on the local situation following the referendum 
With reference to my personal telegram No. 97 of the 23rd of September, I write to 
give you a little background to the proposed visit to London by Manley and his 
Ministers. The position changes so rapidly from hour to hour as the P.N.P. seeks a 
way to re-gain the initiative that some of what I now say may well be changed before 
the delegation reach you; but this little piece of background information may 
perhaps be of some use. 
2. In the first place, there is absolutely no possibility at all of any change in the 
decision to leave the Federation. Apart from the political impossibility of disregarding 
the verdict of the electorate, Manley is himself quite reconciled to the thought of 
"going it alone". But he has certainly not given up all idea of close association. In the 
short term he recognises that the common services must be retained for at least a 
time1 on the basis which existed prior to 1958. In the long term he has told me that 
there can he no change of heart until both political parties have "reasonable" leader-
ship, and that it may now take many years to establish a Federation. 
3. Secondly, Manley has assumed from the outset that Her Majesty's 
Government would grant independence to Jamaica on her own. In this connection 
please see the public statement which he made on the 20th September-my en clair 
telegram No. 380 of the 21st September refers.2 
4. Thirdly, as to timing for independence, Manley at first recognised that it just 
would not be practicable to secure Jamaican independence by May, 1962, but he told 
me a day or so ago that it might just be possible to stick to this date. He recognises 
that Her Majesty's Government may well say that Jamaica cannot have her 
independence until the position in the Eastern Caribbean has been cleared up; but he 
hopes that this will not be so and may press this point very hard. He has been 
thinking in terms of an agreement whereby Jamaica would continue to pay its 
annual contribution to the Federal Government for about a year, and would also 
agree to support certain common services thereafter. It is most important that you 
should remember in your talks with him that the J.L.P. have fi rmly stated their 
demand of independence by the 23rd May, 1962, and that Manley cannot afford to be 
represented in Jamaica as having been a party to slowing the process up. 
5. What is essential in Manley's view is that urgent steps must be taken to 
remove Jamaica from the Federation at the earliest possible moment. 
1 Blackburne added the marginal comment: 'and possibly for ever with B.G. and B.H. coming in with 
Jamaica on a "treaty basis" '. 
2 See 158, note 2. 
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6. Fourthly, Manley accepts the need for a bipartisan approach and will do his 
very best to secure one when he has established by his visit to London that his 
Government is in control. But it will not be easy. He is very bitter about the J.L.P., 
and I must confess that he has fairly good grounds. Some of the J .L.P. leaders are not 
in fact opposed to Federation, and the whole campaign has been fought because 
Bustamante and ,his followers could see no other way of getting back into power. 
Their tactics in the election have not been above reproach, even by local standards. 
Very wild and irresponsible things have been said by J.L.P. leaders and they have 
allowed themselves to lie in the same bed with the racialists like Millard Johnson,3 
and with the Communist group. One of their efforts has been to spread a whispering 
campaign (which was seriously believed by the gullible country people) that the 
"Federal Maple" (the first Federal ship) had arrived in Jamaica loaded with chains to 
re-impose slavery. It may seem incredible to those outside, but the Manley 
supporters in western Jamaica had to deal with this fantastic story quite seriously in 
their meetings. It can all be summed up in words which Manley has written to me:-
''We would not have to deal with Sangster alone who is in a matter of this sort 
by comparison an honourable man. We would have to deal with some of the 
most ruthless and cynical personalities that have emerged in Jamaican politics." 
I think that he refers mainly to Lightbourne and Seaga4-the latter a young member 
of the Legislative Council, recommended to me by Bustamante. 
It is also just worth noting that after the last general election, when the J.L.P. lost, 
there was a tremendous uproar about bogus voting. This time, when their views 
prevailed, there has not been a single suggestion of bogus voting. 
7. The best hope of a successful bi-partisan approach lies in the fact that the 
public of Jamaica may now once again generate some enthusiasm for independence. 
There has been a most marked lack of enthusiasm ever since Jamaica gained internal 
self-government, and indeed the morale and spirit of the country has been on the 
decline for the past few years. There has been little sign of the "national" spirit and 
pride of the years when they were still "fighting" for independence. It is the hope of 
all of us that the new challenge of independence on their own will once again unite 
the country and promote more public spirit and more enthusiasm. As Manley said to 
me yesterday-"Perhaps we can even have a row with the British Government over 
some issue; that will do us all a lot of good out here." 
8. Fifthly, I do not think that Manley will make up his mind finally about the date 
for a general election until he knows the possible date for independence. Many of us 
thought immediately after the Referendum that the P.N.P. would be returned with a 
big majority if they went to the country at once; and I advised Manley to have a 
general election as soon as possible. At first he seemed prepared to face a general 
election this year, but he now thinks otherwise, and is rather more confirmed in his 
views since meeting all his Members of the House of Representatives. He thinks that 
time must be allowed to let the enthusiasm for the victory of the J.L.P. die down. 
3 A local barrister and leader of the People's Political Party which espoused an extreme form of black 
nationalism. Johnson conducted a fiery campaign fo r a no vote in the referendum (see 163). The PPP 
subsequently attracted 5,000 votes at the general election in Jamaica in Apr 1962 but all of its candidates, 
including Johnson, lost their deposits. 
4 E PG Seaga, assistant secretary, JLP, 1960, secretary, 1962; minister of development and social welfare 
in the Bustamante government elected in Apr 1962. 
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Much will depend on the extent to which a bi-partisan approach to the independence 
plans succeeds. So I now feel that he is right to wait a little. Although the "Gleaner" 
made an outright demand for a general election as soon as the results were known, 
and although Bustamante made a somewhat half-hearted demand, public opinion 
seems to be divided; two of the leading Press commentators expressed exactly 
opposite views on this point in the Sunday Gleaner. 
9. Sixthly, I turn to the practical problems-which will obviously be mentioned, 
though only in general terms, when the delegation comes to London. There have 
been virtually no plans made here for Jamaica "going it alone". But working parties 
and committees have already been set up to deal with various issues. Of these the 
most pressing is the future of the West India Regiment. The Brigadier (as always) has 
been most helpful, and he (and Laurence Lindo)5 is now serving on a committee in 
Manley's Ministry to deal with the many urgent problems which arise, such as 
confirmation of the recruitment of staff and the despatch of stores from the United 
Kingdom. As you know, the Federal Government (without consulting the Brigadier) 
has directed a suspension of all these things which means that we may lose the 
United Kingdom staff already earmarked for despatch to the West Indies. By the time 
you receive this letter, I may already have telegraphed to you about this problem. For 
now it is sufficient to say that it is recognised that the aim must be to have one local 
battalion operational and ready to take over when the British troops leave Jamaica. If 
it were possible to take over lock, stock and barrel the existing establishment of the 
West India Regiment that aim could be easily achieved; but if the eastern Caribbean 
component of the West India Regiment were to be required to form the nucleus of a 
force for that area we should be faced in Jamaica with a shortage of more than 300 
men which it would not be possible to correct for a year or so. That shortage would 
have implications for internal security which must be faced and which are being 
brought to the attention of the Cabinet. 
The new situation has made more urgent the formation of a Territorial Regiment 
and plans to push ahead with this are being actively considered. 
10. I fear that this letter is already too long, and some of it may be out of date 
when you receive it. I would only add that we here are all deeply sympathetic with the 
fearful problems which you are facing, and that we recognise (including Manley) that 
our actions in Jamaica will have to be regulated to some extent by developments in 
the eastern Caribbean. How lucky I am not to be working with Eric Williams! 
5 H C Lindo, chief secretary, government of Jamaica. 
160 CO 1032/306, no 316 27 Sept 1961 
[Immigration]: minute by Miss M Z Terry on the discriminatory 
nature of the proposed scheme of control 
I do not propose to comment on the general proposition that immigration from the 
Commonwealth and colonies should be restricted in some way but will limit my 
comments to the proposed scheme of control recommended to Ministers by the 
inter-departmental Working Party. The proposals are designed to meet two separate 
points:-
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(a) the intention is to restrict the numbers of coloured immigrants from the 
Commonwealth and colonies without restricting the numbers of immigrants from 
the white Commonwealth; 
(b) at the same time it is desired to make it publicly apparent that the restrictions 
imposed are non-discriminatory as between white and coloured people and as 
between different Commonwealth and colonial territories. 
The conflict between these objectives is directly responsible for the grave weaknesses 
of the proposals now under consideration. 
2. Were it is not for the desire to make it appear that the policy is non-
discriminatory it would be possible to apply a system of fixed numerical quotas for 
each Commonwealth and colonial territory (linked with a system of short term 
permits for visitors and others not intending to seek employment or take up 
permanent residence). Such a system would be relatively simple to operate in 
practice (on a first come first served basis for each territory with a quota) and there 
would be little difficulty in explaining publicly how it operated. This solution has, 
however, been rejected by the Working Party on the ground that it would make 
clearly apparent the discriminatory intentions of Government policy and would thus 
fail to meet the objective in paragraph l(a). 
3. Another practicable and effective method of applying restrictions would be by 
applying to immigrants from the Commonwealth and colonies the same system of 
control as is applied to aliens. This is based directly on employment permits. This 
has, however, been rejected by the Working Party (against the expressed preference 
of Home Office officials) on two separate scores:-
(i) because it is desired to avoid any measures which would require immigrants 
from the white Commonwealth to submit themselves to the kind of restrictive 
controls involved; and 
(ii) the Ministry of Labour have argued strongly against such a system which they 
say would result in the essential labour needs of this country not being met. 
4. The scheme of control recommended by the Working Party is open to strong 
objections both of principle and of practical application. These are set out in Mr. 
Vile's minute of the 20th July and in the brief which he prepared for Mr. Fraser on 
the 28th July1 which I have brought to the front of the file. These present the 
criticisms with a completeness and a lucidity on which I cannot attempt to improve 
so I will not waste time by recapitulating them here. 
5. In addition to the various criticisms enumerated by Mr. Vile, I would draw 
attention especially to the following weaknesses (which were incidentally touched on 
in my minute of the 22nd September):-
(i) the definition of category (b) which is drawn so wide that it is practically 
meaningless. I criticised this definition at the meeting of the Working Party on the 
25th September and suggested that a more restricted definition should be 
substituted (e.g. the possession of technical or professional qualifications vouched 
for by certificates issued by a recognised authority) . This was opposed by the rest of 
the Working Party, the reason being that category (b) has been included simply in 
1 See 155, which explains the three categories discussed in para 5 of the minute reproduced here. 
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order to enable the Ministry of Labour to grant entry permits to immigrants from 
the white Commonwealth who do not fall into category (a), so that they do not get 
"swallowed up" in category (c) with the mass of coloured immigrants. If the 
definition were given greater precision this would defeat its purpose. I should 
perhaps explain that the existence of category (b) would not be publicly disclosed 
and that there would, of course, be no indication on the entry permit as to whether 
it had been granted under category (a), (b) or (c). Despite this the existence of 
category (b) on the basis of the present very vague definition seems objectionable 
on the following grounds:-
(a) unless the category is used simply as a "blind" for admitting only 
immigrants from the white Commonwealth and for admitting them without 
further question, it will place the Ministry of Labour officials in very obvious 
difficulties in assessing the merits of claims which will be received through the 
post without the corroboration of a local check. The system would make it 
advantageous to individuals to make dishonest claims about their qualifications 
etc. provided they did so with sufficient plausibility; 
(b) again unless the category is used simply as a "blind" for admitting only immi-
grants from the white Commonwealth and for admitting them without further 
question, it will place virtually dictatorial powers in the hands of the officials deal-
ing with individual applications- because they will have been given no guidance 
by Parliament as to the precise interpretation to be placed on the definition; 
(c) because the definition is so vague as to be almost meaningless (the members 
of the Working Party at the meeting on the 25th September admitted that they 
did not know what it meant and that "it could mean different things at different 
times") it would be very difficult indeed for Ministers publicly to defend 
decisions on individual cases which might be challeneged either by questions in 
Parliament or by representations from the Commonwealth and Colonial 
Governments concerned. 
(ii) the Working Party recommend that immigration officials should be given 
powers to admit (or to refuse admission) at their discretion all persons arriving 
without entry permits. These will include the self-employed, bona fides visitors 
and students etc. The Working Party also recommend that no system of 
conditional landings should be adopted in respect of such persons. This seems 
open to great objections:-
(a) it will put a premium on dishonesty on the part of immigrants arriving in 
this way; 
(b) it will place the immigration service in a most invidious and difficult 
position; 
(c) it will risk bringing the law into disrepute by allowing it to be broken with 
impunity; and 
(d) in theory it could operate in such a way as to drive a coach and horses 
through the scheme of control though this is admittedly unlikely. 
6. I do not wish to make unduly heavy weather of the following point but one of 
the gravest objections which I see to the proposed system of control is that it will 
operate not on a basis of clearly defined principles sanctioned by Ministers who are 
answerable directly to Parliament but on the basis of ad hoc decisions given on a host 
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of individual cases by officials operating behind closed doors and not directly 
answerable to Parliament for the decisions given. This kind of procedure seems to me 
extremely distasteful. Even if abuses do not occur there will always be suspicions that 
they do exist. There is an obvious parallel here with the principle that justice must 
not only be done but must be seen to be done. The Home Office representatives at the 
Working Party meeting on the 25th September said in reply to my criticisms that 
there was "no gain without loss" and that one could not achieve the stated objectives 
without getting involved in some difficulties. Some might share my feeling that the 
price of this particular system of control, designed as it is to do one thing while 
publicly claiming that it is doing something rather different, is too high a price to 
pay. 
7. It seems moreover highly questionable whether the recommended system of 
control would in fact achieve both the stated objectives. It would certainly reduce the 
numbers of coloured immigrants coming to this country from the Commonwealth 
and colonies but I do not think it could possibly do this without its becoming apparent 
that the restrictions were directed against "coloured" rather than against "white" 
immigrants. By the end of even the first year it will presumably be apparent that 
the numbers of immigrants from coloured territories have been reduced and that the 
numbers of immigrants from the white Commonwealth have not been so reduced. 
After two or three years this fact would be even more glaringly apparent. Ministers 
would therefore be confronted with precisely the charge (of having adopted a dis-
criminatory policy) which it is the main object of this particular scheme to avoid. This 
means that we shall have got ourselves involved in the recognised difficulties and weak-
nesses of the recommended system (plus its relatively high cost) without avoiding mak-
ing it apparent that the policy is discriminatory-which is the sole objection to the 
administratively simpler "fixed quota" system. 
8. A further difficulty is that even within the coloured territories of the 
Commonwealth and colonies the recommended system would not impose cuts on 
even a roughly proportionate basis. If as stated applications for entry permits from 
those in category (c) are dealt with on a "first come first served" basis, the results 
might well be to impose much heavier percentage cuts on one territory than on 
another. Mr. Vile commented on this point in his minute of the 20th July and 
suggested that it might be difficult for Ministers to explain the reasons for the 
disproportionate nature of the cuts imposed. 
9. Recent developments in the West Indies have made it highly undesirable that 
there should be any public announcement during the next two or three months (and 
until the future of the Eastern Caribbean has become more settled) of the intention 
of Her Majesty's Government to impose restrictions on immigration (see paragraph 6 
of my minute of the 22nd September). This in itself would be an argument for 
postponing any announcement of a decision to adopt the system of control 
recommended by the Working Party. However, because of the very grave weaknesses 
of the recommended system I would hope that we might take the line that any 
restrictions which it may be decided to impose should take the form of some less 
objectionable system e.g. a "fixed quota" system or a system based strictly on 
employment permits as in the case of aliens. A theoretical alternative would be to 
seek the decision that the controls should be applied only to the independent 
Commonwealth and not to the colonies; this seems to me a non-starter however 
since it is primarily immigration from the West Indies which it is desired to reduce. 
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10. The attitude of the Ministry of Labour to the present proposals seems 
equivocal. Having originally said that they were worried about the possible effect of 
large scale coloured immigration on the employment position in the United 
Kingdom, they now seem anxious to ensure that controls are not imposed in such a 
way as to deprive this country of much needed labour. Accordingly there seems a risk 
that if it were decided to impose the recommended system of control the Ministry of 
Labour would subsequently press for the issue of entry permits on a relatively large 
scale. The Treasury seem likely to oppose the proposals, judging by their recent 
paper (the only one in recent months with any hard facts in it) about the economic 
benefit to the United Kingdom of immigration at the current high levels. The C.R.O. 
on the other hand seem anxious that restrictions should be imposed without delay 
and do not appear to harbour any anxieties about the difficulties to which the 
recommended system of control seems likely to give rise. 
161 CO 1013/3278, no 75 28 Sept 1961 
[US policy] : inward telegram no 153 from 1 D Hennings1 to CO on 
'bewilderment' in the State Department at the referendum result and 
the implications for US financial aid 
Foreign Office telegram No. 4081 to New York. 
Following from Colonial Attache. 
I have spoken to State Department as in paragraph 4 of telegram under reference. 
They are both disappointed and bewildered by result of referendum and, beyond 
identifying the various permutations set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the telegram 
under reference,2 have for the moment no suggestions to make but will wait on 
developments. It is likely, as you will probably have surmised, that Americans may 
not be willing to be so forthcoming on matters of aid to the West Indies if the unit 
territories go two or more separate ways to independence since it was the political 
content of Federation that was attractive, particularly to Congress (even though the 
West Indies without Federation will probably require more rather than less aid). 
State Department have already received enquiries from the aid agencies whether $7 
million loan recently granted Federation is now available for reallocation to other 
areas. They have resisted this but the position is that they are on defensive to 
preserve such aid as has already been granted rather than on offensive to secure 
more money. 
1 UK colonial attache in Washington, 1960- 1963. 
2A reference to the options which Macleod had outlined in his minute to Macmillan, see 158. 
162 CO 1031/3280, no 8 29 Sept 1961 
[Trinidad] : letter from Sir S Hochoy to Mr Fraser on Dr Williams's 
reaction to the Jamaican referendum 
In order to bring you up to date with developments at this end as promised, may I say 
firstly that it is with regret that I feel that Mr. Macleod may be waiting in vain for 
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some promising reaction to his message to Dr. Williams?1 The most I expect is a 
reply that the result of the Jamaica referendum calls for careful study and that now 
and for the next few months he and his ministerial colleagues will be occupied 
exclusively with a general elections [sic] campaign. 
Williams' Party held a convention last week-end to consider mainly its candidates 
for the next elections, general and municipal. Without any debate whatever, a 
Resolution relating to the West Indies Federation was adopted in the following 
terms:-
"Be it Resolved 
That this Special Convention expresses its complete satisfaction with the 
handling of the question of a West Indian Federation by its Political Leader up 
to the present moment, and entrusts the future handling of this matter to its 
Political Leader in consultation with such units of the Party as he may see fit, 
and requires him to report to the Party in this matter as soon as it is 
politically proper and wise or in the best interests of the Country so to do, and 
further that there should be no discussion on the topic of Federation until 
after the General Elections." 
All the inference was that the Resolution was in line with Williams' present 
thinking. Indeed Williams is understood to be reading from the Resolution more 
than a few of his closest colleagues. He regards it as an entrustment to him in his 
sole discretion to make decisions on the question without consulting in advance 
even his Cabinet ministers and other Party leaders. 
Williams, as you know, returned in June from the London Conference a very 
sullen, disappointed and bitter man. He was, with much difficulty, restrained from 
making public his account of the Lancaster House deliberations, and his personal 
views also on the conclusions. It was hoped that time would have mollified him, but 
unfortunately this has not been the case. The indication that the United States 
Government was unwilling to finance the College of Arts and Sciences to the full 
extent proposed by him under the Leased Bases Agreement served only to worsen 
this mood and in my personal view the inept handling of this matter by Ivan White 
tended to aggravate a deteriorating situation. 
With his customary flair, Williams has succeeded in convincing himself and some 
of his closest colleagues that the U.S. Government's attitude towards Trinidad has 
altered to accommodate the British policy which is to exert pressure, economic and 
otherwise, on Trinidad and Tobago, the purpose being to compel the acceptance of 
the sort of Federation which resulted from the London talks. Thus there lurks in the 
background of his mind, influencing his every thought, the belief in the revival of the 
conspiracy to keep him in check. 
Now that the Jamaica decision has virtually put an end to a Federation of the West 
Indies, Williams will not forget the criticisms, if not castigations, hurled at him by 
most of the political leaders of the remaining units, if any propositions emanate from 
them, singly or collectively, for some new form of association. 
If I were to hazard a guess, Williams will use his Party's Resolution to shy away 
1 Macleod had sent a message to Williams asking for his views on the referendum result. 
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from consideration of any questions on Federation. It will be only after his return to 
power that he will appear to be prepared to give some thought to that question. 
But, in the meanwhile, he will have determined his course. And to hazard a further 
guess, I think that he will decide to seek Independence for Trinidad and Tobago at 
the earliest possible date and, for appearances only, leaving it open for the other 
territories to make the approach. 
This brings to mind what I understand Williams to have expressed in an aside to 
Mr. Macleod last June. His view was that these Caribbean territories may ultimately 
split into three distinct and independent parts-(1) Jamaica, (2) Trinidad, (3) 
·Barbados, the Windwards and the Leewards. 
But let me advert to the moment. While Williams is content to refrain from any 
public statements, he is not insensible to the full implications of the Jamaica 
decision. He feels that the Federal Government should accept the fact that its powers 
have been extinguished and that it could no longer determine policy for the future, 
so much so that he will refuse to participate in any further conferences sponsored by 
the Federal Government; he holds that the Federal Government should not even 
regard itself as a caretaker Government but at the most [as] "liquidators" and his 
attitude may well be that Trinidad will no longer regard itself as being bound in any 
respect or form to a Federal Authority. 
I trust that I have been able to convey to you the delicate climate which prevails 
here at the moment. It requires very little for the situation to be pushed to the point 
of no return. The china shop has contracted, but unfortunately the bulls are still as 
numerous, at a time when the utmost discretion is imperative. 
I now end on a personal note. I am once more looked upon as a tool of the 
conspirators. 
163 CO 103113709, no 97 Sept 1961 
[Jamaican referendum]: Jamaica intelligence report analysing the 
result [Extract] 
Summary 
The generally unexpected vote in the Referendum against Jamaica's continued 
membership of the Federation has rendered necessary a great deal of re-thinking and 
re-adjustment. There is a mass of urgent work involved in arrangements for 
secession and independence at the earliest possible date. 
Although there were some incidents of hooliganism in the final stages of 
referendum campaign the country is now quiet. 
The Jamaica Labour Party, with others, is pressing for early General Elections. The 
Premier has made it clear that on his return from his present visit to London, 
intended primarily to secure general undertakings with regard to secession and 
independence, he will initiate bi-partisan consideration of constitutional changes 
and of all related matters and that General Elections will be held before 
independence. 
2. The referendum 
(1) In the final three weeks before the referendum the campaigning became most 
intensive. The Premier drove himself hard, devoting three or four days of each week 
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to visits to rural areas and often speaking five times a day. The "Daily Gleaner's" 
section on Federation was filled each day, there were numerous debates and talks 
broadcast by the two radio stations, and certainly there was no lack of expressions of 
views from all sections of the community. It was clear that, generally, the Federation 
cause was supported not only by the People's National Party but by the more 
intelligent and substantial members of the community and that, on the other side, it 
was the rural element which supported the Jamaica Labour Party in its opposition. 
(2) The result came as a surprise to most observers, not excluding many 
prominent members of the Jamaica Labour Party. While it might have been argued 
that the majority against continued association with the Federation would not have 
been sufficient if that majority had appeared on the other side, with 60% of the 
electorate turning out to vote it was certainly enough to make it clear beyond 
argument that the country would have nothing more to do with Federation. It is 
significant that of the 45 constituencies no more than 14 voted in favour and that of 
those 14, 7 were in the urban areas of the parishes of Kingston and St. Andrew. It was 
clear that the rural voters had been finally swayed by lack of knowledge of the subject 
and by fear of the unknown. Further comment on the implications of the result on 
the political scene is made below. 
(3) Sir Alexander Bustamante and his party were elated at the result and obviously 
regarded it as a vote of confidence in themselves. Bustamante himself reacted with a 
great deal of bad taste and his threat to tax the rich who had contributed largely to 
the P.N.P. campaign cannot have done any good in the outside world. The Premier, 
on the other hand, behaved with admirable restraint. Recognising the imperative 
need of securing unity on fundamental issues in the country as early as possible, he 
delivered a most effective broadcast talk a few days later. Shortly before the end of the 
month he left for London, with two other Ministers, for preliminary discussions with 
the Colonial Office. 
(4) The Government has been under considerable pressure from the Opposition 
party and other groups not only to associate them with the present mission to 
London but to hold general elections at an early date and there has been much talk of 
the People's National Party's loss of the people's mandate. The Premier has made it 
clear that as soon as he returns from London he will approach the House of 
Representatives with proposals for bi-partisan consultation on the form of the 
constitution on independence and on all related matters. 
(5) In the closing weeks of the campaign there were several instances of disorder at 
public meetings and there was a good deal of tension in the country. There is now, 
inevitably, a good deal of uncertainty on the future and it is fair to say that the 
changed situation involved in the prospect of early independence in Jamaica on her 
own is by no means yet fully appreciated. But it is also fair to say that, by and large, 
there has been a good deal of settling down and there are responsible voices which 
have been raised in emphasizing the need for deliberation, unity and hard work. The 
Government itself is under no illusions on the magnitude of the task involved in the 
completion of arrangements for secession and for independence itself and a great 
deal of work on the preliminary planning has begun. While it recognises the 
desirability and the need of the preservation of the important links which have been 
already established with the rest of the West Indies it cannot, for political 
considerations, be too forthcoming about these. It has had, for instance, to withdraw 
from the conference proposed for this month on the future of the British West Indian 
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Airways, although it is represented at the Rice Conference. Much will depend on the 
result of the present talks in London. 
(6) As was to be expected, one of the first fears was whether the result of the 
referendum would have an adverse effect on the flow of overseas investment. The 
Premier has been at pains to reassure potential investors that there will be no change 
in the stability of the country. A most encouraging development which occurred only 
a few days after the result was the announcement by the Caribbean Cement Company 
of plans for a large increase in their investment here; negotiations on this had been 
proceeding with the Government for some time. The Industrial Development 
Corporation has emphasized that there is no apparent cause for alarm on this score. 
It is inevitable that there should be some doubts and fears about the future but, 
generally, confidence continues high. 
(7) Bustamante has issued a statement saying that his party is about to prepare 
detailed recommendations on the form of constitution which should be adopted on 
the attainment of independence. It is not impossible that in the present mood of 
confidence on the part of the leading members of the Jamaica Labour Party they will 
seek to make these suggestions on their own and will decline to be associated with 
the bi-partisan consideration which the Premier plans, but it is greatly to be hoped 
that this development will not occur. 
(8) The referendum has had a marked effect on the internal political situation. 
Some months ago, when there was a split in the Jamaica Labour Party at its annual 
general meeting, followed by the resignation of the Chairman (Mrs. Rose Leon), it 
seemed possible that the Party might rapidly become a spent force. Indeed, there 
seemed to be a danger that the absence of an effective opposition would provide a 
favourable climate for the development of an extreme left-wing group, backed by our 
handful of Communists, which would absorb those people who had hitherto drifted 
between the P.N.P. and the J.L.P., buoyed up by the election promises of both parties 
over many years past. The absence of an effective J.L.P. might in particular result in 
disgruntled supporters of the P.N.P. in the last general election joining any group 
which preached racial and class hatred. This was in fact what did occur to some 
extent, and it accounts for such small degree of success as had been attained by 
Millard Johnson and his extreme People's Political Party. 
(9) There are varied opinions as to the part played by the People's Political Party in 
the referendum. It is said (and this is undoubtedly correct) that the pro-federation 
vote in the Kingston area was due in some measure to the fear of the middle and 
upper classes of the effect of the preaching of Millard Johnson and his followers; and 
there is no doubt that during the last few weeks a large number of business and 
promiment people swung in favour of federation as a possible safeguard against 
people like Millard Johnson securing power in Jamaica. It is said that Millard 
Johnson had a considerable effect on ignorant people in the country districts, not so 
much because they supported his racialist and class attacks but because he generated 
a fear of the unknown. 
(10) The preliminary assessment of the internal political changes as a result of the 
referendum may be summarised as follows:-
The Jamaica Labour Party has gained tremendous prestige, particularly among 
the working people of the country. Once again Bustamante has been shown as the 
almost magical and infallible master figure of the country. Once again the Party has 
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shown that it is a force of which serious account must be taken. At the same time the 
Party has lost its previous influential position with many capitalists who previously 
supported it because of their fear of the leftish policies advocated by the P.N.P. before 
they came to power. Discouraged by the failure of the J.L.P. to provide an effective 
opposition for a long time past, frightened by the fact that the J.L.P. and the P.P.P. 
were campaigning on the same anti-Federation theme, and reassured by the actions 
of the P.N.P. over the past six years in power that the P.N.P. does not represent a 
threat to capitalism and individual enterprise, capitalists have come to realise that 
their future will be far safer in the hands of the P.N.P. In short, the J.L.P. has become 
the main outlet for those who are unemployed, without houses, and without hope for 
the future-for the underdogs. 
(11) The Peoples [sic} Politica!Party under Millard Johnson had some successes 
before the referendum; it claims to have some 5,000 paying members. But there is 
every reason to suppose that the main reason for their existence will vanish if the 
J.L.P. fulfills its present promise of being the champion of the underdog. Moreover 
Millard Johnson has made little impact on the Rastafarians, and there are signs of a 
split in the leadership within his party. Although he will undoubtedly continue to 
make a great noise, and although he is a potential source of danger inasmuch as he 
may prompt violent action which would not be countenanced by the leaders of the 
two main parties, in the long term his movement is unlikely to develop greatly if the 
J.L.P. maintains its present strength and comparative unity. 
(12) The Peoples [sic} National Party now finds itself in a very different position 
than when it came to power in 1955 on a strong socialist ticket. Because of the fear 
that a J.L.P. government under Bustamante would not be able to provide efficient 
government, because of fear of the racialist and class movements started by Millard 
Johnson (and accepted tacitly by Bustamante during the referendum campaign), and 
because of respect for the work of the present government, and particularly of 
Manley himself, nearly all thoughtful people in the country now support the P.N.P., 
including most leading businessmen. This movement can in fact harm the P.N.P. 
which is being criticized by some as being "the party of the rich." Indeed, 
considerable harm was done to the cause of the P.N.P. and of Federation by the 
widely publicised efforts of the Hon. Abe Issa1 to secure a pro-Federation vote. 
Bustamante has not been slow to take advantage of this trend. 
(13) The P.N.P. also suffers from two other disadvantages which undoubtedly had 
an effect on the referendum and will have an effect in the coming general election. 
(14) In the first place there is a widespread fear among the thinking members of 
the community that Mr. Wills Isaacs, the stormy and unpredictable Minister of Trade 
and Industry, would become Premier if Manley is no longer available. There is no 
doubt that some people voted against Federation because they did not wish to see 
Manley leave Jamaica. In the long term the P.N.P. is undoubtedly vulnerable since so 
much depends on the personal leadership of Manley, and one of the reasons which 
has prompted Manley to remain in politics after the loss of his referendum campaign 
is undoubtedly his fear that the party might well lose considerable support if he is 
not available to lead it. 
(15) Secondly, there is no doubt that the P.N.P. has lost contact with the poorer 
members of the population. Their policy has been to promote development as quickly 
1 A E Issa, industrialist and financier; member of Jamaican Legislative Council, 1958-1961. 
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as possible and to encourage outside investment in the hope that the rise in the 
general economy would automatically raise the standard of life for all. They have 
therefore devoted much attention to wooing the capitalist and to undertaking 
grandiose projects at the expense of neglecting the problems of the under-privileged. 
There has been widespread criticism, for example, of the Negri! Development 
Scheme (£1,600,000) and of the National Stadium (£855,000) which were 
undertaken before an all-out drive was made to tackle the slum problems of Kingston 
and elsewhere. At the end of last year the P.N.P. belatedly realised the effect of their 
policies and drew up an emergency plan of campaign for unemployment relief and 
housing; but progress has so far been slow since, mainly owing to Manley's 
preoccupation with Federation, the programme has not been pursued with the 
necessary energy. 
(16) There is no doubt that, if the P.N.P. is to be assured of winning the coming 
general election, it will have to make clear by a re-orientation of its policy and by 
positive action that it is not merely the supporter of the rich but still represents the 
interests of the underdog. An active policy of closer association with, and possible 
migration to, Africa is one possibility which the P.N.P. leaders have in mind. But they 
will almost certainly have to take positive steps- at the risk of temporarily 
antagonizing the upper segment of the community- to lower the cost of living for 
the poor, and to speed up the slum clearance and housing programme .... 
164 CO 1032/306 4 Oct 1961 
[Immigration]: minutes by Sir H Poynton and Mr Macleod on the 
timing of the proposed legislation 
Secretary of state 
I have now seen the minutes of the Commonwealth Migrants Committee recorded 
at (323). I suppose it is inevitable that legislation of this kind should be introduced 
and I must say at once that I am not at least worried about the provisions which 
relate to deportation of Commonwealth citizens convicted of certain offences. I am 
not indeed all that worried about the introduction of control of immigration in itself 
but there are frankly two points which worry me very much about the pattern of the 
legislation and its timing. So far as the pattern is concerned I realise that legislation 
on the lines of the Bill at present in draft can be defended against any charge of 
discrimination, either as between "dependent" and "independent" Commonwealth 
citizens or as between white and coloured, but the method of control proposed puts 
enormous powers of administration discrimination into the hands of the officials of 
the Ministry of Labour in the issue of permits for jobs and I fear that we shall never 
escape criticism that a piece of legislation ostensibly non-discriminatory is being 
operated in a discriminatory manner. It reminds me very much of the long and 
difficult history we have had about the control of Indian immigration into East Africa 
where the legislation on paper is impeccable but its whole purpose is to discriminate 
against Indians. 
As regards the timing I fully accept the point made in your manuscript note at 
(322) that a Bill of this importance would have to be mentioned in The Queen's 
speech. We shall I think have to inform all the Colonial Governments confidentially 
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in advance about this but I should not expect it to provoke a great deal of excitement 
except in regard to the West Indies and possibly Malta.1 The telegrams which will 
have to go to the West Indies will have to be rather specially drafted and I am sure 
that we ought to tell the Federal and all Unit Governments quite apart from what you 
might say orally to Mr. Manley in the next day or two. 
In the minutes of the Ministerial Committee you are on record as saying that it was 
no longer necessary to hold up the Government's decision on account of constitu-
tional developments in the West Indies and you referred to the Jamaica decision to 
withdraw from the West Indies Federation. I am not quite sure what you had in mind 
when you said that Jamaica would soon be able to cooperate as an independent coun-
try in the working of the proposed scheme since, as I see it, the scheme will be worked 
entirely by the United Kingdom Government. But what is worrying me more than this 
is the likely effect on the possibility of preserving an Eastern Caribbean Federation 
built around Trinidad. I think we have all felt that on present form Trinidad would be 
reluctant to shoulder the burden of the smaller territories without Jamaica's help and 
that the smaller territories would be unwilling to come into a Federation dominated 
by Trinidad unless Dr. Williams can be knocked off his perch about freedom of move-
ment between the islands. It will be even more difficult to persuade him to change his 
heart on this matter if some three weeks before the Trinidad elections it has been 
announced in The Queen's speech here that the U.K. Government is for the first time 
intending to introduce restrictions on immigration from other parts of the 
Commonwealth. I would have thought that this was an important factor in reaching 
a final decision whether to go ahead with this legislation or not. 
I imagine that Ministers will be hard pressed during the Conservative Party 
Conference to make some announcement of Government policy in this matter. I do 
very much hope that this can be avoided particularly as the Cabinet have not yet 
taken a decision because obviously it would be quite impossible to catch up any such 
statement by telegrams to the West Indies and other Governments before the damage 
was done. 
So far as the immediate problem of your talk with Mr. Manley is concerned the 
suggested synopsis in Mr. Watt's minute of the 3rd October seems about right. 
A.H.P. 
4.10.61 
1. I will talk privately to Manley after the meeting tomorrow on the lines of Mr. 
Watts' minute. 
2. Mr. Butler will be speaking at the Conference. He is bound to say that the 
Government is not averse to legislation, but will not I imagine actually say that the 
Bill will be in the Queen's Speech. If he tried to say less than this he would certainly 
be defeated by the Conference, and the legislation would then appear to have been 
produced in response. That would be far worse. 
3. The point about Jamaica and the Federation generally is that now the 
referendum is over no new event of final significance is going to arrive before the 
Queen's Speech. 
1 Ministers were considering cuts in defence expenditure in Malta which, if implemented, would lay off a con-
siderable number of Maltese workers. The CO anticipated that Anglo-Maltese relations would be 'aggravated 
greatly' if, at the same time as the defence cuts were announced, the Maltese became aware of the UK decision 
to control immigration (CO 1032/306, no 329, 'Commonwealth migrants', CO brief forS of S, Oct 1961). 
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4. I detest the Bill and am painfully aware of its imperfections. But it is wiser to 
do it now than to wait.2 
I. M. 
4.10.61 
2 Under the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962, intending immigrants to Britain from the 
Commonwealth and colonies had to be in possession of a job voucher in one of three categories: A. those 
with specific jobs to come to, B. those having specified skills, and C. those coming to Britain to seek work. 
165 CO 103113200, no 51 9 Oct 1961 
[Jamaica]: letter from D Williams to Sir K Blackburne on the 
discussions in London with Mr Manley on secession and independence 
[Briefing Macleod for his meetings with Manley the CO explained: 'Our main object in the 
discussions with the Jamaican ministers must be to gain t ime to enable the other West 
Indian islands to formulate plans which will keep the rest of the Federation in being. The 
principal unknown factor is the attitude of Dr. Eric Williams .. . and he has made it plain 
that he will not make known his views on Federation until after his elections which may 
be held some time in November, but which constitutionally he could delay until February 
1962. We should aim to secure that nothing emerges from our talks with the Jamaicans 
which might stimulate Trinidad-or indeed any other territory-to follow Jamaica's lead. 
It is suggested that, with this object in view, Ministers in dealing with Mr. Manley can 
take a pretty tough line. Many months have been spent in negotiating a form of 
Federation which might be acceptable to Jamaica, and Jamaica has now rejected it, 
thereby raising serious problems for its partners in the Federation. Jamaica ought 
therefore to appreciate that we and the others must be given ample time to solve the 
difficulties her action has caused' (CO 1031/3200, no 34, draft brief forS of S, Sept 1961). 
Prior to his meetings with Manley, Macleod held discussions in London with Adams and 
federal ministers. Adams maintained that federation would continue and that now was 
the time to press for a more acceptable formula on freedom of movement. He thought 
that Williams would be able to keep Trinidad in if he could point out that the new 
federation would be modelled on his Economics of Nationhood; this would appeal to 
Williams's 'vanity'. The federal prime minister's advice to the CO was to give Trinidad no 
grounds for assuming that it too could secede and achieve separate independence. He felt 
sure that Williams would try to avoid federation becoming an issue at the forthcoming 
elections in Trinidad. Replying Macleod doubted that federation could be avoided at the 
Trinidad elections; Williams would be forced to declare himself. The secretary of state also 
argued that no one should cherish any illusions about Trinidad's inability, on financial or 
any other grounds, to go it alone. Trinidad might be prepared to consider a closer knit 
federation but Macleod questioned whether this would be acceptable to the other islands. 
If Trinidad was prepared to contemplate such an arrangement, it might be possible to 
persuade Trinidadians to modify their stand on freedom of movement as part of the price 
(CO 1031/3278, no 66, record of meeting, 26 Sept 1961).] 
You will have seen the records of Manley's first meeting with the Secretary of State 
and the officials' discussions which I sent you last week and, no doubt, Manley will 
have given you an account of the outcome of his visit to London. There is, therefore, 
but little new I can tell you; this letter will of necessity be largely concerned with the 
position as seen through our eyes. 
In the first place, as the communique makes clear, there was no dispute at all 
regarding Jamaica's withdrawal from the Federation and its ability to "go it alone". 
Manley, with local political considerations in mind, did propose that a firm date-
31st May-should be agreed upon for independence but I doubt whether he ever 
thought that a really feasible proposition. In the event he agreed to independence as 
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early as is practicable in 1962, the actual date being agreed upon at the independence 
conference in January or February. The avoidance of naming Jamaica's independence 
day at this stage is very satisfactory to us since it avoids prejudicing events in the 
Eastern Caribbean. Had a date been decided upon it might have stimulated Williams 
to "go it alone" also, so as not to be left behind by Jamaica. As it is, we still do not 
know whether Trinidad will continue with the Federation (although Hochoy is at 
present of the opinion that Trinidad may follow Jamaica's lead) and the Manley talks 
have done nothing to upset the present status quo (if I may call it that) in the Eastern 
Caribbean. It would be less than fair to Manley if I did not mention that he 
appreciates our difficulties there and is genuinely concerned to do or say nothing 
that might increase the problems. 
It would perhaps be true to say that in exchange for giving way on the 
independence date point, Manley sought and got an assurance that Jamaica secession 
would be achieved as soon as possible. This boiled down to a fairly firm undertaking 
by the Secretary of State that the necessary legislation would be passed by the end of 
March. We are naturally anxious not to present the secession Bill to Parliament until 
we have some indication as to whether any other units wish to follow Jamaica's 
example since clearly Parliament would look with displeasure on a series of secession 
Bills! We hope, however, to know with some certainty what the other units intend to 
do by January or at the latest February and draft the necessary legislation 
accordingly. 
We reached agreement at the official level on the interim arrangements for the 
regional services and at the meeting between the Secretary of State and Manley last 
Thursday those were confirmed. I should, however, mention one matter-defence. 
This is a problem to which Manley attaches considerable importance, as do we, and 
he is clearly concerned that Jamaica should have an adequate force at independence. 
He did ask that the British garrison should if necessary remain in Jamaica for a short 
period after independence while the Jamaican force was being built up to full 
strength and trained. We were fairly non-committal on this and suggested that he 
discuss the future of the West India Regiment with the Federal Government to see 
whether suitable arrangements could be made for a division of the Regiment between 
Jamaica and the Eastern Caribbean. If, however, it proves impossible to make 
suitable arrangements for Jamaica's security by independence day, then we shall 
have to consider the matter further. For the present however we would prefer that it 
should not be assumed that the British garrison will remain; indeed there would be 
very considerable difficulties in agreeing to such a course. 
This brings me to the practical problems involved in Jamaica's secession and how 
they might best be resolved. The Federal Government have not yet been told for-
mally of the Jamaica decision and Manley has agreed to arrange for this to be done 
and, at the same time, to propose that the effects of Jamaica's secession should be 
considered by working parties on which Jamaica, Federal and, possibly other Unit 
Governments should be represented. The chances are that there will be two or pos-
sibly three working parties: one concerned with defence arrangements which could 
most conveniently meet in Kingston since the Caribbean Area Headquarters are in 
Jamaica, and second to consider the immediate and perhaps long term future of the 
regional services and reach agreement on them which in the case of any long term 
solutions proposed would be subject to the confirmation of the Jamaica 
Government after the coming general elections. There is a possibility that there 
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might be a third working party to consider the future of the U.C.W.I. and its pro-
posed charter. Manley said he was most anxious to retain the regional character of 
the University College and we for our part will certainly do all we can from here to 
assist in this aim as, indeed, we shall in respect of the other regional services. We 
should be grateful if you could arrange for a formal despatch to issue to the 
Governor-General as quickly as possible containing the formal notification of 
Jamaica's wish to withdraw and proposing the joint consultative machinery to sort 
out the resulting problems. In view of Federal susceptibilities we think it desirable 
for the Jamaica Government to make as few public statements as possible about 
secession and its consequences. 
We hope to send you by tomorrow's bag the record of the second and final meeting 
with the Secretary of State so I will not attempt to record here the other points on 
which agreement was reached. To sum up the discussions, however, I would say that 
it is clear to us that Manley is determined to carry out the wishes of the electorate as 
expressed in the referendum and withdraw Jamaica from the Federation as quickly as 
possible. On the other hand, there is no doubt but that he is very disappointed at the 
result and is still, at heart, a firm believer in Federation. While his aim may not now 
be achieved for many years he is anxious not to do anything that might tend to 
isolate Jamaica from the Eastern Caribbean and make it more difficult than it need 
be for Jamaica to join with the other territories. To that end he is determined to 
maintain as many as possible of the present links with the Eastern Caribbean in the 
form of continued Jamaican participation in the regional services. Politically it would 
however be impossible for him to attempt to take any steps at present that could be 
interpreted as a wish to continue any form of association, however tenuous, with the 
remainder of the Federation. Bustamante will doubtless be on the look out for any 
such moves on Manley's part and will not .fail to use such evidence in the 
forthcoming general elections. 
Harking back to the present uncertainty in the Eastern Caribbean and the 
doubts as to the future of the Federation without Jamaica, you are, I am sure, very 
conscious of the repercussions that the Jamaican decision may have, particularly 
on Trinidad. As it is, from what we have heard, it is apparent that the Federal Civil 
Service is generally apprehensive about the future and an outright statement by 
Jamaica to give employment to Jamaican Federal civil servants would have a fur-
ther unsettling effect. Manley has undertaken to make a reassuring statement to 
the effect that the Jamaica Government, with the other Governments, will ensure 
that Federal servants, non-Jamaicans as well as Jamaicans, are fairly treated. This 
should go a long way to relieve uncertainty and at the same time do nothing to 
encourage Jamaicans to desert the Federal Service while the future is admittedly 
uncertain. It is important that Jamaican Ministers should be restrained from say-
ing or doing anything that might tend to aggravate an already delicate situation. I 
hope that you will do your utmost to exercise a restraining influence on them and, 
in particular, prevent any provocative statements or actions on their part. It is vital 
that during the next few months nothing should be done that in any way assumes 
or implies that the future of the Federation-or indeed its dissolution-is a matter 
for anyone other than the territories concerned or is in any way a foregone 
conclusion. 
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i 66 CO 10311337 4, no 1 31 Oct 1961 
'Federation in the Caribbean: predictions and possibilities': memo-
randum by G W Jamieson 
[This was the first of what became several attempts by the CO to assess what 
arrangements might be made in the East Caribbean following the Jamaican referendum. 
A further assessment, prepared for Maudling, the new S of S who visited the West Indies 
in Jan 1962, argued that there were more possibilities for the small islands than those 
described by Jamieson in the memo reproduced here. These were (I) a federation of eight 
(or seven or six, according to how many became satellites of Trinidad) .comprising 
Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands; (2) a federation of the Leewards and 
Windwards without Barbados; (3) a reversion to the pre-1960 administrative grouping, 
with Barbados on its own and the Leeward and Windward groups under their own 
separate governors, each of the two groups federating or even forming unitary states; (4) 
complete balkanisation with the only common factor being an official appointed from the 
UK to exercise political oversight over the small islands but with provision also being 
made for the maintenance of regional services; (5) under options 1-3 Barbados might 
seek independence but would probably be satisfied, at least for a time, with an internal 
self-government arrangement along Singapore/Malta lines (none of the individual 
Leeward or Windward islands should be allowed to proceed this far). The advice of the CO 
was to pursue a federation of nine but if necessary to accept a federation of eight on 
condition that much greater powers and resources were given to the central government 
than those envisaged under the Lancaster House agreement. Whatever option was 
adopted, the UK would have to subsidise it 'for a very long time ahead .. . this burden will 
have to be faced whatever political solution is found for these territories. It is a choice 
between (i) feeding the beggars and being ultimately responsible for their total condition 
(and misdeeds) and (ii) feeding the beggars' (CO 1031/3374, no 2, CO brief for Maudling, 
Jan 1962) .] 
Attitudes in the West Indies 
1. Now that Jamaica is out, any forecast of whether the Nine are likely to agree to 
any future political association must be based on what is known, or can be surmised, 
about the attitude of the various parties:-
(a) Federal Government. Most of the federal ministers are hostile to Trinidad. 
They are now simply clinging to power for its own sake and are fearful of losing 
their positions in a Trinidad-dominated association of the Nine. They are much 
more likely to support and work for a federation of the Eight. 
(b) Trinidad. There are two points of view within the P.N.M. (which we assume 
will win the election in December). One view is that Trinidad should "go it alone"; 
she could then enjoy a prosperous and stable future without the burden of poor, 
importunate and troublesome satellites. Others believe that Trinidad has a duty to 
the rest of The West Indies, and that anyway the other islands might prove markets 
for Trinidad's industries. Both these forces are believed to be present in Dr. 
William's [sic] own thinking. He must also be calculating whether he could still 
count on winning a majority of the votes in a wider grouping. This is likely to be a 
crucial factor in his calculations. If Dr. Williams does negotiate, we understand he 
will insist on a unitary or near-unitary state. He will also insist that the United 
Kingdom should underwrite the economic development of the small islands. In 
any event Dr. Williams may well take the view that as any federal negotiations are 
likely to be lengthy, and as there is in any case no guarantee that they will succeed, 
Trinidad should therefore proceed to separate independence about the same time 
as Jamaica without prejudice to the continuation of the negotiations. This would, 
of course, give Trinidad considerable bargaining and psychological advantages. 
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She would treat with the United Kingdom as an equal, and with the small islands 
as a superior. 
(c) Barbados. It is hard to imagine the parochial Barbados Government, already 
suspicious and fearful of Trinidad domination, agreeing to any serious diminution 
of their local autonomy. Sir Grantley Adams' baleful influence is strong and 
Barbados is to a considerable extent still his pocket borough. 
(d) The Leewards and Windwards. Their political leaders are undoubtedly 
determined to cling to as much autonomy as possible. They have already seen the 
promise of the happy land of full internal self-government. They are most unlikely 
to agree to anything less. Most of them are largely swayed by calculation of their 
own positions. Certainly some will reckon it better to stay as colonies, enjoy 
internal self-government (which they believe is altogether in the bag) rather than 
be cut down to size in a new association dominated by a devil they don't know in 
the shape of Trinidad. Some at least would look more favourably on a federation of 
the Eight than an association, or union, of the Nine. 
The probability is that the Nine will fail 
2. Weighing all these attitudes it seems extremely unlikely that the Nine will 
be able to agree on a new political association. Even if Trinidad negotiates (which 
is in itself doubtful) her terms are likely to be rejected by most, if not all, the 
others. 
The problems this raises for us 
3. If the above analysis is correct the following questions have to be considered:-
(a) How vital a United Kingdom interest is it that there should be an association of 
the Nine? 
(b) What can Her Majesty's Government do to bring it off? 
(c) Alternatively, if this fails, should we encourage the Eight to federate? 
How vital a United Kingdom interest is it that there should be an association of the 
Nine? 
4. Clearly it would suit us if the Nine came together and became independent. 
In this way we could honourably and decently cut our colonial commitment in 
the Caribbean (which is an aim in itself in a world where the control of colonies 
daily becomes more unfashionable and embarrassing). It would please the 
Americans and Canadians and such other Commonwealth countries as take an 
interest in the West Indies. But it cannot be claimed that any really vital United 
Kingdom interest is at stake. It would be irritating, but not disastrous if Barbados 
and the small islands are left on our hands. We could reasonably claim that we 
did our best to give them independence in the federation, the break-up of which 
was not our fault. 
What can Her Majesty's Government do to bring it off? 
5. There seem to be three main kinds of approach that are possible:-
(a) Mixture as before. Our line with the Ten was benevolent readiness to give 
advice, issue suitable if rather anodyne exhortations and encouragement, hold the 
necessary conferences at times and places to suit them, and act generally and, on 
request, as ringmaster. Such an approach is unlikely to achieve anything in the 
present situation. 
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(b) A promise of unpleasantness to the small islands. We might seek to convince 
the small islands that if they remain colonies Her Majesty's Government will be so 
beastly to them that they would be better off under Trinidad. We could give them 
to understand that full internal self-government was not now going to come for a 
very long time, if ever; that the financial screws were to be tightened till they hurt; 
and that their administrations were to be subjected to a much greater scrutiny and 
direct oversight than in recent years. This, however, would involve convincing the 
small island politicians, who see the Colonial Office as a "paper tiger", that Her 
Majesty's Government "means it". This might be difficult. But if Her Majesty's 
Government did follow this policy and show them that we meant business we 
might soon reap a harvest. We would probably be faced very quickly with security 
situations. There would be widespread accusations that we were turning back the 
clock in the Caribbean. We would find ourselves in danger of seriously damaging 
our posture as an enlightened colonial power at the United Nations. The present 
political leaders, horrors though they are, might be replaced by new men even 
worse, and probably more extreme. One would not know quite where it would all 
end. Finally, Dr. Williams is unlikely to want unwilling or restless satellites. There 
is the recent sad fate of the United Arab Republic; and press-ganged small islands 
are unlikely to want to keep him in power. He might not therefore at all welcome 
our resorting to such a policy. United Kingdom ministers, who would have to have 
all these considerations put before them before it was applied, would be unlikely to 
endorse such a potentially dangerous policy. 
(c) A promise of long term aid. We could make an offer of continuing aid over a 
period of years (both block-grant and development) which would make it worth 
Trinidad's while to have the small islands and convince the small islands 
themselves that they will be "looked after". This might have to be accompanied by 
hints (not threats!) to the small islands that this was the only way to get such a 
volume of aid. If we could associate the Americans and Canadians this offer could 
be made that much the handsomer. Unfortunately it would be optimistic to reckon 
on the continuation of pound-for-pound formula from the Americans in the new 
situation. On the other hand it will be impossible for the United Kingdom alone to 
come up with any offer remotely approaching Dr. Williams' figures . We had 
envisaged a financial settlement with the Ten on the following lines:-
Grant-in-Aid 
The balance of the £8.75 millions block grant for 1959/63 plus further block 
grant tapering from about £1.75 millions for 1964 down to £0.5 millions for 
1968. 
Development 
The Colonial Development and Welfare balance and a promise of a 
Commonwealth Assistance Loan of £5 millions. This would enable development 
spending to run at about £3 millions a year until about 1965/66. 
But even this might have proved vulnerable to Treasury pressures in the present 
balance of payments situation and external aid ceiling. Even had we been able to 
make our offer as we hoped Dr. Williams would have regarded these sums as 
totally inadequate. He has argued that the United Kingdom should guarantee the 
West Indies much larger sums. For the first ten years he would expect£71 millions 
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(development and grant-in-aid) which is several times what we hoped to be in a 
position to offer.1 It is, therefore, impossible that we can make any offer that has 
any chance of being effective unless we can associate the Americans and Canadians 
with it. Whether we should work towards a joint approach on these lines is a vital 
policy question. 
Alternatively, should we encourage the Eight to federate? 
6. Once it becomes clear that there is no chance of there being any association of 
the Nine, we may be faced with proposals for a federation of the Eight. (Though the 
pattern may repeat itself; it might then be Barbados who felt she was being made to 
carry the small islands and, following Jamaica's and Trinidad's example, refuse the 
honour.) What should our attitude be? Apart from the great inconvenience we would 
suffer if we had to start from scratch and rebuild completely new political 
arrangements in the Eastern Caribbean (some of which e.g. the re-introduction of a 
Governorship for the Leewards and/or Windwards, could be politically difficult), I 
suggest that the main consideration must be whether such a federation would be 
able in the foreseeable future to achieve independence. One should not assume that 
this is impossible. The population of the Eight (700,000) is larger than that of Cyprus 
(550,000) and British Guiana (558,000) and not much less than that of Trinidad 
(780,000). Their total annual governmental revenue (£12 millions) is higher than 
that of Sierra Leone (£11.2 millions) and British Guiana (£10 millions) . Their 
national income per head is considerably larger than many other territories which 
have already achieved, or are reckoned to qualify for, independence. It is perhaps not 
so much their size, poverty and lack of revenues that would prevent the Eight from 
going on to independence, as lack of political will to sacrifice for this end and run 
their affairs on less Heath Robinson lines than at present. 
7. An independent federation of the Eight would, of course, not be financially 
self-sufficient for a number of years, if ever. This, unfortunately, is likely to be the 
position of other territories coming up for independence (e.g. in East Africa) and one 
simply cannot say that financial viability is the same sine qua non for independence 
as it was a few years ago. 
8. Even if we continue to give them grant-in-aid and development aid at the 
present level, could the Eight afford to run a federal machine? The annual 
expenditure of the present federation is about $13 millions, but the contribution of 
the Eight is only about $2 millions.2 However, under the arrangements agreed at 
Lancaster House for the independent Ten, the Eight would have had to contribute 
approximately $4-5 millions a year after independence. An examination of the 
present federal estimates points to it being possible for the Eight to meet the cost of a 
much reduced federal budget within this sum. They would, of course, have to be 
content with a much smaller central administrative machine than the present one; 
they could not afford any full-time defence force; their overseas posts would be very 
small; but they would nevertheless be able to make pro rata contributions to such 
regional services as University College of the West Indies, the teaching hospital, the 
shipping corporation and the meteorological service. 
1 The composition of this figure is set out in detail in the paper "Dr. Williams [sic] probable conditions for 
an Eastern Caribbean Federation" being separately circulated. 
2 Figure based on their share of levy being $1.64 millions plus element of currency profits. 
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9. Looking further ahead to independence they would eventually have to provide 
for the cost of defence and external affairs. This need not be too much; possibly not 
more than an additional $1 million a year. The lack of any regular military force does 
not seem to be delaying early independence for British Guiana. I gather Dr. Jagan 
hopes to depend on the O.A.S. for defence. The Eight might do the same. For internal 
security their existing volunteer units, a very small full-time gendarmerie (say, one 
or two companies) and a few patrol boats would be ample. Their external affairs 
service would have to be correspondingly modest. 
10. It is arguable that there is no point in trying to launch such a frail barque 
upon the international seas, especially as we shall have to continue supporting it 
financially at pretty well the same level as had they remained colonies. I suggest that 
there may be political advantages in giving independence even if it does not save a 
penny. The point has already been made that the position of of colonies will become 
increasingly difficult in the years ahead. We are already having a rough time at the 
United Nations. Moreover, these particular colonies are likely to be troublesome, 
importunate and a source of all kinds of minor scandals which will have to be 
explained away as long as Her Majesty's Government retain sovereignty. Although it 
may at first sight sound cloud cuckoo-land to talk about an independent Eight I 
suggest it would be unwise to rule this out completely as a possibility. If there is not 
to be a Nine, it might be possible to achieve an Eight. If this grouping could, a few 
years hence, achieve independence, it might be in the United Kingdom's interest to 
foster it. 
167 CO 103113278, no 129 1 Nov 1961 
[Small territories]: letter from Lord Hailes to A R Thomas on the 
need for a 'much tougher line' with the small territories 
I did not write last week because there was really nothing to report. A stillness 
pervades everything. However, Arthur Lewis returns from his tour of all the 
territories today, and then we shall have something to bite on. There is much gossip 
but there are no real straws in the wind. The only activity needless to say, is that 
Adams is shooting his mouth in a manner not to please Williams, and La Corbiniere 
[sic] is secretly-as he thinks- canvassing the merits of "The Eight" solution. 
Looking into the crystal it seems to me that a much tougher line will have to be 
taken with the small territories in the future if anything is to be salvaged. They 
clearly think that whatever happens, they will be comfortably cushioned by the 
United Kingdom, and this is more important to many-including Adams-than 
Independence. Perhaps they may have to be threatened with United Nations 
Trusteeship? That would make them sit up, and perhaps make them think more 
kindly of association with Trinidad. 
I attach a copy of a broadcast I made on Sunday to "The Nine" .1 It went down well I 
hear. I longed to be much more outspoken, but there is no point in throwing caps to 
fit anyone-at this stage. 
1 Not printed. 
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168 CO 1031/3278, no 145A 10 Nov 1961 
[East Caribbean]: letter from Lord Hailes to Mr Maudling on 
Professor A Lewis's proposals for a unitary state in the East Caribbean. 
Annex: note by Lewis of his meetings with Dr Williams 
Lewis who has now returned to Jamaica has produced his Report, and I enclose a 
copy.1 Yesterday he discussed it with the Federal Cabinet. Attached also is a note of 
his talks with Williams over the period 22nd September-8th November. 
Lewis' scheme was drawn up after he had visited the Leeward and Windward 
Islands and Barbados. He thinks that apart from Barbados, where attitudes are 
confused, it will be generally acceptable to Units. The scheme departs radically from 
anything previously put forward. In essence it suggests a unitary type of 
constitution-though to use this label would be little short of lethal as far as the 
small units are concerned-with a measure of devolution to local legislatures in a 
limited field of matters, chiefly Medical and Educational-both with heavy central 
subsidies-Agriculture and Social Services. Centralised services include Customs 
Excise and Inland Revenue, Post Offices, Ports, Police, Courts, Prisons, Broadcasting 
etc. The central Government would be financed from 70% of customs duties 
collected, and a 3/- in the£ company tax. It provides for a Customs Union with both a 
free trade area and a common external tariff, freedom of movement-possibly on a 
graduated basis-and representation in the Central Parliament based on the IGC 
formula. Territorial Governments and establishments are to be cut down, with the 
abolition of governorships and restrictions on the number of Ministers. 
You will see that this is a surprisingly tough business to have sold to the Units, for 
all Lewis' ability and charm; but I have subsequently seen Bird, Joshua, and LeBlanc 
who have been here on grant-aid business, and nothing they said appeared to be at 
variance with the Lewis plan. 
There has of course not been time to study Lewis' report in detail, and there are 
features of it about which opinion may differ-not least the net cost to Trinidad-
although in general it will serve as a basis for discussion. 
2. Yesterday Lewis discussed the Report with the Federal Cabinet, who accepted 
it whatever the mental reservations of some members; but the important and 
encouraging outcome of this meeting was that Adams and his Ministers agreed to 
drop the idea of a Conference of units in The West Indies, which Adams had intended 
to convene early in January and to go straight to one Conference in London. This was 
a considerable achievement, for Williams would never have agreed to attend any 
Conference of Units summoned by Adams in The West Indies; and in any case such a 
conference would I am sure only have been used by Adams and Co. as an occasion to 
sabotage any likelihood of a Federation of Nine. But as you will see from Lewis' note, 
we have good grounds for hoping that Williams would attend a meeting in London 
even if Federal representatives were present, if you were the Chairman, and provided 
that it is made clear to him that H.M.G. does not intend to oppose his view that the 
Federation will de facto be broken up the moment Jamaica secedes. Williams' 
attitude on this point, as Lewis records, has become absolutely inflexible. Hochoy 
confirms this. There can be no continuation of any Federation of Nine, without 
1 Not printed. 
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Williams' agreement, and we feel it is essential to meet him on this point if his co-
operation is to be secured in discussions about the future. 
3. What then do we suggest should be done now? I suggest that you should write 
a line to Williams on December 5th congratulating him on his election (if he wins!) 
and say that it is becoming urgent to discuss what happens after March when a Bill of 
Secession is to be passed by the House, thus bringing the present Federation to an 
end, and that for this reason you yourself propose to summon a Conference in 
London early in the New Year. The tidiest arrangement would be to complete the 
dissolution conference (in which the Jamaica Government is of course involved) 
before the Independence talks with Manley to which you are committed in 
January/February. You could explain to Williams that you are leaving it as late as 
possible to give him time to study the issues, but that you cannot leave it later than 
early February for the above reasons. We feel it to be most important, as I say, that 
you should make it quite clear that you accept the fact that a Conference is necessary 
in view of the dissolution of the Federal Government on Jamaica's secession, also 
indicating to him that legislative effect will have to be given to this. 
You could go on to say that it is important therefore to plan as soon as possible the 
positive measures relating to the maintenance of services which will need to be 
continued until decisions are reached about permanent arrangements for the future, 
whether this implies some form of Federation or not. Simultaneously the Conference 
will afford an opportunity for preliminary discussions on Federation on the basis of 
the Lewis plan, or any other plan which may be put forward. 
4. At the proposed Conference one would hope at least to reach agreement in 
principle on the establishment of a Federation of the Nine, and get some idea of its 
general character. In any event however, the requirements of constitutional drafting 
would make an interregnum inevitable when the present Federal Government is 
disbanded, and until a new government can be formed. 
5. During that period a number of regional services would need to be continued. 
While the character of this interim organisation and the range of its functions will 
depend on political decisions to be taken at the Conference, we think it should be 
possible to do much useful planning in advance. It would undoubtedly save much 
time in London, and smooth the way to agreement on these matters, if reasonably 
comprehensive plans could be presented to the Conference for consideration. 
Arrangements are being made at this end for this matter to be studied, and I hope to 
be able to write in more detail about this when we have formulated some ideas. 
6. Even if negotiations for a Federation including Trinidad were to break down, 
there would still be need for a regional approach to many matters. We think 
therefore that we should have ready some outline for an organisation which could 
take over the administration of a number of regional services in such an event and 
which could preserve some link of political association, and we are therefore also 
giving thought to a sketch plan for an organisation of this nature. 
Annex to 168 
I saw Dr Williams four times. 
September 22 
I went to see him to persuade him to declare in favour of a strong Eastern Caribbean 
Federation. He was full of venom and insisted that he wanted the whole Federation to 
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"mash up".2 Only then would he consider starting a new federation, on Trinidad's 
terms. I then switched to persuading him not to say anything at all, and he said he 
would propose to his party that it keep federation out of the election. 
Trinidad's terms would be a strong federation, on the lines of the Economics of 
Nationhood. 
He welcomed the proposal that I sound out the other Governments. 
He repudiated any immediate intention of declaring for the independence of 
Trinidad. 
October 6 
I reported that Mr Bird of Antigua was willing to accept the main features of a strong 
federation, provided no attempt was made at a unitary state. He was pleased with my 
report that a reasonable settlement could be made. 
He informed me that Ellis Clarke had advised that the Federation would end in 
March, and I tried vainly to argue him out of this. 
He thought he might be ready for a meeting in January. 
He undertook to read and comment on my report. 
November3 
We had lunch in his house for two hours. He had previously read a first draft of my 
report, addressed to him. 
There was a marked shift in his thinking, towards a unitary state, but his mind still 
seemed to be open on this subject. 
The alarming shift was in his attitude to a conference. He could not have his party 
convention till mid-January. This would have to be followed by educating the public. 
Clearly he was thinking in terms of months. 
By now he had also publicly committed himself to the ending of the Federation in 
March. 
I gained the impression that destroying the Federation had become an obsession, 
and that his desire to bring off this coup was his main reason for elaborating a 
programme of public "education" which would prevent him reaching the conference 
table until after March. 
He would circulate my report to his friends and officials, and invited me to return 
for further comment after my visit to B. G. 
November8 
He had not yet received comments on my report. His mind was still toying with a 
unitary state, and seemed a little less open. But he argued in a friendly way. 
His attitude to a conference was much worse. He now objected even to the 
presence of the Federal Government at a conference, though when pressed he gave 
the impression that he might yield on this. It was clear that he would not come to a 
conference summoned by the Federal Government, which in any case would not 
exist for him after March. 
2 Earlier, on 6 Nov, Hailes, had written to Thomas about Williams's insistence on 'smashing' the present 
federation: 'Arthur Lewis tells me that he [Williams] is just as bitter about Manley, and also Mr. Macleod. 
He intends he says to smash both their reputations- and in the latter case, the Colonial Office and even 
Her Majesty's Government are not necessarily going to be immune!' (CO 103113278, no 142, Hailes to 
Thomas, 6 Nov 1961). 
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Asked where we go from here; was he prepared to summon his own unofficial 
parley of Chief Ministers? He replied that the Colonial Office had got us into this 
mess, and had a duty to take the initiative in getting us out. There ought soon to be 
discussion on practical arrangements for continuing common services when the 
Federation came to an end. He had received a nice letter from Mr Maudling. He 
would attend a conference if it was clear that the Federal Government would not 
keep interfering in the discussion. 
He insisted that he was anxious to come to terms with the other islands, and we 
spent some time on steps he might take to make friends . I pointed out that he was 
creating an image of himself as the big bad wolf waiting to devour the little islands. 
He promised to mend his ways. 
169 CO 852/2065, no 1 11 Nov 1961 
[EEC]: letter from Dr Williams to Mr Maudling expressing concern 
over trade and immigration 
The commencement in Brussels this week of the formal negotiations over Britain's 
entry into the European Common Market provides me with an early opportunity not 
merely to thank you for your very helpful letter of the 2nd November but also to take 
advantage of your kind offer of personal assistance in a matter of vital importance to 
Trinidad and Tobago. 
You will, I am sure, be aware of the concern with which we in Trinidad and 
Tobago have viewed the acceleration during the past two years of the movement 
towards economic integration in Europe and the grave apprehensions we feel 
about the future of the United Kingdom and European markets for our major 
exports. Recognising, as I know you do, the serious economic and social disloca-
tion that would result from the loss of any part of our overseas markets, you will 
understand our anxiety to be assured beyond all reasonable doubt that our trading 
position will not in any way be jeopardised by Britain's entry into the Common 
Market. 
Our fears about the future have, however, been aggravated by two recent 
developments. One bears directly on the Common Market negotiations and the 
other, in our view, is indirectly related to them. I refer to your Government's 
decision to restrict immigration into Britain and to the reported opposition of the 
French Government to the association of the Netherlands Antilles with the Common 
Market except on terms acceptable to France. 
You will already have received some indication of the strength of feeling in the 
West Indies against your Government's determination to close the door against West 
Indians and other Commonwealth immigrants. This feeling has been heightened by 
the realisation that this measure cannot be unconnected with the provisions of 
Article 48(3) of the Treaty of Rome dealing with the freedom of movement of 
workers. Our understanding of this Article is that, if Britain signs the Rome Treaty, 
workers from European Economic Community Countries will be able to move freely 
into Britain in search of jobs. And I believe that we are not alone in ascribing that 
interpretation to it. 
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In the circumstances, you will appreciate how difficult it is to avoid reaching the 
conclusion that the exclusion of West Indian and other Commonwealth workers 
from Britain may be a necessary preliminary to the admission of workers from EEC 
countries, in accordance with Article 48(3) of the Treaty. I think you will agree that it 
would be unfortunate in the extreme if that view were to gain greater currency. 
Even more unfortunate, however, will be the effect on the economies of the West 
Indian Territories of the denial to their peoples of the opportunity to fill some, at 
least, of the many vacant jobs in Britain. It is no secret that, notwithstanding their 
efforts to promote industrial development, every West Indian territory faces the 
serious problem of massive unemployment. And, while no Government would regard 
migration as the solution to its territory's economic problems, it is clear that 
migration has in the past prevented the aggravation of these problems. 
If, in addition to the exclusion of their peoples from Britain, West Indian 
Territories are also to face the possibility of the exclusion of some of their export 
products, their economic future will certainly appear to them even more hopeless 
than it seems at present. Yet, if the French attitude towards the Netherlands Antilles 
is a reliable indication of the treatment which Trinidad and Tobago may expect from 
the European Economic Community when Britain becomes a Member, it is clear 
that our petroleum products will be practically completely excluded not merely from 
Britain but from the other EEC countries. 
It is because of considerations such as these, and also because of the evident 
unawareness by the Community of the special problems of the West Indies-in con-
trast with the great solicitude shown for the interests of the African territories-
that my Government has agreed that Mr. O'Neil Lewis, the Permanent Secretary in 
the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, Tourism and External Communications, 
should, after attending the forthcoming session of the GATT in Geneva, be given 
the opportunity of discussing with the appropriate officials in London and in 
Brussels the special problems of Trinidad and Tobago in relation to the Common 
Market. Mr. Lewis is fully familiar with the views of my Government on these 
problems and he will be authorised, as the Special Representative of the 
Government, to take whatever decisions he may consider necessary in order to give 
effect to those views. 
I would, accordingly, much appreciate your personal assistance in securing for 
him both the necessary accreditation and the opportunity to discuss our problems 
with British and Common Market officials. Perhaps you would be good enough to let 
me know whether Letters of Credence from this Government will be needed in order 
to effect his introduction to the Common Market Commission. 
I fear that I have devoted practically the whole of this letter to the problems of the 
Common Market although there are certain other questions arising out of your letter 
to which I would have wished to refer. It may, however, be more appropriate to write 
to you separately about those, but you may wish to take advantage of Mr. Lewis's 
presence in London, after the GATT meeting, to arrange for him to discuss with your 
officials some of the implications, as they appear to us, of the results of the Jamaican 
Referendum. 
It only remains for me now to say what a pleasure it was to hear from you. I shall 
write to you shortly about the other points you raise. I share your hope that we shall 
be able to make closer contact. 
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170 PREM 11/3238 17 Nov 1961 
[Immigration]: message from Sir G Adams to Mr Macmillan 
protesting about the proposed UK legislation to control immigration 
from the Commonwealth 
The apparent determination of Her Majesty's Government to proceed with legislation 
to curb migration from the Commonwealth seems to be flagrant disregard of every 
liberal principle on which Britain has based its customs and traditions since Lord 
Mansfield's famous judgement of 1772.1 West Indians are firmly convinced that by 
this action Britain has begun to take steps which are no different in kind to the basis 
on which the system of apartheid in South Africa is based. 
It is inconceivable that West Indians who form less than one half percent of the 
population of Great Britain can constitute any threat to Britain's economy or health. 
There has been no evidence to indicate that West Indians are less law-abiding or 
moral than the people of Britain whose beliefs in law, freedom and justice they share. 
It is particularly disturbing that although still legally described as Citizens of the 
United Kingdom and Colonies the people of The West Indies should even before the 
final attainment of Independence be subjected to hostile and discriminatory 
legislation to deprive them of their historic rights to move freely into Britain. 
Other Commonwealth countries will be as alarmed as we are at this dark day in the 
history of Britain. It will not pass unnoticed that while the Citizens of Ghana are 
giving Her Majesty a royal welcome in West Africa Her Majesty's Ministers are with 
undue haste further diminishing the freedom of people of the same stock for whom 
they have a historic responsibility as a result of the forceful severance which the 
British occasioned and of the rich trade in bodies and goods on which much of 
Britain's prosperity has been founded. 
It will in future be difficult for any person from the Commonwealth to accept un-
reflectingly the oft-repeated assertion of multi-racial partnership. The Government 
of the United Kingdom is therefore jeopardising not only the future of an association 
for which high hopes have been entertained but Britain's own reputation for justice, 
tolerance and fair play. 
My ministers join me in an urgent appeal to the British Cabinet not to proceed 
with legislation which can only result in a deterioration of social conditions in the 
West Indies to the situation in which Lord Moyne found them in 1938. You will 
understand that in these special circumstances the fullest possible publicity is being 
given to this protest.2 
1 In 1772 Lord Mansfield, chief justice of England, gave a judgement that slaves in England could not be 
forcibly removed from the country. This was falsely interpreted at the time, and by many since, that the 
decree had emancipated black slaves in England and Wales. 
2 Macmillan replied on 25 Nov, appreciating the anxiety and concern which the proposed legislation had 
aroused but denying that it would have the 'drastic consequence' envisaged in Adams's message. 
Macmillan continued: 'The Bill is intended as a means of regulating the total volume of immigration from 
all parts of the Commonwealth to a rate at which they can be assimilated. I am sure you will appreciate 
that a Bill which is intended to apply to the whole Commonwealth without discrimination of any kind 
could not discriminate in favour of persons from territories not yet independent as against persons from 
independent Commonwealth countries' . The prime minister had no objection to his reply being published 
(PREM 11/3238, outward tel no 338, Macmillan to Adams (through Hailes), 25 Nov 1961). The 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act received the Royal Assent in Apr 1962. 
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171 CO 103113278, no 147 22 Nov 1961 
[UK interests]: minute by Lord Perth on 'our basic interests in the 
Caribbean' 
[Perth wrote this minute in the middle of an exchange of correspondence beginning with 
Hailes's letter to Maudling of 10 Nov (see 168) in which the governor-general 
subsequently suggested that a conference should be held in London early in 1962 to 
resolve the issues of the dissolution of the existing federation, the maintenance of 
common services and the creation of a new federation based upon the Lewis or any other 
proposals. In his reply Maudling emphasised the problem of timing. The CO was 
committed in the new year to having a conference in London on Kenya. This was going to 
be one of 'extraordinary difficulty' and it was impossible to predict when it would begin or 
how long it would last. There was also the question of an independence conference in 
London with Jamaica to consider. This was scheduled for Feb 1962 but if, beforehand, an 
East Caribbean conference had failed to reach agreement, it was difficult to see how the 
problem of maintaining common services could be resolved. Equally, the Jamaica 
conference would be fixing a secession date. Eric Williams was insisting that the dates for 
Jamaican secession and dissolution of the existing federation should be one and the same. 
What would happen if the 'eight' disagreed? HMG would either have to make provision for 
Trinidad to secede on the same day as Jamaica or unilaterally decide that the federation 
had to be dissolved. The CO did not accept the argument that with Jamaica's secession 
the federation would automatically be dissolved. It would be 'ridiculous' to abolish the 
federation altogether and then to reconstruct it with amendments to suit the nine or 
eight. The CO was anxious to avoid having to go before parliament with a succession of 
West Indian bills and much preferred a scenario in which an order-in-council would 
include enabling provision to cover all eventualities.1 Maudling therefore suggested, as an 
alternative to an East Caribbean conference in London, that he should visit the West 
Indies in Jan 1962 and hold informal discussions which would provide him with an 
opportunity to assess attitudes and possibilities. A formal conference could be held in 
London later and be based on a fairly clear understanding of what was likely to emerge 
(CO 1031/3728, no 1458, Maudling to Hailes, 20 Nov 1961). To all this Hailes responded 
that the existing federal government had to disappear. Federal representatives and 
senators were of 'poor quality' and with one or two exceptions ministers had 'failed 
miserably' to rise to their responsibilities or to provide real leadership. The crux of the 
matter, according to Hailes, was the date for Jamaica's secession. Although no specific 
date had been mentioned at the talks in London with Manley (see 165), it was now 
assumed, certainly in Jamaica itself, that the target date was 31 Mar 1962. To adhere to 
this timetable Hailes insisted that an East Caribbean conference would have to be held 
first. The alternative, and the one he now favoured, was to defer Jamaica's secession and 
independence until, say, 1 Aug 1962. This would provide time to settle the future of the 
East Caribbean. Hailes welcomed a visit by Maudling in Jan 1962 if its purpose was to 
work to this agenda (ibid no 158, Hailes to Maudling, 1 Dec 1961). In the minute 
reproduced here Perth considers the issue of West Indian conferences and legislation in 
the context of the purpose to which he thought UK policy should be working.] 
I have read through West Indian Department 'A's paper on conferences and 
legislation concerned with the West Indies in 1962. As it says, it is in the main 
confi ned to timetables based on various half pledges and guesses about, for example, 
what Williams of Trinidad is going to do. It proposes a ministerial visit to see how 
local politicians react to Jamaica's leaving the Federation and generally to explore 
the future . 
But are we clear ourselves where we want to go? 
1 Maudling put the case for an enabling bill before the Colonial Policy Committee in Dec 1961 (CAB 
134/1560, CPC(61)36, 'Timing of West Indian legislation', memo by Maudling, 18 Dec 1961). In giving its 
approval, the committee recommended that care should be taken to ensure that the bill did not exceed the 
UK's powers and thus cause resentment. The point was also raised in discussion that that part of the bill 
dealing with secession might be seized upon by African leaders in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia who 
opposed the Central African Federation (ibid, CP 13(61)2, 20 Dec 1961). 
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I suppose the first question is what are our basic interests in the Caribbean-and I 
use the term Caribbean to include British Honduras and British Guiana. 
Strategically, as I see it they are nil. Of course we don't want to see them in 
unfriendly hands, but the U.S.A. and Canada must ensure this does not come about, 
although as friends and allies we should be prepared to help by influence and 
?money. 
Economically, to the Government the whole area is a constant and considerable 
drain whether by disguised subsidy or direct help. On the other hand there is a large 
(how large) private investment (real estate and oil) which may or may not bring in a 
handsome return. Clearly we do not want to jeopardise such investment, but is there 
danger of this? 
Morally, there is of course a strong sentimental tie which must have some weight. 
The Immigration Bill will be straining the West Indian side of the sentiment. 
I suggest we need now to review the whole of the West Indian position. The grand 
concept of Federation, perhaps ultimately to embrace British Honduras and British 
Guiana, is in ruins, Jamaica is out and other groups of islands, for example Bermuda 
and the Bahamas, were never in. Is it wise to try and salvage the rest of the 
federation? In that event is it reasonable to expect Trinidad to carry the burden of the 
smaller islands? Surely she won't without the promise of continuing and substantial 
aid. What do we want to do about British Guiana? Jagan is pressing for its 
independence. Geographically it is of course within sight of Trinidad. And then there 
is British Honduras with the prospect of tens of millions being spent for a new capital 
and for what purpose? There are of course lots of other questions which will need 
thought. 
I can think of all sorts of other constitutional solutions than those which we are at 
present more or less drifting into, especially if we are prepared to be tough about the 
giving of aid and attaching strings to it. 
Strategically and probably economically we can afford to be tough and only 
sentimentally have we reason not to be. At a time, and I think sooner rather than 
later, we ought to consult with the Americans and Canadians, but before this we 
should know our own minds. 
172 CO 852/2065, no 7 23 Nov 1961 
[EEC]: letter (reply) from Mr Maudling to Dr Williams on trade and 
immigration 
Thank you very much indeed for your letter of the 11th November1 about the 
European Common Market negotiations, which I was very pleased to receive. 
On the general issues raised in your second paragraph you will recall the 
discussion you had with Lord Perth when he was in Trinidad in July.2 As Lord Perth 
then explained, it is H.M.C.'s intention in the negotiations with the Six to preserve 
the vital interests of Commonwealth countries and territories. So far as our 
territories and other under-developed Commonwealth countries are concerned we 
have proposed to the six that they should all enjoy the same Associated Overseas 
1 See 169. 2· See 154. 
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Territories status as is enjoyed by their own associated countries. This is, we believe, 
the best way of safeguarding the vital interests of dependent overseas territories. 
As regards the particular point you raise on immigration and the Common Market, 
I agree with you that it would be most unfortunate-and indeed it would be without 
foundation-if the view were to gain greater currency that the exclusion of 
Commonwealth workers from Britain was a necessary preliminary to the admission 
of workers from E. E. C. countries. I would like to assure you in the most categorical 
terms that the Government's decision to introduce the Immigration Bill had no 
connection whatever with the negotiations we are engaged on to enter the 
Community. I hope, therefore, that you will support us in scotching that particular 
rumour. 
As regards immigration under Articles 48 and 49 of the Treaty of Rome these 
articles are in fact open to various interpretations and it may conceivably be 
necessary eventually to refer the question of interpretation of them to the Court of 
Justice. In June of this year however, the Council of Ministers approved regulations 
valid for not more than two years which recognise, subject to certain exceptions, the 
principle that priority of consideration should be given to indigenous labour. It is 
quite unreal to suppose that Britain could be compelled suddenly to accept a flood of 
cheap labour from E.E.C. countries, and it would certainly appear from reading these 
Articles of the Treaty that control of such labour is possible. What the final position 
will be we cannot of course yet say and much will depend upon the course of our 
present negotiations with the Six. I have of course explained to you in my recent 
communication the real reasons which lay behind the Government's proposed 
Immigration Bill. 
As regards the other Common Market point you raise-the treatment of 
Netherlands Antilles-recent developments have in fact been encouraging. You have 
probably now heard that the Six have agreed to extend Associated Overseas 
Territories status to the Netherlands Antilles, which means that the whole of their 
indigenous production will receive free entry into the Six. This would seem to be a 
good omen for the treatment which the Six should be prepared to extend to Trinidad 
and other West Indian territories. The only trouble which has arisen with the 
Netherlands Antilles has been the question of their exports to Europe of refined 
petroleum products made from Venezulean crude. The Six, particularly the French, 
were afraid of establishing the precedent that any Associated Overseas Territory 
could set up a refinery, import foreign crude oil (perhaps from Russia) and sell the 
refined products throughout the Community. This could be bad for established 
refinery operators within the Community and I am sure that Trinidad would itself 
appreciate this argument. It has, therefore, been agreed that the Netherlands Antilles 
should be given a duty free quota in the Community markets for exports of 
petroleum products which is in effect double their present exports to those markets. 
I have already replied to you by telegram about the visit of Mr. O'Neil Lewis to 
Europe. We shall be very glad to arrange for him to discuss the special problems of 
Trinidad with appropriate officials in London and Brussels: and we will take all the 
necessary steps to arrange suitable introductions for him. His formal accrediting to 
the Commission in the full diplomatic sense is unfortunately not possible since such 
accrediting is only open to independent Governments, but such diplomatic status 
should not be necessary for him in making all the contacts he wants. There is some 
difficulty in deciding the best time for Lewis' visit in relation to the many 
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preoccupations of the Commission, but our negotiators in Brussels are looking in to 
this and we will get into direct communication with Mr. Lewis on the detailed 
arrangements. 
I look forward to hearing from you again when I get back from Kenya and when 
you will have your elections behind you. 
173 CO 103113278, no 160 6 Dec 1961 
[Small states]: letter from Lord Hailes to Mr Maudling on the need to 
take a firm line with the Leeward and Windward Islands 
I should like to expand a point made in paragraph 11 of my letter of 1st December to 
which this could be regarded as an addendum, about the necessity for taking a line of 
stern realism with the Leewards and Windwards representatives in any talks or 
negotiations in the near future . The point gains importance from the results of the 
Trinidad Elections in which Eric Williams won a resounding victory for his party .I It 
is too soon to say how the remarkable DLP victory in Barbados2 will affect Trinidad-
Barbados relations; but still the first condition of Trinidad's continued participation 
in a political community in the Eastern Caribbean has been fulfilled. 
2. Williams now knows that his electoral strength in Trinidad gives him room to 
negotiate for a strong central government (whether on the basis of Lewis's plan or 
otherwise) which he can be expected to control. But he will need encouragement 
from every source if he is to be persuaded to make a bid, and if the negotiations are to 
have any chance of success. There can be little hope of his making a start in this 
direction unless Trinidad's position of superiority is recognised from the outset, and 
the Leewards and Windwards in particular are made to recognise that they can no 
longer hope to bargain from a position of constitutional parity. 
3. I feel that the sooner the leaders in the small Units are made to realise this the 
better, and that the primary responsibility for telling them so, tactfully of course, but 
firmly, rests with H.M.G. If Williams gets in first with his habitual thunders on the 
same point, that will elicit nothing but bitterness and obstruction. This is just what 
the saboteurs who are aiming at some Federal association of Eight would want. What 
I suggest as essential is that H.M.G. should make clear to the small units in advance 
of any serious bargaining that the indefinite maintenance of the status quo in their 
internal constitutional arrangements, and of a Colonial and grant-in-aid relationship 
with the United Kingdom, is not something which they can, even in the last resort, 
fall back upon in refusing to work out a sound political association for the Eastern 
Caribbean. 
4. So far as their constitutions are concerned, there already exists the 
qualification firmly enunciated (though by no means assented to) at the Leeward 
Islands and Windward Islands Constitutional Conference in June of this year, viz. 
that the advances recommended at that meeting were contingent on the 
1 The elections in Trinidad were held on 4 Dec 1961 and won by the PNM with 58 per cent of the popular 
vote. 
2 A reference to the defeat of Adams's Barbados Party by E A Barrow's Democratic Labour Party in Dec 
1961. 
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continuation of the present Federation and its achievement of Independence on 31st 
May, 1962.3 However, one realises that as these small islands have already been 
allowed to go far along the road to full internal self-government, there are 
limitations as to how far we can go into reverse without eroding the general policy of 
advancing Colonial territories to Independence at the earliest. To subsidise a colonial 
status is however the negation of this policy, and those islands that now rely on 
grants-in-aid to finance their administrations can be told with firmness, and without 
fear of the inevitable charge of coercion, that they cannot be allowed to get the best 
of all possible worlds-to clamour for Independence while refusing to make the 
sacrifices necessary for its achievement; to demand freedom from external control 
while rejecting all practical measures for achieving a viable economy through 
political association, while at the same time seeking to maintain a right to annual 
instalments of grants-in-aid from the U.K. Treasury. 
5. It seems to me that one of the most valuable aspects of your visit in January 
could be to clear the air in these respects in preparation for future negotiations for 
an Eastern Caribbean federal arrangement. It could be an opportunity to make the 
political leaders of the smaller islands understand that they cannot expect special 
efforts to be made to prop up local administrations, and maintain pockets of political 
authority under the cover of a colonial relationship, which can be criticized by 
nations determined to misunderstand the position, when another way is available 
towards our common goal of political Independence and economic self-sufficiency. 
Success in putting over this theme at an early stage would not only I think enhance 
the chances of a proper Federation of Nine but would also, should Trinidad 
unfortunately decide to go it alone, encourage those who harbour the idea of an 
association of Eight to begin their thinking on a realistic basis. 
6. I fear you will think that I am laying down the law in a big way, but I expect 
you would rather I should express my thoughts frankly . Some may well need 
amendment! 
3 See 156, note 2. 
17 4 CO 103113506, no 125 15 Dec 1961 
'The West Indies Federation': CO brief for Mr Macmillan's meeting 
with President Kennedy at Bermuda, December 1961, on the question 
of US aid to the Caribbean 
Small though they are, our Caribbean colonies have been growing steadily more 
expensive in recent years. At the same time our future commitments elsewhere 
(expecially Africa) will not make it possible for the United Kingdom alone to provide 
sufficient development assistance to satisfy West Indian expectations (which are not 
modest) or even, in some cases, simply cope with their population explosions. We 
have therefore over the last two years made an increasing effort to persuade the 
Americans (and also the Canadians) to accept a share of the financial burden of these 
territories, in particular the West Indies Federation. This policy has until recently 
shown some success, largely because strategic factors have ensured that the 
Americans have an interest in maintaining the stability of the area. 
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2. The Americans have shown their sensitivity to the Federation in the following 
ways:-
(a) they took West Indian dissatisfaction with the 1941 Bases for Destroyers 
Agreement extremely seriously and were clearly very glad at being able to agree a 
revision of the Agreement earlier this year with the West Indian Governments; 
(b) in mid-1961 they appointed a Special Representative to the Federation, Mr. 
Ivan White. He was to become their Ambassador at independence and, until then, 
exercise supervision over all United States military and civil activities in the area; 
(c) they readily agreed to participate in the Joint Canada!United States/United 
Kingdom Economic Mission1 to the Leeward and Windward Islands which was one 
of the results of the West Indies Constitutional Conference in London in June, 
1961; 
(d) they gave us to understand that the assistance to the Federation for the first 
few years after independence would match £ for £ what the United Kingdom 
provided. 
3. Since the Jamaican referendum on 19th September they have shown in 
several ways that they are either re-appraising or are uncertain about their future 
policy to the West Indies. They have told us they are reluctant to implement their 
part of the Leewards and Windwards Joint Economic Mission until the political 
future of the area clarifies. They have also hinted that, partly because of 
Congressional cuts in their aid programme, they may not perhaps be able to treat the 
areas so generously as they had earlier envisaged and that, in any case, their policy is 
now to concentrate aid on areas which can play a constructive and influential role, 
and they are inclined to doubt if the Eastern Caribbean is such an area. 
4. It is unlikely that the Americans will take any re-appraisal to the point of 
deciding to write off the West Indies altogether. But even a decision that the West 
Indies was no longer to be a priority American aid target could be a serious blow to 
our interests if it resulted in the United Kingdom having to bear increased financial 
responsibilities or in the total financial bait being inadequate to induce the West 
Indians to adopt the political solutions we prefer. It is therefore important to catch 
American policy-making before it gets to the point of a firm re-appraisal of policy 
towards the West Indies. An opportunity may be given if the President asks the 
Prime Minister to say what he thinks of the future of the Federation. 2 
5. In the present confused situation the only firm fact is that Jamaica has 
irrevocably pulled out, and will become independent in 1962, the precise date to be 
determined at a conference opening in London in early February. 
6. Jamaica comprised half the Federation both in terms of land area and 
population and contributed about 40% of the federal revenue. It is uncertain whether 
the remaining nine members of the Federation will be able to agree to carry on 
together without her. Trinidad is much richer than Barbados and the seven Leeward 
and Windward territories, and fears they would be a drag on her own prosperity. She 
may decide to "go it alone" to separate independence. Barbados and the small islands, 
on the other hand, are afraid of domination by Trinidad and a loss of their identity. 
These fears are heightened by the probability that Trinidad will insist that the 
1 On the outcome of which see 193. 2 Emphasis throughout in original. 
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present Federation must be scrapped and replaced if there is to be another 
federation, by a much more centralised constitution or possibly even a unitary state. 
The Premier ofTrinidad (Dr. Eric Williams) refused to declare himself one way or the 
other before his general election. This took place on 4th December and gave him an 
easy victory, but he has not yet made a firm declaration of his intentions. Such 
statements as he has made have not been reassuring but we cannot yet be certain 
that these are not designed to soften up the other territories before serious 
negotiation starts. The Colonial Secretary is visiting the Federation between 16th 
and 27th January to try to discover what chance there is of keeping the Federation 
together. Overtly, it will be necessary for him to say during his visit that this is 
something the West Indians must decide themselves. Behind the scenes, he will, of 
course, do all he can to keep the Federation intact (though without commiting 
himself to a policy that would certainly involve more financial aid than we are able to 
afford). He will aim at persuading all the Eastern Caribbean territories to attend a 
conference in London (probably about April) to work out the form of political 
association suited to the new position caused by Jamaica's withdrawal. 
7. If the negotiations succeed, the Federation may still be able to go to 
independence in 1962, though not by the date of 31st May agreed at Lancaster House 
last June. If the negotiations do not succeed, Trinidad is likely to demand separate 
independence in the course of 1962 and we will not be able to refuse this. One or two 
small territories may agree to Trinidad's terms, and by going in with her achieve 
simultaneous independence. 
8. If Trinidad with or without satellites "goes it alone", we will be left with 
Barbados and most, if not all, of the Leeward and Windward Islands on our hands. 
They may still wish to be linked in a Federation, but their lack of resources is such 
that they are unlikely to be able to support more than a rudimentary federal 
machine. We have not, frankly determined what, in these circumstances, the 
ultimate political future of these territories would be. On the one hand, neither 
separately nor collectively are they likely to be viable for many years to come. On the 
other hand, it is difficult to foresee them remaining as colonies in perpetuity. It 
might, therefore, be that we should have to consider allowing them (indeed, possibly 
prodding them) to achieve independence in a few years with a guarantee of tapering 
budgetary support for a period of years. 
9. All the West Indians now want of us is massive financial aid. But, however 
much we recognise the urgency of their needs, we are faced with so many competing 
priorities (especially Mrica) that we are simply not able to envisage any increase in 
our volume of aid to the area. The Americans (and Canadians) have already shown 
themselves willing to help. We very much hope the President will not feel that 
current political uncertainties make the fundamental problems of the area less 
pressing. In fact, the West Indians at present feel very threatened. Their own 
population pressures, the gradual closing of doors to migration, the European 
Common Market (though we hope to safeguard many of their vital interests), the 
nearness of Cuba and the unsettling influence of Fidelismo, and a recent re-
emergence of racial tensions (particularly in Jamaica); they all add up to a sombre 
background to the solution of their political problem. 
10. We therefore hope that the United States, so far from diminishing their 
assistance towards the territories which comprise the present Federation, will on the 
contrary step it up. We also hope that Canada may be persuaded to extend further 
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economic assistance to the area. The happiest solution for all would be the 
emergency [sic] of an Eastern Caribbean Federation including Trinidad. But as the 
price of agreeing to this Trinidad is certain to demand massive external aid in the 
shape of development grants and loans to enable it to sustain the burden of 
association with the smaller islands all of which are poor and nearly all grant-aided. 
Her terms are certain to be much too stiff for the United Kingdom with its stretched 
resources and commitments elsewhere, to meet to any considerable extent. 
American willingness to come in with an imaginative offer of large-scale aid may be 
the key to the establishment of an Eastern Caribbean Federation. 
175 CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)32 15 Dec 1961 
'British Guiana independence': memorandum by Mr Maudling for 
Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee on the arguments for and against 
moving more quickly to independence 
The British Guiana Constitutional Conference, 1960,1 agreed on a formula that an 
Independence Conference would not be called until a minimum of two years had 
elapsed after the General Election of August, 1961,2 unless a decision had in the 
meantime been taken to grant independence to the Federation of The West Indies; in 
the latter event, the two year minimum would be reduced to one year. A decision was 
taken to grant independence to The West Indies on the 31st May, 1962, and although 
that has been upset by Jamaica's decision to secede, it would be impracticable to 
argue that the minimum of one year does not now apply. The earliest date for an 
Independence Conference in accordance with the above formula would be August, 
1962 and on this basis, allowing for the necessary legal and other preparations, 
independence could take effect by mid-1963 or a little earlier. 
2. Both houses of the local Legislature recently adopted a Resolution asking me 
to fix a date during 1962 for independence and Dr. Jagan in the course of discussions 
I had with him on the 13th December has pressed me to implement the Resolution. 
Publicly he has expressed the desire that British Guiana should attain its 
independence on the 31st May next. 
3. The main argument for adhering to the formula is that we are under certain 
obligations to the Americans, who take a great interest in the affairs of British 
Guiana. In their eyes, the problem is of tremendous importance and in view of 
hostile public and congressional opinion towards any softening by the U.S. 
Government towards a "communist" country, it is a hypersensitive spot for the 
1 See 135, note. 
2 At the election in British Guiana in Aug 1961, the PPP won 20 seats with 42.6 per cent of the vote; the 
PNC won 11 seats with 41 per cent of the vote; and the UF (United Force), a conservative party formed in 
1961 by Peter D'Aguiar, a Portuguese businessman, won 4 seats with 16.3 per cent of the vote. All20 of the 
PPP's seats were in rural constituencies where East Indians formed large majorities. All 11 of the PNP's 
seats were in urban areas with large African majorities. 3 of the UF's seats were in Georgetown where the 
Portuguese population was concentrated, the fourth being in the interiors in the Amerindian 
constituency. 
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Administration. What happens in British Guiana is, therefore, not merely a matter of 
British colonial policy, but has a bearing on general Anglo/U.S. relations. 
4. Shortly after the introduction of the present British Guiana constitution, an 
informal U.K./U.S. Working Party of officials reviewed the situation in the Colony 
and worked out an agreed approach to its problems. The U.S. representatives 
expressed the hope that the period prior to independence could be prolonged and 
that arrangements for another election as one of the steps towards independence 
could be made. In their view a longer period of internal self-government would 
provide needed additional time to show Dr. Jagan that the West meant well by him, 
and would also provide a better opportunity to evaluate the results of working with 
him. It was impressed on the Americans that developments in the Colony would have 
to be judged in the light of circumstances, and it was agreed with them that there 
should be further consultations as the situation developed. The report of the 
Working Party, which has been endorsed by Foreign Secretary, Commonwealth 
Secretary, and by me, set out inter alia that the United Kingdom would "endeavour 
to adhere to the London formula which would provide for a conference on British 
Guiana independence not earlier than August, 1962". 
5. Although there is no firm commitment to the U.S.A. to adhere to the formula, 
there is a strong moral obligation to do our best to do so, and there is a clear 
obligation to consult with the U.S. authorities. To depart from the formula so shortly 
after the Anglo/U.S. discussions and so soon after the Americans have begun 
(however haltingly) to carry out their side of the bargain by inviting Dr. Jagan to 
meet the President and discussing future aid, would be contrary to the spirit of our 
many mutual dealings over British Guiana. 
6. A subsidiary point is that the more time we have to settle the future relation of 
an independent British Guiana with the Commonwealth the better. Moreover, the 
Government of British Guiana so far have declined to agree to satisfactory 
compensation terms for certain categories of overseas officers for whom I have a 
special responsibility. 
Argument for departing from the formula 
7. On the other hand I can see good reasons for moving more quickly to 
independence:-
(a) The Legislature has passed the independence resolution referred to above by a 
very substantial majority. Both Dr. Jagan's party and the main opposition party, 
which together polled some 85% of the votes cast at the August elections, 
supported it. 
(b) We have no strategic or economic reasons for delaying independence. Nor is 
the internal situation such as to provide a cogent argument for the retention of 
U.K. sovereignty in the interests of preventing communal disturbances. 
(c) We should gain nothing politically from delaying; in fact to do so would be 
more likely to lead to souring relations between H.M.G. and Dr. Jagan's 
Government. 
(d) Economically, so long as British Guiana remains under British sovereignty the 
tendency in the U.S. and elsewhere seems likely to be to regard this country as 
primarily responsible for aid to British Guiana. The aid is sought on a scale which 
is beyond U.K. resources, having regard to our other commitments. The sooner 
British Guiana is put in a position in which she can in her own right tap other 
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sources of financial assistance, and in which the Americans have to recognise that 
British Guiana is more vital to their interests than ours, the better. 
8. The Governor's considered advice is that we should accelerate the pace 
towards independence. The representative of the Security Services in the West Indies 
is of like view. Having regard to the circumstances in British Guiana and to the 
advice which I have received, I am of the opinion that there would be no real 
advantage in refusing to agree to an earlier date for British Guiana's independence. It 
seems to me that the best course to follow, taking into account my other 
commitments, would be for the independence conference to be held in May of next 
year (i.e., about three months sooner than the earliest date possible under the 
Lancaster House formula), and that we should be prepared to grant independence by 
the end of 1962 if, as I hope, this leaves time for the necessary legal drafting. I should 
be grateful for my colleagues' agreement to this proposal. 
9. While I should like to inform Dr. Jagan of the above as soon as possible, it is 
clear I cannot do so until we have consulted the Americans and, if possible, carried 
them with us. I hope to start consultations with the Americans soon, and if it appears 
clear that my proposal will create difficulties with them, I shall, of course, consult 
with my colleagues again. Otherwise, if the Americans accept our views, I propose to 
inform Dr. Jagan that I should be pleased to call a Conference in May, 1962 to discuss 
independence, but I may have to make it a condition that before the Conference is 
held the Government of British Guiana have agreed satisfactory compensation terms 
for certain categories of overseas officers for whom I have a special responsibility. 
176 CO 103113911, no 3 29 Dec 1961 
'United States-Trinidad relations': letter from S J G Fingland1 to 
D Williams on a strained political and economic relationship 
Relations between the United States and the present Trinidad Government, under Dr. 
Williams, have been very much a love-hate affair. When I first arrived, some four 
months ago, the comparative sweetness and light which had been generated by the 
successful talks about the U.S. Bases-particularly Chaguaramas-had evaporated 
and the Americans, like ourselves, were being regarded by Dr. Williams with 
considerable bitterness. This was particularly shown in his attitude towards Ivan 
White, the United States "Head of Mission with the personal rank of Ambassador", on 
whose head Williams particularly directed his wrath at what he regarded as the 
United States' resiling from what had been agreed on economic aid to Trinidad at the 
Tobago talks. 
2. The situation was not improved by the Trinidad attitude following the 
Jamaican referendum, when Ivan White's previous policy of stressing his position 
viz-a-viz the Federal Government, and his "Ambassadorial" status, recoiled on him 
because of Dr. Williams' refusal to have anything to do with the Federal Government 
or any of its works. Fortunately for the United States themselves, Christensen2 
1 Adviser on Commonwealth affairs to governor-general, West Indies Federation, 1960-1961, and to 
governor of Trinidad, 1962; deputy UK high commissioner, Trinidad, 1962- 1963. 
2 W H Christensen, US consul-general, Trinidad, 1961; counsellor, US embassy, Trinidad, from 1962. 
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had just arrived in Port of Spain as deputy to White, and he has been able, by plac-
ing emphasis on his status as U.S. Consul-General in Trinidad, to put the United 
States' relationship with the Trinidad authorities on a much sounder footing. In 
this, Christensen was very much helped by the fact that he had had previous deal-
ings with Dr. Williams when they were both concerned with the activities of the 
Caribbean Commission; and he has been able to expand on this connection to the 
extent that, unlike many of us, he has fairly frequent access to Dr. Williams, and 
close contacts with him. I thought that you might be interested to have the infor-
mation in the following paragraphs about U.S.-Trinidad relations in various fields, 
most of which has been obtained from Christensen, with whom I keep in close 
touch. 
Political 
3. Ivan White himself told me that, as a result of the Jamaican referendum, they 
had decided not to build up the U.S. Mission in Port of Spain to the extent originally 
envisaged, which would have meant the addition of four Political Officers to the 
normal staff of the Consulate General. They were now distributing their resources 
more evenly between Port of Spain and Jamaica by sending two of the Political 
Officers to add to the strength of the present Consulate General in Kingston. The two 
Officers have, in fact, just left. White has implied on one or two occasions that he 
himself may not be staying here very long. His position is still very difficult viz-a-viz 
the Trinidad Government and I gather that he has still little or no contact with Dr. 
Williams, the latter carrying out all his dealings through Christensen. Christensen 
himself told me in confidence that it was likely that White would move to Jamaica 
about March in order to take over from the present U.S. Consul General 
(Macgregor-who is due to leave about February next) with a view to becoming the 
first U.S. Ambassador in Jamaica on independence. I think that it is most likely that 
Christensen will become the Head of Mission in Port of Spain on White's departure. 
Christensen told me that he thought that, as soon as the future constitutional 
position was slightly clearer, the Americans would probably revert to calling their 
Mission in Port of Spain a Consulate General, in the normal way, until independence 
here. 
4. Christensen, incidentally, shares my view that one of the most disturbing of 
recent political events in Trinidad has been Dr. Williams' refusal to display any 
magnanimity towards the Opposition, after winning the elections by a handsome 
majority. There has been no evidence of any appeal to the nation as a whole to forget 
the bitterness of the political campaign and settle down together to work out the 
many problems facing Trinidad in the near future. Indeed, in the course of his 
election victory speech, Dr. Williams categorically rejected the suggestion of a 
previous speaker (Montano, then Minister of Local Government and Housing) that 
there should be an attempt to get away from the intense partisanship of the elections; 
and the Premier himself referred on that occasion, and on other occasions since, in 
the most vindictive terms to the Opposition and all its supporters. 
Economic 
5. Trinidad's main contacts with the United States are, of course, in the field of 
economic aid. Here, Dr. Williams is showing himself insatiable. His main difficulties 
with Ivan White arose out of a disagreement over the interpretation of the U.S.-
Trinidad economic memorandum produced at the time of the Bases talks, in which 
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the U.S. agreed to give economic aid to Trinidad for certain projects.3 (I have, inci-
dentally, not seen a copy of this economic agreement and would be grateful to receive 
one). The main point at issue has been the American Government's insistence that 
their "participation" in the Trinidad economic projects in question means that they 
will put up 60% of the agreed cost, mainly in U.S. goods and services, leaving the 
Trinidad Government to finance the other 40% from its own resources. Dr. Williams, 
on the other hand, argues that he was led to believe that U.S. participation meant that 
they would pay 100% of the cost; and the strength of his feeling on this issue is indi-
cated by the inclusion of the following paragraph in the Trinidad Governor's speech 
delivered today on the opening of the new Trinidad Parliament:-
"My Government expresses its profound regret that its high expectations, and 
those of the people of Trinidad and Tobago, of the Chaguaramas Agreement 
negotiated with the United States of America in Tobago a year ago, have not 
been translated into the practical cooperation which was then confidently 
anticipated". 
The U.S. authorities must take some of the blame themselves for their 
deterioration in relations, having by all accounts been guilty of, at least, a dangerous 
imprecision in what they promised in the economic field at Tobago. 
6. These difficulties having not yet been resolved, the U.S. authorities have not 
yet received a decision from the Trinidad Government on their offer to make 
available the sum of $US 6.6 million to Trinidad, under the Special Aid Scheme 
resulting from the Bases agreement, during the current fiscal year. This sum is 
intended to cover an amount of $US 1.6 million for the development of the U.C.W.I. 
in Trinidad, about which there have already been detailed discussions between the 
U.S. and Trinidad Governments, and an additional sum of $US 5 million in respect of 
further grant assistance to U.C.W.I.; for port development; and for a projected new 
highway from Port of Spain to Chaguaramas. 
7. This proposed Special Aid, which is all in the form of grants, does not by any 
means represent the total of United States economic assistance to Trinidad. During 
the current financial year the U.S. Government have, in addition, given the 
Trinidad authorities two marine tugs and a revolving-crane barge for port develop-
ment, out of U.S. surplus stock, the total value of which is estimated as $US 1.7 
million. They have also agreed to give a $US 9 million loan from the Export/Import 
Bank for the Trinidad Government sewerage scheme. Christensen commented that 
the total involved in all these loans or grants represented a value of $US 20 per 
head of the population of Trinidad and Tobago-a per capita rate far exceeding that 
which ·applied to U.S. aid anywhere in Latin America. The total would be even 
larger if the value of normal U.S. developmental assistance under AID (formerly 
ICA) were to be included, together with the value of certain assets at the 
Chaguaramas Base which the U.S. had agreed to turn over to the Trinidad 
Government, although not strictly required to do so under the terms of the Bases 
Agreement. (In October 1961 the Trinidad Government was informed that it could 
acquire title to 35 buildings and structures on Chaguaramas for use in billeting 
troops; and Dr. Williams was also informed that the United States Government were 
agreeable to making available 29 acres-including two piers and 9 buildings-at 
3 See 141, note 1. 
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Chaguaramas for a commercial dry dock facility, the value of this area being esti-
mated as $US 5 million).4 
8. Despite the fact that he has not yet accepted the U.S. Special Aid referred to 
above, on the terms proposed, Dr. Williams has not been slow to indicate that he 
looks to the United States for large amounts of assistance in other fields. 
Immediately after the recent heavy flooding in the Diego Martin area outside Port of 
Spain, the Premier indicated that he would be asking the U.S. Government to give 
emergency assistance with regard to the re-development of the flooded area; and he 
referred on another occasion to the fact that the Trinidad Government would seek a 
loan of $WI 50 million, interest free, from the U.S. Government to implement a crash 
programme of housing. Christensen told me that the U.S. Consulate General had in 
fact had various requests put to them for additional aid totalling an estimated $US 20 
million. In the middle of all this, moreover, Dr. Williams has stated publicly that the 
present Agreement on U.S. Bases "died" with the Federal Government following the 
Jamaica Referendum. No-one thinks that this means that he is thinking of driving 
the Americans out of Chaguaramas, but it is clearly intended as a means of putting 
more pressure on the Americans for granting economic aid on Trinidad's terms. 
9. Thus, the Americans are clearly finding Dr. Williams a very difficult man to deal 
with. Much of this results from the Premier's personal handling of negotiations of this 
type. Christensen said they had been surprised to learn recently, when challenged 
about their aid by a Trinidad Minister, that the latter- and the Trinidad Cabinet-had 
not been informed about the U.S. Government's offer of Special Aid on the lines 
described above. There is a lesson for us as well as the Americans. If there is any chance 
of Trinidad taking on the leadership of an Eastern Caribbean federation, Dr. Williams 
will clearly try to drive the hardest possible bargain with the United Kingdom in rela-
tion to grants for the development of the smaller units, so that no additional burden 
falls on the Trinidad economy. As Christensen commented, the Americans have now 
fully realised that Dr. Williams is a most difficult man to deal with, and one who can 
be a great force for both good and evil. He has apparently made it clear to the Americans 
that he intends to keep his dealings with them and his relations with the United 
Kingdom in entirely separate compartments, and in any negotiations it will obviously 
be essential not to appear to be ganging up with the Americans. On the other hand it 
is equally apparent that we must keep in the closest touch with the United States (and, 
of course, the Canadian) authorities so that one side is not played off against the other. 
4 A US account of the economic agreement with Trinidad is in CO 1031/3911, no 1, 'Record of United 
States compliance in Trinidad with defense areas agreement and related documents', enclosed with F J 
Galbraith (US embassy, London) to Fraser, 30 Nov 1961. 
177 CO 1031/3374, no 3 8 Jan 1962 
'The Lewis Report': CO brief no 8 for Mr Maudling's visit to the West 
Indies on Professor A Lewis's view that the best option is now an 
independent Trinidad and a Federation of the Eight. Annex: letter 
from Lewis to Mr Fraser, 2 Jan 1962 
Professor Arthur Lewis is a 47 year-old St. Lucia [sic], educated at L.S.E., who is now 
Principal of the University College of the West Indies. He is an eminent man. He has 
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been Professor of Economics at Manchester. Later he was Dr. Nkrumah's Economic 
Adviser. He was for a time Deputy Director of the United Nations Special Fund. 
2. When the result of the Jamaican Referendum was declared on 20th 
September, Professor Lewis flew down to Trinidad completely on his own initiative 
and offered his services to the Federal Prime Minister. He was given the appointment 
of Special Adviser to the Prime Minister at a salary of a dollar a year and it was agreed 
he should tour the Federation on the Prime Minister's behalf to investigate what 
were the chances of keeping the Federation intact after the withdrawal of Jamaica. 
Professor Lewis was probably the only man who could do this. He is universally 
respected, is known to have no political bias, and, above all, is liked by Dr. Williams 
and can get access to him, which is not easy except for the favoured few. 
3. Dr. Lewis submitted his report on 9th November.1 He argued that, contrary to 
expectations, there was now a strong possibility that the remaining territories would 
be willing to form a new Federation, which would be much more centralised than 
either the 1958 Constitution or that under which the Federation of the Ten would 
have become independent. Dr. Lewis claimed that this would even be acceptable to 
Trinidad if there were a drastic reduction of the governmental super-structures in 
the small islands. 
4. Dr. Lewis argued that, whereas it would be necessary to retain somewhat 
truncated separate governments in the small islands, it would in fact be possible to 
approach the condition of a unitary state provided one major requirement was met. 
This was that the outward forms and institutions of a Federation were maintained. 
Dr. Lewis in a significant passage wrote "the language one uses is important because 
words have not only meaning, but also an intense significance as symbols, which 
relates only tenuously to their meaning. A constitution which all may accept if it is 
called federal may equally be rejected by all if it is called unitary." 
5. Elated though the department was by this document, which was the first indi-
cation of any possibility of our being able to keep the Nine together at all, we soon 
began to have doubts as to whether it would, in fact, be possible to reach agreement 
on the basis of elaborate constitutional double talk, and a conspiracy of silence as to 
the real meaning of whatever new political arrangements were to be made. 
6. Since writing his report, Professor Lewis has apparently had similar 
misgivings. He has now written to Mr. Fraser (copy of his letter attached) . He now 
says that a Federation of the Nine is no longer practical politics and that even though 
one or two Windward Islands might accept complete absorption by Trinidad, it would 
be preferable instead to concentrate on forming the Eight into a workmanlike 
Federation and aim at a "sort of East African High Commission" running the 
common services for British Guiana, Jamaica, Trinidad and the Eight. The logic of 
the present situation (surprises apart, and we may yet have these) supports this later 
analysis and it now seems that Dr. Lewis' first report was considerably over-
optimistic in relation to political realities. 
Annex to 177 
Thank you for your letter of 14th December. I shall be in Trinidad from January 13 to 
24. I shall see Bird and Barrow on my way down. 
1 See 168. 
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I have not seen Dr. Williams since the beginning of November. However, from 
studying his speeches, and from what he said then, I conclude the following:-
(1) He would prefer "association" with other territories to going alone, but will go 
alone if he does not get his terms. 
(2) "Association" does not mean federation. It means a unitary state, with the 
other territories having the same status as Tobago. 
(3) He knows that this will not be acceptable to all the other territories. He would 
be content to have Grenada and St. Vincent come in alone; St. Lucia and Dominica 
too if they so desire. 
(4) He will probably ask for a dowry as the price of taking any of the smaller 
islands into association; and will probably refuse if there is no dowry. 
My reaction to this would be to let Trinidad go it alone, and establish the other 
islands as a federation centred on Barbados. There could then be organised a sort of 
East Africa High Commission, whose membership would be British Guiana, 
Trinidad, Eastern Caribbean and Jamaica. This Commission would take over the air 
line, shipping, meteorology, university etc. External representation could be joint in 
some places, e.g. Ottawa, while having to be separate in others, e.g. London and the 
U.N. My reasons for this are:-
(1) Association on Dr. Williams's terms may be acceptable to two or three of the 
islands, but is not acceptable to all-and even those two or three would probably 
prefer federation with Barbados, since the prospect of dictatorship by Dr. Williams 
is not relished. If two or three go with Trinidad, what happens to the rest? It would 
be better to keep them all together in a compact federation. 
(2) It is not desirable to reduce all the other islands to the status of Tobagos. The 
history of Tobagos in the West Indies (including Nevis, the Grenadines, Anguilla, 
Turks and Caicos, Caymans) is one of neglect. I agree strongly with V.C. Bird that 
any island without a government of its own is doomed to neglect. What we have to 
do is not to abolish the island governments, but to trim them to proper scale. 
However, the possibility of a federation centred on Barbados depends partly on Mr. 
Errol Barrow and partly on the Secretary of State. 
When I met Mr. Barrow on December 9110 he had not yet read any of the 
documents, or given serious thought to the problems. It was, however, clear to him 
that a unitary state was neither feasible nor desirable. He stated his position as being 
the same as that of V.C. Bird, with whom he has also close personal relations. He was 
willing to go along with a federation centred on Barbados; but he was worried about 
its cost. His attitude to Dr. Williams was one of suspicion, and it took all my 
persuasive powers to get him to take the initiative in seeking an interview. I have not 
seen him since, and do not know what his attitude now is. 
If my analysis is right, the Secretary of State will have a choice between:-
(1) offering a dowry to Trinidad, and coercing as many of the small islands as 
possible into a unitary state; or 
(2) offering a dowry to Barbados, to be the centre of an Eastern Caribbean 
federation. 
I hope that if it comes to this he will without hesitation chose the latter. 
You will notice that both solutions involve a dowry. Neither Trinidad nor Barbados 
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will take on the other islands without a dowry. The third alternative, which is for the 
Colonial Office to keep the Windward and Leeward Islands, costs money too. So there 
is no costless solution. 
If the Secretary of State considers Trinidad's terms to be unacceptable he should 
say so as soon as he has heard them; should say so both to Dr. Williams, in the hope 
of getting him to be more reasonable, and also to Barrow and to Bird, so that they 
can have some basis for putting up an alternative. Barrow, Bird and Williams are the 
only three who matter. Anything that the Secretary of State works out with these 
three will hold. 
I do not know whether the enclosed appendix2 to my report has reached you yet. 
2 Not printed. 
178 CO 103113278, no 187 11 Jan 1962 
'The "legality" of Jamaican secession': CO brief no 23 for Mr 
Maudling's visit to the West Indies 
The Secretary of State may be asked why, after the Jamaican referendum, he 
unilaterally agreed that Jamaica could secede from the Federation without 
discussing the matter with the Federal and remaining Territorial Governments. The 
Premier of Barbados has said he wishes to discuss this. Others, including the Federal 
Government, may also raise it. 
2. The result of the referendum was in many ways a surprise both to us and in 
the West Indies. In fact, relatively little thought had been given to the complex and 
difficult problems that would have to be faced should Mr. Manley's appeal to the 
electorate fail. Consequently, the period immediately after 19th September was one 
of confusion and uncertainty. 
3. The Federal Prime Minister brought a delegation to London within a few days 
of the referendum. Immediately on his heels came Mr. Manley with a Jamaican 
delegation to demand more or less immediate secession and very early 
independence.l It should be noted that the Federal delegation left London before the 
Secretary of State saw Mr. Manley's delegation, though Sir Grantley himself stayed 
over for a few days to talk to Mr. Manley. 
4. In an ideal world the timing and circumstances of Jamaica's withdrawal would 
indeed have properly been decided in consultation with other West Indian 
Governments concerned. We realised this at the time. It was, however, just not 
politically possible to insist to Mr. Manley that this was the way we should proceed 
without provoking a major row with him. He was already on the political defensive in 
Jamaica, and under the closest scrutiny by Sir Alexander Bustamente for any signs of 
faltering in withdrawing Jamaica without delay. It was clearly just as important to 
please Jamaica, which anyway was shortly going to be an independent 
Commonwealth country, as it was to satisfy the Eastern Caribbean whose political 
future had so darkened that no man knew what, if anything, their political future 
would be. 
1 See 165. 
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5. The commitment finally given to Mr. Manley was that Her Majesty's 
Government accepted the withdrawal of Jamaica from the Federation and would 
introduce legislation early in the forthcoming session of · Parliament, and would 
make every effort to ensure that this became law by 31st March, 1962. It was also 
agreed that Jamaica should proceed to independence in 1962, the date of this to be 
determined at a Jamaican Constitutional Conference which would take place early in 
the new year (now beginning 1st February, 1962). 
6. It should be noted that this commitment contained an element of possible 
misunderstanding. Mr. Manley has tended to interpret it as meaning that Jamaican 
secession will take place before 31st March. We, however, have interpreted it as 
meaning only that the necessary enabling legislation permitting this to be done will 
have been passed into law by this date. This difficulty is unlikely to cause any friction, 
as Mr. Manley now appears to accept that secession will not be possible by 31st 
March, although he clearly still expects that we will honour the commitment to have 
the legislation enacted by this date. 
7. Our first formal communication to the Federal and Territorial Governments 
following the referendum was Despatch No.992 of 24th October (Annex A).2 The main 
purpose of this was to inform West Indian Governments that the Secretary of State 
considered that it was an "inevitable consequence . . . that it is no longer probable 
that the Federation will be able to proceed to independence on 31st May, 1962." 
8. This despatch crossed in the post with the Governor-General's despatch of 
17th October (Annex B) containing the Federal Government's protest against the 
Secretary of State's commitment to Jamaica. This argued "that it would be highly 
impolitic for the act and timing of Jamaica's secession to be negotiated and decided 
solely between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Jamaica without 
consultation at all stages with the Federal Government and the Governments of the 
other territories of the Federation." 
9. Our reply in Despatch No.1035 of 13th November (Annex C) rejected this 
protest, but did nevertheless agree that "as far as is practicable" further action in 
regared to this "should be taken only after consultation with the Federal 
Government and the nine Territorial Governments". The despatch, however, went on 
to say that it would not be possible to give an unqualified assurance on this subject, 
but that the terms of the Bill would in due course be sent to the Federal Government. 
10. A further despatch dated 22nd December has now come in (Annex D) which 
somewhat grudgingly accepts this position, and goes on to say that the Federal 
Government "would appreciate an assurance that all proposals giving effect to the 
secession of Jamaica will be communicated to the Federal Government for 
consideration and, where appropriate, consultation with Eastern Caribbean 
territorial governments before final decisions are agreed between Her Majesty's 
Government and the Government of Jamaica". We have not yet replied, but there is 
no reason why an assurance of the kind requested cannot be given.3 
2 Annexes not printed. 
3 Maudling arrived in the West Ind"ies for discussions with the federal and unit governments other than 
Jamaica on 13 Jan 1962. The day after his arrival the General Council of the PNM in Trinidad approved a 
resolution rejecting participation in any new East Caribbean Federation and urging that Trinidad and 
Tobago should proceed to independence forthwith. On 19 Jan the premier of Barbados and the chief 
ministers of the Leeward and Windward Islands met Maudling and submitted proposals for the dissolution 
of the existing federation and the formation of a new Federation of the Eight based on the Lewis proposals 
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(see 177). The S of S reported these developments to the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee on his return 
to London and advised that the existing federation should be dissolved as soon as possible. It no longer 
commanded any substantial support and had long since ceased to be held in respect. Maudling therefore 
proposed to introduce legislation to provide for dissolution and the creation of an interim organisation (to 
be based in Barbados under the direction of the governor) to provide for common services. As soon as 
Trinidad submitted a formal request for independence, a conference would be arranged in London and 
held in May. It would be necessary to look more closely at the scheme for the Federation of the Eight to 
ensure that it had a strong central government (CAB 134/1561, CPC(62)5, memo by Maudling, 'Federation 
of the West Indies', 31 Jan 1962). In discussion, the Colonial Policy Committee agreed that while it would 
not be practical to withhold the grant of independence to Trinidad, the aim of policy should be to ensure 
that as many as possible of the smaller islands were grouped with Trinidad in a unitary state. This might 
bring advantages to Trinidad (the accession of the small islands would counter the growth of Trinidad's 
Indian population), and to the UK (a unitary state might be financially viable and reduce to some extent 
the subsidy required to maintain the small territories). A separate Federation of the Eight should not be 
ruled out but the scheme proposed would require careful examination. There was no question of 
automatic membership of the Commonwealth for territories in the West lndies, although it had already 
been decided to support Jamaica's application. The committee recommended that CO and Treasury 
officials should now study the whole question of financial support for the West Indies in the broader 
context of persuading the governments of both the US and Canada to accept greater responsibility for a 
region which was now strategically more important to them than it was to the UK. The committee also 
considered granting independence to all territories as well as Trinidad and leaving them to decide their 
own future . This option was ruled out; the UK had a 'moral obligation' to avert the chaos and bankruptcy 
which might well ensue. It would not be possible to make Trinidad's independence conditional upon 
Trinidad accepting responsibility for the smaller territories because for all practical purposes Trinidad was 
independent already. Finally, the committee considered the position of British Honduras, the victim of a 
recent hurricane. It was no longer possible to think in terms of British Honduras in a federation and there 
was no prospect of the territory attaining a viable independence. In the longer-term it might be to the 
advantage of the UK to accept a merger of British Honduras and Guatemala. Present at this meeting were 
Macmillan (chair), Maudling, Duncan Sandys (CRO), Lord Kilmuir (lord chancellor), Henry Brooke (chief 
secretary to Treasury, 1961-1962) and Sir Burke Trend (second secretary, Treasury and Cabinet secretary 
from 1963) (CAB 134/1561, CPC 3(62)1, 2 Feb 1962). 
179 CO 1031/4269, no 42 31 Jan 1962 
[Jamaican referendum]: letter from Lord Hailes to Mr Maudling on 
why the referendum was allowed to proceed 
I have been thinking of the announcement you will make in the House next week 
about the future of the Federation. 
There are signs that the question of why the Referendum was ever allowed or why 
thereafter Manley was allowed to proceed with secession may come to be taken up 
more insistently both here and at home. Comes, La Corbiniere [sic], and Co., who are 
boasting about their contacts in the House of Commons, are more than likely to 
inspire questions, either on your announcement of dissolution-if allowed-or on 
another occasion. The general object of course is to try and pass the blame. 
I think that the line taken about the Referendum has so far been covered under the 
general umbrella of "It is for West Indians to decide their future for themselves". This 
is really not quite enough in the face of the more searching questions which may 
now be asked. After all, West Indians, apart from Jamaicans, were not given any 
opportunity to express an opinion on something which vitally affected the future of 
the whole Federation, and which has led to its collapse. 
Be that as it may, I myself have always felt that it was not realistic to try and stop 
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the Referendum once Manley, on 31st May, 1960, announced his intention to hold 
one.1 For instance, if any action had been attempted, Busta would have made 
common cause with Manley on the lines of gross interference in the affairs of a 
territory enjoying internal self-government. There would have been a great row, but 
in the result the Referendum would have been held just the same, and Manley's 
chances might have been impaired. 
However, what I think has never been made clear is that H.M.G. was not in fact 
consulted in any way beforehand. When I inadvertently met Comes just after his 
interview with you, it was clear that he believed, or affected to believe, that H.M.G. 
knew about the idea of a Referendum and, advised by its "representatives" here, 
decided that it would be a winner and allowed it to go ahead. Comes appeared to be 
genuinely surprised when I said that the first I knew about it was from the 
newspapers. It may well be that the time has come to dissipate an idea which is so far 
from the truth. 
For in fact the monstrous part of it all was Manley's announcement without any 
prior consultation or even notice to H.M.G., to the Federal Government, or the 
Governments of any of the territories, about a subject vital to the Federation, 
apparently on the excuse that this was a domestic matter for Jamaica alone to decide. 
The first anyone knew of the decision was a headline in the Gleaner on 1st June and a 
telegram from Jamaica, No. 199 of 31st May to the Secretary of State, repeated to me 
as No.193, received by Macleod just as he was leaving for Jamaica, giving the text of 
Manley's announcement to the House of Representatives. (I remember ringing up 
Blackburne immediately to ask for an explanation of what I said was on any view a 
reckless gamble with the whole future of Federation. I was assured that "it was all 
right"-although I was equally told when I next visited Jamaica that it was now far 
from all right!) 
I am wondering whether the time has not come to make the factual position clear, 
but of course without recrimination. This may well make things easier when our 
House meets on 12th February, quite apart from the House of Commons, which it is 
not for me to advise about. 
1 See 126, note. 
180 PREM 11/3666 20 Feb 1962 
[British Guiana]: letter from Mr Rusk1 to Lord Home asserting that it 
is not possible for the US 'to put up with an independent British 
Guiana under Jagan'. Minute by Mr Macmillan 
You know from our correspondence in August of last year of my acute concern over 
the prospects of an independent British Guiana under the leadership of Cheddi 
Jagan. Subsequent to his victory in the August elections we agreed to try your policy 
of fostering an effective association between British Guiana and the West, and an 
Anglo-American working party developed an appropriate program. At our request, 
safeguards, including consultations about new elections, were included in case 
1 Dean Rusk, US secretary of state, 1961- 1969. 
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matters went awry. In pursuance of this program the President received Jagan on his 
visit to this country in October. I must tell you now that I have reached the 
conclusion that it is not possible for us to put up with an independent British Guiana 
under Jagan. We have had no real success in establishing a basis for understanding 
with him due in part to his grandiose expectations of economic aid. We have 
continued to receive disturbing reports of Communist connections on the part of 
Jagan and persons closely associated with him. Partly reflective of ever growing 
concern over Cuba, public and congressional opinion here is incensed at the thought 
of our dealing with Jagan. The Marxist-Leninist policy he professes parallels that of 
Castro which the OAS at the Punta del Este Conference declared incompatible with 
the inter-American system. Current happenings in British Guiana indicate Jagan is 
not master of the situation at home without your support.2 There is some 
resemblance to the events of 1953. Thus, the continuation of Jagan in power is 
leading us to disaster in terms of the colony itself, strains on Anglo-American 
relations and difficulties for the inter-American system. 
These considerations, I believe, make it mandatory that we concert on remedial 
steps. I am anxious to have your thoughts on what should be done in the immediate 
future. In the past your people have held, with considerable conviction, that there 
was no reasonable alternative to working with Jagan. I am convinced our experience 
so far, and now the disorders in Georgetown, makes it necessary to re-examine this 
premise. It seems to me clear that new elections should now be scheduled, and I 
hope we can agree that Jagan should not accede to power again. 
Minute on 180 
Foreign Secretary 
I have just received a copy of a message to you from Mr. Rusk about British Guiana. I 
am bound to say I have read it with amazement. One or two phrases are incredible, 
for instance, "I must tell you now that I have reached the conclusion that it is not 
possible for us to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan" or "It 
seems to me clear that new elections should now be scheduled and I hope that we 
can agree that Jagan should not accede to power again". I hope Sir Patrick Dean3 will 
be given these sentences. 
How can the Americans continue to attack us in the United Nations on colonialism 
and then use expressions like these which are not colonialism but pure 
Machiavellianism. Of course, it is nice to feel that they are partners with us and have 
such confidence in you as to send you a letter of this kind but it does show a degree of 
cynicism which I would have thought Dean Rusk could hardly put his pen to. He, 
after all, is not an Irishman, nor a politician, nor a millionaire; he has the reputation 
of being an honourable and somewhat academic figure. 
H.M. 
21.2.62 
2 Disturbances had broken out in Georgetown in Feb 1962 after the introduction by the Jagan government 
of an austerity budget at the end of January, see 185. 
3 Permanent UK representative to the UN, 1960- 1964; ambassador in Washington, 1965- 1969. 
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181 PREM 1113666 26 Feb 1962 
[British Guiana]: letter (reply) from Lord Home to Mr Rusk 
challenging US policy over British Guiana 
Thank you for your letter on British Guiana.l From our past discussions we have 
known your pre-occupations and you have known the efforts which we have made 
despite setbacks to provide for the orderly development of this territory. We are 
studying what best to do now to discharge our responsibilities and when we have 
decided, we shall be glad to see in a more official way what can be done to concert our 
action and yours. 
Meanwhile there are some general thoughts which I should like to put to you 
privately and with the same frankness with which you wrote. I do so not only because 
I think this is right between us, but because you have often shown in the 
conversations which the two of us have had, that you recognise the sustained efforts 
over long periods that we have made in our dependent territories to try to ensure 
that they have a reasonable chance of using and not abusing freedom when they get 
it. This must depend to a large extent on the progress of each different territory and 
its readiness to run its own affairs. But once this process has gone as far as it now 
has, there is bound to be an added risk over timing in the remaining dependent 
territories which are still either backward or have peculiar racial or other difficulties. 
This was inherent in the problem from the beginning. 
Now it was your historic role to have been for long years the first crusader and the 
prime mover in urging colonial emancipation. The communists are now in the van. 
Why? Amongst other things because premature independencies is a gift for them. 
What I do not think possible is to beat them by cancelling the ticket for 
independence and particularly if this is only to be done in the single instance of 
British Guiana. You say that it is not possible for you "to put up with an independent 
British Guiana under Jagan" and that "Jagan should not accede to power again". How 
would you suggest that this can be done in a democracy? And even if a device could 
be found, it would almost certainly be transparent and in such circumstances if 
democratic processes are to be allowed, it will be extremely hard to provide a 
reasonable prospect that any successor regime will be more stable and more mature. 
So I would say to you that we cannot now go back on the course we have set 
ourselves of bringing these dependent territories to self-government. Nor is it any 
good deluding ourselves that we can now set aside a single territory such as British 
Guiana for some sort of special treatment. 
This of course does not mean that we should not try to mitigate the dangers in 
British Guiana as elsewhere in the areas of the Americas and elsewhere. You will 
know our present concern over Kenya, the [Central African] Federation and other 
territories in East Africa. I take comfort from your letter to think that you will be 
ready to understand and support us in solving these problems. I do not want to go 
into them further here. But I should like to draw your attention to another territory 
in the area of the Americas, British Honduras. It will be difficult enough to provide 
for the future well-being of this territory. We now have in addition the President of 
1 See 180. 
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Guatemala using language reminiscent of Hitler to press his claim. "The 
Guatemalans", he said publicly on February 20, "would maintain their unshakeable 
determination to regain Belize." As the present regime in Guatemala would hardly 
have come into being without your support in 1954 and since, I shall be asking you 
to use your good offices at the right time to prevent another possible misadventure 
on your doorstep. 
Let us by all means try and do what is possible to prevent the communists and 
others from perverting our common aim of doing our best to assure a timely and 
orderly development of independence in the remaining dependent territories. But we 
must do this across the board and you will realise that while territories like British 
Guiana may be of special concern to you in your hemisphere, there are others of at 
least equal importance to us elsewhere. 
182 PREM 1113666 12 Mar 1962 
[British Guiana]: record by Lord Home of his conversation with Mr 
Rusk in Geneva 
Mr. Rusk said the President had wondered whether the Foreign Secretaries' 
correspondence1 had not been a bit "sharp" in tone. I said it was lucky I had not sent 
my first reply but I hoped he would never hesitate to write to me as frankly and 
forcefully as he liked and I would do the same. He could reassure the President that 
this was the normal practice as between Oxford men. 
He said the United States were really terrified of another Cuba on their continent. 
All the South American states joined with the United States in hoping that we could 
find ways and means of stopping Dr. Jagan from taking his country into the 
Communist orbit. How could the United States and others help to prevent this [?] 
I said I thought that the first thing was for Hugh Fraser to see the President. The 
second for us to consider Fraser's report2 and in the light of that to decide a line on 
the politics of independence. I did not see how we could delay it all that long. 
I added that British Guiana and British Honduras were likely to be 
embarrassments to us. Could they not be integrated somehow into the O.A.S. 
If Dr. Jagan was very poor perhaps there might be a price. I said we would keep in 
touch with them on these matters in Washington. 
1 See 180 and 181. 2 Mter his visit to British Guiana, see 184. 
183 CO 103113509, no 12B 19 Mar 1962 
[Federal finance]: minute by Sir H Poynton to Mr Maudling on 
whether the UK should contribute forty per cent of the federal deficit 
in dissolving the federation 
[The Treasury had rejected this proposal on the grounds that it represented an 'open-
ended commitment'. Federal assets and liabilities were as yet unknown quantities and it 
was, according to Brooke, chief secretary to the Treasury, 'most undesirable to make a 
financial undertaking where the size of our commitment is to some extent at the mercy of 
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those who will benefit from it' (CO 1031/3509, no 12D, Brooke to Maudling, 15 Mar 
1962). Within the CO, Thomas calculated federal assets at £1 million, and federal 
liabilities at £1 million for compensation (less if federal officials were absorbed in unit 
services) and a pensions liability of £42,000 per annum or £500,000 if funded. Thomas 
based the CO's case for a UK contribution to the federal deficit on the grounds (a) that it 
would not be possible to dissolve the federation without making satisfactory 
arrangements for compensation and pensions, and (b) that it would equally not be 
possible to establish an interim organisation to manage common services (ibid, no 12C, 
minute by Thomas, 16 Mar 1962). This was an issue over which the Treasury eventually 
relented.] 
Secretary of State 
You may like to have my comments on Mr. Thomas's minute to me about the 
Treasury's rejection of the proposal that H.M.G. should contribute 40% of any West 
Indian Federal deficit involved in the winding up of the Federation. (A copy of Mr. 
Thomas's minute has been sent direct to Mr. Howard-Drake.) I find myself in some 
difficulty in dealing with this matter because, as I think you know, I am not really 
convinced that we have a strong case at all here. My view has always been that we 
ought not to accept any liability simply because the West Indies are unwilling to pay 
but that we should limit ourselves to being prepared to rally round with grants-in-aid 
in any case where a Unit Government is unable to pay. I cannot help asking myself 
how far it really matters to the United Kingdom if (a) local officers of the Federal 
Service go uncompensated, and (b) if unification of the Common Services broke 
down. The former is definitely a West Indian responsibility and is somewhat 
analogous to the position of the non-designated officers in East Africa. As to the 
latter the continuation or non-continuation of the Common Services is really one 
which affects the West Indies themselves. If they do not want to keep this service 
together is there any reason why the British taxpayer should bribe them into doing 
so? Moreover I am not myself entirely convinced that these consequences would 
necessarily follow from our taking a tough line. This matter is following the very 
common West Indian pattern of negotiation. 
First they invent an assumption for which there is no justification, secondly they 
say they were misled by H.M.G. into that assumption, next there is a commitment on 
H.M.G. and finally a breach of faith by H.M.G. 
However, assuming that it is your decision that we should try and help then we 
must consider the relative importance of this particular proposal in relation to a 
number of other financial propositions that we have to negotiate with the Treasury. 
In particular I would list:-
(1) The proposed loan of £7X million for the local share for the E.A.C.S.O. 
compensation scheme. 
(2) Approximately £1 million for the Delamere recommendations in Kenya.1 
(3) The Kenya lands proposals which may well run into between £35 million and 
£40 million over some ten years.2 
1 Money allocated to guarantee the price of land in Kenya which had plummeted following the decision to 
advance Kenya's independence. 
2 A reference to that part of the pre-independence negotiations in Kenya which opened up the white-held 
'large farm sector' to African farmers, the largest being the 'million acre' scheme of 1962 with HMG 
compensating white farmers. 
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(4) An almost certain increase for Malta to offset the consequences of the Defence 
White Paper. 
(5) Always in the background lurks the horrors of Central Africa. At this very 
moment we are about to start financial talks with Nyasaland on their development 
plan; we are likely to be asked for about £10 million or more. If Federation has to 
be dissolved, Nyasaland will in addition need a grant-in-aid from the United 
Kingdom which would probably have to be of the order of £3 to 4 million a year. 
Against this distasteful menu I am bound to say the West Indian proposal does not 
seem to me to rank very high. I realise there is not much money involved but I do 
feel that to press it in the teeth of Treasury opposition would prejudice our success 
with other far more important negotiations. 
184 PREM 1113666 20 Mar 1962 
[British Guiana]: note by Mr Fraser to Mr Maudling on his 
conversations with President Kennedy and US officials in Washington 
I had formal meetings with the President, Alexis Johnson1 and officials of the State 
Department and informal conversations with Mr. McCone, Head of the C.l.A.,2 Bobby 
Kennedy,3 the Attorney-General and Governor Stevenson,4 the U.S. Ambassador at 
the U.N. The conversations were of course exploratory in so far as H.M.G.'s policy has 
not yet been decided and I pointed out to all that naturally H.M.G. could not be 
committed by a somewhat mysterious exercise in which I talked to them before I 
talked to my own Secretary of State. 
2. The fact that the President gave me more than two hours of his time and that 
the others showed such a keen interest makes it clear that the problem of B.G. in 
American eyes is regarded as one of critical importance. The object of my talks 
were:-
(i) to tone down any excitement caused by the Rusk/Home exchange of letters;5 
(ii) to get the Americans to accept our policy of a fairly swift withdrawal from B. G. 
as the best; and 
(iii) to endeavour to change the American attitude in two fashions:-
(a) to damp down the importance of British Guiana, and 
(b) to abandon their present policy of boycotting the Jagan Government and 
reneging on the various pledges of aid which the Americans made to Jagan 
during his visit to Washington. 
3. Quite apart from the problem with Congress who are now using B.G. as a 
crowbar with which to attack the foreign aid programme, Washington opinion is 
deeply divided on the issue of help to B.G. (It is interesting to note however that 
McCone, not a brilliant but an entirely honest man, assured me the C.I.A. were 
1 US deputy under-secretary of state for political affairs. 
3 Robert Kennedy, US attorney general, brother of President J F Kennedy. 
4 Adlai E Stevenson, US permanent representative to UN. 
2 J A McCone, head of CIA. 
5 See 180 and 181. 
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taking no convert action in the Territory.)6 The "soft" school is led by the President, 
Arthur Schlesinger7 and, needless to say, Adlai Stevenson, with the Attorney and 
some of the State Department in a half-way position. What matters, however, is the 
President's attitude and on my second meeting with him and on leaving him he said 
he felt that the Aid Mission should go down and Schlesinger, whom I saw later in the 
day, was of the opinion that the State Department should look very seriously at the 
project of offering immediate aid or at least some financial facilities towards the 
reconstruction of Georgetown.8 
4. I think therefore it would be best to describe how this shift or partial shift in 
the American attitude to make them offer assistance to a man whom they regard not 
as a communist so much as the Castro-type surrounded by communists, has been 
achieved. Perhaps for this purpose I should stress the various changes in British 
policy which I believe the situation calls for. 
5. In my opinion the problems of British Guiana are dangerous in the following 
order:-
(i) Racial. 
(ii) Economic. 
(iii) The threat of communist penetration. 
I believe that to proceed to independence with the present Constitution and with 
only 42% of the voters being behind Jagan and without new safeguards would not be 
morally acceptable. These new safeguards must be of a constitutional character. I 
think we will find both D'Aguiar and Burnham will press resolutely for a system of 
proportional representation and I think further that any safeguard which is written 
in, whether it be P.R. or a Senate, must have an electoral validation of its own. 
Therefore, I believe that fresh elections in British Guiana are inevitable. This of 
course I have not put authoritatively to the Americans, but I have said that the 
Constitutional Conference is almost certain to break down and that we will be faced 
with imposing or negotiating a constitution which will entail safeguards which will 
almost certainly mean some new electoral provision whether in the Senate or in the 
Lower House. This, I hope I have made clear to them, must flow not from us but 
from the demands of the British Guianese themselves. 
6. Until now I think the Americans have been toying with the idea that somehow 
Burnham and D'Aguiar could oust the Jagan Government. I think also they have 
believed in some mysterious way that time was on the side of Burnham and D'Aguiar. 
I think I have made it clear to them that over the next ten years the Portuguese will 
remain a minority and the Africans will become one, and that therefore their policy 
must be whilst helping minorities to look to the Indians as the centre of power to con-
centrate on weening Jagan and the moderates away from the communist apparat. This 
is run, I think, by Mrs. Jagan, and I hope I have made it clear that a line can be drawn 
between these types of international communists and what I would call the anti-colo-
nial type of communist which as I pointed out to them Jefferson9 might well have been 
if the communist manifesto had been written in 17 48 instead of 100 years later. 
6 cf 185, note 4, para 2. 
7 Arthur Schlesinger Jnr, professor of history, Harvard University, 1954- 1961; special assistant to 
President Kennedy, 1961- 1963. 8 After the Feb 1962 disturbances, see 185. 
9 Thomas Jefferson (1743- 1826), premier philosopher of US democracy: US president, 1801 - 1809. 
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7. Having, I think, sold the ideas to the Americans that British Guiana was really 
now more their responsibility than ours and would increasingly become more so, I 
agreed with the State Department that we should keep in the closest touch. The 
following points of policy I think should therefore be decided: -
(i) We should consult with the Governor as to when the American Mission should 
come down to have the maximum effect recognising that aid money may not be 
forthcoming until the end of June or July. To balance this probability we should 
like his recommendations as to what form a more immediate U.S. assistance to the 
rebuilding of Georgetown should take. 
(ii) We should send out a Constitutional Adviser to assist the Governor in his talks 
with the leaders of the Political Parties as to the form of independence 
Constitution which would offer adequate safeguards. I think this is most 
important to keep the talks in being. This Constitutional Adviser should also for 
our part consider what sort of independence Constitution we should aim at 
achieving. 
(iii) We should I think keep to the May date for the opening of a Constitutional 
Conference. But this, because of deadlock in the Governor's Committee and the 
report of the Commission of Enquiry, could reasonably be degraded to preliminary 
Constitutional talks and these could probably be done locally by me. 
(iv) This having broken down, we would summon a further Constitutional 
Conference in London in July. At this stage we would make proposals to safeguard 
minority interests. 
(v) From this would flow some form of election whether to a Senate or on the 
basis of proportional representations. Following the elections there might have to 
be a further conference if the electoral safeguards had to be imposed to decide a 
date for independence early next year, a financial settlement, etc. 
(vi) Having decided our general line of policy, we should have discussions at 
Ambassadorial level, and inform the United States Government of our broad lines 
of policy and the most propitious time for the action they may be or are 
contemplating. 
8. I have discussed this minute with the Department who agree with the general 
line I have taken. 
185 CAB 134/1561, CPC(62)13 3 Apr 1962 
'Recent developments in British Guiana': memorandum by 
Mr Maudling for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee on disturbances 
in Georgetown and the appointment of commission of inquiry1 
[Just before the disturbances one company of the Royal Hampshire Regiment in British 
Guiana had been brought up to strength. A sister company from the same regiment 
stationed in Jamaica was moved to British Guiana in February and three more companies, 
two of the 1st East Anglia Regiment and one of the 1st Duke of Edinburgh Regiment, 
were flown in from the UK. The British naval presence consisted of five frigates, one of 
1 From this point until independence in 1966, the future of British Guiana was seldom off the agenda of 
the Colonial Policy Committee or of its successors, the Oversea Policy Committee (from the end of June 
1962) and the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (from 22 Oct 1963). 
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which, HMS Trowbridge , provided a communications link with London because Cable 
and Wireless in Georgetown ceased to function when the heat from surrounding burning 
buildings forced staff to evacuate the central telegraph office. The February disturbances 
took their toll of Governor Grey. He confessed himself 'depressed' about his inability to 
suggest a way forward . Jagan, he said, saw no need for a political solution. He was in 
power with an elected majority and with British troops to give him practical security. 'All 
he needs now is money and he expects the rest of the world to give it to him'. The 
opposition parties in the colony had committed themselves to 'unlawful attempts' to 
bring him down. 'We thus have the absurdity that Jagan, though incompetent, is legally 
right and the Opposition are legally wrong and British troops are here to uphold the law' 
(CO 1031/4028, no 35, inward tel no 54, Grey to CO, via Admiralty, 21 Feb 1962). The 
outbreak of the disturbances occasioned Rusks 's letter to Home (see 180). Within the CO, 
R W Piper concluded that Rusk was probably right in saying that Jagan's continuation in 
power was leading to disaster for British Guiana, a strain on Anglo-American relations 
and difficulties for the inter-American system. However, Piper continued: 'Having said 
that, I think it is also true that the Americans bear a load of responsibility for what has 
happened in British Guiana. The cause of the trouble stems from Dr. Jagan's budget 
proposals. Dr. Jagan's Government was faced with a deficit in 1962 on the recurrent 
account of about $7 million, and on their development expenditure there was an even 
greater shortage. The Compulsory Savings Scheme was introduced specifically to raise 
funds for development and it seems to me that had the Americans come forward with any 
moderate measure of financial aid following Dr. Jagan's visit to Washington last year that 
particular unpopular proposal in the budget might not have been put forward . The 
Americans have, in fact, done nothing concrete to help British Guiana since Jagan's 
Government came in last September' (ibid, minute by Piper, 21 Feb 1962).] 
In C.P.C. (61)32 I proposed to hold an Independence Conference in May of this year 
to discuss the date and arrangements for British Guiana's independence.2 I so 
informed Dr. Jagan on the 12th January. On the 16th February, following a week of 
demonstrations and a general strike, serious disturbances broke out in Georgetown, 
the capital, resulting in the loss of four lives, many injuries, and substantial material 
damage. Part of the business area of Georgetown was burnt to the ground, and 
estimates of the damage caused by fire and looting run as high as £7 million. The 
proximate cause of the riots was the introduction of a budget on the 31st January, 
which imposed considerable taxation increases and introduced a scheme under 
which anybody earning over £20 a month would have had to contribute 5% (rising to 
10% in the higher income brackets) in compulsory savings. 
2. The disturbances were such as to make necessary the appointment of a 
Commission of Enquiry into their causes and the events leading up to them. This 
Commission's report will be relevant to the consideration of British Guiana's future, 
with particular reference to British Guiana Government's capacity to maintain law 
and order without outside assistance. The disturbances have also left a legacy of 
bitterness and non-co-operation between the three political leaders which threatens 
to jeopardise the territory's orderly progress to independence. With my colleagues' 
agreement I therefore sent the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the 
Colonies to British Guiana to investigate the position. 
3. During his visit the Parliamentary Under-Secretary persuaded the British 
Guiana Government not to seek the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry 
through the United Nations, but to invite Her Majesty's Government to appoint one 
whose membership would be drawn from the Commonwealth. Her Majesty has since 
been pleased to make the British Guiana (Commissions of Enquiry) Order in Council 
1962, empowering me to appoint such a Commission of Enquiry. The Governments 
2 See 175. 
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of India and Ghana have agreed to nominate members to this Commission and await 
the nomination of the United Kingdom Chairman before submitting the names of 
their nominees. I hope that it will be possible for the Commission to begin its work 
soon after the middle of April. It is unlikely that the Commission could present its 
report in less than a month i.e. before towards the end of May. 
4. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary also succeeded in persuading the three 
political leaders to form a working party under the Governor's chairmanship, to work 
out as far as possible agreed proposals for British Guiana's Independence 
Constitution, and to delimit their areas of disagreement. This working party has 
already held one meeting and I hope that sufficient progress will be made by it 
during the next six weeks to indicate how much agreement exists on the future form 
of British Guiana's Constitution. It is, however, very doubtful whether the 
fundamental differences will have been resolved by May. 
5. It is important to allow sufficient time for the local talks between the political 
leaders. I shall also need adequate time to consider what emerges from them. We 
certainly do not want an abortive Conference. In any case it seems essential to me 
that the Commission of Enquiry should present its report before the Independence 
Conference opens, so that it may be available to the Conference. I therefore consider 
that it will be necessary to put back the holding of the substantive independence 
talks. The first opportunity after May will arise in July. The British Guiana 
Government is aware of this possibility but no public mention has been made of it at 
this stage. Dr. Jagan's Government has so committed itself to achieving 
independence by the end of this year that it would politically be very difficult for it to 
accept a straight postponement. Nor would it be to our advantage simply to 
announce a postponement from May without specifying a new date, given the close 
United Nations' interest in British Guiana. I would propose, therefore, that the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary should again visit British Guiana in May for further 
constitutional discussions with the three political leaders. The main purpose of these 
would be to take stock of the progress made up to that time and to avoid having to 
say that we are altogether postponing a May conference. After these discussions, 
during which progress should be made in settling outstanding differences, any 
further meeting would be adjourned until about the middle of July, by which time 
the report of the Commission of Enquiry should have been received and digested, 
and detailed constitutional proposals worked out. I do not however envisage that 
there should be any substantial postponement of independence for British Guiana, 
which might be expected in the new circumstances to follow in early or mid-1963. I 
should like my colleagues' agreement to this course proposed in this paragraph. 
6. During his stay the Parliamentary Under-Secretary also discussed with the 
Governor and the military Commander the reduction of the garrison in the Colony, 
which at the time of his visit stood at five rifle companies. He reached agreement that 
the garrison could be reduced forthwith by two rifle companies, and these have since 
been moved. A further company will leave British Guiana when the 1st Battalion of 
the Royal Hampshire Regiment, which is at present stationed in Jamaica, and 
provides part of the British Guiana garrison, leaves the Caribbean for BA OR. 
7. After leaving British Guiana, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary paid an 
informal visit to Washington, where he had the opportunity of meeting the 
President, and emphasising both the dangers of over-estimating the importance of 
what happens in British Guiana, and the need for the Americans to make a real 
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contribution to British Guiana's economic development.3 I think that these 
discussions served a useful purpose in putting British Guiana into perspective in 
American eyes; it now remains to be seen whether the Americans will be more 
forthcoming as regards aid to British Guiana. 
8. The Americans are still very exercised about the political complexion of Dr. 
Jagan's Government. Moreover the recent disturbances in Georgetown may have 
begun a shift in political loyalties in British Guiana. There is local unease about Dr. 
Jagan's future policy, which finds expression in demands for entrenched safeguards 
(for which there is a strong case for the interests of minority races) and a move to 
alter the present electoral system to one based on proportional representation as 
likely the more accurately to reflect the strengths of the political parties. At the last 
elections Dr. Jagan's party polled only 42% of the votes cast. Although in normal 
circumstances it would hardly be appropriate to press for fresh elections, seeing that 
the last ones were held as recently as August 1961, I am coming to the view that, 
taking all the above factors into consideration, it would be desirable to hold fresh 
elections in the Colony before it finally becomes independent. This would of course 
be welcome to the Americans. How to achieve this objective with local agreement 
remains to be worked out, but I should like to know that I have my colleagues 
support in this policy. 
9. To sum up, I should be grateful for my colleagues' agreement that:-
(a) the substantive Independence Conference should not take place before the 
report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Georgetown disturbances is 
available, and progress has been made in removing the differences between the 
three Guianese political leaders on the form of the independence constitution; but 
the Parliamentary Under-Secretary should hold constitutional discussions locally 
in May; 
(b) we should continue to press the Americans to make a material contribution to 
British Guiana's economic development; and 
(c) I should aim at securing general agreement on the part of the Guianese 
political leaders to the holding of fresh elections before independence.4 
3 See 184. 
4 In July 1962 Maudling reported back to the Oversea Policy Committee that an independence conference 
would have to be delayed because the report of the commission of inquiry into the February disturbances 
would not be available until August. Maudling's memo also considered the question of whether the UK 
should support an application by British Guiana for Commonwealth membership. The arguments against 
were (a) the country was too small; (b) it would be dependent on aid for many years to come; (c) it was 
unstable because of the racial conflict; (d) Jagan and the PPP had communist leanings; (e) instability 
might lead to an embarrassing request for British troops after independence. The arguments in favour 
were (a) the UK had never yet failed to sponsor a territory for membership; (b) some of the more recent 
admissions rendered the argument about size redundant; (c) to 'cold-shoulder' Jagan would be to drive 
him into the arms of Castro or Khrushchev- 'my impression is that Dr. Jagan is an unpractical idealistic 
nationalist devoted to Marxist economics rather than a dedicated Communist'; (d) as a member of the 
Commonwealth the country would be more likely to look west than east for aid; (e) there seemed to be a 
genuine attachment to the Crown in the population at large; (f) India and Ghana would oppose any 
attempt to keep British Guiana out; (g) the US was anxious that the Commonwealth connection should be 
maintained. On balance, therefore, Maudling recommended that an application should be supported (CAB 
134/2370, OP(62)8, 'British Guiana', memo by Maudling, 12 July 1962). The report of the commission of 
inquiry, chaired by Sir H Parry, was released in Oct 1962. It found that the January budget was not a threat 
to the economy of the country, or to capital investment, and that 'the real origin of the riots lay in political 
rivalries and jealousies which had finally found expression in the criminal acts of a few groups of 
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hooligans' (Report of a Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in British Guiana in February 1962, Col 
354, 1962, p 50). 
On the same day that Maudling circulated his views to the Oversea Policy Committee about British 
Guiana and the Commonwealth, Dean Rusk sent a memo to President Kennedy on US policy towards the 
territory which concluded: 'In the light of all the evidence that has now accumulated, I believe we are 
obliged to base our policy on the premise that, once independent, Cheddi Jagan will establish a "Marxist" 
regime in British Guiana and associate his country with the Soviet Bloc to a degree unacceptable to us for 
a state in the Western Hemisphere. Such a development would have severe adverse affects in the foreign 
relations field and obvious undesirable repercussions in this country' (Foreign Relations of the United 
States , 1961- 1963, vol XII, American Republics (Washington, 1996) pp 575- 576.) McGeorge Bundy, 
Kennedy's special assistant for national security affairs, commented that Rusk's analysis in favour of 
getting rid of Jagan had 'more energy than most State Department papers'. He agreed that Jagan would 'go 
the way of Castro'; he was weaker than Castro because he was more inefficient but this would make it 
easier for Moscow to control him. But while the case against supporting Jagan, or even trying to sustain 
peaceful co-existence with him, was clear, 'the case for the proposed tactics to be used in opposing him is 
not so clear. In particular, I think it is unproven that the CIA knows how to manipulate an election in 
British Guiana without backfire' (ibid, p 577, Bundy memo to Kennedy, 13 July 1962). 
186 CAB 134/1561, CPC(62)12 4 Apr 1962 
'The future of British Honduras': joint memorandum for Cabinet 
Colonial Policy Committee by Lord Home and Mr Maudling. Annex 
[Extract] 
Anglo-Guatemalan talks, to discuss practical measures for a reduction of the 
tensions which have recently prejudiced relations between the two countries, are due 
to be held in San Juan, Puerto Rico on Aprill6, 1962. A meeting of this kind was first 
proposed by the Guatemalan Foreign Minister during his visit to London in May 
1961. The background to these talks is as follows. It had been hoped that the ultimate 
future of British Honduras lay within the West Indian Federation. The Federation 
having collapsed, there are now only the following courses open to British 
Honduras:-
(a) An indefinite continuation of the status quo. This is not practical politics in 
the long run, if only for the following reasons. Politically, it is anachronistic to 
maintain a colony on the American continent in the 1960's: its existence 
complicates Her Majesty's Government's relations with all the Latin American 
States (who are passionately anti-colonial), and particularly with those in Central 
America. Indirectly, this also has repercussions on our relations with the United 
States. Militarily, the maintenance of a garrison in British Honduras is a 
commitment which we ought to shed as soon as possible. Financially, British 
Honduras costs Her Majesty's Government half a million pounds per annum 
simply to balance the budget. Added to these general disadvantages is our long-
standing dispute with Guatemala, which is costing us about £1 million per annum 
in lost trade already and, if the Guatemalan Government decides to break relations 
with us, could lead to the loss of substantial British assets as well. 
(b) A merger with Guatemala. The great majority of the population of British 
Honduras are believed to be opposed to union with Guatemala. Only among the so 
called "Ladinos" is there believed to be support for union with Guatemala. Mr. 
Price (leader of the Peoples' [sic] United Party and First Minister) abandoned this 
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cause because it no longer seemed to command majority support. Moreover 
Guatemala is an inefficiently administered and poverty stricken state dependent on 
the United States for budgetary as well as development aid: it is also governed at 
present by an unstable and highly "personalist" form of Government which could 
hardly be called democratic. Her Majesty's Government could not follow a course 
which led to the unfortunate British Hondurans being linked indissolubly with 
such a country against the will of a majority of them. The Mexicans maintain that 
their claim is superior to that of the Guatemalans, although they do not press it 
with us, and they have always made clear that they could not accept anything like a 
merger between British Honduras and Guatemala. 
(c) Some form of independence. There are virtually no visible prospects of the 
territory becoming economically viable, unless incorporated within some larger 
economic framework. Nevertheless, it is tacitly accepted in British Honduras that in 
fact independence is our goal, and if other Latin Americans do not give Guatemala 
more support it is because they have come to believe this too. The Guatemalans 
themselves probably believe that we have conceded the principle of independence. 
2. What is needed is a formula which fulfils the following requirements:-
(a) Her Majesty's Government are relieved as soon as practicable of their 
commitment to defend and give full financial support to British Honduras; 
(b) Guatemala's aspirations to see British Honduras associated closely with 
Central America and so with her are satisfied far enough to enable our relations to 
return to normal. 
(c) An alternative source for British Honduras financial needs is provided; 
(d) British Honduras is given adequate protection against Guatemala's old 
ambition to annex the territory. 
(e) Mexican susceptibilities are satisfied. 
3. The proposed solution 
These requirements could, be met as follows:-
(a) The time is not far distant when we should be considering a further 
constitutional advance in British Honduras. It is proposed that talks should be 
held in 1963 between Her Majesty's Government and British Honduras leaders 
with a view to settling the next stage of advance. It is possible that the present 
British Honduras Government will be in no hurry thereafter to press for full 
internal self-government (if that is not granted as a result of the 1963 talks) or 
independence. But it will appear to all in the Americas that these are likely to 
follow. Further Guatemalan efforts to continue to treat British Honduras as a lost 
province will therefore carry less conviction. 
(b) On the assumption that British Honduras would eventually attain 
independence she should at that stage, if it were the wish of the people, be 
admitted on to: -
(i) ODECA (The Organisation of Central American States) and to the parallel 
economic grouping, which is an embryonic Common Market set up by a series 
of treaties culminating in the General Treaty for Central American Economic 
Integration of December, 1960. If the British Hondurans agreed, we should also 
support any proposal for British Honduras to be admitted if possible as an 
associate member of ODECA prior to independence. 
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(ii) The Organisation of American States, in which as an independent, even if 
small, Latin American state, British Honduras would naturally qualify for aid 
under the Alliance for Progress programme. 
4. By providing for the territory's association with the growing movement for eco-
nomic and political integration in Central America and by visualising an end to its 
colonial status these proposals would remove most of the driving force from 
Guatemala's efforts to annex it. If these nevertheless persisted, membership of the 
O.A.S. would give the territory the guarantees against aggression which are enjoyed 
by all other members and which have proved effective, particularly in Central America. 
Financially, the current budgetary deficit and development requirements would best 
be covered by aid received within the general framework of the Alliance for Progress. 
The source for this aid would of course be the United States. Although there is strong 
congressional feeling against using Alliance for Progress funds for shoring up Latin 
American deficits, the fact remains that the United States are still, as they have for 
many years past, providing budgetary aid for many Latin American Governments, 
including that of Guatemala itself. Aid for British Honduras would not be an obliga-
tion which either the O.A.S. or the United States in particular could easily avoid: all 
members of the O.A.S. including the United States (pace their views on British 
Guiana) have never left any doubt about what they feel on the subject of the contin-
ued existence of colonies, particularly on the American continent, and all are wedded 
to the principle of self-determination on which the whole scheme would rest. 
5. There are other reasons why the United States Government may be expected 
to welcome a solution to the British Honduras dispute, even if it increased (slightly 
in relation to the total) their existing commitments under the Alliance for Progress 
programme. The dispute is embarrassing to them since they owe loyalties both to 
Guatemala as an O.A.S. partner and to us. If the Guatemalans went to desperate 
lengths as they have threatened to do and Her Majesty's Government had to defend 
the colony by force, or if the Guatemalans created a situation which enabled them to 
appeal to the United Nations, both parties would appeal to the United States who 
would then be ip an impossible position, both at the United Nations and in the O.A.S. 
The United States would almost certainly prefer to provide the necessary aid through 
the Alliance for Progress to British Honduras as an additional member of the O.A.S. 
than direct in response to an appeal from us; the latter course could raise insuperable 
constitutional and political obstacles and would in any case imply a direct transfer to 
the United States of our status as the Colonial power. 
6. These proposals do not prejudice, one way or the other, the question of future 
membership in the Commonwealth for British Honduras. The Working Party on the 
Future of the Commonwealth has reported that Brit ish Honduras is one territory for 
which a solution other than full independence within the Commonwealth may be 
possible. But the proposals do not make impossible future membership of the 
Commonwealth if this was the wish of the British Hondurans. 
7. It is proposed that at the talks with the Guatemalan Government the United 
Kingdom Delegation should be guided by a brief on the lines of the attached draft, 
particularly in regard to paragraphs 7 to 10 thereof. Subject to the agreement of our 
colleagues we therefore recommend that:-
(a) The leader of the British delegation at the forthcoming talks should have 
authority to outline proposals for constitutional advances in British Honduras as 
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indicated in paragraph 3 above, and to speak in general terms about the future of 
the territory along the lines indicated in paragraphs 7-10 of the attached draft 
brief. 
(b) The United States Government should be informed (but not consulted) about 
the proposals outlined in this memorandum and in the draft brief for the possible 
future association of British Honduras with the states of Central America and with 
the O.A.S. 
(c) A similar communication should be made to the Mexican government. 
Annex to 186: Paragraphs 7- 10 of the brief for the UK delegation at the Anglo-
Guatemalan talks 
U.K proposals 
7. At this stage, the United Kingdom Delegation, after rebutting unacceptable 
Guatemalan claims and proposals, should say that for the information of the 
Guatemalan Government, Her Majesty's Government see the future of British 
Honduras as follows. It is, as stated, impossible to pre-judge the future of the Colony. 
However, assuming that the orderly process of constitutional evolution continues, it 
is Her Majesty's Government's hope that, if British Honduras Ministers agree, talks 
will be held in 1963 with a view to settling the next stage of constitutional advance. 
As regards a final political settlement, it will of course be for the people of British 
Honduras to consider the form of settlement they desire. It would be pointless to try 
to predict now what that will be. The inhabitants of British Honduras may very well 
choose to seek full independence; it is well known that Her Majesty's Government 
regard such requests as the natural fulfilment of their colonial policy. If in these 
circumstances British Honduras does seek independence, the overriding problem 
against which the decision will have to be made will be that of economic viability. In 
bringing forward Colonial territories to independence, Her Majesty's Government 
seek to ensure that their economies are viable or can be made so in a relatively short 
time. This poses a particular problem in relation to British Honduras. For not only is 
that country entirely dependent on external aid for its development expenditure, but 
it is also dependent on grant assistance from the United Kingdom in order to balance 
its annual recurrent budget. It will obviously be unable to make ends meet on 
recurrent account without external aid for some years to come. Before embarking on 
independence, British Honduras would want to be assured that it would be able to 
count on satisfactory and thoroughly dependable arrangements for the provision of 
this special assistance for as long as it were necessary. 
8. If proposals were advanced which would lead to replacing British Honduras ' 
present financial relationship with Her Majesty's Government by financial 
dependence on some other country, this could not be regarded among the opponents 
of colonialism as any improvement on the present practice. British Honduras has 
historic links with Britain. It may be that after a final constitutional settlement, 
British Honduras will always wish to maintain some special relationship with the 
U.K. Correspondingly, Her Majesty's Government believes that an independent 
British Honduras situated on the mainland of Latin America should be able to turn 
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with confidence to the Latin American countries and particularly to her other 
American neighbours for support. 
9. Her Majesty's Government would think it appropriate if both the O.A.S. and 
the Organisation of Central American States (O.D.E.C.A.) could give consideration to 
the future relationship of British Honduras with themselves. This need surely not 
await the attaining of full independence of British Honduras? Her Majesty's 
Government understand that the Charters of neither the O.A.S. not O.D.E.C.A. 
provide for associate membership; but Her Majesty's Government would be glad, 
assuming that British Honduras Ministers so wish, if those bodies were to examine 
ways in which British Honduras might be associated with them, preparatory to full 
memberships in the period prior to a final constitutional settlement. Collective help, 
provided through such organs in the O.A.S. as the Inter-American Development Bank 
or through such United Nations agencies as the International Development 
Authority would be the surest way to avoid the danger mentioned in paragraph 8. 
Her Majesty's Government would also think it appropriate that the O.A.$. should 
consider ways in which they might in due time be able to help the government of an 
independent British Honduras to overcome its financial difficulties both on 
development account and in the matter of its annual recurrent deficit. 
Proposals for a modus vivendi 
10. A declaration on these lines would enable the Delegation effectively to counter 
any Guatemalan offer (however spurious) of substantial aid to British Honduras. But 
since an ex parte statement on these lines cannot easily be discussed with the 
Guatemalans there may at this point be a danger that the talks would break down. The 
Guatemalans are for their part, also likely to repeat proposals which the Delegation 
could not entertain. They are indeed bound to do their best to keep discussion alive 
on this subject for as long as possible, if only for the sake of the record. We should do 
what we can to meet them in this understandable aim. However, a point will sooner 
or later be reached at which the delegation will have to state that further progress on 
these lines does not appear at this stage to be possible; and urge that further study 
should be made of the relations between an independent British Honduras and Latin 
American states. At this point the Delegation might submit that the E.C.L.A. 
Secretariat be invited to put into effect the resolutions passed at the Ninth Session in 
1961 requesting the Secretariat to explore ways of associating British Honduras with 
the Central American Committee on Economic Integration. The Delegation should 
then suggest that the parties should now consider ways of achieving a modus vivendi 
in the period up to a final constitutional settlement in British Honduras . ... 1 
1 At the talks in Puerto Rico the UK delegation was led by Lord Dundee, minister of state at the FO. British 
Honduras was represented by Price and W H Courtenay, a lawyer and speaker of the Legislative Assembly. 
The Guatemalan delegation was led by Senor Viteri, president of the Guatemalan Congress Foreign Affairs 
Committee. At the outset Dundee stated that the UK would not hinder British Honduras deciding its own 
future or uniting with Guatemala if it so desired. Realising that British Honduras would not opt for union 
with Guatemala, Viteri, in Dundee's account of the talks, refused to agree to any communique mentioning 
either self-government or independence. Instead he fell back on the argument that British Honduras 
could never be economically viable and that self-determination for a territory with a population of only 
90,000 had no meaning. Viteri proposed that British Honduras should eventually become part of a Central 
American Federation and that as a first step there should be a transitiomil regime in which British 
Honduras and Guatemala would be politically associated while preparing to join the federation together 
(CAB 21/5296, report by Dundee, nd, c 25 Apr 1962). 
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187 CAB 134/1561, CPC(62)14 6 Apr 1962 
'Federation of the Eight': memorandum by Mr Maudling for Cabinet 
Colonial Policy Committee. Annex 
I attach a background paper, putting forward detailed proposals for handling the 
report of the recent Conference of Ministers from Barbados and the Leeward and 
Windward Islands, in which they have recommended the setting up of a "Federation 
of the Eight." 
2. The arrangements which the West Indian Ministers propose for a Federation 
are basically similar to those for the present Federation. There would be a 
Governor-General, a Senate, a Federal House of Representatives (of about 20 mem-
bers, of whom 6 would be from Barbados), and a Federal Supreme Court. There 
would be Queen's Representatives in each of the units, and each unit would have a 
legislature and a ministerial form of government as at present, though the number 
of Ministers might be slightly reduced. The units would have full internal self-gov-
ernment. The new Federal Government, however, would have greater powers than 
the present one by having its own sources of revenue, derived in the first instance 
from customs and excise duties, currency profits and postal services, and (after five 
years) from income tax. It would also have concurrent powers, with Federal law 
prevailing, over loans, banking, labour and industrial development. There would be 
freedom of movement of persons within the Federation. The Conference appear to 
envisage the early grant of independence to this Federation shortly after it has been 
set up. The most unusual feature of their proposals is that on the strength of some 
calculations put forward by Professor Arthur Lewis, they appear to envisage making 
do with external aid of only £1.76 million a year as compared with the present level 
of external aid from the United Kingdom which is in the region of £3 million per 
annum, (though appearances in this respect may be deceptive, and, once they have 
got us to accept their plans for Federation, they may well come back to us with 
more ambitious plans for assistance.) They recommend that grant in aid should 
taper by 15% per annum over the next five years and should, in effect, cease in 
1968. 
3. The attached paper suggests that there are three courses open to Her Majesty's 
Government:-
(a) The first is that we should reject any possibility of setting up a Federation of 
the Eight. It is suggested that such a course could have only two possible 
consequences. The first is that we should be saddled with eight separate little 
island units for an indefinite period into the future. The second possibility is that 
the units might seriously consider accepting Trinidad's offer to join Trinidad in a 
unitary state. If the units remain under our direct control I fear that, in view of 
their being grant-aided and of the accumulating evidence of the way they are 
mismanaging their own affairs, I shall have to take back some of the constitutional 
powers which have been granted to these islands in recent years. This is likely to 
be an unpopular course which may lead to trouble. On the other hand, I do not 
think the idea of these territories joining with Trinidad in a unitary state in the 
immediate future has much chance of success. Trinidad is facing serious internal 
difficulties of its own, both political and financial, and it would take over some of 
the Leeward and Windward Islands from us now only at a price which we should 
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not be prepared to pay. I am not therefore in favour of rejecting the proposals of 
the Federation of the Eight out of hand. 
(b) The second course is that we should accept the proposals put forward to us by 
the Conference as a basis of discussion. The attractions of this course are first that 
it should be easy to secure agreement, secondly that we could move ahead fairly 
rapidly, and thirdly that the Governments appear to be ready to settle for external 
assistance from the United Kingdom on a scale lower than that which we are 
giving at present. I suggest that if we accept this course, we should agree to the 
Federation moving to independence as quickly as possible and almost as soon as it 
is set up, despite the fact that they will have to remain for some time in receipt of 
grant in aid. My reason for making this suggestion is that under these proposals I 
shall have no power whatever to put to rights the maladministration which is 
taking place in the small islands and, having no power, I might as well be rid of the 
responsibility. In my view, however, the financial irresponsibility and 
administrative incompetence of most of the units is such that to accept the kind of 
Federation proposed by the Little Eight, together with their other terms, would 
mean that they would go rapidly downhill both politically and economically in a 
comparatively short time. 
(c) The third possibility is that we should put forward counter-proposals of our 
own for a Federation in which the Federal Government would be very much 
stronger than that proposed in the Conference Report. Indeed it would in all but 
name be a unitary state. To take this course would be a departure from the attitude 
we have taken in recent years, when we have generally adopted the line that it was 
for the West Indians to come forward to us with proposals showing what they 
wanted. It would be necessary to make our proposals public before the Chief 
Ministers came to a conference, so that there could be as much public discussion 
of them as possible. 
4. I am in favour of adopting the third course, since I consider that it offers the 
opportunity of producing a greater measure of political stability in the West Indies at 
less expense to us than either of the other two. It would reduce the trappings of 
government considerably and should not only produce more efficient administration 
but also, by reducing the numbers of people holding electoral office, it should lessen 
the opportunities for corruption. In consequence there would be a better prospect 
that the British grant-in-aid would be spent honestly and efficiently. In view of the 
· parochialism of these small islands, however, it will not be an easy course to carry 
through successfully and we shall probably have to exert considerable pressure on 
the Little Eight to get them to accept. For this reason I would suggest that our 
proposals should be set out in a despatch or published, and that we take our 
proposals as the basis of discussion. 
Annex to 187 
Introduction 
The Chief Ministers of the Leeward and Windward Islands and the Premier of 
Barbados held a Conference in Barbados from the 26th February-3rd March to 
consider the possibility of establishing a Federation of their eight territories. A copy 
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of the Summary of Decisions of this Conference together with a copy of a 
Memorandum addressed to me by the Premier of Barbados, who was chairman of the 
Conference, is attached to this paper.1 
2. The genesis of this proposal was described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of my 
memorandum C.P.C. (62) 5.2 In my statement to the House of Commons on 
February 6th, I welcomed the proposal for a Federation of these eight territories as a 
promising development but one requiring a great deal of careful study here and in 
The West Indies before any final decision could be taken. 
3. When the Governments concerned announced their intention of holding a 
Conference on 26th February, I sent them a message welcoming their decision and 
saying that I looked forward to receiving the results of their deliberations as soon as 
possible. After the Conference had started, I arranged for them to be given a 
document setting out my preliminary views of the kind of criteria which a Federation 
of the Eight ought to satisfy if it is to stand a chance of success and of rendering a 
genuine service to the territories of Barbados and the Leeward and Windward 
Islands. Briefly, the first criterion I suggested was that such a Federation should be 
marked by a strong central government with consequentially diminished powers in 
the individual islands. In particular I suggested that the federal government should 
be able to exercise general financial control and be effectively responsible for 
economic development. Secondly, I suggested that the forms of government in a 
federation of such small territories should be greatly simplified as compared with 
those existing at present. Thirdly, I expressed the view that as most of the territories 
of the Eight are heavily grant-aided, a serious examination would be required to be 
undertaken of what is necessary to ensure their viability. 
The main features of the present proposals 
4. The main features of the proposals put forward by the Conference can be 
quickly summarised. In general form the new Federation would be similar to the 
present one. It would have the same name- The West Indies-and would have a 
Governor-General as Queen's Representative; a Senate (consisting of one 
representative from each island); a House of Representatives (elected on a formula 
which would give Barbados about 6 members and each of the other islands 2 
members-except Montserrat, which would have 1). There would also be a Federal 
Supreme Court. In addition the Unit constitutions would give the Units full internal 
self-government in their own sphere; each Unit would have a Legislature and a 
Cabinet under a Premier (though the Conference itself appears to envisage some 
reduction in the number of Ministers), and each Unit would have a Queen's 
Representative (to be styled "Commissioner" instead of "Governor" or 
"Administrator" as at present). The main differences from the present Federation are, 
first, that this new federal government would have its own sources of revenue, 
derived in the first instance from customs and excise duties, currency profits and 
postal services. After five years the new Federation would also have powers of income 
tax. It would therefore not be dependent, as is the present Federation, on subventions 
from the Units. Furthermore the Conference has proposed certain additions to both 
the exclusive and the concurrent legislative lists, which would undoubtedly give the 
new Federation greater powers, particularly in the field of economic development, 
1 Not printed. 2 cf 178, note 3. 
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than has the present Federation. In particular they propose that industrial 
development, labour legislation, loans and commercial banking should be 
concurrent subjects (with Federal law prevailing). On the question of independence 
for this Federation, they appear to propose that it should be granted independence 
very shortly after it is set up. 
5. Particularly important are the proposals concerning finance and economic 
development. What the Conference would appear to have in mind is not adequately 
set out in the Summary of Conclusions attached to this paper. They are described 
more fully in a report which was made to the Conference by Professor Arthur Lewis. 
His proposals are designed to reduce the dependence of the Leeward and Windward 
Islands on external aid. They are based on three main assumptions:-
(a) that the output of commodities over the next decade can increase by 30% in 
the Leeward Islands, 35% in the Windward Islands, and 36% in Barbados; 
(b) that there is roughly a threefold increase in the value of receipts from tourism, 
and 
(c) that Civil Service salaries remain at their present level and are not allowed to 
rise with any increases which might occur in other incomes and prices. 
Given these assumptions, Professor Lewis estimates that the islands could balance 
their recurrent budgets by 1967. The United Kingdom Government, however, should 
contribute towards their capital expenditure. In terms of figures, this means 
(according to Professor Lewis) that grant-in-aid would be tapered down from BWI $9 
million to BWI $2 million over the next five years and then be stabilised at this level. 
Simultaneously a capital fund would require to be established for the Leeward and 
Windward Islands, guaranteed for the next five years at a rate of BWI $7 million a 
year. On the strength of these proposals the Conference have recommended that 
grants-in-aid towards the recurrent expenditure in the Leeward and Windward 
Islands should continue, tapering down by 15% per annum until 1968. They further 
recommend:-
(a) that the amount of grant-in-aid to each territory should be fixed in advance 
and not be subject to annual negotiation or bargaining, and 
(b) that it should be paid direct to the Unit Government and not through the 
Federal Government (as at present) . 
They further request a grant of BWI $4 million towards the initial cost of 
establishing the Federal capital (in Barbados) , and that there should be an early 
meeting with the U.K. Government to determine what is needed to secure the 
rapid economic development of the islands. 
H.M. G.'s attitude to closer association between the Eight 
6. In my view it is desirable that we should make up our minds on the merits of 
these proposals, particularly on whether we are prepared to use them as a basis of 
discussion, fairly quickly. The Governments of the Eight in fact put forward a 
resolution that we should summon a conference to discuss their proposals before the 
existing Federation is dissolved, with a view to making arrangements for the 
establishment of the new Federation. Before considering the merits of these 
particular proposals (which I do in paragraphs 7- 9 below), I should say that my 
general conclusion is that some kind of association between the eight territories 
would be preferable to their continuing to exist as eight separate Administrations. It 
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would afford a better opportunity of providing certain common services for them 
more economically. It would offer a better hope of their achieving some degree of 
viability through an integrated economic development plan and of their sustaining 
independence sooner or later. The only alternative possibility would be that 
individually they should accept the offer of the Premier of Trinidad to join him in a 
unitary state. This was the course which seemed to find most favour when the matter 
was discussed by the C.P.C. on 2nd February3 and it clearly has many attractions. It 
may well be that if we accept a Federation of the Eight, we shall be left with two 
countries in the Eastern Caribbean, each with less than a million people: the one 
Trinidad (politically unstable), and the other (the Eight) economically unviable. It is 
possible to argue that the union of even some of the Eight with Trinidad would, by 
increasing the Negro majority over the Indians, help to promote political stability, 
while access to Trinidad's resources would help to remedy some, at least, of the 
economic weaknesses of the Eight. Nevertheless, despite the attractions of absorbing 
even some of the Eight into a unitary state with Trinidad, I am now very doubtful 
whether there is much prospect of its happening-at any rate within any period 
ahead that we can foresee. The Premier of Trinidad has a talent for making enemies 
and his behaviour during my visit appears to have alienated the Governments of the 
Little Eight. Their recent Conference has, for the time being at least, given them a 
feeling of solidarity and strengthened their antipathy to Trinidad. Furthermore, in 
view of the internal situation in Trinidad itself, where bitter opposition appears to be 
developing to the Government and where the Government itself may be heading for 
serious financial trouble as a result of its extravagences, there is every indication that 
Dr. Williams is not now keen on the immediate absorption of any of the Little Eight. 
He would like Her Majesty's Government to hang on to them for two or three years 
until he is in a stronger position, and then take them over. Even then, he would, as a 
price for relieving the British Government of this responsibility, demand assistance 
on a scale which we should not be prepared to pay. (From his public statements he 
would probably ask for £71 million over a ten-year period). There would also be 
absolutely no guarantee when the time came that, even if Trinidad were willing to 
take them, all of the Eight would be willing to go, and we might be left with more 
bits of debris (like the Virgin Islands and the Turks and Caicos), with even less 
prospect of fitting them into any working scheme of association with other 
territories. I am therefore in favour of some kind of closer association among the 
Eight in preference to the other possible courses immediately open to us; and I 
would not rule out the possibility that if we can devise such an association and make 
it work, it might be possible within the not too distant future for it to enter into some 
kind of union with Trinidad. 
Weaknesses of the present proposals 
7. Turning now, against this general background, to the merits of these 
particular proposals, an examination of them has shown that they have serious 
weaknesses. In the first place this set of constitutional proposals is closely bound up 
with the financial and economic plans of Professor Arthur Lewis and the 
assumptions on which they are based, which I have described in paragraph 5 above. 
It is in my view extremely doubtful whether these assumptions are realistic. To be 
3 See ibid. 
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certain on the point would require an examination which would probably take an 
expert a month or six weeks to perform; but I am advised that the increase in the 
output of the commodities envisaged by Professor Lewis does in fact appear to be 
considerably higher than has been achieved over the past decade. Of all the major 
commodities produced in the area, only bananas have shown a substantial increase, 
and the output of most other commodities is not only not rising but in some cases 
has fallen substantially. Secondly, there is in Professor Lewis's projections a hidden 
assumption that any increase in the volume of production will not be counteracted 
by a fall in price. In fact, however, the principal commodities on which the area is 
dependent-sugar and bananas-are facing highly uncertain market conditions and 
prices may well fall over the next few years. Thirdly, Professor Lewis maintains that 
Civil Service salaries will have to be kept at their present level even though other 
prices rise. In the smaller islands it is already difficult enough to get civil servants of 
decent calibre and, as a result, much of the assistance we have given to them has 
been misspent. In my view, if Professor Lewis's recommendation is implemented, the 
Civil Services in their higher levels at any rate would be in danger of running down 
completely. On the other hand, his assumption that there might be a threefold 
increase in incomes derived from tourism may not be out of the question. 
8. In view of the exorbitant demands for aid put forward by The West Indies in 
the past, it is surprising that they now appear to be contemplating independence in a 
Federation, with assistance from us of only some £1.76 million per annum as 
compared with the present level of aid which is running at something like £3 million 
per annum. There is a temptation to accept such an offer at such a bargain price. 
Appearances here, however, are likely to be deceptive; and it is probable that, having 
first persuaded us to accept their Federation in principle, the Governments of the 
Little Eight will then conduct a detailed exercise to prove that £1.76 million is far 
from adequate to their needs. We should also consider whether we have any interest 
or responsibility in ensuring that Professor Lewis's proposals are based upon 
reasonable and realistic assumptions. 
9. The second major weakness of these proposals is political and constitutional. 
Although they envisage the new Federal Government having greater powers than the 
present one, particularly in finance and economic development, they still leave very 
considerable powers in the hands of the Units. In form, the new Federation is a 
replica of the old, with all the paraphernalia of 9 "Queen's Representatives" and about 
35 "Ministers" to handle the affairs of less than 700,000 people. This is altogether too 
much harness for so small a horse. Indeed, it is clear to me that the Unit Ministers, 
although claiming to support the idea of a stronger federation, have in fact been at 
pains to keep a good deal of power in the hands of the Units. This is serious. 
Information which has come to light in the past few months has shown a grave 
situation developing in the administration of most of the Leeward and Windward 
Islands. The constitutional changes introduced in 1959,4 although they fall short of 
full internal self-government, give Unit Ministers a very considerable degree of 
control over their own affairs, especially over their own finances. This step was no 
doubt justified when it seemed fairly certain that the Federation would proceed 
rapidly to independence and it was desired to raise all the Units constitutionally to 
the status of Jamaica, Trinidad and Barbados. In practice, however, in most cases the 
4 See 98, note 1. 
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results have been unfortunate. The small island Ministers have shown themselves 
financially irresponsible and administratively incompetent. Antigua is virtually 
bankrupt. In Montserrat it would seem that most of the United Kingdom assistance 
funds have been utterly misspent. In Grenada the new Chief Minister-a ruthless 
demagogic gangster-appears to have incurred considerable sums of unauthorised 
expenditure and is using all the means which the courts provide to resist any proper 
inquiry. In most cases the Unit Chief Ministers regard any form of political 
opposition as downright subversion. They take the same view of any advice submitted 
by civil servants which runs contrary to their views; and most of them have been 
guilty of interfering improperly with the Civil Service and of making threats against 
any civil servant who did not appear thoroughly loyal to their party. If the proposals 
embodied in this report are accepted, they will perpetuate this state of affairs beyond 
remedy and these small islands will degenerate into little paradises for political boss 
rule. I should make it plain that Barbados itself is an exception to these strictures. 
There, there is a healthy party system and, by West Indian standards, a reasonably 
competent Civil Service not unduly subject to political interference. 
Courses open to H.M. G. 
10. There appear to me to be three courses open to us. The first is that we should 
reject any possibility of setting up a Federation of the Eight. This course I do not 
recommend. The idea of some kind of a federation among these Units has caught on 
and for us not to give it some serious consideration will be regarded as a sharp rebuff 
by the governments concerned. They might, under these circumstances, open 
negotiations with Trinidad with a view to joining Trinidad as a unitary state. In view 
of Trinidad's own internal difficulties, however, I do not think that this is an idea 
which Trinidad itself will pursue very seriously in the immediate future or that it 
would promote the general stability of the area if they did. The result would most 
probably be that we should have these eight separate Units on our hands for an 
indefinite period. They would have to continue to be heavily grant-aided and, in view 
of the way in which most of them have been mismanaging their affairs, I should 
under these circumstances have to assume a greater control over their affairs than 
any which we have had in the past three years. This, although it might be good for 
the islands, would be a serious reversal of policy and one which would expose us in 
some quarters to a good deal of criticism. It might also face us with a good deal of 
unrest in the territories concerned and prove expensive. 
11. The second alternative is that, basically, we should accept the proposals 
which have been put to us by the Conference, subject to working out the details. The 
attractions of this course are:-
(a) that it should be easy to secure agreement on this basis with the governments 
concerned; 
(b) we could move ahead with it fairly rapidly; 
(c) we might be able to settle at once as part of the bargain for external assistance 
from the United Kingdom on a scale no higher than that envisaged by Professor 
Arthur Lewis. 
I suggest, however, that if we accept this course we also agree that the Federation 
should move to independence as rapidly as possible and almost as soon as it is 
established, despite the fact that we shall be supplying it with grant-in-aid. My 
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reasons for making this recommendation are that under the scheme proposed in this 
report, we shall have no power whatsoever to put to rights the state of affairs in the 
smaller islands. If we kept this proposed Federation as a dependency under the 
arrangements they propose, we should still have a theoretical responsibility for their 
affairs with absolutely no power (short of the ultimate power to amend or suspend 
the constitutional arrangements) to put anything right if things went wrong. It 
would therefore be to our advantage to get rid of our responsibility under these 
circumstances completely. I should however warn my colleagues that in my view, for 
the reasons described in paragraph 9 above there is a grave risk that the whole area 
will go rapidly downhill both politically and economically within a comparatively 
short time. I must also point out that this course would create a precedent for 
granting bilateral budgetary aid to an independent country, and for granting political 
independence to a country which had no hope of financial independence. 
12. The third possibility is that we should put forward counter-proposals of our 
own and invite the Governments to a conference here to discuss them at an early 
date. These counter-proposals would be designed to increase considerably the powers 
of the Federal Government and to reduce the administrative trappings of the Units 
accordingly. In fact, though we would not admit as much, they would be designed to 
make the Federation much more like a unitary state. If we could publish these 
counter-proposals in advance of a conference, I believe we should find considerable 
support for them not only in The West Indies but also in this country on both sides of 
the House. 
13. The main features of the counter-proposals which we might put forward are 
as follows:-
(a) We should add to the concurrent powers of the Federation a provision whereby 
the Federal Legislature could by simple majority declare any subject to be 
concurrent, and add by way of explanation that in our view all services should be 
run on a federal basis unless there were strong reasons why this should not be the 
case (e.g. as in education because of religious difficulties). 
(b) Federal powers should be so constructed as to ensure a flow of funds to the 
centre. For this purpose income tax should become an exclusive Federal subject 
from the beginning, but there should be a fiscal inquiry into the way in which the 
Federation would be financed and the division of revenues between the Federal 
Government and the Units. One of my reasons for making this proposal is that, if 
political and financial power is concentrated at the centre in this way, the political 
leaders from the islands will go to the Federal Government, and Unit politics (with 
all the corruption and chicanery that goes with them) will have much less 
importance. 
(c) The Conference has itself proposed that the Federal Government shall have the 
power to set up "Commissions of Enquiry in respect of any matter tending to 
undermine good government or financial stability in any part of the Federation." I 
would accept this proposal but further suggest that there should be a further 
provision (on the lines of that in the Nigerian Constitution) whereby the Federal 
Government could take over the administration of any island in the event of the 
collapse of the administration in an individual unit. 
(d) As for Unit constitutions, I would propose that in the place of the present 
Ministerial system they should be governed by elected Councils in which the 
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legislative and executive functions were fused and which should be presided over 
by an elected Commissioner acting as chairman. If the Federation still wished to 
preserve a Senate, we might provide that these elected Commissioners should in 
addition sit as an Upper House, with certain revisionary functions. Otherwise I 
propose that the Federal Senate should be abolished. 
(e) I think it will probably be necessary that grants-in-aid should be given to the 
Federal and not the Unit Governments. Subject to this and to discussions of this 
proposal with the Treasury, I would be prepared to settle for a tapering block grant 
over a fixed period of years with no detailed financial control by H.M.G., on the 
understanding (as in Aden) that it is immutable except under exceptional 
circumstances. 
14. I think it would be necessary to offer to such a Federation the prospect of 
early independence and, further, that it would be to our advantage to do so, because 
even under this much more centralised system I should still not have the power to 
ensure directly that proper standards of administration were maintained or that 
United Kingdom moneys were properly spent. I should also point out to my 
colleagues that to adopt the positive line envisaged in this third course would be a 
considerable departure from the line we have taken in recent years in dealing with 
The West Indies, when we have adopted the attitude that it was for them to come 
forward to us with proposals showing what they wished to achieve. I nevertheless feel 
that if we press this third course with sufficient energy and state our case for it 
clearly to the public both here and in The West Indies, there would be a good 
prospect of our carrying it through. Furthermore, I believe it would offer better 
prospects of securing a measure of political stability and making progress in this area 
at less expense to Her Majesty's Government than any other course. 
188 CO 1031/3375, no 92 6 Apr 1962 
'Federation of the Eight': CO brief for Mr Maudling on questions 
raised by the CRO and Treasury 
The draft of this paper1 was submitted to the Treasury and to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office before being circulated. They agreed to its circulation but have given 
notice that they will probably brief their Ministers to raise certain points during 
discussion. These points are listed below, together with suggestions for dealing with 
them. 
1. Why are the Cayman.s, the Turks and Caicos and the Virgin Islands not included 
in these proposals? 
The Conference of the Chief Ministers related only to those of the Leeward and 
Windward Islands which are included in the present Federation. The British Virgin 
Islands, although they were formerly part of the Federation of the Leeward Islands, 
have never been part of the Federation of The West Indies.2 They declined to come in 
when the Federation was formed. Economically they tend to look much more 
towards the United States Virgin Islands and it may well be that eventually their 
1 See 187. 2 cf 145. 
[188] APR 1962 511 
political destiny lies in the same direction. The Department, however, hope to put 
forward in the fairly near future certain proposals for the economic development of 
the Virgin Islands. If they showed an interest in coming into a Federation of the 
Eight, we have the power under the new Bill to bring them in and we could, at the 
appropriate time, consider the desirability of exerting pressure upon them to take 
this course. It would however be advisable to consider their future as a separate 
problem. 
The Caymans and the Turks and Caicos Islands have never formed part of a 
federation with either the Leeward or the Windward Islands.3 Although territorially 
they have been a part of the Federation of The West Indies, administratively they 
have come under the Governor of Jamaica. We have not seriously considered linking 
them with a Federation of the Eight for the following reasons:-
(a) The Caymans are 1,200 miles from the nearest of the Leeward Islands and the 
Caicos Islands are about 800 miles away. 
(b) The Caymans have expressed a desire for direct dependence upon the United 
Kingdom and the Turks and Caicos, if they do not agree to go in with Jamaica, will 
probably express the same wish. If, however, in connection with the Federation of 
the Eight, we set up some United Kingdom organisation (such as the old 
Development and Welfare Organisation), it might be given some functions in rela-
tion to the Caymans and the Turks and Caicos Islands. The possibility, however, of 
establishing some special machinery of this kind has not yet been considered. 
2. Are we prepared to see political independence given to an area which appears to 
have such small hope of financial independence? 4 
This problem is no doubt raising its head in other areas besides the West Indies. The 
Little Eight themselves, at their Conference, drew particular attention to the fact 
that from 1942 to 1958 the British Government gave Libya a total of £27~ million as 
budgetary support in addition to some £6 million in development grants and loans. 
They claim that the British Government is still supporting Libya to the tune of some 
£3 million a year. This, of course, is all perfectly true: the difference being that Libya 
offers us something in return, namely a military base. Attention is drawn to the 
problem in paragraph 11 of the paper. 
3. If the Federal Government were given the sources of revenue proposed in 
paragraph 4 of the paper, what effect would this have on territorial revenues? 
This is a question which it would require a fiscal commissioner to decide. Such a 
fiscal commissioner would be required to make estimates of both Federal and 
territorial expenditure and make recommendations for relating these to possible 
sources of revenue. 
4. How would Britain's entry into the Common Market be likely to affect Professor 
Lewis's estimates of future production quoted in paragraph 5? 
As far as sugar is concerned, entry into the Common Market is not likely to make any 
difference. As regards the other main products, bananas and citrus, it is possible that 
3 cf 150. 
4 This was the point raised by the Treasury in particular: 'This would perhaps be the first case in which we 
have openly granted political independence to a dependent country while recognising that there is no 
hope of economic independence (I realise that Kenya may be first in this particular rat race)' (CO 
1031/3375, no 85, Treasury letter from C J Hayes to D Williams, 3 Apr 1962). 
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the West Indies' position might be marginally improved by Britain's entry into the 
Common Market, but not enough to make any significant difference. 
5. Assuming a Federation of the Eight were set up, what steps do the Colonial 
Office propose to take in the interim period to deal with the financial scandals that 
have arisen? 
Before we can answer this question, we really need to know how long is likely to 
elapse before the new Federation can come into existence. We are already trying to 
set on foot a financial inquiry in Grenada; we have had preliminary inquiries in both 
Montserrat and Antigua; and we have addressed some stern inquiries to St. Lucia 
about some of their shortcomings. To what extent we press these matters home will 
depend upon the amount of time we have at our disposal and upon the tactics which 
politically it proves desirable to adopt. 
6. VVhy are we in favour of a Federation of the Eight rather than of pushing the 
territories in with Trinidad? 
Paragraph 6 of the main paper attempts to deal with this question, but C.R.O. do not 
accept these arguments and are strongly in favour of our trying to push the Little 
Eight into a unitary state with Trinidad.5 They consider that this course is preferable 
to our allowing two small states to spring up, neither of which will have a population 
of more than three quarters of a million. While not questioning our judgment that 
there is little prospect at the moment of persuading the Eight to throw in their lot 
with Dr. Williams, they would prefer us to look forward to this solution eventually 
and to conduct for the moment a holding operation until Dr. Williams is ready to 
absorb the Eight. 
This is certainly a serious dilemma. The recent telegrams received from Dr. 
Williams on the one hand and the Chief Ministers of the Little Eight on the other 
show that, while Dr. Williams is afraid that we shall proceed with a Federation of the 
Eight and thereby foil his plans for a greater Trinidad, the Little Eight are equally 
afraid that we are going to drive them into the arms of Dr. Williams. If one felt more 
confident about the political future in Trinidad, then the right course would probably 
be to push the Little Eight into the arms of Trinidad (always assuming, of course, 
that H.M.G. were prepared to foot the bill for persuading Trinidad to relieve them of 
this responsibility). Our estimate of the political future of Trinidad being what it is, 
however, it hardly seems right that Her Majesty's Government should incur all the 
political odium which would face them if they tried to drive the Little Eight into the 
arms of Trinidad. 
5 CRO views are recorded in DO 200/111, no 2, brief by L B Walsh Atkins for Duncan Sandys, 10 Apr 1962. 
189 CO 103114321, no 18 27 Apr 1962 
[British Guiana]: letter from Sir R Grey toN B J Huijsman1 on a 
proposal to raise a local army 
Council of Ministers memorandum CP(62)187, about "Defence and Security: 
Training of local Forces", a copy of which I send with this,2 reached me at 6 p.m. 
1 Principal, CO, West Indian Dept 'B '. 2 Not printed. 
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yesterday, together with an agenda showing that the matter was to be discussed at 10 
a.m. this morning. As I read the Memorandum (and another paper about 
arrangements for Independence, about which I shall write separately), I seriously 
wondered whether Jagan and those advising him are sane. Two and a half weary years 
had not really led me to expect these terrible depths of idiocy. I therefore arranged to 
see Jagan first thing this morning, with the intention of telling him very bluntly that 
the time had come for him to get down out of the clouds, to face facts and to deal in 
realities. In the event, the impact was somewhat lessened by reason of the fact that 
he brought with him Ramsahoye3 in order to discuss the ridiculous fix in which the 
Government now finds itself through its own incompetence in letting the Opposition 
defeat the motion for the Third Reading of the Appropriation Bill last night, about 
which I have telegraphed today. Jagan admitted the Party's parliamentary 
incompetence and I took the opportunity to say in front of Ramsahoye that although 
it was painfully obvious that Minister of Finance Jacob4 did not know whether he was 
on his head or his feet, it behoved Benn,5 as Leader of the House, with some 
experience in the Legislature, to do better- but he had not even been there himself 
to vote. Later, when Ramsahoye was gone, I improved the shining hour by telling 
Jagan that most people who called on me were worried lest he should be a 
Communist, that I had (largely to the detriment of my own reputation) stuck to the 
view that he was not, but that I had always expressed the fear that we should come to 
much the same end because he and his Government were incompetent. He rather 
pathetically said that he knew many of those about him were not competent but they 
were what he had, he had to work through them and he had no others. He was less 
ready to admit his own faults! 
2. I had intended to write a tongue-in-cheek non-Personal Despatch forwarding 
the Memorandum, saying that I had received it only last night (without being 
consulted on the drafting, despite my constitutional responsibilities), that it was to 
be discussed in Council today but the system would not yield confirmation of the 
decision for some time and that as the Secretary of State was to be asked for 
constitutional change (para. 1(iv)), it was well to let him know the Ministers' 
proposals without waiting for the formal conclusion, and adding that I had told the 
Premier some time ago that if he kept to his view that internal security must, despite 
all the professional advice to the contrary, be entrusted to an Army rather than to an 
enlarged Police Force, he must seek provision from the Legislature and must show 
how he proposed to economize on existing commitments in order to produce the 
money for the Army without unbalancing the Budget. However, Jagan told me today 
that in view of the unhappy course of events in the Legislature last night, the 
meeting of the Council of Ministers was cancelled. I therefore concentrated on trying 
to get him to see the gross defects in his paper. 
3. I said that I was not this morning going to argue about the merits of an Army 
as against an enlarged Police Force; I was just stating the bald fact that this 
Government can not, without sacrificing some existing recurrent commitments not 
yet identified, produce even the least amount of money required under any of the 
schemes set out in the Memorandum. It is futile to say, as is said in (7) on p. 4:-
3 Or F H W Ramsahoye, attorney-general. 4 Or C Jacob, minister of finance. 
5 Mr B H Benn, minister of natural resources. 
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"It is expected that the expense or the major part of it will be carried by loan 
or grant from the United Kingdom." 
The United Kingdom Government will not spend its taxpayers' money on a project 
that it has repeatedly told the Premier who proposes it is not the economical and 
effective way of doing what is wanted. Nor will the Canadian Government. It is 
equally futile to write a Memorandum and end up, as this one does, with a gap of 
half-a-million dollars and give no indication of where it is to come from. It may be 
that Chairman Khrushchev will produce $413 million (or whatever is Jack Kelshall's6 
latest figure), but he will not produce it for budget-balancing purposes. And anyone 
that does produce money for budget-balance exercises (if anyone does) will insist on 
the usual prerogative of the grant-aider, namely, control of the finances of the 
territory grant-aided. Jagan took this point. 
4. I said that the proper line along which he should seek a solution was the 
political line. He wanted an Army because the Opposition were (he said) seeking to 
overthrow the Government by unlawful means; he could not have an Army because 
he could not pay for it; he could not pay for it because he could not get his Budget 
through the Legislature; he could not get the Budget through because it was 
unacceptable to so many people, including some of his own followers; because the 
Budget was unacceptable strength was given to the Opposition moves against him. 
This vicious circle would be broken if inter-community harmony could be restored; 
there would still be need for a good internal security force, but certainly no need for 
an Army; and if the Opposition could be made to share in the responsibility for 
running the country, then many of the Government projects that were now held up 
because of Opposition activities might be able to get going. I also sought to get him 
to see the complete folly of basing his thinking on the rapid creation of "an Army" of 
the kind that he was proposing; it would not in fact enable the Government to govern 
and it might well be far more nuisance than it was worth. 
5. I said frankly that before I assumed office here I was told that the worst fate 
that could overtake this country and its neighbours would be for Jagan and Burnham 
to form a coalition; now it seemed to me that there was little hope of progress unless 
this happened. Jagan said that it was much in his mind but Burnham was so difficult, 
etc. He claimed to have carried "some in my own party" with him and to have made 
approaches through John Carter7 and Bissember, but "Burnham wants my place and 
will not be happy till he gets it-I do not want it so much, but I do not want him to 
be in it." I said that time was against him-we were getting more and more into the 
mire, no progress was being made with anything; Burnham was on the point of going 
off to U.S.A. for three weeks (Jagan says it is private litigation over an ill-fated 
diamond deal that is now taking Burnham there) and unless Jagan made some 
forthright attempt at a political solution now, I could see nothing but unhappiness 
ahead. 
6. Knowing that Kelshall was the author of the ridiculous Memorandum, I told 
Jagan of my original conversation with this man-"I know you do not want me; I 
6 Said by the British to be a communist (CO 1031/4404, no 29, para 7), Kelshall was a Trinidadian and 
lagan's private secretary. 
7 Leader of United Democratic Party, an offshoot of the National Democratic Party which contested the 
1953 election (see 17, note 2), who led a merger with the Burnhamite PNC in 1961. 
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know you think I am a Communist, though I am not; but you and I can work 
together because I am a practical man and, dearly as I love Jagan, I know that he is 
not practical." I said that I still did not know whether Jack was a Communist or not 
but it was abundantly plain to me and to every other person who had dealings with 
him outside the Party that he is not a practical man. "He is a bigger dreamer than 
you are, Premier, and that is competing in open company." He smiled sweetly and 
said that maybe he was a dreamer-but not all that of a one! 
7. I also sought to show him the folly of winding up the B.G.V.F., merely to start 
afresh with a Home Guard. Why not enlarge the B.G.V.F. if and when money was 
available. Jagan seemed to see little difference. Tradition and all that mean nothing 
to him. 
8. Where we go next with this frightful paper I know not. I shall send it to the 
Garrison Commander for his comments on matters of detail. But I sincerely hope 
that somehow or other we can kill it dead. Meantime, of course, we are training with 
the East Anglians only those who are already enlisted in the Police. 
190 CO 103113376, no 187A 21 May 1962 
[Federation of the Eight] : letter from D Williams to F G Burrettl on 
UK financial assistance [Extract] 
We now expect the final session of the East Caribbean Federation Conference to take 
place on Thursday, and our Ministers consider that it will be necessary for them then 
to say something about financial assistance to the new Federation. The proposals 
have got to be put to the legislatures of the Little Eight and it is hardly to be expected 
that they will be willing to consider them without having any idea of their financial 
prospects. 
2. When we had our discussions on 17th May it was on the basis that we should 
indicate our acceptance of the Lewis proposals. On further reflection we no longer 
wish to go as far as that at present. I enclose a formula2 which we should like to 
suggest that our Secretary of State should announce to the Conference on Thursday 
and which they will probably press to have written into the Conference Report, which 
will be published as a White Paper. The object of this formula is to give a general 
indication that we will see the new Federation right, without going into any detail at 
all as to the nature or amount of our assistance. On our present thinking we would 
1 FO from 1946; transferred to Treasury, 1960. 
2 The formula proposed was discussed at a CO-Treasury meeting on 22 May as a result of which it was 
amended to read: 'The U.K. Government recognise that a Federation of Barbados and the Leeward and 
Windward Islands would stand in need of external assistance for a period after it is established, both as 
regards capital and budgetary assistance. Her Majesty's Government would be willing to provide assistance 
within the limits of the resources which they would be able to make available, but its amount and nature 
would require further consideration. In this connection H.M. Government have noted with interest 
proposals put forward by Dr. Lewis. Under these budgetary assistance would be continued for a limited 
period after the establishment of the Federation but on a tapering basis from its present level. At the same 
time Dr. Lewis proposes that U.K. capital assistance should be fixed at a given annual level for an initial 
period of 5 years after the setting up of the Federation. This approach merits further study in the light of a 
more detailed survey of the economic needs and potential development of the area which the U.K. 
proposed to put in train' (CO 103113376, no 188, enclosure). 
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arrange for a study of the possible needs of the area to be carried out by an economist 
under our auspices, and in the light of this Her Majesty's Government itself would 
have to decide before the Constitutional Conference next year what its offer should 
be. We think that this would be better than setting up an economic commission 
whose findings would be unpredictable. 
3. The objection which you might see in this formula is that, although no figures 
are involved, we should be accepting a long term financial commitment which would 
be bound to extend after Federal independence. We concede that something of a 
gamble is involved. There is no certainty that assistance on the scale we might 
contemplate will make the area viable by the end of five years and I can see that it 
might be embarrassing if the Federal Government came back for more, either during 
the five years or thereafter, with a plea that economic collapse was imminent. If this 
happened after independence the Commonwealth Secretary would have an awkward 
choice between giving way to such a plea or turning it down and thereby leaving the 
United Kingdom Government saddled in the eyes of the world with the responsibility 
for keeping the area in poverty. 
4. However, it seems to me that whatever we do in this area is in fact a choice of 
evils. If there were no Federation of the Eight, we should have to meet indefinitely 
the sam~ needs in the individual territories without the economic advantages of 
federation but with the political embarrassment of being unable to show the world 
that we were advancing the area towards independence. These islands can never 
achieve independence except as a Federation; and if we miss the chance of federating 
them now I doubt if it will ever come again. 
5. Looking only at financial considerations it might perhaps be said that we 
could better resist demands for additional assistance if we were dealing with 
individual and dependent territories and that in that case we should be able to put 
back into their constitutions provisions which would give us effective control over 
their finances and so ensure that our assistance was efficiently administered. But we 
doubt whether nowadays it is a tenable policy to put the clock back in this way; nor 
whether, if it is put back, it can be kept back indefinitely. Nor do we think that it 
would be any harder for H.M.G. to resist further financial demands from a federal 
government, dependent or independent, than from individual dependent islands. 
6. Finally, if it is accepted that we can hold assistance at the level proposed, it 
ought not to be overlooked that the Lewis proposals would be a bargain even if we 
accepted them as they stand. They would involve grant-in-aid tapering from $7.2 
million to nothing, and a total of $35 million capital assistance (some of which might 
be in loans) over the five years. The present Federal block grant leaves $15.9 million 
for these islands for 1962 and 1963, and if we tapered down on the lines which we had 
already envisaged, the figure would not come out very differently from the Lewis 
proposals on recurrent account. As regards development assistance, however, the 
C.D. & W. allocations to the Little Eight for the present quinquennium total £7.37 
million (over $35 million) including the carry-over from the last Act. In other words, 
we should be getting away over the next five years with total assistance rather less 
than we have provided over the past five. I cannot see that we could do it any cheaper 
on any other basis, whether within a Federation or dealing with individual units. 
7. We hope to be able to discuss the draft formula with you tomorrow and I trust 
that you and the C.R.O. will be able to agree that these arguments justify the 
Secretary of State's putting it to the Conference .... 
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191 CO 1031/4236, no 301 23 May 1962 
'United Kingdom military requirements in the West Indies': report by 
COS (COS(62)221, annex) [Extract] 
Introduction 
1. In June, 1961, we approved a report! on our long-term military requirements 
in the West Indies outside the Federation. This report was based, inter alia, on the 
understanding that the West Indies Federation, consisting principally of Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago, the Leeward Islands, the Windward Islands, and Barbados, 
would achieve independence in 1962 and would exercise a stabilizing influence in the 
Caribbean area. Our military commitments in the area would thereafter be the 
defence and internal security of our remaining colonial territories. Since the report 
was approved, however, there have been certain political developments, including 
withdrawal by Jamaica and Trinidad from the Federation in April, 1962, and their 
intention to seek full independence later this year. There have also been disturbances 
in British Guiana which have necessitated the stationing there of a larger UK force. 
2. We have already taken certain decisions concerning deployment and transfer 
of responsibilities in the Caribbean area; these are referred to, where appropriate, 
below. In addition, the Chief of the Defence Staff has recently toured the West Indies 
and has issued his report, on which we have had a preliminary discussion. 
Aim 
3. To re-examine United Kingdom military requirements in the West Indies. 
The political situation 
General 
4. We are advised that the British West Indies territories can be divided 
politically into three broad categories:-
(a) Territories whose independence is imminent. 
(b) Territories whose eventual independence is an accepted aim of policy. 
(c) Territories for which independence is not ultimately foreseen. 
More detailed advice is set out below. 
Territories whose independence is imminent 
5. Jamaica. Jamaica, already enjoying internal self-government, will become 
fully independent on 6th August, 1962. 
6. Trinidad and Tobago. Following Jamaica's example, Trinidad having 
withdrawn from the Federation will become fully independent in the autumn of 
1962. 
Territories whose eventual independence is an accepted aim of policy 
7. "Federation of the Eight". The possibility of establishing a "Federation of the 
Eight" comprising Barbados, Antigua, Montserrat, St. Kitts, Dominica, Grenada, St. 
Lucia, and St. Vincent is now under examination. These territories have expressed 
1 Dated 26 June 1961, copy in CO 1031/4235, no 184. 
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the wish to federate and have made proposals which are being considered by HM 
Government. It is unlikely that such a Federation could be established before the end 
of 1962 and that it could be given independence for some years to come. 
8. British Guiana. British Guiana has achieved internal self-government and, 
prior to the recent riots, was expected to achieve full independence in the autumn of 
1962. It is too soon to forecast how this programme may be affected but it appears 
probable that whatever political proposals are made to meet the present situation 
they will not be generally accepted locally and that British troops will be required in 
the territory until it becomes independent. 
9. British Honduras. Both Mexico and Guatemala lay claim to British Honduras. 
Although as a result of the recent discussions2 we hope to achieve a modus vivendi 
with Guatemala, which alone poses any military threat to British Honduras, the 
Guatemalan Government is so unreliable that we cannot discount the possibility of 
irresponsible acts directed against the colony. Within British Honduras it has so far 
been announced that talks will be held in 1963 to discuss internal self-government 
which could follow soon after and lead eventually to independence. However, it is not 
possible to set a date for full independence and British Honduras must be regarded as 
a UK responsibility for the foreseeable future. 
Territories for which independence is not ultimately foreseen 
10. Bermuda, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos 
Islands, and the Cayman Islands . There is no probability that the above islands will 
ever become independent. 
The threat 
11. We are advised that the assessment of the threat made by the JIC in our 
previous paper remains unchanged. In the immediate future British Guiana remains 
the most likely internal trouble spot. The only identifiable external threat is a small-
scale incursion from Guatemala into British Honduras. 
Military commitments and requirements 
External defence 
12. United Kingdom commitments for external defence in the area will consist of 
responsibility for remaining colonial or dependent territories and the possible need 
to come to the aid of ex-dependent territories which are members of the 
Commonwealth. These territories could and, we are advised, may be encouraged to 
join the Organization of American States and would in any case derive a certain sense 
of security from the presence of substantial United States forces in the area. We have 
no global war commitments in the Caribbean except for certain NATO maritime 
arrangements. 
Jamaica 
13. The Jamaica Defence Force, consisting of the Jamaica Regiment and the 
Volunteer Territorial Battalion, will, we consider, be capable of meeting any internal 
security problems after 1st June, 1962, when the British battalion stationed there 
2 cf 186. 
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will become non-operational. The Jamaican Government has been advised that they 
should have a small local naval or coastguard force after independence. 
14. Although we have agreed that the British battalion should start withdrawing 
on 1st June, 1962, and that Headquarters Caribbean Area should close down on 1st 
July, 1962, there will be a requirement for British officers to be seconded to the 
Defence Force for a few years. The exact requirements cannot be determined until 
the new Jamaican Government has decided on its future policy. 
Trinidad and Tobago 
15. Since the dissolution of the Federation in April it is no longer possible to use 
the West India Regiment for internal security duties in Trinidad. We understand that 
Trinidad intends to form its own "National Guard" (of two regular and two Volunteer 
companies), partly out ofTrinidadians withdrawn from the West India Regiment. The 
Police Force may also be extended to form a Marine Coastguard Force. Although 
there is a possibility that trouble may arise when the political parties start 
considering details of the Trinidad independence constitution, it is considered 
unlikely that the Governor would need to call on British troops for internal security 
purposes. There will, however, be a requirement for British Officers to act as military 
advisers and to train and command the defence forces . 
British Guiana 
16. Although we originally planned to withdraw forces from British Guiana 
sometime after the achievement of internal self-government, there can now be no 
question of withdrawal before independence. In addition a serious internal security 
situation could develop after the date for independence has been announced. We 
have therefore agreed that a battalion should remain until independence. In addition 
to reinforcement by Royal Marine detachments and landing parties from the West 
Indies frigates, the garrison could be reinforced from the United Kingdom by a 
company within 48 hours and the balance of a battalion in just over 3 days. 
17. We understand that local Ministers have discussed the formation either of a 
form of "Garde Mobile", some 200 strong, or of a local Military Force.3 Despite the 
advice he has received Dr. Jagan is considering a Military Force separate from the 
Police of 350 regulars and at least 150 National Service men. British assistance may 
be sought for training such forces. Should it be decided for political reasons that this 
assistance should be afforded, the conditions would have to be carefully considered in 
order to safeguard the position of the British officers and men involved. 
British Honduras 
18. To meet the external threat we have previously agreed that a small 
headquarters and one infantry company should be stationed in British Honduras. For 
internal purposes we consider that to raise a local regular military force would be an 
unwarranted expense and that the Government should concentrate on expanding 
and improving the efficiency of the civil police force in order to maintain law and 
order. The assistance of additional British police officers will probably be required to 
improve the standard of the local force and we understand that the Colonial Office 
are investigating this. The present Volunteer Force should be maintained but its 
efficiency should be increased. The Garrison can assist in this. 
3 See 189. 
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19. Reinforcement. After withdrawal of the UK area reserve from Jamaica in 
June, 1962, land force reinforcements for British Honduras if required in addition or 
alternatively to those provided by the West Indies frigates would be flown from the 
United Kingdom. Because the existing runways at Belize (Stanley Field) are too short 
for RAF strategic aircraft, reinforcements from the United Kingdom would have to 
change to MRT aircraft at Nassau if the quickest route were to be used. Although 
suitable aircraft can sometimes be chartered locally for onward transit to Belize, 
delays in making the necessary arrangements are unpredictable and could have 
serious operational consequences. Although arrangements could be made to 
preposition RAF MRT aircraft in Nassau when the situation in British Honduras 
required it, reinforcement in this way would take so much longer than it would if 
strategic aircraft could fly direct to Stanley Field that the extension of this airfield is 
of considerable military importance. 
Remaining dependent territories 
20. In our previous study we envisaged retaining responsibility for Bermuda, the 
Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, British Honduras, and possibly the Cayman 
Islands. To this list will now have to be added at least for the time being Barbados, 
the British islands in the Leeward and Windward groups; and also the Turks and 
Caicos Islands. 
21. Islands in the prospective "Federation of the Eight". We understand that a 
police mutual aid scheme may be introduced enabling the transfer of police at short 
notice between these islands and that the frigates stationed in the West Indies might 
be called upon to assist in moving them. One frigate will normally be available in the 
area of the Eastern Caribbean and will also be able to provide a landing party if 
required. Airfields suitable for use by strategic aircraft exist in Antigua and Barbados. 
22. The other islands. These will continue to be separately administered, to be 
self-contained for police forces, and will normally be able to call for assistance on a 
frigate in the area although usually at Bermuda. Strategic airfields exist in Bermuda 
and at Nassau. 
23. We consider that these arrangements will obviate the need to station UK 
forces permanently in any of the remaining dependent territories. If necessary, 
additional land forces could be flown from the United Kingdom. 
Naval forces 
24. With the withdrawal of the Army reserve from Jamaica our permanent land 
force garrisons in the Caribbean will be reduced to those maintained in British 
Guiana (until independence) and British Honduras. Coverage of the remainder of the 
area, and in particular the provision of initial military assistance in the islands of the 
Eastern Caribbean, will then fall principally to naval forces . In addition to this 
commitment and the need to give assistance in British Guiana and British Honduras 
if required, the naval forces under the command of the Senior Naval Officer West 
Indies are responsible for maintaining contact over a much wider area extending 
roughly from Charleston and Bermuda to Cayenne in the Atlantic and from San 
Diego to Lima in the Pacific. 
25. In order to undertake these responsibilities three frigates are required. 
However, as this number of ships could only be provided permanently at the expense 
of commitments on another station we consider that the following alternative naval 
deployment will be acceptable:-
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(a) Two frigates with Royal Marine detachments (20 to 30 strong) embarked to be 
stationed in the West Indies, based on Bermuda. One ship would usually be 
available in the Eastern Caribbean area, using Barbados as an advanced base. 
(b) A third frigate to be detached from the Home Fleet when necessary. Where 
possible a ship with a Royal Marine detachment embarked would be used. 
26. The first ship with a Royal Marine detachment embarked will arrive on 
station in July, 1962, and the second in late 1962 or early 1963. These detachments, 
together with Seamen landing parties, will provide up to a company in strength for 
limited internal security duties. 
27. Shore facilities required in the area. Admiralty are examining whether a 
worthwhile improvement in the availability of a frigate in the Eastern Caribbean 
could be made by improving the existing self-maintenance facilities at Barbados. 
Existing naval facilities in Bermuda would still be required in the normal cycle of 
maintenance of the frigates and for NATO and Commonwealth purposes. Fuelling 
facilities for HM Ships in the Western Caribbean are at present provided by 
commercial arrangements in Jamaica. In case an independent Jamaica should 
withhold these facilities, similar arrangements in Belize are required and Admiralty 
are investigating this. 
Access 
28. Although staging facilities and overflying rights cannot be guaranteed in 
emergency, they are useful in routine trooping and movement. We therefore confirm 
the conclusion of our previous study that they should be negotiated, if possible, with 
the newly independent territories .. . . 
192 CO 103113492, no 67 25 May 1962 
[Financial responsibility]: minute by J D Higham1 to Sir H Poynton 
on financial irregularities in Antigua and Montserrat 
The Secretary of State has arranged to see Mr. Bird at 9.45 on Monday morning, and 
Mr. Bramble at 10.15. Separate briefs, prepared jointly by Finance Department and 
West Indian Department, are attached.2 Copies of these have been sent to the Treasury 
for clearance, as these are grant-aided territories, but I am sending them forward, in 
view of the shortness of time, and I will report if there are any Treasury comments. 
2. I am quite sure that we must take a very tough line with these two territories 
as well as with Grenada, and that we must make every endeavour to restore a sense of 
financial responsibility. Although public reaction to the Grenada report (to judge 
from casual talks with members of the public) has been rather lighthearted, the 
P.A.C. can be expected to take the affairs of all three territories much more seriously, 
and you would be in an indefensible position if vigorous action were not taken. A 
separate submission will be made on Grenada, and here I would only record the view 
that if Mr. Gairy is allowed to continue in office the effect on actual and potential 
misdemeanance elsewhere will be similar to that of the Salan verdict.3 
1 Assistant secretary, CO, head of Finance Dept. 2 Not printed. 
3 A reference to the French general, Raoul Salan, recently sentenced to life imprisonment for mutiny and 
treason. 
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3. You will recall that the East Caribbean Conference yesterday agreed to our 
proposal that one of the functions of the preparatory commission would be to work 
out the details of financial control. We should I think endeavour to find a U.K. body 
for this and to ensure that his task is not confined to working out an academic 
exercise, but that he is given facilities to travel to the various territories and look into 
the operation of their systems of control. It is important that he should deal with the 
individual units as well as with the Federal control system. In his talk with both Chief 
Ministers the Secretary of State might mention that he was pleased to see from their 
agreement to this proposal that they recognised the importance, from the point of 
view of the reputation of the Federation and the territories, of placing emphasis on 
the importance of financial control, and that he trusted they would give every help 
within their power to see that satisfactory proposals were evolved. 
4. I am sure that the idea of getting Financial Secretaries (preferably expatriates) 
in the two territories is the only sound way of proceeding. Now that we are likely to 
have at least two years before there is an independent Caribbean Federation we can 
start looking round for candidates. I am afraid it is not going to be easy to find 
suitable people, but if no serving or retired H.M.O.C.S. officer can be found, we 
should consider seconding from the Office an experienced S.E.O. or H.E.O. 
5. In the long term the crux of the problem is I think to ensure the freedom of 
the civil service from irresponsible interference by Ministers; we shall never achieve 
this until there is a unified civil service and a central P.S.C. 
6. The brief on Montserrat does not refer to secret information we have received 
about Mr. Bramble's suspected personal interest in some of the C.D. & W. 
transactions. Briefly Mr. Bramble appears to have been selling land in his private 
capacity to the Chief Minister in his official capacity and making quite sure that the 
value of the land was rather more than it would have fetched on the open market. The 
Secretary of State should not, of course, refer to this but he may wish to know of it. 
193 CO 1031/3382, no 8 May 1962 
'The Joint Economic Mission to the Leeward and Windward Islands': 
CO brief no 7 for the UK delegation to the East Caribbean conference 
[Briefing the UK delegation to the conference on the financial and economic implications 
of a Federation of the Eight, the CO commented on the tactics anticipated from West 
Indian ministers: 'They will try to persuade the British Government to agree to a 
Federation of the Eight first, and only proceed to work out the cost at a later stage. 
Having worked out the cost, they will then ask the British Government to foot the bill. 
From previous experience we know that their demands for outside assistance (whatever 
Dr. Lewis may say) are likely to be exorbitant. West Indian governments are among the 
most unabashed mendicants in the whole Commonwealth. (The Times described their 
opening speeches at the last Lancaster House Conference as a "chorus from The Beggar's 
Opera".) They also remain singularly unimpressed by the arguments that we have used in 
the despatch, that there are other areas in the world for which we are responsible, where 
the needs are even greater. They like to pretend that they have a special claim upon our 
purses and that Britain has a great moral responsibility to help them out of any financial 
difficulties and guarantee them a reasonable standard of living as just recompense for the 
evils which their ancestors suffered as a result of the Slave trade' (CO 1031/3382, no 6, 
'Financial and economic implications of Federation of the Eight', CO brief, 5 May 1962).] 
During the course of the West Indian Constitutional Conference in London last June 
it became clear that the success of the Conference could only be assured by some 
[193] MAY 1962 523 
kind of financial "sweetener". The Federal Government had submitted a demand on 
behalf of the Leeward and Windward Islands that the United Kingdom should agree 
to a ten year programme of economic development of the Leeward and Windward 
Islands designed to make their economies and finances viable and raise their general 
standards closer to those of the larger territories of the Federation. Although they 
accepted that this proposal could only be considered in the subsequent conference 
on the financial and economic settlement with the Federation, they strongly pressed 
the United Kingdom to agree there and then to provide an initial instalment on this 
programme of approximately £6,000,000 for a one year interim development 
programme. 
2. It was clearly impossible to provide any sum approaching this figure. On 
the other hand it was also clear that if the delegations returned completely 
empty-handed it would gravely endanger the chances of achieving the endorse-
ment of their legislatures to the proposals of the Conference which were in sev-
eral respects repugnant to many of them, particularly because of Trinidad's 
refusal to agree fo Freedom of Movement within the first ten years after indepen-
dence. 
3. To get round this difficulty Mr. Macleod finally proposed, and it was agreed by 
the Conference, that an economic mission should visit the Leewards and Windwards. 
The relevant paragraphs of the report read as follows:-
"40. In deference, however, to the representations made during the 
Conference on behalf of the smaller Territories concerning the urgency of 
their need for development, Her Majesty's Government stated their readiness 
to send a small official Mission to The West Indies as soon as this could be 
mounted (say within 3 or 4 weeks from the holding of the Conference) with 
the object of considering, in consultation with the Unit Governments of the 
Windward and Leeward Islands and the Federal Government, any particular 
short term projects which were of special urgency or importance to the 
smaller islands but which for one reason or another had not found a place 
within the existing approved development programme. Her Majesty's 
Government were able to state that the United States Government had agreed 
to be associated with this Mission, and Her Majesty's Government and the 
United States authorities (subject to the availability of Congressional 
appropriations) would respectively consider the provision of finance for such 
projects as the Mission might recommend. In the case of the United Kingdom 
contribution this finance would be additional to the existing Colonial 
Development and Welfare allocations. In making its examination the Mission 
would of course have to limit its scope to a relatively small number of short 
term projects, i.e. those which could be completed within a year or so. Her 
Majesty's Government stated that they were glad to be able to this extent to 
respond to the representations which had been put forward and particularly 
appreciated the willingness of the United States authorities to associate 
themselves with the proposed investigation. 
41. These arrangements represent a special approach to a specific problem 
and do not in any way prejudge or prejudice the total amount of assistance 
which Her Majesty's Government may be able to accord The West Indies in 
the light of the discussions of the Conference of 8th January." 
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Subsequently the Canadian Government also agreed to be associated with the 
Mission. 
4. The United Kingdom contribution was fixed at a maximum of £500,000 of C. D. 
& W. money and £250,000 in Exchequer loans. The Americans agreed to participate 
up to a similar ceiling. The Canadian contribution was not quantified but was clearly 
to be a lesser sum (we learnt later that it would be up $1.3 millions); it was, 
furthermore, to come out of their existing $10 million aid programme, so it did not, 
like our and the American's [sic] contributions, represent additional aid. It was 
agreed that these ceilings should not be revealed to the West Indies, and they are 
indeed still in ignorance of them. Mr. Selwyn1 (Senior Economic Adviser) was the 
U.K. representative on the Mission which assembled in Trinidad on 21st July, toured 
all the territories concerned and completed its report on 18th August. 
5. During the progress of the Mission around the islands a difficulty arose with 
the Canadians. The attitude of their representatives on the Mission was that in 
accordance with normal Canadian policy governing overseas aid they were obliged to 
ensure that Canadian-financed projects should cover mainly imports, and that these 
should come from Canada, the local costs of all such projects being borne by the 
territory concerned. As the Leeward and Windward Islands are grant-aided the net 
result would be that not only would Canada secure a disproportionate share of the 
export opportunities likely to arise from the Mission, but that these Canadian exports 
would be enjoying an indirect U.K. subsidy as the local costs would ultimately have 
to be borne by the U.K. The question of "tied aid" has come up before, and we have 
always resisted it, as our own aid has not been tied (but see para. 10(a)). Because of 
this, and because we already knew that British business interests (in particular Lord 
Rootes, Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Exports Council) were keenly 
interested in the export possibilities likely to result from the Mission, Mr. Selwyn was 
instructed to press his Canadian colleagues to modify their attitude. They were 
unable to do this and it was therefore not possible to reach any final agreement on 
the precise division of projects before they dispersed. Their report, therefore, simply 
enumerated a list of schemes which the Mission considered to be "eligible for further 
consideration by one or other of the participating governments". Statements by 
representatives of the three participating governments were appended to the report. 
The Canadian statement staked out claims on certain particular projects; the United 
States did the same but much less greedily for export opportunities than that of the 
Canadians; the U.K. statement expressed a general recommendation of the projects 
in the main report and suggested that the three participating governments should 
have early discussions "in order that a mutually satisfactory co-ordination of 
schemes between them might be arrived at". 
6. Following the receipt of the Mission's report and discussion with other 
interested Whitehall departments (Treasury, Foreign Office, Commonwealth 
Relations Office, Board of Trade, Department of Technical Co-operation) it was 
decided that it was essential to try and persuade the Canadians that they should 
accept a rather more equitable division of projects with high export potentialities and 
that they should agree to finance at least some part of the local cost of their schemes. 
It was clear that if this were not done there would be serious danger of an outcry by 
business interests in the U.K. which could result in parliamentary embarrassment 
1 P Selwyn, senior economic adviser, CO. 
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and, possibly, increased pressure to [?on] Her Majesty's Government to abandon its 
present policy of untied aid. The Canadian reply was that they felt unable to alter 
their present policy and that were they to agree to meet local costs in the West Indies 
they would have to make similar concessions elsewhere. They made no comment on 
our request that they consider a more equitable sub-division of the high import 
content projects. 
7. In the middle of all this the Jamaican Referendum took place which resulted 
in Jamaica's decision to leave the Federation. Clearly this placed the whole future of 
the Federation in doubt and in view of the Premier of Trinidad's decision not to 
commit himself on remaining in the Federation before his general election (4th 
December) and possibly not for sometime after, doubts were of course raised as to 
whether we should go ahead with the whole project. 
8. The view of the Treasury was that while there could be no withdrawal of "this 
promised assistance" the timing of any announcement or undertaking should be 
considered in the light of whether Trinidad would continue in the Federation, 
especially as the whole objective of the Mission was to provide employment for the 
small islands and make other decisions of the June Conference more tolerable to 
both Trinidad and the small islands. The Treasury agreed we could tell Canada and 
the United States that we would go ahead if they would but suggested we should 
withhold overt action until the prospects of the Federation surviving became clearer. 
9. On the 17th November West Indian Governments were informed in a circular 
telegram that "consultations with the other Governments concerned have not yet 
been concluded. I regret that some time may elapse before decisions can be made 
known." (The subject had been raised by Sir Grantiey Adams when he saw Mr. 
Macleod in September. Mr. Macleod told him that the matter was being 
sympathetically considered, but he would have to discuss the question with the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer who had already agreed to make funds available in the 
context of the Lancaster House decisions. This conversation took place before the 
views of the American Government (see below) were known.) 
10. By the end of 1961 the follow-up to the Mission's report had been put into 
cold storage as a result of four principal factors:-
(a) The dispute between ourselves and the Canadians over the insistence of the 
latter in appropriating for their own aid those schemes which would result in an 
appreciable gain to Canadian industry and their refusal to bear local costs as part 
of their aid (which would result in an indirect U.K. subsidy, as local costs would 
ultimately have to be borne by the U.K. through grant in aid) (see paragraphs 5 
and 6). (The question of "tying" U.K. aid has recently been the subject of 
discussion in the Development Policy Committee. Ministers have now agreed that 
dependent territories should be told that purchases on a significant scale from 
non-U.K. sources out of U.K. C.D. and W. assistance will have to be cleared with 
H.M.G. first to enable the Board of Trade to consider whether comparable British 
material could be offered. A communication to territories is under preparation.) 
(b) The desire of the United States to reconsider their aid programme to the area 
following the appointment of Mr. Fowler Hamilton as Administrator of A.I.D. and 
Congressional reduction in the President's requested aid programme. The State 
Department said that they could not be sure whether the $U.S. 2.1 m. earmarked 
for the Mission would survive in the revised programme though they were 
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"generally confident" it would; they also said that even if the money were available 
they would probably not want to commit it "until the constitutional outlook of the 
Eastern Caribbean is clarified". Even though the United States may still be 
prepared to consider aid to the area, she will probably wish to concentrate on those 
islands where she has defence interests (Antigua, Barbados and St. Lucia). Their 
general attitude seems to be that "if Federation is off, then the June commitment 
is off'. In any case, their appropriation will lapse at the end of June. 
(c) The general political uncertainty in the area following Jamaica's decision to 
secede from the Federation and the doubts as to the future intentions of Dr. 
Williams. The Mission had been a financial lever to help pull off the Lancaster 
House settlement. Now that the settlement had broken apart, it seemed likely that 
the money might well be needed as a "sweetener" at some future date. 
(d) The fact that a whole string of financial misdemeanours had been unearthed 
in Grenada, Montserrat and Antigua. Until these situations had been sorted out it 
seemed difficult to justify to Parliament any new assistance at least to these three 
territories. 
11. Therefore at the time of the Secretary of State's visit to Trinidad in January 
we were not eager to take up the implementation of the full Report. At the same time 
it was recognised that complete inaction was not possible. It was therefore suggested 
that the Secretary of State might like to indicate during his visit that there were 
three projects recommended in the Mission's report which could be considered for 
Exchequer loans (if loans were unobtainable from other sources). These projects 
were:-
(a) A cotton ginnery in St. Vincent to replace one destroyed by fire in 1959. The 
Mission's estimated cost of the ginnery is $BWI 525,000 (£115,000). 
(b) An electricity supply scheme in St. Vincent in conjunction with the Colonial 
Development Corporation, for which $BWI 190,000 (£35,000) is required to 
provide capital for expansion. 
(c) An electricity supply scheme in Dominica for which $BWI 350,000 (£75,000) is 
required. The electricity company is owned and operated by the Colonial 
Development Corporation which has agreed to double the capacity of the hydro-
electricity plant and has asked Dominica to purchase an interest. Dominica has 
large potential sources of hydro-electric power and this might make a substantial 
contribution to its development. 
The Secretary of State during his visit informed the Governments concerned that 
applications for Exchequer loans could be considered. No formal applications have 
yet been received and savingrams have recently been despatched informing the 
territories that detailed applications will be necessary before any consideration can 
be given to the provision of Exchequer loans (and that they must satisfy us that other 
sources of loans have been tried without success). In the case of Dominica there is a 
sawmill project, allied to the electricity project, in which the Canadians showed an 
interest during the Mission. It is understood that they are still interested and this will 
be taken up with them as a separate individual item apart from any question of 
implementation of the full Report. Until full applications have been received from the 
territories and have been examined it is not intended to approach the Americans and 
Canadians about a possible start by them on implementation of some projects on 
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their lists. We may, however, have to make some approach to the American and 
Canadian Governments to discuss the position on the Mission Report, as the political 
position in the West Indies begins to clarify. 
12. The general question of the Mission was raised at the meeting which the 
Secretary of State had in Port of Spain in January with the leaders of the "Eight". The 
Secretary of State explained that the failure of the Lancaster House agreement to be 
ratified had necessitated re-examination of the question of the Mission's Report and 
he explained that there were a number of points which were still under consideration 
with the other Governments. 
13. It is almost certain that the question will be raised again during the 
Conference. It is suggested that the Secretary of State might say:-
(a) That it has not yet been possible to resolve the difficulties surrounding the 
implementation of the Report which have in large measure stemmed from the 
uncertain political situation; and that it will be necessary for H.M.G. to discuss the 
position with the other Governments when the political situation is clearer; 
(b) That the Mission was mounted in the context of the Lancaster House 
settlement and independence for the Federation this May. The changed situation 
has caused all the Governments concerned to re-examine the position. 
(c) That no indication can, therefore, be given at present of whether it will be 
possible to implement the proposals in the Mission's Report. 
(d) That if the two other Governments were not to wish to continue with the 
proposals it would be necessary as far as H.M.G. was concerned to consider the 
projects discussed in the Report in the light of the general development plans of 
the territories and the overall resources available to meet them (including the 
total assistance which H.M.G. can make available under the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act). The Governments of Dominica and St. Vincent have already been 
informed that certain of their projects can be considered for Exchequer loans if 
other finance is not available. 
194 CAB 134/1561, CPC(62)20 18 June 1962 
'East Caribbean Federation conference': memorandum by Mr 
Maudling for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee on proposals to 
establish a Federation of the Eight! 
I am circulating for the information of my colleagues this note on the outcome of the 
East Caribbean Federation Conference. 
2. In my memorandum C.P.C. (62)142 which discussed the proposals put forward 
by the Governments of Barbados and the Leeward Islands (other than the British 
Virgin Islands) and the Windward Islands for a federation of their eight territories, I 
recommended that I should be authorised to put forward counter proposals which 
would suggest that the central government in any federation of these territories 
should be much stronger than would be the result if their own proposals were 
implemented. This course of action was approved at our meeting on 11th April 
1 The conference was held at Marlborough House between 9 and 24 May 1962. 2 See 187. 
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(C.P.C. (62) 8th Meeting). I embodied my suggestions in a despatch to the eight 
Governments and invited them to join in discussions in Barbados early in May but 
the West Indian Governments requested that these discussions should be held in 
London. A conference opened in Marlborough House on 9th May and concluded its 
work on 24th May: its report has been published as a White Paper (Cmnd 17 46) and a 
copy is attached. 
3. The Conference recommended that there should be a Federation of the eight 
territories of Barbados and the Leeward Islands and the Windward Islands and set out 
the steps to be taken to implement this recommendation. First, the report is to be 
considered by the Legislatures of the territories concerned; and Fiscal and Civil 
Service Commissions are to be appointed to examine various problems connected 
with the establishment of a Federation. When these Commissions have reported, and 
assuming that the report of the recent Conference has been approved by Unit 
Legislatures, there will then be a further Conference (to which representatives of 
opposition parties in the eight territories would be invited) to reach final decisions 
about the form of the new Federation. (I have made the stipulation about opposition 
representation because I have received in recent weeks a considerable number of 
representations from opposition parties on the question of federation. Some have 
been representations against any form of federation and some have been in favour of 
a near unitary state). Assuming general agreement at this second Conference, the 
Federation would then be set up and Federal elections held. I have said that if and 
when a new Federation is established I will be ready to enter into discussions 
concerning independence and that these discussions would include a review of the 
provisions of the Federal Constitution. 
4. The recent Conference agreed that an advisory Regional Council of Ministers 
should be established consisting of representatives of each Unit under the 
chairmanship of the Governor of Barbados to consider problems of common interest 
to the territories and to make preparations for the establishment of a Federation. 
There will thus be a forum for discussion of common problems and the preliminary 
work which will be done under the direction of this Council, coupled with the reports 
of the two Commissions, should provide a reasonable basis for the next round of 
discussions. I do not expect that it will be possible to hold this further Conference 
much before early 1963 so that if events run smoothly we might expect the new 
Federation to come into being in about a year's time. 
5. The recent Conference went some way in determining the framework of the 
new Federation. We did not achieve all our objectives. In particular we did not 
succeed in securing any radical re-shaping of the Unit Constitutions. There were two 
main obstacles to this: first, the position of Barbados, which at present enjoys full 
internal self-government. There was no apparent disposition on the part of the 
Barbados delegation to make a grand gesture and surrender some part of their 
constitutional apparatus. I suspect the present Government would view this as a 
dangerous move so far as their internal political position was concerned. Secondly, 
in the last Federation the smaller territories demanded parity of status with the 
larger ones. Though the Federation broke up before the Leeward and Windward 
Islands received full internal self-government, they had already secured a ministerial 
system with considerable control over their internal affairs. These two difficulties 
proved insuperable at this stage though I do not rule out the possibility of returning 
to this point at the next conference when, if the proposals for a Federation have 
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survived, there will have been time for a lessening of parochial feeling as the 
Regional Council of Ministers begins to look on itself as a future Federal 
Government. We secured agreement, however, that there should be a reduction in 
the number of Ministers in most of the Units after the first general elections 
following the establishment of the federation. 
6. We did secure a strengthening of the central government and in particular in 
the all important fields of economics and finance. The territories had already agreed 
to form a customs union within the framework of the federation. We obtained their 
further agreement that all external aid should be made available through the Federal 
Government and not direct to Unit Governments. It is also proposed to create a 
Federal Loans Council, a Federal Economic Development Council and a Federal 
Industrial Development Board. There will also be freedom of personal movement 
within the area. The Federal Government will have available to it the proceeds of 
import duties, postal services, court fees and currency profits. A formula was devised 
under which the Federal Government will administer the collection of income tax 
and will lay down uniform legislation and rates (except the rates of tax and 
allowances in respect of personal income tax). The Federal Government will return 
the collected revenue to the Unit Governments but provision is made for this to be 
reviewed within five years. I think that these proposals should provide a reasonably 
firm basis for central control and initiative in economic and financial matters should 
the will be there to exercise it. 
7. The earlier Conference in Barbados between the Premier of Barbados and the 
seven Chief Ministers had proposed that the Federal Government should have the 
power to appoint a Commission of Enquiry to investigate any matter tending to 
undermine financial stability and good government in any part of the Federation. In 
addition, we secured agreement that following an adverse report by such a 
Commission, in certain circumstances the Governor General could dissolve the 
Legislature of a Unit and arrange for fresh elections. The Federal Government will 
also have concurrent powers for maintaining and securing public safety and public 
order and the legislative lists which were drawn up by the Conference also enable the 
Federal Government to take action over a wide range of subjects. The Police will 
become a Federal responsibility. 
8. One of the most satisfying results of the Conference was an agreement that 
the aim of the eight territories should be to introduce a unified public service which 
would staff posts in both Unit and Federal Governments. This will necessarily have to 
be introduced on a phased basis but it should do much to improve the efficiency and 
morale of the public service. 
9. Taken as a whole I would describe the results of the Conference as quite 
promising. There are, however, difficult problems inherent in the situation in the 
area which might prevent the successful establishment of a Federation of these 
territories. Though the economic gulf between Barbados and the smaller islands is 
not as wide as it was between Jamaica and Trinidad and the other territories of the 
last Federation, and Barbados has severe economic problems of her own, she will be 
the largest and most developed unit of the eight. The advantages to her of joining 
with her smaller neighbours are no more than marginal at the best, (though the 
location of the Federal capital in Barbados should be of some economic benefit) and 
she will be in danger of being outvoted, possibly to her detriment by a combination of 
her fellows. If her partners indulge in irresponsible behaviour, Barbados might well 
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begin to question the value of any association with them. At the moment, the 
political leaders in Barbados consider that it is up to them to provide leadership in 
the area and there has also been a gratifying change of attitude on the part of the 
politicians from the smaller territories. They seem to be in a somewhat chastened 
mood as a result of the failure of the last Federation and to be more likely to make a 
realistic and sensible approach to their problems. There is, however, always the 
danger of dissension between the eight territories breaking out before the Federation 
gets into its stride. 
10. There is also the question of the economic viability of the area. At the 
Conference we put on record our recognition that the area would stand in need 
of external assistance for some time to come and undertook to set in train a sur-
vey of these requirements, bearing in mind the recommendations made by 
Professor Arthur Lewis to which I referred in my earlier memorandum.3 When 
the findings of this survey are available, I hope that both the United States and 
Canada will be ready to join in providing economic assistance for these islands 
but even so the economic foundations of the area are not likely to say the least, 
to be very secure. 
11 . Though the proposals contained in the report of the recent Conference 
could produce a strong Federal Government, the emergence of such a government 
cannot be guaranteed. The tools will be there but the will to use them, if necessary 
in the face of Unit opposition, must be there also. A great deal will depend on how 
far the leading politicians of the area will be prepared to enter the Federal political 
arena. 
12. The next few months should provide some indication of the likelihood of 
establishing this Federation on a reasonable basis. In particular the attitude of the 
various leading Ministers will be demonstrated by the manner in which they tackle 
the problems discussed in the forum of the Regional Council of Ministers. I am not 
unhopeful of preventing further fragmentation in this area and of securing a central 
government which, whilst not as strong as we might hope, can none the less do more 
for the area than would be possible if the eight territories were to remain apart; but 
there are many problems to be solved before this goal can be reached. 
3 Carleen O'Loughlin, an economist from the University College of the West India, visited the CO in June 
1962 and left details of an economic survey which the Institute of Social and Economic Research at UCWI 
was hoping to mount. The CO asked her to enlarge the project for official use. While, as planned, she 
would conduct studies of individual islands, she was asked to broaden the project's scope to cover a 
Federation of the Eight in relation to the following questions which she herself had put:-
(a) could a territory achieve a level of economic activity necessary to secure a rising standard of living 
for its growing population, and independence from recurrent external aid? 
(b) what measures for increasing public utilities, developing industry and agriculture, attracting 
foreign investment and obtaining trained manpower and other basic needs would be needed to achieve 
the object in (a) above? 
(c) how could these measures best be implemented? 
(d) how long would it take for the objective to be achieved? 
She was expected to produce an interim report by Mar 1963. E G Donohoe of the CO minuted: 'She knows 
well enough what we want. Her preliminary views are that given a framework of objects to work to, these 
little islands could get out of grant in aid in ten years-with the exceptions of Montserrat & Dominica, 
who could be expected to rely on help from the area as a whole, rather than on us-after ten years' (CO 
1031/3370, minute by Donohoe, 7 June 1962). 
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195 CO 103113974, no 22C June 1962 
[Maladministration in Grenada]: CO note on the background to and 
provisions of the Grenada (Constitution) Order-in-Council, 1962 
This Order in Council makes provision for two things:-
(i) the virtual suspension of the existing Constitution of Grenada as from the day 
when the Order is brought into operation and reversion then to direct rule by the 
Administrator; and 
(ii) the re-introduction of the existing Grenada Constitution after the next general 
election in the territory, with a few but important changes which will give the 
Administrator enhanced powers. 
The background is set out below. 
2. Following the Leeward and Windward Islands Constitutional Conference in 
London in June, 1959, a new constitution was introduced in Grenada with effect 
from 1st January, 1960. This provided for a substantial measure of internal self-
government. In the exercise of most of his functions the Administrator is required to 
act on the advice of his Ministers except where he considers it necessary to do 
otherwise in the interests of maintaining law and order in the West Indies or in order 
to maintain the efficiency of the Judiciary or Public Service. He has no reserved 
legislative power. 
3. Things went smoothly under the Government which was in power when the 
new Constitution was introduced. It had, however, been agreed at the 1959 
Constitutional Conference that those parts of the new Constitution relating to the 
Legislature would come into effect only after new general elections had been held in 
the territory: and that these would be held within a reasonable time after new 
constituencies had been demarcated. In accordance with this agreement general 
elections were held in Grenada towards the end of March, 1961 and were won by the 
Opposition, the Grenada United Labour Party led by Mr. E. M. Gairy. 
4. Mr. Gairy had been a leading politician in Grenada for many years. During the 
general elections in August 1957 he committed an electoral offence of which he was 
convicted by the Courts in December, 1957. The penalty under the Elections 
Ordinance for such an offence was disqualification from membership of the 
Legislative Council for five years. Accordingly, when Mr. Gairy's party won the 
elections in March, 1961, he himself could not stand for election. A few months later 
the Legislative Council amended the Elections Ordinance in such a way as to reduce 
the disqualification for the offence of which Mr. Gairy had been found guilty to one of 
three years. Mr. Gairy was thereupon elected to the Legislative Council and became 
Chief Minister towards the end of August, 1961. 
5. The Administrator of Grenada had become increasingly concerned during the 
months since the Gairyites achieved power about the apparent misuse of public 
funds by the Government of the day, and in September be asked the Principal Auditor 
to prepare a special report on the control of public expenditure during August, 1961. 
This report became available early in November, 1961 and confirmed that serious 
irregularities had occurred in the use of public funds. Both the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies and the then Federal Government of The West Indies decided that the 
position was sufficiently serious to warrant the appointment of an independent 
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Commission of Enquiry to investigate the facts and to establish where the 
responsibility lay. A three man Commission under the chairmanship of a Barbadian 
Judge was appointed early in February, 1962. Their proceedings were interrupted by 
legal action taken by the Chief Minister of Grenada who sought an injunction from 
the Courts to prevent the Commission from proceeding. The injunction was refused 
on the 7th April and the Commission resumed their work on the 16th April. Their 
report (Cmnd. 1735) was published on the 22nd May. 
6. The Commission of Enquiry reached the following general conclusions:-
(i) the Minister of Finance (who was also the Chief Minister) had disregarded and 
contravened the laws and regulations governing the control of expenditure; 
(ii) expenditure had been incurred wastefully or unnecessarily through failure by 
Ministers to seek or refusal to accept the advice of the civil servants; 
(iii) the Executive had deliberately destroyed the morale of the Civil Service by 
undesirable interference with administrative duties and by improper threats 
against security of office; 
(iv) the Civil Service had been induced by this interference and these threats to 
commit or condone improprieties or irregularities in the expenditure of public funds. 
In general the report was a most damning indictment of the Government of the day 
and in particular of the Chief Minister and Minister of Finance, Mr. Gairy. 
7. The Secretary of State for the Colonies does not consider it possible to allow 
Ministers against whom such grave charges have been made by an independent 
Commission of Enquiry to remain in office under a constitution which places very 
few restraints on their power, in a territory for whose good government he is still 
ultimately responsible, particularly since Grenada receives substantial amounts of 
United Kingdom funds, both as grants in aid of administration and for development 
and welfare purposes, for the use of which the Secretary of State for the Colonies is 
accountable to Parliament. It is not, however, possible under the existing 
Constitution for the Administrator to dismiss the Chief Minister. On the contrary, 
the Administrator is constitutionally required to appoint as Chief Minister the 
elected member of the Legislative Council who is most likely to command the 
confidence of a majority of the elected members of the Legislative Council: and he 
can be removed from office only if a vote of no confidence in him is passed in the 
Legislative Council by a majority of the votes of the elected members. Mr. Gairy's 
party hold eight of the ten elected seats in the Legislative Council and it is out of the 
question to expect a vote of no confidence to receive the support necessary to ensure 
his dismissal. (In any case, even if he himself chose to resign, this would not solve the 
problem because the Administrator would have no choice but to invite another 
member of the Gairy party to become Chief Minister and to form a new Government: 
and as in the period between March and August, 1961, Mr. Gairy would effectively 
control the new Government from the sidelines where he would be even more 
dangerous through the exercise of power without responsibility.) 
8. Under the existing Constitution the only way in which to get rid of the present 
Government of Grenada would be to dissolve the Legislative Council (the 
Administrator has discretionary power to do this) and to arrange for new general 
elections. Although Mr. Gairy's party probably command considerably less support 
today that in March, 1961, it is not possible to assume that they would lose such 
general elections. If, despite the publication of this damaging report, the Gairyites 
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were to win a fresh general election within the next two months and thus to receive a 
fresh mandate from the electorate to continue in power, it would then be politically 
very difficult indeed for H.M.G. to amend the Constitution. Therefore, in view of the 
risk that the Gairyites might win the new elections, it is necessary to amend the 
Constitution before the general election takes place in such a way as to provide the 
Administrator with sufficient powers to ensure that there can be no recurrence of the 
malpractices revealed by the Commission of Enquiry, whichever party is returned at 
the next general election. The necessary amendments to achieve this objective are 
contained in the Schedule to this Order, which will come into effect after the next 
general election. 
9. This step in itself is not however sufficient to deal with the present situation 
because, even if the Legislative Council were to be dissolved tomorrow, the existing 
Government would remain in office until a new Chief Minister was appointed 
following the new general election. For the reasons set out above the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies does not consider it possible to countenance the continuance 
of the present Government in office for even a short further period. In addition, 
therefore, to dissolving the Legislative Council, the Order will dissolve the existing 
Executive Council and suspend the provisions of the existing constitution relating to 
the Executive Council and the functions of Ministers with effect from a very early 
date. The Administrator will then run the territory by "direct rule" until a general 
election is held in about two months' time, at which stage, as explained above, a 
modified form of the existing Constitution will be re-introduced. 
10. The main changes in the Constitution which will take effect after the general 
election are as follows:-
(i) the Administrator will have a wider reserved executive power i.e. he will be 
empowered to act contrary to the advice of his Ministers if he considers it 
necessary to do so in the interests of public order, public faith or good 
government; 
(ii) the Administrator will be given a reserved power enabling him to ensure the 
enactment of legislation (including legislation appropriating public money) which 
the Legislative Council has failed to pass, if he considers that its enactment is 
necessary in the interests of public order, public faith or good government; 
(iii) the Administrator will be empowered to decide, in his discretion, to appoint an 
official Minister of Finance (so that if the Gairyites win the next general election, it 
will be possible to ensure that no single elected member controls the purse-strings). 
11. The Additional Instructions, which are consequential on the dissolution of 
the Executive Council, will have the effect of requiring the Administrator to consult 
an ad hoc committee should he have to consider whether to exercise the prerogative 
of mercy in a capital case during the period when there is no Executive Council. 
196 CO 852/2064, no 5 29 June 1962 
'Jamaica and the Common Market': CO note for CRO. Annex 
Introduction 
Jamaica's considerable interest in our negotiations to enter the E.E.C. stems 
primarily from the fact that Britain is her biggest export market and that a number 
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of the more important products she exports to us benefit from valuable preferences 
and other special arrangements such as the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. If we 
entered the E.E.C. without any special arrangements being made to protect her vital 
interests Jamaica would not only lose these benefits but would be liable to pay the 
Common tariff and face reverse preferences in favour of the Six and their existing 
associates. This would be disastrous for her trade and could lead to a severe fall in her 
standard of living. It is for this reason that the special arrangements described below 
which we are proposing to protect her interests are vital for her. 
2. The special arrangements we have proposed for Jamaica consist essentially of 
a request for association under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. In paragraph 35 of his 
statement at the opening of the negotiations the Lord Privy SeaP said that "we 
should like to see the less developed members of the Commonwealth and our 
Dependent Territories given the opportunity, if they so wish, to enter into 
Association with the Community on the same terms as those which will in future be 
available to the present Associated Overseas Countries and Territories." As far as The 
West Indies are concerned our Delegation in Brussels have since maintained this 
position strongly and they will continue to do so. Up to the present there has been no 
indication from the Six that they would not be prepared to concede association to 
Jamaica and the rest of the West Indies. 
3. If we are successful in achieving association for Jamaica it will provide her 
with eventual free entry into the whole of the enlarged Community for a number of 
her important exports with, in some cases, significant tariff protection against 
competition from third countries. In addition she will also be eligible to receive 
assistance from the Overseas Development Fund of the E.E.C. As against this she will 
have to face additional competition in the British market from similar products (e.g. 
citrus and bananas) produced in other E.E.C. countries and the existing Associates, 
but this should not be serious. She will also have to be prepared to accord to other 
Community countries and Associates any preferences which she at present grants to 
Britain and other Commonwealth countries but she should still be able to retain 
tariffs on her imports to meet the needs of her development or for fiscal purposes. 
4. If an offer of association is obtained for and accepted by Jamaica her position 
will then depend on the degree of protection and other arrangements for her exports 
in the Community market as a whole. The position on the main commodities of 
interest to her is set out in the Annex. She might also be affected by any 
arrangements finally agreed by the Community with regard to the free movement of 
labour and the position on this aspect is explained in paragraphs 7 and 8 below. 
Previous consultations with Jamaica 
5. In July, 1961, as part of the round of visits to various Commonwealth 
countries previous to Britain's decision to apply for entry to the Common Market, 
Lord Perth, the then Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, visited The West Indies to 
obtain the reactions of West Indian Governments to the possibility of Britain 
applying for membership of the E.E.C.2 In the course of this visit he held 
consultations in Trinidad with the then Federal Government and with 
representatives of Unit Governments including Jamaica. The immediate reaction of 
West Indian Ministers in general was to express apprehension at the possibility of 
1 Mr Edward Heath. 2 See 154. 
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Britain entering Europe, as they were afraid that this would entail her giving up the 
Commonwealth and sacrificing the West Indies. Lord Perth took great pains to show 
the West Indians that this was not the case, that it was not a simple matter for the 
U.K. of choosing the Commonwealth or Europe and that in any negotiations we 
would do our utmost to protect vital West Indian interests (in this connection he 
explained the possibility of Association). As a result the fears of the West Indians were 
somewhat mollified but, as they have a habit of mind of clinging tenaciously to what 
they have got (i.e. a privileged position in the British market) and of fearing the 
unknown or unfamiliar they have retained a certain suspicion. Their reaction was, 
however, to demand association on the most favourable possible terms with 
continued protection for all their exports. 
6. Since then there have been consultations in London with West Indian officials 
and three West Indians (including a Jamaican official) visited Brussels in December 
to confer with the U.K. Delegation and to meet the E.E.C. Commission. In addition 
regular circulars describing the progress of the negotiations have been sent to all 
Colonial governments, including the Jamaica Government, ad hoc communications 
are sent to individual governments on points of special interest to them and there are 
arrangements to consult the embryo Jamaica High Commissioner's Office (formerly 
the West Indies Commission) in London when the occasion arises. The Prime 
Minister3 of Jamaica, who is visiting London at the beginning of July to discuss 
financial questions, will take the opportunity to discuss Common Market questions 
at the same time. 
Free movement of labour 
7. The position on the main commodities of interest to Jamaica is set out in the 
Annex. One other subject which may be raised in Jamaica, however, concerns the 
provisions in the Treaty of Rome for the free movement of labour within the 
Community. It might be argued that, following the passing of the U.K. 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, intending immigrants from the Community will be 
treated more favourably in the U.K. than will Commonwealth immigrants. It has also 
been alleged in the West Indies that this Act was passed primarily in order to 
facilitate Britain's entry into the Common Market; and, although the Colonial 
Secretary has emphatically denied this in correspondence4 with the Prime Minister 
of Trinidad it may still require once again to be firmly denied. The charge of more 
favourable treatment for Community labour cannot, however, be denied so 
emphatically .. The relevant articles of the Treaty of Rome (Articles 48- 51) are not 
clear on how the obligation to accord free movement of labour is to be interpreted in 
practice in the Common Market period (i.e. is it to mean freedom to accept 
employment if offered, which involves some degree of administrative control, or 
freedom to move to another country to seek employment). The regulations in force 
at the moment retain the principle of administrative control and there have been 
indications that the Six do not intend to permit complete freedom of movement 
(which they call "vagabondage"). On the other hand they may well in the end accept 
only the minimum degree of administrative control. Provided, however, that 
3 Now Sir A Bustamante who defeated Manley at the general election in Jamaica on 10 Apr 1962. 
Percentage of votes: JLP 50.04, PNP 48.60, others 1.36. 
4 See 169 and 172. 
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reasonable administrative control is retained Community labour will in fact be 
treated no better than Commonwealth immigrants who are controlled by the 
voucher system (vouchers being granted to intending immigrants who have been 
offered jobs and to a fixed quota of others on a first come first served basis). 
8. As to the possibility of West Indians seeking to move to other E.E.C. countries 
it is again not known what treatment will be accorded them for the purposes of 
immigration. Article 135 of the Treaty provides that movement of workers in 
Member States from associated countries and territories and vice versa shall be 
governed by agreements to be concluded subsequently; but so far no such 
agreements have been negotiated. 
Annex to 196: Position of main commodities of interest to Jamaica 
(1) Sugar 
Sugar accounts for over a quarter of Jamaica's total exports. Almost two thirds of her 
exports are sold in the U.K. market under the special terms of the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement which gives her a negotiated price more than twice the present 
level of the world price for a fixed quota. Most of the rest is sold in Canada at world 
price plus Canadian preference (over £7 a ton). There are also valuable sales to the 
United States. The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (C.S.A.) at present runs until 
1969 (it is agreed for eight years ahead and has so far been extended each year) and it 
is our intention if we enter the Common Market to continue the Agreement for this 
period. Thereafter in the Common Market period we hope to negotiate either the 
continuance of the C.S.A. within the framework of a Community Policy on sugar or 
arrangements which will have an equivalent effect. It is not known to what extent we 
will succeed in this objective but in any case it should be possible to negotiate 
favourable terms for territories which are offered association. 
(2) Jamaica [sic: Bananas] 
Although of considerably less importance than before the War bananas still account 
for about 11% of Jamaica's total exports. They are all sold in the U.K. where they 
receive the benefit of a Commonwealth preference of 7/6 d per cwt. (about 13%) as 
well as protection against competition from Central and South American bananas by 
quantitative restrictions on dollar imports. As a result Jamaica receives prices for her 
bananas as much as 40% above world prices. If we join the Common Market the 
Common external tariff and preference for the associates is likely to be 20% but, if at 
the same time the dollar restrictions were removed, this would still mean a fall in 
prices for Jamaica. The same position arises for Franc Area bananas in France and for 
Somali bananas in Italy, both of which receive very much higher than world prices in 
their metropolitan markets. Our proposals in the negotiations on this product 
involved the imposition of a levy on all bananas into the enlarged Community, the 
proceeds being paid over as subsidies to the Associated countries and territories 
(including Jamaica). This would have given the associates returns greater than they 
would have received with a tariff of even 20%. However, it is unlikely that this 
proposal will now be adopted, at least immediately, if only because of German and 
Benelux opposition. Instead, it is likely that the British, French and Italian markets 
will be isolated for the time being which would mean that we could retain our 
quantitative restrictions if we so wish. As to that, H.M.G. are committed to reviewing 
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the operation of dollar q.rs with the West Indies in 1963, but no undertaking to 
retain the q.rs indefinitely has been given. 
(3) Fresh citrus and citrus products 
In the field of citrus Jamaica exports fresh grapefruit, a small quantity of fresh 
oranges and ortaniques, canned grapefruit, orange and lime juice. Well over 90% of 
her citrus exports are sold in the U.K. As we have only a relatively low tariff (5/- per 
cwt. or about 7%) on fresh grapefruit and no tariffs at all on canned grapefruit 
segments and orange and grapefruit juice, the West Indies are protected against U.S. 
competition in the U.K. market for these products by quantitative restrictions on 
dollar imports. E.E.C. tariffs are, however, high especially on citrus products (where 
they range from 21-27% and 42% on highly concentrated juice). Despite these high 
tariffs, however, it is now proposed that we accept them pro tern for the purposes of 
the negotiations and allow pressures from third countries (especially the U.S. and 
Israel) in the G.A.T.T. to obtain reasonable reductions later. Provided Jamaica and 
the other West Indian citrus producers are associated they will thus receive 
considerable preferences on these products and we will be able to consider favourably 
the removal of our dollar restrictions. On one product, fresh grapefruit, we are 
asking for an increase in the Common tariff from 12% to 15% in the West Indies 
season to enable us to remove dollar restrictions. 
(4) Spices 
The main spices exported by Jamaica are pimento and ginger. In the case of pimento 
she has virtually a monopoly of world exports and a tariff would be of no benefit to 
her. With ginger the U.K. preference at present provides no price advantage because 
the greater part of the world's supplies come from the Commonwealth (especially 
India). In this case, as India will not be associated, it is felt that a zero duty will be to 
the best overall advantage of the Commonwealth and will not harm Jamaica. We have 
therefore asked for zero duties in the enlarged Community on both these spices and 
also zero duties on all minor spices on de minimus grounds. 
(5) Essential oils 
Jamaica's main essential oil exports are citrus oils (mainly orange and lime) and 
pimento oil. In general we have proposed accepting the Common tariff of 5-10% on 
non-citrus oils and of 12% on citrus oils. On lime oil, however, we have asked for an 
increase to 20% to protect the West Indies against competition from Mexico and the 
U.S.A. (The U.K. tariff was increased from 10% to 25% for this purpose in 1956, using 
the G.A.T.T. Colonial waiver, after dollar imports were liberalised) . 
(6) Cocoa 
Jamaica exports small quantities of cocoa, but it is not as important for her as for 
Trinidad and Grenada. The Common tariff has been 9% and we have asked for this to 
be reduced to zero. It is, however, unlikely that we will succeed in obtaining this and 
the Six are proposing in negotiations with their existing associates a reduction of 
40% in all to 5.4%. If she is associated Jamaica is thus likely to receive a preference at 
this level in the enlarged Community. 
(7) Coffee 
Again Jamaica exports only relatively small quantities of high grade coffee. The 
present Common tariff is 16% and we have asked for a reduction to 5% . The Six are, 
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however, again proposing to their existing Associates a reduction of 40% to 9.6% and 
it is likely we will accept this. Once again as an associate Jamaica would receive the 
benefit of whatever preference is eventually agreed. 
(8) Rum and molasses 
Over two thirds of Jamaica's rum exports are sold in Britain and the Six but a much 
smaller proportion of her molasses exports. The Common tariff in each case is 
considerably higher than the present U.K. tariff (our own duty on rum is essentially 
an excise duty with a tiny Commonwealth preference) and would prima facie confer 
advantages on Jamaica if she is associated. Jamaica does, however, receive some 
protection in the U.K. market from q.rs on dollar imports on rum and these would 
presumably be removed when the higher preference came into effect. 
(9) Cigars 
Jamaican cigars mainly compete with the more expensive varieties from Cuba., the 
U.S.A. and the Philippines and she is protected at present in the U.K. market by q.rs 
on dollar imports. As with rum the U.K. duty on cigars is mainly an excise duty with 
a very small Commonwealth preference. The Common tariff on cigars, on the other 
hand is again a high one (80%) and, if applied on imports from third countries with 
free entry for Jamaica as an associate, would provide Jamaica with very considerable 
protection against competition from Cuba and other dollar sources. If protection on 
this generous scale is obtained for Jamaica there would be no grounds for continuing 
the U.K. restrictions on dollar imports. 
(10) Bauxite and alumina 
Bauxite and alumina together constitute Jamaica's most important export (about 
45% of her total exports). She is heavily dependent on this industry for her revenue 
and also after independence, for her foreign exchange earnings although it is less 
important than sugar and the other agricultural industries for employment. All 
Jamaica's bauxite is sold in Canada and the U.S.A. and alumina (the product of the 
first stage of processing) to Canada and Norway. As, however, a large part of Canadian 
exports of aluminium are sold in the U.K. and the E.E.C. she will be affected by the 
level of tariff on aluminium applied in the U.K. and the enlarged Community; and the 
state of the Canadian industry will indirectly affect Jamaica's sales of bauxite and 
alumina. The present common tariff on aluminium is 9% but we have asked for a 
zero duty. Although the Six are unlikely to agree to this it is hoped that either a low 
rate of duty or duty free quotas in the U.K. market will be obtained which will not 
seriously affect Canada's sales. As French interests are involved, however, the battle 
will be a hard one. Norway has applied for full membership and, if she obtains it and 
Jamaica is associated, Jamaican duty free sales of alumina to Norway will be 
maintained, as will Norway's exports of aluminium to the Community no matter 
what the level of the Common tariff. Jamaica should not therefore have anything to 
fear as regards her sales to Norway. 
(11) Minor manufactured goods 
Jamaica is encouraging the establishment of new industries in the Island and she 
now exports small quantities of cotton yarn and fabrics, travel goods, clothing and 
footwear etc., partly to neighbouring Caribbean territories and the U.S., but also in a 
small way to the U.K. If she becomes an associated state she should continue to 
benefit from free entry for these goods in the U.K. and also eventually in the rest of 
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the Community. It seems likely, however, that the Six will insert a "disruption 
clause" in the new Part IV Implementing Convention which will provide for 
protective action in the Community (by applying the Common tariff in whole or in 
part) if sales of this type of goods from the associates threaten disruption. It is 
unlikely that the clause would in fact be invoked, but it would be wise, if Jamaica 
begins to develop her exports of these types of goods to Europe, to spread them over 
a range of goods rather than concentrate on one type. 
197 CO 1031/3489, no 44 2 July 1962 
'Financial and defence discussions with Jamaica government 
delegation': CO note of a meeting between Mr Maudling and a 
delegation led by Sir A Bustamante 
[A financial settlement with Jamaica had been under CO consideration since the end of 
1961. J E Whitelegg, a principal in the West Indian Dept 'B', argued that as Jamaica 
constituted just over half the population of the former federation, a case could be made 
for allocating to the territory half of the assistance previously contemplated for the 
federation as a whole, excluding the grant-in-aid element (CO 1031/3489, minute by 
Whitelegg, 18 Dec 1961). DJ Kirkness, a principal in the Finance Dept, contested this. To 
apply the same criterion throughout the Caribbean, Trinidad would receive three times as 
much as Barbados which would be 'absurd' . The test ought to be based on need and, in 
Kirkness's view, 'I do not rate Jamaica very high on that'. Jamaica's national income per 
head was twice that of the Leewards and Windwards, one and a half times that of Barbados 
and seven times that of East Africa generally: 'They have little claim on us, & our object 
should be to give them the least we can ... . We can get away with a good deal with 
Jamaica on a "take it or leave it" basis; if they want independence, let them have it on our 
financial terms'. In view of the recent ministerial decision that new or increased overseas 
commitments could be accepted only if they were of exceptional importance to UK 
interests, Kirkness maintained that no case could be made for the future of Jamaica 
falling within that category (ibid, minute by Kirkness, 19 Dec 1961). As preparations were 
made to receive Bustamante (see 196, note 2) and his delegation in London, J D Higham 
reminded colleagues of the statement made by Selwyn Lloyd, the chancellor, in July 1961 
that an overseas aid budget of £180 million was the maximum the UK economy could 
sustain (ibid, minute by Higham, 22 June 1962). At the London talks in July 1962 the 
Jamaican delegation submitted a request for grants of over £2 million and loans of £11 
million for the period up to the beginning of a new ten-year development plan in 1963, 
with assistance thereafter bringing the total to about £14.5 million. D Williams described 
this as 'preposterous' (ibid, minute by Williams, 27 June 1962). 
Invited by the Secretary of State to explain their case for seeking financial assistance 
from H.M.G., the Jamaica Government delegation said that Jamaica's needs fell into 
two broad categories. First, there was the problem of immediate requirements. On 
assuming office the new Government had found that they had inherited a liability of 
£6.1 million for the period up to 31st March, 1962, with the result that no reserve 
funds were available for emergency purposes. There was also a deficit of about £4~ 
million for the current year which could be met only by external loans. The new 
Government had also inherited a heavy commitment for the purchase of railway 
stock and the Industrial Development Corporation had borrowed from the Banks 
over £1 million for the construction of factory buildings. Secondly, there was the 
need to secure low interest bearing loans for the proposed 10-year development plan 
which represented the minimum rate of growth possible which was satisfactory given 
the political and economic circumstances in Jamaica. Credit restrictions during the 
past two years had forced back the rate of development and there would be serious 
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difficulties if development could not take place at the rate proposed in the plan; 
expectations had been heightened by the advent of a new Government and the 
movement into independence. There were however increasing difficulties in the way 
of expanding the economy further; all available internal resources had been 
earmarked for the plan (no more money could be raised for the time being by 
Treasury Bills); the private sector (e.g. bauxite, hotels, etc.) could not be called upon 
for additional funds which would in future have to be found from the public sector; 
there were no untapped natural resources which could be developed, only marginal 
expansion could be made; the prospects of raising a London loan were not 
encouraging while Jamaica's stock was examined as part of the Colonial group and a 
year had been lost in seeking to get on to the market; and it seemed unlikely that the 
I.B.R.D. would be able to assist as it appeared there were no schemes planned in 
Jamaica which would be suitable for financing from its sources. 
2. Sir Alexander Bustamante said that Jamaica stood alone "among a sea of 
discontent" in the Caribbean. The overall increase in Jamaica's wealth in recent years 
had hardly touched the small man; 18% of the working forces still remained 
unemployed. Developing the Premier's point, Mr. Seaga said the fact that the gross 
domestic product had been increasing at an average rate of 7J.f% over the past six 
years (it had fallen about 3J.f% from 1958 onwards) was misleading since there was 
no correlation between incomes and the level of unemployment. Industrial 
development had resulted in only 8,000 jobs being found whereas 18,000 were 
required; about 10,000 persons were being added annually to the number of 
unemployed. The problem had previously been partially eased by immigration into 
the United Kingdom but the Commonwealth Immigrants Act had created a new 
problem. It was essential that economic growth should proceed at a faster rate than 
the increase in population. Much was made of Jamaica's wealth in comparison with 
other newly independent countries; but there were, for example, secondary school 
places for only 7J.f% of children of school age and the house building programme was 
meeting about only one-tenth of what was needed. 
3. The Secretary of State said that he had been very surprised at the extent of 
the financial assistance sought by Jamaica which was completely out of line with 
what had been expected, with what H.M.G. might be able to afford, and with what 
other newly independent countries had sought. He had been surprised to learn that 
there was a deficit of £6 million for 1961-62. The Colonial Office had been aware 
that the previous Government required assistance to meet immediate difficulties; 
but they had not known the problem was anywhere near as large as was now stated. 
It seemed to him unreasonable to expect that because Jamaica was becoming inde-
pendent there would be a higher inflow of external funds to meet this deficit. The 
proposed development plan appeared to be based on the assumption that external 
assistance would be available at three times the level at which it had been previ-
ously which again seemed to be unreasonable. H.M.G. could only provide assistance 
where the need for it could be clearly shown; otherwise, the unqualified release of 
funds could damage the position of sterling. The amount of overseas assistance 
which could be provided was strictly limited and regard had therefore to be paid to 
such criteria as levels of income per head in the various countries seeking assis-
tance. On that basis Jamaica was very wealthy as compared, for example, to East 
Africa. 
4. There was also some discussion of the following matters:-
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(a) Continuation of C.D. and W. schemes. The Jamaica delegation asked whether 
some financial arrangement could be made whereby existing schemes could be 
continued after independence. The U.K. delegation indicated that it should be 
possible to make such an arrangement. 
(b) Subscriptions for membership of various international organisations. The 
Jamaica delegation said that they wished to join various organisations, including 
the World Bank and I.M.F., but that the costs of doing so were high. The U.K. 
delegation suggested that rather than consider such a request in isolation it would 
be better to discuss the overall level [of] assistance from which the cost of such 
subscriptions might be met. 
(c) Capital costs of the U. W.I. The Jamaica delegation said that H.M.G. had 
previously recognised the need to finance the development of the University and 
hoped that Jamaica's independence would not lead to any change in this attitude. 
(d) War Department lands. The Jamaica delegation said that it would not be 
possible for the Jamaica Government to pay for the lands and that, following 
tradition, they should be handed over to Jamaica. 
(e) Defence equipment. The Jamaica delegation said that they would like H.M.G. 
to help in meeting the cost of equipment for the Jamaica Regiment, including the 
refund of moneys which the Jamaica Government had already spent on acquiring 
equipment from the British garrison. 
(f) Common Market. The Jamaica delegation said that they were not clear 
whether, if Britain's application to join the Common Market were successful, it 
would be open to Jamaica to enjoy Associate Membership. 
4. It was agreed that discussions would be held at official level on the general 
financial questions and the questions listed in paragraph 6, after which a further 
meeting would be arranged at ministerial level. 
198 CO 1031/3489, no 41A 6 July 1962 
[Financial settlement with Jamaica] : letter from Mr Fraser to 
Mr Brooke1 
I think you have seen Edward Boyle's2 letter to me of to-day. I am sorry to have to 
come back to you in Reggie Maudling's absence but I have to see the Jamaican 
delegation at 4 o'clock this afternoon when they are expecting to hear our final 
decision. I realise that the Treasury have gone quite a long way in an effort to help us 
and I hope you will not think that I am ungracious therefore when I say that quite 
frankly I do not believe that the authority Boy le has given me in this letter represents 
a settlement which we can reasonably put before the Jamaican Delegation as our last 
word. 
The particular point on which I regard the Treasury proposal as vulnerable is the 
suggestion that the development loan should be limited to £500,000. 
I have not in the time available been able to carry out an exhaustive analysis of 
Jamaica's bid which adds up to some £11 million in loans up to the end of the 
1 See 178, note 3. 2 Financial secretary to Treasury, 1959- 1962. 
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current financial year together with over £2 million grants but we are satisfied 
having regard to the resources otherwise available to them that to offer as little as 
£500,000 would enforce on them a cut in development expenditure which would be 
quite unacceptable to them. They have been averaging over £10 million a year and 
while we may consider this to be more than they can afford we cannot I think ask 
them to come down at once to the kind of figure which a development loan of no 
more than £500,000 would necessitate. As far as I can see their current year's 
programme would on this basis have to be limited to something like £7 million. Not 
only have they a great many continuing commitments to be met within this but the 
political effect cannot be left out of account. Unemployment is already a serious 
problem and we cannot ignore the practical as well as the political effects of the 
Commonwealth Immigration Act. 
Any development loan would count against the £100 million ceiling in the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act for Exchequer loans. We in the Colonial 
Office, as the Treasury know, had always regarded it as appropriate, on the basis of 
competing priorities, to earmark £5)!,1 million for the Caribbean area (excluding 
British Guiana) and of this we have always contemplated that at least £1~ million 
would be an appropriate sum for Jamaica. We are not therefore asking the Treasury 
for any provision for which we have not already allowed and which is not already 
covered in the Aid Programme forecasts. 
I am trying to arrange to have a word with you about this matter before I see the 
Delegation at 4 o'clock but I thought it as well to give you this advance notice of the 
point which I shall want to raise with you. 
If you can meet me on this then I would be prepared to tell the Jamaican 
Delegation this afternoon that this is a final settlement even though they do not get 
the warships and even though the value of the War Department's lands is included at 
a figure which the Government of Jamaica would certainly regard as an over-
valuation. Frankly I could not put your present proposals to them as a final 
settlement.3 
3 The final settlement reached with Jamaica consisted of (a) grants equivalent to the amount of Jamaica's 
CD&W allocation remaining unspent upon independence--£600,000; (b) grants to make good the 
shortfall in the current capital programmes of the University of the West Indies Teaching Hospital 
resulting from the reduction of CD&W schemes for these purposes upon independence---£300,000, 
together with grants of about £100,000 towards Jamaica's expenditure which would otherwise have been 
met from existing CD&W schemes for regional services, should Jamaica wish to participate in them; (c) a 
special grant of £112,000 towards the cost of completing the Institute of Arts, Science and Technology; (d) 
War Office lands and buildings to the value of £2,5 million; (e) a loan of £1li million in respect of Jamaica's 
1962-1963 development programme, the territory's ten-year development plan being regarded as a 
separate question for which Commonwealth Assistance Loans would be made available if need was shown 
(CO 103113489). 
199 CO 852/2065, no 75 13 Aug 1962 
'Trinidad and the Common Market': CO note for CRO. Annex I 
Introduction 
Trinidad and Tobago are the southernmost of the West Indian Islands and are 
situated off the coast of Venezuela. Their population is about 850,000 (the second 
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largest in the West Indies after Jamaica) and their main exports are petroleum and 
petroleum products (about 80% of total exports), sugar, cocoa, coffee, citrus and 
rum. The territory was a part of a Federation of The West Indies but, after the break 
up of the Federation, it applied for independence on its own. This has been granted 
and Trinidad will become independent on the 31st August (i.e. before the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference). 
Interest in the Common Market negotiations 
2. Trinidad's main interests in the Common Market negotiations are:-
(a) Association; 
(b) the treatment of her petroleum products; 
(c) sugar; 
(d) the free movement of labour. 
These are all dealt with seriatim below and notes on Trinidad's main export com-
modities are included in Annex I. It should be noted that Dr. Eric Williams, the 
Prime Minister of Trinidad, is an able economist who is well aware of Trinidad's 
economic interests in the negotiations and how these might best be met. Mter the 
Trinidad Independence Conference earlier this summer, he visited a number of 
capitals of the Six and he also discussed Trinidad's problems with the Lord Privy 
Seal. 
Previous consultations with Trinidad 
3. In July, 1961, as part of the round of visits to Commonwealth countries 
previous to Britain's decision to apply for entry to the Common Market, Lord Perth, 
the then Minister of State for Colonial Mfairs, visited the West Indies to obtain the 
reactions of West Indian Governments to the possibility of Britain applying for 
membership of the E.E.C.I In the course of this visit he held consultations in 
Trinidad with the then Federal Government and with representatives of unit 
Governments, including the Government of Trinidad. The immediate reaction of 
West Indian ministers in general was to express apprehension at the possibility of 
Britain entering Europe as they were afraid this would entail her giving up the 
Commonwealth and sacrificing the West Indies. (To some extent Dr. Williams did not 
share this rather emotional attitude and took a more calculating line, but even he 
was apprehensive about such factors as the future of Trinidad's petroleum exports, 
the free movement of labour and the future of the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement) . Lord Perth took great pains to show the West Indians that their fears 
were unfounded, that it was not a simple matter for the U.K. of choosing the 
Commonwealth or Europe and that in any negotiations we would do our utmost to 
protect the vital interests of the West Indies. (In this connexion he explained the 
possibility of association). As a result the fears of the West Indians were somewhat 
mollified but, as most of them have a habit of mind of clinging tenaciously to what 
they have got (i.e. a privileged position in the British market) and a fear of the 
unknown or unfamiliar, they have retained a certain suspicion. Their reaction was 
however to demand Association for the West Indies on the most favourable possible 
terms with continued protection for all their exports. 
1 See 154. 
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4. In the late autumn of 1961 Dr. Williams wrote to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies expressing apprehension about certain aspects of the Common Market (i.e. 
those mentioned above in paragraph 3) and suggesting that one of his officials 
should visit the U.K. and Brussels to make Trinidad's case better known.2 This was 
accepted and consultations were held in London with Trinidad and other West Indian 
officials in December, during which the whole field was gone over. The officials 
concerned also visited Brussels to confer with the U.K. delegation and to meet the 
E.E.C. Commission. Following these consultations Dr. Williams expressed himself as 
satisfied with the assurances given to his representative. In addition to this special 
mission regular circulars describing the progress of the negotiations have been sent 
to all Colonial Governments (including the Trinidad Government) , ad hoc 
communications are sent to individual Governments on points of special interest to 
them and there are special arrangements to consult the Trinidad Office in London 
when the occiision arises. Occasional meetings of representatives of Colonial 
Governments in London are also held to keep them in the picture about the progress 
of negotiations. 
5. During the Trinidad independence Conference earlier this summer further 
meetings were held with the Trinidad officials concerned to discuss Common Market 
matters, especially petroleum. Following his visit to the continent after the 
Conference (during which he conferred with the German and French Governments 
among others) Dr. Williams had meetings in London with the Lord Privy Seal and 
with officials to raise further points regarding Trinidad's possible relationship with 
the enlarged Common Market; (copies of the records of these meetings are attached 
at Annex II) .3 He made requests for a considerable amount of information which has 
since been sent to him. 
Trinidad's particular interests 
(a) Association 
6. The Trinidad Government is fully aware that if Britain joins the E.E.C. the best 
means of safeguarding her economic interests would be association with the enlarged 
Community. Britain is her biggest market, especially for sugar and citrus, and an 
important market for petroleum products. From the beginning of the negotiations 
H.M.G. has therefore maintained for Trinidad, as for other dependent territories, a 
demand for association under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome on the same terms as are 
available to the existing associated countries and territories. It was for a long period 
difficult to get to grips with this aspect of the negotiations because the Six were dis-
cussing the renewal of the association arrangements with their existing associates. 
But now that the broad outline of the terms on which association is likely to be 
renewed is known it has been possible to make progress in Brussels during the last 
month or two with discussions on association for Commonwealth countries and ter-
ritories. As a result it has been agreed that most of our dependent territories would be 
accepted for association if Britain so wishes and that independent Commonwealth 
countries in Mrica and the Caribbean would also in principle be considered suitable 
for association if they so wish. For this purpose, Trinidad, because she has a date for 
independence, has been included in the independent countries. 
2 See 169. 3 Annexes II and Ill not printed. 
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7. Association would be of benefit to Trinidad because it would enable her to 
continue to sell some of her most important exports free of duty in the British 
market and indeed eventually to have these privileges extended to the markets of 
the whole Community on preferential terms. On the other hand, if the U.K. 
entered the E.E.C. without any special arrangements being made to protect her 
vital interests, Trinidad would not only lose the benefits she has already in the 
British market but would be liable to pay the Common tariff and face reverse pref-
erences in favour of the Six and their existing associates. This would be a severe 
blow to her trade and could lead to a sharp fall in her standard of living. It is for 
this reason that the achievement of association, which is the most suitable special 
arrangement available in Trinidad's circumstances, is vital to protect her essential 
economic interests. 
8. If Trinidad is successful in achieving association it would provide her with 
eventual free entry in the whole of the enlarged Community for a number of her 
important exports (but see below for petroleum products) in some cases with 
significant tariff protection against third countries. As against this she will have to 
face additional competition in the British market from similar products (e.g. citrus, 
cocoa and rum) produced in other E.E.C. countries and the existing associates, but 
this should not be serious. She will also have to be prepared to accord to other 
Community countries and associates any preferences which she at present grants to 
Britain and other Commonwealth countries but she should still be able to retain 
tariffs on her imports to meet the needs of her development and for fiscal purposes. 
9. If Trinidad is offered and accepts association her position will then depend on 
the degree of protection and other arrangements for her exports in the Community 
market as a whole. Her position on the main commodities of interest to her is set out 
in the Annex I. 
(b) Petroleum 
10. Crude petroleum and petroleum products account for over 80% of Trinidad's 
exports. About half her production comes from indigenous crude and the other half 
from imported, mainly Venezuelan crude. She exports about 11 million tons of 
refined products and 1 million tons of crude of which about 2~ million tons of 
refined products and ~ million tons of crude come to the U.K. Only small quantities 
are exported to the Six, mainly the Netherlands, and the rest finds markets in the 
Western Hemisphere and Africa. 
11. Her position on petroleum is complicated by the fact that the Six have not 
yet decided what the Common tariff should be on petroleum products and by the fact 
that a decision on this is almost certain to be taken only in the context of the 
formulation of a common energy policy for the Community as a whole. As an interim 
measure the Six have agreed that the Netherlands Antilles, (whose exports consist 
almost entirely of refined petroleum) can only be associated with the Community if 
they agree to their duty free exports of petroleum being limited to a given quota, 
divided up within the markets of the Six. Any exports above these quotas both to the 
Six as a whole and to individual member countries might have to pay the Common 
tariff or be subjected to other limitations agreed upon by the Community. This 
protocol on Netherlands Antilles oil is clearly of vital importance for Trinidad as the 
Six will almost certainly insist on some similar arrangements being agreed for her 
before she can be associated. 
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12. As far as the U.K. is concerned our interests and those of Trinidad are 
identical, namely the maximum freedom of trade in petroleum products with, if 
possible, a zero tariff in the enlarged Community. But it is unlikely that the Six 
when they agree a tariff on refined petroleum (the tariff on crude oil is zero) 
would agree that this should be zero, and indeed as explained above, the whole 
matter is mixed up with the negotiation of a Common energy policy. This is a 
most complex field in which it is unlikely that early agreement will be reached, 
but one of the factors to be taken into account is the French desire to protect oil 
refined from Saharan crude. It is this interest which led the Dutch in the end to 
accept the quota for duty free imports from the Antilles and it is highly unlikely 
that Trinidad will be able to escape with anything less. We will naturally do our 
best to avoid this but, if the Six insist, it may be necessary to negotiate the best 
quota possible as part of the terms of a settlement. One of the factors that should 
be taken into account is that on the surface at least the Antilles quota is not 
ungenerous. It is approximately double their present exports to the Six and if 
Trinidad could get similar terms she should not be too badly placed. The exact 
basis of calculation of the Antilles protocol is, however, disputed and efforts are 
being made to obtain further information on this vital point before deciding on 
the exact tactics to be adopted in Trinidad's case. One of the arguments the 
Trinidadians want to make use of is that a large part (about a half) of Trinidad's 
petroleum exports are refined from her own indigenous production of crude oil 
(as compared with the Dutch Antilles which have to rely entirely on imported, 
mainly Venezuelan, crude), and they argue that this would justify more generous 
treatment. The difficulty we see in making too much of this argument is that we 
do not want to appear to concede to the French any arguments in favour of dis-
criminating against oil produced from imported crude. In our opinion it is per-
haps best at this stage to be clear about our objectives in negotiating about oil 
and to leave the tactics to be decided nearer the time in the light of the situation 
as it develops. We will in any case keep closely in touch with the Trinidad 
Government on all aspects of this matter (it may be that in the end they will 
insist on trying to negotiate their own terms of association although we shall no 
doubt wish to liaise closely with them). 
(c) Sugar 
13. The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement has been one of the mainstays of 
the West Indian economy in the post-war years. It is one of our main objectives in 
the negotiations to retain the substance of this agreement and, indeed, we have 
contractual obligations to keep it running until 1969. In retaining the substance, 
however, we shall if necessary be willing to accommodate the form to whatever 
common policy for sugar is eventually agreed by the Community (indeed the Six 
may insist in the Common Market stage that the arrangements in the C.S.A. 
should be changed to fit them more closely into the Community framework) but 
it is our aim to retain the substance. We have erpphasised to the Six the very 
heavy dependence of the West Indies and certain other territories on exports of 
sugar and now feel that they understand the position. It was, however, not possi-
ble to have any substantive discussion on sugar with the Six before the 
Conference adjourned for the Summer holidays and we shall have to take it up 
again in the Autumn. 
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(d) Free movement of labour 
14. This is a subject which Dr. Williams has raised in the past. He has alleged 
that the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was introduced to help ease Britain's 
passage into the Common Market to enable us to discriminate in favour of 
Community labour and against the Commonwealth. The Colonial Secretary has 
emphatically denied this in correspondence with Dr. Williams.4 The fact is that the 
present E.E.C. regulations on this subject provide for individual member countries 
to continue to give special treatment to labour from countries with which they have 
special associations and it is not our intention in this regard to discriminate in 
favour of the Community and against the Commonwealth. It might also be said that, 
although we do not know how this part of the Treaty will eventually be interpreted, it 
is likely that, even in the Common Market Stage, the Community will retain some 
form of administrative regulation over the free movement of labour and will not 
allow people to wander from country to country in search of jobs. It will certainly be 
our policy if we become a Member to press for the retention of minimum controls. 
Finally, it might be said that we do not expect to receive any large numbers of 
workers from the Continent if we join. There is now virtual full employment in 
almost all countries of the Community and an acute labour shortage in some (e.g. 
Germany). Even in Italy unemployment is falling fast and there is a shortage of 
skilled workers; and the Italian Government are trying to induce some Italians in 
other countries to return to Italy to work. 
15. As to the possibility of West Indians seeking to move to other E.E.C. 
countries it is again not known what treatment will be accorded them for the 
purposes of immigration. Article 135 of the Treaty provides that movement of 
workers in Member States from Associated countries and territories and vice versa 
shall be governed by agreements to be concluded subsequently; but so far no such 
agreements have been negotiated. 
Martinique and Guadaloupe 
16. One of the ideas which has interested Dr. Williams recently is the possibility 
of an Eastern Caribbean Common Market to include not only the British territories 
in the region but also the French Overseas Departments of Martinique and 
Guadaloupe and the Dutch Antilles (naturally under Trinidad leadership). He clearly 
realises that the possibility of bringing this about would be strengthened if Trinidad 
were to become associated with the E.E.C. This is one of the matters which he raised 
with the French Government when he visited Paris last month (although, on the 
advice of Sir Pierson Dixon, the British Ambassador in Paris, presumably in guarded 
terms, although we have had no reports of what transpired) . An extract from Sir 
Pierson Dixon's record of his meeting with Dr. Williams is attached at Annex Ill. 
Annex I to 199: Position on main commodities of interest to Trinidad 
1. Oil and petroleum 
Crude oil accounts for about 3% of Trinidad's total exports and refined petroleum 
products for 81%. About half her relatively small exports of orude oil and about 30% 
of her exports of refined petroleum come to the U.K. The Six (mainly the 
4 See 169 and 172. 
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Netherlands) take about 4% of her exports of refined products. The E.E.C. Common 
tariff on crude oil is zero and no difficulties should therefore arise in that field . The 
much more complicated position in the field of refined petroleum products is 
explained in the main part of the brief (paragraphs 10-12). (For a more detailed 
account i.e. C.M.N. (0) (62)295-Negotiating Brief on exports of Oil Products from 
Commonwealth Territories into the Common Market) . 
2. Sugar 
Sugar accounts for about 7% of Trinidad's total exports (over a third of her non-
petroleum exports). Getting on for nine tenths of her sugar is sold in the U.K. under 
the special terms of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which gives her a 
negotiated price for a fixed quota more than twice the present level of the world 
price. Most of the rest is sold in Canada at the world price plus Canadian preference 
(over £7 a ton). The Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (C.S.A.) at present runs until 
1969 (it is agreed for eight years ahead and has so far been extended each year for one 
more year) and it is our intention if we enter the E.E.C. to continue the Agreement 
for this period. Thereafter in the Common Market period we hope to negotiate either 
the continuance of the C.S.A. within the framework of whatever Community policy 
on sugar is eventually decided or arrangements which will have an equivalent effect. 
It is not known to what extent we will succeed in this objective but in any case it 
should be possible to negotiate favourable terms for territories which are offered 
association. 
3. Cocoa 
Trinidad's cocoa exports are not large by world standards (e.g. Ghana or Nigeria) but 
she is with Grenada the biggest cocoa exporter in the West lndies, cocoa accounting 
for about 2).:1% of her total exports (13% of her exports other than petroleum). The 
Common tariff for cocoa is at present 9% but the Six have agreed a reduction or 40% 
(including a 15% suspension) to 5.4% in the context of their negotiations with the 
existing associates on the renewal of the Association Convention (the reduced rate 
would come into force immediately on 1/1/63). We have asked in our own negotiations 
for the tariff to be reduced to zero but it is unlikely that the Six will agree on any fur-
ther reductions. If she is associated Trinidad is. thus likely to receive free entry for her 
cocca into the enlarged Community together with a preference of somewhat over 5% 
against third country suppliers. 
4. Citrus and citrus products 
In the field of citrus Trinidad exports fresh grapefruit, orange juice and grapefruit 
juice, most of which are sold in the U.K. market (she is also just beginning to export 
canned grapefruit segments) . Although all her citrus exports only account for about 
1% of her total exports they are important politically and from the point of view of 
employment and Trinidad is in fact the largest supplier of grapefruit juice and of 
sweetened orange juice to the U.K. market and the largest exporter of fresh 
grapefruit in the West Indies. As the U.K. has only a relatively low tariff (5/- per cwt. 
or about 7%) on fresh grapefruit and no tariffs at all on canned grapefruit segments 
and orange and grapefruit juice, the West Indies are protected against U.S. 
competition in the U.K. market for these products by quantitative restrictions on 
dollar imports. E.E.C. tariffs are, however, high especially on citrus products (where 
they range from 21-27% and 42% on highly concentrated juice) . Despite these high 
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tariffs, however, it is now proposed that we accept them pro tern for the purposes of 
the negtiations and allow pressures from third countries (especially the U.S. and 
Israel) in the G.A.T.T. to obtain reasonable reductions later. Provided Trinidad and 
the other West Indian citrus producers are associated they will thus receive 
considerable preferences on these products and we will be able to consider favourably 
the removal of our dollar restrictions. On one product, fresh grapefruit, we are 
asking for an increase in the Common tariff from 12% to 15% in the West Indies 
season to enable us to remove dollar restrictions. 
5. Coffee 
Trinidad exports only small quantities of coffee (0.5% of her total exports) and most 
of [?it] is sold in markets other than the U.K. and E.E.C. The present Common tariff 
is 16% but the Six are agreeing to a reduction of 40% to 9.6% in the context of their 
negotiations with the existing associates, the revised tariff to come into effect at one 
stroke on 1.1.63. We have asked for a further reduction to 5% but will probably in the 
end have to accept the rate proposed by the Six. If Trinidad is associated her small 
exports of coffee to the enlarged Community would receive the benefit of whatever 
preference is eventually agreed. 
6. Rum and molasses 
Trinidad's exports of rum and molasses, although not negligible, are less important 
than Jamaica's. The Common tariff in each case is considerably higher than the 
present U.K. tariff (our own duty on rum is really a revenue duty with a tiny 
Commonwealth preference) and would prima facie confer advantages on Trinidad if 
she is associated. At present Trinidad does receive some protection in the U.K. 
market from q.rs on dollar imports of rum and these would presumably be removed 
if and when the higher preference came into effect. 
7. Natural asphalt 
This is a peculiar export of Trinidad (Trinidad Lake Asphalt). The E.E.C. Common 
tariff is, however, zero and, although Trinidad will thus lose some Commonwealth 
preference in the U.K. market, this should not affect her sales. 
8. Minor manufactured goods 
The Trinidad Government is encouraging the establishment of new industries and in 
recent years there has b een a considerable development of manufacturing industry, 
notably bricks and tiles, paint, cement, clothing, boots and shoes, furniture, soap, 
matches, cigarettes, beer, biscuits, chocolate, confectionary, glass, drugs and 
industrial gasses. Among these products Trinidad exports cement, cotton fabrics, 
shirts and other clothing, shoes and glass bottles mainly to neighbouring territories. 
There is no known export to the U.K. or E.E.C. of any of these products. If Trinidad is 
associated she will eventually benefit from free entry into the whole of the enlarged 
Community for any exports of manufactured goods. It seems likely, however, that the 
Six will insert a "disruption clause" in the new Part IV Implementating Convention 
which will provide for protective action in the Community (by applying the Common 
tariff in whole or in part) if sales of this type of goods from the associates threaten 
disruption. It is unlikely that the clause would in fact be invoked, but it would be 
wise, if Trinidad begins to develop her exports of these types of goods to Europe, to 
spread them over a range of goods rather than concentrate on one type. 
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200 CO 103113494, no 37 31 Aug 1962 
[Trinidad]: letter from NE Costar1 to Sir S Garner2 reporting a 
conversation with Dr Williams on Trinidad's r elations with the UK 
and the US and his view of the Common Market [Extract] 
I paid my first call on the Prime Minister, Dr. Eric Williams, on 31st August. . .. He 
went out of his way to be charming and informally affable .... The bulk of the time 
was taken up by a very frank, if somewhat one-sided, discussion by the Prime 
Minister of various political matters, almost all of which were raised by him. The 
main points are summarised below. 
(I) Relations with Britain 
Trinidad and Tobago was now independent and would brook interference from no 
outside power. But this did not mean that the Trinidad Government wanted Britain 
to take less interest in her affairs than in the past. I would no doubt find that he 
would be giving Britain a few "knocks" from time to time but this would not be to 
discourage us from a continuing concern with Trinidad. On the contrary, I would 
find that Dr. Williams wanted Commonwealth links of the right kind to be 
strengthened not weakened. It soon appeared that he had in mind, in the main, three 
things:-
(a) Trinidad did not wish to be abandoned by Britain to the Americans either 
politically or economically. A report had circulated in Trinidad that Mr. Macmillan 
and the U.S. President (I am not clear whether President Eisenhower or President 
Kennedy was meant) had agreed at Bermuda that Trinidad should be recognised by 
Britain as being the concern of the United States. This had been denied in London 
but the fact was that many in Trinidad believed it. (He did not say that he did, nor 
did he demur when I protested that he would know that that was not the way we 
behaved in relation to Commonwealth territory.) Even if it were true, he would for 
his part not stand for any American attempt to run or interfere in Trinidad affairs. 
But his point was that he would welcome continuing British political interest in 
Trinidad as a counterpoise to American attempts at domination which he professes 
to fear. I think Dr. Williams sees Commonwealth institutions as a means of 
helping in this context. 
(b) Trinidad wanted Britain to take a continuing interest in the Caribbean 
generally. We had made mistakes in the past. We (with others) for instance were to 
blame for the break up of the Federation. The switch from Mr. Lennox Boyd's to 
Mr. MacLeod's policies-though right in itself-had been somewhat too sudden 
and had not been fully understood by the people of Trinidad. We should have been 
firmer in ensuring that Federation succeeded and continued. (I think he meant 
that we paid too much attention to the views of the smaller islands.)3 But our 
1 CO from 1932; DO, 1935-1936; deputy UK high commissioner in the following locations: Wellington, 
Apr-Dec 1947; Colombo, 1953- 1957; Canberra, 1960- 1962; mission to Maldive Islands, Dec 1956; 
assistant under-secretary of state, CRO, 1958; UK high commissioner to Trinidad, 1962- 1966; KCMG 
1963. 
2 Permanent under-secretary of state, CRO. 
3 It is equally plausible that Williams was referring to Macleod's reversal of Lennox-Boyd's insistence that 
continued financial dependence was incompatible with political independence. 
[201] SEPT 1962 551 
present policy in the Caribbean, and here he was referring particularly to British 
Guiana, was right and that of the Americans wrong. Our main fault now was not so 
much the pursuing of wrong policies as the absence of any positive policy. Here he 
referred to the need for a Caribbean Treaty Organisation. 
(c) Trinidad wanted Britain to help her economically. Now was the time for more, 
not less, investment and loans. He wanted the money to give Trinidad 
independence a good start. When he asked the Americans or the Germans for 
money for the same purpose, they asked what the British were doing. I mentioned 
the many other claims on our limited resources. He replied that the argument that 
Trinidad should go to the bottom of the list because she was better off than the 
others was wrong. We should invest the money in Trinidad to make it a show place 
of successful British decolonisation. 
(II) Relations with the United States 
Most of the early part of our discussion was taken up with a long diatribe by Dr. 
Williams against the Americans. He professes to fear attempts by the Americans to 
interfere and to dominate. Inconsistently, he complained that the United States also 
neglected Trinidad, and instanced as an example the fact that their representative in 
Port of Spain was of junior rank. 
(Ill) Common Market 
He thought Britain right to join the Common Market. This was not on economic 
grounds but because the world needed a strong third force in Europe. He would, of 
course, fight to prevent any damage to Trinidad's economic interests. 
201 CO 103113376, no 216 13 Sept 1962 
[Barbados]: minute by D Williams to A R Thomas on the delaying 
tactics of Mr Barrow with regard to a Federation of the Eight 
I have just had an extremely interesting conversation with Mr. Barrow. 
2. He stressed that the information he was giving me was under no 
circumstances to be allowed to leak to anybody in the West Indies. He wished me to 
know however that with regard to federation, the longer it could be delayed the 
happier he would be. He hopes indeed that we shall be able to make a radically 
different approach to the whole problem from anything we had been contemplating 
up till now. What Mr. Barrow wants is that before any political federation is set up we 
should first create a series of common services working up to a Common Services 
Organisation and then later to a full political federation. He would like us to start 
with a Customs Union and then proceed to the setting up of other common services 
such as the Audit and the Courts. At all costs he said, we must avoid having any 
federal elections within the next twelve months. He personally would not participate 
in any such elections if they were held within that time. He was not going to be 
diverted from dealing with what he regarded as the more urgent problems of 
Barbados. 
3. I thanked Mr. Barrow for explaining his attitude to me so clearly and promised 
to respect his confidence. I pointed out to him, however, that we were at present 
proceeding with our preparations for the federation on a very different basis from the 
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one that he had outlined to me. We had not contemplated the establishment of any 
common services (with the exception of the Courts) in advance of the final decisions 
being taken to set up a federation. We should also be under a very considerable 
pressure from the Leeward and Windward Island Governments if it appeared that we 
were being dilatory in our preparations for the federation. We were proceeding with 
the establishment of the Fiscal and Civil Service Commissions and we hoped they 
would have finished their work by about the 1st January. Similarly we were putting 
in hand the economic survey1 which we hoped would be sufficiently complete for our 
purposes by about February. If these commissions had thus completed their work 
early in the New Year there would on the face of it, be little excuse for delaying the 
next conference beyond, say, March or April. Mr. Barrow said this was too early for 
him. He would want to delay things beyond this date and would not like to have a 
conference before June. He would do his best to delay things by such tactics as being 
dilatory in replying to our correspondence and by prolonging the discussions of 
items affecting the federation in the Regional Council of Ministers. If the worst came 
to the worst he would be prepared to come out in public and say that Barbados was 
not going to be rushed. 
4. He concluded by laying great stress on one point, namely that Barbados would 
want to see the Customs Union established before she came into federation. This is 
clearly going to be awkward because I think that if Barbados has its Customs Union it 
may well lose interest in other aspects of federation. 
5. The other surprising titbit to come out of the conversation was that Mr. 
Barrow understood that Mr. Southwell had enrolled as a student in Lincolns Inn. Mr. 
Barrow had no idea whether this meant that Mr. Southwell was retiring from politics 
in St. Kitts. 
6. I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr. E. L. Sykes in C.R.O., who has 
recently been enquiring about the prospects of The Eight. 
1 See 194, note 3. 
202 CO 1031/4321 20-21 Sept 1962 
'British Guiana: proposed army': minutes by Sir H Poynton and Mr 
Duncan Sandys 
Secretary of State 
The February disturbances showed that British Guiana before it becomes 
independent, should build up its Internal Security Forces. For this purpose, the 
Government of British Guiana wish to raise a small army.1 Professional advice is that 
it would be quicker, cheaper and more suited to the conditions of the country if the 
existing riot squad of the police force were enlarged. But Dr. Jagan's Government 
cannot be persuaded to accept this advice, and wish to have an army. Most emerging 
colonial territories have either "inherited" or established armies: in principle there 
seems no reason why British Guiana should not too. 
2. Dr. Jagan has been flirting with the Government of Israel with a view to 
I cf 189. 
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getting Israel's help in training and running an army on "NAHAL"2 lines but he has 
rather cooled off this and is now keen that the British Government should assist the 
British Guiana Government in the training of a small army and in the provision of 
officers. He hopes that H.M.G. would be prepared to provide finance for the 
purpose-British Guiana certainly cannot afford any money for an army this year 
and it is doubtful whether they can next year. If H.M.G. were unable or unwilling to 
provide assistance Dr. Jagan would explore the possibility of getting technical 
assistance in training an army through United Nations sources. 
3. H.M.G. has provided assistance by way of officers and N.C.Os. and financial 
help where need was shown, to help other emerging territories build up a national 
army. Provided the army were a national force and recruitment was not restricted to 
supporters of Dr. Jagan's party there would seem to be advantage in H.M.G. helping 
British Guiana to build up an orthodox force on sound British lines. Since the 
Governor is constitutionally responsible in his discretion for "Defence", he would be 
responsible for the raising of the army and this should ensure, especially if the 
enlistment and training of recruits is in British Army hands, that the force is 
established on acceptable lines. 
4. If you agree in principle that H.M.G. should help British Guiana in this way, 
we can work out proposals in greater detail, which will have to be cleared with 
various other Departments. Those directly concerned are the Ministry of Defence, the 
Service Departments and the Treasury, but the C.R.O. and F.O. are also, less directly, 
interested. We may need your personal intervention with other Ministers to clinch 
this. 
Sir H. Poynton 
A.H.P. 
20.9.62 
Please speak. I agree in principle that BG must be capable of maintaining law and 
order. But I am inclined to agree that what they need is police rather than soldiers. 
The Treasury will never agree to raise an army in a country which has such need for 
other more urgent assistance. 
2 NAHAL: Home Defence Force in Israel. 
D.S. 
21.9.62 
203 CO 103113376, no 250 16 Oct 1962 
'UK policy towards a Federation of the Eight and Grenada's proposal 
to enter negotiations for a unitary state with Trinidad': CO 
memorandum for Mr Duncan Sandys 
1. The problem is to decide U.K. Government policy towards 
(a) a Federation of Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands and 
(b) the Government of Grenada's proposal that it should enter into negotiations 
for a unitary state with Trinidad. 
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2. Relevant statistics of revenue, expenditure, United Kingdom aid, area and 
population for Barbados and the Leewards and Windwards are given at Appendix A. 1 
3. On Federation generally, it should be noted that it represents the closest form 
of political association which most of these Governments will contemplate; they have 
firmly resisted the idea they should joint [sic] together in a unitary state. This being 
so, there are four possible courses open to the U.K. Government viz.:-
(a) to encourage the territories to federate on suitable terms; 
(b) to work instead for a looser form of closer association (i.e. a Common Services 
Organisation); 
(c) to keep the territories separate; 
(d) to work for their piecemeal absorption by Trinidad. 
4. On the Government of Grenada's proposal to enter into negotiations with 
Trinidad for a unitary state there are only two possible courses, viz.: -
(a) to permit them or 
(b) to prevent them. 
5. The advantages of allowing Federation to proceed are:-
(a) It appears to offer the best prospect of advancing all these islands to 
independence and of securing some measure of economic viability for them. 
(b) H.M.G. is on record as considering that "provided the constitution is such as 
to provide adequate powers to the Federal Government and to offer a reasonable 
prospect of economic and financial stability," Federation "appears to offer the best 
solution to the problems of the area." Substantial reasons will have to be found if 
this view is to be changed. 
(c) A Conference has been held under the last Secretary of State's Chairmanship 
at which the Governments concerned "agreed to recommend that there should be 
a federation," (paragraph 8, Cmnd. 17 46 attached) and drew up outline proposals 
which are ad referendum the Legislatures concerned.2 Only two of them have so 
far formally approved the report but others are considering it and it would be 
difficult to stop the process. 
(d) If they federate, and particularly if we then allow them to proceed to 
independence, they can be expected to attract aid from other sources than the 
United Kingdom (e.g. United States and Canada), thereby lessening the burden on 
us. 
(e) Provided the proposed powers of the central government can be made strong 
enough, federation offers the best prospect of cutting the small island political 
bosses down to size. 
6. The disadvantages of allowing Federation to proceed are:-
(a) Even if they federate, they will still require substantial sums of outside aid, 
much of which they will expect to come from the United Kingdom and some of 
which for some years to come may have to be in the form of grants in aid to meet 
Government deficits. The smaller islands have shown themselves to be financially 
irresponsible and administratively incompetent. Once they are federated, we shall 
1 Not printed. 2 See 194. 
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have even less control over the way they spend our money than we have now. If 
thereafter they proceed rapidly to independence, financial control will present new 
problems involving new techniques. 
(b) Even if we allow the preparations for federation to proceed, there is no 
guarantee that the territories will be able to bring it off. The Premier of Barbados 
is known to have doubts and reservations. Others may be tempted to follow 
Grenada's example and seek union with Trinidad. They lack any united national 
spirit. 
(c) Even if they do federate, a widely scattered population of under 700,000 with 
their limited resources is a weak and uncertain basis on which to support the 
paraphernalia of Federation, and the burdens of independence. 
7. The only advantages of a looser form of association running Common 
Services are that the Premier of Barbados is believed secretly to favour this course as 
a prelude to ultimate Federation3 and that it might enable the territories to enjoy 
some of the advantages of Federation without incurring all the costs of running a 
Federal Government machine. The disadvantages are that we could hardly grant 
political independence to a Common Services Organisation and that it would leave 
the small island political bosses dominant in their own territories. 
8. The advantages of keeping them separate are that since we may have to go on 
supporting them financially anyhow, we shall thereby have greater control over the 
way they run their affairs. The disadvantages are first that such a course would 
virtually preclude the possibility that any of them, with the possible exception of 
Barbados, could attain independence. We should thus be stuck with them indefinitely 
and we could expect growing political frustration in the islands, which might lead to 
trouble. Secondly, to secure any effective control over the way they ran their affairs, 
we should have to take back some of the self-government they have already obtained. 
This might also lead to trouble. Thirdly, if they continue separate and dependent, 
they are clearly our responsibility. No other power in these circumstances could be 
expected to provide any substantial help with their development. Fourthly we might 
meet growing criticism in international circles that we were keeping the islands 
separate just so that they could not stand on their own feet and must remain 
dependent on us. 
9. The advantages of encouraging their absorption by Trinidad are that we 
thereby get rid of all responsibility. They become absorbed into a unitary 
independent state as counties under the authority of the central Government in Port-
of-Spain. It also appears to meet the wishes of at least one of them (i.e. Grenada). 
Others (i.e. Montserrat and St. Vincent) may be content to follow suit. The 
disadvantages are first that some of them at least (i .e. St. Kitts, Antigua and 
Barbados) are never likely to be willing to accept absorption into Trinidad, which 
(since Dr. Williams is unlikely to accept anything less than absorption such as a 
Northern Ireland relationship) therefore offers only a partial solution to the problem 
of the future of these territories. Secondly Dr. Williams is likely to demand very 
considerable sums of U.K. financial aid as his ~rice for taking any of them on. (£71 
million over ten years is believed to be his asking price for taking on the lot, which is 
more than twice the rate of our assistance to them at present.) 
3 See 201. 
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10. The Grenada Government, however, has now requested the Secretary of 
State's permission to enter into negotiations with Trinidad to join that country as a 
unitary state, stressing that the negotiations at this stage would be purely 
exploratory and that the Grenada Government would not commit itself without the 
Secretary of State's approval. The advantage of allowing them to proceed is that the 
Grenada Government having just fought and won an election on this very issue, to do 
otherwise would lead to trouble and would risk offending the Government of 
Trinidad. The disadvantages are first that the defection of Grenada will diminish the 
already meagre resources of the Eight-though not fatally: a Federation of the 
remaining Seven would not be appreciably more difficult to contemplate. Secondly, 
it may start a rot and other territories, particularly Montserrat, may wish to follow 
Grenada's lead, thus jeopardising any prospect of a federation of the rest. Thirdly, 
there can be no guarantee that the negotiations will succeed. Not only will Dr. 
Williams demand substantial sums of United Kingdom aid as his price for taking on 
Grenada, but to permit the union to come about he will have to amend some of the 
specially entrenched provisions in the Trinidad constitution. For this he will require 
a three-quarters majority in his own House of Representatives which there can be no 
guarantee that he will get. (It should be noted, in passing, that an Act of the U.K. 
Parliament will also be required.) Finally, once the terms of the union were known, 
H.M.G. might feel bound to insist that there should be a further reference to the 
people of Grenada, and there can be no guarantee that they would vote next time as 
they did last. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
11. It is suggested that the conclusion to which the previous paragraphs point is 
that Federation, provided it can be brought about on suitable terms-particularly 
with a strong central Government-offers the best solution to the problems of the 
area. Preparations for it that are now going on should therefore be allowed to 
proceed. (These preparations take the form of enquiries into the fiscal, economic and 
civil service implications of the proposals in Cmnd. 17 46 and discussions of the 
Regional Council of Ministers of the Governments concerned, as well as debates in 
the Legislatures.) At a suitable moment after they are complete, the Conference 
envisaged in paragraph 63 (iii) of Cmnd. 17 46 should take place. 
12. At the same time, however, the negotiations between Trinidad and Grenada 
should be permitted to proceed on the basis proposed by the Government of Grenada 
(i.e. that they are purely exploratory at this stage.) It will also be important to 
emphasise that the initiative for them comes from Grenada and not from H.M.G.; 
and there should be no H.M.G. representative present at them in the early stages. 
This approach should strengthen our position when we have to be brought in on the 
question of United Kingdom aid and will also make it clear to the rest of the Eight 
that H.M.G. is not trying to wreck their schemes for Federation by pushing one of 
their number in with Trinidad. The question of timing also requires to be considered. 
The Secretary of State has said that he wishes to keep the situation regarding 
Grenada uncrystallised until he himself can visit the West Indies; and Dr. Williams 
for his part appears to be in no hurry to tackle the problem. This would seem to point 
to our using our influence to delay the talks. On the other hand, once the enquiries 
into the civil service, financial and economic problems of a Federation of the Eight 
are concluded-as they should be by early New Year-we can expect pressure from 
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most of the Eight for an early resumption of talks about federation. Before these can 
realistically be undertaken, we ought to know whether we are considering a 
federation of the Seven or of the Eight. This points to the talks starting fairly soon. It 
is suggested that a reasonable compromise would be for the talks to start early in the 
New Year. We should not have too much difficulty in postponing a further 
conference about federation until May or June, and by then the talks between 
Trinidad and Grenada ought to have advanced at least to the point where we could 
know whether union between them was practicable or not. 
204 CO 1031/3376, no 258 24 Oct 1962 
'Financial implications of a Federation of the Eight': CO note for CRO 
Present level of U.K. financial assistance 
1. The present combined recurrent annual expenditure of the eight territories 
totals about £17 million. All the territories with the exception of Barbados are 
currently in receipt of grant-in-aid from Her Majesty's Government to enable them 
to balance their budgets and the financial position of Barbados itself is deteriorating. 
Over the last five years these territories have received from U.K. funds an average of 
£1.87 million per annum (including hurricane relief assistance) in grants-in-aid and 
a little over £1 million per annum in capital aid. 
Forecast of future aid requirements 
2. An attempt to estimate future economic and financial trends in the area was 
made earlier this year. This suggested that if present trends continued, the eight 
territories might require a total of £70 million in external aid over the next decade. 
(This must not be regarded as an accurate forecast: insufficient economic data is 
available at present to enable one to be made). 
3. Against this background, it was a surprise that Dr. Lewis, in papers drawn up 
for the political leaders of the Eight earlier this year, suggested that these territories 
could manage with about £1.46 million per annum of external capital aid and at the 
same time succeed in balancing their recurrent budgets within a period of five years 
(thus ceasing to need grant-in-aid funds). These calculations, however, were based 
on extremely optimistic and rather shaky economic suppositions. 1 
H.M. G. 's attitude 
4. Before the May Conference on federation and during the course of the 
Conference itself, the Colonial Office had discussions with both the Commonwealth 
Relations Office and the Treasury on the effect of federation on H.M.G.'s financial 
commitments. The Treasury insisted that it must remain open to H.M.G. to refuse 
independence at any given time if the likely cost to U.K. funds was judged excessive. 
If there was to be any question of independence for the new Federation before it 
became economically viable, it was recognised that this would pose special problems 
for control of any U.K. funds made available to it. Even so, it was agreed that 
Federation might do much to strengthen the area economically and that the area 
would appear to have rather better chances for economic growth if the territories 
1 See 187, annex, paras 5 and 7-8. 
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were federated than if they were not. It was considered that the United States and 
Canada should be invited to assist the U.K. in meeting a new federation's external aid 
requirements. 
East Caribbean Federation Conference 
5. At the Marlborough House Conference the U.K. delegation made a statement 
(included in the Conference Report) recording the U.K. Government's recognition 
that a Federation of the Eight "would stand in need of external assistance for a period 
after it was established, both on capital and on budgetary account. The U.K. 
Government would be willing to help within the limits of the resources which we 
were able to make available, but the amount and nature of such help would require 
further consideration".2 The statement referred to the proposals which had been put 
forward by Dr. Lewis and stated that these "merited further study in the light of a 
more detailed survey of the economic needs and financial development of the area 
which the U.K. Government proposed to put in train". 
6. Work on this economic survey, which is being undertaken by Dr. Carleen 
O'Loughlin of the University of the West Indies, has already begun.3 This survey, 
together with report of the Fiscal Commission, (being undertaken by Mrs. Hicks4 of 
Oxford University), which is to report on the financial aspects of the establishment of 
a Federation of the Eight, should provide a firm and factual basis for a detailed 
examination of the economic prospects in the area and of how far it can hope to 
decrease its dependence on external aid both on capital and recurrent account. There 
seems little hope, however, that its economic dependence can be ended entirely 
within the foreseeable future. 
2 See 190. 3 See 194, note 3. 
4 Ursula Kathleen Hicks (Lady Hicks), university lecturer in public finance, Oxford, 1947-1965; 
publications include Report of Fiscal Commission East Caribbean (Cmnd 1991, 1963). 
205 CO 103113492, no 98 [31 Oct 1962] 
'The appointment of a financial secretary in Antigua and related 
matters': CO note for ministers 
The problem is whether to proceed with the appointment of an expatriate Financial 
Secretary in Antigua and with the implementation of certain measures agreed to 
between Mr. Maudling and the Chief Minister of Antigua in June, 1962, providing for 
greater supervision over Antigua's finances. 
2. Late in 1961, it became apparent that the Antigua Government was unable to 
meet a commitment which it had entered into to make available $750,000 to the 
Royal Bank of Canada as part of a special arrangement for salvaging the sugar 
industry in Antigua. An investigation showed that the Antigua Government was "in 
the red" to the tune of about $1~ million and that in order to meet a cash deficiency 
it had used up the Sugar Special Funds-funds which should have been held in trust 
to meet special purposes connected with the sugar industry. Mr. Maudling sent out a 
special fact-finding Mission in February, 1962 (Report at (42)). The Mission 
confirmed the seriousness of the situation and stated that it had been caused by 
imprudent policies, such as unauthorised budget deficits being incurred for several 
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years-bad administration of various peasant loan schemes-excessive and irregular 
authorizing of supplementary expenditure and allowing arrears of revenue to mount 
up. The Mission considered that the main blame rested upon the Ministers, but that 
officials had also been weak and had closed their eyes to the consequences of 
Ministerial policy when their warnings were disregarded. The main Ministerial 
culprit was the Chief Minister himself (Mr. Bird) who, since 1960 when under the 
constitutional changes an unofficial took over the Finance portfolio, has also been 
Minister of Finance. Mr. Bird had pressed on with expenditure regardless of the rules 
which he only imperfectly understood. Mr. Maudling saw Mr. Bird at the end of May, 
1962 and told him of his serious concern. He also gave him an edited version of the 
Mission's Report. He insisted that to remedy the situation he would have to appoint 
an able Financial Secretary who would have to attend all Executive Council meetings 
and countersign all warrants. Mr. Maudling confirmed this in writing in his letter of 
the 1st June ((68) on file). Mr. Bird wrote back on the 18th June ((75) on file) saying 
that he was prepared to acquiesce in these arrangements. 
3. Since that date we have been prevented from implementing these 
arrangements by difficulty in recruiting a suitable Financial Secretary. A candidate 
has now been found, however, whose name is Mr. Booth, 1 formerly the Auditor in the 
Leeward Islands and just released from Tanganyika. He would appear to be suitable 
for the job. Owing to the time which has elapsed however since Mr. Bird's meeting 
with Mr. Maudling in June, he has recovered his courage, and the savingram from 
the Administrator at (92) reports that he is no longer prepared to appoint an 
expatriate Financial Secretary, nor does he see the need for him to attend meetings 
of Executive Council. He argues that since the previous Financial Secretary (who was 
to be dismissed or transferred elsewhere) was given permission to return to the 
territory (a journey in the course of which he met his death), this implied that the 
Secretary of State had cancelled the previous arrangement. It is clear, however, that 
it implied nothing of the kind. The former Financial Secretary would have to return 
to the territory before his removal elsewhere could be arranged. 
4. Another complicating factor now is that Mr. Bird is apparently about to 
produce financial proposals for 1963 which will keep him out of grant-in-aid. He may, 
therefore, try to argue that the serious situation obtaining at the time of Mr. 
Maudling's letter of the 1st June has now ceased to exist. The temptation to take him 
at his word and merely say that he must sink or swim on the strength of his own 
proposals is strong. The fact is, however, that from what we know of his proposals 
some of them are of doubtful effectiveness, and if Mr. Bird really. got into financial 
difficulties in 1963, would Ministers in fact be prepared to let him drown? 
Furthermore, a good deal of the mess from previous years still remains to be cleared 
up, and unless steps are clearly taken directed to this end there is likely to be trouble 
with Parliament and the Public Accounts Committee. 
5. A question also connected with this issue is that raised in the Acting 
Administrator's despatch No. 46. The permanent Administrator of Antigua, Mr. 
Turbott, is now on leave. The Antigua Trades and Labour Union (from which Mr. Bird 
derives most of his support and in which one of his Ministers, Mr. George,2 is the 
1 J F Booth, principal auditor, Tanganyika, 1958- 1962; financial secretary, Antigua, 1962- 1964. 
2 Mr McC B George, member without portfolio, Antigua. 
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moving spirit) has been conducting a campaign against the return of Mr. Turbott. 
This campaign is related in part to certain financial measures which we had to insist 
should be taken when we resumed responsibility for grant-in-aid and which reduced 
the amount available for expenditure in Antigua. They were necessary partly because 
grant-in-aid money had been spent on development projects which should have been 
financed out of C.D. and W. and partly by the need to make good the deficits of 
previous years . Mr. George and the Labour Union have been trying to represent that 
these cuts in the Antigua budget are due to slanders made against them by the 
Administrator in correspondence to the Secretary of State. One of our difficulties in 
answering these charges is that we have been at pains not to make Mr. Bird's 
shortcomings public, partly in order not to damage the credit of Antigua and partly 
in order to save his face. If, however, Mr. Bird either resists the appointment of a 
Financial Secretary or fails to restrain the agitation of his followers against Mr. 
Turbott, it is suggested that we have no alternative but to hold over him the threat of 
public exposure. If, however, we press ahead with our proposals, then we must expect 
trouble first from Mr. Bird and his colleagues and later possibly on the streets. 
6. The arguments in favour of taking a strong line with Mr. Bird over the 
appointment of a Financial Secretary are 
(a) That a good deal still needs to be done to put Antigua's financial house in order. 
The only effective means of doing it that we can see-unless we want to resort to 
the drastic action of altering the constitution-is to carry out the arrangements 
agreed between Mr. Maudling and Mr. Bird in June. The time which has elapsed 
since those arrangements were entered into has not altered the basic situation. 
(b) From what we have seen of Mr. Bird's financial proposals for 1963, we are not 
satisfied that they will be adequate to take him out of grant-in-aid, particularly 
without stricter financial practices being brought into operation. We could, of 
course, take them at their face value and say that provided Mr. Bird does not in any 
circumstances come running to us in 1963 for grant-in-aid, we will not insist on 
the appointment of a Financial Secretary. But in practice, if Antigua got into 
financial difficulties, it would be very difficult to refuse to bail them out. 
(c) Although we have no wish publicly to humiliate Mr. Bird, in the way we did 
Mr. Gairy,3 it is nevertheless in the interests of the area as a whole that sounder 
financial practices should be introduced everywhere. Antigua is one of the more 
prosperous territories and is a good place to start. 
7. The arguments against proceeding with the appointment of a Financial 
Secretary are 
(a) That it will meet with opposition from Mr. Bird and his Ministers and may 
cause trouble; 
(b) In order to cover up their own shortcomings, they may resort to agitation 
through the Labour Union which could lead to violence on the streets; 
(c) The man appointed to the post may have to face a great deal of unpleasantness 
and unless he is a very robust character may not be able to stand it. 
8. The arguments in favour of permitting Mr. Turbott to return as Administrator 
are (a) that he has been a very effective Administrator and is generally well regarded; 
3 See 195. 
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and (b) to remove him following pressure by Mr. Bird's Labour Union would in fact 
be to abdicate our responsibility entirely. The argument against allowing his return 
is simply that it may lead to trouble. 
9. In order to make sure of getting Mr. Booth as Financial Secretary we now have 
to proceed swiftly and bring these matters to a head. Four draft telegrams are 
attached which would have the effect of telling Mr. Bird that the Secretary of State is 
satisfied the arrangements entered into by his predecessor must proceed and an 
expatriate Financial Secretary, viz. Mr. Booth, should be appointed. A further 
telegram also rejects the Labour Union's cricitisms of Mr. Turbott and their 
suggestion that the financial measures insisted upon by the Colonial Office are 
unjustified.4 
4 Minuting Duncan Sandys on this issue, Poynton commented that to proceed with the appointment 
would almost certainly lead to trouble with Antigua ministers and possibly to street demonstrations. It was 
therefore tempting to reverse the decision, on the strict understanding that Antigua made no request 
whatever for grant-in-aid in 1963. It was doubtful, however, whether Antigua's proposals for getting out of 
grant-in-aid would be effective and if in fact they failed it would be extremely difficult for the UK, which 
carried the ultimate responsibility, 'to bail the Antigua Government out'. The CO would then be in 
difficulty with the Treasury and ultimately with the Public Accounts Committee and Parliament, 'because 
we should have to come to Antigua's assistance with less prospect than ever of ensuring that our money 
was properly spent or that Antigua would put its finances in order'_ Poynton urged that Booth should be 
appointed and that there could be no question of removing Turbott from his post as administrator. 
Duncan Sandys agreed (CO 1031/3492, minutes by Poynton and Dun can Sandys, 1 and 4 Nov 1962). 
206 CO 103113494, no 61 5 Nov 1962 
[Financial settlement with Trinidad]: telegram from Dr Williams to 
Mr Macmillan proposing to reject the UK offer 
[Williams was in London when he sent this telegram. The terms of the UK offer to 
Trinidad had been the subject of a dispute between the CO and the Treasury. Originally 
the Treasury rejected the CO proposal to give Trinidad a loan of £1 million. From the 
viewpoints both of need and the political considerations involved, which included 
comparison with the aid given to Jamaica (see 198), Treasury ministers saw no reason to 
give additional aid to Trinidad beyond the £500,000 loan which they were proposing. 
Reinforcing their conclusion was the difficulty of meeting far more urgent demands from 
other overseas territories. Nor originally did the Treasury accept the CO suggestion that 
the Viscount aircraft should be handed over as a gift. This would constitute a new type of 
independence aid for which there was no justification and the Treasury saw no reason 
why the Trinidad government or BWIA should not pay themselves (CO 1031/3494, no 29, 
F G Burrett to D Williams, 17 Aug 1962). From the purely financial point of view the CO 
agreed with the Treasury analysis. Higham of the Finance Dept argued that with half the 
population of Jamaica, Trinidad was now aspiring to maintain a development programme 
as large as that of Jamaica. Trinidad was the wealthiest per head of the British West In dies 
and its unemployment and population problems were not as serious as those of Jamaica. 
Trinidad's total CD&W allocations had been £1).2 million as compared with Jamaica's £9 
million. Its revenue was slightly higher than that of Jamaica owing largely to oil. And yet, 
as Higham acknowledged, Trinidad had hitherto financed development almost entirely 
from its budget and other local sources. This would no longer be possible to the same 
extent; without external help Trinidad would be able to cover only fifty per cent of its 
next five-year plan. The gap on the 1962 development budget was £5 .6 million and 
the short-fall over five years would be £23 million. 'Clearly', Higham argued, 'Trinidad 
will have to cut back'. But a loan of £500,000 would be regarded as 'derisory'; the 
CO's proposal to provide a loan of £1 million would be acceptable when compared 
with the £Bi million loan given to Jamaica (ibid, minute by Higham, 22 Aug 1962). 
Duncan Sandys emphasised the importance of political considerations in his appeal to J A 
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Boyd-Carpenter, chief secretary to the Treasury, 1962-1964. Trinidad had been 
'imprudent' in boosting its development programme but a loan of £500,000 would be 
regarded as 'little better than a calculated snub' and relations with Trinidad would be 
seriously affected after independence (ibid, no 30, Duncan Sandys to Boyd-Carpenter, 
22 Aug 1962). At first the Treasury proposed an either or compromise, either the four 
Viscounts or a £1 million loan but not both. A further CO appeal persuaded the Treasury 
to accept the original CO package but only on the strict condition that Trinidad paid the 
money which the UK insisted it still owed to the former federation in respect of a housing 
loan (£600,000) and the costs of defence expansion (£75,750). Any default on these 
obligations would be recovered from the grant and loan now offered to Trinidad (ibid, no 
46, Boyd-Carpenter to Duncan Sandys, 18 Sept 1962). The offer made to Trinidad 
consisted of (a) a grant representing the balance of the territorial and regional CD&W 
allocations relating to Trinidad and Tobago--£250,000 approx; (b) the purchase and 
handing over of four Viscount aircraft to BWIA-£800,000; (c) a Commonwealth 
Assistance Loan of £1 million. When Williams formally rejected the offer (see 207) 
Trinidad stood to lose the CD&W grant which in turn affected the receipts of the 
University of the West Indies. For a subsequent UK assessment of why the offer was 
rejected and the eventual outcome, see 209.] 
1. You will be aware that, until quite recently, your Government had apparently 
been unable to reach a decision on the proposals, which I had the honour to submit 
to the then Secretary of State for the Colonies as far back as July this year, for United 
Kingdom financial assistance to Trinidad and Tobago on the occasion of the 
achievement of its independence. 
2. Our proposals were clearly set out in two documents, with which you are no 
doubt fully familiar, and I had the assurance that they would receive the early and 
careful consideration of your Government. In the event, we have enjoyed the 
doubtful distinction of being the only Commonwealth country to assume the 
responsibilities of independence with nothing more from the United Kingdom than 
the good wishes of Her Majesty's Government. 
3. Within the past week, I have received through our High Commissioner in 
London an Aide Memoire from the Commonwealth Relations Secretary containing a 
statement of the nature and scppe of the financial assistance which your Government 
proposed to offer to the people of Trinidad and Tobago to mark the attainment of 
their new status as an independent member of the Commonwealth. 
4. I think you will agree that the proposals in the Commonwealth Relations 
Secretary's Aide Memoire do not bear any significant relation to the proposals 
contained in the official memoranda from my Government. These, in substance, 
sought the provision of a low-interest (or no interest) loan of £5 million for large-
scale low cost housing, together with certain other sums in respect of naval and 
military equipment, the re-development of the town of Scarborough in the island of 
Tobago, the writing-off of certain sums still owing to B.O.A.C. by B.W.l.A. in 
connection with the lease-purchase of Viscount aircraft to maintain air services vital 
to the Eastern Caribbean, and the restoration to the University of the West Indies of 
that portion of the C.D. & W. allocation to the West Indies that might properly have 
been regarded as falling due to Trinidad and Tobago. 
5. Apart from the B.W.l.A. aircraft "write-off', the proposals in the 
Commonwealth Secretary's Aide Memoire appear to have been drawn up with little 
reference, if any, to our proposals as outlined above; and, in fact, are substantially the 
same as were outlined to me in informal discussions in June of this year, before our 
proposals were submitted in writing. You will readily understand, therefore, my 
inability to give them serious consideration. 
6. Paragraph (a) of that document amounts to an offer of a loan of £1 million, 
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with strings attached and at a rate of interest of approximately 6 per cent. Paragraph 
(b) is, in effect, an offer to do that which Britain has always done for any independent 
territory and what in fact it was assumed would be done when Trinidad and Tobago 
undertook to share in certain common services with the other units of the former 
federation. Paragraph (c) represents a concession which B.W.I.A. has been seeking 
for some time having regard to (a) its primary function as a means of linking the 
Caribbean and maintaining the contacts between the units of the former Federation 
and (b) its factual position as a feeder service of B.O.A.C. 
7. Whatever positive merits these proposals may appear to contain are 
completely offset by the unfortunate implication that they are conditional upon the 
assumption by Trinidad and Tobago of "certain outstanding obligations" which we 
have already firmly refuted, as far back as March 1961, in respect of defence 
arrangements for the former West Indies Federation. I do not propose to revive the 
discussions on this particular subject. 
8. I note the regret which your Government feels at being unable to meet our 
request for short term accommodation in connection with the repayment of the sum 
of £600,000 made available by your Government to finance certain items of capital 
expenditure by the late Federal Government and devoted instead to the construction 
of housing in Trinidad for Federal officials. The refusal to grant our request is, in 
effect, a demand for the immediate refund to your Government of money which, it 
had seemed, was originally intended as a gift to the people of the West Indies, 
including those of Trinidad and Tobago. My Government will naturally refund the 
entire sum now claimed, including, of course, that portion that might ordinarily 
have been regarded as representing the share of Trinidad and Tobago. 
9. As I have repeatedly indicated to various members of your Cabinet and their 
advisers, the very special problem of Trinidad and Tobago is unemployment. You are 
very perturbed, quite rightly, at a 4% rate in the United Kingdom, rising to 6% in 
special areas; you will, I am sure, readily understand our position, faced as we are 
with a 15% normal rate. The people of the United, Kingdom, especially the labour 
movement, are deeply concerned over the question of redundancy, with particular 
emphasis on the railways; you will, I am sure, readily understand our position, faced 
as we are with a steady decline over the past five years of employment in the basic 
industries of oil and sugar, a decline which shows every sign of continuing. 
10. It was in order to deal firmly with the unemployment, and to forestall the 
inevitable concomitant threat of political instability, that I took up with your 
Secretary of State for Colonies, in January of this year, the question of an Exchequer 
loan of £5 million. I repeated this request to three other prominent personalities 
since that date. Up to the present I have received no formal reply to this request. If 
the Aide Memoire is the answer, it would then become a very serious matter if the 
question of economic aid to a former colony should end merely in the old-fashioned 
colonial policy of providing a colonial market for British industry and employment 
for British workers. 
11. I am forwarding copies of the Aide Memoire and this letter to the Cabinet 
in Port of Spain with a recommendation that the offer contained in the Aide 
Memoire be rejected as being not, in fact, economic aid. As soon as I have had a 
reply I shall communicate with you-possibly through our High Commissioner 
here, as I leave London today for Rome and Cairo, and do not expect to be back 
before November 15. 
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207 CO 103113495, no 80 [Nov 1962] 
'Trinidad financial settlement': draft CO intelligence telegram for 
circulation to UK high commissioners. Annex 
As has become customary when a country approaches independence nowadays, 
Trinidad put in a list of the forms of assistance which they wanted from us at 
independence. The wording was slightly novel. Trinidad's paper was headed 
"Equipment for Independence" and opened with the following words:-
'The concept of a "parting gift" to "departing Colonies" has no place in the 
thinking of the Government and people of Trinidad and Tobago in respect of 
economic assistance from the United Kingdom. What we seek, and regard as 
not unreasonable to expect, is to be adequately equipped for the journey on 
which we embark when we join the Commonwealth Caravan.' 
Trinidad's request amounted to three items-a grant based on the unspent 
allocation of C.D. & W. funds plus other grants totalling just over £1 million; a loan 
for development, interest-free, worth £7~ million plus interest-bearing loans 
totalling £2~ million; and the transfer to their Government airline, British West 
Indian Airways, of four Viscount aircraft at present hired by B.W.I.A. from B.O.A.C. at 
a rate of £200,000 a year for the next four years. 
2. After full consideration with other Departments authority was obtained to 
offer the customary grant based on the balance unspent of C.D. and W. allocations 
(about £250,000); a Commonwealth Assistance Loan of £1 million; and the transfer 
of the aircraft. It proved impossible to finalise the British offer by the time of 
Trinidad's independence. This was due partly to the fact that only 12 weeks elapsed 
between the holding of the Conference and Independence and partly to the practical 
difficulty that all the officials in Whitehall concerned with the subject were also 
heavily involved with the corresponding negotiations about Jamaica. Jamaica 
became independent on 6th August, and Trinidad followed 25 days later. Immediately 
after, there was the Prime Ministers' Conference and the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations had hoped to be able to inform Dr. Williams of our offer 
shortly after the end of that Conference. (Dr. Williams had had a warning from Mr. 
Hugh Fraser, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, in 
July that our offer would hardly reach £2 million, if that; and it may be recalled that 
this conversation was followed by an outburst by Dr. Williams in Trinidad in which 
he said that the British Government had had no policy for the West Indies for the last 
20 years) . Dr. Williams persistently evaded opportunities for discussing the subject, 
so ultimately our offer was conveyed by means of an Aide Memoire handed by the 
Minister of State to the Trinidad High Commissioner in London on the 30th October. 
This was followed by a letter from Dr. Williams to Mr. Macmillan in most 
discourteous terms, threatening to reject the offer.I Finally, on 25th November, Dr. 
Williams addressed a group of West Indian students in London and told them that his 
Government had rejected the British offer. On the following morning, 26th 
November, since an official reply from the Trinidad Government was still awaited, 
the Minister of State sent for the High Commissioner who, when he arrived, 
1 See 206. 
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produced a brief letter from Dr. Williams to Mr. Macmillan dated 26th November, 
cursorily rejecting the offer. 
3. It remains our view that the offer made to Trinidad was a reasonable one and 
in line with the offers made to Jamaica and to various African countries recently. It is, 
of course, relevant (though not always remembered) that Ghana and the three older 
Asian Commonwealth countries received no "golden handshake" at the time of inde-
pendence. Figures can be made to prove anything, but the attached table will give some 
idea of how the offer looks in relation to what we did for other countries. We do not 
want to base our case too heavily on the population of the territory since such an argu-
ment could have embarrassing consequences in, e.g., Kenya. Our position was 
described in the following words in Mr. Macmillan's reply to Dr. Williams:-
"This offer, like those we have made to other countries in connection with 
their attainment of independence, represents what we believe we can do to 
help them, having regard to our resources and to the other demands upon us . 
. . . You will understand that we in Britain cannot undertake to meet all or 
even a major proportion of the estimated needs of each newly independent 
Commonwealth country. We consider each case separately and we strain our-
selves to give as much help as we are able". 
This wording gives the best line to take though the statistics could be used if pressed. 
They are based on the "Quarterly Digest of Statistics" published by H.M. Stationary 
Office. 
4. Reference should also be made to the statement made by Mr. Fisher (in the 
absence of the Secretary of State) in the House of Commons on the 27th November. 
(Hansard Cols. 39 and 40). 
Annex to 207: Financial assistance to various Commonwealth countries 
Country Amount of Population in Expressed as National 
grant or thousands shillings per income per 
development head of capita income 
loan population 
Nigeria £12 m 35,000 6/10d £30 
Cyprus* £15m 578 £139 
(grant) 
Sierra £3.5m 2,400 29/2d plus £25 
Leone plus£3 m 25/-
(grant) 
Tanganyika £4m 8,788 9/1d plus £21 
plus£4 m 9/-
(grant) 
Jamaica £1.25 m 1,613 15/7d £157 
Uganda £1.5 m 6,682 4/6d £24 
(grant) 
Trinidad £1m 819 25/- £229 
*The high figu re to Cyprus took account, of course, of the fact that this territory had suffered from 
something approaching civil war for several years. 
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208 CO 10311357 4, no 18 22 Nov 1962 
[Canadian aid programme]: CO record of a meeting with Canadian 
officials 
1. Mr. Thomas in welcoming Mr. Towe1 and Mr. Reynolds2 said how useful it was 
to maintain contact over projects in progress, or under consideration, within the 
Canadian aid programme to the Caribbean. He asked what progress was being made 
with the scheme of a quay installation in St. Vincent. 
St. Vincent Quay 
2. Mr. Towe said that this contract had now been let at a tender price of Canadian 
$1,194, 481.66. Within the$ (Canadian) 1 million allocation for this project a sum of 
$(Canadian) 916,999 remained unspent. This left a balance of $(Canadian) 
278,481.66 and he understood that St. Vincent could make available $(Canadian) 
216,000 (£75,000). There were possible savings in the scheme which could be made, 
mainly on the paring of reclaimed areas and truck-scale, and it was possible that 
savings on the contract might be sufficient to complete the full scheme from the 
sums at present available from Canadian and St. Vincent sources. It was not 
impossible that an additional amount of Canadian aid might be made available but 
this would require Cabinet approval which would be very difficult. He suggested that 
the question of a short-fall on present estimates should be shelved until the contract 
was nearer completion, when a more accurate picture would be available. He realised 
that any idea of an open ended commitment by the St. Vincent Government (or by 
the U.K. Government as their backers) was out of the question. Mr. Towe mentioned 
also that the same engineering firm which was responsible for the harbour project 
had examined a scheme for improving the water supply in St. Vincent. Very tentative 
plans had been drawn up for a limited scheme costing $(Canadian) 24,000. The aim 
was to increase the water supply by 50% by laying 3-inch pipe, and it was hoped that 
work could be completed during the current financial year. This was not expected to 
involve any local contribution apart from the wages of local labour. 
3. Miss Terry said that she welcomed the suggestion that the problem of a short-
fall on the St. Vincent project should be shelved for the time being, and hoped that 
St. Vincent would not now be pressed to sign any agreement involving undefined 
commitments. 
Canadian aid to the Caribbean 
5. [sic] Mr. Towe then described the present position in regard to the Canadian 
aid programme in the Caribbean. $(Canadian) 2.452 million had been included for it 
in the 1962/63 Canadian Estimates but it was expected that only Canadian $1.895 
million would in fact be spent: this would involve liabilities for expenditure 
amounting to $(Canadian) 1.1 million in 1963/64, though sums had yet to be 
appropriated by Parliament for that period. His Department, at official level, was 
hoping for a 1963/64 Vote of at least $(Canadian) 2.1 million for the Caribbean 
programme (including British Honduras and British Guiana). However, there was a 
general reluctance on the part of the Canadian Government, given the present 
political and economic climate, to seek increased foreign aid funds from Parliament. 
1 Deputy director general, Canadian External Aid Office. 2 Of Canada House, London. 
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He said that he would be interested in Colonial Office views on how the Caribbean 
allocation, whatever it might be, could best be allocated. 
6. Mr. Thomas said that the "Eight", the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and 
Caicos Islands, British Guiana, and British Honduras were all deserving of aid on 
grounds of economic need. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were, of course, no 
longer a Colonial Office responsibility. He knew that these two territories had not 
been pleased with the offers the U.K. had been able to make in the context of 
independence settlements but the U.K. had felt that other territories to which it had 
obligations had more compelling needs. He imagined that both countries would be 
likely to seek aid from Canada. He outlined the political and economic position of the 
various territories, and made particular reference to the present economic survey of 
"the Eight" being carried out by Dr. O'Loughlin of the University of The West Indies.3 
When the results of her survey were available, the U.K. hoped to secure the co-
operation of the Canadian and United States Governments in making development 
aid available to these territories. 
7. Mr. Towe said he thought the Canadians would welcome a Commonwealth 
programme for the Caribbean area rather than one under the auspices of the 
International Bank or of the D.A.C. They would like to see the programme include 
British Honduras and British Guiana. A Commonwealth venture would not preclude 
American participation, perhaps on the Colombo Plan pattern, and might encourage 
countries such as India and Australia to come in. Mr. Thomas said that there was 
perhaps too great a political distinction between the territories to make it easy to 
lump them together in one programme. He was not sure how much aid would be 
likely to come from other Commonwealth countries. He thought it more likely that 
any programme would be limited to aid from Canada, the U.K. and the United States, 
but he welcomed Mr. Towe's interest in the proposals and said that there were no 
detailed or firm plans for an internationally concerted programme at present. He 
explained the particular problems of British Honduras in the context of their 
programme of recovery from the effects of the 1961 hurricane and referred also to 
the importance of the West providing aid in reasonable quantities for British Guiana. 
8. In reply to questions Mr. Towe said that the Canadians were experiencing 
difficulty in finding outlets for their aid programme, partly because of its smallness. 
This tendency to underspend was attributable only partly to the stringent tying of 
Canadian aid, which in turn was forced on them by their economic difficulties and by 
the fact that so many Canadian goods themselves contained a high proportion of 
imported materials. Other reasons for under-spending were the understaffing of the 
aid office and consequent administrative bottle-necks; understaffing in recipient 
countries and consequent delays in preparing applications; and the lack of sound 
projects suitable for Canadian assistance. Thus although Canada had a big 
commercial stake in British Guiana they had not been able to find suitable outlets for 
aid there. Canada could not contemplate making long-term, low-interest loans to 
developing countries because the Federal Government did not make such loans 
available to the Provinces, which received only grants. 
9. It was agreed that while direct contact between the Canadian Government and 
United Kingdom colonial territories in receipt of their aid was useful, especially on 
matters of detail affecting projects, it was also most helpful to use the Ottawa/London 
3 See 194, note 3. 
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channel in the first instance because of the direct financial involvement of the U.K. 
in many of these territories. 
10. Both Mr. Thomas and Mr. Towe said how useful they had found this 
exchange of information and of views on current aid problems in the Caribbean area. 
209 CO 1031/3495, no 108 13 Dec 1962 
[Financial settlement with Trinidad]: letter from NE Costar to Mr 
Duncan Sandys on why Dr Williams rejected the UK offer [Extract] 
Dr. Williams 's reasons for rejecting British offer 
9. From this public speech and subsequent statements since his return, it is 
possible to see the reasons behind the rejection of the British offer.1 I hope that it will 
be forgiven if, in the interests of trying to set out the often involved motives of Dr. 
Williams, I appear for the moment to take the role of Devil's Advocate. 
10. On the question of C.D. & W. balances Dr. Williams' feeling is clearly that 
this part of the offer is a means of restoring certain sums promised under C.D. & W. 
schemes, mainly to the University of the West Indies, which ceased to be payable 
directly because of the independence of Trinidad and Tobago i.e., this was not new 
money: its continuance was in accordance with usual practice when colonies emerge 
into independence and in any case the major beneficiary was not specifically Trinidad 
and Tobago but a regional University in which Britain herself was interested through 
the Little Eight. Dr. Williams' line on the Viscounts-despite the fact that his 
Government had specifically asked for this gift for B.W.I.A., to all intents and 
purposes a national airline in which they hold 90 per cent of the shares-is that they 
represent a gift to an airline which serves the region, including the Little Eight, as 
well as Trinidad; and that the gift is, in any event, grossly over-valued since the true 
worth of the aircraft is nearer £300,000. (On the last point he is supported by all in 
Trinidad who know about civil aviation matters.) 
11. But there seems little doubt that it was the £1 million Commonwealth 
Assistance Loan that was the main aspect of the offer which Dr. Williams regarded as 
inadequate. He clearly wanted more money, and he equally clearly wanted a loan 
which was not tied to the purchase of overseas goods and service but could be 
expended, without question, on meeting local costs in Trinidad. For this reason he 
has referred to the loan offered as having "strings" and as being a contribution 
towards development in Britain rather than in Trinidad and Tobago. He has 
emphasised the growing problem of unemployment, and under-employment, here, 
to which I made reference in my despatch No. 3; and he has made it clear that his 
main aim at present is to raise a sum of approximately £5 million, interest free or on 
low interest terms, to finance a rehousing project involving the building of a 
minimum of 40,000 houses and at the same time the development of local industries 
employing local labour to produce all the ancillary fittings and furnishings that will 
be required for this housing project. 
12. Dr. Williams has also shown resentment at what he regards as an attempt to 
interfere with Trinidad's development plans by insistence that agreement be reached 
1 See 206 and 207. 
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on the projects on which the Commonwealth Assistance Loan should be spent. The 
impression he got in this respect was no doubt due in part, at least, to Dr. Williams' 
unfamiliarity with the processes of E.C.G.D. Loans and perhaps to the emphasis that 
may have been laid on this aspect of disbursing Commonwealth Assistance Loans 
because of the desire to ensure that outstanding amounts owed by the Trinidad 
Government were repaid before disbursements were finally made under the loan. If it 
could have been made clear to Dr. Williams that, in the case of a country such as 
Trinidad which is already importing large amounts of British capital goods, a loan 
tied to British goods and services represents in fact a very flexible form of support for 
the Trinidad and Tobago economy, he might well have reacted more favourably. But 
I cannot avoid the feeling that the main trouble in this respect has arisen because 
Trinidad, unlike Jamaica, was offered a Commonwealth Assistance Loan in place of 
the normal Independence Exchequer Loan, owing to the failure, for which Dr. 
Williams does not feel himself in any way responsible, to conclude the financial 
settlement before Independence. I believe that an earlier offer of an Exchequer Loan, 
of the same amount of £1 million, which was clearly available for local expenditure in 
Trinidad, would have been accepted by Dr. Williams, even although he would 
undoubtedly have complained in private, and perhaps in public, about its size. 
13. Finally, I should be failing to indicate the complete picture if I did not report 
that much of Dr. Williams' present critical attitude towards Britain appears to arise 
from his feeling that he was better treated, and found Ministers more accessible, on 
the Continent than in Britain. Whatever basis there may be for this,-the feeling 
may be due to no more than the V.I.P. treatment accorded by European governments 
to a head of government new to them, although, unfortunately, all too well known in 
the United Kingdom-it is nevertheless a real factor in Dr. Williams' present state of 
mind which has to be taken into account. So, also, are two other feelings. First that 
he received no formal reply to his request for aid until 4~ months after he submitted 
his first memorandum; and even then there was no attempt to deal with his specific 
requests e.g. for help with his housing development plan. Secondly, Dr. Williams, 
whose skin is so thin as to be almost non-existent, feels that he was personally 
slighted because, after all this delay, discussion of the aid proposals so near to his 
heart was not undertaken at as high a level as he thinks his due as a Commonwealth 
Prime Minister. This petty point, I fear, looms as large in his mind as his failure to 
secure the substance of his requests. 
The future 
14. Dr. Williams appears to regard the offered settlement as a complete package 
which he was required to accept or reject entirely. If he were to show any signs of 
being prepared to accept the parts of the offer represented by the C. D. & W. balances 
and the Viscount gift, which I admit seems unlikely in his present state of mind, I 
should recommend that, in our own interests, this be given careful consideration. I 
feel that there is considerable truth in what he says about C.D. & W. balances. I 
understand that the total figure involved is made up roughly of £163,000 that would 
have been payable for the financing of the University of the West Indies; of £20,000 
that would have been payable as the balances of certain unexpired regional C.D. & W. 
schemes; and of £66,000 that would have been payable as the balance of various 
unexpired territorial C.D. & W. schemes. The dilemma is that the withholding of 
these sums may do as much harm to our own interests (e.g. in the maintenance of 
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the University and regional projects) as to Trinidad and Tobago's. Similarly, the non-
acceptance ofthe gift of Viscounts is likely to increase the subsidy which may have to 
be given to B.W.I.A. to enable that airline to continue to provide services for the 
other British Territories in the region. 
15. But I am not suggesting that we should be in any way lenient towards 
Trinidad and Tobago in this respect. On the contrary, I think that it would be fatal to 
confirm Dr. Williams in his belief, based on his experiences with the Americans and 
others in the past, that he has only to shout loudly enough and to be sufficiently 
unpleasant in public as well as in private in order to get what he wants. We should 
deal with him on an entirely realistic basis. For example, if it is in our interests that 
the outstanding C.D. & W. payments should be made to the various institutions 
concerned, it is perhaps in retrospect a pity that we made so much of the C.D. & W. 
monies as part of the independence gift to Trinidad and Tobago. But, having done so, 
if we now find that for our own reasons we still want to make the payments, I 
consider that it is important to try to make them through the front door on the 
request of Trinidad and Tobago, rather than making them through the back door, 
without acknowledgment, by finding other means of financing the institutions 
concerned. I have no doubt that Dr. Williams relies on getting the value of the C. D. & 
W. balances and the Viscount gift by the back door in this way; and if he does, it will 
be all the more difficult to bring him back to reason. Moreover he is only too likely to 
claim credit for his achievement publicly. 
16. I am under no illusion that our relations with Dr. Williams generally, and 
mine here in particular, will be difficult for the next few months. We are likely to be 
put in the deep freeze, as the Americans were during the period when Dr. Williams 
was exercising pressure on them over their aid offer. Temperamentally, Dr. Williams 
must always have someone to attack at any particular time; and I am afraid that we 
are the present target. This is likely to last for several months. Eventually Dr. 
Williams' mood will change, and this might be hastened if he finds, as I suspect he 
will, that his much publicised tour of Europe has produced little or nothing in the 
way of real aid from there. During this phase I recommend that our attitude should 
be to continue to deal with the Trinidad and Tobago Government as correctly as 
possible but to give them nothing in place of the aid they have rejected. At the same 
time we must recognise that the corollary of this is that we shall not be able to ask 
them for anything during this phase; and that for this reason our ability to influence 
them on any subject, for example, in relation to registering votes in the United 
Nations where they do not see their own interests to be engaged, will be negligible. 
17. In the meantime it must be the object of our policy to keep the question of 
the independence financial settlement as much as possible out of the public eye.2 Dr. 
Williams, for his part, since his return has said much less against us than might have 
been expected, possibly because his Cabinet colleagues, whilst feeling it necessary to 
support their Prime Minister's rejection of our offer, are not altogether happy about 
the way in which he did it. On the other hand Dr. Williams is turning the situation to 
2 The issue of Trinidad's financial settlement was one of protracted controversy which was not finally 
resolved until Dec 1963. By that time Trinidad had been given the aircraft and part of the CD&W balances. 
In the final settlement, in order to qualify for the remainder of the CD&W balances---£138,000- Trinidad 
agreed to pay the defence debt of £75,075 and accepted, in place of the £1 million Commonwealth 
Assistance Loan a short-term Exchequer loan of £600,000 (DO 200/89). 
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his political benefit by using it as the basis for urging his own people to greater 
efforts on their own behalf. If we are to keep the temperature down, as we must hope 
to do, we need to refrain as far as possible from directly challenging Dr. Williams' 
decision in public. At the same time we ought to redouble our efforts to bring home 
to the people of Trinidad and Tobago, and perhaps of Britain too, just how much we 
are constantly doing to help and subsidise the West Indies in general, including 
Trinidad and Tobago. This is best done not as part of a justificatory exercise when 
what we say is partially discounted as propaganda, but as suitable occasions present 
themselves. One such was recently missed. When the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement was renewed, it should have been presented at any rate in publicity 
directed to the West Indies as a direct subsidy worth £x million by the British 
taxpayer annually to individual West Indian countries separately listed with amounts. 
Similar treatment should also be accorded to other cases where we in effect support 
Trinidad and Tobago. Possibly bananas and grapefruit are examples. 
18. I am sending copies of this despatch to the British High Commissioners in 
other Commonwealth countries, to the British Ambassadors in Dublin and Caracas 
and, on a personal basis, to the Governor of Barbados. 
210 CAB 134/2153, LAC(62)14 20 Dec 1962 
'Future prospects for Jamaica and for Trinidad and Tobago': CRO note 
for Cabinet (Official) Committee on Latin America and the Caribbean 
[This note circulated two despatches, both to Dun can Sandys1 which are reproduced here. The first, no 3 dated 23 Oct 1962, was from Sir A Morley, UK high commissioner to 
Jamaica. The second, also no 3 dated 21 Nov 1962, was from N E Costar, UK high 
commissioner in Trinidad (see 200, note 1). Both despatches are prefaced by CRO 
summaries of their contents.] 
The outlook for Jamaica 
SUMMARY 
Is Jamaica just one more addition to the non-committed Commonwealth countries? 
The length and depth of the British association, the absence of any native race, and 
her relative maturity at independence, makes it probable that Jamaicans will see 
their problems through British or, at least, Western spectacles (paragraphs 2-6). The 
only neighbours of much interest to Jamaica are the United States, Canada and Cuba, 
and scarcely seem to include even Trinidad (paragraph 7) . 
2. The two political parties present an extreme example of political unionism 
(paragraph 8) and their activities over the past 25 years have left Jamaica with a 
formidable wage/cost problem (paragraph 9). 
3. The effect of the Commonwealth Immigration Act on her high and 
unrestrained birthrate will affect the quantum of external aid (paragraph 10). 
1 KCMG, 1959, Sir Alexander Morley; India Office from 1930; on loan to Ministry of Aircraft Production, 
1940-1942; assistant secretary, Burma Office, 1945- 1947; on loan to Treasury, 1947; CRO from 1949; 
deputy UK high commissioner, Wellington, 1950-1953; assistant under-secretary of state, CRO, 1954; UK 
deputy high commissioner, Calcutta, 1956; UK high commissioner, Ceylon, 1957-1962; UK high 
commissioner, Jamaica, from 1962. 
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4. On the other hand, the Jamaican economy has acquired momentum during 
the last decade, is entirely open and is free from the distortions of "economic 
nationalism". Just at present it shows signs of stagnation, and a less exuberant policy 
is now, in any case, desirable (paragraphs 11 and 12). 
5. If the Jamaicans can make their moderate and perhaps even "committed" 
voice effectively heard on External Affairs, it will be good for them and good for us 
(paragraph 13). 
6. Sir Alexander Bustamante's personal authority offers the prospect of stability 
and a breathing space; but there is doubt whether he can impart the necessary drive 
and energy needed for the Government to emerge as an effective supporter of the 
West and to get the economy moving forward again. It would be unwise of us to 
neglect any opportunity to foster what may prove to be a Commonwealth partner of a 
new kind (paragraphs 14 and 15). 
After some two months in this new post, it seems timely to attempt to set down some 
of the features of the Jamaican scene which have especially struck me, and to seek to 
identify the main problems confronting the Jamaican Government in the immediate 
future. What follows is necessarily generalised and superficial; but since Jamaica is 
situated in a new area of Commonwealth relations it may be helpful to hazard 
opinions now, even if future experience necessitates corrections. 
2. Until Jamaica's accession to independence, it has been justifiable to regard the 
"old" Commonwealth countries, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as firmly 
aligned with the West, and the remainder (with the possible exception of Pakistan) 
as, in varying degrees, "uncommitted" and neutralist. The natural assumption may 
therefore be that Jamaica will be, for practical purposes, just one more addition to 
the "uncommitted" Commonwealth and likely to display before long all their familiar 
attitudes. Would such an assumption be warranted? 
3. The Jamaicans we see around in Britain are of more or less pure African stock, 
as is the great mass of the population here. But they have almost wholly forgotten 
their African origins and have no folk memories to complicate their attitudes, except 
those of slavery. Nationalism in the Commonwealth countries of Asia and Africa, 
expressing itself as it is apt to do in neutralism, is often fomented by internal 
conflicts arising where the structure of society is strongly influenced by an archaic 
caste or tribal structure out of tune with 20th century political institutions or by 
sentimental nostalgia for an imagined pre-colonial Golden Age. There is virtually 
nothing of this in Jamaica. Not only has Jamaica known three centuries of British 
rule but, for practical purposes, Jamaican history may be said to begin with the 
arrival of Cromwell's soldiers in 1655. Indeed the ancestors of the present 
inhabitants were not here when British rule began. There are in Jamaica only some 
28,000 persons classified as East Indian and some 10,000 as Chinese. Jamaican 
history is, for practical purposes, a history of the relations of two main groups of 
immigrants, those from Britain and those brought as slaves from Africa. The latter 
have no distinctive background; their cultural and economic aspirations are 
essentially the same as those of the former and their enthusiastic Christianity-
much of it of Nonconformist inspiration-has only a gentle undercurrent of African 
practices. What is more, British political institutions in this country go back a very 
long way and, although a fresh start on orthodox Crown Colony lines was made after 
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the abortive revolt of 1865, under the ruling "plantocracy" Jamaica had already for 
two centuries enjoyed democratic institutions in the same sense at least as did 
Athens-on a foundation of slavery. The continuity of British institutions in Jamaica 
is still marked by vestigial traces of the 17th century in such venerable institutions as 
the Jamaican Privy Council, the Parish Custodes and the Broad Seal. 
4. To a considerable extent, therefore, the whole population of Jamaica starts off 
at independence with a British orientation of a depth unknown in any other new 
Commonwealth country. Moreover, relatively few "top people", whether in politics or 
other organised public life, have a high proportion of African blood. If we ignore the 
small Jewish community who came to Jamaica from Spain and Portugal in the 18th 
century and the Levantines who came in the 19th century, though these are 
important driving forces in the Jamaican body politic, Jamaica is largely ruled at the 
present time by people with a substantial proportion of British blood in their veins 
and, in some cases, by people of virtually pure white extraction with an outlook very 
similar to the people of New Zealand. This fact is a source of internal tensions overtly 
arising from colour, but essentially stemming from the natural desire of the "have 
nots" to displace the "haves". Thus, while the outlook for Jamaica obviously depends 
on the way in which these tensions will be resolved over the coming years, it is at the 
present time a fact in our dealings with Jamaica, which we must bear constantly in 
mind, that we are confronting people who, in many ways, display the characteristics 
rather of the old Commonwealth countries than of the new, and with a society that, 
for all its internal tensions and the widely varying aptitudes and industry of its 
members (according to their racial origins) has a certain homogeneity of outlook and 
probably much more so than many Latin American countries. Although the frequent 
proclamation by the Jamaican ruling class of the absence of any racial problem in 
Jamaica, might, in some sense, be cynically regarded as whistling to keep up their 
courage, it does from another standpoint contain a measure of truth. Furthermore, 
Jamaica has been, for more than a century, essentially a country of smallholders with 
all the stability, as well as the economic inefficiency, to be expected in such a society. 
It is by no means inevitable that, given wise leadership, the needs and discontents of 
the non-privileged will erupt in the same revolutionary way (even though the 
revolution has sometimes been non-violent) as we have known in other new 
Commonwealth countries. 
5. In assessing the prospects for the orderly and rational evolution of Jamaican 
society, we must also bear in mind that independence has come to Jamaica at a 
relatively late stage. Jamaica has had an advanced constitution for a number of years, 
with universal franchise since 1944, and has enjoyed the advantages of a two-party 
system, even though the parties may have grown up to an unhealthy degree round 
the contrasting personalities of two outstanding politicians. It would be rash to 
assume that Westminster democracy is fully understood and deeply rooted in 
Jamaica-the fact that Sir Alexander Bustamante could even toy with the thought of 
making himself Governor-General and that without severance of his party and trade 
union links, is evidence to the contrary-but certainly the chance that it may 
become so looks more promising here than elsewhere. The Jamaican Constitution 
was worked out in full agreement between the two parties and required no dramatic 
Independence Conference in London to secure its acceptance. For what it may be 
worth, it is a remarkably sane and moderate document with, for instance, built-in 
provisions for consultation with the Leader of the Opposition on certain key matters, 
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scope for the Leader of the Opposition to nominate a quota of Senators, and full civic 
rights (including eligibility for Parliament) for citizens of other Commonwealth 
countries after a year's residence. There is, of course, no constitutional bar on any 
Jamaican citizen holding any office and, although it would have been disingenuous, 
even in so cursory a survey as this, to avoid all mention of the obsessive problem of 
colour, there is no lack of opportunity for those born black to rise to the highest 
offices of state, if endowed with the necessary ability; and some have. The 
appointment of the new Governor-General is being hailed on this ground.2 (Colour 
in Jamaica may perhaps be likened to accent in Britain. It tends to proclaim a 
humble origin but it is not a formal bar or, even in practice, always a disadvantage.) 
k5 further evidence of moderation of outlook, one might point to the deep 
constitutional entrenchment of the British monarchy, which appears to reflect the 
attitude of the great majority of Jamaicans, though there are pockets of 
republicanism especially among the young and the intelligentsia. 
6. All this combines to make it probable that Jamaicans will see their problems, 
as they arise, through distinctly British, or perhaps it would be more prudent to say, 
through Western spectacles. For although, as is notorious, the outlook of Jamaicans, 
like that of other British Caribbean islands, is parochial and they have had 
surprisingly little contact with their neighbours, it must, of course, be remembered 
that they are embedded in the Western hemisphere and, as such, are inevitably 
subject to American influence. This, with the withdrawal of the British, may be 
expected rapidly to increase. Miami lies only 500 miles away and with Cuba only 90 
miles away, a cautious and realistic approach towards Leftism would be natural, quite 
apart from any deliberate pressures which the United States may exert, and from the 
sobering reflection that British power in this region is now virtually limited (apart 
from small garrisons in British Honduras and British Guiana) to two frigates. Unless 
there should be some sudden break through of the under-privileged, it seems likely 
that the facts of geography will greatly influence the Jamaican outlook. This view is 
also reinforced by the economic facts. A considerable proportion of Jamaican trade 
and investment is already American; the Jamaican tourist trade is largely dependent 
on Americans; and Jamaican hopes for, though not perhaps prospects, of massive 
American aid are high. Whether or not the United States Government follows up the 
delegation of the Vice-President to the independence celebrations with a major 
attempt to "takeover" Jamaica, it seems almost inevitable that the material pull of 
the United States, even though often in conflict with Jamaican instincts, will be 
strongly felt here, and may give rise to some of the same attitudes as have 
characterised Canada. This, in its turn, may present problems for ourselves. But even 
though there may be problems reflecting Anglo-American differences, we shall, it 
may be hoped, be dealing, initially at least, with differences of relative nuance of a 
kind familiar among the Western countries, and not with the basic differences of 
outlook that obtain between the West and most of the countries of Asia and Mrica. 
And we may perhaps look for Canadian assistance in resolving them, though thus far 
signs of Canadian interest have not even extended to the nomination of a High 
Commissioner. 
2 Blackburne served as Jamaica's first governor-general from 1 Aug 1962 and was succeeded by Sir Clifford 
Campbell from 1 Dec 1962. 
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7. In discussing the facts of geography, I have deliberately referred only to the 
United States, Canada and Cuba. One's first impression is that these are the only 
neighbours of any real consequence to Jamaica. She may be seeking membership of 
O.A.S. in the belief that her prospects of security and aid may thereby be increased; 
but Latin America means very little in this country where English is the only 
language spoken and where there are very few persons of Spanish or even French 
descent. Inevitably the British Caribbean territories mean rather more, if only 
because there has been a certain amount of mixing up especially in recent years and 
because of the university and one or two other common services. One's first 
impression is, however, of considerable surprise that the West Indies Federation 
should even have got as far as it did and the links with Trinidad seem, from Kingston, 
surprisingly weak and perhaps likely to grow still weaker. Trinidad is further from 
Jamaica in flying time (and air fares) than New York and almost as far as Australia 
from New Zealand; and the attitude of the Jamaicans towards Trinidad, although 
they belong to the larger country, displays a detachment even stronger than that of 
New Zealanders towards Australians, combined with a similar half-scandalised, half-
admiring wonder at what so unpredictable and so unsound a Commonwealth partner 
may be up to next. But, seen from Kingston, Federation is not only dead but almost 
forgotten; and the Jamaicans have not yet even decided whether they need a High 
Commission in Port of Spain. 
8. Political life in this predominantly agricultural, geographically isolated 
community revolves round two parties, the Jamaica Labour Party and the People's 
National Party. As I have said above, leadership of these parties is largely "coloured"; 
but, since there is universal franchise, both must look for support from "blacks". 
There is little else by way of political organisations, apart from a small, and at 
present, insignificant fringe of groups taking either a strongly racialist, or quasi-
Communist, line. None of them is represented in the present Parliament. Both the 
two main parties derive from the depression of the '30 s and the unrest which led, 
just before the war, to the Moyne Report, from which it is customary in Jamaica to 
date both the independence struggle, such as it was, and the accompanying cultural 
awakening. Both parties have been associated with pressure for constitutional 
progress and, although both are now essentially moderate, their principal platform 
has traditionally been for improved conditions for organised workers, who form a 
relatively small, though increasing, section of the working population. Each party 
has a strong and undisguised trade union base and this is especially true of the 
Jamaica Labour Party. Not only is Sir Alexander Bustamante founder member and 
Life President of the trade union which bears his name, but he has included two of 
the principal officers of his union in his Cabinet, one of them as Minister of Labour. 
The membership of the respective unions is not, in form at least, geared to, but cuts 
right across, particular trades. Jamaica thus presents an extreme example of political 
unionism. The cohesive force in each party is essentially loyalty to the leader and to 
his own union following and such differences as there are between the parties are 
largely differences flowing from the personalities of the two leaders. Mr. Norman 
Manley, as is well-known, is an intellectual and a rational politician who, although 
once a follower of Sir Stafford Cripps,3 has now largely shed his Socialism. He has a 
good knowledge of the outside world and was a supporter, albeit an over-cautious 
3 Chancellor of Exchequer, 1947- 1950. 
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one, of Federation. He is interested in the arts and the cultural side of life; and his 
appeal is essentially to the educated classes and the relatively sophisticated 
inhabitants of greater Kingston, which contains something like 30 per cent. of the 
total population of Jamaica. By contrast, Sir Alexander Bustamante is a politician 
guided by instinct. In his seventy-ninth year at least, he is scarcely capable of 
discursive thought or even of coherent oratory, but has, in a marked degree, the born 
politician's flair for the right decision and for sensing the line which is in tune with 
the mood of his followers, to many of whom his word (brief and obscure though it 
frequently is) is law. His paternalistic appeal is essentially to the "quashies" (as the 
small farmers are known) and to the rural labourers who find Mr. Manley somewhat 
remote and over their heads. Although Sir Alexander Bustamante is somewhat of an 
opportunist and a demagogue-the final destruction of Federation was essentially 
his doing-his political position in most matters is to the right of Mr. Manley and is 
even more uncompromisingly anti-Communist. 
9. The party struggle over the last 25 years has thus essentially been a struggle to 
demonstrate which party is better at securing improved conditions for organised 
workers and both parties appear to have been only too successful, the more so as the 
last decade has seen the introduction of a fair measure of secondary industry 
protected by the usual quantative restrictions. It has seen, too, the introduction of 
substantial operations by Canadian and American companies for the winning of 
bauxite and the manufacture of alumina, which now account for half Jamaica's 
export income. These North American companies have been somewhat reckless 
about their wage rates and, although the employment which they themselves give is 
limited, they have tended to set the pattern of earnings. The result of all this is that 
Jamaica now faces a formidable wage-cost problem and a policy of wage restraint is 
no less desirable than it is in Britain. It is, however, something of a paradox that this 
should be so in a country where unemployment is rife, the social services by no 
means highly developed, and where each rise of wages (which, in monetary terms, 
now sometimes approach or even exceed those in Britain) tends to cause employers 
to reduce their payroll or to turn to greater mechanisation. Moreover, although the 
Jamaica Balance of Payments is still heavily dependent on the export of certain 
primary agricultural products, especially sugar, in regard to which there is keen 
world competition and, although the fortunes of a large part of the population are 
bound up with these products, she has become something of a high cost producer of 
them. These tendencies have, perhaps, been accentuated by the inevitable British 
tenderness towards Jamaica in commercial matters so long as she remained a colony, 
with the result that, to borrow the phrase of Mr. J. H. A. Watson,4 in his farewell 
despatch on the ex-French territories in Africa, Jamaica displays some of the features 
of a "greenhouse" economy. The working of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, 
for instance, has ensured that we amply cover the producers' cost even though, in 
recent years, it has involved us in paying something like double the world price; and 
there have been special arrangements designed to ensure a market in Britain for 
Jamaican citrus and bananas however uncompetitive their price. The importunate 
attitude of Jamaican Ministers regarding sales of their concentrated orange juice to 
the Ministry of Health might be regarded as a symptom of a "greenhouse" mentality. 
4 Head of Mrican Dept, FO, 1956-1959; British ambassador to Mali Federation, 1960- 1961, to Senegal, 
Mauritania and Togo, 1960-1962. 
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It seems to me that the central economic problem which confronts the present 
Jamaican Government is that of bringing wage increases under some form of 
restraint and relating them better to the individual's output (which by and large is 
well below that of workers in Europe), and generally of getting costs under better 
control, especially where it is practicable-in this day and age-to do so in a way 
which takes advantage of the abundance of unskilled manpower and does not drive 
employers to more mechanisation. It is to be feared that, on the industrial side, the 
present Jamaican Government are not well situated for tackling this problem and 
will find great difficulty in considering the long-term interests of the community as a 
whole rather than the short-term interests of the section represented by the trades 
unions. On the other hand, they may be relatively well placed to tackle the resistance 
of smallholders to elimination of some of their inefficient methods of cultivation. As 
ex-slaves, the smallholders are perhaps even more passionate individualists than 
their kind elsewhere. While this has the advantage of making them anti-Marxist it 
has the disadvantage of making them particularly resistent [sic] to any form of 
interference designed to modernise their methods. But if anyone can bring them 
along the path of agricultural progress, Sir Alexander Bustamante, if only he can be 
convinced of the need, seems the man to do it. 
10. Jamaica's other main economic liability is her high birthrate, amounting to 
37.; per cent. natural annual increase and accentuated by the outlook of an ex-slave 
population in which, broadly speaking, maternity is rated above matrimony. (Only 30 
per cent. of births are legitimate.) Birth control, which at best could only be a long-
term palliative, appears still to be a subject almost taboo in Jamaica. The fact that the 
Prime Minister is a Roman Catholic presumably has something to do with the 
archaic attitudes on this question; and it is obvious that in Jamaican conditions it 
would be difficult to present birth control as family planning. In these 
circumstances, Jamaica needs to export a proportion-some say as much as half-of 
her population increase if all plans for development are not to be frustrated. There is 
in fact a long tradition of Jamaican emigration-going back for instance to the 
construction of the Panama Canal. Any emotional reaction there may originally have 
been to the Commonwealth Immigration Act has long since evaporated but the 
practical working of the Act is being keenly watched to see how great is the outflow 
of Jamaican immigrants who still succeed in getting into Britain. By and large, this is 
seen here as what it is-a vital factor in the Jamaican economic outlook. The greater 
the migration the less, broadly speaking, the aid which Jamaica will require and, if 
this migratory flow is heavily damped down, we may expect to hear a good deal of this 
argument. At the same time, it must be recorded that Jamaican migrants tend (or are 
thought) to include an undue proportion of such relatively skilled labour as exists, 
since those most skilled are the people with the greatest initiative and desire to 
improve their skills abroad. Unfortunately, though they may intend a relatively short 
sojourn in Britain for this purpose, they often become permanently lost to the 
Jamaican economy. 
11. To balance these economic liabilities, there is a great deal on the credit side. 
As is well known, the Jamaican economy in the last decade has acquired considerable 
momentum and, as a leading Jamaican official has been heard to put it is now some 
way up the greasy pole leading to self-generating growth, even if there is some 
danger of her slipping back. This has been achieved through a combination of the 
development of the bauxite industry (which, as mentioned in paragraph 9, has 
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brought its own problems), and of the tourist industry, and of a conscious policy of 
deficit financing and credit expansion. The economy is wholly open, apart from such 
quantitative restrictions as have been imposed to protect nascent industry and for 
such vestigial exchange control against non-sterling currencies as is still enjoined 
from London. In these circumstances a good deal of private investment has been 
directed to Jamaica in recent years, and the flow continues, though recent political 
changes have, in the last year or so, induced much greater caution among potential 
investors. But, broadly speaking, Jamaica's payments are only balanced by the tourist 
industry, and by migrants' remittances, which will tend to fall away, in so far as the 
volume of migration falls and those who have already emigrated are joined by their 
dependants. The tourist industry looks somewhat precarious and in danger of pricing 
itself out of the market, and is, in any case, at the mercy of factors outside Jamaican 
control. The policy of deficit financing and rapid expansion had probably in any case 
gone on as long as was healthy if it were not to have a dangerous effect on the 
balance of payments. The J.L.P. will now have the task of working out a less 
exuberant policy which will yet enable development to go forward. They have also set 
themselves the more strictly political task of devising a new development plan to 
replace that of Mr. Manley, though they do not differ significantly from his 
Government in their outlook. It is being currently said that more emphasis will be 
placed on agricultural welfare and on housing, particularly in rural areas, though it 
remains to be seen what this will mean in practice, or how far the plan will look like 
bringing about a change in the maldistribution of wealth which exists in Jamaica. 
(The average annual income per head is as high as £131 but the serious poverty in 
the Kingston slums and the countryside are patent for all to see.) In seeking external 
aid, the Jamaican Government will be faced with the fact that, while it will take time 
to establish their credit as an independent country, their need is less great than that 
of many new countries; and need (together with nuisance value) tends to weigh more 
heavily than merit or achievement in the minds of donor Governments in their 
allocation of bounty. 
12. But it can be said that the prospects that Jamaican Governments will act 
rationally, even if mistakenly, and free from the blind emotion of "economic 
nationalism" are fairly bright. There appear few signs of any problem of 
"Jamaicanisation". British and other overseas firms appear long since to have been 
operating largely through Jamaican personnel and in many cases have admitted a 
share of Jamaican equity. The small expatriate British community seems well mixed 
up with the Jamaican community (which includes domiciled citizens of the United 
Kingdom) in the manner familiar in the old Commonwealth countries. This should 
help to avert the pressures and resulting distortions so familiar to us in most other 
new Commonwealth countries. 
13. These strike me as the principal domestic problems confronting the 
Jamaican Government. They must also build up their external affairs machinery and 
shape some sort of course in foreign policy. This is not merely a matter of self-respect 
or the casting of votes in the United Nations; it impinges on the domestic situation 
because the outside world-the world of potentially aid-giving Governments and 
private investors- is waiting to see where Jamaica stands and the absence of policy 
thus contributes to the current economic stagnation. It is in our own interest to 
encourage and assist Jamaica towards making her voice effectively heard because, 
initially at least (and with good management of internal affairs, perhaps for some 
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time), it is likely to be a moderate voice and perhaps even a voice openly committed 
in essentials to the West. Though neutralism is not unknown in Jamaica, it tends to 
receive the reception habitually reserved for views that are eccentric or put forward 
with the motive of "epater les bourgeois"5 and seems unlikely, in the present climate 
of opinion, to carry much influence. 
14. But thus far hardly any glimpse of the views of Sir Alexander Bustamante's 
Government on any subject has been vouchsafed to the public and independent 
Jamaica has been existing in something of a policy vacuum. Excuses for this can 
readily be made. The J.L.P. took office only at the end of April and only one, or at 
most, two Ministers besides the Prime Minister had held office previously and that 
with circumscribed responsibilities. Much of their energies in the first months went 
to the organisation of the independence celebrations, which were followed at only a 
few weeks' interval by the visit of Sir Alexander Bustamante, together with some of 
his principal colleagues, to London for the Prime Ministers' Meeting. Sir Alexander 
Bustamante has only just made up his mind that he does not wish to become 
Governor-General when Sir Kenneth Blackburne leaves Jamaica at the end of next 
month and that he is prepared to carry on for the time being, despite his advanced 
years, as Prime Minister. There is something in all this and it is perhaps sufficient 
justification for their reluctance to meet Parliament (apart from a couple of days' 
debate on the Common Market issue before the Prime Minister's departure for 
London), even though Mr. Manley and his colleagues appear no less justified in 
beginning to draw public attention to the absence of decisions from the Government. 
Sir Alexander Bustamante's continued presence as Prime Minister carries with it the 
prospect of stability-his conservative outlook is well known. His authority within 
his own party is unquestioned and, despite his tendency to arrogate to himself a 
position going a little beyond that normally accorded to a democratic Prime 
Minister, it is generally conceded, even outside his own party faithful, his continued 
presence will not only give a breathing space to Jamaica to find out where she stands 
as an independent nation, and to his own party to sort out rivalries for succession to 
himself, but postpones the day when the withdrawal of one of the two local giants 
will transform the political scene as Jamaica has known it for a quarter of a century. 
There is, however, a price to be paid. Sir Alexander's age and limited intellectual 
capacity would be of less account if he had the capacity to impart drive and energy to 
the Government machine. I fear, however, that I can find little trace of this. His 
Ministerial colleagues appear to feel inhibited from taking their own decisions but 
unable to obtain from him the swift and clear guidance which they need. Senior 
officials speak ruefully of the necessary period of education of their new political 
masters as still incomplete. There is a real danger that, even if Sir Alexander 
Bustamante shows himself capable of the statesmanship to throw off his past as a 
trade union boss and give Jamaica the leadership it needs, all might yet come to 
naught through plain inefficiency, too slow a tempo of work, and the lethargy which 
is the curse of the West Indian islands. It may however prove to be a case of reculer 
pour mieux sauter6 and there is a fair chance that the J.L.P. Government may 
emerge both as an effective supporter of the West, and as a Government able to get 
the Jamaican economy once more moving forward. If they can achieve the latter, it 
5 To impress the middle classes. 6 Move back in order to move forward. 
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may fairly be hoped that adjustments of Jamaican society will take an evolutionary 
form and that she may escape the violent internal convulsions, leading to sharp 
changes of external course, which we have known in some other new 
Commonwealth countries. It seems, therefore, worthwhile to exert ourselves to give 
the Jamaican Government whatever assistance may be in our power. For a 
substantial part of the British connexion, we tended to neglect the West Indies. 
Troll ope wrote a century ago "If we could, we would fain forget Jamaica altogether". I 
hope that this is not true to-day. Though small and situated in a part of the world 
where British influence has for long been limited, it would surely be unwise to 
neglect any opportunity to foster the emergence of a new Commonwealth partner of 
a very different kind from most of those in Asia and Africa. 
15. I am sending copies of this despatch to the High Commissioners at Ottawa 
and Port of Spain, Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington and Havana, the United 
Kingdom Delegate to the United Nations in New York and (on a personal basis) to the 
Governor of Barbados. 
The prospects for Trinidad and Tobago 
SUMMARY 
Dr. Williams' long absence since independence has not affected his personal position, 
but while he is away the country is standing still, and there is some criticism of the 
Government (paragraph 2). 
2. The political parties reflect the main racial division of the country in which 
the Negroes just outnumber the East Indians (paragraph 4). 
3. Dr. Williams' party, the P.N.M., has a solid parliamentary majority and there 
seems to be no political reason why it should not continue in power until the next 
election. The Opposition, D.L.P., is ineffective (paragraphs 4-8). 
4. But the country faces serious economic problems due to unemployment 
accentuated by population growth; and to the distortions arising from the 
juxtaposition of a rich man's industry (oil) and a poor man's industry (agriculture) 
(paragraphs 10 and 11). 
5. Government efforts to deal with economic problems are hampered by over-
enthusiastic planning and ineffective administration. "Crash" programmes have 
distorted the labour situation and had a bad effect on agriculture (paragraphs 12 and 
13). 
6. There has been great emphasis on new industrial development but it has 
already become "high cost", and it cannot make much impact on the growing 
unemployment. The comparative wealth of the oil industry has led to inflated wage 
rates which threaten other sectors of the economy. Strikes are prevalent (paragraphs 
14-16). 
7. The Government have recently been trying to increase revenue; to raise more 
capital from abroad; and to change their priorities in development. Agriculture 
should, however, be given even more attention (paragraphs 17-19). 
8. Dr. Williams has been right in laying such stress on association with the 
E.C.M. But he is likely to be disappointed in his search for aid in Europe. He and his 
Ministers need to concentrate on using better the resources already available and on 
tackling the country's problems-mainly labour unrest, unemployment and the 
strangling growth of population (paragraphs 20 and 21). 
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In the hope that they may usefully supplement the detailed briefing for your 
forthcoming visit to Trinidad and Tobago, I have the honour to submit some broadly 
drawn comments on the prospects for Trinidad and Tobago, and in particular the 
strength and weaknesses of the economy. 
2. This is, perhaps, not the best time to try to take a long view of the internal 
politics of the newly independent State of Trinidad and Tobago. A few days after 
independence Dr. Williams left the country for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
Meeting; and he has found it possible to stay away for nearly three months on an 
extensive tour mainly of Western Europe. This is in itself evidence of the strength of 
Dr. Williams' personal position, and that of his party in the Trinidad political scene. 
But meanwhile there is a notable lack of progress in any political or economic matter 
in Trinidad which, added to the simultaneous growth of unemployment which I deal 
with below, is weakening the position of the Government in the country. Only the 
absence of an effective Opposition makes this a less serious matter for the 
Government than it has so far been. Nevertheless, among those who can see the 
shoals ahead, there is a growing feeling that the ship of State is at the moment 
rudderless. For the same reason too, the Trinidad and Tobago Government have 
since independence taken no steps not forced on them by circumstances to define 
their position in international affairs. 
3. Despite these present uncertainties, it is possible, and indeed not very difficult, 
to see the main features of the local scene and, in particular, some of the major 
problems which will face Dr. Williams on his return. 
The internal political situation 
4. It may be trite, but it is none the less necessary, to repeat the comment that 
Trinidad and Tobago is a country formed mainly of two racial groups-the negro 
descendants of the slaves brought here from West Africa; and the "East Indian" 
descendants of the indentured labourers who were brought in from the Indian sub-
continent when the slaves were emancipated and deserted the fields and plantations 
for the towns. The percentage of the population represented by these racial groups is 
43 per cent. and 36 per cent. respectively, the rest of the population being made up 
mainly of people of mixed (but predominantly African) descent with a small 
proportion of Europeans and Chinese. This racial division is a fact of political, as well 
as social, life. 
5. The Government party, the Peoples' National Movement (P.N.M.) is an 
intellectual conception which in 1956 sprang, Minerva-like, fully armed from the 
head of Dr. Williams, into the almost complete national political vacuum at that 
time. Within months it came into power, drawing its strength from the urban negro 
voters. As a result of the elections of December 1961 it increased its majority to the 
present figure of 20 out of a total of 30 seats in the House of Representatives. 
6. Trades unionism played no part in the origins of the party; but some of the 
main urban unions came out in its support at the last elections and the unions may 
in future play an increasing part in party politics. Basically, however, the P.N.M. is 
not a radical party. Its strength lies in organisation and in Dr. Williams' appeal-
calculated but none the less real-to the negro masses. If of course Dr. Williams 
were to retire from politics-there are constant rumours to this effect, recently given 
a fillip by a report that he would like to accept appointment to the Vice-
Chancellorship of the University of the West Indies which will fall vacant next year~ 
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the scene could be radically changed since no other P.N.M. politician enjoys anything 
like his prestige in the country. 
7. The Democratic Labour Party (D.L.P.) holding all the remaining 10 seats in 
the House of Representatives is by comparison a collection of amateurs. Badly led by 
Dr. Rudranath Capildeo ("the Mad Scientist") it draws its support mainly from the 
rural East Indian community and from some 'White Trinidadians" and others who 
prefer it to the P.N.M. for a mixture of reasons-because it is more capitalist; because 
they fear a one-party State; or more simply because they find the Indian politician 
more congenial than the Negro. 
8. In day-to-day politics, the rapprochement reached at the last Constitutional 
Conference between the Government and Opposition continues. Both major parties 
had seen how close racial tensions had taken the country to open racial violence and 
both seem to be prepared to co-operate genuinely in measures to reduce racial 
tensions. The British Guiana rioting in February no doubt also left its mark. The 
improved atmosphere seems likely to continue although one gets the feeling of a 
fairly uneasy truce; and the situation will remain potentially dangerous, particularly 
if political passions flare up, so long as the two parties draw their main support from 
racial groups. While the rapprochement continues it clearly helps the Government 
more than the Opposition. 
9. In terms of present political strength, therefore, there is no challenge to the 
position of the Government, and no reason why they should not continue in power 
for the four remaining years before another election must be held. There seems also 
to be no political reason why racial disturbances should interfere with their 
programme, provided that they do not enter into a trial of strength with the 
Opposition on matters touching on the strongly entrenched provisions of the 
Constitution. One such matter could conceivably be union with Grenada, which is 
likely to be increasingly opposed by the D.L.P. and the East Indian community 
because the addition of the negro population of Grenada to the local political scene 
would reduce the proportionate strength of the East Indians and also postpone the 
time when, because of their greater fecundity, they overtake the Negro population. 
The economic situation 
10. But while politically, despite the current stagnation, the Government ride 
comfortably in the saddle, it is in the social and economic fields that they are faced 
with most difficult problems. At the core of both social and economic troubles is the 
rapid, uninhibited growth of population. On the one hand, the Government's 
commendable desire to improve social conditions is rendered so much greater a 
burden on the Exchequer; on the other hand, the Government's considerable efforts 
to create new employment can make no headway against the rising tide of people. 
Also facing the Government are the problems arising from the juxtaposition, in a 
small island, of a rich man's industry employing relatively few (oil) and a poor man's 
industry employing many more (agriculture). 
11. The population now numbers 828,000; it has risen by 265,000 in the 14 years 
since the previous census and, for reasons of religious belief or racial practice, there 
is unlikely to be any control on its continued growth. 350,000 are under 15; this 
number exceeds the present working population of Trinidad and Tobago. In the next 
five years alone, 100,000 people will newly enter the labour force, by contrast with 
only 16,000 who are in the age group 60-65. There exists already in the territory 
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serious unemployment, estimated at as much as 20 per cent. out of work and another 
14 per cent. working only part-time. The problem is to provide employment for these 
people plus the flood of newcomers to the labour force. But it can be said at once that 
the problem is insoluble in terms of creating new jobs to match the population 
growth and appears soluble only by a reduction of the growth itself. There is no 
outlet in emigration. 
12. In the past five years the Government saw its priorities as being:-
(a) the improvement of social conditions, and 
(b) the attraction of new industry. 
Its Development Plan for the period 1958-62 included new roads and bridges, 
hospitals, airport runways, schools and housing; much improvement has been made 
in all these socially desirable spheres. In the process employment was created, 
though much of it only temporary employment. In 1961 (and suspiciously close to 
election time) the Government found some WI.$6 million for a "Crash Programme" 
of works to provide employment. But the funds were badly administered, and the 
programme amounted to nothing more than a "dole" to a few thousand workers for a 
few weeks. This same inefficiency of administration was evident throughout the 
whole Development Programme; it stems from an acute shortage of competent staff 
in Government, at both administrative and technical levels. Projects are "planned", 
but incompletely; a new technical college is built with C.D.W. funds but stands 
empty, having neither teaching staff nor equipment; a new airport terminal is built 
and remains unoccupied for months while neglected details are rectified; the 
proposed project to build 5,000 low-cost houses results in the building of 200 high-
cost houses. Millions are spent on a splendid new road to open up a beach, while 
over-crowded hospitals and slums fester. The Government is full of ideas and ideals 
but lacks the talent, the know-how and the drive to implement them. In part, this 
lacuna stems from the Prime Minister himself, an intellectual who does not 
encourage his Ministers to take independent decisions and who has held the reins of 
Government so tightly in his own hands that the efforts of other Ministers and the 
Civil Service (neither of whom in any case is of high calibre) have been stultified. 
13. The island of Tobago received the Government's special attention in the 
Development Programme-new schools, a new road, improved shipping, &c. This 
devotion to Tobago is of course of political rather than economic significance. In the 
first place Dr. Williams headed off the movement in Tobago to secede from Trinidad 
and join the West Indies Federation. "The development of Tobago initiated by the 
present Government", said Dr. Williams, "affords an example and an inspiration to all 
the smaller and under-developed islands of the Federation." Secondly, he was 
rewarded by winning both the Tobago seats in the 1961 Election. But in the process 
of so-called development, Tobago's Civil Service establishment rose from 360 to 442, 
hundreds of workers were employed on road making, at higher wages than the 
agricultural estates were able or willing to pay, and the island's agricultural 
production (its major asset) declined at a more rapid pace than before. 
14. The Government's second priority in these five years was the attraction of 
new industry by means of incentive legislation and the creation of an Industrial 
Development Corporation. It sought to achieve additional employment and a 
diversification of its industrial activity. But neither of these objectives was achieved. 
The main expansion took place in the oil industry so that the territory's dependence 
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on its main industry became still more marked; at the same time the emphasis 
swung to refining of imported oil and away from the production of indigenous crude 
which in Trinidad is, for technical reasons, high cost; the industry became more 
capital intensive and the numbers employed actually fell. Simultaneously the sugar 
industry, fighting the constant squeeze of increasing costs upon more or less fixed 
returns, was reducing its labour force. Some new manufacturing industries were 
established, but the number of new jobs created totalled only about 4,000. Thus, with 
employment in oil and sugar declining, with employment in manufacturing industry 
increasing only slowly, and with the population increasing rapidly, there were more 
people unemployed at the end of the Five-year Development Programme than at the 
beginning. It may be counted as a minor credit that people are now reported to be 
applying for work in the less palatable jobs such as the cocoa and coconut estates. 
15. The very high rate of capital expenditure in the public sector ($240 million in 
five years) and the very high rate of capital inflow in the private sector, so desirable in 
many ways, and so transforming of the local scene, nevertheless had some adverse 
effects. The Government, launched irrevocably on a social programme they can no 
longer maintain from internal resources, find themselves in the position of paupers, 
anxiously begging for aid from every possible external source. The people of Trinidad 
and Tobago have, thanks to the period of expanding money circulation, come to 
demand a higher standard of living, and to accustom themselves to the luxury 
symbols of refrigerators, automobiles and television. The Trinidadian now sees 
himself as entitled to a North American standard of living though making no effort 
(because of the serious unemployment and his inborn-or perhaps his slave 
ancestor-cultivated-indolence) to achieve comparable productivity in his daily 
work. But this is a standard of living the economy cannot support. 
16. And these very factors of high public sector spending and high private sector 
capital inflow which produced the expansion are now recoiling on the Government 
and the people. Because Government revenues have been so seriously strained by, 
inter alia, the Development Programme, Government spending has virtually ground 
to a halt, while the consumer boom, financed largely by the over-enthusiastic 
activities of hire-purchase companies, has collapsed. The expansion of the oil 
industry has reached a plateau; existing manufacturing industries have been 
hampered by the failure of the West Indies Customs Union and the growth of 
competing plants in the Caribbean; one can point to two existing companies at 
present expanding (significantly, both are capital-intensive projects) but there is 
little evidence of interest in establishing further manufacturing industries. The 
economy has ceased its advance. Another serious, and longer-term effect, can be 
seen; the territory has become a high-cost producer, and is in danger of forfeiting 
what claim it had to offering cheap labour as an incentive to local manufacture. The 
labour unions, with (until recently) the implicit approval of the Government, have 
emerged as militant, but irresponsible, groups, demanding more and more money 
for less and less work. Their first target has naturally been the oil industry, which is, 
at one and the same time, both the pillar of the economy and a major threat to it. The 
pace of wage increase in the territory is set by Texaco who, as the largest oil company 
in Trinidad, are the first target for the unions, and who, thanks to profits from their 
huge refinery employing relatively little labour, can afford higher wages. In the 
labour negotiations now proceeding between Texaco and the Oil Workers' Trades 
Union, the company have offered-at an early stage of the negotiations when no 
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intolerable pressure had been put upon them-wage increases totalling an estimated 
20 per cent. over the next three years. But the remainder of Trinidad's economy 
consists of high-cost sugar production, inefficient citrus, banana, cocoa and coffee 
production, and marginally efficient secondary manufacturing sheltering in varying 
degrees behind tariff protection. These other industries cannot afford to follow the 
lead of the oil industry in granting wage increases, but the unions will not permit 
them to lag far behind. The territory meantime is beset by strikes. 
17. The question is "Whither Bound"? In the past year the Government have 
shown some appreciation of the problems (though they would hotly deny that any of 
them were self-created). They have changed their priorities; recurrent revenue must 
be increased to match expenditure; development must be channelled into productive 
enterprise and especially into agriculture, in order to reduce imports, to stabilise the 
rising cost of living and to provide more jobs. The Government, ever aware of the 
territory's dependence for its economic expansion on capital inflow, has been 
assiduous in its own efforts to preserve a favourable investment climate. 
18. Useful progress has already been made on increasing revenue, in which task 
the Government have moved on sound and sensible lines, without arousing undue 
anxiety in Trinidad itself or externally. Customs and Excise duties have been 
increased, loopholes in tax collection have been stopped, and Treasury Bills have 
been successfully introduced. Even so, Government expenditure has been increasing 
rapidly (the result in large measure of unnecessary expenditure, e.g. , their takeover 
of the Telephone Company, their purchase of British West Indian Airways, 
independence celebrations, opening of diplomatic offices overseas, &c.), so that, even 
with the increase in local revenue, the Government is still desperately short of cash 
to meet its recurrent commitments. In the quest for capital for future development, 
Government have sought contributions from major companies in the territory, and 
so far have received firm promises of Wl.$26 million; the allocation of these funds no 
doubt awaits the publication of the next Five-year Development Plan. It has also to-
day (21st November) been announced that the United States Government has agreed 
to give Trinidad WI.$51 million in economic aid over five years, one-third of it before 
30th June next. 
19. As to channelling resources into agriculture, this seems to me the correct 
priority. But the Government as yet have shown no evidence of producing a dynamic 
policy of agricultural development. Indeed their inactivity has stirred the usually 
lackadaisical Opposition to challenge the Government on this subject. Nothing short 
of a national campaign of "Back to the Land" can hope to make an impression on the 
serious unemployment, and this will take great courage from a Government whose 
principal support is the urban Negro. 
20. The Government's immediate preoccupations on the economic front are 
first, the preservation of the United Kingdom market for their exports and, second, 
the raising of finance for continued development. As to the first, the Prime Minister 
has, I think, been right in making his grand tour of Europe to present the Trinidad 
and Tobago case to the Six. Without some arrangement for Trinidad's refined 
petroleum products and for continued protection for sugar and citrus, Trinidad's 
economy must suffer severely. The Prime Minister has, at the same time, made wide-
ranging requests for aid; the publicity on this has been such that his followers will 
undoubtedly expect him to return weighted down with European money bags. I fear, 
however, that the Prime Minister himself may have had to learn the unpleasant truth 
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that there are no vast sums waiting to flow, for long-term and at low interest, into 
public sector developments. 
21. Trinidad and Tobago is a territory which has an enormous economic 
advantage over other Caribbean territories, viz. an indigenous oil industry on which 
has been erected a yet bigger refining structure. This in turn gives the people a 
higher per capita income than anywhere else in the Caribbean. But these advantages 
have led to inflated ideas and inflated ambitions. It would be in the territory's 
interests to recognise its limitations, to set itself more realistic targets and to aim at 
achieving a few limited objectives. The Prime Minister, because of his immense 
intellectual capacity, has become a juggler, manipulating vast numbers of balls in the 
air at the same time; when these balls are projects, some inevitably fall and others 
remain permanently in orbit. Projects which are virtually on the point of being 
clinched are suddenly cast back while yet more offers are examined. Thus the 
telephone expansion is again postponed while the Prime Minister personally 
negotiates with Philips; again, existing housing projects about which endless 
preparations have been made stand still while the Prime Minister invites a German 
firm to Trinidad to build 40,000 houses and the supply-industries to go with them. 
While the Prime Minister dreams of aid in the hundreds of millions, and derides the 
genuine but more modest efforts of the United Kingdom and the United States to 
help, worthwhile projects stand still. On past evidence, it is, I fear, too much to hope 
that complete economic realism will prevail. But much will depend on the frame of 
mind in which Dr. Williams returns from Europe. He will return to many domestic 
problems, most prominent of them that of quieting labour unrest and dealing with 
rising unemployment. If he can move forward on limited development aims, while 
preserving the prospect of gaining a share of the European Development Fund and of 
American Aid to Latin America, then the economy might resume its advance, though 
at a gentler pace. But whatever external finance is forthcoming, and however capably 
the Government and Administration perform, nothing in sight will enable them to 
escape from the stranglehold imposed by the uninhibited growth of population. 
22. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioners in 
other Commonwealth countries, the British Ambassadors in Dublin, Caracas and 
Washington and, on a secret and personal basis, to the Governor of Barbados. 
211 CAB 134/1777, EER(63)78 14 June 1963 
'Jamaica and the European Free Trade Association': CRO note for 
Cabinet (Official) External Economic Relations Committee on a 
proposal that Jamaica should join EFTA 
In April, 1963, before coming to the Commonwealth Economic Consultative Council 
meeting of Trade Ministers in London, the Jamaican Minister of Trade and Industry 
(Mr. Lightbourne) requested the Jamaican High Commissioner in London to explore 
with British Ministers the possibility of association of Jamaica with the European 
Free Trade Association (Kingston telegrams Nos. 165 and 168 to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office). 
2. Little progress was made at that stage. The brief on this subject prepared for 
British Ministers in case Mr. Lightbourne should raise the matter with them at the 
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time of the C.E.C.C. meeting (C.E. (U.K.) (63) 32 Annex B) recommended that he 
should be told that we had not as yet been able to reach any definite view on his 
suggestion, but that, though it was certainly an interesting one, it seemed to involve 
a good many serious difficulties; it further recommended that, if Mr. Lightbourne 
should ask us to seek the views of our E.F.T.A. partners, it would be best to stall, e.g. 
on the grounds that we should prefer not to commit ourselves to doing this until we 
had had time to evaluate the outcome of the Lisbon meeting. 
3. In fact, Mr. Lightbourne barely referred to the matter at the time of the 
C.E.C.C. meeting. He did, however, discuss it at some length with the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations on 23rd May. A record of this 
meeting is attached as Annex A to this paper.1 Mr. Lightbourne is now again in this 
country, for medical treatment, and had a further talk with Mr. Tilney on 13th June; 
the record of this meeting is attached as Annex B. 
4. It will be noted from the record of these meetings that:-
( a) Mr. Lightbourne is not primarily concerned with commercial or economic 
advantages for Jamaica, but with the political or psychological value of being 
associated with a European group, partly as a counter to pressures on Jamaica to 
join the Organisation of American States, though some of his colleagues are 
known to think that it would be an advantage if Jamaica joined the O.A.S., and this 
is also the British view; 
(b) he also hopes that association with E.F.T.A. would help to ensure a satisfactory 
position for Jamaica if Britain later joined the European Economic Community; 
(c) he would regard it as essential that Jamaica should remain free to retain 
protection for domestic industries against manufactures from the member 
countries of E.F.T.A; 
(d) Mr. Lightbourne's proposal is not an official one from the Jamaican 
Government as a whole, but is primarily a personal idea of his own for which he 
wishes British support before putting it to his colleagues in the Jamaican 
Cabinet- however, we understand that at least one of the other Jamaican 
Ministers is aware of Mr. Lightbourne's ideas and is in sympathy with them, and 
Mr. Lightbourne apparently intends to put his proposal to his colleagues as soon as 
he gets a favourable response in principle from us. 
5. At the meeting on 23rd May Mr. Tilney undertook that the British 
Government would give Mr. Lightbourne's suggestion careful consideration and 
would find out what the other E.F.T.A. Governments thought about it, and let Mr. 
Lightbourne know. It is awkward to consult other Governments formally about an 
idea that has not so far been sponsored by the Jamaican Government as a whole, but, 
in the circumstances, it seems well to take some informal soundings before replying 
to Mr. Lightbourne. 
1 Annexes not printed. The record of Tilney's meeting with Lightbourne on 23 May opens: 'Mr. 
Lightbourne explained that the reason why he would like to see Jamaica associated with E.F.T.A. was that 
Jamaica badly needed to feel that it "belonged" to a group of countries. The essential thing for Jamaica was 
stability. Jamaica was stable but the Latin American countries on the mainland were not. There were 
pressures being exerted to bring Jamaica into membership of bodies like the Organization of American 
States and the Central American Free Trade Area. He thought that any such move would be a very bad 
thing and therefore wanted his country to join some group outside the Caribbean-American region'. 
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6. If the other E.F.T.A. Governments considered that, irrespective of the terms of 
Article 41.2 of the Stockholm Convention, they were not prepared to agree to extend 
association with E.F.T.A. to a country so far away from Europe and with an economy 
so different from their own, we should have a fairly simple answer to give Mr. 
Lightbourne, and the rejection of his suggestion on these grounds should not cause 
political difficulty between ourselves and Jamaica. 
7. If the view of the other E.F.T.A. Governments were that they might be 
prepared to agree to the association of Jamaica, but only on condition that Jamaica 
accepted a timetable for the eventual removal of protection of domestic industries 
against E.F.T.A. manufacturers (e.g. on the lines of Annex G (Portugal) of the 
Stockholm Convention), then the Jamaicans would have to decide whether they were 
prepared to accept such a timetable. If they were, then we should have to decide 
whether we were prepared to agree to have them associated with E.F.T.A. 
8. It is not clear that there would be strong economic arguments one way or the 
other so far as we were concerned. We should lose preference in Jamaica as against 
the other E.F.T.A. countries; but, provided that Jamaican duties on E.F.T.A. 
manufactures were eventually removed, we should then secure a better position for 
our own manufactures vis-a-vis both domestic Jamaican industry and the 
manufactures of non-E.F.T.A. countries (United States, E.E.C., Canada, etc.) 
9. It would be politically undesirable for the British Government to be 
responsible for the rejection of this proposal if the other E.F.T.A. Governments were 
prepared to agree to it on reasonable conditions. On the other hand, it may be argued 
that it would not be in British interests to extend the E.F.T.A. complex in this way, 
and that we should not therefore press this proposal on our E.F.T.A. partners. In any 
case, we cannot at this stage tell them that the proposal has our support, since it has 
not yet been officially endorsed by the Jamaican Government. 
10. Our attitude towards this proposal must depend in large measure on our 
view of the future development of E.F.T.A. The association of Jamaica might possibly 
lead to applications from other countries, whether in Europe or outside, and in this 
way help to improve the standing of E.F.T.A. on the world stage. The more desirable 
that this is considered to be, the more support we should presumably give to Mr. 
Lightbourne's suggestion; and vice versa. 
11. We should avoid giving Mr. Lightbourne any statement of our views until we 
have taken soundings of our E.F.T.A. partners. It is accordingly suggested that, as a 
first step, H.M. Representatives in the other E.F.T.A. capitals should be instructed to 
explain informally to the Governments to which they are accredited the nature of Mr. 
Lightbourne's proposal as indicated at the meeting on 23rd May,2 making it clear 
that this is not at present a formal move by the Jamaican Government and asking 
that it should be treated as entirely confidential; and then to go on to explain the 
British Government's tentative views as follows:-
2 A draft note prepared in the CRO for use by UK representatives should they discuss Jamaica's admission 
with EFTA governments included the following: 'In order to understand the context of this approach, it 
must be realised that Jamaicans do not look upon themselves as Americans or Caribbeans, still less as 
expatriate Africans and Indians. Jamaica has been a British island for 300 years with no surviving 
indigenous race or culture, and the sympathies and outlook of Jamaicans are accordingly overwhelmingly 
conditioned by and directed towards their European connections' (CAB 134/1777, EER(63)78 
(Addendum), 18 June 1963). 
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(a) although Article 41.2 of the Stockholm Convention contains no limitation on 
the countries which may be associated with E.F.T.A., we had previously regarded 
E.F.T.A. as of concern to European countries only; however, we consider that this 
is not in itself a conclusive argument against considering Mr. Lightbourne's 
suggestion; 
(b) the pattern of Jamaican trade is such that association with E.F.T.A. would not 
at first sight appear to carry any substantial advantage for Jamaica; however, Mr. 
Lightbourne seems to realise this, and to be concerned rather with more general 
aspects; 
(c) we have noted his desire to retain unimpaired the right to protect Jamaican 
domestic industry, and his argument from the precedent of association with the 
E.E.C. The question would arise whether a timetable for reducing and eventually 
eliminating duties on E.F.T.A. manufactures should be a condition of any 
agreement of association between Jamaica and E.F.T.A.; 
(d) if other E.F.T.A. Governments were prepared to agree that the fact that 
Jamaica is not in Europe was not in itself a sufficient reason for refusing to 
consider the possibility of association with E.F.T.A., we for our part would be glad 
to join with the Jamaican Government and the other E.F.T.A. Governments in an 
examination of the possible terms of an association agreement; the first step 
towards such an examination would presumably be for us to inform Mr. 
Lightbourne that, if the Jamaica Government so wished, the possible terms of an 
agreement could be discussed with them. 
212 CAB 134/1775, EER 10(63)1 20 June 1963 
'Jamaica and the European Free Trade Association': Cabinet (Official) 
External Economic Relations Committee minutes advising against the 
proposal that Jamaica should join EFT AI 
The Committee had before them a note by the Commonwealth Relations Office 
(E.E.R. (63) 78)2 covering a memorandum about a proposal for Jamaican association 
with the European Free Trade Association, which had been put to the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations by the Jamaican Minister of 
Trade and Industry (Mr. Lightbourne). 
Mr. Shannon 3 said that it was necessary to consider what the United Kingdom's 
attitude to this proposal ought to be and, secondly, how the suggested approach to 
member governments of the European Free Trade Association should be handled. 
The proposition was not one which would have suggested itself to us, but now that 
the idea had been introduced it should be recognised that it would have some 
advantages. In particular the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State believed that a 
step which would strengthen the ties between a newly independent Commonwealth 
country and the United Kingdom would have political advantages in this country. It 
was recognised that it was awkward to make an approach to the other members of 
1 The meeting was chaired by A W France (3rd secretary, Treasury) and attended by officials from the CO, 
CRO, FO, Board of Trade, Board of Customs and Excise, Treasury, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food, and the Bank of England. 
2 See 211. 3 G E B Shannon, CRO. 
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the Association on the basis of a proposal which had not been put to us formally by 
the Jamaican Government, but the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State had 
agreed to seek the views of the other Association members. 
The Committee first considered whether it would be in the United Kingdom's 
interest to support Jamaican association, and various serious objections were put 
forward. The inclusion of countries outside Europe would go beyond the original 
purpose of the Association and would substantially aggravate the difficulty of a future 
negotiation for accession to the European Economic Community. Although the 
association of Commonwealth countries might be limited to the West Indies with the 
possible exception of Southern Rhodesia, it would nevertheless set a dangerous 
precedent and, for example, make it more difficult to resist the association of 
Portuguese Mrican territories, which would be an even more serious encumbrance 
in a future negotiation with the Community. It might also lead to difficulty with the 
Colonies: Hong Kong and Singapore had sought association when the Stockholm 
Convention was negotiated, but we had declined to put their proposal forward on the 
ground that the other members would be unwilling to face the competition from 
their low cost manufactures. They could be expected to reopen this question if 
Jamaica were granted association, especially as Jamaica also produced textiles and 
cheap clothing. There might also be tariff complications: we might for instance be 
pressed to extend free entry for agricultural products on Annex D of the Convention 
to other Association members as well as Jamaica and the Association might see some 
risk of diversion of trade through Jamaica from other Commonwealth countries. 
Finally the creation of another preferential bloc including under-developed countries 
would be inconsistent with our approach to the problems of the trade of the less-
developed countries in the current discussions under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. 
There was doubt too whether the proposal for association with the European Free 
Trade Association was in Jamaica's own interest. Her long-term political interest lay 
more in membership of the Organisation of American States and in closer links with 
Latin America. Association might not be technically inconsistent with membership 
of the Organisation of American States, but it would make it unlikely that Jamaica 
would be admitted. Mr. Lightbourne seemed to be holding out the possibility of 
association in order to turn other members of his government away from the 
Organisation. There might also be trade disadvantages both for us and for Jamaica: 
we should be likely to lose the benefit of preferences on our exports to Jamaica, and 
Jamaica would lose preferences in other Commonwealth countries and might in 
particular jeopardise her special relations with Canada. 
As regards the suggested approach to the other members of the European Free 
Trade Association, it was agreed that, having regard to the force of the arguments 
against association, it would be inappropriate and unwise for us to seek the views of 
other members without ourselves giving an indication of our own. There was a risk 
that the proposal would be supported by Portugal, while other members might raise 
no objection to pursuing it further, in which case we should be committed to 
embarrassing discussions. If there were to be a discussion on the general principle of 
extending the membership we could not avoid giving our opinion and we should 
then be open to criticism for having tabled a proposal which we could not ourselves 
support. It would also be embarrassing if our opposition reached the ears of Mr. 
Lightbourne. In addition, since the proposal had been made by only one Minister 
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without the authority of his government, it would be inappropriate to make a formal 
approach to member governments of the Association and the most that we could 
consider undertaking was informal discussion between Ministers during the course 
of a Council meeting. The next opportunity for this would be in September. 
Summing up, The Chairman said that in the light of the discussion the best 
course would be to explain to Mr. Lightbourne the objections that we saw to his 
proposal, and to warn him that if we took soundings among the other member 
governments of the Association we should have to reveal our own views, and 
moreover that we could not undertake to approach them before September. He 
might then realise that the idea was not worth pursuing, or, if he insisted that we 
should approach the Association on this basis, he would then have no grounds for 
complaint if in doing so we ourselves opposed the suggestion. It would be best for the 
Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office to prepare a joint report 
analysing the objections to the proposal, which the Commonwealth Relations Office 
might then submit to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State with the advice 
that he should reply to Mr. Lightbourne on these lines. The Foreign Office should 
submit it to the Lord Privy Seal at the same time so that he might discuss it with the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. 
The Committee:-
Invited the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office, in 
consultation with the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade, to prepare a report 
on the objections to Jamaican association with the European Free Trade 
Association and to submit it to their Ministers individually with a recommendation 
for action on the lines indicated by the Chairman.4 
4 Tilney saw Lightbourne again on 24 July. The latter had been 'disappointed' by the decision 'but had 
taken it in good part'. No further approach was anticipated from the Jamaican government (DO 200/39, no 
26, record of meeting between Tilney and H C Lindo, Jamaican high commissioner in the UK, 1 Aug 1963). 
213 CO 1031/4402, no 40 24 June 1963 
[British Guiana]: CO briefing note for the Anglo-American official 
talks on the current situation and the options for UK policy 
At the constitutional conference in March 1960 the principle of independence was 
conceded.1 A constitution was agreed providing for full internal self-government, 
including responsibility for internal security and the police. It was visualised that 
independence would follow some two years after the introduction of the new 
constitution. This constitution took effect in August 1961 and in September Dr. 
Jagan's "Peoples Progressive Party" (P.P.P.) formed the government having, in a 
general election, won 20 of the 35 seats in the Assembly against Mr. Burnham's 
Peoples National Congress Party's 11 (P.N.C.) and Mr. D'Aguiar's United Force 
Party's 4 (U F.P.). The percentage of votes polled by the three parties were P.P.P. 
43%; P.N.C. 41 %; U.F.P. 16%. The election of one P.P.P. member was subsequently 
declared invalid: a by-election has not yet been held. With the expulsion of one 
1 See 135, note. 
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member of the Assembly from the P.P.P., the votes commanded by Dr. Jagan in the 
Assembly number 18 against the opposition parties 16. 
2. In 1961, Anglo-American official talks were held. A joint programme was 
agreed based on the principle that the right policy was to give Jagan aid from the 
West and to work with him and that the wrong policy was to treat him as a pariah 
and deny him aid. Under the former policy there was a prospect of getting him 
neutralist if not actually favourable to the West, while under the latter policy he was 
bound to turn increasingly to the Soviet bloc. The report was approved by the 
President.2 
Following a visit by Dr. Jagan to Washington in the autumn of 1961, it began to be 
clear that the Americans were finding it difficult-because of congressional and press 
hostility to Jagan-to give aid, and, in the event, did not feel able to proceed with this 
proposal. The British Guiana Government became increasingly resentful and 
frustrated as they realised that American aid was not forthcoming. 
3. At the end of 1961 lagan's Government, with the support of the opposition 
party (P.N.C.) asked H.M. Government to fix a date for independence. With the 
acquiescence of the Americans, an independence conference was planned for May 
1962. In January 1962, the British Guiana Government introduced a budget aimed at 
increasing revenue to provide money for development. It contained unpopular tax 
measures and led to a strike and disorders involving extensive damage by fire to 
Georgetown. The British garrison (one Company) had to be reinforced by a battalion. 
It has since remained one battalion. The independence conference had to be 
postponed until November, 1962. 
4. In the interval, in agreement with the Americans, our aim in British Guiana 
had altered from that of "making the best of Jagan" to that of exploring ways of 
granting independence under a government not led by Jagan. 
5. The November conference had to be adjourned for the reason that the parties 
could not reach agreement on the electoral system.3 Dr. Jagan pressed for the 
transfer of residual powers to his Government without fresh elections, whereas the 
opposition parties wanted fresh elections-held on the basis of proportional 
representation. The conference was adjourned to allow for further discussions 
between the parties in British Guiana. The White Paper reporting the outcome of the 
Conference contains a statement that "if after an interval no agreed solution could be 
found, the British Government may have to consider imposing a settlement on their 
own authority so as to enable British Guiana to go forward to independence". Despite 
face-saving meetings between the political leaders, no progress has been made since 
the conference towards finding a solution. 
2 The document reproduced here is a copy. The original is not in the file, having been retained in the 
department (the FCO) under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act, 1958. A section of the text from the 
original in the middle of paragraph two of the copy'reproduced here has been blanked out. 
3 The November 1962 conference broke down on three issues: (a) whether elections should be held on the 
basis of the existing system of single-member constituencies or on a form of proportional representation; 
(b) whether the voting age should be 21, as then existed, or 18; (c) whether there should be new elections 
before independence. Jagan wanted single-member constituencies, voting at 18, and no elections. The 
opposition led by Burnham and D'Aguiar wanted proportional representation, voting at 21, and new 
elections (CAB 134/2370, OP(62)11, 'British Guiana independence conference, 1962', 19 Nov 1962; also 
Report of the British Guiana Constitutional Conference, 1962, Cmnd 1870). 
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6. In April1963 the British Guiana Government introduced into the Assembly a 
"Labour Relations Bill". The Trade Unions regarded this as a threat to their 
independence. The Government's motive was to enable it to take under its control 
the main Sugar Workers' Union. A general strike was called on 20th April, in which 
the vast majority of the unions, including the Civil Service Unions, have participated. 
The strike has been running for 9 weeks. There have been negotiations on the Bill 
and agreement has been reported between the T.U.C. and the Government on the 
major points. On the 28th May, Jagan and three colleagues were suspended from the 
Assembly. On the 18th June the Governor, on the advice of Jagan, which he was 
constitutionally bound to accept, prorogued the Legislature. This ended the 
suspensions but also killed the Labour Relations Bill which had not passed through 
the Upper House. The cause of the strike was thus removed, but the British Guiana 
T.U.C. appear determined to continue it with the aim of bringing Dr. Jagan's 
Government down. That the strike has gone on for 9 weeks is due to financial 
assistance to the strikers from outside British Guiana;4 that it had done so without 
serious disturbances is no doubt due to the presence of a battalion of the Coldstream 
Guards. 
7. The Jagan Government has been inefficient and under their rule the economy 
of the country has deteriorated. The disturbances in February 1962 resulted in a loss 
of confidence, which has never been regained. The 1963 budget was barely balanced 
and developed [sic] expenditure had to be severely curtailed. The strike is costing the 
Government $2-3 million a month and the aftermath will be serious. The 
Government will need $6 million at the end of June to meet their commitments. This 
will rise to $11 million by the end of July. The territory relies on bauxite, sugar, rice; 
the first two have been at a standstill during the strike and it is doubtful whether the 
bauxite industry can regain its lost markets. The rice industry, owing to 
mismanagement by the statutory Rice Marketing Board, is expected to face a crisis at 
the start of the next crop year August/September. 
8. In the absence of economic aid from the West, other than that which was 
already being provided by Britain, the British Guiana Government has been forced to 
turn increasingly to Cuba, Russia and other bloc countries. 
9. There appear to be only three courses:-
(1) to let things drift but hope and work for a change of Government. In this case 
there would be a coalition of Burnham and D'Aguiar. This would be at least as 
incompetent as the present Government, and it is doubtful if it could last long. 
Jagan would be more effective in opposition in stirring up trouble than he is in 
Government; 
(2) to make British Guiana independent as early as possible under Jagan; 
(3) for us to resume direct government. This would be attacked in the United 
Nations, and by both the main local parties. Jagan's popularity might increase 
4 By American trade unionists like Serafino Romualdi and through such organisations as the American 
Institute for Free Labour Development and AFL-CIO, the American Federation of Labour-Congress of 
Industrial Organisations. Their activities, which were bitterly resented by the Jagan government, are 
described in a number of secondary accounts, including James G Rose, British colonial policy and the 
transfer of power in British Guiana, 1945- 1964, (unpublished University of London PhD thesis, 1992, 
chapter VII) . Rose draws extensively on the official UK records but his analysis ends in 1964 because the 
records to independence in 1966 were not then available. See also CO 1031/4928, 4929. 
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since popular discontent could be switched to Britain as a target. It would cost a 
great deal of money. To be of any value it would have to be continued for a 
period of years during which it would be necessary to build up the economy; 
establish political stability; and (if this is possible) find better leaders. It would 
offer no permanent solution unless over a sustained period alternative leaders 
were to emerge. Indians are multiplying faster than Mricans and in a few years 
more than half the electorate will be Indian. If Jagan maintains his hold over the 
Indians, his Government will then be returned to power under any electoral sys-
tem.5 
10. We have no strategic or other interests in British Guiana. The present 
development plan was estimated to cost BWI $135 million (approximately U.S. $85 
million) over 5 years. A plan at least as ambitious will be required over the next 5 
years if there is to be any prospect of political stability. 
5 These three options had been discussed by the Oversea Policy Committee on 14 June. They were stated in 
a message from Macmillan to President Kennedy (CAB 134/2371, CP(63)12, 14 June 1963, 'British 
Guiana', note by the secretaries). 
214 PREM 11/4586, ff31-33 28 June 1963 
[British Guiana]: FO record of a meeting between Lord Home, Mr 
Duncan Sandys and Mr Rusk at 1 Carlton Gardens in London on the 
current situation in British Guiana1 
Mr. Rusk explained that the prospect of a Jagan Government taking British Guiana 
into independence was very distasteful to the United States Government. They 
considered it extremely serious to have another Marxist regime in the Western 
Hemisphere. He was certain that most of the Member States of the Organisation of 
American States would also object. If the British Government insisted on granting 
independence considerable difficulties might arise. He himself would prefer Britain 
to delay granting independence until there was no risk of British Guiana going 
Communist. He did not know whether the present Constitution offered any scope for 
achieving this aim. 
Mr. Sandys explained that Britain still had formal responsibility for external affairs 
and defence, but that this did not get us very far. It would be possible to keep out 
undesirable foreigners and, so long as the British garrison remained in the territory, 
to restore order in the event of serious internal trouble. Otherwise, effective power 
was in the hands of the British Guiana Government. The present situation offered 
little prospect of improvement in the territory. The nine weeks old strike might now 
be settled, but would leave British Guiana financially ruined. 
If Britain left British Guiana now Jagan would have a parliamentary majority, but 
with strong negro opposition to him in the main towns. The outcome would be riots 
1 Also present: from the UK, Mr Fisher, Sir D Ormsby-Gore, Sir H Caccia, Sir H Poynton, A R Thomas; 
from the US, W Bruce, W Burdett. This meeting was preceded by preparatory discussions between UK and 
US officials which were held in London between 25 and 27 June 1963. For the record of these, see 
CO 1031/4402, no 42. 
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and bloodshed which Jagan could not control, leading to a Congo situation. If, on the 
other hand, British Guiana became independent under a Burnham/D'Aguiar 
coalition, the result would be equally negative since such a coalition would soon 
break up. Furthermore, Jagan, though an incompetent minister, would be much 
more formidable in opposition than in office. The outcome would be a situation in 
which the coalition Government would not be in control of large areas of the 
country. 
There was a third alternative of suspending the Constitution and reimposing direct 
rule. This would be particularly objectionable in that it would arouse the strongest 
opposition inside and outside British Guiana. It seemed most undesirable for Britain 
to expose herself in this way for the sake of a territory in which she had no profound 
interest. He would be very reluctant to contemplate embarking on a course which 
would have very considerable long-term political, military and financial implications. 
Mr. Rusk said that he differed from the Commonwealth Secretary's assessment of 
British interest in British Guiana; he was certain that Britain had a very large 
interest in British Guiana in the context of wider Anglo-American relations. 
Mr. Sandys asked whether, if it were possible to give independence to British 
Guiana under a non-Jagan Government, the United States Government would feel 
able to enter into defence and economic aid agreements with this Government which 
would give the United States a locus standi for intervention, should Jagan return to 
power or if there should be a fresh Communist threat. 
Mr. Rusk said this was not an attractive solution. The United States preferred a 
solution which enabled the British Government to exercise the essential powers in 
British Guiana. Would it not be possible to reach an accommodation with the Labour 
Party on a resumption of direct rule? Lord Home said that there was no prospect of 
reaching an accommodation with the Labour Party. Moreover, reversion to direct 
rule in British Guiana would destroy Britain's image as a decolonising Power and 
would create the greatest possible difficulties for the British Government in dealing 
with its remaining problems in Africa, particularly Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Rusk 
asked whether the British Government would be interested in imposing direct rule. 
Mr. Sandys said that without committing himself to the political desirability or 
practicability of this course, he thought it might be possible to make direct rule work 
provided the United States gave generous financial and economic aid. Direct rule was 
not a short-term solution. It would have to operate for a number of years to enable 
the economy to be built up and to enable new leaders to come forward. Eventually a 
non-Communist Government might emerge, which could be given independence 
linked to a defence agreement, and technical assistance and economic aid 
agreements, with the United States. Mr. Rusk asked whether a successor 
Government would be obliged to take over such commitments. If one did have a non-
Jagan Government, it might be possible to work out a joint United States-British 
development plan, a defence plan, and also to impose proportional representation. 
Mr. Fisher pointed out that proportional representation did not necessarily provide 
even a short term solution. 
After discussing various alternatives Mr. Rusk said that it seemed that a reversion 
to direct rule provided the only really satisfactory solution. 
He thought that the whole question would have to be considered by the Prime 
Minister and the President. There were three possible courses of action; 
independence under Jagan, independence under a Burnham/D'Aguiar coalition and 
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direct rule. The United States did not wish British Guiana to become independent 
under Jagan. This left the alternatives of a Burnham/D'Aguiar coalition or direct 
rule; of these the United States preferred the latter. Mr. Sandys said that he would 
not yet exclude the possibility of giving independence to Jagan. Until fairly recently 
both Governments had agreed to work with lagan's Government, but the American 
attitude had changed. What were the alternatives? Direct rule would only be 
practicable if Britain knew that the United States would be prepared to carry the 
financial baby-which might turn out to be a substantial long-term commitment. 
Furthermore, there might be domestic obstacles to substantial American aid being 
given to a British colony. Direct rule also implied a serious military commitment, for 
the garrison might have to be increased to three battalions to maintain law and 
order. The position would be different if British Guiana were independent. The 
United States could then give aid to an independent Government, and the United 
States could have any number of troops it wished on its base, and intervene if the 
internal situation should deteriorate. It was easy to go into direct rule but difficult to 
foresee how it would develop. It also provided no opportunity for new political 
leaders to emerge, while the existing political leaders would be able to consolidate 
their position by opposition. Mr. Rusk said it might be possible to work out an O.A.S. 
underpinning of an alternative Government. 
Mr. Rusk reiterated the serious view the United States took of any independence 
for British Guiana under a Jagan Government. Sir Hilton Poynton said that in the 
discussions between British and United States officials, it was agreed that Jagan 
would try to establish a Castro-type Communist Government; but that whereas the 
United States officials thought he was bound to seek Communist assistance the 
British thought the local opposition would be strong enough to stop him. Mr. Rusk 
said that this might be true so long as the Russians did not aid Jagan, which they 
were bound to do. Mr. Sandys asked how far the United States would be able to help 
Britain in the general colonial field if Britain had to reimpose direct rule on British 
Guiana. Would it be possible to bring the O.A.S. solidly behind Britain in support on 
other colonial issues? Mr. Rusk said that it was the Communist threat that made 
British Guiana different from all other colonial issues for the Western Hemisphere 
countries. He did not doubt that anti-colonial pressures could be held back on 
British Guiana. Mr. Sandys said that this did not help Britain, as there was at present 
no anti-colonial pressure over British Guiana; the pressures were elsewhere. It 
seemed reasonable to ask for help in other directions if Britain was to assist the 
United States in this one. 
Lord Home said that if the internal situation in British Guiana really collapsed 
then it might in any case be necessary for Britain to resume control, but in that event 
financial assistance would be absolutely essential. He asked what the prospects were 
of producing a Ziirich-type agreement for British Guiana. Mr. Sandys reiterated that 
unless Britain felt virtually certain that practically the whole economic bill was being 
paid by someone else Britain could not take the political risks involved in suspending 
the Constitution. There was also the question of timing. If it should be decided to 
reimpose colonial rule a suitable and respectable opportunity would have to be 
awaited. Mr. Rusk thought that both sides would have to do some more thinking on 
this problem before the talks at Birch Grove. 
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215 PREM 1114586, ff33-36 30 June 1963 
[British Guiana]: FO record of a meeting between Mr Macmillan and 
President Kennedy at Birch Grove House on the current situation in 
British Guiana1 
Mr. Rusk said that in view of the acute danger of Dr. Jagan establishing another 
Cuban regime in British Guiana, he felt that there were only two possible solutions. 
The first was for Britain to resume direct rule until a better situation developed. The 
second was somehow to work towards a Coalition Government in British Guiana 
composed of the supporters of Mr. Burnham and Mr. d'Aguiar and to give 
independence under this Government. The danger of a Castro-type regime was very 
real. 
Mr. Sandys said that normally the United Kingdom would now move rapidly 
towards giving British Guiana independence. However, they recognised the dangers 
of handing over the country to a Communist regime of the Castro type or leaving 
British Guiana in a state of civil war. There were various theoretical possibilities. One 
was a coalition between Burnham and d'Aguiar: but Burnham would no doubt want 
Proportional Representation before independence, and Mr. Sandys was not certain 
that even elections held under Proportional Representation would produce a 
satisfactory result. Jagan of course had asked for independence without new elections 
and this was what probably would have to be given to Burnham. 
Another possibility was for the British Government to say that it was clearly impos-
sible for the parties in British Guiana to agree among themselves, and to impose a ref-
erendum on the questions of introducing a system of Proportional Representation. 
Probably the country would vote for Proportional Representation unless the imposi-
tion of this solution by the British Government had an adverse effect. It was difficult 
to gauge the reactions of the electorate. Even if the referendum went all right there 
would then have to be elections under the new Proportional Representation system 
and the result of these would be very uncertain. Because the Indians were increasing 
in numbers more rapidly than the Africans, Dr. Jagan would be likely to get more votes 
at any future elections. If however a Burnham Government did come into existence 
and was given independence, then perhaps they could quickly make a defence agree-
ment with the United States. Mr. Rusk said that the United States could then certainly 
move rapidly in the fields of economic and social aid. They could possibly also reacti-
vate the base in Guiana. 2 Mr. Sandys suggested that it might be not a bad thing if the 
United States showed some interest in their base anyway. It was derelict at the moment 
but the United States had the right to use it at any time. President Kennedy said that 
this was a most interesting account of the situation. As he understood it there was a 
good chance of getting a favourable vote for Proportional Representation at a refer-
endum. What would happen at elections? Would a good result emerge from elections 
under a new system? Mr. Sandys said that a referendum would give a better result. But 
if a Burnham-d'Aguiar coalition did win an election held under Proportional 
1 The meeting, at Macmillan's home in Sussex, was also attended by Home, Duncan Sandys and Ormsby-
Gore from the UK and by Rusk and McGeorge Bundy from the US. 
2 Under the 1941 bases agreement, the US acquired sites in British Guiana on the bank of the Demarara 
river about twenty-five miles from the sea and at the mouth of the Essequibo. 
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Representation it might then be possible to give immediate independence. Mr. 
Macmillan asked whether an independent Government of British Guiana would claim 
that the base agreement no longer applied. Mr. Rusk said that Dr. Jagan would cer-
tainly denounce the agreement. President Kennedy enquired how long matters could 
be kept going as they were. Mr. Sandys explained that it was impossible to be certain. 
Anything might happen. He did not feel that the situation could drift on very long. For 
one thing there would be a financial crisis in the near future. Mr. Macmillan asked if 
Dr. Jagan would refuse to co-operate in a referendum. Mr. Sandys said that a referen-
dum could be imposed by Order in Council although an Act of Parliament would be 
needed to alter the Constitution. The trouble was that under the Constitution the 
Governor was a figurehead except in matters of foreign affairs and defence. If a state 
of emergency were to be declared the powers would go to the Government, i.e., to 
Jagan. Another alternative was to revert to direct British rule. He did not worry about 
the pretext for doing this. It was clear that if the British troops were withdrawn now 
there would be riots and a general breakdown of law and order. It would be possible to 
show conclusively that neither Jagan nor Burnham could control the situation. There 
were tremendous problems of which the financial one was perhaps the most serious. 
It would be possible to say that Britain had resumed direct rule in order to give the 
country time to rebuild its economy and to develop a more stable political life. The 
trouble was that in five years the position might be no better. The most serious worry 
however was that after Britain had resumed direct rule, Dr. Jagan might resort to brig-
andage and a long drawn-out campaign on the Malaya model might begin. In such a 
situation Burnham might find it impossible to support the British Government and 
so the whole country would be hostile. Mr. Rusk said that he thought that Burnham 
could be persuaded to act sensibly. He wondered if it might be possible to say that 
direct rule was being resumed in order to make stable arrangements to enable inde-
pendence to be given. It might be a mistake to mention any period of years . Lord Home 
said that to resume direct rule would run counter to the whole of present British pol-
icy. The Committee of 24 [at the UN) had just voted for Britain to leave at once. Also 
if Britain resumed direct rule in British Guiana the question would be asked why the 
same could not be done in Southern Rhodesia. This might be embarrassing. 
President Kennedy said that Mr. Sandys had made a very fair presentation of a 
most difficult problem. From his point of view he was worried that Jagan would take 
Guiana into the Communist camp. This would be very difficult for the United States. 
The Russians would certainly move in technicians quickly and many Cubans as well. 
In his view Latin America was the most dangerous part of the world because many 
countries in it might go Communist at any minute. Next year there were elections in 
the United States. If Guiana had gone Communist meanwhile then the pressure for 
the United States to take some action against Cuba would rise and would be 
impossible for any administration to resist. He did not believe that if Britain resumed 
direct rule there would be great difficulties with the Latin Americans or with the 
Mricans, but the grounds for such action should be stated as the need to avert a race-
war. At any rate he asked the British Government not to give British Guiana 
independence under present conditions. Mr. Rusk felt that the possibility of a 
Burnham-d'Aguiar coalition should be examined again. Mr. Sandys said that even 
assuming a Burnham-d'Aguiar Government the problem was not at an end. For one 
thing it was unlikely that the Coalition would last because Burnham and d'Aguiar 
really had nothing in common. Also Burnham was, if anything, more incompetent 
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than Jagan. Finally, Jagan would no doubt try to break up the Government by 
violence. A situation might arise in which the Government held the cities and the 
Opposition the countryside; it would be rather like the Yemen. He felt that the 
United States would have to be prepared in such circumstances to move in military 
forces in order to support the lawful Government. It would not be just a question of 
reactivating the United States base, but of the United States policing the country. 
President Kennedy said that he thought that in these circumstances there might be 
almost as bad a situation for the United States. Could the Jagan Government be 
propped up for a further period? Mr. Sandys pointed out that Dr. Jagan would not be 
prepared to play on this basis for long. 
He expected independence very soon, and if he did not get it he would demand a 
dissolution. At an election he would probably get a bigger majority if only on the 
grounds that Britain was refusing independence. Mr. Rusk suggested that in such 
circumstances the British Government might impose a referendum on the issue of 
Proportional Representation. Mr. Sandys agreed that this was a possibility but 
pointed out that this would be about the worst possible situation in which to hold a 
referendum. Mr. Rusk said that he supposed that the British Government could exile 
or imprison Jagan. Mr. Sandys agreed that this might be necessary. If he was turned 
out of office he would have nothing to do except to organise revolution. President 
Kennedy said that he saw the difficulties of any possible solution but he thought that 
these were less than the dangers of Guiana going Communist. He was prepared to 
put up with a great deal to prevent such a result. Mr. Sandys said that he thought the 
best solution would be to find a way of giving independence under Burnham. 
The discussion was adjourned at about 11.45 a.m.3 
President Kennedy said that he still felt that the best solution would be to make 
every effort for a coalition between Burnham and D'Aguiar. Mr. Sandys agreed. The 
situation could perhaps be looked at again within a month. Mr. Macmillan asked if 
Mr. Sandys would want to take further powers in British Guiana before the end of 
July. Mr. Sandys said that he was not too worried about the constitutional position. 
There might be some possibilities of action which would not involve a new Act of 
Parliament. It was impossible to suspend the Constitution by Order in Council, but it 
might be possible for the British Government to take the executive powers while not 
doing away with the legislature. He was reluctant to put forward a Bill in Parliament 
for increased powers without actually taking the powers and of course once the Bill 
was before the House it would bring to Jagan's notice the fact that the British 
Government were preparing to move. President Kennedy asked what could be done if 
the coalition proved impossible to achieve and Britain did not want to resume direct 
rule because of the complications with Southern Rhodesia. Could the British hang 
on? Mr. Sandys said that it was possible to envisage this situation but he imagined 
that there would be serious rioting and looting. Mr. Rusk asked if Dr. Jagan could be 
arrested if there was clear evidence that he had broken the law. For example, the 
Americans believed that they could prove that he had intimidated the Speaker by 
threatening to murder him. Mr. Sandys said that if no coalition were formed he 
thought the aim should be to prolong the present situation for two or three months. 
His fear was that Jagan would ask for a dissolution. He was of course faced with a 
3 The discussion then continued at 3.30 pm when Sir H Caccia from the UK and Mr McGeorge Bundy from 
the US also attended. 
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serious financial crisis when the rice crop was harvested in August. The corporation 
which he had formed was not working and there was a danger that the Russians 
might buy the rice, thereby saving Jagan's position. Mr. Rusk suggested that the 
British Government could prevent such an arrangement under their powers to 
control foreign policy. Mr. Sandys said that this would certainly be possible but 
scarcely popular. Indeed, it would unite the whole country against Britain. The sum 
of money involved was not very large and the Russians could easily find it. Mr. Rusk 
asked if the British Government could stop the ratification of any trade agreement 
with Czechoslovakia. Mr. Sandys said that this could certainly be done. The difficulty 
was to avoid providing Jagan with a good issue on which to demand new elections. 
President Kennedy said that it would be very important to play down any stories of 
British and American discussions about British Guiana. The only concern to which 
the United States Administration should admit would be about the possibilities of 
racial strife. In answer to questions by the Press, it should be said only that British 
Guiana had been briefly discussed by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Sandys. 
Mr. Macmillan asked about the position in the Organisation of American States. 
Mr. Bundy said that Brazil and Mexico would not be helpful but might not vote 
against. Mr. Sandys suggested that the Americans should begin to activate their base 
a little. President Kennedy asked if this would not be a help to Jagan. Mr. Sandys did 
not think that American activity in their base would give Jagan a handle if such 
activity were on a very small scale; perhaps a few transport flights would be best. He 
hoped that the base would not remain entirely dormant. Mr. Rusk said that the 
United States Consul in Georgetown could certainly go and inspect the base and 
perhaps arrange some maintenance of it.4 
4 In the published US record of this meeting, Kennedy observed that Latin America was the most 
dangerous area in the world. The president repeated twice his view that if, by 1964, in addition to Cuba, a 
communist state had been established in British Guiana, this would tip the scales in the US presidential 
election with the result that a candidate would be elected who would take military action against Cuba. 
There would be considerable resentment in the US if the UK pulled out of British Guiana. The president 
was therefore looking for a way 'to drag the thing out' by delaying the new elections under the option 
preferred by the US of proportional representation. Instead of saying that they could not pull out because 
of the danger of British Guiana going communist, Kennedy advised the British to say that they were 
staying to avoid a racial war. Home insisted that if the UK resumed direct rule in British Guiana, people 
would ask why the same could not be done in Southern Rhodesia. Asked by Duncan Sandys if the US 
would give the UK 'real support' at the UN if direct rule were reinstated, Kennedy replied that it would be 
a 'pleasure'-'we would go all out to the extent necessary' . Home intervened with a comment about the 
lack of US support over Southern Rhodesia at which point the US record of the meeting continues: ' "Well, 
for that matter", said the President, in a lighter tone, "you haven't given us that much support on the 
MLF"' (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961- 1963, vol XII, American Republics (Washington, 
1996), pp 607- 609, record of conversation, 30 June 1963). 
216 CO 1031/4415, no 2 16 Oct 1963 
'Austrian State Treaty and British Guiana': minute by Sir H Poynton 
to Mr Duncan Sandys on whether the treaty forms a suitable 
precedent for British Guiana 
[Jagan, ahead of the Nov conference (see 217), suggested that once settled, the 
constitution of British Guiana might be guaranteed on the Austrian model. Duncan 
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Sandys asked officials to study the Austrian precedent and to work out the arguments 
against it (CO 1031/4403, no 69, minute by R W Piper, 8 Oct 1963).] 
You asked the Department to study the Austrian State Treaty and show why it would 
not form a suitable precedent for British Guiana. 
2. I attach the Treaty and a note by the Foreign Office.1 
3. The Treaty, which was signed in Vienna on the 15th May, 1955, is in nine parts 
of which, however, only Parts I and IX seem relevant to our problem. Part I contains 
the political and territorial clauses and Part IX contains the clause dealing with the 
interpretation of the Treaty. 
4. In Part I Austria is recognised as re-established as a sovereign, independent 
and democratic state. She undertakes to secure human rights and fundamental 
freedoms to all its peoples and the rights of the Slovene and Croat minorities are 
protected. She undertakes also to have democratic government based on elections by 
secret ballot and to guarantee free, equal and universal suffrage without 
discrimination as to race, sex, language, religion or political opinion. She undertakes 
to destroy the National Socialist Party and related organisations and to dissolve all 
Fascist-type organisations. 
5. Article 35, Part IX, provides that any dispute concerning the interpretation or 
execution of the Treaty which is not settled by direct diplomatic negotiation is to be 
referred to the four Heads of Mission (British, French, American and Russian). Any 
such dispute which is not resolved by them within two months is to be referred to 
arbitration by a commission composed of one representative of each party and a third 
selected by mutual agreement from nationals of a third country (if they cannot agree 
on the third member, the United Nations Secretary General is to make the 
appointment) and the decision of the commission is to be accepted by both parties as 
definitive and binding. 
6. The fundamental weakness of a treaty of this sort is the absence of any 
effective sanction. Subject to the general principles voiced in the Treaty regarding 
human rights and democratic institutions, the constitution is for the territory itself 
to devise and amend as it sees fit. If the Government or Parliament decided on action 
inconsistent with the Treaty, the only sanction, short of invasion by one or more of 
the signatory Powers, would be that of public opinion. It is highly doubtful whether 
in British Guiana this would be sufficient. The alternative of invasion after 
independence is surely unthinkable. In any case it is doubtful whether any major 
Power would wish to risk the international crisis which would arise if one such 
power proposed to step in against the wishes of another. In short, it does not provide 
a recipe for healing the racial and ideological divisions which harass British Guiana. 
These must be solved internally by British Guianese; not by a continuing deus ex 
machina from outside. 
7. There are other objections which cannot be expressed in the Conference viz. it 
is inconceivable that the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. could agree on the terms of a treaty. It 
might be difficult to select suitable guarantor-states. Jagan's choice would not be 
ours. But if there is to be a guarantee of neutrality (as for Austria) it would be 
reasonable to expect (as in the Austrian Treaty) the removal of all foreign bases; this 
the Americans are unlikely to agree to, whether the U.S.A. were a guarantor-state or 
1 Not printed. 
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not. There is also no provision-and it would scarcely be possible to have any 
workable provision-to prevent infiltration by communist agents and advisers.2 
2 Coinciding with consideration of a neutral British Guiana was the issue of UN or Commonwealth 
mediation in the colony. The CO opposed a Visiting Mission from the UN on the grounds that it was 
doubtful if it would succeed, that the UK would be blamed for the failure , and that it would set an 
unwelcome precedent (DO 181/34, no 130, 'British Guiana and the Committee of Twenty-Four', CO brief 
for Duncan Sandys, 3 July 1963). Some in the CRO took a different view:' .. . we cannot see any particular 
virtue in excluding a Delegation from the Committee of Twenty-Four from British Guiana. The country 
itself is of marginal importance to us; we should gain nothing by having a public quarrel with the 
Committee at a time when our own African problems are under fire at the United Nations generally. All we 
should do through exclusion, whether with the aid of troops or otherwise, would be to ensure that further 
coals of fire were heaped on our heads. To let a Delegation in-whether or not it consisted solely of 
Commonwealth representatives in order to overcome the legalistic snag about admitting aliens- would at 
least offer the hope of their eyes being opened to the real facts in the colony. Whatever Dr. Jagan might say 
to the Delegation would be cancelled out by the vitriol which the Opposition Parties and the Trade Unions 
would pour into their ears. There is, therefore, some hope that the blame for the existing situation would 
not for once be put on the British alone' (ibid, minute by G StJ Chadwick, 5 July 1963). Duncan Sandys, 
who was responsible for both departments, thought that a UN Visiting Mission might lead to unrest in 
British Guiana. In the CO Poynton was also opposed to the proposal that a group of Commonwealth 
lawyers might visit the colony under UN auspices. The reasoning was much the same as before: it would 
set a precedent and there was little reason to believe that outsiders would be any more successful in 
resolving British Guiana's difficulties (ibid, no 171, minute by Poynton, 25 Sept 1963). CRO officials again 
disagreed, pointing out that this would be the fourth refusal in almost as many months to suggestions for 
Commonwealth conciliation of colonial problems. It would create a bad impression of Commonwealth co-
operation, especially for new members (ibid, minute by J D B Shaw, 24 Sept 1963). However, on the 
question of Commonwealth countries acting independently of the UN in British Guiana, Whitehall as a 
whole was more forthcoming. The Foreign Office especially viewed Commonwealth involvement as a 
useful 'buffer' between the UK and direct UN intervention (ibid, minute by M M Minogue, 30 Sept 1963). 
217 CAB 133/157, BG 4(63)2 & 3 5 Nov 1963 
'British Guiana conference, 1963': record of the 4th plenary session on 
31 Oct on decisions by Mr Duncan Sandys and his closing statement. 
Annex 
[Jagan was in London at the end of Sept 1963 and met Poynton at the CO. When the 
discussion turned to the question of how politics might be divorced from race in British 
Guiana, Jagan argued that politics were not in fact racial and illustrated his point by 
drawing a contrast with East Africa. He suggested that racial distinctions in East Africa 
were also social and economic distinctions. The large immigrant Asian population in East 
Africa conducted business and the retail trade and provided the middle ranks of the civil 
service while the Africans were, for the most part, the 'basic working classes'. This was 
not the case in British Guiana where the two main races could be found at all social and 
economic levels-in the civil service, the professions ('he [Jagan) had to remind himself 
that the Police were almost wholly "negro" '), business and agriculture, although in this 
latter respect East Indians were predominant. Society in British Guiana, according to 
Jagan, was divided horizontally into social and economic levels irrespective of race rather 
than vertically with the races occupying different social and economic positions. Politics 
therefore cut across race. Poynton found Jagan's analysis 'ingenious' and not without an 
element of truth but he was still not convinced: ' .. . I am afraid it does not point to the 
conclusion which Dr. Jagan claimed, namely that politics does not follow the line of racial 
cleavage, for it obviously does' (CO 1031/4402, no 64, note by Poynton, 27 Sept 1963) . At 
the same meeting Jagan raised the question of external mediation in British Guiana, 
either by the UN or by a Commonwealth commission consisting of neutral countries. He 
real ised that the UK would object to UN mediation and offered to conclude a neutrality 
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treaty at independence (see 216); Poynton assumed he meant a treaty with the US. 
Poynton questioned why outsiders should be any more successful in resolving British 
Guiana's problems (see ibid, note 2) but he did not reveal that the UK had already decided 
to impose a solution which had been agreed with the us: The aim was to remove Jagan 
from office and the plan involved Duncan Sandys summoning alf three political leaders to 
London in Oct 1963. Anticipating that yet again there would be no agreement, the 
secretary of state would declare in favour of a new electoral system to counteract racism. 
Jagan would protest and would either resign and ask the governor to dissolve the 
legislature and hold elections under the existing system, or sit tight and obstruct. In 
either event the UK might be forced to suspend the constitution and resume the 
administration. In the unlikely event that Jagan co-operated, his removal would have to 
wait until he showed signs of deliberate obstruction. The UK was still working towards a 
goal of independence but could not say when this would happen. Troops and new 
administrators would be sent in at the right moment if necessary. It would be important 
to have US support at the UN. That Jagan and Burnham might reach agreement before 
the London meeting was seen as the only danger of the plan going 'seriously awry'. 
Burnham was said to be showing signs of supporting a UN commission. The UK looked to 
the US to discourage joint moves either for a coalition in British Guiana or fo r an outside 
inquiry as this would upset the plan to remove Jagan (CO 1031/4402, no 63, Macmillan to 
Kennedy, sent as outward FO tel no 9662 to Washington, 27 Sept 1963). British and 
American officials met in London between 14 and 16 Oct to consider the plan to remove 
Jagan. It was agreed that in any statements on action against Jagan, the UK would 
emphasise (i) the failure of repeated efforts to find a compromise between the political 
leaders; (ii) the manner in which the protracted nature of the dispute had impeded 
independence, damaged the economy and produced an atmosphere of fear and 
uncertainty in the colony; (iii) that the new electoral system was the best means to 
combat racism; (iv) that the UK was still committed to independence and that any period 
of direct rule would be a temporary measure only. The UK would avoid any reference to 
lagan's 'communist sympathies'; this was important because critics would inevitably say 
that Britain had acted under US pressure. It was recognised that it would not be possible 
to avoid references to communism in any US statments on the situation but UK officials 
urged that the US should do everything possible to dampen charges of collusion and to 
refrain from presenting British action in British Guiana as a counter-stroke against 
Cuban or Soviet plans in the Caribbean (CO 1031/4403, no 66, record of discussions, 
14- 16 Oct 1963) .] 
2. Decisions by the Secretary of State 
The Secretary of State informed the Conference of his Decisions on the outstanding 
constitutional issues. The text of his statement is annexed to these minutes. 
The leaders of the three delegations expressed their regret that the Secretary of 
State had not fixed a precise date for British Guiana to become independent. Dr. 
lagan said that when he had asked the Secretary of State to settle the outstanding 
issues he had assumed that a date for independence would be fixed. He said he did 
not know what would be the attitude of the People's Progressive Party to these 
decisions. Mr. Bumham said that, while regretting that no date had been fixed for 
independence, the People's National Congress adhered to their undertaking to accept 
the decisions. 
The Secretary of State said that he had given no undertaking to fix a date for 
independence when he had agreed to arbitrate. However, he wished to make it clear 
that the British Government had no wish to delay British Guiana's independence. 
They would however have been failing in their responsibilities if they had not first 
taken steps to reduce the dangerous tension between the races. The decisions which 
he had made were directed to this end. As he had indicated, the British Government 
would convene a conference after elections had been held under the new electoral 
system, to settle any remaining constitutional issues, and to fix a date for 
independence. 
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3. Closing statement 
The Secretary of State said that the Conference had been a difficult one. But he 
hoped that all the parties would now do their best to make a success of the decisions 
which he had announced. He thanked the Governor, the Delegates and the Secretary-
General for their help. 
Annex to 217: Closing statement by the secretary of state 
I had hoped that after a year's adjournment the political leaders of British Guiana 
could have succeeded in reaching agreement. But since that had proved impossible 
there was clearly no advantage in the further postponement of decisions. Therefore, 
although it was for me an unenviable task, I am sure that in all the circumstances 
you were right to ask the British Government to settle on your behalf your 
unresolved constitutional differences. 
British Guiana faces many difficulties, but all that you have told me at this 
Conference, and all that I saw during my visit to your country last July, have 
convinced me that there is one problem which transcends all others, namely the 
growth of racialism. That is the curse of British Guiana today. The whole life of the 
country is poisoned and weakened by mutual suspicion and fear between the two 
predominant racial groups, the Indians and the Mricans. This state of tension has 
become acute in the last few years and has led to racial murder, arson and violence. 
Last summer it reached the point where law and order could not be maintained 
without the assistance of two battalions of British soldiers. In fact, the Premier told 
me that, if the British troops were withdrawn, the situation would get completely out 
of control. 
Before British Guiana can safely assume the responsibilities of sovereign 
independence, it is clear that by one means or another harmony and confidence must 
be restored. 
This need not necessarily take long. There is no deep-rooted or historical enmity 
between the races; nor is there any basic clash of interests between them; nor is there 
animosity between the religious groups, Christian, Hindu and Muslim. 
The root of the trouble lies almost entirely in the development of party politics 
along racial lines. In its present acute form, this can be traced to the split in the 
country's main political party in 1955. It was then that the People's Progressive 
Party, which had previously drawn its support from both the main races, broke into 
two bitterly opposed political groups, the one predominantly Indian, led by Dr. 
Jagan, and the other predominantly Mrican, led by Mr. Burnham. Both parties have, 
for their political ends, fanned the racial emotions of their followers, with the result 
that each has come to be regarded as the champion of one race and the enemy of the 
other. 
In this atmosphere of mutual suspicion objectivity has entirely disappeared. Every 
political act is, or is alleged to be, dictated by racial prejudice. The Mricans accuse 
the Government party of governing in the interests only of the Indians, and demand 
a share in political decisions. On the other side, the Indians accuse the Police, which 
is mainly Mrican, of partiality towards the Mricans and demand the creation of a 
separate defence force, recruited more extensively from the Indian community, to 
counterbalance the Police. 
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This state of general distrust has had a profoundly demoralising effect throughout 
the country. It has not only undermined political stability, but gravely threatens 
economic progress. It has led to such financial difficulties that the Government is 
unable, despite severe economies, to balance its budget and will be obliged to seek 
outside assistance. 
British Guiana is thus faced with an acute crisis of confidence. While this 
manifests itself primarily in a racial form, the cause is basically political. It is 
therefore a political solution which must be sought. 
The aim of any such solution must be to create a reasonable degree of mutual trust 
and co-operation between the races. In the grave situation which has developed, no 
single remedy will be sufficient. The problem must be tackled from all possible 
angles. 
In the first place, the Constitution must provide the strongest safeguards to 
protect minorities, to preserve basic human rights, to ensure the impartiality of the 
Police, and to insulate the Judiciary and the Public Service from party political 
influences. On constitutional issues there should be a right of Appeal to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council. The Constitutions of a number of new 
Commonwealth countries contain provisions designed to achieve these objectives, 
and, with necessary adaptations, I propose to apply them to British Guiana. 
In view of the racial character of the problem, I consider that there should in 
addition be some special provisions to penalise those who seek to promote 
antagonism between the races. 
At the same time, every possible step must be taken to improve the relationship 
between the Government and the Opposition, of whatever political complexions they 
may be. Under a democratic system, minorities must accept the decisions of the 
majority. But there are limits beyond which it is neither right nor safe for a 
Government to disregard the feelings and wishes of large sections of the people. In a 
country with a small population and slender resources, it is more than ever 
important that the Government should endeavour to rule with the general consent 
of the population. Bi-partisan policies may not be possible, but the political 
temperature can be greatly reduced by sincere and effective consultation. Of this 
there has been all too little in British Guiana, due to the intransigent and 
uncompromising attitude of both sides. The need for improvement in the methods 
and practice of consultation is recognised in all quarters, and all three political 
leaders have put forward a variety of proposals to this end. These will be studied and 
will where appropriate be adopted. 
It is also necessary to strengthen the forces available to maintain law and order. A 
country should only in the most rare and exceptional circumstances have to call 
upon troops to assist the civil power; and after independence it would of course be 
most undesirable for British Guiana to have to rely upon the army of another 
country to preserve internal security. It is arguable whether the additional forces 
required for this purpose should be regarded as an army or as an extension of the 
police. But whatever may be decided on this point, these should be constituted before 
independence by the Governor, who would endeavour to ensure that recruits were 
not drawn predominantly from any one racial group. 
The measures I have indicated should to some extent help to reduce the present 
tensions and fears. But, if confidence and co-operation are to be restored, more 
positive steps must be taken to encourage the healthy development of political life 
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along non-racial lines. The opposition parties have insisted that, in order to achieve 
this, a change in the electoral system is essential. On the other hand, this view has 
been strongly contested by the Government delegation. 
I have listened carefully to the arguments advanced in favour of single member 
constituencies ("first past the post") and those advanced in favour of various types of 
proportional representation. I must, however, say that I got the impression that the 
advocates of the different solutions, while propounding impeccable principles, were 
more concerned with their own electoral prospects than with the furtherance of 
racial harmony in British Guiana. 
After taking into account all that has been said, I have tried to examine this 
problem with complete objectivity and with one aim only, namely, to assess what 
electoral system would be most likely to give to your country peace and good 
government. 
A powerful case was made for the retention of the system of "first past the post". It 
was pointed out that this is the standard practice in almost every country where the 
British Parliamentary system has been introduced; that it tends to produce clear 
Parliamentary majorities, thereby helping the winning party to provide effective 
government; and that it gives constituents direct contact with a member of 
Parliament who has a special responsibility for looking after their interests. 
The main arguments advanced in favour of proportional representation are, first, 
that it is absolutely fair in that the proportion of seats exactly reflects the proportion 
of votes cast for each party and, secondly, that it would be likely to compel the 
formation of coalitions between parties and races which, in the circumstances of 
British Guiana, would be most desirable. 
In addition, I considered a variety of electoral devices, specially designed to 
encourage cross voting between races and parties. These included a proposal that 
votes cast by one race which were matched with votes by other races should be given 
increased value, thereby rewarding parties which secured a multi-racial following. 
Although this scheme was at first sight attractive, I felt obliged to reject it, since it 
involved registering voters on separate racial rolls, which might in practice have the 
effect of accentuating rather than diminishing racial consciousness. 
I also examined a proposal that electors should be required to cast first and second 
preference votes, the latter counting a half or a quarter. The object was to encourage 
middle-of-the-road parties, acceptable to the two main races. However, I discarded 
this idea on the grounds that it might give a very unfair advantage to the opposition 
parties if they were to make an electoral pact, and that it could be frustrated by the 
formation of dummy parties. 
I considered a number of other ingenious proposals, but in every case I found that 
the disadvantages outweighed the advantages. I was thus forced to the conclusion 
that the choice lay between the existing system of "first past the post" or some 
straightforward form of proportional representation. In deciding between these two 
alternatives, I felt it right not only to weigh the theoretical arguments for and against 
each system, but above all to take into account the actual conditions and practical 
problems in British Guiana. 
The system of "first past the post" has undoubtedly fulfilled the principal claim of 
its supporters, in that it has in successive elections given to the winning party a 
substantial parliamentary majority. In 1953 the P.P.P., with 51 per cent of the votes, 
obtained 75 per cent of the seats. In 1957, with 47 per cent of the votes, it secured 64 
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per cent of the seats. In 1961 the P.P.P. polled 43 per cent of the votes and obtained 
57 per cent of the seats, as compared with the P.N.C. party, which polled only 2 per 
cent fewer votes but obtained only 31 per cent of the seats. 
The wide disparity between votes and seats which this system has consistently 
produced in British Guiana has not unnaturally engendered a sense of frustration 
and grievance among the opposition parties, which together polled a majority of the 
votes at the last two elections. On the other hand, it is argued that a certain measure 
of over-representation should be accepted as the price of strong government. 
Unfortunately, in British Guiana this electoral system, while providing clear 
parliamentary majorities, has not provided strong government. The fact is that the 
administration of the country has been largely paralysed, the Government is 
insolvent, and law and order can be maintained only with the help of outside troops. 
Without attempting to apportion blame, the reason for this state of affairs is that the 
ruling party has alienated the confidence of the non-Indian communities, while they 
on their side have obstructed and resisted the Government at every turn. 
Against this background, I have had to consider whether the situation would be 
improved by the introduction of proportional representation. The supporters of this 
system claim that, since no one race constitutes a majority of the electorate, all 
parties will have to appeal for support to all races. In practice I doubt whether either 
the Indian or the Mrican party could, under its present leadership, hope to increase 
appreciably its following among the other racial groups. On the other hand, I am 
satisfied that there is validity in the argument that in present circumstances where 
no party commands an overall majority of votes, proportional representation would 
be likely to result in the formation of a coalition government of parties supported by 
different races, and that this would go some way towards reducing the present 
tension. 
But the creation of temporary alliances in Parliament between the representatives 
of rival groups, though a step in the right direction, is not enough. Normal 
conditions will not be restored until the present racial alignments are replaced by 
genuinely political alignments based upon a common belief in political and 
economic objectives. 
So long as the whole political field is occupied by three parties, each identified 
with a different racial group, it is hard to see how non-racial politics can develop. It 
would seem therefore that the best hope of altering the present rigid pattern may 
well lie in the formation of new parties which are not handicapped by past 
animosities. It must, however, be recognised that under a system based upon single 
member constituencies, new parties would have little hope of winning any seats and 
would probably never be formed. 
In the light of these various considerations, I concluded that it must be our 
deliberate aim to stimulate a radical change in the present pattern of racial 
alignments. It was therefore my duty to choose the electoral system which would be 
most likely to encourage inter-party coalitions and multi-racial groupings and which 
would make it easy for new parties to form. Having thus defined the objective, the 
answer was clear. British Guiana must change over to a system of proportional 
representation. 
It remained for me to consider which form of proportional representation should 
be adopted. Of the various systems which have been advocated at this conference, I 
am satisfied that the simplest and fairest is that under which the whole country 
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forms a single constituency, and seats are allocated in proportion to the votes cast for 
each party. I am furthermore convinced that this is the system best suited to the 
present circumstances of British Guiana. 
It remains to be decided whether, in order to obtain seats, a party should be 
required to poll a qualifying minimum percentage of the total national vote. During 
our discussions the figures of 2, 5 and 10 per cent were mentioned. In normal 
circumstances, it would be desirable to discourage splinter parties. But, in view of 
the overriding importance of reshaping the political pattern, there would be no 
advantage at present in restricting the creation of new parties, which at first will 
inevitably be small. 
However, once these new parties, some of which may still have racial connections, 
have been brought into being, it is to be hoped that some may amalgamate into 
larger multi-racial groupings and contest subsequent elections together. To 
encourage this process of fusion, it may well be desirable, after the first election, to 
introduce a minimum qualifying percentage. The level at which this should be fixed 
need not be determined now. 
No case has been made to show that a lowering of the voting age would help to 
solve the problems which face British Guiana. I do not therefore propose to make any 
change. 
In order to prevent personation and other forms of cheating, about which 
complaints have been made, there should be a fresh registration of electors who 
should be issued with reliable identity cards. The work of registration and the 
responsibility for preparing and conducting the first elections under the new system 
should be entrusted to a special commissioner appointed by the British Government 
from outside British Guiana. Subsequent elections should be conducted by an 
independent commission to be set up under the constitution. 
Another question I was asked to decide was whether there should be fresh 
elections before independence. If it were proposed to retain the existing electoral 
system, there would be no justification for holding further elections. However, since 
the system is to be changed, it is clearly right that fresh elections under the new 
system should be held before independence. Preparations for them should be put in 
hand as soon as practicable. 
After the elections are over, the British Government will convene a conference to 
settle any remaining constitutional issues, and to fix a date for independence. 
The constitutional documents which are required to give effect to the decisions 
which I have outlined will be drafted without delay. Before giving my approval, I will 
arrange for the three Delegations to have an opportunity to study them and 
comment upon them. 
It is not yet necessary to take a final decision on the question of whether, after 
independence, British Guiana should be a Monarchy or a Republic. Some differences 
were expressed on this subject at the Conference a year ago; but there was general 
agreement that the Parliamentary system as distinct from the American Presidential 
system should be adopted. The constitution will therefore be drafted on the 
assumption that, on independence, the Governor will be replaced either by a 
Governor-General with the powers of a constitutional monarch, or by a President 
exercising similar functions . 
As you know, I would much have preferred that you had decided these matters by 
agreement between yourselves. It was only when I was convinced that agreement was 
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impossible that I accepted the task of arbitration. In deciding the difficult and 
controversial issues which you referred to me, I have been concerned only to do what 
I believe to be in the best interests of British Guiana and all her peoples. From the 
start it was inevitable that my conclusions, whatever they might be, would disappoint 
some or all of you. But you were good enough to assure me that you would accept 
them; and I know that you will honour your undertaking. 
However, I wish to ask you to do something more. Now that these issues have been 
settled and that British Guiana is firmly set upon the path to independence, I appeal 
to you to bury the fears and suspicions of the past and to work together for the unity 
and happiness of this new nation, of which you are the leaders and founders . 
218 DO 200/102, no 21 18 Dec 1963 
'Trinidad's foreign policy': despatch no 9 from Sir N Costar to 
Mr Duncan Sandys 
There is free speech, a free Press and a Parliamentary Opposition in Trinidad and 
Tobago and a brand of democracy which is recognisably British. But more than in 
most well-established democracies, though perhaps not more than in some other 
new members of the Commonwealth with an acknowledged father of the people, the 
country's foreign policy is the personal policy of its Prime Minister, Dr. Eric 
Williams, who is also Foreign Minister. In this despatch I have the honour to submit 
some reflections on his aims and his record in the foreign field. 
The Caribbean 
2. Dr. Williams who has led this very small country since 1956 has wider 
horizons than Trinidad and Tobago. As a historian with a deep knowledge of his 
subject and considerable intellectual attainments, he has formed the view that the 
fragmentation of the Caribbean area as a result of the historic rivalries of European 
Powers, Spain, Holland, France and Britain, is out of date in the modern world of 
larger and more viable units. He believes that social progress in the West Indies 
depends upon economic and political co-operation within the area, and his prime 
aim is Caribbean unity, starting with the old British West Indies, but later taking in 
Dutch, French and Spanish-speaking territories. For this reason, Dr. Williams has 
assiduously cultivated Jamaica since independence and he said recently that relations 
with Jamaica were Trinidad's first concern in the external field. He has also done his 
best to maintain through various surviving "common services" certain of the links, 
such as the University of the West Indies (of which he is Pro-Chancellor), British 
West Indian Airways, and the West Indies Shipping Service, which bound together 
the islands of the old Federation of the West Indies. 
3. It is of course true that Dr. Williams' critics frequently accuse him of 
contributing to the collapse of the old Federation of the West Indies. But his aim was 
an altogether tighter Federation, no doubt with him at the top! Not without some 
justification, he regarded the old Federation as merely an expensive and ineffective 
superstructure on top of existing island Governments run by Ministers with 
parochial outlooks, over whom the Federation's control was far too limited. In his 
view experience had shown that this unsatisfactory system needed to be cleared away 
in order to rebuild from the base upwards. "Unitary statehood" whether in the West 
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Indies as a whole, or in the more recently mooted union between Trinidad and 
Grenada, is Dr. Williams' preference. His temperament is such that, during the time 
of Federation, he could not agree that half a loaf was better than no bread. But since 
Trinidad has become independent he has shown signs of becoming more flexible, and 
in the future this tendency may perhaps develop further. In his new mood he has not 
been without his successes. It was as a result of his initiative that a Summit 
Conference of Commonwealth West Indian leaders was held in Port of Spain in July 
this year, and a second similar conference is due to take place in Jamaica next 
month. This represents progress in a sound and sensible policy. It is in Britain's 
interests that it should be continued and that it should succeed. 
Wider horizons 
4. As part of his drive to promote Caribbean unity, Dr. Williams also exhibits the 
lively interest to be expected of an able and restless if politically orientated historian 
in the world outside his area. He has definite views on most current international 
issues, which he does not hesitate to express publicly, though his interest is perhaps 
less intrinsic than in the repercussions of these issues in or on his beloved Caribbean. 
He early showed his qualities over Britain's approach to join the European Economic 
Community. He was the first and almost the only Caribbean statesman to grasp its 
significance for the future of the countries in the area. He was the only new 
Commonwealth leader to accept this development as one which could benefit not 
only Britain but also the under-developed nations of the Commonwealth, and to 
proclaim his acceptance in public. He was also the only Commonwealth Prime 
Minister to undertake a tour of Europe at the time the negotiations were in progress 
to familiarise himself with the issues and personalities and to press Trinidad's point 
of view on those concerned. All this contrasts with Sir Alexander Bustamante's 
"dagger pointed at the heart of the Commonwealth". 
5. In public statements on external affairs which I feel sure reflect his true 
thinking, Dr. Williams gives pride of place to the authority of the United Nations and 
the rights of the smaller countries and the "have nots" against the rich industrialised 
nations. But in general, his presentation of these views is moderate by current world 
standards, except perhaps in Woodford Square, the local equivalent of Trafalgar 
Square, where for internal political reasons from time to time he lets off steam. But 
above all, in his practical handling of Trinidad's attitude towards most of the major 
international issues on which Trinidad has been required to take a position since 
independence, Dr. Williams' approach has been fair and objective. The rest of this 
despatch will summarise the evidence which supports this statement. 
United Nations groupings 
6. Dr. Williams' objectivity may be first illustrated by his United Nations policy. 
Trinidad has connections at the United Nations with the Commonwealth Group, the 
Latin American Group and the Afro-Asian Group, and until recently it has not been 
clear which of the two geographical groups would be Trinidad's first choice. The 
largely Afro-Asian composition of the Trinidad population, and an element of 
emotion (almost certainly felt by Dr. Williams) weighted the scales on one side; the 
country's comparative wealth and Westernisation and its geographical position on 
the other. In the event, and probably with an eye on development assistance from the 
United States and the Alliance for Progress, Dr. Williams has now opted for Latin 
America and hopes in due course to follow Jamaica into the Organisation of 
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American States. But if for any reason he is rejected by Latin America (and in his 
view if this happens a principal motivation would be colour prejudice), he is likely to 
be resentful and it is improbable that he would knock at their door a second time. 
Subversion 
7. Dr. Williams, who by British political standards would belong to the Middle or 
Middle Right of the Labour Party, has also made it very clear that he stands firmly 
against subversion, whether straightforward Communism or a la Castro. He has 
made it plain that this opposition applies both to attempts to conduct subversive 
activity in Trinidad itself, and attempts to use Trinidad as a basis for subverting her 
neighbours. Within Trinidad he has recently set up a Commission of Enquiry into 
Subversion in the Trade Unions, Youth Movements, and so on. In the external field, 
during November of this year, he showed his resolution in practical terms in his 
treatment of a group of teenage terrorists from Venezuela who arrived in Trinidad 
expecting asylum after they had hijacked a Venezuelan aircraft. Despite the fact that 
Dr. Williams has a long-standing grievance against Venezuela for refusing to remove 
the "colonialist" 30 per cent Antilles surtax on Trinidad exports, the group were very 
quickly returned under military escort whence they had come. As a result of this 
action Dr. Williams is now openly and perhaps (for him) dangerously, marked as an 
enemy of Communism and Castro-type terrorism. He has followed this up by 
rejecting an approach from a Cuban emissary who came with proposals for opening 
up trade and diplomatic relations. In this matter he is not prepared to follow the 
Jamaican example. 
British Guiana 
8. Similarly, his actions even more than his statements over British Guiana, 
show his attitude towards the prospect of a Communist or near-Communist State as 
a neighbour. During the long drawn out British Guiana strike earlier this year he was 
neutral against Dr. Jagan and, in particular, unhelpful to the British Guiana Premier 
over oil supplies and air transport facilities. Since then Dr. Williams' public 
statements on British Guiana, following your recent decision on that country's 
constitutional future, 1 have been extremely helpful to British policy and critical of 
Dr. Jagan's obduracy, and the Trinidad representative at the United Nations has on 
instructions taken the same line. Indeed, Trinidad alone of the Afro-Asian States, 
abstained with Britain on the Ghana motion urging that a date be fixed for British 
Guiana's independence. Trinidad's representative went further and spoke out 
publicly against the motion. Here, again, Dr. Williams' record compares favourably 
with Jamaica's, despite the latter's closeness to the United States. 
9. Dr. Williams naturally has no sympathy towards colonialism. On the other 
hand, he is prepared to be objective over British Guiana, and has publicly recognised 
that the normal textbook solution for a colonial situation does not apply there. His 
helpful action at the time of the establishment of Malaysia (again in contrast to that 
of Jamaica) also revealed a willingness to look fairly at the aims of an old colonial 
Power and to accept them if they stood up to examination. 
10. Dr. Williams had earlier showed his mettle at the time of the Cuban crisis. 
Dr. Solomon, Acting Prime Minister in his absence, had wavered slightly in the face 
1 See 217. 
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of President Kennedy's quarantine decision but Dr. Williams, then in Brussels, was 
definite and wholehearted in his support of the American action, and under his 
instructions Trinidad came quickly into line. Indeed, since her independence, 
Trinidad has been extremely firm against Russia. Dr. Williams has for example 
adopted delaying tactics over a tentative Russian approach to establish an Embassy in 
Port of Spain. 
Africa 
11. Admittedly on matters where the colour issue is uppermost, as in the prob-
lems of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, Dr. Williams' views are more in line 
with those of his new Commonwealth colleagues. He has said that if the African 
countries want South Africa out of the United Nations, then Trinidad is with the 
African States. Moreover, he has put this statement into practical effect in the 
instructions given to Trinidad representatives at international gatherings. The 
Trinidad Minister of Labour, for example, was directed by Dr. Williams to follow 
the lead of the African States at this year's I.L.O. Conference. His attitude on 
Southern Rhodesia is similarly staunchly pro-African though many of his state-
ments (and those authorised by him) on that country seem to have a lesser con-
tent of invective than those of other new Commonwealth leaders. His attitude is 
one of assumed puzzlement that Britain can genuinely regard Southern Rhodesia 
as self-governing in the British sense of the word. To some extent he recognises 
the particular difficulties which face Britain there, and his support for President 
Nyerere's2 initiatives on Southern Rhodesia has in it an element of seeking a quid 
pro quo for support of his own unorthodox views (by new Commonwealth stan-
dards) in relation to British Guiana. He professes to see a parallel between his 
desire to see the British withhold independence in present circumstances from 
British Guiana and the Africans' desire to see us withhold it from Southern 
Rhodesia. 
The Commonwealth 
12. As the leader of a small country with a considerable racial mixture, Dr. 
Williams is attracted by the Commonwealth idea as he interprets it. He also has 
good practical reasons for friendship with Britain. Trinidad and Britain are still very 
substantial trading partners and the British influence is a balance against excessive 
American influence which is unattractive to Dr. Williams personally. In addition, 
Dr. Williams is in the market for large-scale aid for his second Five-year 
Development Plan, and he certainly hopes for substantial help from Britain. Against 
this have to be set deep-rooted feelings of wishing to show that the colonial connec-
tion is over and done with, and that Trinidad has a policy of her own overseas as 
well as at home. 
International trade 
13. On balance, Dr. Williams, like the island he leads, is probably still 
intellectually and emotionally closer to a moderate and racially tolerant Britain (his 
image) which gives at any rate some help and some trading chance to the under-
developed, than to any other non-Caribbean country. For example, his daughter, like 
2 J K Nyerere, president of Tanganyika, 1962-1964, of United Republic of Tanzania, 1964- 1985. 
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many other Trinidad children, is being educated in Britain. Even so Dr. Williams will 
be very carefully watching Britain's attitude at the forthcoming World Trade 
Conference for any sign that Britain may be insufficiently forthcoming in pursuing 
policies helpful to the interests of small and under-developed countries like Trinidad. 
He for his part will be seeking, probably through personal participation, to promote 
the view that small under-developed countries are entitled to two-way preferential 
treatment. They should be helped to export through international commodity 
agreements like the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which Dr. Williams publicly 
praises as a model: they should not be prevented from developing new industries at 
home by means of local incentives such as pioneer industry status, import licensing, 
perhaps tariffs. 
Dr. Williams' good record 
14. I have previously reported that Dr. Williams is an exceptionally prickly 
personality, not easily led and resistant to direct and obvious attempts to influence 
him. He is also ready to see insult and injury where none is intended, and his sunny 
moods can quickly fade . When they do, his words even if not his actions lose 
restraint, and argument degenerates into invective. We have had a bitter experience 
of how this can happen in our dealings with him over the abortive financial 
settlement on independence.3 But even there Dr. Williams refrained from going 
beyond hostile words to hostile action, and the final arrangement now made is both 
fair and mutually satisfactory. However unpleasant this somewhat prolonged 
difference between Britain and Trinidad may have been, on world issues that 
mattered Dr. Williams has continued to pursue sensible policies generally parallel to 
those of Britain. His recent actions, where they impinge on British interests and 
policies, compare favourably with those of most of his new Commonwealth 
colleagues, including even his Caribbean colleague Sir Alexander Bustamante. I hope 
that this record will be given full weight in our dealings with Dr. Williams if he seeks 
our help over the Development Plan. I hope, too, that it will be recalled if at some 
future date, in one of his blacker moods, he should again appear to belie his wise 
actions with intemperate words. 
15. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the British High Commissioner in 
Jamaica, the British Ambassadors in Caracas and Washington, to the Head of the 
British Mission to the United Nations, and on a secret and personal basis to the 
Governors of Barbados and British Guiana. 
3 See 206, 207 and 209. 
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[British Guiana]: CO record of a discussion in London between 
Mr Duncan Sandys and Mr Rusk on the current situation 
Mr. Rusk said that he would like to have Mr. Sandys' appreciation of the situation in 
British Guiana, and possibly exchange a few words on Indo-Pakistan relations. The 
Secretary of State suggested that they might also exchange views on Southern 
Rhodesia and Ghana. 
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British Guiana 
2. The Secretary of State said that the last conference1 had achieved its purpose. 
It had been possible to steer it in the right direction and the presentation of the 
outcome had been satisfactory. There had been virtually no international criticism 
and Jamaica and Trinidad, in particular, had reacted well. He was especially pleased 
with Dr. Williams' attitude, given his dislike of proportional representation. Had 
Jamaica and Trinidad not supported the British Government's decision, the outcome 
might have been awkward. 
3. Throughout the Conference he had not know [sic] whether Dr. Jagan would 
resign and indeed the latter had stayed on in London for a week after the Conference 
trying to make up his mind on this point. However, Dr. lagan's reactions had not 
worried him once the political leaders had signed a piece of paper asking him to 
arbitrate. Dr. Jagan of course now tried to make out that his signature had been 
conditional, but his explanations were not convincing. 
4. The Secretary of State's main concern had been not to make a martyr or a 
hero of Dr. Jagan. It would have been very easy to have suspended the Constitution, 
or to have squeezed Dr. Jagan out of office. It had, however, to be borne in mind that 
Dr. Jagan was an able agitator, and that one ought not to put him in a position 
whereby he could gain popularity in opposition. The dangerous period had been 
immediately after the end of the Conference; but the longer Dr. Jagan delayed his 
resignation, the less he could hope to derive popularity from it, and the more 
prospect there was that he would offer Her Majesty's Government justifiable cause 
for dealing with him in the wider interests of good government in British Guiana. If 
occasion offered, H.M.G. would not hesitate to act. 
5. At present there was a lull. There had been no violent reaction-only violent 
language-following the Conference. The Secretary of State was now proceeding 
with the drawing up of the Constitution, in accordance with his mandate from the 
party leaders, and it was his intention to make it as watertight as possible. The next 
step was to hold an election, which he thought Dr. Jagan might lose, even if nothing 
was done to discredit him. 
6. It was, however, not certain that this result would be achieved. It was 
therefore most important that everything should be done between now and the 
election to encourage the formation of new parties. He thought it would be a good 
thing if the American and British agencies concerned were to get together on this 
point. The pity was that there was such a lack of leadership in British Guiana. 
7. Mr. Rusk asked whether Mr. Rai2 could be eliminated as a potential leader. The 
Secretary of State considered him to be feeble, but he thought the dearth of talent to 
be such that nobody should be excluded as a possible leader. The main thing was to 
encourage the emergence of one or more parties, which would help to draw support 
off Dr. Jagan. The electoral system he had devised ought to encourage the growth of 
small parties. 
1 See217. 
2 B S Rai, minister of home affairs in the Jagan government who was dismissed from the PPP and resigned 
his portfolio. He formed the Justice Party but was defeated at the 1964 election. 
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8. He had hoped that British Guiana's budgetary situation would have enabled 
him to take action. However, the British Guiana financial turnout appeared, on the 
face of it, less serious than had been expected. Dr. Jagan would now have to pre-
sent a budget for 1964, and this might provide an opportunity to turn on the 
screw. 
9. Mr. Rusk said that his officials had been in favour of Britain resuming direct 
rule in British Guiana. He thought, however, that some of the problems of concern 
to the United States could be resolved without putting Dr. Jagan out of office. For 
example, the Organisation of American States would meet shortly to discuss the 
question of Castroist penetration and subversion. It was likely that the meeting 
would adopt resolutions facilitating control over the movement of Cubans, Russian-
backed Cuban funds, etc. It was likely that the Jamaican and Trinidad Governments 
would support these resolutions. His general preference was to explore with H.M.G. 
what steps possible under direct rule could be taken without resorting to direct rule. 
10. Mr. Rusk asked whether Mr. Sandys had any evidence of arms shipments to 
or through British Guiana. The Secretary of State said that none had so far reached 
him. There had been many rumours, but no hard evidence. Mr. Rusk said that 
American experience had been the same. The recent discovery of the Venezuelan 
cache of arms, which had been traced back directly to Cuba, was the first evidence to 
hand of arms traffic. 
11. The Secretary of State said that while there was no evidence of arms traffic, 
it was clear that Dr. Jagan was getting Cuban-or more probably Russian-funds 
through his phoney trading organisation GIMPEX. Mr. Rusk asked if Mr. Sandys had 
heard of the latest financial deal, whereby the Cuban Government would provide 
GIMPEX with a further "loan" of one million dollars. The Secretary of State said he 
had not, and it was agreed that the American officials concerned would Jet their 
British counterparts have the relevant information. Sir Hilton Poynton explained the 
latest Guianese moves to give GIMPEX the monopoly for importing Russian oil. This 
might provide an opportunity to take suitable action. 
12. Mr. Rusk asked whether it would be possible to associate British Guiana 
with the OAS resolutions. The Secretary of State said that if Jamaica and Trinidad 
gave a lead by co-operating with the OAS, it would be helpful, and he thought that 
it might be possible to do something if British Guiana became, in effect, the odd 
man out. However, everything had to be subordinated to the aim of securing Dr. 
Jagan's removal from office through the new elections. To do this one might have 
to put up with a number of things which one didn't like. The important thing was 
not to do anything which Dr. Jagan could use to boost his popularity. Subject to 
this, he was certainly willing to examine any proposals for co-operation with the 
OAS. 
13. Mr. Rusk asked whether it was possible to do anything about Dr. Jagan's 
control of internal security, especially with regard to such points as intimidation, 
entry of Cubans into, or movement of Cubans through, British Guiana. The 
Secretary of State explained that the British authorities would be running the 
elections and that everything possible would be done to prevent intimidation at the 
elections.3 
3 The meeting then proceeded to discuss Southern Rhodesia. 
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220 FO 3711173580, no 2 7 Jan 1964 
[US policy in the Caribbean]: letter from I J M Sutherland1 to A R 
Thomas on the concerns of the State Department 
I made a record of the conversation with Bill Burdett2 and other members of the 
State Department on December 13 when the Anglo-Guatemalan talks and British 
Honduras were discussed (forwarded with my letter of December 16 to Miss 
Hutchinson, Foreign Office, which was copied to Jerrom) but we have not reported 
the subsequent talk on other Caribbean territories. Burdett, Knox3 and Tepper4 
stayed on for this meeting and we were joined by Mr. Thickpen of the Office of Inter-
American Affairs. Nothing very significant was said about the Caribbean Organisation 
and the other subjects mentioned briefly on that occasion, but I think it is worth 
recording the expression of concern voiced by Burdett at the prospect of early 
independence for the Little Seven. 
2. You will recall that after you had given an account of events since the breakup 
of the West Indies Federation, of the probable merger of Grenada with Trinidad and 
of what we hoped to achieve at the forthcoming Constitutional Conference on the 
Little Seven, Burdett made it clear that although the U.S. Government had not taken 
up any position on the subject, the creation of a new economically and politically 
weak state was something which he could not welcome. Indeed he went so far as to 
say that he did not like the idea of independence for the proposed Federation per se 
and that it was something which the State Department would not wish to see 
happen. Only grudgingly did he concede that an independent Federation might be 
less unfortunate than fragmentation which, as you explained, seemed to be the most 
likely alternative to early arrangements for an independent group. When you spoke 
of the continuing economic burdens to the U.K., making it clear that you had not 
intended to bring up the subject of possible U.S. aid, Burdett took the occasion to say 
that in his view the prospects of U.S. assistance were "quite slim" and referred to the 
current unfavourable attitude towards foreign aid in Congress. He took note of your 
remark that if we come to the conclusion that Federation might stand or fall on the 
availability of aid, the British Government might come forward with proposals for 
tripartite assistance, bringing in the Canadians. 
3. Burdett concluded by saying that the U.S. Administration would be watching 
the situation in the Lesser Antilles very closely in the New Year and they would wish 
to consult the course of events in the British territories at some future date. He was 
clearly very concerned when you said it was H.M.G.'s policy to try to hasten the time-
table for the grant of independence to a Little Seven Federation despite the lack of 
any great enthusiasm for the idea in the territories concerned, and it came as a shock 
to him to hear that if the Federal plan broke down, we would probably not object to 
1 UK embassy, Washington, 1962-1965. 
2 WC Burdett, deputy assistant secretary of state for European affairs, US State Dept, from 1962. 
3 Marion Cordon Knox, Bureau of European Mfairs, US State Dept; deputy director, Office of British 
Commonwealth and North European Mfairs. 
4 R Tepper, officer in charge of Caribbean Dependencies' Affairs, US State Dept. 
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Barbados "going it alone" and might even agree to a separate independent Antigua or 
a Federation of what was left. 
4. I do not think that the Americans had hitherto focused much attention in the 
political future of the island Caribbean territories, and they have rested content in 
the belief that the status quo was likely to remain unchanged for some time. 
However the introduction of the new Constitutions in the Bahamas and in British 
Honduras5 this month have also given them cause to consider more closely what the 
future U.S. relationship should be to those territories, and I gather from a remark 
made to me this week by Tepper, that the State Department are now engaged in one 
of their periodic appraisals of U.S. policy in the area. What the conclusion will be I do 
not know. There are probably divided counsels within the Administration and within 
the State Department itself. So far your conversation with Burdett about the Little 
Seven has not been followed up here. But I am inclined to think that we shall come 
under increasing pressure from the Americans to go slow on constitutional changes 
in the Caribbean. Certainly this is the way in which the Bureau of European Affairs in 
the State Department appears to be thinking and they are likely to be supported by 
the Department of Defense. 
5. As Burdett stated, one of the U.S. Government's primary concerns is the 
possibility of communist and particularly Cuban penetration and influence on the 
pattern of British Guiana; they are also most anxious to preserve and protect the 
security of the bases and other military facilities which they have in the British 
islands; they have, of course, the general interest of maintaining and improving 
political stability in an area very close to the U.S. which is already disturbed not only 
by the presence of a hostile regime in Cuba, but by unstable governments in Haiti 
and in the Dominican Republic and difficulties in Venezuela. They also have their 
own worries over Puerto Rico. Whatever may be said about the virtues of the 
principle of self determination, and however the Americans may view our colonial 
policies in other parts of the world, they regard the British presence in the Caribbean 
as an important stabilising influence which they would be reluctant to see diminish, 
and as a guarantee of our continuing interest in the southern part of this 
Hemisphere. In the course of the last two years, the Americans have been exhorting 
us (and other European countries) to take a greater share of responsibility and 
interest in Latin America and they have, on the whole, been gratified at the increased 
interest which we have shown, but they are likely to consider that their and our 
efforts have been in vain if this process is accompanied by a corresponding 
diminution in our stake in that part of the area where our historical interests are of 
longest standing and which lies closest to the U.S. 
6. I should be grateful if you would let us know if there are any indications from 
the U.S. Embassy in London that the Americans are thinking on these lines. We also 
consider it important that we should continue to keep the Americans closely 
informed both here and in London of our thinking on the Little Seven and of 
developments in the other island territories. 
7. I am copying this letter to Dick Slater in the Foreign Office, to Moynihan in 
Port of Spain, Diggines in Kingston and Edmonds in Caracas. I enclose three extra 
copies in case you wish to send it to the Governor in Bridgetown or elsewhere. 
5 Effectively conferring internal self-government on these two territories, with the British governors 
retaining responsibility for defence, external affairs, internal security and the Public Service. 
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221 CO 103114411, no 14 26 May 1964 
[British Guiana]: outward telegram no 211 from Sir H Poynton to Sir 
R Luyt on the declaration of a state of emergency and the possible 
detention of all three political leaders 
[Violence peaked in British Guiana during the first half of 1964, the numbers killed 
between January and July being estimated at 136 and those injured at 778. Janet Jagan 
resigned her position as minister for home affairs on 2 June and the governor took over 
her department. Two days later a state of emergency was declared.] 
Begins. Special meeting of Privy Council is being held this week probably Thursday 
for other urgent business. Secretary of State thinks it would be wise to take this 
opportunity of making British Guiana (Emergency Provisions) Order 1964 so as to 
authorise you to exercise, in your discretion, the powers conferred on you by the 
Emergency Provisions Order in Council 1939. This would give you discretionary 
power to make emergency regulations (including regulations amending or revoking 
those that you have already made on ministerial advice) and would also give you 
discretionary power to terminate emergency, i.e. to direct that Part II of the 
Emergency Powers Order shall cease to have effect. (Premier would thus be unable to 
advise termination of emergency if he were to dislike any regulation made by you). 
You have already seen draft of above Order, but it is being amended on Secretary of 
State's instructions and revised text will be telegraphed to you. Order could, if you 
felt it desirable, be kept secret until it was necessary to make use of it. Please let us 
know your view by 12.00 hours G.M.T. tomorrow (Wednesday). 
2. Secretary of State would like your views as soon as possible but not necessarily 
within above time limit on the risk that the giving of such powers to you would cause 
Jagan to resign or, if he did not resign, to wash his hands of the running of the 
emergency. Latter might be no bad thing. What do you think? 
3. Secretary of State would also like your views whether it would be wise to 
detain all three political leaders and remove all Ministers from office and even if need 
be exile them or some of them. He had in mind possibility of forming a temporary 
nominated "national" government drawn from any section of the community who 
would respond and carry on until general election. 
4. We should have to consider what legal instruments would be required to make 
it possible to establish such temporary government, but before we give further 
thought to this, do you consider such policy would be effective or wise? Ends. 
222 CO 1031/4411, no 15 28 May 1964 
[British Guiana]: inward telegram (reply) no 258 from Sir R Luyt to 
Sir H Poynton. Minute by Poynton 
Your telegram Personal No. 211.1 
Upon my return to Georgetown yesterday I saw your telegram No. 211 and the 
reply sent by Rose in his telegram No. 254. I support his view that the British Guiana 
(Emergency Provisions) Order 1964 should be made now and be kept on secret use. 
1 See 221. 
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2. With reference to paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 211 I think Jagan might 
indeed resign or more probably wash his hands of the running of the emergency. I 
am not particularly keen that he should as yet take either of these steps and be able 
to point to the Order in Council as justification. This would retain for him most of 
his local support and perhaps enlarge rather than diminish his image as the 
unfairly frustrated Indian and P.P.P. leader. However, if I find that the effective 
restoration and maintenance of peace and order are being seriously and patently 
impeded by unwillingness of the Jagan administration to do their duty, I would not 
only want to use the powers of the Order in Council but would be in a position to 
tell the people the clear and impressive truth and thus either counter or minimise 
reactions. 
3. If I am to take over responsibility for running the emergency, I would 
much prefer to acquire this duty because Jagan voluntarily hands it over. The 
"Daily Chronicle" is about to launch a campaign calling upon Jagan as a national 
duty at this time to ask me to run the emergency. The Chronicle was in touch 
with me yesterday and emphasised that it is also their view that a voluntary sur-
render by Jagan of control over internal security would be much better than dis-
possession. 
4. I am not particularly optimistic as to the likelihood of a voluntary surrender 
but would like to give it a chance to occur. If, however, developments require 
bringing the Order in Council into operation at any time for important security 
reasons, I will not delay because of the preference expressed in paragraph 3 above. 
5. With regard to your paragraph 3 I would not recommend detaining all three 
political leaders. Burnham and D'Aguiar may be a nuisance on occasions but they are 
not current security threats. Indeed Burnham has been positively helpful on 
occasions as regards Georgetown. They both want elections soon and do not want to 
rock the boat unduly. I reserve judgement on Jagan. He is possibly not personally 
promoting violence but he seemingly does nothing to keep his colleagues in the 
P.P.P., P.Y.O. and G.A.W.U. in order. 
6. If the three leaders were removed from the scene I doubt whether I could form 
a temporary nominated national government of much worth or influence. No 
ambitious politician would touch it and with independence in the offing local people 
generally would not wish to be tainted with service for the Imperialists. 
7. Furthermore, merely knocking the head off the P.P.P. would not be likely to 
achieve stability. There are more extreme men than Jagan in the party. The chances 
of holding a 1964 election would probably also be destroyed as a campaign without 
Jagan, Burnham and D'Aguiar would be unreal and popularly unacceptable. Thus on 
present form I do not support the proposition in your third paragraph. 
Minute on 222 
Secretary of State 
We now have the Governor's views (telegram attached) on wider issues of policy, 
including the idea that there might be advantage in locking up the three political 
leaders and setting up a nominated "National" Government until the elections are 
held. 
2. The pros and cons appear to be as follows:-
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Cons 
(1) The Governor would not recommend detaining the three political leaders. He 
points out that Burnham and D'Aguiar are both anxious to have elections soon, do 
not want to rock the boat unduly and have been positively helpful on occasions as 
regards Georgetown. 
(2) To lock up the three political leaders would probably inflame feeling against 
the British from not only the Indian but the African and Portuguese communities. 
It might well necessitate a postponement of elections. 
(3) Such action would give the United Nations, and others critical of us, material 
with which to attack us again. At present our critics are handicapped by not 
knowing whether to support Jagan or Burnham. 
(4) The Governor doubts whether he could form a temporary nominated "National" 
Government of much worth or influence. With independence in the offing, local 
people generally would not wish to be tainted with service for the imperialists. 
Pros 
(1) Removal of the three political leaders and the setting up of a "National" 
Government (but see (4). above) would give the Governor a free hand in 
containing the violence. (But this might be intensified with both Africans and 
Indians against us). 
3. The Governor does not favour the idea and with respect I agree with him. The 
best way of getting rid of Jagan is, I am sure, for him to be defeated "democratically" 
at an election. 
4. The Governor agrees that an Order in Council should be made today to enable 
him to exercise his powers under the Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939, in 
his discretion. If it is brought into operation, there is a risk that Jagan might resign 
or more probably wash his hands of the running of the emergency, i.e. remain in 
office, non-co-operative but not positively obstructive. Sir R. Luyt is not keen that 
either of these should happen, but if important security reasons require bringing the 
Order into operation, he says that he will not delay for fear of the consequences. It 
seems to me that if Jagan washed his hands of the running of the emergency that 
might be no bad thing. If he were to resign (and I think this is unlikely) I see no 
alternative but Governor's rule until the elections are held. 
A.H.P. 
29.5.64 
223 H ofC Debs, vol699, cols 252-261 21 July 1964 
[British Guiana]: questions and answers in the House of Commons on 
the conduct of the emergency 
United Nations mission 
6. Mr. Brockway1 asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and 
the Colonies what action is to be taken by Her Majesty's Government on the proposal 
of the United Nations Special Committee on Colonialism that a three-member 
committee of good offices should visit British Guiana to assist in restoring harmony 
and peaceful conditions. 
1 Fenner Brockway, MP (Lab) for Eton and Slough; veteran campaigner for colonial emancipation. 
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Mr. Sandys: We have taken note of it. 
Mr. Brockway: Is the right hon. Gentleman content to allow the present critical 
situation in British Guiana to continue, with emergencies, with arrests, and with 
killings? What is his constructive proposal for a settlement of this problem? As he has 
refused a Commonwealth mission of good will, why refuse a United Nations mission 
of good will? 
Mr. Sandys: I agree that a little more good will in British Guiana would be a nice 
thing, but I do not think that further missions are likely to create it. As regards the 
proposal for a Commonwealth mission, in which I know some hon. Members have 
some interest, as the communique showed, this was discussed at the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers Meeting, but there were widely differing views about the wisdom of 
such action. 
Police and security forces 
8. Mrs. Harf2 asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the 
Colonies if he is aware that there is a lack of confidence in the political and racial 
impartiality of the police and security forces in British Guiana; and what steps he is 
taking to increase public confidence. 
Mr. Fisher: I know that the Police have been accused of partiality, but these 
accusations are quite unjustified. On the contrary, the British Guiana Police have 
done and are doing a fine job in very difficult circumstances. In recruitment to the 
Police Force and to the new Special Service Unit care is being taken to ensure that 
recruits are not drawn predominantly from any one racial group. 
Mrs. Hart: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that his whole Department is being 
exposed to charges of the gravest arrogance and deliberate unwillingness to see what 
is happening in British Guiana when he gives an Answer like that? Is he aware that 
many persons have been imprisoned without any charges being made against them, 
and that at the same time there are people who are not in prison but who are known 
by the public in British Guiana to have committed many of the outrages? Will he 
look at the way in which recruitment is carried out so that it is of such a kind that 
there can be greater confidence by that section in British Guiana which does not 
have any at the moment? 
Mr. Fisher: The racial imbalance is due to the fact that in the past there have 
been insufficient Indian recruits because they do not particularly like the disciplined 
way of life and are often not of the right physique. Over the last two years 
recruitment has been on a strict basis of parity between the two main races. If the 
hon. Lady talks about increasing public confidence in British Guiana, I think that 
that might be helped if hon. Members refrained from making quite unjustifiable 
assertions of this kind in the House of Commons. 
Mr. Clark Hutchison:3 Is my hon. Friend aware that the police and the security 
forces in British Guiana are behaving excellently and have an admirable record? Will 
he back them to the limit of his ability and do his best to counteract the 
misrepresentations from hon. Members opposite? 
Mr. Fisher: My hon. Friend is right, and we shall certainly back them to the full. 
2 Judith Hart, MP (Lab) for Lanark; minister of state, Commonwealth Office, 1966- 1967; minister for 
overseas development, 1969-1970, 1974-1975, 1977-1979. 
3 MP (Con) for Edinburgh South. 
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Detained persons 
9. Mrs. Hart asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the 
Colonies if he will arrange that the 13 African and 20 non-African members of the 
P.P.P. of British Guiana, who are among 34 individuals at present imprisoned there, 
shall be either charged and tried, or released at once. 
15. Mr. R. Edwards4 asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 
and the Colonies why the Deputy Premier of British Guiana, Mr. Brindley Benn, and 
other elected representatives who have been arrested were not brought before the 
courts immediately and indicted under the Criminal Law so that they might be given 
an opportunity to defend themselves. 
28. Mr. Femyhough 5 asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 
and the Colonies how many persons are now detained in British Guiana; for how long 
they have been detained; when they will be charged; and when they are likely to be 
tried. 
35. Mr. Lough! in 6 asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and 
the Colonies how many persons are now detained without trial in British Guiana. 
Mr. Sandys: Thirty-six persons are detained under emergency regulations. The 
period of their detention varies between four and five weeks. Three are being charged 
with sedition. No charges have yet been brought against the remainder. 
Mrs. Hart: Why is this so? How can it be justified that a British Governor, with 
emergency powers, can retain in prison people who are well known to have tried 
their best to serve the interests of their country-whatever may be the opinion of the 
Minister-without making charges against them? Is not this the most gross form of 
old-fashioned colonialism? How can the right hon. Gentleman expect to have a 
possible solution in British Guiana unless he shows some understanding of what is 
expected in standards of behaviour and standards of conduct from the British 
Government themselves? 
Mr. Sandys : I do not think the hon. Lady quite understands what emergency 
regulations are for. 
Mr. S. Silverman:7 What are they for? 
Mr. Sandys: For the public safety. It would be unusual to bring to trial people 
detained under emergency regulations. In cases where it is possible to make a charge 
and to produce witnesses who are not afraid to give evidence, those people would, of 
course, be arrested and charged under the normal criminal code. The reason why 
they are not so charged is because those circumstances do not exist. 
Mr. Edwards: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the detention of the 
Deputy Premier and four Elected Members of the Legislative Assembly has destroyed 
the majority of the Government of British Guiana? Is it not vital that these men and 
women should be charged so that they can defend themselves, otherwise the whole 
democratic system will be in ruins if the majority is destroyed by arbitrary arrests of 
this description? 
Mr. Sandys: I think that I have explained the situation. I understand the hon. 
Gentleman's feelings on these matters. He is correct in saying that the majority of 
the Government in the Legislature has been upset by this situation, but I would point 
4 MP (Lab) for Bilston. 
6 C W Loughlin, MP (Lab) for Gloucestershire West. 
5 E Fernyhough, MP (Lab) for Jarrow. 
7 J Silverman, MP (Lab) for Birmingham, Aston. 
[223) JULY 1964 623 
out that the right to detain without trial was included in the emergency powers 
assumed by Dr. Jagan's Government-the hon. Gentleman is referring to Dr. Jagan's 
majority-in the emergency both in 1962 and in 1963. 
Mr. Femyhough: Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that so long as policies of 
this kind are pursued our protests about what happens under dictatorships become 
hypocritical? Is it not time that Her Majesty's Government began to learn a little 
from history? Will not they have a look at what happened in Ireland, Nyasaland, 
Kenya and Cyprus and realise that sooner or later they will have to go back on those 
policies, as they had to do in the case of every territory that I have mentioned? 
Mr. Sandys: The hon. Member would do well to look at his history a little. There 
is no resemblance whatever between the struggles against colonial Powers in certain 
other territories and what is going on in British Guiana, where two sections of the 
population are killing each other, night by night. I consider that the Governor, with 
the full support of the British Government, should do everything in his power to 
protect innocent people from being murdered. 
Mr. F. M. Bennett:8 Is it not a fact that these charges of colonialism are entirely 
inaccurate in this context, and also that every emerging Commonwealth country on 
becoming independent has immediately reintroduced arrangements for emergency 
arrest and detention without trial-in every case more severe than the arrangements 
of the outgoing British administration? 
Mr. Bottomley:9 I recognise that exceptional measures are necessary in Southern 
Rhodesia, but does not the right hon. Gentleman agree that we should be seen to 
administer justice fairly? In the circumstances, will not he speedily submit the cases 
of those detained to a tribunal for investigation? 
Mr. Sandys: There is a tribunal, and it is operating. 
SirS. McAdden: 10 I should like to tell my right hon. Friend that there is great 
concern on both sides of the House about a situation in which people are imprisoned 
without trial, but can my right hon. Friend clear up one doubt in my mind? Do the 
figures to which his attention has been drawn refer to British Guiana-or to Ghana? 
Mr. Bottomley: Can the right hon. Gentleman say how many cases have been 
before the tribunal? 
Mr. Sandys: Not without notice. 
16. Mr. Milne 11 asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and 
the Colonies what arrangements have been made to assist families in British Guiana 
who are suffering hardship as the result of relatives being detained without trial. 
Mr. Fisher: The salaries of detainees paid from Government funds are 
continuing. The Social Assistance Department are investigating whether the families 
of other detainees are in need. 
Mr. Milne: Is the Minister aware that, whatever may be the logic of the argument 
for detention without trial, the suffering of this must not be visited upon the relatives 
of the people who are detained and that we are glad to see that steps have been taken 
to alleviate any suffering? Will the Minister, however, make every effort to ensure that 
the investigation is speeded up and that the suffering is alleviated as soon as possible? 
8 MP (Con) for Torquay. 
9 MP (Lab) for Middlesbrough East; S of S Commonwealth relations/affairs, 1964- 1966. 
10 MP (Con) for Southend East. !! E J Milne, MP (Lab) for Blyth. 
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Mr. Fisher: Yes. Recommendations to the Governor from the Assistance 
Department are expected very soon and the Governor has power to charge 
expenditure connected with the regulations against the resources of British Guiana. 
Situation 
14. Mr. R. Edwards asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 
and the Colonies whether he will make a further statement on the situation in 
British Guiana. 
31. Mr. Lough/in asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 
and the Colonies if he will make a statement on the present situation in British 
Guiana. 
Mr. Sandys: Since my statement a month ago there have been a series of further 
acts of inter-racial violence. The Governor has made new regulations and some 
additional troops have been sentto reinforce the garrison. 
Mr. Edwards: Is the Secretary of State aware that there seems to be over-
whelming evidence of massive American intervention in British Guiana? Will he 
investigate the activities of the American Central Intelligence Agency, whose agents 
seem to be able to move in and out of British Guiana without any difficulty? Does he 
agree that since the emergency has been imposed 150 people have been killed, and 
that there never was such a situation in British Guiana until democracy was 
completely eliminated from this area? 
Mr. Sandys: Is the hon. Member really suggesting that American agents are 
killing people in British Guiana? 
Mr. Edwards: Yes, I do. 
Mr. Sandys: That is a monstrous suggestion. 
An Hon. Member: The Government are creating another Cuba. 
Mr. Brockway: What is the Secretary of State's constructive proposal to deal with 
the situation in British Guiana? He cannot possibly be content with it as it is. Is he 
not now prepared to consider a United Nations mission of good will? If he is not 
prepared to accept either a Commonwealth or a United Nations mission of good will, 
what is the right hon. Gentleman's proposal to deal with the situation in British 
Guiana, which is the result of his own administration and is resulting in the killing of 
human beings? 
Mr. Sandys: The hon. Member asked exactly the same supplementary question 
on Question No. 6 and I answered it then. [HON. MEMBERS: "The Minister did not 
answer it."] 
Mr. M. Foot:12 Does not the Minister realise that there could be nothing more 
provocative than his reiterating that he does not propose to lift his finger to try to 
influence the desperate situation in British Guiana? Even if he rejects the proposals 
from Dr. Eric Williams and others, has he no single proposal of his own to try to deal 
with the situation? Is that what he is telling the House of Commons at the end of his 
whole period of dealing with the problem? 
Mr. Sandys: I explained fully my policy and my views about how we should deal 
with the situation when we had a half day's debate on the subject. Nobody from the 
12 Michael Foot, MP (Lab) for Ebbw Vale; S of S employment, 1974-1976; lord president of the Council 
and leader of the house, 1976-1979; deputy leader, Labour Party, 1976- 1980, leader, 1980- 1983. 
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benches opposite suggested-[HON. MEMBERS: "What are your suggestions?")-any 
alternative policy:-
Mr. Brockway: Yes, we did. 
Mr. Sandys: -which stood any chance of solving this problem. 
Mr. Bottomley: If the suggestion is that we suggested anything other than that 
law and order should prevail, the Secretary of State is quite right. We did, however, 
suggest ways in which he could tackle the problem. One suggestion was to send out a 
Commonwealth team, which at that time, I think, could have done some good. 
Mr. Sandys: We go on having this suggestion about a Commonwealth team. We 
have had a team from Ghana and efforts have been made by the Prime Minister of 
Trinidad and Tobago, the Prime Minister of Jamaica and the Premier of Barbados. 
They have all tried their hand at this, and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
collectively discussed it but were unable to produce any suggestions about how we 
could handle the matter which would stand a better chance of securing good results. 
I am sure that what we must do is try to maintain law and order and proceed to the 
elections, the preparations for which are going ahead. There has been registration on 
a considerable scale and I hope that we shall be able to preserve law and order 
sufficiently to hold the elections in the autumn as planned. 
Households (searches) 
17. Mr. Milne asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the 
Colonies if he is aware that household equipment is being removed from homes 
searched by troops during the present emergency in British Guiana; and what steps 
he will take to relieve the hardship thus caused. 
Mr. Fisher: I assume that the Question refers to iron piping used for blowing 
domestic fires. Iron piping has been used to make firearms and pipe grenades and 
any of this piping found during searches is therefore confiscated. This should not 
cause hardship as bamboo and other hollow stems are readily available and can be 
used instead. 
Mr. Milne: Is the Minister aware that we are glad that investigations have been 
made into this matter and to receive his assurance that alternative methods have 
been produced by the authorities to alleviate this suffering? 
Emergency Regulations (Flogging) 
25. Mr. M. Foot: asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and 
the Colonies if he will make a statement on the recent orders issued by the Governor 
of British Guiana about penalties to be imposed on those convicted of possessing 
illegal arms and ammunition. 
27. Mr. Wade 13 asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and 
the Colonies what instructions he has given to the Governor of British Guiana 
regarding the reintroduction of flogging as a punishment in the Colony. 
Mr. Sandys: The emergency regulations made on 23rd May on the advice of 
Guianese Ministers provided a variety of penalties for looting and kindred offences. 
On 7th July the Governor added the illegal possession of arms, ammunition and 
explosives to the list of offences covered by the earlier regulations. No change was 
made in the nature of the penalties prescribed. 
13 D W W Wade, MP (Lib) for Huddersfield West. 
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Mr. Foot: Whoever may have supported proposals of this kind in the past, will the 
Secretary of State tell us whether he was asked to approve these methods of 
barbarism? Does he think that it can assist in establishing democracy in British 
Guiana for the British Government and Governor to be a party to the imposition of 
flogging and life imprisonment, punishments which are more reminiscent of the 
slave trade than anything to do with democracy? 
Mr. Sandys: First, as to the question of the Governor being associated with this, I 
should like to point out that these penalties are included in the normal criminal code 
of British Guiana. My second point is that the application of these penalties to 
offences under the Emergency Regulations was introduced by the locally-elected 
Ministers of British Guiana and that the Governor was merely introducing that in 
accordance with constitutional practice. It was his duty to make whatever 
regulations the elected Ministers ask for. What he has done is to add-I should have 
thought, reasonably-to the list of offences which carry these penalties, and which 
previously included looting, the illegal possession of arms, ammunition and 
explosives. 
Mr. Wade: Does the Minister really think that the use of flogging can in any way 
help to resolve the conflict? Does it not play into the hands of these who are trying to 
blame Britain and who are suggesting that Britain is adopting reactionary measures? 
Surely, the introduction of flogging is about the worst thing to do. 
Mr. Sandys: The kind of murder and violence that is going on there is very 
reactionary. I believe that whatever measures are necessary to save life, to prevent 
murder and to bring to an end this reign of fear and terror are justified. As I have 
said, these penalties are already included in the criminal code of the country and 
have been proposed by the elected representatives of the people in British Guiana. 
Mr. Bottomley: Is not Her Majesty's Government's name involved in this, too? 
The Secretary of State takes upon himself many responsibilities for British Guiana, 
and I should have thought that in this case he could have called for the end of flog-
ging. Is he aware that at the independence celebrations in Malawi when Britain's 
stock was very high, this news was received and shocked every African there pre-
sent? 
Mr. Sandys: I hope that the right hon. Gentleman did his best to explain the true 
facts. 
Mr. Bottomley: I did. I was ashamed. 
Mr. Sandys: I hardly think that at a time when racial murders are taking place 
night after night it is the right moment to reduce penalties for violence. 
Mr. F. M. Bennett: We ought to get this matter into proper perspective. Would 
my right hon. Friend care to give the House, by one method or another, a list of the 
independent countries which have reintroduced flogging since independence, 
including flogging for simple offences such as larceny? 
Mr. M. Foot: Is it the Secretary of State's desire, as it has been the desire of some 
previous Secretaries of State, to abolish flogging throughout British territories? Why 
does he try to shelter behind somebody else's decision? Would he tell us whether he 
is in favour of flogging as a penalty in British Guiana and, if he is, does he recognise 
that he convicts himself of barbarism out of his own mouth? 
Mr. Sandys: I have made my position perfectly clear, and I have nothing to add. 
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224 PREM 13/137, pp 159-165 29 Oct 1964 
[British Guiana]: record by J 0 Wrightl of a conversation between Mr 
Wilson and Dr Jagan on the conditions under which the UK would be 
prepared to grant independence to British Guiana 
Mter an exchange of courtesies, the Prime Minister enquired whether Dr. Jagan was 
going to see the Minister for Overseas Development about the British Guiana 
development plan. Dr. lagan replied that it was rather a waste of time for him to try 
to draw up a plan if there was going to be another Government after the December 
elections. He went on to say that he had been shocked to learn from the Colonial 
Secretary that Her Majesty's Government intended to allow the Constitutional 
arrangements for elections in December to go ahead as planned. 
The Prime Minister said that he had criticised the present Constitution in the 
House of Commons when it was drawn up; at the same time he had said that he could 
not give an assurance that the Constitution would be changed when Labour returned 
to power. Her Majesty's Government had now to deal with the facts as they found 
them. The Prime Minister enquired which way Dr. Jagan thought the election would 
go. 
Dr. lagan replied that it was very difficult to say, it was a matter of a few thousand 
votes. One thing was certain: if his Party won a majority of seats and obtained more 
votes than any other party and were still not called upon to form a Government, a 
very serious situation would arise. 
The Prime Minister said that in many talks which they had had together, they had 
discussed a system in which Dr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham would work together; either 
with Dr. Jagan as President and Mr. Burnham as Prime Minister or the other way 
round. Dr. lagan said that a Government of this sort was not acceptable to Mr. 
Burnham doubtless because it was not acceptable to the United States Government. 
The Prime Minister said that with the major parties so evenly balanced what hopes 
of peace were there in British Guiana unless Mr. Burnham and Dr. Jagan could work 
together. Dr. lagan said that was why he supported co-operation on a basis of parity, 
but from the public statement only the day before, Mr. Burnham had said he would 
not co-operate with Dr. Jagan's party whether he won or lost. 
. The Prime Minister asked whether Mr. Burnham wanted independence. Dr. lagan 
said he did; but the difficulty here was that independence under Burnham could very 
easily lead to the sort of right wing dictatorship which was familiar in Latin America. 
The Prime Minister said that although he could not at present speak for the British 
Government, because the Cabinet had not yet considered the situation, he thought 
there would be a very strong opposition here in London against granting 
independence to British Guiana unless both sides had given some proof that they 
could work together. Britain could not with responsibility grant independence if it 
was likely to lead either to a blood-bath or to a right wing dictatorship. This meant 
that after the elections, all parties in British Guiana would have to demonstrate over 
a period that they could work together. 
The Prime Minister went on to say that there were a number of problems. First 
there was the problem of imbalance in the police; that was a matter which could be 
1 Private secretary to Mr Wilson. 
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dealt with without too great difficulty. Then there was the question of observers at 
the forthcoming elections. Finally there was the longer term problem of the future of 
British Guiana. Speaking quite personally the Prime Minister said that he had been 
thinking of the possibility of a visit to British Guiana of a group of Privy Counsellors 
to look at the broader problems and report back. Dr. lagan enquired what would be 
the purpose of their enquiry. The Prime Minister answered that it would be to report 
back on the basis on which independence could be granted. 
Dr. lagan said that in his view the Constitutional problem was the most urgent 
one. Would it not be better, even at this late stage, to re-examine the whole thing in 
order to bring about a situation in which there could be a Government of both major 
parties. The Prime Minister replied that he would have no objection to such a 
Government if one were formed after the elections. If the Labour Party had come to 
power in June it might have been possible to do something different; now it was too 
late and H.M.G. saw no alternative but to let the elections go forward. Dr. lagan said 
that when the Labour Party came to power he had assumed that something would be 
done; the Prime Minister replied that H.M.G. had to take the position as they found 
it. But he would repeat: he could see no question of granting independence to British 
Guiana until both sides had shown that they could work together. 
Dr. lagan thought that if no attempt was made now to postpone the elections, the 
Constitution would be more difficult to work after the elections. Mrs. White said that 
that was precisely the difference between them. Dr. lagan thought that the elections 
were the end of the road; we thought that they could be the beginning of a new 
arrangement. Had Dr. Jagan thought of the consequences of postponing elections? 
There would be great trouble and his own safety would be in jeopardy. Dr. lagan said 
that the British Government had demonstrated its ability to control crowds. 
The Prime Minister said that if Dr. Jagan won with an overall majority of seats and 
votes, the Governor would doubtless call upon him to form a Government. If he 
failed, was it his guess that Mr. Burnham would not get a majority. Sir Hilton 
Poynton said that Mr. Burnham and Mr. d'Aguiar and the small splinter parties could 
probably form a majority in the House together. 
Dr. lagan said that if his party contested, under protest, the elections and won, as 
they expected, twenty of the 35 seats and 50% of the votes or more, the position was 
fairly clear. But if they did not obtain a majority of the votes despite winning a 
majority of seats, and the Governor did not call upon them to form a Government, 
there would be grave dissatisfaction because under the old system they would have 
won and they would consider that they had been deprived of victory by the new 
Constitution. Moreover if Mr. Burnham was unable to form a Government, either in 
coalition or alone, the United States would bring their influence to bear to force the 
splinter parties to support Burnham. The United States would do anything to keep 
Dr. lagan's party out of power. 
The Prime Minister, again emphasising that the matter had not been before the 
Cabinet, felt fairly sure that there would be no support for independence for British 
Guiana unless there was proof in this country that Dr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham and 
their supporters could live together and that there was a prospect that the country 
had a viable economic future . He had thought this was true regardless of what 
Government was formed under the new Constitution; it would have been equally 
true even if Dr. Jagan had formed a Government under the previous Constitution. It 
was absolutely necessary for the two communities in British Guiana to learn to work 
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together. After the history of the past few years, no responsible Government could 
grant independence to British Guiana unless they were satisfied on this point. 
The Prime Minister said that we should look into the problem of the imbalance in 
the police force. Then there was the question of observers at the forthcoming 
elections. Finally there was the question of taking a fresh look at the whole problem 
when the elections were over. Mrs. White added that this would be the time to take 
up certain of Dr. Jagan's very interesting proposals which really had not received very 
much attention up to date. 
The Prime Minister repeated, for the third time, that there could be no question of 
independence, either for a Government run by Dr. Jagan or one run by Mr. 
Burnham, until the British Government was satisfied that British Guiana was ready 
for it. Dr. Jagan should not assume that whoever won the next elections would be 
invited to a simple constitutional conference at Marlborough House. He did not 
know what the Government would decide; but he thought that it would wish, after 
the elections, to take a fresh look at the whole situation in British Guiana and that 
they would probably wish to take the advice of a group of wise statesmen, possibly an 
all-Party group of Privy Counsellors. It would be utterly irresponsible of the United 
Kingdom to grant independence while inter-community warfare was still a 
possibility and while there was little prospect of an economical [sic] viable future for 
the country. The British Government would ensure when independence came, so far 
as was possible, that there would be no dictatorship in British Guiana either of the 
right or the left; there would be proper safeguards for that sort of thing. 
Dr. lagan said that as far as observers in the elections was [sic] concerned, he 
would rather have a United Nations observer than Commonwealth observers. He had 
lost all confidence in British officials. Even though his was now the Government that 
was running the country, the police, the judiciary and the Civil Service were all 
against him. On the question of the imbalance in the police forces, it was not merely 
a question of numbers; it was a question of the way the whole police and judicial 
system was functioning. 
The Prime Minister closed the meeting by saying that we should want to look into 
all these problems after the elections. 
Dr. Jagan left at 7.00 p.m. 
In the short conversation afterwards with Mrs. White and Sir Hilton Poynton, it 
was agreed that Commonwealth Observers at the elections were to be preferred to 
United Nations observers, since they would be appointed by the Prime Minister and 
would report back to him. 
225 FO 3711173580, no 99 11 Nov 1964 
'Jamaica- Trinidad relations': memorandum by Sir A Morley on a 
growing rift between Jamaica and Trinidad1 
When the Federation of the West Indies broke up, it was generally recognised that 
measures of continuing regional co-operation on the part of the independent British 
Caribbean countries and the existing colonies would be desirable and, indeed, in 
1 Memo enclosed with a letter of the same date from Morley to Sykes at the CRO. 
630 THE BREAK-UP OF THE FEDERATION [225] 
some matters-of which the chief were the shipping and meteorological services and 
the University-positive regional co-operation was accepted as a necessity. The lead 
in subsequent attempts to strengthen regional co-operation was taken by Trinidad, 
with Jamaica appearing to be quite content to amble along in Dr. Williams' wake; but 
the degree of success of such aims obviously depended largely upon the maintenance 
of reasonable relations between the two principal countries concerned-Trinidad 
and Jamaica. 
2. During the earlier part of 1964, signs began to appear that Jamaica was not so 
content as she had at first appeared to be to let Trinidad make the running and that, 
in particular the period of Jamaica's apparently docile acceptance of Dr. Williams' 
tendency to speak for Jamaica as well as for Trinidad and in some respects to appear 
to be running Jamaica's external policy, was coming to an end. In recent months, 
Jamaica's reluctance to continue to be led by the nose has become explicit. 
3. The first signs of an access of spirit on Jamaica's part were perhaps contained 
in Sir Alexander Bustamante's sudden attack, on the last day of the second Caribbean 
"Summit" Conference in January 1964, on Dr. Jagan and his policies and his call for 
an abandonment of these as the price to be paid for Jamaica's and Trinidad's 
intercession with the British Government for a stay on the new electoral procedures 
imposed by the Secretary of State. The effect of this was to prejudice an initiative 
which had been taken by Dr. Williams in an attempt to bring forth "a Caribbean 
solution for a Caribbean problem". While the Jamaican Prime Minister probably did 
not say anything with which Dr. Williams disagreed, his manner and timing of saying 
it could not have been to Dr. Williams' liking and it at all events put a stop to Dr. 
Williams' attempts to find a regional solution to British Guiana's problems and did 
harm to his ambitions to be regarded as the leader of the Caribbean region. 
4. The next ripple on the surface appeared in May, when Dr. Williams was 
passing through Jamaica on his way back to Trinidad after his travels in Africa, 
Europe, Canada and the United States. Dr. Williams was travelling in his own 
privately chartered aeroplane, but had so arranged matters that he would only have a 
short stop in Jamaica, allowing insufficient time even for him to leave the airport. He 
nevertheless expected Mr. Sangster, who was then Acting Jamaican Prime Minister, 
to be prepared to agree there and then to matters of important concern to both 
countries. He wanted Mr. Sangster to present himself at the airport, with his Cabinet 
colleagues in attendance, ready to endorse various plans and proposals which he had 
formulated during his travels. Mr. Sangster declined to comply. He came himself to 
the airport, however, with officials; but some acerbity was shown on both sides. 
Although Dr. Williams vented his irritation at not getting his own way by later 
referring to the ineptitude of the Jamaican Government in being unable to 
participate in discussions of this nature merely because Sir Alexander Bustamante 
was away, it is at least as likely that Mr. Sangster's reluctance to meet Dr. Williams' 
wishes on this occasion sprang from resentment at the latter's tactlessness and from 
a not unjustified sense that the time and place were not appropriate for decisions. 
5. It seems that the most important matters upon which Dr. Williams wished Mr. 
Sangster to commit himself were that the third Caribbean "Summit" meeting, which 
had been scheduled to take place in Barbados in late July, should be advanced so that 
it could take place before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, and that the 
"Summit" Conference should include in its agenda the discussion of a proposal 
(which he had mooted in Ottawa) that there should be a conference between Canada 
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and the West Indian territories to take place in the autumn at which Canadian 
relations with and aid to the West Indies would be considered; that it should receive a 
report from him on his African and North American tours; and that it should discuss 
a common line to be taken by Trinidad and Jamaica at the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers' Meeting. (There may have been other serious bones of contention; it has 
been suggested that Dr. Williams proposed that the Emperor of Ethiopia should be 
invited to Jamaica as well as to Trinidad and Mr. Sangster may well have baulked at 
such a proposal, as, apart from any other consideration, such a visit might have 
embarrassing repercussions on Jamaica's Rastafarian problem. According to Mr. 
Sangster, he had understood Dr. Williams to say that the Emperor would only come 
to the West Indies if he were invited by both Trinidad and Jamaica, and no such 
invitation had been extended by the latter.) 
6. In the event, Jamaica subsequently proposed a date in August for the third 
Caribbean "Summit"; this was rejected by Trinidad, and the "Summit" is now 
unlikely to take place before January 1965, if at all. An opportunity had thereby been 
lost for the two countries to mend their fences . Meanwhile, the situation had further 
deteriorated as a result of the antipathy which, as we understand, emerged quite 
openly between Dr. Williams and Mr. Sangster at the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers' Meeting. Moreover, Jamaicans generally took grave exception to Dr. 
Williams' television broadcast in London in which he appeared to be speaking for 
the whole of the British Caribbean when he said that the Commonwealth meant lit-
tle for this part of the world. At the same time, Jamaica incurred the wrath of 
Trinidad by Mr. Sangster's failure to support Dr. Williams' proposals, at the 
Conference, in respect of British Guiana. (In this, although Mr. Sangster was 
attacked by Mr. Manley for the Jamaican Opposition, he was quickly supported by 
Sir Alexander Bustamante and the general opinion in Jamaica was that Mr. Sangster 
had every right to express his own Government's views and had in any case said the 
right thing.) 
7. Since the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting, matters have hardly 
improved, with Jamaica taking a very poor view of Dr. Williams' reversal of his own 
Government's representative's acceptance of the Regional Shipping Council 's 
decision in April to dispose of the two Canadian ships operated by the Regional 
Shipping Service; with Dr. Williams' public attack on Sir Alexander Bustamante for 
not implementing his part of an agreed (but ·Confidential and half-baked) 
arrangement under which Jamaica and Trinidad were to have shared representation 
in Africa and Latin American countries (Trinidad's responsibility being for Africa and 
Jamaica's for Latin America); with Mr. Lightbourne, the Jamaican Minister of Trade 
and Industry, having publicly to deny press reports originating in Trinidad that there 
had been an agreement between Jamaica and Trinidad, which had been broken by the 
former, to meet in Barbados before the United Nations Trade and Development 
Conference in Geneva, with a view to determining a joint policy to be adopted at the 
conference; with the same Minister declaring that Jamaica had been unable at 
Geneva to agree with Trinidad to forego preferences for certain goods entering 
Britain; with Dr. Williams' criticism of Jamaica's handling of the application for both 
countries to be admitted to the O.A.S.; and with the assault by a burglar on Mr. 
Hector Wynter, Jamaica's High Commissioner in Trinidad-an essentially minor 
matter in itself, which was blown up to become, for a few days, a matter of serious 
concern, mainly by a flurry of largely unnecessary telegrams initiated by Sir 
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Alexander Bustamante and by the despatch to Trinidad of the Permanent Secretary 
for External Mfairs accompanied by "Investigating Officers". 
8. The result of all this is that Jamaica!frinidad relations are now in disarray; 
and while Mr. Ramcharan, the Trinidad High Commissioner in Jamaica, is always 
anxious to assure everyone that relations between the two countries are excellent, 
Dr. Williams, as reported by Sir Norman Costar, believes them to be non-existent. 
This is presumably to be interpreted to mean that, since Dr. Williams cannot get 
Jamaica's agreement to his various plans and to his outlook generally, he has written 
off Jamaica, at least for the time being, as is consistent with his usual reaction to 
opposition from any quarter. 
9. Thus, on his way back to Trinidad after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
Meeting, Dr. Williams embarked, without further reference to Jamaica, on a new 
initiative for Caribbean co-operation based on Trinidad, Puerto Rico and the 
Netherlands Antilles. In his talks with Mr. Munoz Marin2 in Puerto Rico, at which 
five joint Puerto Rican/Trinidad study groups were set up to examine the possibilities 
of the establishment of such regional schemes as shipping and air services, a 
Regional Industrial Development Bank and Regional Hurricane Insurance, Dr. 
Williams pointedly left Jamaica out of account, leaving it to Puerto Rico to make an 
approach to Jamaica at official level. 
10. It has been noted that one of what might be called the Federal remnants-
namely, the Regional Shipping Service-has figured among the areas in which 
friction between the two countries has developed. The University of the West Indies, 
the largest and most important of all the existing manifestations of the former 
Federation, is potentially the focus of an even more serious dispute. The Jamaicans 
(and at any rate Jamaican University officers), are understood to be increasingly 
disillusioned with Dr. Williams' performance as pro-Chancellor of the University and 
it would seem that, so far from Sir Arthur Lewis' creation of the post of pro-
Chancellor for Dr. Williams being the master stroke which it at first appeared to be, 
he might prove to have admitted the Trojan horse. The immediate point of dispute is 
the site of the proposed law faculty. This is a matter on which the Jamaica 
Government feel it politically impossible to give way. The purely academic 
arguments appear to be in favour of having the faculty at Mona so that it could be 
alongside the arts and social science faculties; but it appears that Dr. Williams is 
determined to get the law faculty for Trinidad, and the Jamaicans fear that he will 
improperly use his position as pro-Chancellor to this end. There is a danger that the 
dispute over this, if brought into the open, might escalate. 
11. In all these circumstances, are we to look for an eventual improvement in 
the relations between Jamaica and Trinidad, or will they continue to be 
unsatisfactory or deteriorate even further? The outlook does not appear to be very 
bright. Is there however any particular reason why Jamaica's relations with Trinidad 
should be close? It often appears to be assumed in London and elsewhere that 
because they are both former British Caribbean colonies with both attaining 
Independence at about the same time, they should have identity of interests and 
purpose. But it could be argued that the dissimilarities between the two countries are 
much more extensive and go deeper than any similarities. For instance, Trinidad's 
economy is dominated by oil, while Jamaica's is still essentially an agricultural 
2 Governor of Puerto Rico. 
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economy. Jamaica's roots as a British colonial territory are much deeper than 
Trinidad's and carry with them to a much greater extent, all the connotations of an 
original slave society. Jamaica's present Government, dominated though it may be by 
one old man with an emotional and irrational approach to things, Is much more 
broadly representative of the informed and intelligent man of affairs, than is 
Trinidad's which appears virtually to be a one-man Government; and in Jamaica 
there is a Parliamentary Opposition which commands respect; this does not seem to 
be the case in Trinidad. Jamaica's ethnic structure is not nearly so diversified as 
Trinidad's; in particular the population is not divided by a large and growing East 
Indian minority and there is virtually no admixture of French or Spanish blood. Both 
countries subscribe to the ideals of multi-racial society but the possible emergence of 
racial tension in either country cannot be discounted; if this were to happen, it would 
be likely to take differing forms in the two countries, arising from the essential 
difference in their racial structures. Finally, Jamaica is nearer geographically and in 
flying time to the United States than it is to Trinidad and the Eastern Caribbean. The 
Caribbean may be a convenient geographical regional designation for certain 
purposes; but all the indications are that Jamaica regards her political and 
economical ties with North America as being closer than those with the Caribbean. 
12. In all these circumstances it would on the whole be surprising if, with such 
"difficult" men at the head of their affairs as Dr. Williams and Sir Alexander 
Bustamante, these two countries found it particularly easy to get along with each 
other. 
226 PREM 11/137, pp 136- 139 25 Nov 1964 
[British Guiana]: record by J 0 Wright of a ministerial meeting on the 
line to be taken in discussions with the US 
The Meeting considered the line to be taken when the Prime Minister visited 
President Johnson in Washington at the beginning of December. 
The Prime Minister recalled that when Dr. Jagan had called on him on October 292 
he had informed Dr. Jagan that no British Government could grant independence to 
British Guiana unless there was proof that Dr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham and their 
supporters, and indeed the Indian and African communities in British Guiana, could 
live together in conditions of peace and stability, and that there was a prospect that 
the country had a viable economic future. 
The first thing that the Prime Minister would therefore have to tell President 
Johnson was that whoever won the forthcoming election in British Guiana there 
could be no progress towards independence until these conditions had been fulfilled. 
He himself thought that once the result of the elections were known and a 
government formed, the next step might be to send to British Guiana a group of 
Commonwealth elder statesmen who would take a completely fresh look at the 
situation on the ground and make recommendations. 
1 Ministers attending were Mr Wilson, Mr Gordon Walker, Mr D Healey (S of S defence, 1964-1970) and 
Mr Greenwood. 2 See 224. 
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[Fourth paragraph deleted and retained under section 3(4) of the Public Records 
Act, 1958] 
In discussiQn the following points were made:-
(i) A coalition between Jagan and Burnham was the pre-requisite of stability in 
British Guiana. Whichever party won the forthcoming elections, both Dr. Jagan 
and Mr. Burnham would have to be told that they must get together: perhaps the 
United States could be induced to help the attainment of a coalition. 
(ii) If there were a coalition it was very doubtful whether the United States 
Congress would sanction any aid to British Guiana: the United States Congress 
would simply not provide money for any government of which Jagan was a 
member. It was therefore better to work not for a coalition but for conciliation. 
[Sub paragraph (iii) deleted and retained under section 3(4)] 
(iv) While the United States would find it difficult to live with another Cuban 
situation in the Western hemisphere there was a danger that British Guiana might 
become a second Congo as a result of great power rivalries there. 
[Sub paragraphs (v) and (vi) deleted and retained under section 3(4)] 
Summing up, the Prime Minister said that he would be guided in his discussions 
with President Johnson by the foregoing considerations. He would emphasise that 
the British government had no intention of granting independence to British 
Guiana, whoever won the election, until they were satisfied that there was a prospect 
of a stable political and viable economic future for the country. He would also say 
that Her Majesty's Government were examining the possibility of sending a Mission 
of senior Commonwealth statesmen to British Guiana to make recommendations 
about the country's future. 
[Sentences deleted and retained under section 3(4)] 
227 FO 3711173580, no 99 27 Nov 1964 
[Jamaica- Trinidad relations]: letter from Sir N Cos tar to E L Sykes on 
the growing rift between Jamaica and Trinidad and its implications for 
UK policy in the Caribbean 
I was very interested to read Alec Morley's letter to you dated 11th November1 about 
the differences between Jamaica and Trinidad, which have come to the surface this 
year. Let me say at once that I am in very broad agreement with Morley's account and 
by and large also with his views. But there are one or two points which I should 
perhaps pick up. 
2. First of all I think it worthwhile to stress that the antipathy exists only at the 
top. I think I speak fairly for people here when I say they are not cross with Jamaica. 
They are just not very interested. This is despite their connection through the 
University of the West Indies, British West Indian Airways and the Federal Shipping 
1 See 225. 
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Service, to name just three of the remaining links which span the thousand miles or 
so from Kingston to Port of Spain. 
3. Moreover, as a gloss on the antipathy at the top, it is Dr. Williams' view that 
until the succession to Bustamante is settled there would be little point in high level 
talks between Trinidad and Jamaica. Dr. Williams sees this succession as a tussle 
between Sangster and Shearer;2 and he thinks their struggle is the cause of the 
reluctance of the Jamaican Government to be active in foreign affairs. Dr. Williams' 
antipathy is to Sangster in particular. Ellis Clarke, who was present at the meeting in 
Jamaica between Dr. Williams' and Sangster when the row developed, told me that 
Sangster was as much to blame as Dr. Williams, if not more. 
4. Another point which I think is important, is that we should avoid getting into 
a position where we might get involved in the present quarrel at the top. There is 
some risk of this happening if we try to mediate or in other ways be helpful. On the 
other hand, it is certainly a pity that the two Commonwealth countries in the 
Caribbean seem to be drifting apart, the more so as Britain is involved with them 
both, in the University, the Shipping Service (for sometime a headache to me 
personally) and in British West Indian Airways, etc. 
5. In the long term Britain will no doubt be disengaged from these particular 
involvements. But in the short term one of the difficulties which I foresee is that we 
may from time to time have to take positions which may or may not appeal to this 
side or that. To take just one example, the British attitude to Air Jamaica has already 
run us into some difficulty with Trinidad, the 90% owner of British West Indian 
Airways, and could potentially run us into substantial difficulty. Similarly any 
financial support to the University for the siting of the Faculty of Law could land us 
in trouble at one end or the other. Our problems over the Federal Shipping Service 
are well known in London. 
6. There is also the prospective West Indies Federation to consider. On personal 
grounds, the leaders of the smaller Eastern Caribbean islands share Mr. Sangster's 
view of Dr. Williams and have little affection for him. But these islands do have a 
much more substantial connection with Trinidad than with Jamaica, which is so 
much further off. There is also British Guiana where I think Dr. Williams's personal 
relations with all party leaders are as bad as elsewhere. Even so I would hope that we 
might, at some time, without seeming to meddle, be able to do something to keep 
the Eastern Caribbean Commonwealth on mutual speaking terms. 
7. So far in this letter I think I have followed Alec Morley's view that the 
Caribbean is just "a convenient geographical regional designation for certain 
purposes". But Dr. Williams would not agree with this definition, and his efforts to 
create some sort of union in the Caribbean are likely to continue. Perhaps too, he has 
some case when he dreams of a Caribbean Economic Community. The economic and 
social development of the area probably is hampered by the artificial as well as the 
natural barriers between the islands. 
8. But as I have said more than once, Dr. Williams is not the man to achieve their 
union. He woos too ardently and courts rebuff. When he gets it his love is apt to turn 
to hostility. All his affairs must proceed exactly as he wishes. In the two years since 
2 H L Shearer, Jamaican trade unionist; vice-president, Bustamante Industrial Trade Union from 1960; 
leader of government business in Senate, 1962-1967; prime minister and minister of defence and external 
affairs, 1967 -1972; leader of Opposition, 1972-1974. 
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independence, he has blown hot, blown cold, with Jamaica, Barbados, British 
Guiana, Surinam, Puerto Rico and the Netherlands Antilles. 
9. On the other hand, Dr. Williams is not the man to blame himself. In his mind, 
colonialism is the cause of most of the troubles of the Caribbean; indeed, of most of 
the troubles of the world. The theme of his book "Capitalism and Slavery" recently 
re-issued, was that Britain gave up slavery, not on humanitarian grounds, but just 
because it no longer paid. Likewise, he says that today we give up our colonies 
because they too no longer pay, and that the ex-colonial power still maintains a 
position of economic advantage. 
10. It is true that in recent years Dr. Williams has frequently condemned Britain 
for a lack (in his eyes) of a Caribbean policy.3 But this really means to him, the lack of 
a policy to bring the British Caribbean under his sway, and to help it on its way with 
a large endowment. 
11. Yet, as I have suggested, it is such a pity that this should be so when the best 
interests of the Caribbean, at any rate of the Eastern Caribbean, Trinidad, the Little 
Eight and British Guiana, probably would be served by some sort of union. 
Unfortunately it is most unlikely that Dr. Williams' methods will ever achieve this 
end, and although our relations with Dr. Williams may suffer if we fail to back his 
Caribbean initiatives, it is difficult to foresee what real British or even Caribbean 
interest would at present be served by involving ourselves too much in the cross 
currents of the Caribbean. American interests are, of course, of a different order. 
12. To sum up, I would at present advise against any avoidable involvement in 
the domesticities of the West Indies. Indeed our best interests might be served by 
further withdrawal as occasion permits. But when some of today's leading West 
Indian personalities move off the stage, more positive British encouragement of 
Caribbean co-operation might be generally welcome. This will be the time to help. 
13. I am copying this letter to Morley (Kingston), Lintott (Ottawa), Killick 
(Washington), and secret and personal to Stow (Barbados) and Luyt (British Guiana). 
3 Reporting a conversation with the prime minister of Trinidad in July 1964, Costar explained that Eric 
Williams was of the opinion that the UK should abandon its policy of 'drift' in the Caribbean and that it 
should 'do something' for the small islands, using the lever of aid to force them together: 'Surely we could 
afford to spend some money in the West Indies, and not put it only into places where we had a strategic 
interest, like Kenya and Malta. He is clearly irked at our £SOm. independence settlements for these two 
countries' (FO 371/173580, no 57, Costar to Sykes, 29 July 1964, enclosing a record of talks with Williams, 
27-28 July 1964). 
228 CO 1031/4706, no 37 Dec 1964 
'US aid proposals for the Caribbean': CO note on a new American 
initiative 
[I J M Sutherland of the UK embassy in Washington reported to the FO in Oct 1964 that 
State Dept officials (H Shullaw, director of the Office of British Commonwealth Affairs 
and R Tepper, see 220, note 4) had raised the question of the US modifying its policy of 
not giving aid to dependent territories in the Caribbean. Shullaw emphasised that the 
approach was informal but also explained that the State Dept recognised that political 
stability in the area depended on economic growth. The problem was one of how to 
persuade Congress to reverse its stand on aid policy. One answer lay in Canada's recent 
decision to increase its own aid programme to the Caribbean from 2 to 10 million dollars. 
[228] DEC 1964 637 
The US might match this, and Congressional ob-jections would be overcome if the UK 
followed suit (CO 103114706, no 27, Sutherland to FO, 13 Oct 1964, copied to CO). Within 
the CO, D Williams stressed how important it was that the US initiative should be 
followed up and that British territories should benefit: 'The aid we are giving them does 
not begin to compare with what the Dutch, the French and the Americans have done for 
their territories. Moreover, if it ever got out (as it would) that we had turned down the 
American initiative, our name would be mud in the British Caribbean' (ibid, minute by 
Williams, 30 Oct 1964). Internal inquiries in the CO revealed that in 1963 the French had 
given nearly 95 million dollars (in aid and loans) to Martinique, Guadaloupe and French 
Guiana. After a visit to the Windward Islands, Kirkness minuted: 'there is a need for a 
higher level of development assistance if we accept, as we have done tacitly for years, that 
these islands must have a level of services a good deal above what we would think 
necessary in Africa or Asia. The condition of the schools and hospitals ... is in most cases 
deplorable, because such aid as we have been able to provide has had to go to more 
important economic priorities. At the same time, we should have to watch carefully the 
effect on their recurrent budgets of any substantial increase in capital aid. The budgets 
are already showing signs of strain under the steady increase in recurrent costs arising 
out of capital development. The real problem . .. is to keep the national income moving 
up at a rate sufficient to cover the increased cost of their social services. This has been 
done so far by the dramatic expansion of banana exports from the Windwards and of 
tourism in Antigua, and to some extent Montserrat. But there are serious fears about the 
future of the banana industry and also of the other main export crops, such as cocoa. The 
biggest contribution the Americans could make would be to stop pressing us to remove 
our quantitive restrictions on dollar bananas' (ibid, minute by Kirkness, 16 Oct 1964).] 
Increase of U.K assistance 
The main feature of the United States proposals outlined in the letter from the 
Embassy to the Foreign Office of 13th October, 1964, is that the United Kingdom 
should provide additional aid funds to the Caribbean which the Americans would 
then match. It is not altogether clear how much additional money the Americans 
would envisage the British should make available. The proposal, however, has arisen 
out of the expansion of Canadian aid to the Caribbean from $2 million to $10 million 
per annum, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that the Americans are 
suggesting that we should make an additional sum of aid of between $8 m. and 
$10 m. (i.e. between £2.9 m. and £3.5 m.) available annually to the Caribbean 
(including Trinidad, Jamaica and British Honduras as well as the territories of the 
Eastern Caribbean, but not British Guiana). 
2. Over the past ten years Britain has disbursed in aid to the Caribbean area, 
including British Guiana, and Trinidad and Jamaica before independence, a sum of 
about £88 m. British aid to British Honduras and the territories of the Eastern 
Caribbean in Colonial Development and Welfare money and grant-in-aid is now 
running at about the rate of £4).{ m. a year. Despite the fact that the Americans feel 
that the British aid effort to the Caribbean compares poorly with that of the other 
metropolitan powers, our aid effort in the area is very considerable in relation to our 
other responsibilities elsewhere in the world and the relative economic levels of the 
different areas. It is therefore felt that our starting point in any discussions with the 
Americans about their proposal should be to point out that they are already a long 
way behind us in their present aid effort to this area. The same is also true of the 
Canadians. On paper, the Canadian effort in making $10m. available for expenditure 
in this area looks very good. In view of the fact however that the Canadian aid is so 
rigidly tied to Canadian exports, it is extremely doubtful whether their actual 
expenditure on aid will be commensurate with the generosity of their offer. Most of 
the aid that we make available to the dependent territories is in the form of grants, 
and the major portion of it in the Caribbean is expended on local costs. This is what 
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these territories most need; their capacity to use aid tied to imported goods and 
services is limited. 
3. Although, therefore, we might see advantage in making additional aid 
available to the Caribbean in order to entice into it fresh United States Government 
money, especially to the dependent territories, it is suggested that our point of 
departure in negotiating with the Americans should be that it would not be fair to 
ask us to match their aid by increasing our own on a dollar for dollar basis. If we are 
able to increase our aid to this area, we cannot tie the increase to the United States 
level of aid. We have to settle the question of our aid to any particular area in the 
light of our own total commitments and not those of any other power; and, in turn, 
we must judge the total commitments we can accept by their effect on our resources, 
and particularly our overseas payments. 
The form of any additional aid that may be made available 
4. It is suggested that if Britain does find it possible to make any additional aid 
available in response to this American initiative, it should be in the form of loan and 
not of grant. A very considerable proportion of the £4!4 m. a year we are now 
providing in aid to this area is already in the form of grant, and it would not be fair to 
ask us to increase this burden. Whether the aid should be in the form of hard or soft 
loans, however, will depend partly upon British aid policies generally and partly upon 
the aid policies of the other donors. It should however be noted that what West 
Indian Governments led by Dr. Williams are clamouring for is soft loans or grants 
not tied to the donor's exports. It would therefore probably be a good gesture 
politically if we could make some part at any rate of our aid available in the form of 
soft loans. 
Uniformity between the aid policies of the donor countries 
5. At present all Canadian aid is rigidly tied to Canadian exports and is not 
available except in very exceptional circumstances to contribute towards local 
costs. American policy, it is understood, has also tended in the same direction, 
though it is not so inflexible. Most of the projects for which the Caribbean 
Governments need aid include a high local cost element. For this reason it has 
proved difficult, particularly for the smaller islands, to make any use of the 
Canadian offers of assistance. If Britain does go into some kind of an aid consor-
tium with the United States and the Canadians, it is highly desirable that the three 
Governments should work towards establishing a common aid policy, and in par-
ticular that the Canadian Government should become less inflexible over this ques-
tion of local costs. Otherwise the Canadians, in particular, would merely skim off 
the export cream of any aid projects that were going and leave us to deal with the 
non-export element. 
6. Although this is the ideal to aim at, however, there can be little doubt that if 
we try to make uniformity in aid policies a pre-condition of instituting joint aid 
arrangements, no progress will be possible, particularly in view of both Canada's 
and America's balance of payments difficulties and the need for fresh legislation in 
Canada before the policy can be changed. Uniformity, therefore, is something that 
we should have to work towards over a period, not something that could be 
obtained at once. It would probably depend on the success of a move towards 
uniformity in the wider field of overall aid policy, such as the D.A.C. has been 
pursuing. 
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Machinery for administering joint aid arrangements 
7. In the correspondence so far, all the indications are that Canada, the United 
States and ourselves would prefer the aid to be given under bilateral arrangements 
but with some form of joint consultation between the donors. The alternative to this 
method of operation would be to pay over the money to a joint fund or bank and 
leave it to be administered independently. Such an arrangement would probably be 
very acceptable to Dr. Williams, who would envisage such a joint fund being under 
West Indian control. Quite apart from the fact that this kind of arrangement is not 
likely to be acceptable to the United States Congress, however, it is probable that in 
West Indian conditions it would be highly inefficient. They are so given to 
quarrelling among themselves, particularly over anything to do with money, that the 
chances of their operating a joint fund disbursing aid with any success are extremely 
remote. There would also be a loss of U.K. control over the administration of our aid 
which might be unacceptable to Parliament. 
8. Alternatively the West Indians might press for some wider international 
presence (such as the United Nations) to be involved in administering this aid. This is 
likely to prove equally unacceptable to the Americans and unlikely to produce a more 
efficient administration of the aid available, and to be open to the same objection 
from our point of view as the alternative above. This device, therefore, should also be 
avoided. 
9. Probably the most satisfactory device for co-ordinating the policies of the 
donors would be an annual meeting between the representatives of the donor 
Governments and representatives of the local Governments seeking assistance. The 
territorial development plans could be examined by experts in advance of such a 
conference, and donor countries could then decide upon which projects they were-
either severally or jointly-prepared to support, and to what extent. If a British aid 
mission is established in the area, it might be charged, among its other duties, with 
exercising a general watching brief over the execution of aid projects under these 
arrangements on behalf of all three donor countries. The British aid mission could 
also provide secretarial services for any annual meeting of the donor countries. 
229 OD 20/234 8 Feb 1965 
[US aid]: minute by Miss M Z Terry1 on the new American proposals 
[Extract] 
. . . 3. As I understand it, the Americans, who withdrew as aid donors to the British 
Caribbean dependencies after the dissolution of the old Federation, have now come 
forward with proposals for a joint (Anglo-American-Canadian) aid consortium in this 
area, primarily if not exclusively for the benefit of the dependent rather than 
independent territories.2 This is an exciting and most welcome initiative. The 
Eastern Caribbean dependencies are for the most part impoverished agricultural 
slums. They desperately need substantial injections of capital aid for development if 
they are to achieve any significant improvement in their economies. Unless 
something quite unexpected happens to the British economy, the U.K. Government 
1 Terry is listed in the CO list for 1965 but she was working in the ODM. 2 See 228. 
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will continue, as in the recent past, to be unable to do anything substantial to help. 
We can keep them ticking over at their present low level by means of our grant in aid 
"dole", and give what extra we can for development through such channels as C.D. & 
W. and the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. But unless our development aid can 
be doubled or trebled (and at present it seems more likely to be cut) we can do 
nothing really effective to promote reasonably quick and substantial improvements 
in the economies. Since there is virtually no local capital available to promote 
development, the only hope is to attract external capital aid from non-U.K. sources. 
4. Against this background the American initiative is extraordinarily welcome, 
particularly at a time when we had given up hope of U.S. aid for these dependencies. 
Almost certainly, at the outset the Americans would not be able to put in very large 
sums, but the important thing would be that they would be committed in principle 
to giving aid in this area. The door would be open, and the way made clear for bigger 
and better things in the future. Because of the implicit potential in this offer, we 
should, I believe, firmly grasp the opportunity offered to us and give this initiative 
our full support. 
5. As I understand the position as discussed at the meeting on the 18th 
December, the U.S. representatives have made it clear that for the purpose of an 
approach to Congress they will need a further joint economic study of the needs of 
the area. To those of us who know too well how often in the past this ground has 
already been covered, this may well seem an irritating and pointless nuisance. 
Irritating it may be-but not, surely, pointless. We have to accept certain facts of life, 
one of which is that Congress will not apparently entertain these proposals unless 
the presentational point can be made that they are being asked to act in response to a 
"new study". If that is the price we have to pay, then it is surely more than 
worthwhile in view of the prize to be won (not simply in terms of the actual amount 
of U.S. aid likely to be forthcoming in 1966 or 1967, but for getting the Americans 
committed in this area) . There is a lot of goodwill towards us on the part of certain 
State Department officials who are genuinely keen to get U.S. aid for the British 
Caribbean dependencies, but they cannot move without Congress. They have told us 
what is needed in order to enable them to approach Congress. It seems to me that 
because of our concern for the interests of the territories in question, we should 
respond as positively and quickly as we can. 
6. It does therefore seem that we should now follow up the discussion on 18th 
December by considering the proposal for a joint economic study: that as our 
starting point we should accept the need for this in principle: and that we should 
concentrate our efforts on:-
(a) defining the terms of reference in such a way that the end result is not another 
O'Loughlin.3 We should try to aim at a reasonably modest survey which might pick 
out a number of priority projects of high development potential, rather than at a 
comprehensive survey of all the long-term economic and social needs of the area; 
and 
3 A reference to the recommendations of the survey conducted by Dr Carleen O'Loughlin, see 194, note 3 
and Carleen O'Loughlin, A Survey of Economic Potential and Capital Needs of the Leeward Islands, 
Windward Islands and Barbados, UK Department of Technical Co-Operation Overseas Research 
Publication No 5 (London, 1963). 
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(b) deciding the desirable size and composition of the team and the particular 
university etc. sources from which it might be drawn. 
Both (a) and (b) would need to be discussed first with the Colonial Office, and then, 
when we had formed some clearer ideas, with U.S. officials from the Embassy. I 
would recommend that action on these lines should now be started. 
7. Although it would be nice to know at the outset how much the Americans 
are likely to put into a programme of this kind, I do not think that in the circum-
stances we can reasonably expect them to do so. This initiative has come from U.S. 
officials, not from Congress. In this country an initiative of this kind would be 
unlikely to be made without Ministerial backing, and if that was given, 
Parliamentary approval could be counted upon to follow. The American position is 
of course quite different, with Congress deeply jealous of its independence of the 
executive arm. The Americans will not therefore be able to give us any figures 
which are reliable until they have been to Congress: and to go to Congress they 
need our co-operation. In short we are being asked to commit an act of faith- but 
the stakes are high, and the immediate price (our share of a joint economic study) 
relatively low. (At the very worst, even if U.S. aid failed to materialise in the end, 
the study could well be useful if the terms of reference and membership were wisely 
chosen). 
8. Nor do I think that we need be unduly disturbed that the Americans have 
asked for an indication of our own likely aid to the area before committing 
themselves. These territories are, after all, a strictly British responsibility, (and no 
one who has seen them can be too complacent about our trusteeship). They are not 
however an American responsibility, and it is a generous and imaginative gesture 
they are making in suggesting that they might help to share our burden. 
9. Having been concerned with these territories for almost 6 years I no doubt 
feel particularly strongly about the need to grasp any opportunity to bring them 
extra help which they badly need and which we can no longer afford to give. In 
terms of the strictest expediency, however, it cannot be other than helpful to long-
term British interests to attract American aid into the area. Without substantial 
economic development, the U.K. will be forced to go on paying out grant in aid till 
the end of time, regardless of whether the islands ever achieve political indepen-
dence. 
10. I hope therefore that we can secure agreement to proceeding now on the 
general lines suggested in paragraph 6.4 
4 Sir A Dudley, deputy secretary, ODM, did not share Terry's enthusiasm for the latest US approach. 
Commenting on the preliminary discussions with US officials to which Terry refers in para 5 of her 
minute, Dudley minuted: ' . . . the Americans were really concerned only with the dependent territories, 
and were not much interested in wider planning in the Caribbean area. I could not help feeling that we 
were really talking to the wrong people, and that the discussion was pretty pointless . . . we might well find 
ourselves involved in something which would cost a good deal in the dependencies, would take up a lot of 
time of people in the dependencies, and would only serve to arouse expectations there which the 
Americans might not after all be prepared to fulfil. This in turn would place us in the embarrassing 
position of seeming to go back on intentions which perhaps we had never formed .. .' (ODM 20/234, 
minute by Dudley, 23 Dec 1964). 
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230 CAB 148/20, OPD(65)51 15 Mar 1965 
'East Caribbean Federation': memorandum by Mr Greenwood for 
Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee on the options for UK 
policy. Annex [Extract] 
Introduction 
During February I visited Barbados, Montserrat, St. Kitts, Antigua, Dominica, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent, and Grenada, to hear views on proposals for a Federation which 
have been under consideration since January 1962. 
2. My conclusion is that important differences of view remain between those 
Governments who want to see a strong Federation set up and those who prefer a 
weak one. Further, there appears to be little popular feeling either for or against 
Federation. Nevertheless it is very much in our interest to bring it about if this can 
be done. Any other solution to the problem of the constitutional future of these 
territories is either unlikely to work or will leave the British Government with heavy 
responsibilities in the area for years to come. Moreover, I believe that with careful 
negotiation an attempt may succeed. 
3. The Annex to this paper, together with its Appendices, gives the historical and 
factual background to this problem, describes in greater detail the position now 
reached and explains my reasons for coming to the above conclusions. 
Recommendations 
4. My recommendations to my colleagues are as follows:-
(a) We should try to set up a Federation of Barbados, Antigua, St. Kitts, 
Montserrat, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent (with the hope that Grenada may 
join later) (v. Annex paragraphs 11- 14); 
(b) We should aim at securing a closely knit Federation with a strong central 
Government (v. Annex paragraph 12); 
(c) If Antigua (the proponent of a weak Federal Government) will not accept this 
type of Federation, then we should persevere with the remaining six (v. Annex 
paragraph 12); 
(d) The Federation should become independent within a reasonably short time of 
its being fully established (this will involve a short Act of Parliament) (v. Annex 
paragraph 9); 
(e) For the reasons set out in paragraphs 15- 17 of the Annex I should examine 
with other Ministers concerned the possibility of increasing British and other 
external aid to the area; 
(f) I should communicate my views to the Governments concerned in a despatch 
on the lines suggested in Appendix A, 1 which should be published, together with 
their draft Federal Scheme. 
1 Appendix A not printed. 
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Annex to 230: The constitutional future of the East Caribbean territories 
. . . 5. These preparations2 were duly put in hand, but after a general election in 
Grenada the new Government there took no part in them. With a view to a final 
conference in June 1963 a preparatory conference was convened in Barbados in May. 
Shortly before this, however, the Government of Antigua suddenly announced that 
after careful consideration of the Reports of the Fiscal Commission and the Civil 
Service Commission they considered it "inadvisable to proceed with a Federation 
based upon the recommendations of the London Conference Report (Cmnd. 1746)". 
They proposed instead thata "more modest and realistic approach to a Federation of 
the East Caribbean territories is necessary". They therefore put forward proposals 
whereby only a very limited range of services would become Federal. As a result the 
May conference was extremely confused. The main features of the proposals which 
emerged, but which were far from unanimous, were that:-
(i) the proposed Federation should be independent from the outset; 
(ii) there should be a less expensive form of Federation than that proposed in 
Cmnd. 1746 with the Federal Government having even fewer powers and 
responsibilities than its predecessor-at any rate for a period of five years from its 
inception; 
(iii) there should be positive assurances about the amount of British aid for the 
period of up to 10 years after the Federation was set up. 
6. Since then, faced with the stand taken by Antigua, most of the other 
Governments have been prepared to compromise; but St. Lucia, following a general 
election in 1964 and a change of Government, has taken a stand at the opposite 
extreme and favours giving the Federal Government maximum powers in the fields 
of economic planning and taxation. Meeting as the Regional Council of Ministers in 
December 1964, the principal Ministers of the seven territories adopted a draft 
Federal Scheme, subject to reservations by the Governments of Antigua, St. Kitts, 
Dominica and St. Lucia. The main differences between this scheme and the proposals 
of the London Conference in 1962 are described in paragraph 7 below. The Council 
also remitted detailed studies to four Committees for early report. Their intention 
was to consider the draft scheme further in the light of those reports at a meeting in 
April and, if they reached agreement then, to suggest a conference with Her Majesty's 
Government in London to reach final decisions on Federation. They suggested June 
for this conference if this would be convenient to Her Majesty's Government. The 
Premier of Barbados has stated that he will not be prepared to attend such a 
conference unless unanimity has been reached between the seven Governments. 
7. The main respects in which the draft Federal Scheme differs from the 
recommendations of the 1962 London Conference are the following:-
( a) The executive authority of the Federal Government. The London Conference 
added various subjects to the lists of items on which the Federal Legislature had 
power to legislate. It did this on the basis that the executive authority of the 
2 Paras 1- 4 of the annex, a brief survey of the history of federation in the Caribbean, are not printed. The 
'preparations' mentioned here refer to the plans to implement the federal proposals for the East Caribbean 
agreed at the Marlborough House conference in London in May 1962, see 194. 
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Federal Government would cover all matters within Federal Legislative 
competence. This is the normal provision in Federal Constitutions and was the 
case under the Constitution of the previous Federation. The result of adding 
subjects to the legislative lists was thus to increase Federal executive authority 
correspondingly. 
The draft Federal Scheme includes no precise provision about the extent of the 
Federal Government's executive powers. The omission is known to be due to the 
unwillingness of Antigua to accept the inclusion of such a provision. If the 
executive authority of the Federation does not match its legislative powers the 
Federal Government will not itself be able to administer its own legislation on all 
matters, and may not have effective power to ensure that such legislation is 
'properly administered by the Unit Governments. 
The executive authority of the Federal Government under the draft Federal 
Scheme will be further reduced because of the omission of police (except for a 
central training school and a mobile reserve) and postal services from the list of 
services then. administered by the Unit Governments which the London 
Conference agreed should be transferred to the Federal Government. 
(b) Power to remedy maladministration. The London Conference agreed that 
following a Commission of Enquiry the Governor-General should be enabled to 
dissolve a Unit Legislature if the faults revealed were not remedied. The draft 
Federal Scheme omits this provision, and offers no alternative. 
(c) Financial controls. The London Conference agreed that special attention 
should be paid to the possibility of establishing uniform and effective provisions to 
ensure proper control and supervision of the expenditure of public funds. Some 
Unit Governments have resisted acceptance of uniform procedures, and the draft 
Federal Scheme is not made contingent on their adoption. 
(d) Federal revenues. The London Conference proposed that the Federal 
Government should refund to the Units on the basis of derivation any excess which 
it deemed to exist of revenue from import duties over its needs. Under the new 
draft Federal Scheme those needs may be smaller, but it proposes that the Federal 
Government should refund a fixed percentage of this revenue. On this basis the 
Federal revenues may be inadequate and will be less flexible. The only means of 
varying the Federal revenue to meet a fall in imports or an increase in expenditure, 
will be by increasing the rates of import duties. 
(e) Economic planning. The London Conference agreed that one of the 
advantages to be gained from the establishment of a Federation would be the 
opportunity to encourage economic development by the creation of a single 
market and of machinery for economic co-operation and consultation. It was 
agreed that external assistance should be made available to the Federal 
Government and not the Unit Governments individually. These provisions appear 
to be still acceptable to the Regional Council of Ministers but I have reason to 
believe they are contemplating administrative arrangements which (contrary to 
those recommended by the Fiscal Commission) would in practice weaken the 
Federal Government's powers in economic planning. 
(f) Status of the Federation and procedure for establishment. The London 
Conference considered the establishment of a Federation which would have full 
internal self-government. Independence would be discussed only if that was the 
wish of an elected Federal Government. The draft Federal Scheme envisages 
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independence as soon as all Federal institutions have been set up. (In a despatch of 
9th August, 1963, my predecessor had agreed that "the next conference should 
take place on the basis that it will settle the terms of a Constitution for an 
independent Federation".) There are practical difficulties about the proposals in 
the draft Federal Scheme, but when those difficulties are fully understood by the 
other Governments, a compromise will doubtless be accepted under which 
independence will follow with the least practicable delay. 
Secretary of State's visit, February 1965 
8. The situation therefore as I found it during my visit was that all the 
Governments (with the exception of Grenada) expressed themselves in favour of 
forming a Federation but there are differences between them over the extent of the 
Federal Government's powers. Most Governments would prefer to see a Federation 
established with at least as much power as was proposed in Cmnd. 1746 (v. paragraph 
4 above). One (St. Lucia) would like to see it even stronger, but another (Antigua) 
wants to see it a great deal weaker. In an attempt at a compromise, the Governments 
have worked out among themselves a draft Federal Scheme on which they appear to 
be broadly agreed, though some of them (notably Antigua) have important 
reservations upon it. There is moreover an important omission from the scheme-it 
does not define the extent of the Federal Government's executive powers. The 
scheme does, however, in my view offer a basis on which we can negotiate with the 
Governments with some prospects of success for a Federation with effective powers 
in matters of regional concern which could become independent next year. 
9. During my visit, the West Indian Governments published their draft Federal 
Scheme and the reservations attached to it by some of them, together with certain 
exchanges of correspondence with my predecessor. They are due to meet again in 
April. I have promised them that I will let them have Her Majesty's Government's 
views on their proposals to be taken into account at that meeting and that these will 
be published. A suggested despatch setting out these views is attached at Appendix A. 
If their further discussions show that there is a sufficient basis of agreement between 
all parties concerned, then it is my intention that there should be a conference in 
London in July next at which I would hope final agreement could be reached. A short 
enabling Act would be required in due course. 
10. There appeared to me during my visit to be little popular feeling either for or 
against Federation. This is confirmed by West Indian Press comment since my 
departure which shows there has been little or no discussion of the proposals in the 
draft Federal Scheme. Nevertheless, in my view it is very much in our interest to 
bring about a Federation if it can be done. 
Outline of possible solutions to the problem of the constitutional future of the East 
Caribbean territories 
11. Although these territories no longer have the strategic and commercial 
importance for Britain that they had in the 18th century, they are located in an 
internationally sensitive area. Their position on America's doorstep, astride some of 
the approaches to Central America, makes them a potentially useful prize for 
, interests hostile to the West. At present there are few signs of any danger of internal 
subversion. In several of the territories, however, the present Governments are not 
very effective. The economic problems which face them-with their limited 
resources and a population which, if present trends continue, will increase from 
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750,000 to 1.5 million in the next 25 years-are very great. The situation is therefore 
potentially dangerous. Somehow we must devise a constitutional solution for the 
future of this area which offers a reasonable prospect of securing the political 
stability of these territories and promoting their economic development. 
12. There seem to be four possible constitutional futures for these territories:-
(a) The first is that they should be combined together in a reasonably strong. 
Federation which should become independent as soon as possible. A strong 
Federation is the only sensible basis on which these territories could all become 
independent since some of them are too small to sustain independence alone. It 
should create a measure of political stability in an area which is subject to fairly 
considerable international pressures; and it should enable the economic 
development of the territories to be planned regionally and give them access to 
sources of external aid not otherwise available. The difficulty is, however, that if we 
insist on the Federal Government having effective powers, Antigua will probably 
withdraw from the negotiations. This we should be prepared to accept. Even 
without Antigua, the other six territories combined would have a population of 
about 600,000 and (if present trends continue) about 1 million in 20 years' time. 
This should enable them to cut a reasonable figure on the international stage. If at 
a later date Grenada (present population estimated at 100,000) joins them, the 
argument is reinforced. Moreover, I think there is a chance that if the Federation 
is once set up and shows signs of moving to independence Antigua may, despite its 
misgivings, fall into line. If it does not, then it will have to remain, in some way or 
other, in direct relationship with the United Kingdom. It is too small to sustain 
independence on its own. 
(b) The second possibility is that we should yield to Antiguan pressure and let the 
territories combine in a weak Federation. This is not a course that I favour, 
particularly if the Federation is to move to independence. In the first place, I think 
it would alienate both Barbados and St. Lucia, and Barbados is by far the 
wealthiest and most stable in the Federation; indeed, without Barbados it might 
not be worth pursuing Federation. Moreover, I think the quarrels that would break 
out between the Unit Governments over which the Federal Government would be 
unable to exercise any effective control would rapidly destroy a weak Federation. If, 
in the meantime, the Federation had become independent, we could not remedy 
the breakdown in the way we did in 1962. 
(c) The third possibility is that the three Leeward Island territories of Antigua, 
Montserrat and St. Kitts should be grouped together, possibly in a unitary State, 
and that the same should happen to the four Windward Island territories of 
Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Dominica. Thereafter these two groupings 
should be linked in some way, perhaps in the form of a Federation with Barbados. 
At first sight this solution has its attractions, not the least of which is that it would 
make up three Units of a more equal population size (i.e., the Leeward Islands 
150,000, Barbados 250,000, the Windward Islands 370,000). Moreover, there are 
indications that the Windward Islands might be prepared to join together in a 
single group. The difficulty of this solution, however, is that the antipathy between 
the Governments of Antigua and St. Kitts is so great that they would probably 
never be willing to combine in this kind of association. I think, therefore, that this 
solution, despite its attractions, is not feasible. 
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(d) The fourth possibility is that Barbados alone should proceed to separate 
independence and that we should then offer the other territories separately some 
kind of "free association" with Britain short of full independence. Unless we can 
reach agreement about Federation on satisfactory terms within the next 12 
months, I think Barbados will probably ask for separate independence. If it does it 
would be very difficult to refuse it. The difficulty, however, about any form of free 
association is that it would still leave the United Kingdom responsible for the 
defence and the external affairs of these territories. Unfortunately, owing to their 
geographical location, their domestic policies frequently impinge upon external 
affairs. Moreover, for the past five years they have already had a considerable 
measure of internal self-government. During this period they have shown a 
tendency to boss rule and financial maladministration. The British Government 
has been able to prevent or remedy some abuses by the limited constitutional 
powers of intervention which it still possesses. Under a system of free association 
the British Government would have only very limited power to intervene if things 
went wrong. If present tendencies continue, therefore, any form of free association 
is likely sooner or later to place the British Government in an awkward position. 
13. My conclusion, therefore, is that the best course is to go for a reasonably 
strong Federation and take it to independence as soon as practicable. 
Grenada 
14. The present Government in power in Grenada wishes to continue to seek 
union with Trinidad and not to consider the possibility of joining a Federation. The 
Opposition in Grenada, led by Mr. Gairy, wants to take Grenada into a Federation. I 
am satisfied that Dr. Williams, the Prime Minister of Trinidad, for reasons of internal 
politics in Trinidad, could not bring about union with Grenada within the foreseeable 
future even if satisfactory terms could be negotiated. The best answer for Grenada, 
therefore, probably lies in its joining in a Federation with the rest of the territories in 
the Eastern Caribbean. The presence of Mr. Gairy at a conference to discuss 
Federation, however, would make a difficult negotiation even more difficult. I 
therefore think the best course is to go ahead with negotiations for a Federation with 
those territories which are ready to enter on them, leaving it open for Grenada to 
join the Federation later if it wishes. 
British aid 
15. One of the questions which will have to be settled at the next conference, if 
we succeed in convening it, is that of future British aid to the area. At one stage, the 
Governments concerned declined to come to a conference at all until the British 
Government had stated how much aid it was prepared to make available to a 
Federation during the first 10 years of its existence. They tried in fact to get the 
British Government to guarantee the finance for the full cost of the proposals of the 
Economic Survey (v. paragraph 4 (j) above) (estimated at about £59 million over a 
10-year period).3 This the British Government declined to do. Instead Her Majesty's 
Government gave them an assurance in February 1964 "that if Federation can be 
brought about on satisfactory terms, British aid will continue and that over the first 
five years of Federation, the amount will be not less than these territories are 
3 ie the O'Loughlin survey, see 194, note 3, and 229, note 3. 
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together receiving from Britain at present". They have again said that they do not 
regard this assurance as satisfactory; but they are prepared to come to a conference 
without imposing any preconditions about aid though they will not finally agree 
about Federation until the question of their external aid is decided. 
16. I am satisfied, therefore, that the question of external aid, especially British 
aid, will play a big part in the conference and that there is little possibility of securing 
a successful outcome unless satisfactory assurances are forthcoming. The matter will 
have to be examined further between now and the time of the conference. In my 
view, however, no matter how successful we may be in inducing other donors to 
supply aid, we shall have to offer more British aid in the first five years of Federation 
than the territories obtained from us in the last five years. This is a matter which I 
propose to pursue separately with the Treasury and the Ministry of Overseas 
Development. 
Other external aid 
17. The fact that the area requires so much external economic assistance lends 
urgency to the need for encouraging other external donors-notably the Americans 
and Canadians- to be active in this field. Canadian aid to the area has recently been 
stepped up. The Americans ceased giving aid when the old Federation dissolved. My 
officials are now working with officials of O.D.M. on a plan which, it is hoped, will 
succeed in inducing the Americans to renew their aid programme to these territories 
and will co-ordinate their aid effort with that of the Canadians and ourselves . ... 
Appendix B to Annex: Statistics relating to the East Caribbean territories 
Estimated Recurrent revenue Grant-in-aid C.D.W. funds 
population, (approximate) , (approximate), available, 
1965 1964 1964 1963-66 
£ £ £ 
Barbados .. . 260,000 6 million Nil 592,000 
Montserrat . .. 13,000 240,000 170,000 271,000 
St. Kitts ... 66,000 1 million 200,000 678,000 
Antigua . . . 61,000 2.1 million Nil 666,000 
Dominica .. . 70,000 800,000 220,000 738,000 
St. Lucia . .. 102,000 1.5 million Nil 682,000 
St. Vincent ... 96,000 900,000 230,000 674,000 
Grenada ... 106,000 1.4 million 300,000 587,000 
231 PREM 11/137, pp 68-74 22 Mar 1965 
'British Guiana': note by Mr Greenwood to Mr Wilson on his recent 
visit to British Guiana and proposing that independence might be 
granted in 1966. Enclosure 
[Elections were held in British Guiana in Dec 1964 under a system of proportional 
representation with the parties submitting a list of candidates in order of preference and 
the electorate voting for the party, not the individual candidate within the party. Seven 
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parties contested the election but only three won seats. With 45.84 per cent of the votes, 
the PPP won 24 seats, 3 short of a majority. The PNC won 40.52 per cent of the votes and 
22 seats, the UF 12.41 per cent of the vote and 7 seats. Jagan offered Burnham the 
premiership but the latter declined, having already been assured of UF support in a new 
coalition government. An impasse created by Jagan's refusal to resign was resolved by an 
order-in-council. He was dismissed by the governor who then invited Burnham to form a 
new government. In Mar 1965 Luyt submitted a fresh appreciation which acknowledged 
that proportional representation had failed to realise its intended purpose of breaking the 
mould of racial politics. However, his appraisal suggested that under the conditions 
prevailing in 1964, no electoral system could have broken down the racial barriers. The 
violence of 1964 had left its mark. All communities had put racial interests above any 
others. The extreme right and left within the East Indian community had voted for the 
same party, and the African community had followed the same principle. At the election 
party policies had been of little importance compared to racial fears . But at least PR had 
prevented absolute control of the government by one of the major communities and 
according to Luyt the need for minority support was already exercising a steadying 
influence on the majority African group (CO 103114408, no 383, Luyt to Greenwood, 12 
Mar 1965). British Guiana was discussed at the meeting of Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers in June 1965. Eric Williams of Trinidad was less amenable than he had been in 
1963 (see 219, para 2) , and he was critical of the UK for having ignored both his own 
suggestion that British Guiana should be placed under UN trusteeship with a UN peace-
keeping force and Ghana's proposal that the territory should be visited by a 
Commonwealth Conciliation Mission. According to Williams, the only effect of PR had 
been to remove the party in power in favour of another. The UK had aggravated racial 
divisions and outside interference had polarised the situation internationally. 
Responding, Greenwood admitted that the Labour Party in opposition had not been happy 
about PR but argued that the Labour government, which taken office only days before 
nomination day in British Guiana, had not had time to influence events. Had the election 
been delayed and the voting system changed, the government in London would have been 
accused of a breach of faith and there might have been violence and bloodshed. 
Greenwood was also insistent that UN trusteeship was not supported by the political 
parties in British Guiana (CO 1031/4409, no 495, PMM 9(65)2, 22 June 1965, minutes of 
meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers on future of dependent territories).] 
Prime Minister 
I enclose a minute setting out my present thinking on British Guiana and my 
proposals for future policy. The points I discussed there have since been the subject 
of correspondence between the Governor and myself, and, of course of further 
discussion between the Governor and Burnham. 
The main points in the minute are:-
A. The Burnharn/D'Aguiar coalition government have made a good start, 
particularly in the financial and economic fields. (Paragraphs 1-4). 
B. Their main task is to reassure the East Indian community and if possible secure 
some East Indian support. They see the need for it and are making sincere efforts 
to achieve it. (Paragraphs 2, 5, 10). 
C. Jagan was entirely unco-operative and seemed to be under the thumb of his 
associates. (Paragraphs 5 and 6). 
D. Burnham has suggested a number of amendments to the constitution but I 
have accepted only those which I believe to be necessary for the effective 
functioning of the Government. (Paragraphs 9). 
E. If, however, Burnham invites the International Commission of Jurists to study 
racial imbalance we should revert to the position as it was before June, 1964 when 
the Governor exercised emergency powers on the advice of Ministers rather than, 
as now, in his discretion. (Paragraph 10). 
F. Although things are fairly quiet at the moment we cannot rule out the risk of 
further violence, and our previous policy of saying that, before independence, we 
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need to have proof that the races can live together, puts a premium upon it. 
(Paragraphs 7, 8, 12). 
G. On the assumption that the races will never co-operate effectively so long as we 
are there to hold the ring, there is much to be said for a constitutional conference 
later this year leading, if all goes well, to independence in 1966. (Paragraphs 11-16). 
Enclosure to 231 
In this minute I outline impressions of the situation in British Guiana gained during 
my recent visit and the course of action which I think we should follow. 
2. The new Burnham/D'Aguiar coalition government is doing well. It has held 
together much better than was expected. It has re-established business confidence; it 
has put some heart into the civil service, and it is avowedly following a policy of being 
a government for all Guianese, irrespective of race. It has not yet won the confidence 
of the East Indians, but it is trying to do this. 
3. Responsibility has enhanced Mr. Burnham's stature and he speaks and 
behaves in public and in private in spite of his somewhat volatile temperament, as a 
man of integrity, maturity and good judgment. I was favourably impressed in the 
talks I had with him, both formal and informal. 
4. Mr. D'Aguiar (whose political philosophy has little in common with our own) 
has made a good beginning in handling the economic affairs of the country and has 
already achieved a good deal. He is, in fact a good business man and a sound 
administrator. For example, he has made agreements with the two bauxite 
companies, affecting their payments to government and their security of tenure, 
which are beneficial to both sides. He has also persuaded the large firms not to 
demand a repayment of the moneys due to them as a result of the court's decision 
that the previous government's National Development Savings levy was illegal, but to 
leave the money with the government in debentures. He has also launched a 
voluntary savings scheme which has been a success. He is, moreover, putting 
government finances on a much sounder basis than they were under the previous 
government. 
5. On the other side of the picture, Dr. Jagan's stature has diminished with 
defeat. He constantly harps on the past and on the injustice of which he feels himself 
to have been the victim. I tried in vain to persuade him to end his sterile boycott of 
the House of Assembly and to oppose constructively. I also tried to get him to meet 
with Mr. Burnham and myself to discuss the setting up a Commission on racial 
imbalance in the police and other sectors of Guianese life. He refused, though Mr. 
Burnham was willing. In my discussions with Dr. Jagan he put forward no 
constructive idea, and I am doubtful whether he has much freedom of decision inside 
his own party. It is, perhaps, significant that both times I met him he was 
accompanied by 2 of his colleagues who indicated to him pretty clearly that he must 
not comply with my suggestions. 
6. There is no doubt that at least some leaders of the P.P.P. are deliberately 
stoking up East Indian fears of the Africans. If left alone, I believe that many East 
Indians would accept the coalition government-at least as a constitutional 
government until the next elections-provided it maintains its present non-racial 
policy and cari establish confidence among them by giving them economic security. 
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7. Sabotage, mainly of communications and water supplies, and of arson on 
sugar estates continues on a fairly small scale, and some of the incidents may well be 
caused by other factors. Sabotage, however, could easily be developed into 
widespread violence if the P.P.P. decided that their interests lay in launching a 
wholehearted campaign of violence (see paragraph 12 below). 
8. The rice trade is a Government monopoly in British Guiana and the rice 
growers are almost all East Indians. The present Government has inherited unsold 
stocks from its predecessor-largely because of Cuba's failure to fulfil its obligations 
to the Jagan Government. These fill the godowns and, unless they can be cleared, will 
make it impossible for the new crop to be taken in. The P.P.P. propaganda machine is 
saying that the Government is deliberately trying to hurt the East Indians by not 
helping with rice. Unless the Rice Marketing Board sells its rice, a very serious 
security situation could easily build up. For this reason we have done everything we 
could to help, but not with any spectacular success. 
9. I discussed with Mr. Burnham a number of requests which he had made when 
he was over here. Most of these, if granted, would involve amendments to the consti-
tution. I took as my guiding rule that we ought not to make piecemeal amendments 
to the constitution between constitutional conferences-especially where amend-
ments were not agreed by the opposition in British Guiana (and Dr. Jagan opposes on 
principle)-unless it could be shown that they were necessary for the effective func-
tioning of government. On this basis I have agreed to changes to provide for the 
appointment of an Attorney-General from outside the House of Assembly and for the 
removing of the age limit for Puisne Judges. Other proposals, for the appointment of 
a Guianese Deputy Governor, for formal recognition of the Leader of the Opposition 
with salary, and for changes affecting the Public Service Commission, I did not accept. 
10. The most significant of Mr. Burnham's constitutional proposals relates to the 
exercise of emergency powers. He wants to revert to the pre-June 1964 position of 
the Governor exercising emergency powers on the advice of Ministers rather than as 
now, in his discretion. This, of course would be resented by the Indian population 
and I made clear to him that I could only agree if we had in return some positive 
move on his part towards dealing with racial imbalance, particularly in the police. I 
hope he will now go ahead with his idea of inviting the International Commission of 
Jurists to undertake such a mission. It should be remembered of course that we 
could always revert to the present situation if Mr. Burnham seemed to be using the 
emergency powers unfairly, and I believe therefore that at an appropriate time we 
should agree to this proposal. 
11. Mr. Burnham raised with me the question of a constitutional conference. 
The pledge given by Her Majesty's Government at the last British Guiana 
constitutional conference in October, 1963, was:-
"After the elections are over, the British Government would convene a 
conference to settle any remaining constitutional issues, and to fix a date for 
independence." 
Mr. Burnham sought a conference in British Guiana in early August, or earlier if the 
conference was to be held in London. I gave no indication whether such a conference 
would be convened. 
12. Mr. Burnham wants a conference to be followed fairly soon by independence 
and Mr. D'Aguiar who was previously opposed to independence supports him. 
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Dr. Jagan does not want independence under a Burnham government. Statements 
that independence depends on the British Government being satisfied about the 
prospects of stability and inter-racial harmony in British Guiana put a premium on 
Dr. Jagan's stirring up violence and inter-racial hatred. I think, therefore, it would be 
wrong to emphasise this line any more, and I myself refrained from doing so during 
my visit. Mr. Burnham's government hold that an early fixing of a date for 
independence by the British Government would of itself have a stabilising effect 
because it would remove at least this premium on violence. 
13. There are a number of arguments against convening an early conference. In 
his present state of mind Dr. Jagan may well refuse to attend or, if he attends, will 
probably adopt an obstructive attitude towards any proposals supported by Mr. 
Burnham. The conference in fact will be unrepresentative if Dr. Jagan boycotts it or, 
if he attends, it will fail to reach agreement on major issues. We shall not be given 
carte blanche to settle issues as my predecessor was; nevertheless, we shall have to 
reach decisions. To adjourn the conference without doing so would lose us the co-
operation of Mr. Burnham's government and put off independence indefinitely. An 
announcement of an early conference would also carry some risk that the P.P.P. 
would resort again to violence with a view to securing its postponement and that of 
the independence which it might lead up to. Finally, since a conference would 
undoubtedly subject us to strong pressure from the British Guiana Government to 
set a date for independence within a matter of months, an early conference would 
leave only a very short period in which to satisfy ourselves that British Guiana can 
safely be allowed to go to independence. 
14. On _the other hand, confronted with firm decisions by the British 
Government, first, to convene a conference and, then, to grant independence on a set 
date, there is some prospect that the Indian community might recognise the 
inevitable and make the best of the situation by acquiescing constitutionally in 
government. This in effect is what happened in Trinidad where, before the question 
of independence had been settled, the Opposition voiced grave fears about the 
predominantly African Government's attitude towards the Indian minority, but 
thereafter swallowed their fears, which they have found largely illusory. So long as 
we are there to hold the ring politicians on both sides can enjoy the advantages of 
appealing to racial interests. 
15. Provided that Mr. Burnham is prepared to continue in the way he has begun 
and, in particular, is prepared to take steps in the field of racial imbalance adequate 
to restore a measure of Indian confidence, the British Guiana Government, with 
economic help from ourselves and others, should be able to establish a regime under 
which the East Indians would find themselves faring a good deal better than they did 
under the inefficient Jagan Government. I am fully convinced that a delay will do no 
one any good, and that, in spite of the risks and difficulties involved, we ought to 
proceed to a constitutional conference in the late summer with a view to fixing an 
early date for independence. The Governor fully shares this view. 
16. I propose that we should think in terms of convening a Conference in 
London in September. Provided that Mr. Burnham could then point to a reasonable 
record of constructive government, independence might follow in early 1966. If this 
is agreed I would propose not to tell Mr. Burnham immediately of this decision. We 
should wait until the Commission on Racial Imbalance has been set up. But I think 
the announcement of the date of the Conference should be made as early after that as 
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the Governor advises is compatible with security (see paragraph 13 above). Early 
announcement of a Conference in September is probably the best chance of 
dissuading Mr. Burnham from pressing for the actual Conference to take place in 
August or even earlier and in British Guiana. The Conference itself should not, in my 
view, take place till the report of the Racial Imbalance Commission is available 
because the Commission's recommendations, and in particular the attitude of the 
British Guiana Government to them, will be relevant factors in considering the grant 
of independence at the Conference. 
17. I have not consulted any of my colleagues about these proposals; I thought I 
should clear them with you first.l 
1 Minuting Wilson on Greenwood's proposals, Sir Burke Trend observed that to the arguments against an 
early constitutional conference (para 13) two more should be added. First, an offer of early independence 
would be a reversal of the UK's previous policy that independence should not be granted until the 
communities had demonstrated that they could live together in reasonable peace and harmony: 'What is 
the justification for abandoning this basic stipulation-except the reason (which we cannot publicly avow) 
that we an! sick of trying to hold the balance between these quarrelsome people and want to wash our 
hands of them as rapidly as we can?' Secondly, the prospect of early independence would be liable to 
'excite alarm and suspicion in the United States' . For these reasons 'it might be wiser to play the whole 
thing in slightly slower time', clearance in advance being gained from both the US and Canada, the latter 
because of its substantial bauxite interest in British Guiana (PREM 13/137, pp 64-65, Trend to Wilson, 26 
Mar 1965). 
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[Immigration]: report of Lord Mountbatten's discussions with the 
governments of Jamaica and Trinidad during the visit of his 
immigration mission to the West Indies1 
Jamaica 
The Mission had an opening meeting with the Acting Prime Minister of Jamaica, 
Mr. D. B. Sangster. At this meeting Mr. Sangster was accompanied by 25 persons 
including many Ministers and senior officials. The note of this opening meeting was 
discussed at a subsequent session which was also attended by several Ministers. The 
principal points made in the discussions with the representatives of the Jamaican 
Government were embodied in the agreed note which is reproduced below. There 
were more detailed discussions with officials of one or two specific problems. 
2. The Leader, the Deputy Leader and the Secretary of the Mission also had a 
brief talk, at the suggestion of the Acting Prime Minister, with the Leader of the 
Opposition, Mr. Norman Manley. 
3. The representatives of the Jamaican Government made it clear that they could 
not publicly acquiese in any restriction on the right of their citizens to emigrate to 
Britain, and they asked that if restrictions were imposed preference should be given 
to Jamaican citizens in every respect and at every stage. 
1 Formerly supreme allied commander, South-East Asia (1943-1945) , viceroy (1947) and governor-
general (1947-1948) of India, Mountbatten had recently held the post of chief of the UK defence staff 
(1959-1965). Discussions were held with Mr Sangster, the acting prime minister of Jamaica and members 
of the Jamaican Cabinet and officials on 28 May 1965. They were held with Dr Williams and members of 
the Trinidad Cabinet and officials on 30 May 1965. 
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Note of meeting 
1. After the Acting Prime Minister had made an opening speech of welcome, and 
Lord Mountbatten had replied explaining the purposes of the Mission, Mr. Sangster 
stated the Jamaican Government's position in relation to a number of general ques-
tions affecting emigration from Jamaica to Britain. He said that Jamaica would 
deplore any form of restriction which was operated on the grounds of colour. He 
said that Jamaica had not contributed to Britain's present difficulties in so far as 
these were caused by evasions of existing controls or the difficulties in social adjust-
ment. Jamaica had more than honoured the requirements of the existing controls, 
and had made a substantial contribution to the integration of Jamaicans into the 
British community by her large and efficient Welfare Section at the High 
Commission in London, which co-operated fully with the British authorities. The 
Acting Prime Minister stated that Jamaica was not willing to administer any emigra-
tion controls on behalf of Britain, and he said that if further restrictions were 
imposed Jamaica claimed preferential treatment at all stages, in view of her particu-
lar needs and the definite contribution which she had made in the past to the British 
economy. Jamaica would also claim special treatment on the grounds of a common 
language, common social customs and common standards of behaviour and living. 
Finally Mr. Sangster said that in any arrangements that were made Jamaica consid-
ered that Commonwealth citizens should not in any way be treated worse than 
aliens. 
2. Lord Mountbatten agreed generally with the views expressed by Mr. Sangster, 
particularly on the question of evasion, and undertook that the claim of the Jamaican 
Government for special consideration would be fully reported to the British 
Government. In subsequent discussion the following points were made: 
3. In response to a question about the nature of the problem as seen by the 
British Government, the British representatives said that this was local in character 
and caused particularly by the fact that immigrants who because they were coloured 
were easily identifiable had tended to congregate in particular parts of Britain, and 
this had already given rise to some social problems because of the difficulty of 
integrating communities which tended to become self-contained. The British 
representatives described the work being done by local authority and voluntary 
organisations, and the steps now being taken by the Government to co-ordinate 
these activities at Ministerial level, and to see to what extent they needed to be 
intensified. 
4. The Jamaican representatives enquired whether any attempt had been made 
by persuasion and education to disperse the immigrant communities which had 
grown up more widely over the country as a whole. The British representatives 
described the powerful attractions, economic as well as social, which drew 
immigrants to particular areas of the country. 
5. The Jamaican representatives asked whether the British Government was 
looking at the matter from the social or the economic point of view, having regard to 
the fact that the number of unemployed appeared to be less than the number of 
vacancies. The British representatives replied that both factors had to be taken into 
account and that it must be admitted that at some points the two were in conflict. 
One of the principal tasks which the British Government was undertaking, and 
which it was one of the purposes of the Mission to contribute to, was the striking of a 
balance which was fair and reasonable between the economic requirements of 
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increased manpower and the social need to integrate immigrant workers and their 
families into the indigenous community. It was also suggested that the problem was 
in part one of educating the local British population. 
6. There was then a discussion about the voucher system now in operation and 
possible ways in which it might be changed in the future. The Jamaican 
representatives said that they would like Britain to grant fewer vouchers to those in 
Category B (those having specified skills), and more in Category A (those having 
specific jobs to come to) and also in Category C (those coming to Britain to seek for 
work). The British representatives explained that the issue of Category C vouchers 
had been suspended throughout the Commonwealth for several months, and that it 
was unlikely that any would be issued in the foreseeable future. They noted the wish 
of the Jamaican authorities that the number of those in Category B should be 
reduced, but they stated that in 1964, 1,504 Category A vouchers had been issued to 
Jamaicans, and 81 Category B vouchers, and that for the first three months of 1965 
the figures were 468 Category A vouchers and 7 Category B vouchers. The Jamaican 
representatives said that these figures did not correspond to their own figures of 
emigration from Jamaica, with respect, for example to nurses. 
7. The Jamaican representatives enquired whether there would be quantitative 
restriction on the total number of immigrants, and if so on what principles 
permission to come to Britain to work would be granted. The British representatives 
explained that it was likely that whatever qualifications and regulations were 
prescribed, the British Government would find it necessary to impose a numerical 
limit on immigration. The principles on which employment vouchers would be 
issued under those circumstances had not yet been worked out, and indeed the 
British Government wished to make these decisions in the light of the Report of the 
Immigration Mission and of such discussions as were held in London· during the 
time of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting. 
8. Reference was made to particular cases where a total of 800 applications for 
Category A vouchers on a properly organised basis had been put in hand, but where 
only five vouchers had been issued. The British representatives asked for particulars 
and undertook to have the matter investigated. 
9. The Jamaican Government representatives asked whether special 
arrangements could be made for seasonal workers or those coming to Britain to 
work for a limited period. The British representatives said that this would certainly 
be considered sympathetically by the British Government. 
10. It was suggested that one method of preventing the loss of trained persons in 
the field of nursing might be for Britain to accept student nurses rather than 
qualified nurses. The British representatives pointed out, however, that there was no 
restriction on the entry of students of all kinds, including student or trainee nurses. 
They took note of a suggestion that there might be some interchange through the 
financing in Jamaica of establishments for nursing training. 
11. As regards visitors, the British representatives made it clear in reply to 
questions that entry certificates were a facility available to those who wished to use 
them, but were not at present a requirement: nor was there any likelihood that the 
British Government would at any future date make them a requirement. The 
Jamaican representatives said, however, that the present position tended to be 
confusing and that it might be better to say openly that any intending visitor to 
Britain would be well advised to obtain an entry certificate. The mere existence of 
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entry certificates was bound in a period of more stringent control to lead to very 
close questioning of those who arrived in Britain without them. 
12. Anxiety was also expressed lest a Commonwealth citizen, particularly if he 
were coloured, who was a genuine visitor to relatives or friends established as 
immigrants in Britain would tend to be discriminated against at the port of entry on 
the assumption that because the persons he was visiting were coloured he was not a 
bona fide visitor. The British representatives gave a firm assurance that there was not 
now any bias against immigrants, students or visitors who happened to be coloured, 
and that there was no intention of allowing any such prejudice to arise in the future. 
They did, however, take note of the anxieties which had been expressed. 
13. The Jamaican representatives enquired what degree of control was exercised 
across the land frontier between Eire and Northern Ireland. The British representa-
tives said that it had been explained in Parliament, when the Commonwealth 
Immigration Bill was before it, that to establish control along this frontier would pre-
sent great difficulties and cause great hardship, and that so long as there was no evi-
dence of any substantial abuse it was not proposed to set up such controls. 
14. There was some discussion of medical examination of intending immigrants. 
The United Kingdom Government representatives proposed that there should be 
health checks on immigrants entering the United Kingdom in addition to those 
provided for in the International Sanitary Regulations. It was stated that there was 
no intention to use these requirements as a means of controlling the volume of 
immigration: and it was not proposed to exclude dependants on health grounds but 
only to ensure their good health on arrival in the United Kingdom. It was also made 
clear that the responsibility for the administration and control of the health checks 
would be that of the United Kingdom Government. The Jamaican representatives 
asked that they should be informed of the nature of the health checks proposed. 
15. Reference was made to a particular case of a fiancee who wished to join the 
man whom she intended to marry but had been refused entry. The British authorities 
offered to go into the matter with the Jamaican authorities and to furnish them with 
the particulars. 
16. There was also a reference to parts of the insurance and other fields in which 
it had been reported that discrimination was exercised in Britain against Jamaicans 
among others. The British representatives undertook to bring these reports to the 
notice of the appropriate authorities. 
17. In the course of the meeting a note was circulated of recommendations made 
by the Jamaica Council of Churches, and the British representatives undertook that 
this would be taken into consideration. 
18. It was noted that the discussions which had taken place in no way committed 
either the Jamaica or the British Governments. 
Trinidad 
The Mission attended a working dinner given by the Governor-General on their 
arrival in Trinidad. This dinner was attended by the Prime Minister of Trinidad and 
Tobago, Dr. Eric Williams. 
2. The opening discussions were followed by talks with the Prime Minister, the 
Minister of External Affairs, the Minister of Industry and Commerce, the Minister of 
Education and Culture and senior officials. 
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3. The record of these discussions was agreed at a subsequent meeting presided 
over by the Minister of Home Affairs. The note of it is reproduced below. The 
representatives of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago confined themselves in 
the main to noting what was said by the Mission and seeking clarification of 
particular points. They were concerned with the problem of immigration into 
Trinidad from the neighbouring islands, some of which are still British colonial 
territories, and they indicated that if any additional controls were imposed on 
immigration into Britain they would seek to make this the opportunity for pressing 
the British Government to place restrictions on immigration from their dependent 
territories to Trinidad. 
4. The representatives of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago also showed 
some concern that any arrangements made to establish the bona fides of students 
and to ensure that they were continuing their course should not reflect in any way 
upon the responsibility of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago for sponsoring 
and supporting students. 
Note of meeting 
1. Lord Mountbatten had explained the purposes of his mission at a working 
dinner the previous evening given by His Excellency the Governor-General and 
attended by the Prime Minister. 
2. The Prime Minister said that there was great pressure from the neighbouring 
islands, some of which were still British colonial territories, to emigrate to Trinidad. 
Between 1955 and 1963 the official figures showed that a total of 4,300 people had 
emigrated to Trinidad from the smaller islands. The true figure could not even be 
estimated, but it was certainly very large. To the extent that the United Kingdom 
exercised more stringent control over immigration there would be greater pressure 
to emigrate to Trinidad. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago asked that this 
should be taken into account by the British Government in any policy decisions they 
might make. The British representatives undertook to report these views to their 
Government. 
3. The representatives of the British Government asked what the view of the 
Government of Trindidad and Tobago would be on a proposal that health checks for 
immigrant workers, dependants and students should be carried out in the country of 
origin of the immigrant. They said that the purpose of medically examining 
dependants was not to exclude them if they were in ill-health, but to make sure that 
undetected disease was not brought into the country. Similarly, in the case of 
students the purpose of the medical check would be to ascertain that the prospective 
student's health would enable him to follow his chosen course of study. The British 
representatives said, in reply to a question, that they did not wish to duplicate 
medical examinations where these were already adequate, and if a university or other 
academic institution required a medical examination before accepting a student, that 
certificate would certainly be sufficient for the purposes of control of entry into the 
country. It was agreed that this question should be discussed in more detail between 
medical representatives. 
4. The Prime Minister enquired whether arrangements for medical checks would 
be operated on a reciprocal basis, that is whether the British Government would co-
operate with the Government of Trinidad and Tobago if they for their part were to 
require medical checks for persons emigrating to Trinidad, both from the United 
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Kingdom and from British dependent territories. The British representatives said 
that the decision as to what medical requirements should be imposed was entirely 
one for the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, and that any proposals put forward 
would certainly be considered in a co-operative spirit. 
5. The Prime Minister noted with surprise that arrangements had recently been 
introduced in Britain under which all students were admitted to Britain for a period 
of 12 months in the first instance, and had to apply for an extension to enable them 
to continue their studies. The British representatives said that so long as a person 
remained a bona fide student he would have no difficulty in getting an extension. The 
Prime Minister recognised that some control of this kind was probably necessary in 
the case of students who had made private arrangements, but in the case of students 
selected by a Commonwealth Government, supported by them during their studies 
and supervised by them, he thought that admission to Britain should be for the 
whole period of the course without any necessity for annual renewal. The British 
representatives saw no difficulties of principle in the way of making arrangements of 
this kind (subject to a condition that the student continued with his studies) on a 
Government-to-Government basis for all Commonwealth countries who wished for 
it. 
6. The British representatives said in reply to a question that there was no 
objection to bona fide students taking employment to enable them to support 
themselves in their studies. The representatives of the Government of Trinidad and 
Tobago asked what the position was for a student who ran out of funds, and whether 
he would be able to take full-time employment until he was in a financial position to 
resume his studies. The British representatives said that each such case would be 
considered on its merits, and that the determining factor was whether the person 
was in intention a bona fide student. 
7. The British representatives described the existing powers for repatriation of 
Commonwealth citizens, namely that repatriation, which was on the order of the 
Home Secretary, could only be carried out provided the person had been living in 
Britain for less than five years, had been convicted of a criminal offence punishable 
by a sentence of imprisonment, and had been recommended for deportation by the 
court. They asked what view the Government of Trinidad and Tobago would take if 
the British Government sought power to enable the Secretary of State to make a 
repatriation order in particular cases of breach of conditions of entry or evasion of 
controls. The representatives of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago thought 
that there were circumstances in which such a power was probably necessary, but 
they enquired whether this also would be on a reciprocal basis between 
Commonwealth countries. The British representatives said that there could be no 
objection of principle to reciprocity in this field. 
8. There was some discussion of the control of persons from Commonwealth 
countries entering Britain to work, and the comparative treatment extended to 
aliens. The British representatives said that the majority of aliens who came to 
Britain to work did not intend to settle permanently in the country, and the statistics 
therefore showed a frequent turnover. They confirmed that control over alien 
workers was more stringent than that applied to Commonwealth workers. Aliens 
were always admitted for a limited period only, were required to register with the 
police, and could not change the employment for which they were first admitted 
without the permission of the Ministry of Labour. 
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9. The representatives of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago asked whether 
the problems caused by the congregation of large numbers of immigrants in 
particular areas could not be avoided by admitting immigrants to the country 
(perhaps on an experimental basis) for work in areas where there were no large 
immigrant communities already existing. The British representatives said that they 
thought that the economic and social attractions towards the existing immigrant 
communities were very strong, but that they would report this proposal to Her 
Majesty's Government. 
10. The representatives of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, noting that 
aliens were admitted to Britain to work for a limited period, asked whether some of 
the vacancies so filled could not be reserved for persons from Commonwealth coun-
tries who would then be admitted for a limited period without prejudice to the 
numbers admitted under Categories A and B. In view of the distance of most 
Commonwealth countries.from Britain it was suggested that the period would need 
to be of the order of two to three years. It was also proposed that at the end of the 
specified period, favourable consideration should be given to a request from the 
individual worker to be allowed to stay permanently. The British representatives 
said that if such a proposal were accepted it would probably be necessary to require 
some form of registration, and that a person permitted to stay, notwithstanding 
that he had been admitted for a limited period, would probably have to be counted 
against the allocation of vouchers to those coming avowedly to settle in the coun-
try. The representatives of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago suggested that 
it might be possible to exercise control over this class of worker by registration 
through the offices of the High Commission in London. By this means it would be 
possible to deal throughout with any such schemes on a Government-to-
Government basis. 
11. The British representatives said that they would report these proposals to 
Her Majesty's Government and arrange for them to be considered. 
12. The British representatives asked the views of the Government of Trinidad 
and Tobago as to the types of workers who should be given priority if there had to be 
a reduction in the number of vouchers issued. The representatives of the 
Government of Trinidad and Tobago asked whether it was possible to give any 
indication of the principal kind of employment for which there would be vacancies in 
future years. The British representatives said that it was not possible to make any 
accurate forecast but that they would expect there to be a continuing demand for 
skilled building and engineering craftsmen, and in general in the semi-skilled and 
unskilled fields in which there were at present shortages. The Prime Minister of 
Trinidad and Tobago said that it would be helpful if Governments could be given 
some indication of the kinds of employment for which their citizens could be given 
preliminary training. 
13. Finally, following an enquiry by the Prime Minister, it was noted that the 
question of economic assistance to Commonwealth countries, particularly in the 
Caribbean area as a means of reducing the urge to emigrate, was outside the terms of 
reference of the Immigration Mission, but Lord Mountbatten undertook to report to 
the British Government that the matter would be the subject of separate 
representations by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago. 
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233 OD 28/80 25-28 June 1965 
[British Development Division in the Caribbean]: minutes by D AS 
Sharpl and H C G Hawkins2 
[A British Development Division in the Caribbean was established in Jan 1966 at 
Barbados. The head of the Division was W L Bell, Colonial Administrative Service, 
Uganda, 1946-1953. At the time of his secondment to the ODM and his appointment to 
the Caribbean, he was secretary to the governors, Westfield College, University of London. 
He serv.ed until 1972 and for the last two years he was also UK director, Caribbean 
Development Bank. The Development Division covered UK dependent territories in the 
Caribbean, independent Commonwealth countries (Jamaica and Trinidad) and foreign 
countries in Latin America bordering the Caribbean excluding Cuba. Although it 
subsequently withdrew its objection, the CRO at first argued for the exclusion of 
independent Commonwealth countries, especially Trinidad, on the grounds that Eric 
Williams would identify the Division as an extension of colonial influence.] 
The Colonial Office has recommended that the Division should be staffed by people 
who are able to give specialist advice on the spot to the governments of the 
dependent territories, of the sort they need for the day-to-day running of their affairs. 
At the same time these people would know what additional expert advice to ask for 
from London on particular problems. The Cokmial Office therefore suggested the 
Division should be staffed on the following lines:-
1 Head of Division 
1 Economist 
2 Financial Advisers 
1 General Agriculturist 
1 Public Works Adviser 
1 General Education Adviser 
1 Legal Draftsman 
1 Civil Aviation Adviser 
9 
The Colonial Office thinks that we should concentrate on getting the Head of the 
Division, the Economist and the two Financial Advisers very soon, with the 
Agriculturist, Education Adviser and Legal Draftsman to follow as quickly as 
possible. 
2. These comments by the Colonial Office have been copied to the C.R.O. and 
Foreign Office and we have not yet heard from them. It seems possible that they may 
think the C.O. is giving the wrong slant to the organisation. They may argue that the 
need is for specialists able by personal contact and professional ability to win the 
confidence. of those responsible for economic development in independent countries, 
and therefore the requirement is for men of high technical qualifications, long 
experience and suitable personality to play a discreet advisory role. (Indeed the 
C.R.O. may say that staff of the type envisaged by the Colonial Office will lend support 
to the view that the Development Division represents an extension of colonialism in 
a very thin disguise.) 
3. The Advisers on Agriculture, Technical Education, Engineering, Social 
Development and Housing have not replied to our request for comments as to 
1 Caribbean and Latin American Dept, ODM. 2 Economist, Geographical Division, ODM. 
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composition of the Division. However, it may be useful to consider at this stage the 
recommendations made by the Colonial Office. 
4. The decision to establish the Division was taken, I think, with three main 
purposes in view:-
(a) to make the most effective use of the T.A. and C.D.&W. funds which are 
allocated to the Region. 
(b) to provide our dependent territories with high-grade assistance in managing 
their day to day affairs. 
(c) discreet promotion of the British interest in the region. 
These might, I suppose, be broadly categorised as the O.D.M. view, the C.O. view and 
the F.O. view respectively. In principle these purposes are not mutually exclusive, but 
in practice if the Division is to consist of only about six advisers it is necessary for us 
to be clear as to the relative order of importance we are going to place these purposes 
in. 
5. To my mind, if the Division is to be established immediately, the C.O. view 
must carry the most weight. The needs of the dependent territories are the most 
immediately pressing problem, and indeed we have publicly stated that "one of its 
first tasks" will be in relation to the dependent territories-which to the ordinary 
person means the dependencies have first priority at the moment. 
6. However, if a federation or a Common Services Organisation is likely to be 
formed within a year or so of our setting up the Division, I doubt whether we should 
accept the Colonial Office view so easily. A regional organisation would really be 
better suited to carry out some of the purposes suggested for the Development 
Division by the C.O. This would leave more room to meet what I would call the 
"O.D.M. purposes" of the Division (i.e. following the lines of the M.E.D.D.). I think 
perhaps we should clarify our views on this before we meet Sir Stephen Luke and 
C.O. representatives to discuss the future of the Development Division. 
D.A.S. 
25.6.65 
I agree entirely with Mr. Sharp's analysis and suggestions in his minute of 25th June. 
2. The O.D.M. has three main purposes in establishing a Development 
Division:-
(a) To establish close contact with the recipient territories and enable us to assess 
what their aid requirements are. 
(b) To supervise the execution of the aid programme and follow up the schemes 
much more closely. 
(c) The staff of the Division to make available their own technical expertise for the 
use of the local governments. 
3. The C.O. has a rather different set of priorities, their main purpose being to 
supply various technical experts to form the nucleus of a common services 
organisation. The efficient use of aid is only a secondary purpose. They would 
therefore put (c) above as their first priority. 
4. These two approaches are clearly not mutually exclusive or even 
contradictory. The problem is mainly one of priorities. However, when we turn to 
what Mr. Sharp labels as the F.O. view, there does seem to be an element of 
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contradiction, particularly with the C.O. requirements. This emerges in Mr. Sharp's 
paragraph 2. In the dependent countries the members of the Development Division 
will have something of an executive role. In the independent countries it will be 
purely advisory. It might be difficult for the staff to maintain this distinction, and as 
Mr. Sharp suggests the independent countries may feel that a Development Division 
set up on C.O. lines is an extension of colonialism. 
5. If federation of the Little 5, 6, 7 or 8 does not come about it seems essential 
that a fully-fledged common services organisation be set up. If this happens, the 
Development Division could revert to its ODM functions and could be less narrowly 
tied to the needs of the Little Eight. The question of its location would also have to be 
considered carefully. It would no longer seem so obvious that it should be based in 
Barbados. In fact there would be strong arguments for it not being based there. 
H.C.G.H. 
28.6.65 
234 FO 371/179142, no 5 28 Sept 1965 
[Leeward and Windward Islands]: letter from Sir H Poynton to Sir P 
Gore Booth1 on future constitutional arrangements. Enclosure: 'The 
constitutional future of the Leeward and Windward Islands' 
[This document marks the point at which the CO finally abandoned its attempts to put in 
place a federation in the East Caribbean. It should be read in the context of official think-
ing about the future of smaller colonial territories more generally. In May 1965, Greenwood 
addressed a minute to the prime minister which was then circulated to the Defence and 
Oversea Policy Committee. In it he explained that 'at this stage in our Colonial history our 
main task must be to liquidate Colonialism', either by granting independence or by evolv-
ing other forms of government which would secure democratic rights for the people but 
which would .also involve some degree of association with the UK 'without any stigma of 
Colonialism'. The policy of the CO was therefore (i) to give independence to territories 
which wanted it and were capable of sustaining it, (ii) to avoid a policy of drift 'which would 
result in our having to produce ad hoc solutions in the most unfavourable circumstances', 
and (iii) to arrive at solutions acceptable to international opinion (CAB 148/21, OPD(65)89, 
31 May 1965, 'Future ofthe remaining British colonial territories', note by Sir Burke Trend 
circulating a minute by Greenwood, 26 May). The issue was discussed at the conference of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers in June 1965. In the context of the Caribbean it was sug-
gested that the UK should summon an international conference to discuss the future of all 
smaller dependent territories in the region. Eric Williams of Trinidad argued that political 
federation in the East Caribbean would not succeed and that the emphasis instead should 
be on economic aid. He contrasted the British approach with that of the French in 
Guadeloupe and the Dutch in Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles and suggested that 
without an international aid effort the basic problem of instability in the region would not 
be solved. Williams was supported by Donald Sangster, the deputy prime minster and 
finance minister of Jamaica, who also called for the reformation of the West Indies Regional 
Economic Committee. Lester Pearson, the Canadian prime minister, had no objection to 
a conference provided the US agreed. The UK likewise thought a conference worthy of con-
sideration but Greenwood reminded participants that an East Caribbean Federation was 
still under consideration and that the initiative had come from the islands concerned. This 
should be given a further chance before a more ambitious scheme was tried. The UK did 
not intend to hold up economic support until political progress had been made and 
Greenwood referred to the proposed Development Division (see 233) for the Caribbean (CO 
1031/4409, no 495, PMM 9(65)2, 22 June 1965, minutes of meeting of Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers on future of dependent territories; also CAB 133/305, PMM (UK) (65) C13 
&14, 17 June 1965). In July 1965 a conference of ministers, officials, governors, adminis-
trators, academics and other interested parties was held at Oxford under the chairmanship 
1 Permanent under-secretary of state, FO, 1965- 1969. 
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of Greenwood to consider future relations with the smaller territories more generally. The 
territories concerned were divided into four groups. British Guiana and British Honduras 
were placed in the first group which consisted of territories said to have a reasonable 
prospect of individual independence over the next few years. The second group consisted 
entirely of Caribbean dependencies-the Little Eight (the Little Seven if Barbados joined 
group one), the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands. 
Independence for these territories was said to depend on a regional solution. The third 
group consisted of territories not in receipt of budgetary aid where early independence was 
thought unlikely. It included the Bahamas and Bermuda. No Caribbean dependencies were 
placed in the fourth group, consisting of territories receiving budgetary aid and for whom 
there was no early prospect of independence. For each of the groups a number of solutions 
were considered, including the idea of association with other countries, either 
Commonwealth or foreign. The Western Samoa model was explained but rejected because 
although New Zealand was responsible for Western Samoa's external relations (in the sense 
that New Zealand acted as the agent of Western Samoa in external affairs when requested 
by the Western Samoan government), Western Samoa was in fact a fully independent coun-
try. More promising as a model were the Cook Islands which had recently opted for full 
internal self-government in continuing association with New Zealand. UN approval of such 
an arrangement was still under consideration. For the UK territories free association was 
neither a colonial relationship nor, by definition, independence. The important principle 
was that the people should decide for themselves in a manner which would be acceptable 
to international opinion. Hence provision had to be included for a transition to complete 
independence if, after a period under free association, the people of the territory wanted it 
(CAB 2115296/5, annex, conference at Lady Margaret Hall on colonial policy, 8-11 July 
1965). This, in effect, was the proposal which the CO circulated to other departments in a 
draft white paper in Aug 1965. It met with a sceptical response. The FO doubted that any 
statement of UK policy would be acceptable to the UK's most trenchant critics at the UN. 
Moreover, free association as loosely defined in the white paper was, according to the FO, 
open to objection on several counts. It would encourage countries with territorial claims 
on UK territories, including those of Guatemala on British Honduras and Venezuela on 
British Guiana, while territories the CO proposed to exclude altogether from the white 
paper proposals-which included the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar and Hong Kong-would 
be seen as a direct challenge by Argentina, Spain and China respectively. It was equally not 
clear precisely how it would be decided whether any particular territory was capable of sus-
taining separate independence. In a dispute over this with aUK dependency, the UN would 
inevitably support the dependency. The FO also warned that the US was still concerned 
about a rash of tiny independent islands in the Caribbean falling under Cuban influence. 
Above all, the prospect of dependencies being ultimately able to demand independence 
posed a potential threat, not only to the strategic interests of the UK but also to those of 
the UK's allies. Islands in the Atlantic and the Indian and Pacific Oceans were cases in point. 
From the viewpoint therefore of UK foreign policy interests, the FO advised that the white 
paper should avoid any references to independence or free association and concentrate 
instead on the UK's specific achievements and current plans (CAB 21/5296/5, Sir J Nicholls, 
permanent under-secretary of state, FO, to Eastwood, 25 Aug 1965). The Ministry ofDefence 
shared the concern that the proposed exclusions from the white paper would add to the 
UK's overseas difficulties (ibid, Sir R Melville, 2nd permanent under-secretary of state, 
MOD, to Eastwood, 25 Aug 1965). The CRO expressed reservations over the implications 
of the UK having to sponsor many more small states as members of the Commonwealth 
and argued that it would be unwise to offer free association to every territory. The CRO also 
believed that whatever policy was adopted for the smaller territories, the UK would not suc-
ceed in clearing its international image until the Rhodesian problem had been solved (ibid, 
letter from Sir N Pritchard, deputy under-secretary of state, CRO, to Eastwood, 27 Aug 
1965). The Treasury and the Ministry of Overseas Development were concerned over the 
economic implications, not only in terms of aid but also because the draft white paper had 
suggested that the CO should be replaced by a new Department of Territories Overseas 
which would have a joint establishment with the ODM (ibid, Sir P Alien, 2nd secretary, 
Treasury, to DJ Mitchell, under-secretary Treasury and principal private secretary to prime 
minister, 31 Aug 1965, and Sir A Dudley, deputy secretary, 0 D M, to Eastwood, 25 Aug 1965). 
The CO withdrew its proposed white paper but still planned to cater for all remaining depen-
dencies by way of an omnibus piece of legislation entitled 'Overseas Territories Bill'. This 
too encountered both parliamentary and departmental difficulties and the proposed bill 
was dropped in Aug 1966 when the CO finally merged with the CRO to form the 
Commonwealth Office. Territories continued therefore to be dealt with on a piecemeal basis 
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on the merits of each individual case and not, as the CO had hoped, according to generally 
accepted principles (D J Morgan, The official history of colonial development, vol 5, 
Guidance towards self-government in British colonies 1941-1971 (London, 1980) pp 
218-250, provides the background).] 
On the instructions of the Colonial Secretary, I am writing to you and the other 
recipients of this letter to seek urgent clearance for some despatches to the Leeward 
and Windward Islands about their constitutional future. The drafts are, he hopes, 
sufficiently in line with the ideas, recently discussed at O.P.D., about how to deal 
with territories to whom it would be hard to grant full independence, for it not to be 
necessary to make a formal reference to O.P.D. on them. If, however, you and the 
other recipients of this letter think otherwise, I should be grateful if you could let me 
know quickly so that the necessary machinery can be put into motion. 
2. Enclosed with this letter you will find a Memorandum explaining what the 
Secretary of State has in mind together with two appendices. Appendix I with its two 
annexes makes certain constitutional proposals to the six Leeward and Windward 
territories of Antigua, St. Kitts, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada; 
Appendix II makes a different proposal to Montserrat.2 
3. We have been trying for the past three years to combine these territories with 
Barbados in a federation. For the moment at any rate, these efforts have broken 
down.3 Most of them are now clamouring for a constitutional advance which would 
give them full internal self-government on much the same pattern as Barbados or 
British Guiana. This we should be prepared to contemplate if it were reasonable to 
assume that thereafter they would proceed to separate independence. The difficulty is 
that independence is not something which any of them appear to want at present. 
Nor is it something which, with their small populations and limited resources, any of 
them would be likely to sustain for long with any kind of political or economic 
stability. So far as purely British interests are concerned, this might not greatly 
matter. We have no great commercial or defence interests in these islands any 
longer; and the ties that we have with them are largely cultural, moral and 
sentimental. Our principal ally, the United States, is, however, very sensitive about 
2 Appendices not printed. 
3 SirS Luke toured the East Caribbean in Apr-May 1965 and reported back that the prospects of achieving 
federation were now very remote. The public was 'ignorant and apathetic' and there was a growing 
recognition of the region's lack of capable politicians and civil servants. Everywhere there was an 'extreme 
insularity of outlook' and it was therefore essential, in the absence of federation, to put in place a Common 
Services Organisation (CO 1031/4554, no 4, Luke to Greenwood, 28 May 1965). Luke also reported Mr Bird 
as being of the opinion that there was now no hope of securing a loose federation in which Antigua would 
be willing to participate. Bird had therefore decided to withdraw from the negotiations and he was 
thinking of a 'Western Samoa type of association with another Commonwealth country'. This might be the 
UK or another country closer to Antigua. Although Bird did not mention it by name, Luke assumed the 
other country to be Jamaica (ibid, no 2, record by Luke of his talk with Bird, 6 May 1965). Within the CO 
Elaine White, the parliamentary under-secretary of state, minuted: 'Continuing "Association" is essential 
for all save Barbados. Association with another Caribbean country might make good sense, but I cannot 
believe that we can wait upon such a development'. The problems surrounding the establishment of a 
Common Services Organisation were, according to White, almost as intractable as those of federation: 
'Once Barbados is out of the way, can we not take a firm line and say "Such and such- or else aid will dry 
up"? If we do not take a strong initiative now, any hope of fairly good government may pass over for ever' 
(ibid, no 10, minute by White to Greenwood, 16 June 1965). 
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anything that happens in these territories and would not welcome a situation 
developing in which Britain withdrew and left seven potential little Haitis or Cubas 
on their door-step. 
4. The scheme the Colonial Secretary is proposing for these territories is 
designed to meet this awkward dilemma. It offers them full internal self-government 
with Britain handling their defence and external affairs, but also gives Britain certain 
constitutional rights of intervention in their internal affairs to an extent necessary 
for Britain properly to discharge its defence and external affairs responsibilities. The 
arrangements likewise offer them an opportunity to proceed to separate 
independence whenever they wish; but also contain built-in safeguards designed to 
ensure that they will only take this course after due deliberation and provided an 
overwhelming majority of both their legislatures and peoples desire it-in other 
words in circumstances in which it would be extremely difficult for us to refuse it to 
them anyway, and frankly in circumstances which, on present form at any rate, are 
not very likely to arise. They would also be given the right to amend their own 
Constitutions; but the Constitutions would contain provisions (which would not be 
easily amendable) designed to ensure that these territories remained reasonably 
respectable members of the international community and not the sort of States 
whose defence and international relations Britain would find it embarrassing to be 
responsible for. 
5. It is not easy, as the earlier discussions on "free association" showed, to 
reconcile all these conflicting objectives; but the Colonial Secretary feels that, in the 
circumstances of the Caribbean, the attached proposals offer the best prospect of 
doing so-although of course success cannot be guaranteed. He thinks they will 
satisfy the demands from the territories for a bigger voice in their affairs, safeguard 
the essential interests of Britain and its allies, leave the door open for some form of 
closer association between these territories and even with their neighbours in the 
Caribbean at a later date, and also stand a fair chance of being acceptable to 
international opinion as an end of Colonial status. 
6. There is, however, one special point of difficulty to which I should like to draw 
attention. It is dealt with in paragraphs 14-16 of the Memorandum and in paragraph 
8 of the despatch at Appendix I. It concerns the constitutional power of the British 
Government over finance in these territories if these arrangements are introduced 
and of our accountability to Parliament for it. It is not an easy one to resolve. I am 
inclined to think that, if we adopt the solution under which the British Government 
retains the constitutional right to intervene in the internal affairs of these territories 
for financial matters, it will be virtually impossible to present these proposals either 
to the territories or to international opinion as "post-colonial". On the other hand, 
the Governments have shown a fair capacity in recent years for financial 
mismanagement which it has been difficult to control; and to adopt the alternative 
solution of having no constitutional powers of financial intervention does leave the 
British taxpayer with that much less protection. 
Enclosure to 234 
1. For the past three years the British Government has been in favour of 
bringing about a federation of Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands. 
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Efforts to this end have proved unsuccessful. The Colonial Secretary, in the face of 
mounting pressure from the Leeward and Windward Islands individually for full 
internal self-government, is anxious to put proposals to them in the terms of the 
attached despatches before the end of October. Barbados will have to be dealt with 
separately later. 
2. The following summarises the present position regarding the requests from 
each territory for constitutional change. 
(a) Grenada withdrew from the federal discussions in September 1962, and has 
since been trying without success to enter a unitary state with Trinidad. It has 
recently called upon the British Government to take early steps to grant "full 
internal autonomy" to Grenada. 
(b) The Barbados Government following the withdrawal of Antigua from the federal 
discussions last April, has presented a White Paper to its Legislature urging that 
Barbados should move to separate independence first, and only resume federal 
discussions after this has been granted. The two Opposition parties in Barbados (who 
at the last election commanded a majority of the popular vote) have come out 
against separate independence for the territory and the Barbados Cabinet itself is 
alleged to be split on the issue. It is not yet clear what is going to happen, and the 
British Government line on Barbadian independence cannot be decided until a 
request for it is made by the Barbadian Government. (The question of separate 
independence for Barbados, however, is only indirectly relevant to the issues 
discussed in this paper, in that the action of the Barbados Government has made it 
more difficult to seek a federal solution for the constitutional future of the Leeward 
and Windward Islands.) 
(c) The Antigua Government, since last April, has decided to take no further 
part in any federal discussions and has submitted an urgent request to the 
Colonial Secretary for full internal self-government by the end of this year. 
Antiguan Ministers are aware of the solution which New Zealand has adopted in 
the case of the Cook Islands; and the Chief Minister is making public speeches 
demanding a similar solution for Antigua. General elections are due in the ter-
ritory in November; and the Colonial Secretary in discussions with the Chief 
Minister in August, undertook to give the Antigua Government a reply to their 
request for constitutional changes before their elections took place in 
November. This is important because it sets a deadline on the date by which 
decisions have to be reached and notified to Antigua. Further, we have to recog-
nise that whatever solution is proposed for Antigua will have to be made avail-
able to any of the Leeward and Windward Islands (with the exception of 
Montserrat) who may want it. It therefore sets a deadline to the date by which 
we have to let the others have a reply to their demands for constitutional 
changes. 
(d) The St. Kitts Government has sent a demand to the Secretary of State arguing 
that, since the federal proposals are now dead, he should make an early grant of 
full internal self-government to St. Kitts, and urging him to call a conference of all 
the Leeward and Windward territories for this purpose. 
(e) The Dominica Government has supported the St. Kitts proposal and 
demanded similar treatment. 
(f) The St. Lucia Government has debated the issue in its Legislative Council and 
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sent a despatch to the Secretary of State demanding the grant of full internal self-
government by the 1st January, 1966. 
(g) The Chief Minister of Montserrat has said that his Government is reluctant to 
consider constitutional change at the moment. He thinks it should concentrate on 
economic development. 
(h) Only the Government of St. Vincent has remained silent. 
3. Under the present constitutions of these territories the Administrator is 
required to act on the advice of his Ministers except when he considers it necessary 
to act contrary to their advice in the interests of either the defence of the territory or 
the regulation of international relations or the maintenance of law and order or 
maintaining the efficiency of the judiciary or the public service. (The constitution of 
Grenada, following its suspension as a result of the financial scandals of 1962,4 for 
the time being gives the Administrator wider powers, but this is an exception). The 
constitutions of these territories therefore stop short of full internal self-government 
in that they give the Administrator certain powers in relation to defence and external 
affairs and in relation to the maintenance of law and order, the public service and the 
judiciary, and Britain has the power to disallow any law. They do not give the 
Administrator any over-riding power in the field of finance; and, in the event of 
financial scandals, the only remedies open to H.M.G. are either to stop the aid or to 
suspend the constitution. 
4. The constitutional proposals now being put forward by most of the territo-
ries are that they should become internally self-governing colonies of Britain. 
This means in practice that Britain would devolve to the dependencies full pow-
ers to manage their internal affairs whilst Britain, as the metropolitan power, 
would necessarily continue to look after defence and external affairs; power to 
alter or suspend the constitution would be reserved to the British authorities and 
Britain would thus have ultimate constitutional powers of control over the con-
duct of both the external and internal government of the territory and would, 
both in the eyes of the territory and of the outside world, be regarded as being 
responsible for the government of the territory. Experience in British Guiana and 
elsewhere has shown that unless the Colonial Government is very well-behaved, 
internal self-government on this basis only works satisfactorily as a short interim 
stage on the road to full independence. Where a Government of an internally 
self-governing territory starts to behave badly and independence is indefinitely 
delayed, this situation is the worst possible for Britain; at this stage the British 
Government has the ultimate responsibility for the government of the territory 
but no longer has an effective administrative machine in the territory under its 
control by which its policies can be implemented. The Colonial Secretary's view 
is that a constitutional relationship should be devised which will be satisfactory 
to Britain and the people of the territory in the long term, and he therefore con-
siders that full internal self-government should not be granted to any of the 
Leewards and Windwards. Instead, he is anxious to put to the Governments of 
4 See 195. 
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this area, in the course of the next month, proposals described in the attached 
despatches with their annexes. 
5. The proposals in Appendix I would be addressed to Antigua, St. Kitts, 
Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada but NOT to Montserrat (to whom a 
separate despatch would be sent as in Appendix 11). Their main feature is that 
provided certain conditions were met the British Government would be responsible 
for defence and external affairs but that, subject to the special arrangements 
described below, Britain would have no powers or responsibilities in other matters of 
government; the power to alter the constitution would cease to be in British hands 
and would pass to the territorial Legislature and electorate; accordingly the territory 
could, so long as the procedures prescribed by the constitution were observed, 
amend the constitution to make the territory independent. To enable Britain to carry 
out its responsibilities for defence and external affairs, however, the British 
Government would require to have the power:-
(i) to legislate in the interests of its defence and external affairs responsibilities. 
These powers would extend to any action in the field of internal government which 
Britain considered it necessary to take to prevent circumstances arising or 
continuing in the territory which might prejudice the discharge of Britain's 
responsibilities; 
(ii) to refer the executive action of any Unit Government to the courts to decide 
whether it was constitutional; 
(iii) to make orders having the force of law, which would ensure that the authority 
of the courts would be upheld in cases where the decision of the courts was not 
being carried out. 
Further, the features of the constitution designed to ensure that normal democra-
tic practices were followed would be deeply entrenched and not easily amendable 
or circumvented. Finally the procedure whereby these territories could proceed 
unilaterally to independence would also be so deeply entrenched that they could 
only proceed to independence if an overwhelming majority of the voters were in 
favour of it and if there had been a fairly long period of public discussion and 
deliberation. 
6. The arguments in favour of proceeding in this way in the Eastern Caribbean 
seem to the Colonial Secretary to be very strong. The first is that the West Indian 
Governments are dissatisfied with the present constitutional arrangements because 
they feel they are not masters in some parts of their own house, viz. over matters 
concerning the police and the civil service. The new proposals would give them full 
control of these matters so long as they exercised it in accordance with the 
constitution and with the rule of law. We should try so to frame the constitutions as 
to ensure that normal democratic practices were followed in dealing with these 
important subjects. 
7. Secondly, the proposals would constitutionally give the British Government 
the right to ultimate control over such aspects of the internal affairs of these 
territories as were necessary to discharge its responsibilities in the field of external 
affairs and defence. For example, they would give the British Government power to 
intervene in the event of a breakdown in law and order or of a situation developing 
which was likely to produce such a breakdown. 
8. Thirdly, they would give the courts jurisdiction to decide certain important 
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constitutional questions, and they would give the British Government the right of 
intervention in support of the courts and in upholding the constitution. 
Presentationally, this seems to the· Colonial Secretary very much better than if the 
British Government had nothing to rely on except physical force to make its 
interventions effective. 
9. Fourthly, the alternative to the arrangements proposed in the attached 
despatches would appear to be either to refuse any constitutional change at all to 
these territories, which would lead to considerable dissatisfaction and possibly 
serious unrest; or to grant them full internal self~government on the British Guiana 
pattern, which would be the worst of all possible worlds. 
10. Fifthly, the new proposals not only invite the Governments to consider some 
new form of regional co-operation in the area in a Common Services Organisation. 
They also leave the door open for some other form of closer association either in a 
federation or in a unitary state at a later date. They should therefore not be 
unwelcome to either the Federationists or Dr. Williams. 
11. Sixthly, arrangements on these lines would not only be the best way of giv-
ing these territories a full measure of control over their own internal affairs; they 
should also go some way to satisfy the Americans (who, we are told, would "be 
alarmed at the prospect of a rash of tiny independent islands in the Caribbean") and 
give them some assurance both that the islands would not easily go to separate 
independence and that the British Government will continue to be involved in the 
area. It should also go some way to satisfy those members of the Commonwealth 
who are concerned at the prospect of an increasingly large number of very small 
territories applying for Commonwealth membership. It could, however, not guaran-
tee that at a later date some of them would not opt for independence and (if they 
did so) would not also apply for membership of the U.N. and full membership of the 
Commonwealth. The first problem has recently been the subject of separate corre-
spondence between departments; while on the second we might hope that, if the 
eventuality arises, some member of the Commonwealth (other than Britain) might 
oppose their entry. 
12. The new proposals would also give the British Government the right 
unilaterally to declare these islands independent any time it wishes to do so. It seems 
to the Colonial Secretary a necessary safeguard that the British Government, on its 
side, should have the right to terminate this arrangement if for any reason it is 
proving too difficult to work, embarrassing to us internationally, or placing too great 
a strain upon our resources. 
13. One point to note is that nothing is said in the attached draft despatches 
about Citizenship. The position will be that so long as these territories remain in 
association with us, we would contemplate no change in their present citizenship 
arrangements. In conjunction with the Home Office, however, we should have to 
devise some method of ensuring that if a territory moves to independence, the 
arrangements for citizenship of the territory are satisfactory to us. 
14. One other very important point which the attached papers leave undecided is 
raised by the two alternative versions of paragraph 8, of the draft despatch at 
Appendix I; namely, is the British Government to be given any constitutional powers 
of intervention in the field of finance? This is a point on which I should particularly 
welcome your views. The first version of paragraph 8, which our Ministers very much 
prefer, would not give Britain this power. The second version of paragraph 8 would 
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give Britain the power (and would indeed give Britain greater power in this field in 
relation to these territories than it possesses at the moment).5 
15. If the first version of paragraph 8 is adopted, then it will be necessary for 
Ministers when introducing these proposals in Parliament to make it plain that the 
British Government's responsibility in relation to these territories is limited to 
certain matters affecting the proper discharge of Britain's responsibilities for their 
defence and external affairs. The arrangements would not leave us with any residual 
responsibility for other matters and, in particular, Britain would have no power to 
intervene in financial matters. In other words, we should deal with the question of 
budgetary assistance to any of these territories in the same way as we do in the case 
of an . independent Commonwealth country. Once this had been accepted by 
Parliament, we consider that our Accounting Officer would have a good defence 
against criticism by the Public Accounts Committee. It would, however, have to be 
clearly understood as a corallary to this, that under such an arra,ngement Britain 
would have no responsibility to under-write expenditure in these territories at 
whatever level might be accepted as necessary to maintain adequate standards of 
services. Britain would provide whatever budgetary assistance it thought fit, and if 
there were still a budgetary deficit thereafter, that would not be our affair. Further, if 
there were gross financial mismanagement or impropriety, we should have to 
employ the only sanction we had left, namely the stoppage of aid. This point has not 
been made clear to the territories in the draft despatch, but is implied by the 
reference in the first version of paragraph 8 to the fact that assistance would be 
provided in the same way as it is "to certain independent Commonwealth countries". 
It would be necessary to make it more explicit at some stage of the negotiations. 
16. The alternative paragraph 8 is based on the opposite assumption, i.e. that we 
must retain some responsibility to intervene in internal affairs for financial reasons. 
To insert this provision is, we feel, to admit that under these arrangements the 
territories would fall short of full internal self-government and therefore that some 
responsibility remained with H.M.G. It also follows, however, that we should thereby 
admit that we had a responsibility to maintain their public services at a certain level. 
17. It will be observed that in .the attached drafts no use is made of the phrase 
"free association". There is no suggestion in the draft despatches that these 
5 The first version of para 8 suggested that the new arrangements would not affect eligibility for CD&W 
assistance. Budgetary assistance would be made available 'in the same way as it is provided to certain 
independent countries'. It would not be necessary to give the representative of the UK government any 
special powers in relation to finance . It would, however, be necessary to have agreements with the 
governments concerned covering the conditions under which aid would be made available, whether on 
budgetary or capital account. The conditions could not at present be specified in detail but they would 
include the observance of such UK financial requirements as might be laid down, the maintenance of 
legislation on the lines of the current Finance and Audit Ordinances, and access to the accounts and 
records relating to the expenditure of funds provided by the UK government. The second version of para 8 
deleted the reference to the UK having no special powers in relation to finance. It then suggested that in 
order to meet the requirements of parliamentary control of expenditure from UK funds, the representative 
of the UK government should have a special power, in relation to any territory in receipt of budgetary 
assistance, to intervene 'for the purpose of maintaining or securing the financial and economic stability of 
the territory or of ensuring that any condition attached to any financial grant or loan made by the U.K. 
Government was complied with'. 
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arrangements, if they go through, would be presented by the British Government to 
the United Nations as a form of "free association" or as arrangements which would be 
regarded as a full measure of self-government for the purpose of terminating 
transmissions under Article 73 (e). The Colonial Office feel that provided financial 
powers were not retained there would be a reasonable case for maintaining at the 
United Nations that these arrangements amount to "a full measure of self-
government" under the Charter, but much would depend on the reception given to 
the proposals in the territories concerned. This point, however, will require to be 
considered further once the result of the United Nations debates on the Cook Islands 
is known. In the meantime, the proposals are put forward as the best possible 
solution in the circumstances to the constitutional future of these six Leeward and 
Windward Islands, and the one most likely to conform with the wishes of their 
Governments while at the same time safeguarding the essential interests of Britain 
and its allies. 
18. As explained in paragraph 5 above, these proposals would be put to six of the 
territories but not to Montserrat. Montserrat is a poor territory with only 13,000 
inhabitants. (The others have between 60,000 and 100,000). Its Government has 
made it plain that for the moment it does not want "full internal self-government", 
and may indeed not want any constitutional changes at all. It could not conceivably 
contemplate independence either now or in the foreseeable future; whereas it is just 
conceivable (though very undesirable) that the others could. It is considered that 
proposals on the lines of these put forward in Appendix 11 should deal with 
Montserrat adequately.6 
19. It is important, for reasons explained above, that the Colonial Office should 
be able to put these proposals to the Leeward and Windward Governments by about 
the end of October. For this purpose it will be necessary to have the comments of 
other Whitehall Departments not later than the 8th October, and earlier if possible. If 
these comments are favourable, it is the Colonial Secretary's wish that the proposals 
should be explained both to the Americans and the Canadians in time for him to 
discuss them further with the Americans on his visit to Washington on the 18th and 
19th October. (The Americans have already been warned that he may wish to do 
something of this kind) . At what stage anything is said to any other Commonwealth 
Government (e.g. Australia or New Zealand) should be for the C.R.O. to decide; but 
the Colonial Secretary is anxious that nothing should be said at this stage to the 
Government of Jamaica or the Government of Trinidad and Tobago. 
20. If the reaction to these proposals in Whitehall and Washington is reasonably 
favourable, and the despatch can issue by about the end of October, it is the Colonial 
Secretary's intention then to arrange for Sir Stephen Luke with a Colonial Office 
legal adviser to visit the Caribbean in November to discuss them with the 
Governments concerned. At this stage he would probably be willing to inform the 
6 In Appendix 11 it was explained that in two respects, associated status might not be appropriate for 
Montserrat. The proposals under consideration would grant to the territories concerned, not only full 
control over their own internal affairs but also-subject to special provisions-power to amend their own 
constitutions and power unilaterally to move to independence. It was considered inappropriate to give 
such powers to a small territory with insufficient material resources. Subject to the two reservations, the 
UK would be prepared to discuss similar arrangements for Montserrat but if the government of Montserrat 
so wished, the present Crown Colony constitution could be retained. 
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Governments of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago of what was afoot. Thereafter the 
proposals would be published (some time before The Queen's visit in February) for 
the purposes of debate in the legislatures and for public consideration. Then it is the 
Colonial Secretary's present intention to try to have discussions on them in the 
Caribbean during the Easter recess with a view to introducing these arrangements in 
the course of the next twelve months.7 
7 The same letter was sent to the CRO, the Treasury, the MOD, the ODM and the Cabinet Office. The FO 
replied that it had two main interests- to avoid a situation which would be indefensible at the UN and to 
prevent the 'emergence of seven little Haitis or Cubas' on the US doorstep. It was vital to consult the US 
and to have American support. On the two versions of para 8 of Appendix I, the FO appreciated the 
practical reasons for the second but also recognised that it would 'doubtless be represented by our anti-
colonial opponents, and even perhaps by those who were more impartial, as retrogressive' (FO 
371/179142, no 5, BA B Burrows to Poynton, 7 Oct 1965). 
235 CO 103114865, no 225 18 Oct 1965 
[Anglo-American discussions]: CO record of a meeting in Washington 
between Mr Greenwood and Mr Rusk on the future of colonial 
territories [Extract] 
[Greenwood visited Washington between 17 and 21 Oct 1965. The officials accompanying 
him included assistant under-secretary of state, W I 1 Wallace. Greenwood's purpose was 
to explain UK colonial policy. He found the Americans very concerned at the risk of 
proliferation of what they called 'mini states' in the UN. Their immediate anxieties had 
been roused by the grant of independence to the Maldives in July 1965 and they had 
raised this with Mr Stewart, the foreign secretary, on a recent visit. They also told 
Greenwood that they had 'small territory problems' of their own and that they greatly 
welcomed the thought already given to the problem by the UK. They had not thought 
their own problems through in the same way and in this respect they were behind the UK 
(CO 1031/4865, no 227, report by Greenwood on his visit, 5 Nov 1965).] 
Future of the colonial territories 
Mr. Rusk said it would be very useful for him to have some indication of the British 
Government's plans for the future of their remaining Colonial territories. 
The Secretary of State said that there were 31 remaining territories, with a total 
population of about 10 million, about half of which were in Hong Kong or South 
Arabia, so that 29 territories had between them a population of about 5 million. We 
were already committed to independence for some of them. 
Bechuanaland and Basutoland would become independent next year and also 
British Guiana; Mauritius with % million, by the end of 1966 or very soon after; 
South Arabia by 1968 and Swaziland perhaps in 1968. Also Barbados with %1 million 
people might seek independence and it would be difficult to withhold it. British 
Honduras has been led to expect independence when it is no longer in receipt of 
grant-in aid; the protected state of Tonga with some 70,000 people might choose 
independence and if so, we should find it difficult to prevent it. 
Of the remaining territories some were very small and there was no prospect of 
their seeking independence, for instance the Turks and Caicos Islands, Pitcairn or St. 
Helena. For them we sought to work out some form of relationship which would 
carry with it no Colonial stigma. This left about a dozen territories whose future was 
rather problematical. He thought it very unlikely that the Bahamas and Bermuda 
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would seek independence; if the Seychelles did so it would not be for a number of 
years; Fiji with its population of ~ million was not likely to seek independence for 
some time; indeed the condition on which the Fijians had attended the recent 
conference had been that independence should not be on the agenda. 
Eastern Caribbean 
The Secretary of State said that there remained the territories of the Eastern 
Caribbean and certain proposals were about to be made to them regarding the future. 
Mr. Rusk asked whether there was any chance of their combining for some kind of 
federation. 
The Secretary of State replied that we had been working for this but with no 
success. There was now a move in Barbados for independence though no proposition 
had yet been made officially to the British Government and there was a good deal of 
opposition to the idea in the island. If, however, there was a firm demand for 
independence we should find it difficult to refuse it. The remaining 7 territories were 
the real problem. We had no vital interests in them but we recognised a moral 
responsibility and a responsibility not to prejudice the interests of our friends. 
Mr. Rusk asked how far it would be possible to follow the model of Puerto Rico; 
they had the best of both worlds, with free entry to the American market but no 
liability to pay American taxes and they could amend their Constitution as they 
wished. 
The Secretary of State said that a despatch was about to be sent to the territories 
proposing a form of associated status for them.1 This would give them complete 
responsibility for their internal affairs. We should remain responsible for defence and 
foreign policy and would have power to intervene in internal affairs to the extent 
necessary to allow us properly to discharge these responsibilities and to seek a court 
judgment as to whether they were acting unconstitutionally. They would be able to 
change their constitutions unilaterally-even to the extent of choosing 
independence-but only after a vote of a majority of two-thirds of the members of 
the legislature and of two-thirds of the voters entitled to vote in a referendum. 
Mr. Rusk enquired about sentiment in the territories-were they very pro-British? 
The Secretary of State replied that there was no real security problem at the 
moment. The situation might change if there was a collapse of the sugar price. 
English was the language and their way of life was essentially British. He believed 
that they would accept the proposals we were about to make to them. There was no 
real talk of independence in these territories and it was our belief that the proposals 
we were making would reduce the likelihood of their ever seeking it. 
Mr. Rusk commented that it was a pity that the larger federation in the West Indies 
had not worked but it sounded as if its re-establishment was just not on. 
The Secretary of State agreed that that was so but he would not rule out some 
coming together as an ultimate possibility. 
We intended to work for the development of a common services organisation 
between the territories in the Eastern Caribbean. 
Mr. Wallace said that they had already a common High Court and it was hoped 
that common services might be developed perhaps even to the extent of having a 
common establishment for the higher ranks of the police. 
1 See 234. 
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The Secretary of State said that the Ministry of Overseas Development proposed to 
set up a regional office and that would help to bind the territories together. The 
tripartite survey2 which was to be undertaken-and we were very grateful for the 
American willingness to take part in this-would also help. There was a great need 
for purposeful planning in these Colonies. 
Mr. Rusk asked whether we had heard from the Canadians. The Secretary of State 
said that he had just heard from the British Embassy that the Canadians were willing 
to take part in the Caribbean survey but he was not sure at the moment of their 
position about British Honduras. He hoped that the Eastern Caribbean survey could 
be got under way by December. 
British Guiana 
Mr. Rusk enquired about the position of British Guiana. 
The Secretary of State said that a conference was to start on November 2. It was 
not yet certain whether Dr. Jagan and the P.P.P. would come. He thought they might 
come if only in order to be able to walk out during the conference. 
He was fairly happy about the internal security position and said he thought the 
chances of a successful outcome to the conference were good. He doubted very much 
if there would be any change in the present electoral system and he thought 
agreement would be possible on extensive constitutional safeguards. Mr. Burnham's 
government was strengthening the security forces. There was already in existence a 
Special Service Unit which would be valuable but not by itself wholly adequate. 
Mr. Rusk asked whether there was any chance of Britain leaving forces behind 
after independence. 
The Secretary of State said that Mr. Burnham would like this but it would be a 
new departure; the most that we could possibly do would be to tide over a few 
months until British Guiana had established their own effective forces. They were 
starting now to build up a military force but it would be at least October 1966 before 
this was effective. Mr. Burnham, however, wanted independence well before that. He 
had mentioned February. That was probably not practicable; May, June or July would 
be a more sensible time. To delay longer than that might be dangerous. If the 
American Government pressed strongly that we should bridge the gap by leaving 
forces for a few months he would represent this to his colleagues. 
Mr. Rusk indicated that he did feel strongly on this subject. He understood that 
there could be no question of our leaving troops permanently. He believed Mr. 
Burnham was being sensible: was the tension with the Indians less than it had been? 
The Secretary of State thought this was definitely so. Mr. Bunham had gone out of 
his way to demonstrate that economic help was fairly allocated to all races. The visit 
by a team from the International Commission of Jurists on the question of racial 
imbalance was very helpful. Their report was about to be published and Mr. Burnham 
was ready to accept all their recommendations; the principal one was that in 
recruiting for the police during the next five years three Indians should be recruited 
for every one of other races. 
2 See 228-229. 
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Discussion then turned to the question of the Venezuelan claim.3 The Secretary of 
State said that we were convinced that there was nothing in the Venezuelan 
arguments about the 1899 award. We wondered whether the American Government 
could bring any influence to bear on the Venezuelan Government to drop their 
claims. He asked whether the Venezuelans were worried about the political future of 
British Guiana. 
Mr. Rusk said he feared that if the Venezuelan claim remained unresolved it would 
stand in the way of British Guiana coming into the O.A.S. because at the insistence of 
the Argentinians it had recently been agreed that no new member should be 
admitted to the O.A.S. against whom there was a territorial claim. He asked whether 
there was any question of the International Court of Justice being brought in. 
The Secretary of State doubted whether this would be valuable, partly because it 
might seem to imply that there was something in the Venezuelan claim. We should, 
be very grateful if the American Government could use its influence with the 
Venezuelans to drop their proposals. 
Mr. Rusk wondered whether anything could be done by some re-adjustment of the 
boundary involving a give and take on both sides. 
Mr. Wallace said that any semblance of territorial concession would reek [sic] Mr. 
Burnham's Government. Mr. Greenwood added that it would certainly be exploited 
by Dr. Jagan. 
Mr. Rusk indicated that he would be seeing the Foreign Minister of Venezuela at Rio. 
Mr. Rusk asked whether the tension between the Mricans and Indians had 
sufficiently eased to permit independence to go ahead. 
The Secretary of State thought that it had. He thought that once the decision on 
independence had been taken this would force the people to learn to live together. 
His impression was that Dr. Jagan's position had deteriorated very much. He was still 
a very popular figure, but there were disagreements in his own party and he had 
given the impression when he met him in February of having lost something of his 
old fervour. There had been demonstrations by the Indians when he had been in 
British Guiana in February. These had been organised by Dr. Jagan but in fact they 
had all been friendly .... 4 
Mini-states 
From this discussion moved over to the question of mini-states. Mr. Rusk said that 
Mr. Gromyko5 had appeared interested in this problem and was prepared to talk 
about it. He was concerned at the large number of new states becoming members of 
the United Nations. 
The Secretary of State said that we were publicly committed to giving 
independence (implying membership of the U.N.) to the territories he had. named. He 
had already indicated it would be very difficult to offer them "independence minus". 
Some Commonwealth Prime Ministers were equally concerned about the number of 
small states which might seek Commonwealth membership. He suggested that he 
3 Venezuela's claim to about two-thirds of British Guiana on the western boundary between the tWo 
countries was frequently discussed at the UN. The UK argued that the boundary had been settled by the 
award of an Arbitral Tribunal in Oct 1899. Despite its claim, Venezuela supported British Guiana's bid for 
independence, which was not the case with regard to the dispute with Guatemala over British Honduras. 
4 Section on the South Pacific omitted. 5 Soviet foreign minister. 
676 THE BREAK-UP OF THE FEDERATION [236] 
should send Mr. Rusk a document setting out our present thinking regarding the 
future of our territories. 
Mr. Rusk welcomed this. He said that in addition to the British territories there 
were a few American "bits and pieces" in the Pacific and there could be one or two 
French territories. 
The Ambassador6 suggested that when the Americans had considered the 
document that we were to give them there might be further discussions at official 
level, either in Washington or in London, so that we could get a better idea of the size 
of the problem. The Ministers agreed. 
British Honduras 
In reply to questions, the Secretary of State said that the internal situation of British 
Honduras was fairly satisfactory. Mr. Price was much the most effective politician. 
We estimated, not perhaps with great confidence, that they might be self-supporting 
by 1968. Their sugar industry should by then be one of the most efficient in the West 
Indian area. 
Mr. Rusk said that there was a move among the Central American territories 
towards closer co-operation. Would British Honduras fit into this? 
Mr. Wallace said that this would obviously be desirable but that Commonwealth 
preferences, especially for sugar, pulled them the other way. 
Communism in the Caribbean 
Mr. Rusk enquired whether there was any sign of Communist penetration in the 
Caribbean territories. They had had reports of some efforts in the French islands, but 
not very recently. 
The Secretary of State said that the Communists did not seem to cut any ice in the 
British territories. The population were great individualists and the Caribbean 
Council of Labour was a stabilising influence. Cuba had caused some embarrassment 
in the Bahamas but not with Communist infiltration. 
The discussion ended with the Ministers agreeing to keep in touch on British 
Guiana and British Honduras. 
6 ie the UK ambassador in Washington, Sir P Dean. 
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[British Guiana]: press release by the Information Department, CO, 
on the report of the inquiry into racial imbalance in British Guiana by 
the International Commission of Jurists 
The International Commission of Jurists publishes today (Thursday, October 21, 
1965) the Report of the British Guiana Commission of Inquiry, which was asked to 
examine the balance between the races in the public services and other areas of 
governmental responsibility in that country and to make such recommendations as 
it considered necessary to eliminate imbalance based on racial discrimination. This is 
the first such inquiry to have been conducted into the problems of public 
administration in a multi-racial society. 
It was at the request of the Government of British Guiana that the International 
Commission of Jurists agreed to constitute the Commission of Inquiry. The 
Commission of Inquiry consisted of Mr Justice Seamus Henchy (Ireland), together 
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with Professor Felix Ermacora (Austria) and Professor Pierre Papadatos (Greece); the 
International Commission of Jurists provided the Registrar to the Commission of 
Inquiry, Mr David Sagar, a Legal Officer on its staff. 
The racial problems which the Commission of Inquiry was asked to consider arose 
from complaints, following upon the tragic disturbances in 1964, that there were in 
the public service, and particularly in the Police Force, a disproportionately large 
number of Africans in relation to Indians; and that this was both the result and cause 
of racial discrimination. On the other hand, participation in the land settlement 
schemes was overwhelmingly Indian. 
The Inquiry was conducted in Georgetown, the capital of British Guiana, from 
August 5 to 22, 1965, and on the basis of the written memoranda and oral evidence 
and submissions received the Commission of Inquiry in its Report examines each of 
the sectors of the public service with which it was called upon to deal. 
General conclusions 
In its general conclusions the Report emphasises that the present racial disharmony 
is due in no small degree to the uncertainties and tensions of a community passing 
from colonial tutelage to full independence, and expresses the view that it is only 
when independence is achieved that the Guiana community will find the national 
self-reliance, the common purpose and the cohesion of nationhood which are 
necessary for the successful pursuit of a racially integrated society. 
Among the findings and recommendations of the Commission, which deal with all 
aspects of their Inquiry, attention is drawn to the following:-
(1) It is only in the Security Forces, and particularly in the Police Force, that the 
admitted preponderance of Africans can be said to be, in part at least, the result of 
factors which might encourage or lead to discrimination. This led to widespread 
complaints against the Police and lack of confidence in it ori the part of the Indian 
community. In view of the importance of ensuring that the Police Force should 
broadly reflect the different races of the population, in addition to removing the 
factors which might encourage or lead to discrimination, for a limited period of 
five years recruitment should be on the basis of 75% Indians and 25% other races. 
(2) Apart from this temporary and exceptional measure, the Report rejects the 
system of racial quotas in the recruitment of personnel in any part of the public 
service. It holds that such a system is discriminatory and liable to underline and 
strengthen the very divisions it is intended to guard against. 
(3) In addition to preserving the provisions as to fundamental rights in the present 
Constitution, the Report recommends that an Ombudsman, or a suitably constituted 
committee if it is impossible to find a generally acceptable individual, should be 
appointed to provide a summary, inexpensive and easily available authority to deal 
with complaints of racial discrimination in all areas of governmental responsibility. 
(4) In view of the widespread anxiety as to the possibility of further troubles 
similar to those which occurred in 1964, the Report suggests, as a necessary 
precaution in case an emergency situation arises, that the possibility be considered 
of making arrangements, without derogating from the sovereignty of an 
independent Guiana, for the provision of an adequate military force from outside 
the country until Guiana has had time to recruit, train and equip an adequate 
Guianese military force. 
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In addition, the Report makes further findings and recommendations on: the Volunteer 
Force; the Civil Service; the Judiciary; Education; Local Government; Land Settlement 
Schemes; Government Agencies and Undertakings; Anti-Discrimination Legislation; 
Education in Civics; Co-operation between Parties; and Economic Advancement. 
In transmitting the Report of the Commission of Inquiry to the Government of 
British Guiana, the Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists, Mr 
Sean MacBride, expressed the hope that its recommendations would be of assistance 
to Guiana in its ultimate political, social and economic development as an 
independent nation and concluded: "The fact that the Government of British Guiana 
has taken the constructive initiative of seeking independent advice on the problems 
which are the subject-matter of this Report will, I trust, inspire confidence among 
nations and international institutions which could provide technical and financial 
assistance for the rapid and full development of the Guiana economy." 
237 PREM 13/734 26 Oct 1965 
[British Guiana]: letter from Mr Greenwood to Mr Bottomley on a 
proposal that British troops should remain in British Guiana for a 
limited period after independence 
The British Guiana Independence Conference opens on Tuesday 2nd November and 
there is one point on which I am anxious to have a decision before the Conference 
opens, namely, the retention of British troops in Guyana (as it will be called) in an 
internal security role for a limited period after independence. The background to this 
proposition is as follows. 
The People's National Congress (led by Mr. Burnham) and the United Force (led by 
Mr. D'Aguiar), who together form the present coalition Government, will attend the 
Conference but it is not yet certain whether the People's Progressive Party (led by Dr. 
Jagan) will do so. I hope that the threatened boycott by the P.P.P. will not take place 
but in any case it cannot be allowed to affect the holding of the conference. 
The Attorney-General of British Guiana has produced a draft Independence Con-
stitution which the two Government parties, while reserving the right to comment 
in detail, have agreed provides a useful basis for discussion at the Conference. In 
principle, the draft Constitution appears to me to be unobjectionable. It contains full 
provision for the protection of fundamental rights and freedom of the individual; it 
provides for the continuation of the monarchy with possible change to republican 
status after a minimum period of 3\lz years; it contains adequate safeguards for the 
independence of the public service and the judiciary; and it retains the existing 
parliamentary system with a single-chamber legislature elected by proportional 
representation under universal adult suffrage of those aged 21 and over. 
There is unfortunately little prospect of agreement being reached between all the 
parties on a number of major issues. At the last constitutional conference held under 
the Conservative Government in October 1963 the three party leaders in British 
Guiana, being unable to resolve their own differences, asked the then Colonial 
Secretary to make decisions on their behalf and undertook to abide by them.1 Dr. 
Jagan (P.P.P.) has consistently refused to accept these decisions; and when the 
present (British) Government came into power he came over to London to ask that 
1 See217. 
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the General Election (fixed for December 7th 1964) should be postponed.2 We 
decided that arrangements were too far advanced to make this possible though our 
dislike of the electoral system produced by Mr. Sandys remained. The three points 
settled by Mr. Sandys in 1963 were: -
(i) The electoral system (P.R.). 
(ii) The voting age (21 and not 18 as demanded by the P.P.P.). 
(iii) That fresh elections should be held under the new electoral system (these 
were held in December 1964). 
I have no doubt that the P.P.P. if they come to the Conference will attempt to reopen 
these three questions. While I think it will be politic to allow them to have their say I 
intend to take the line that these are not "outstanding matters" within the agenda of 
the conference and that the right course would be for the people of British Guiana, 
by due constitutional processes, to alter these arrangements after independence if 
they so wish. (The draft Constitution which will form the basis of discussion at the 
Conference provides for such changes to be made on a simple majority of the House 
of Assembly followed by a simple majority in a referendum.) It should be possible to 
handle the Conference in such a way that the Independence Constitution can be fully 
justified in public and in Parliament. 
It should be possible to fix a date for independence: it is highly desirable that this 
should not be delayed longer than absolutely essential. But there is a difficulty over the 
timing of independence which arises from the inadequacy of the Colony's own security 
forces, and it is on this point that I am seeking an early decision from my colleagues. 
The Police Force is an effective body but in 1962, 1963 and 1964 it was necessary to 
use British troops in aid of the civil power. The present British garrison consists of two 
infantry battalions and a garrison headquarters. It is there solely for internal security 
duties. Despite our constant urging to take decisions about the security forces that 
would be needed after independence, it was not until September last that the British 
Guiana Government came down in favour of a military rather than an expanded 
(armed) Police Force.3 The proposed Military Force is ultimately to consist of a three 
company battalion with a total establishment of 700 all ranks, but initially only two 
companies will be formed with the strength of 450 to 500 all ranks. There may also 
ultimately be a coastguard arm and possibly an air wing. The Ministry of Defence has 
been most co-operative in providing assistance in planning, command and training 
for the embryo force, by the secondment ofBritish personnel. These arrangements are 
well in hand, a planning officer has already arrived in the territory, and the com-
manding officer has been nominated. The best estimate which can be made is that the 
two company force should be brought to full operational efficiency by October, 1966. 
Mr. Burnham, however, is pressing for independence very early in 1966. Setting 
aside considerations of internal security, I think it might be possible for 
independence to be achieved by about the mid year. I think that Mr. Burnham would 
be content with this. Mr. Burnham's Government realize, however, that their own 
forces will not be adequate by such an ·early date and they have asked that British 
troops should be permitted to remain in the territory for a limited period after 
independence until their own defence force has become fully operational at 
acceptable strength, say until October 1966. 
2 See 224. 3 cf 189 and 202. 
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The Governor of British Guiana strongly supports Mr. Burnham's Government's 
request that British troops should remain for a limited period after the grant of 
independence. His reasons for doing so may be summarised as follows:-
(i) The longer independence is delayed the longer and better opportunity is 
provided for the opponents of the present Government to plan and promote 
sabotage in an endeavour to prevent independence under that Government. Once 
independence is granted the purpose of such sabotage no longer exists. Disruptive 
elements in British Guiana are likely to have to come to terms with realities under 
independence and the sooner this happens the better. 
(ii) It is not in the British interest (apart from that of British Guiana) for the period 
of such potential sabotage to be prolonged by delaying the date for independence. If, 
as would be likely, the internal security situation were to deteriorate as a result of 
such delay the British commitment could be indefinitely extended. 
(iii) There is an improved economic atmosphere in British Guiana resulting 
largely from the purposeful progress of the present Government and the generally 
improved situation in the country. A loss of momentum in this forward 
movement, particularly if arising from speculation or anxieties about the security 
factor vis a vis early independence, would be harmful. 
In the course of my recent visit to Washington4 I was informed by the Americans 
that, while they would prefer a later independence date, a date in the range May to 
July would be acceptable to them and that they appreciated that any delay in 
granting independence might well cause a deterioration in the security situation. Mr. 
Rusk himself (and also Mr. McGeorge Bundy5 who keeps a close watch on British 
Guiana developments on behalf of the President) urged upon me strongly the 
desirability of leaving British troops in the territory for a limited period after 
independence until the Guyanese security forces were stronger. 
The recently published report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed by the 
International Commission of Jurists to enquire into the problems of racial imbalance 
in the public services in British Guiana included the following recommendation: 
"In the course of this Inquiry we found widespread anxiety as to the possible 
consequences of the country's entering into independence without there 
being available to the Government an adequate military force should an 
emergency situation develop. Having regard to the nature and extent of the 
recent disturbances, and the disruption that has sprung from them, we 
consider that such anxiety is not unfounded. It is clear that if there is to be an 
early grant of independence (which the Commission of Inquiry itself 
favoured), there will not be time to recruit, train and equip an adequate 
Guianese military force. Accordingly, we recommend that, until such a force 
has been recruited, trained and equipped, consideration should be given to 
the possibility of making arrangements, without derogating from the 
sovereignty of an independent Guyana, for the provision of an adequate 
military force from outside the country, that could be called upon to 
maintain order should the necessity arise."6 
4 See 235. 
5 Historian and political analyst; special assistant to the president for national security affairs, 1961- 1966. 
6 See 236 (emphasis here in original). 
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I see the force of the arguments against leaving British troops in a territory after 
independence and I made it clear in my Washington talks that there are real 
difficulties. Nevertheless, I am quite convinced that in the circumstances of British 
Guiana the balance of advantage lies in fixing the earliest possible date for 
independence (within the May-July range) and allowing British troops to stay in the 
country after independence until the local forces are adequate, say until October, 
1966. A delay, at best, would serve only to sour our relations with the Government of 
Mr. Burnham and Mr. D'Aguiar. At worst, it might lead to circumstances in which 
independence might have to be delayed indefinitely. I would accordingly propose that 
arrangements should be made for a phased withdrawal of our troops in such a 
manner as to leave a rearguard of adequate strength to meet the needs of the internal 
security situation. Arrangements would, of course, have to be made to ensure that 
our troops have adequate protection against legal processes arising out of the actions 
taken in the course of duty. I don't expect any difficulty with the British Guiana 
Government on this score. 
It would seem beyond the means of the government of an independent British 
Guiana to meet the cost of maintaining a British garrison even for the limited period 
in view. Acceptance of the necessity for British troops remaining would therefore 
involve acceptance that the costs should be met from British funds. (If we delayed 
independence, of course, we should have to meet them anyway). 
In the light of the foregoing I trust that you will agree with me:-
(i) that the date of independence for British Guiana should not be delayed solely 
for the reason that the local security forces are not yet capable of discharging 
responsibility for internal security; 
(ii) that arrangements should be made for a phased withdrawal of British troops 
in such a manner as to leave a rearguard of adequate strength to meet this 
responsibility in the territory after independence, if necessary until October 1966; 
(iii) that it should be accepted that the cost of maintaining British troops in 
British Guiana for this period should be met from British funds (the sum involved 
might be taken into account in the negotiation of any independence financial 
settlement). 
I am writing in similar terms to the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Defence and 
the Chancellor of Exchequer. 7 
7 Stewart, the foreign secretary, sent a brief reply agreeing with Greenwood's conclusions: 'I am sure it 
would be wrong to postpone independence solely on account of deficiencies in the local security forces. 
But a breakdown in law and order in British Guiana could have serious international consequences, and 
the insurance against this which you propose seems to me to be very necessary. As you know, the 
Americans attach a great deal of importance to this: and I think they are right' (PREM 13/734, Stewart to 
Greenwood, 1 Nov 1965). James Callaghan, the chancellor, was equally brief. He had no objections to the 
proposals, provided Healey, the defence secretary, agreed that they were practicable. The only points made 
by Callaghan were (i) it should be made clear that the troops would be withdrawn in Oct 1966; (ii) the cost 
of their maintenance should be taken into account in any financial settlement; (iii) the troops should be 
adequately safeguarded against legal responsibility arising from whatever actions they might have to take; 
(iv) if extra costs were involved, these should be met after independence by the CRO, with an appropriate 
adjustment to CO votes (ibid, Callaghan to Greenwood, 1 Nov 1965). More substantial points were raised 
by the MOD and the CRO and their responses are recorded at 238 and 240. 
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238 PREM 13/734 29 Oct 1965 
[British Guiana]: letter from Mr Healey to Mr Greenwood on the 
proposal that British troops should remain in British Guiana for a 
limited period after independence 
You wrote to me on 26th October about the problem of security in British Guiana 
after independence until their own forces are supposedly capable of maintaining 
order.! 
2. Taking the first of your specific questions, I accept that in the special 
circumstances of British Guiana there is a case for fixing the date of independence if 
necessary earlier than the time at which local forces are capable of discharging 
responsibility for internal security. This is, however, subject to the political point 
that I make at the end of this letter. 
3. If our colleagues argue that political factors are overriding and that British 
troops should remain after Independence, it would be practicable for one battalion to 
remain until the end of October 1966. This will involve problems over the timing of 
the relief of units. I would plan not to replace 3rd Battalion Parachute Regiment 
when they are due to leave British Guiana in February 1966. The tour of the other 
battalion, the 1st Battalion King's Regiment, is due to end in June 1966 and cannot 
be extended. I would prefer to relieve them in April if, as seems likely, independence 
will be granted between May and June 1966. The relieving battalion could then stay 
on after Independence, within a normal nine months tour, until October 1966. This 
battalion could be stationed, if this were thought desirable, at Atkinson Airfield 
rather than in Georgetown itself. In public we should take the line, I suggest, that the 
battalion would be remaining for a limited period, perhaps announcing the date of its 
return, to help in training Guyana's forces and in the defence of the country. We 
should not make any public reference to internal security. There must, however, be 
agreement with the independent Government about the tasks which the battalion 
might be called upon to perform. I should be extremely reluctant to see British 
troops after Independence being in any way responsible for the sorts of activities that 
have formed the bulk of the garrison's tasks in recent months, namely patrolling the 
countryside to deter inter-racial violence. It seems to me that the task of the 
battalion should be to help in ensuring the survival of the government and the 
protection of essential utilities. Thus I should recommend that the role of the British 
troops should be restricted to emergency assistance on the High Commissioner's 
instructions in guarding the Government and vital installations. 
4. Your second question related to cost. I am content, if my colleagues agree, 
that British funds should pay but I would ask that the normal arrangements for the 
refunding to the Defence Vote of extra costs should obtain. 
5. I am glad to see that you expect no difficulty over indemnification of our 
troops. It is absolutely essential that there should be no loopholes here. Other 
questions such as the system of command and the precise instructions to be given to 
the British Commander will of course have to be worked out. 
6. There may very well be difficulties in securing both the recruitment of 
seconded personnel from the British Army and suitable local Guyanese volunteers for 
1 See 237. 
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the new Local Force. Therefore, operational readiness may not be achieved by 1st 
October 1966. If it is accepted that British troops should stay after Independence, I 
must insist that there is no open-ended commitment and that they come out on the 
date planned. 
7. Apart from these practical points I have, I must confess, serious anxieties. It is 
not I imagine beyond the bounds of possibility that Jagan might stage a coup while 
our troops were still there and that he might succeed. In that event I imagine that 
the United States would expect us to throw out a communist government by force 
and that, if we did not do so they might wish to take the necessary steps themselves. 
Are we prepared to contemplate a United States military intervention in an 
independent Commonwealth country while British troops are present and remain 
neutral? If not, are we prepared to commit ourselves to use our forces to act against 
Jagan in such circumstances with or without American help or are we prepared to 
refuse and if necessary resist such intervention by American troops? If we are not, we 
must, I imagine, either postpone independence or be prepared to use British troops 
against the effective Head of an independent Commonwealth country. I believe we 
should discuss the problem collectively before we reach firm conclusions either on 
the date of independence or on our willingness to leave British troops in the country 
after Independence. 
8. I also think we should consider whether we are wise to commit ourselves to 
the Americans on this issue before our general discussion with them about the 
Defence Review since the continued presence of British troops in Guyana is one of 
the most valuable things we can offer them and, compared with other requests they 
may make of us during the Defence Review discussions, one of the least costly. 
9. I am sending copies of this letter to the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and Commonwealth Secretary. 
239 PREM 13/136, pp 7-8 1 Nov 1965 
[British Guiana]: letter from Dr Jagan to Mr Wilson comparing 
British Guiana to Rhodesia and declining to attend a constitutional 
conference 
In spite of my appeals, the Colonial Secretary persists in holding a Constitutional 
Conference in circumstances and conditions fully described to him which make our 
participation impossible and which would also make any decisions reached 
unacceptable to more than half off the population for which my Party speaks. 
I have pointed out to Mr. Greenwood that British Guiana is virtually a police state. 
Unnecessary emergency powers are being used to harass, detain without trial, and 
silence political opponents of the coalition government. With the approach of 
independence, for which my Party has always struggled, it is essential that the 
Guianese people as a whole should first reach agreement among themselves on the 
nature of their constitution for complete autonomy in an atmosphere free from the 
fears that presently exist under arbitrary rule and political despotism. 
British Guiana is no different from Rhodesia with respect to the question of 
independence. You rightly pointed out to the Rhodesian Prime Minister that the 
detention or restriction over a long period of nationalist leaders, the restriction of a 
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former Prime Minister, and the banning of a prominent newspaper have suggested to 
the outside world the pattern that might be adopted in the future. Genuine fears with 
respect to the arbitrary exercise or misuse of power have now gripped the minds of 
more than half of the Guianese people because of the coalition government's record 
thus far. 
Former Police Superintendent Lambert provides a case in point of a virtual police 
state in being in this country. Lambert was suspended from duty pending the hearing 
of a charge. Although he was acquitted by the Supreme Court and the Police Service 
Commission recommended his reinstatement, the Governor ordered his compulsory 
retirement. This has been done no doubt on pressure from the government because 
this officer with a most creditable record had discharged his duties impartially and 
with zeal in breaking up the "P.N.C. terrorist organization". 
Ultimately, it is your responsibility to ensure that British Guiana goes forward to 
independence under a constitution acceptable to the majority and in circumstances 
and with safeguards that would remove existing fears and guarantee the country's 
social and economic progress. My final appeal is that the British government come to 
grips now with the Guiana situation with the same will and determination displayed 
in dealing with that in Rhodesia.1 
1 Wilson replied to the effect that it was not only desirable but indeed a 'duty' for Jagan to attend and to 
represent those who voted for him at the last election: 'I cannot accept that present circumstances made it 
impossible for you to participate in the conference. If your party or their supporters were concerned about 
the actions of the present British Guiana Government, and had genuine fears for the future, the place to 
express that concern and those fears was at the constitutional conference, where they could be taken into 
account before decisions were taken concerning the future of your country. You attempt to draw an 
analogy between British Guiana and Rhodesia, but the circumstances in the two countries are completely 
different. I regret very much that your party declined to attend the conference along with representatives 
of the other two parties' (PREM 13/136, pp 2-3, Wilson to Jagan, 13 Nov 1965). 
240 PREM 13/734 2 Nov 1965 
[British Guiana]: letter from Mr Cledwyn Hughes1 to Mr Greenwood 
on the proposal that British troops should remain in British Guiana 
for a limited period after independence 
Thank you for your letter of 26 October about the retention of British troops in 
Guyana in an internal security role for a limited period after independence.2 I have 
studied the arguments you have put forward in favour of our proposal and recognise 
their force . But I feel that I should set out the counter arguments so that we can all 
be clear about what would be involved for us if we were to agree. As I see them these 
are as follows:-
(a) There is no British defence interest justifying the retention of British troops in 
Guyana. 
(b) Their retention would expose the U. K. and Guyana Governments to attack in 
the United Nations and elsewhere: we for neo-colonialism and the Guyana 
Government for permitting it. Such an arrangement might make it more difficult 
for Guyana to win international recognition as a genuinely independent state. 
1 Minister of state for Commonwealth relations, 1964-1966. 2 See 237. 
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(c) The calling out of British troops in aid of the Guyana Government would have 
to be ordered by the British Government. Our responsibility could not be 
concealed and this could bring us into serious trouble with the U.N. 
(d) As the present opposition party is almost entirely of East Indian race an 
internal security situation in British Guiana would almost certainly be racial in 
character. Any British involvement on behalf of the Burnham administration 
could be represented as anti-Indian and thus add to our difficulties with India, and 
could well create ill-feeling towards us elsewhere, notably in Trinidad where there 
is a similar racial composition of the population. 
(e) On the basis of population statistics alone the present opposition party is 
bound to gain political power eventually-possibly after the next election. Military 
intervention by us would almost certainly appear to be directed against the present 
opposition and this could have a disastrous effect upon our future relations with 
the country. 
It seems to me that these counter-arguments are also very cogent and I feel that 
they merit further consideration. Our position vis-a-vis the United Nations in 
particular needs careful examination before we commit ourselves. 
Basically my difficulty is that a decision by us to intervene in an internal security 
situation in British Guiana could only be taken at the time and in the light of the 
prevailing circumstances. We might, when the time comes, well decide that the right 
course is to call for the despatch of a United Nations peace-keeping force. But if we 
decide here and now to leave British forces in British Guiana after independence we 
would in fact be pre-judging that decision: the pressure to use forces already there 
for that specific purpose would be likely to be irresistible should the occasion arise. 
I therefore feel that we should explore other possible means of meeting this 
problem if you still feel that we must aim at independence in June rather than 
October. I notice that Sir Richard Luyt suggested in one of his telegrams that if we 
refuse Mr. Burnham's request he might react by asking for an immediate U.N. peace-
keeping force; and mentions that the International Commission of Jurists 
themselves raised this possibility. I would not regard this as a threat. Indeed the idea 
has at first sight considerable attractions seeing that the objections to the stationing 
of British forces in Guyana would not apply to a U.N. force. I suggest therefore that 
this alternative might be examined. 
I am sending copies of this letter to the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Defence 
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
241 CAB 130/248, MISC 89/1 5 Nov 1965 
'Security arrangements in Guyana after independence': memorandum 
by Mr Greenwood for Cabinet Committee on British Guiana 
In previous correspondence1 I proposed:-
(i) that the date of independence for British Guiana should not be delayed solely 
for the reason that the local security forces are not yet capable of discharging 
responsibility for internal security; 
1 See 237. 
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(ii) that arrangements should be made for a phased withdrawal of British troops 
in such a manner as to leave a rearguard of adequate strength to meet this 
responsibility in the territory after independence, if necessary until October 1966; 
(iii) that it should be accepted that the cost of maintaining British troops in 
British Guiana for this period should be met from British funds (the sum involved 
might be taken into account in the negotiation of any independence financial 
settlement). 
It looks likely that at the present Conference the date for independence in the period 
May-July 1966 will be decided. Guyanese security forces will be adequate by the end 
of October. 
2. In commenting on my proposals Cledwyn Hughes in his letter of 2nd 
November2 set out certain counter-arguments. I accept that these are cogent; but the 
longer independence is delayed the longer and better is the opportunity for 
opponents of the present government to promote sabotage in an attempt to prevent 
independence under the Burnham Government; and in these circumstances it is not 
in our interest to prolong the period of such potential sabotage. If we accordingly 
accept that independence should be granted as early as practicable we must also 
accept that a breakdown in law and order after independence, before local Guyana 
forces are ready to discharge their responsibilities, would, as the Foreign Secretary 
points out,3 have serious international consequences, not least with the Americans, 
and we should be open to criticism both abroad and in Parliament for failing to make 
adequate security arrangements. Although the continued presence of British troops 
after independence might be criticised in the United Nations, it seems inconceivable 
that objections would be pressed to the point of refusing to admit Guyana to 
membership. After all, much more valid objection on this score could have been 
raised over Kenya which was admitted while there was still a British base as well as 
British troops on Kenya soil. There should be no difficulty in justifying continued, 
but temporary, presence of British troops at the Guyana Government's request. In 
my view these considerations out-weigh the arguments against British troops 
remaining for a short period. 
3. Cledwyn Hughes suggests:-
(a) that a decision to intervene in a post-independence security situation in 
Guyana could only be taken at the time and that we might then decide to propose a 
U.N. peace-keeping force; 
(b) that if we decide now to leave British troops we should be pre-judging such a 
decision; 
(c) that the possibility of asking now for a U.N. peace-keeping force should be 
examined. 
No doubt the Foreign Secretary will wish to comment on these suggestions. I 
would only say that to defer a decision about a U.N. peace-keeping force until the 
situation had actually arisen, would be too late, while on the principle of a U.N. 
peace-keeping force for the purpose we have in mind, British Guiana Ministers and I 
would see a number of serious objections:-
2 See 240. 3 See 237, note 7. 
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(i) it would clearly be very difficult to arrange and might cause all sorts of new 
complications; 
(ii) even if it could be arranged, to replace British forces, who know the country 
and are known there, by an international force for a short period after 
independence would have the exact effect which we wish to avoid - it would 
introduce a most unsettling factor into the country; 
(iii) an international force could not smoothly and speedily complete the intensive 
training of Guyanese forces which the British troops have begun and which, if 
allowed to proceed, they estimate they can conclude by the end of October. 
4. Both the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer concur with 
my proposals, the latter subject to the agreement of the Defence Secretary and to 
four points which I readily accept.4 
5. The Defence Secretary (in his letter of 27th October)5 also accepts that there is 
a case for fixing an early independence date and permitting British troops to remain 
for a limited period. His acceptance however is subject to clarification of the position 
of British troops in the event of a coup resulting in the formation of a Jagan 
Government. In the Governor's view a situation of this kind is so unlikely to arise 
that it may for practical purposes be disregarded. The existing security forces are pro-
Burnham, and Georgetown, the seat of Government, is also pro-Burnham. 
6. A further point which the Defence Secretary considers should be taken into 
account before any commitment is made is whether it is advisable to make it known 
that we accept that British troops should remain in an independent Guyana before 
the general British-American discussions on the Defence Review; a continued British 
presence in Guyana, he argues, is one of the most valuable things we can offer the 
Americans and, compared with other requests they may make of us in the 
discussions, one of the least costly. This may well be true (although the period 
involved would only be a matter of months) but the fact is that we shall have to take a 
decision on the date of independence, and hence on the future of British troops in 
Guyana, before the present Conference ends. 
7. On the question of the role of the British troops to which the Defence 
Secretary refers, their mere presence would act as a deterrent and this indeed may 
prove to be their only internal security role. I agree, and so does the British Guiana 
Government, that the Guyanese security forces should deal with the local populace 
and that the role of the British troops would be as reserve. Requests for aid from the 
British troops would be made only as a last resort and it would then be for the British 
Government to decide whether to meet them. I am not happy however about the 
Defence Secretary's suggestion that the troops might be withdrawn to Atkinson Field 
at independence. The withdrawal of British troops from their present stations should 
be gradual, so as not to disturb confidence, but as quick as Guyanese forces can be 
trained to take their place; indeed this process should be begun before independence. 
It would be a continuous planned operation. Meanwhile, both before and after 
independence, the British troops would be actively engaged in training the Guyanese 
forces to take over from them as soon as possible. For the purposes of public 
presentation the main emphasis could be placed on the training role of the troops. 
4 See ibid. 5 Healey's letter was dated 29 Oct, see 236. 
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8. As regards the other points made by the Defence Secretary I fully accept that if 
troops were left this would have to be:-
(a) for a short and definite period; 
(b) subject to satisfactory prior agreement as to their protection against legal 
responsibility arising from their actions (the Premier of British Guiana has again 
assured me that there will be no difficulty about this). 
9. I therefore seek my colleagues' approval of the proposal that, subject to the 
conditions in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, and those contained in the Chancellor's 
letter, we should agree that British troops should be left in Guyana after 
independence until the end of October 1966. 
10. The Governor of British Guiana will be available at our meeting to give us the 
benefit of his assessment of the situation. 
242 CO 1031/4383, no 4 6 Nov 1965 
[British Honduras]: letter from Sir P Stallard to Mr Greenwood 
discussing the prospects for British Honduras after the introduction 
of internal self-government 
You will recall that in the course of your visit to British Honduras1 you expressed a 
wish that Governors would record at intervals the progress made by their charges, 
and would hazard a forecast of what the next period held in store. Your visit, 21 
months after the introduction of our ·self-government Constitution, provides an 
opportunity for attempting a general assessment of the present plight of this colony. 
Perhaps "plight" is a strong term to apply but not inappropriate to this relatively 
poor country. I am, however, optimistic enough to believe that its economic state, 
while sorry, is not hopeless, and that its political state is healthy. 
2. You saw for yourself how, politically, everything turns on the Premier, Mr. 
George Price, and how anxiously he is trying to build a national consciousness. 
Circumstances tend to make this an appallingly difficult task: while the hard core of 
active opposition is fairly small, the real obstacles are natural lethargy and the 
reluctance of almost the whole country to take the plunge into independence and 
self-reliance. Most people, including the majority of the Cabinet, would prefer to 
remain indefinitely on the diving board, basking in the sunshine of United Kingdom 
grant-in-aid. 
3. At the risk of being tedious I feel bound to interpolate a paragraph on Mr. 
Price and his background. He was at one time being trained for the priesthood by the 
Jesuits but failed to complete the course because, it is reliably said, he was unable to 
subscribe to the vow of humility. This Jesuit training made him a devout Catholic (he 
attends Mass daily at 5.30 a.m.) but, because it was never completed, he failed to reap 
the full benefit and is apt to be indiscriminate in persuading himself that the end 
justifies the means. He concentrates on the semantics of independence with a 
humourless single-mindedness which borders on fanaticism. In vain, at least so far, 
does one counsel government by consensus rather than coercion. His volatile nature, 
1 Greenwood visited British Honduras in Oct 1965. 
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wanting to see immediate action taken on all his ideas, and his past experiences make 
it difficult for him to keep to the path of democracy. As we turned away from 
watching your aircraft leave, he remarked rather wistfully that the Opposition were 
being treated very much more kindly than his party had been when in opposition. 
One tends to forget the effect of several years' persecution by the Colonial 
Government: thwarted and frustrated at every turn he acquired a bitterness against 
all things British. I write this in no spirit of criticism of my predecessors but merely 
to draw attention to the prejudices he inevitably acquired. I have tried to persuade 
him that provided he behaves constitutionally he may depend on the full support and 
encouragement of the Governor and the Colonial Office. Nevertheless I realise that 
he trusts no one, that he approaches each new situation ready to be disillusioned, 
and that there is unlikely ever to be the mutual trust between us which would help 
him to relax and take an objective view of the problems of government. In case my 
experience can be of use to others in a similar predicament, I have found the most 
effective way of offering unpalatable advice or criticism to be by way of a manuscript 
note: the fact that there is no personal confrontation and more important, that he 
knows that no one else is aware of the advice having been given, makes it much 
easier for him to accept it. 
4. As a party leader he is undoubtedly successful but the same cannot be said of 
his Premiership. Mr. Robert Tepper, recently appointed United States Consul and 
formerly the desk-officer in the State Department responsible for dealing with 
British Honduran affairs, told me that when Price visited Washington in 1963 he was 
uncomfortably tense even at social functions: it was not until he was taken to see the 
Catholic University that he relaxed. Tepper formed the impression that Price did not 
understand and actively disliked the administrative side of ministerial responsibility. 
It is true that he prefers the day-to-day contacts with his supporters throughout the 
country, touring constantly and, as a sort of ombudsman, concerning himself with 
the individual problems of the people, which should be dealt with by the District 
Officers. In fact all too often he is a glorified parish priest. 
5. The PUP (People's United Party), of which Price is the leader, won 16 out of 18 
seats in the House of Representatives in the general election of last March. They 
depend for their support on the Indian and Spanish-speaking farmers in the 
Districts, and on the lower-class Creoles in Belize City. The NIP (National 
Independence Party) which forms the Opposition comprises the better-off Anglicans 
and Methodists, some of the educated Roman Catholics, and former members of the 
PUP who have fallen out with Price. It is the last section which is the most active. By 
and large the pensionable officers in the Public Service and most of the Police Force 
support the Opposition, a fact which enrages the Premier but about which he can do 
very little: despite the accusations of victimisation made by the Public Officers Union, 
they are in fact well protected by the Public Service Commission of which the 
Chairman is a die-hard NIP, and in the last resort by the Governor. I know of no case 
in which the PUP have succeeded in victimising a pensionable civil servant, although 
the occasional messenger may have been mauled. 
6. Although the Premier retains his magnetic hold over the mass of the PUP, 
there are signs that the Parliamentary party are becoming restive on account of his 
dictatorial behaviour. Here again he is an extraordinary mixture: on the one hand he 
tends to get carried away by his own enthusiasms which lead him to interfere in 
other ministries and to give direct orders to their subordinate staff, yet on the other 
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hand if consulted as Premier about some matter he usually refuses to commit 
himself until he has consulted his Cabinet. The refusal of the Parliamentary Party to 
be steam-rollered does provide a measure of protection against his incipient 
Nkrumahism. 
7. After the Premier the outstanding figure in the Cabinet is C. L. B. Rogers, 
Minister of Internal Affairs and Health. He approaches nearest to the idea of a 
Minister because he is prepared to listen to civil service advice and, once convinced of 
the need for a certain course of action, to pursue it even against the Premier's 
express wishes. A. A. Hunter2 probably has more ability but can never stand up to the 
Premier and so, too often, his good intentions come to nothing. The remainder of the 
Ministers are disappointingly ineffective but with the tenacity of the ignorant 
frequently oppose new ideas unreasonably and thus frustrate the Heads of 
Department. If any calamity overtook Price it is generally assumed that Rogers would 
step into his shoes but I have certain doubts which are mentioned below in 
paragraph 10. 
8. The Opposition are rather weak, miss many opportunities especially of making 
use of their representation in the Legislature, and rely on their newspaper, the Belize 
Billboard, and on public meetings for ventilating their grievances. Although they call 
themselves the National Independence Party they do not want independence in the 
foreseeable future-you will recall that at Corozal an NIP sympathiser was carrying a 
placard proclaiming "No independence". A further example of their ineffectiveness 
was that they spent nearly the whole time of the interview which you accorded to 
them, complaining about the present system of registration which to their certain 
knowledge is currently under review and which the Government inherited from the 
old Colonial Government and has undertaken to reform. The "symbols" of 
independence, flag and anthem, were never mentioned. This ineffectiveness, 
combined with the fact that most of the Opposition strength lies in the relatively 
well-to-do, reduces the risk of violence which might occur if there were a straight 
division on racial lines, and which would probably occur if the roles were reversed 
with the PUP constituting the Opposition. 
9. The new internal self-government Constitution was introduced in January last 
year (1964). It may be said that the executive side of it has worked well: Ministers 
have, on the whole, been willing to shoulder their new responsibilities and have 
shown a commendable honesty. The Security Council and the External Affairs 
Committee have both functioned smoothly, Ministers appearing to appreciate the 
extent to which they have been consulted. As regards Security credit is due to 
Rogers, Minister of Internal Affairs, who has not trespassed into the operational 
sphere, but especially to the Commissioner of Police who has patiently explained to 
the Minister his plans for maintaining law and order, and for dealing with any 
extraordinary situation, with the result that he has received the full support of the 
Minister. Unfortunately the British Honduran officers and NCOs are sometimes still 
reluctant to implement the spirit as well as the letter of the new Constitution. Most 
of them are Creoles and patently mistrust the Premier, suspecting him of trying to 
Latinise the country. They know what the rulers of the Central American Republics 
feel about negroes and have no wish for the country to have closer links with those 
countries. 
2 Minister of natural resources, commerce and industry. 
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10. If the Cabinet has enjoyed the new Constitution, the same cannot be said of 
the backbenchers: they have found that there is really no difference in their role. 
L. S. Sylvestre, who resigned as a Minister in 1963 owing to certain corrupt practices 
coming partially to light, is the leader of their discontent because not only does he 
want to return to the Cabinet for financial reasons but he is also genuinely inter-
ested in Administration. Since the backbenchers paid an educational visit last sum-
mer to the United States to see the United States Central and State Governments at 
work, the PUP backbenchers have formed themselves into a pressure group with the 
object of at least sharing some of the responsibilities of their ministerial colleagues. 
Their minds are working on some sort of organisation like the Congressional 
Committees: if the Premier is wise he will divert them with a few Parliamentary 
Committees and will allow them their heads when considering Bills .in Committee, 
but he is an obstinate person, reluctant even to appear to be sharing his power. It is 
Sylvestre and his clique that I see as the alternative Government here, rather than 
Rogers or the National Independence Party, but none of them could oust Price at 
present. 
11. For nearly two years Radio Belize, which Price uses quite shamelessly as a 
propaganda organ for himself and his Government, has proclaimed thrice hourly 
that it is the voice of the emergent nation of Belize in Central America. Several 
people who pay periodic visits to us have said that they have found a growing fear 
among the Caribs and Creoles that after independence they would be dominated by 
the Spanish-speakers and that the Latin-American way of life would be imposed on 
the country. One local criticism, they report of the Premier, is that he wants to fill 
the country with Mexicans and Central Americans while refusing to permit any 
Creoles from the West Indian islands to immigrate. There is no doubt that in 
sentiment the British Honduran Creoles, and to a lesser extent the Caribs, are pro-
British to the core-not surprisingly when one considers how the negroes have been 
treated in the surrounding countries. It must have been a big relief to his Creole 
supporters when, about a year ago, Price declared that he intended to take the 
country into independence within the Commonwealth. No doubt the approach of a 
general election and the realisation that economically any other course would be 
disastrous, helped him to reach this decision-made incidentally without reference 
to his party. It is, I think this fear of Latinisation which is at the back of the 
opposition to the blue and white flag. This may be the appropriate place to include an 
account of Price's difficulties with his "symbols of independence", name, anthem and 
flag. 
12. Until about 100 years ago the territory was referred to as the Belize 
Settlement (once as British Yucatan) , and neighbouring countries always called it, 
and still call it, Belice. In the days before he became reconciled with the British, Price 
chose the name Belize as being the one for independence. Nobody but the active 
members of the NIP really feels very strongly about this point, nor about the 
"Belizean National Anthem", a popular patriotic song written in the 'thirties and 
subsequently taken over by the PUP as its party song. The author, now living in the 
United States, sympathises with the NIP and often threatens to sue Price for breach 
of copyright but this is no deterrent and the tune is played at every opportunity. I 
believe that Price is genuine in doing this as part of his campaign to create a national 
consciousness. However, it is the blue and white flag which causes the real trouble 
and here personal pride and obstinacy is what now motivates the Premier. The 
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origins of the flag are obscure but it is known that Goldson,3 then a leading member 
of the PUP, was one of its first champions in 1951. Opposition to the flag comes first 
from the NIP who dislike it because it is the party flag of the PUP, and secondly from 
a much wider section of the public which mistrusts the blue and white of Central 
America. Those who support it are the older PUP members who recall marching 
behind it and the Stars and Stripes, in order to annoy my predecessors. (On one 
occasion when the sentries had been particularly slack, it was found to be flying from 
the flag staff in Government House garden.) It has now become so much a personal 
matter with Price that it is impossible to persuade him even to contemplate the fact 
that he is only hardening the general opposition to himself by forcing the blue and 
white flag on the country; but he has got himself too far out on a limb to be ready to 
compromise by holding a competition, and while he may even fear that his blue and 
white flag would not be the choice of the majority, he probably hopes to get it 
accepted through habit. As you saw for yourself, the party colours, blue and white, 
are imposed on every conceivable object and building, and it was only because of the 
Premier's absence in London last spring that it was possible to use the neutral green 
and white on the Supreme Court-and, had it not been for the expense, the building 
would have been repainted on his return. This is all very childish but I am told that 
the first order given in the Irish Free State in 1922 was that all red letter boxes 
should immediately be painted green, so there is a precedent. 
13. At present the country depends for its defence upon the British Army which 
provides a garrison of small headquarters staff under a colonel and one company of 
an infantry regiment which does a tour of nine months. Reinforcements can be flown 
in but would take about five days from the call for help. However, one company is 
considered to be sufficient for the tasks in hand, and it is most unlikely that the 
Guatemalans will attempt a serious incursion so long as the British troops are here. 
The Government does not wish to have a professional army of its own; Ministers have 
seen too many examples in Central America of what happens to the politicians when 
the soldiers take control. Instead it proposes to have a special Police Reserve which 
general duties constables would take turns to man. This should be adequate for 
internal security after independence, and for dealing with any small incursion either 
by land or sea. For the rest I think we must aim at persuading the United States to 
accept responsibility for ensuring that no large scale aggression is permitted. 
14. Up to this point I have been filling in the political background and have not 
mentioned the country's economy, yet it is the economy and the smallness of its 
population which are the crucial factors in the advance of British Honduras to 
independence. The population is around 100,000. Figures of 105,000 are given but 
are dubious. With a population of this size it would be difficult in any case to find 
enough talent to provide the leaders for Government and commerce, but this 
country has an additional handicap in the steady drain of many of the brighter 
youngsters to the United States. The United States immigration quota is 100 persons 
a year but many others get round the regulations by going there on a visit and just 
staying on beyond their appointed time. Provided they do not fall foul of the police 
they seldom come to light. The most recent Immigration Law has raised the figure to 
650 a year which bodes ill for this country as yet more of the ambitious school-
3 P S W Goldson, formerly founder member of PUP and member for Social Service in British Honduras 
government; leader of National Independence Party. 
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leavers will seek their fortune in the States. Of those who remain there are many of 
great ability-any country would be lucky to have a man of the calibre of Fonseca4 in 
its civil service-but the problem is whether the remaining yeast is sufficient to 
leaven the disproportionately large mass of dough whose favourite phrase is "Take it 
easy, man". It is difficult enough to man the Civil Service now: the additional load of 
independence would put an almost unbearable strain on it. Emigration also has an 
adverse effect by removing too many of the foreman type, so that labour is often 
disappointing through lack of management. There have been many suggestions for 
increasing the population by large-scale immigration: however the money required 
for an operation like this would never be forthcoming and I shall not weary you with 
the pros and cons; the Government would oppose it. 
15. The economy of the country has never been strong. For two-and-a-half 
centuries it depended upon exports of forest produce and the first attempt to 
diversify the economy by introducing banana plantations in the Stann Creek Valley 
was brought to a dismal end in the 1930s by Panama disease. The United Fruit 
Company made a survey last year of an area south of Stann Creek and there were 
high hopes of a large investment but they came to nothing, partly perhaps owing to 
Guatemalan pressure on the United Fruit Company since the Guatemalans feared 
that the new development would be at their expense. 
16. The banana industry was replaced by citrus. This grows well and with proper 
cultivation gives excellent yields but the world market prices fluctuate considerably 
and are now very low. Mter the Florida freeze in late 1962 the Salada Corporation put 
in a factory and have increased the groves which they bought from the CDC. This 
ensures a market for about half the citrus produced. 
17. Sugar is now the main export crop. Tate and Lyle took over the Corozal 
Sugar Factory and plantations in 1964 and are undertaking an enormous expansion. 
It is intended to mechanise most of the operations and thus to avoid the high costs 
which the company faces in the Caribbean islands. The small population of British 
Honduras and the large area of suitable land, at present uncultivated, makes this an 
ideal place to introduce mechanisation, and creates wonderful opportunities for local 
mechanics and artisans. Local cane farmers produce two-thirds of the 37,000 tons of 
sugar made by the factory but their plans for expansion are hampered by labour 
problems, for the Creoles, who form the bulk of the unemployed, dislike working in 
the canefields and farmers are dependent upon imported Mexican labour to cut their 
cane. The United States quota has just been raised from 4,000 to 10,000 short tons 
and this lasts until 1971. 
18. The Cayo district has great potentialities for cattle-raising but the local 
market is too small to justify any large extension although I believe that if only we 
could overcome vested interests and local inefficiency there are wonderful 
possibilities for a dairy industry. The vested interests are the importers and retailers 
of tinned milk; as regards inefficiency the plain fact is that too often the will to 
achieve does not match the good intentions. For beef cattle there have been hopes for 
several years that either CDC or some consortium of businessmen would erect an 
abattoir. With the apparently insatiable demand for meat, an export industry seems 
assured of a market but until the abattoir is built local herds have already reached 
their maximum practicable size. 
4 RA Fonseca, permanent secretary, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 
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19. The big disappointment of this year was the closing down of the Hercules 
Powder Company's rosin extraction factory because the operation was not economic 
and on account of an alleged error in estimating the quantity of pine stumps 
available for processing. This was a million pound investment which started 
operating in January 1964 and was giving employment to a good Flllmber of artisans 
in the southern part of the country. Most of those who have been willing to move 
have found employment in the construction of the new sugar factory at Orange Walk 
Town but it means that there is a dreary pocket of unemployed in the south. 
20. The fishing industry is profitable but relatively small, the main item being 
lobster tails of which about 450 tons are exported annually to the United States. The 
Government has been advised by a fisheries expert to keep the exports at that figure 
for fear of exterminating the lobsters. There could be a significant increase if our 
fishermen could be persuaded to harvest the deep waters between the Turneffe 
Islands and Lighthouse Reef. A certain amount of poaching is carried on in the 
southern waters by fishing vessels from Honduras. 
21. Various oil companies have prospected on the mainland without success. 
Shell are now about to start offshore exploration in the area of the Turneffe Islands 
due east of Belize City and express optimism although one cannot help but feel that 
much of this is aimed at ensuring co-operation by the Premier. 
22. The economy was undoubtedly boosted as a result of the 1961 hurricane 
which devastated Belize City, Stann Creek town and the immediate hinterland. First 
of all came the insurance money and then the grants and loans from Her Majesty's 
Government, which enabled a large programme of reconstruction and development 
to be undertaken. In fact this injection of money could have had a far greater effect, 
had it not been competing with the habitual inefficiency which causes so much 
money and effort to be wasted. The Premier recently bemoaned to me the fact that 
"our people have a tendency to treat loans as gifts, and not to pay their rates and 
taxes". Vested interests also handicap the economy and put obstacles in the way of 
every plan to achieve self-sufficiency. These interests are the importers who for 
centuries have lived comfortably on the commission charged on each tin or bag of 
food without having to take any great pains. Add to this the pauperisation caused by 
the distribution of free food by CARE for several years after the hurricane, and it will 
be apparent that many factors militate against the economy becoming viable. 
23. Ministers pin many hopes to tourism but here again it is necessary to sound a 
warning. Tourists in bulk, I am told, expect clean sandy beaches and good hotel 
service, neither of which are yet to be found in British Honduras although in time 
both could be available. Stann Creek Town has a nice stretch of sandy beach but for 
too long it has been used as an alternative for public conveniences. Hotels on the 
cayes are a possibility if difficulties of title to the land and of providing sufficient 
fresh water can be overcome. The best prospect for selective tourism probably 
remains the establishment of a first-class hotel with a properly run casino. If a 
suitably attractive site can be found there is a good chance of interesting a 
respectable United States backer. 
24. Another financial obstacle to viability will be the award of the Salaries 
Commissioner, Sir Richard Ramage, who is at work now. He tells me that in view of 
the salaries currently being paid outside Government he does not see how the award 
can be less than 15 per cent overall and in some cases, for example, nurses, more. 
The effect of this will be that even if British Honduras can meet the cost of the 
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recurrent budget there will be practically nothing left over for development. 
However, there is a break in the clouds, namely, the proposal for tripartite aid from 
Great Britain, the United States and Canada. 
25. I have purposely omitted any mention of the Guatemalan dispute because the 
United States Government has recently undertaken to mediate. It seems a pity that 
they should have chosen an elderly jurist: what I had hoped for was some amiable 
figure of international repute who would jolly the Guatemalans into giving way 
gracefully. A legalistic approach may serve to make them more obdurate than ever. 
One thing is certain and that is that 99 per cent of the local population would oppose 
any sort of political association with Guatemala: this is the one opinion on which the 
country really is united. 
26. Looking ahead I should say that our primary aim should be to get the United 
States firmly committed to the general protection and development of this country, 
and that it will be possible to do this only by indirect methods. Certainly for the past 
four years the State Department has shown a great reluctance to become involved in 
our affairs but the decision to undertake mediation may prove to have been the 
turning point. Logically the Americans should be eager to bring this country into 
their area defence plan, and they can always prevent the Guatemalans from any 
stupid military venture. 
27. In local politics I predict that Price will remain as Premier for the foreseeable 
future-many of his colleagues would like to take his place but none of them is likely 
to be able to consolidate the opposition to Price. In Belize City Rogers is strong: in 
the districts Sylvestre has a fair following. Both are conscious of the real position and 
are not prepared to court personal disaster by challenging the leader now. The NIP is 
unlikely to defeat the PUP, and even if it did, no change of general policy would be 
likely to follow. The only section of the community which is really disgruntled is the 
commission-agent type of businessmen who ran the country for so long and 
organised its government for their own benefit. They have been unwilling to change 
-perhaps they have not enough energy-and, as they see their members going to 
the wall, they blame Price and the PUP instead of looking at their own shortcomings. 
28. My own summing up would be that a country twice the size of Corsica but 
with half its population and lacking natural resources cannot really make sense as an 
independent nation, but since international politics necessitate this, and Mr. Price 
would never agree to anything less than full independence although he is in no hurry 
to take the final step, British Honduras is likely to muddle along with its habitual 
inefficiency and good nature, with much grandiloquence but little real poverty, 
depending on the charity of Her Majesty's Government and the United States 
Government, and even if it does not make sense it will make only harmless nonsense 
of independence. 
29. To summarise-the Internal Self-Government Constitution is working well 
but there is no desire for immediate independence: Mr. Price dominates the political 
scene but is not altogether successful in leading his parliamentary party. The 
Opposition party (NIP) is rather ineffective. Opposition to the proposed national flag 
of an independent Belize is fairly widespread as it involves fears of Guatemala and of 
Latinisation. The small British Garrison is adequate for the present but the future 
defence of the country is likely to depend on the United States. Economic prospects 
are not bright. Emigration of promising youngsters takes away too many potential 
leaders so that labour is disappointing. The country now depends upon the sugar and 
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citrus industries but there is hope for a meat industry if an abattoir is established. 
Even if the country can pay for its recurrent budget next year there will be very little 
left over for capital expenditure. The country will be financially dependent for as long 
as one can foresee. 
243 PREM 13/734 8 Nov 1965 
'Security arrangements in Guyana after independence': minute by Sir 
B SU Trend to Mr Wilson on Mr Greenwood's proposals1 
It should be possible to bring British Guiana to independence (as Guyana) within the 
period May/July, 1966, provided that interim arrangements can be made for 
maintaining internal security until the Guyanese security forces are able to take over 
in October. The Committee may feel that the Colonial Secretary's arguments against 
postponing independence until October 1966 are decisive-particularly the 
consideration that, if we miss the relatively favourable opportunity which now offers, 
there might well be a renewal of internal disorder which could compel us to postpone 
the grant of independence and to continue to carry our invidious responsibility for a 
further, indefinite, period. 
2. There are also strong arguments for allowing British troops to remain after 
independence in order to cover the interim period until the Guyanese security forces 
are adequate in about October 1966:-
(a) The British Guiana Government are pressing for this and have given 
assurances about the status of our forces and their protection against any legal 
liability arising from their actions. (But are these assurances adequate? This 
depends largely on the role which the troops would be designed to discharge-on 
which see paragraphs 3 and 5 below.) 
(b) The United States Government have also urged us to agree. If we do so, we 
shall be better placed to invoke their assistance in dealing with Venezuelan claims 
against British Guiana territory; and we can also take credit for our decision in the 
discussions with the United States Government on the Defence Review, although 
the decision itself could scarcely be deferred until these discussions take place. 
(c) The Commission of Enquiry appointed by the International Commission of 
Jurists recommended the provision of an adequate military force from outside the 
country until the Guyanese security forces were adequate. The only alternative to 
British troops would be a United Nations force; and the Commonwealth Relations 
Office have suggested that this possibility should be examined. But the Colonial 
Secretary gives strong reasons, in paragraph 3 of MISC. 89/1, for rejecting this as a 
feasible substitute for British forces. These are practical reasons rather than 
reasons of principle. But, if we accept that the main argument in favour of 
retaining British troops after independence is the importance which the United 
States Government attach to our doing so, the considerations in paragraph 3 of 
MISC. 8911, reinforce this factor powerfully. 
1 See 241. 
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3. But, if British forces remain after independence, it is important that:-
(a) Their role should be . as strictly limited as possible-i.e. that, instead of 
carrying the main responsibility for maintaining law and order, as at present, they 
should act solely as a reserve for the local Guyanese forces and that, in the event of 
trouble, their primary task should be restricted to protecting the Government and 
vital installations. (This was the basis on which we were prepared to send British 
forces into Kenya earlier this year in order to deal with a threatened coup against 
President Kenyatta). 
(b) They should be as inconspicuous as possible. There is force in the Defence 
Secretary's suggestion that they should be withdrawn from Georgetown and 
stationed at Atkinson Airfield. 
(c) There should be a firm date for their withdrawal. I suspect that the local 
security forces will not, in fact, be adequate by October 1966. Nevertheless, on this 
date the British forces should be withdrawn; and this should preferably be stated 
publicly in advance, in order both to give the local Government the maximum 
incentive to press on with training their own security forces and to expose us to 
the minimum risk of having to intervene in a conflict between Burnham and 
Jagan, with all the potential embarrassments outlined in paragraph 7 of the 
Defence Secretary's letter. If we make it clear now that we intend to withdraw by 
October 1966, Jagan (if he has any sense) will wait until then before trying to seize 
power by force and Burnham will have a few extra months in which to prepare for 
this risk. 
4. On balance, the Committee may feel that, although there are clear risks in 
leaving British troops in Guiana, they are less serious than the alternative courses, 
i.e. either to defer independence until October, 1966, or to leave Guyana, during the 
vital initial months of independence, with no adequate backing for the maintenance 
of internal security except the dubious prospect of a United Nations force. 
5. If so, however, it is essential that our troops should be adequately protected 
against legal action in the local courts in respect of acts which they may commit 
in maintaining law and order in support of the civil power, even on the limited 
basis suggested in paragraph 3(a) above. This seems to be covered by paragraph 
8(b) of the memorandum; but our agreement to make troops available will 
presumably be conditional on any requisite local legislation being passed before 
independence. 
6. On a relatively minor point, the Defence Secretary says, in paragraph 3 of his 
letter, that the battalion in question would be due to be relieved in June; and he 
proposes that they should in fact be relieved in April (i .e. before independence is 
granted in May or June) in order that their subsequent stay until October may be 
encompassed within a normal nine months tour. One can see the force of the 
argument. But the arrival of a new battalion only a month or so before independence 
is due to be granted will tend not only to highlight our intention to keep troops in 
the country after independence but also to create the impression that we mean to 
keep them there for rather longer than we do. It is a pity that the battalion which is 
due to be relieved in June cannot simply stay on until October, when they would be 
overdue for relief and their departure would be to that extent more plausible on 
strictly military grounds. 
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244 CAB 130/248, MISC 89/1 8 Nov 1965 
'Security arrangements in Guyana after independence': minutes of 
Cabinet Committee on British Guiana1 [Extract] 
[The minutes begin with an opening statement by Greenwood, summarising the 
arguments in 241, followed by a statement by Healey, reiterating the points made in his 
letter to Greenwood at 238. They then continue with an appraisal by Sir R Luyt, the 
governor.] 
.. . The Governor of British Guiana said that the situation in British Guiana had 
greatly improved during the past year and, although the present Government had 
not won over the bulk of the Indian population, they had the support of a part of it 
and of a majority in the country as a whole. For the first time in the twelve years 
since the constitution had been suspended there was a feeling of confidence in the 
economic and political future. The local security forces consisted of a regular army 
battalion which was now being recruited and a territorial battalion which was being 
reorganised and trained. There was also an efficient police force. All these forces were 
being organised on an inter-racial basis, though the police force would for some time 
remain predominantly African. A detailed timetable had been worked out for the 
recruitment and training of these forces and they should be ready to assume 
responsibility for maintaining internal security by October. His military and police 
advisers agreed that the internal security position was improving and early 
independence could be expected to discourage the organisation of large scale 
subversion. It was not yet safe to agree to a reduction of the British garrison in 
February, but one battalion could be withdrawn on independence or perhaps even 
earlier and the local forces could on independence take over the routine maintenance 
of internal security. The P.P.P. could still create local disturbances but he was 
satisfied that the Guianese forces could deal with these and the risk of Dr. Jagan 
being able or even attempting to overthrow the Government was remote. To delay 
independence beyond about May would mean losing the present momentum and 
would be interpreted both in British Guiana and elsewhere as a lack of confidence by 
the United Kingdom Government. This could have serious effects both on the 
internal situation and on the prospects of obtaining aid and investment from abroad. 
If the British battalion remained after independence, a date for its withdrawal should 
be fixed and announced in advance. 
In discussion it was suggested that despite these considerations, it would be 
preferable to delay the grant of independence until October, when British troops 
could safely be withdrawn. It was however the general view of the meeting that, 
although there were risks in leaving British troops in Guyana after independence, 
these were less serious than the risk of deferring independence until October or of 
leaving a vacuum during the interim period until local forces were adequate to take 
over. Reliance could not be placed on a United Nations force and any criticism in the 
United Nations of the retention of British forces would be minimised if Mr. Burnham 
asked for them to remain in order to assist in training the local forces. It would be 
important not to suggest that the British forces were needed to defend Guyana 
1 Present: Wilson, Callaghan, Stewart, Healey, Bottomley, Greenwood, Poynton and Luyt. Also present 
from the secretariat: Trend, P Rogers and D S Laskey. 
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against external attack since this would encourage Venezuela to press her claim 
against Guyana. If we agreed to keep British forces we should in return try to secure 
Mr. Burnham's agreement to the Venezuelan claim being referred to the 
International Court of Justice. 
In further discussion it was suggested that the Canadian Government might be 
asked to share this responsibility with us and to contribute forces. It was however 
pointed out that they might be unwilling to have Canadian forces in Guyana after 
independence and to the extent that Canadian· forces replaced British forces this 
would complicate the training which British forces were giving to the local Guyanese 
forces and delay their readiness to take over full responsibility for internal security. 
Summing up the discussion The Prime Minister said that it was generally agreed 
that the grant of independence should not be delayed until October 1966 and that the 
suggestion that a United Nations force should provide the necessary backing for the 
maintenance of internal security was not practicable. On balance, the Meeting agreed 
that British forces should remain and Mr. Burnham might be informed that we were 
prepared to have discussions with him on this basis. It must be made clear that our 
forces would remain at the request of the British Guiana Government in order to 
assist in the training of the local forces and there must be prior legislation to give 
them full protection against legal process arising from their actions. The timing of 
the reduction and final withdrawal of British forces should be decided and 
announced in advance. The best arrangement might be for the battalion which was 
due for relief to be replaced in February; the other battalion would be withdrawn on 
independence and the remaining battalion in October, 1966. We could still take 
credit for our agreement to leave British forces after independence during the 
discussions with the United States Government on the Defence Review, though the 
decision to do so would have to be taken in advance of these discussions and would 
no doubt become known to the United States Government. 
The Meeting:-
Approved MISC. 89/1, subject to the points made by the Prime Minister in his 
summing up. 
245 PREM 13/734 19 Nov 1965 
[British Guiana]: CO brief for Mr Wilson's talk with Mr Burnham on 
the arrangements for independence 
1. The constitutional conference 
The Prime Minister might open by congratulating Mr. Burnham on the outcome. 
The Conference has resulted in agreement that British Guiana should become 
independent on .. .1 with a Constitution adapted from the present one. It will include 
safeguards for human rights, the rule of law, and democratic government. The 
system of proportional representation will be maintained but there is provision for 
some changes later, if the British Guiana Parliament wishes, so that some members 
will have a connection with constituencies. 
1 Date left blank in the original but see 246. 
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2. The Queen and membership of the Commonwealth 
British Guiana is to have a Governor-General at least until 1st January 1969. The 
Constitution will enable the British Guiana Parliament to substitute a President for 
the Governor-General after that date (the Queen has approved this arrangement). 
The Delegates have gone on record as hoping that British Guiana will be accepted as 
a full Member of the Commonwealth. 
3. British troops 
It has been agreed that British troops will stay in British Guiana until October 1966.2 
Mr. Burhham has accepted our conditions viz:-
(a) The public line will be that the troops are staying at the British Guiana 
Government's request to assist in training their forces; 
(b) Indemnifying legislation for our troops; 
(c) The troops will be used only as a last resort and with our agreement. 
4. Defensive brief 
Mr. Burnham may raise:-
(a) Independence aid 
He expects a "golden handshake" and is to have a talk about this later with the 
Colonial Secretary when he will be told that while we shall of course be prepared 
to discuss continuing developing aid after independence, we are not yet ready for 
this mainly because wehave not yet had time to examine his new developing [sic] 
plans. Also Mr. Burnham is aiming at an international aid consortium, 
(U.K./U.S.A./Canada/ West Germany) and if we are to follow this up we ought 
meanwhile to settle our own aid bilaterally.3 
(b) Defence agreement 
Mr. Burnham is disappointed that we have declined to enter into a defence 
agreement. We have explained that we did [sic] not do so unless the area is one in 
which there are direct British defence interests. He has accepted this and is 
unlikely to return to it. If he does, the most we can say is that if British Guiana 
appeals to us for help in an emergency we shall be ready to consider their request 
in the light of the circumstances at the time including the efforts of the Guyanese 
Government to prevent the emergency from arising. But any understanding on 
this should remain an oral one. 
(c) Venezuela's claim to two-thirds of British Guiana 
The boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela was established by an arbitral 
award in 1899 which the Venezuelans now maintain was unjust. There is no 
substance in the Venezuelan claim and, having consulted the law officers, the 
Foreign Office would be prepared to offer to refer the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice. Mr. Burnham will not agree to this. Mr. Burnham is anxious that 
there should be a defence agreement which inter alia would guarantee British 
Guiana's boundary with Venezuela. (See note (b) above.) 
2 See 244. 
3 Upon independence, Guyana received £3 million in financial aid up to the year 1966-1967 (£1 million 
budgetary aid, £1.2 million in development grants and £750,000 in technical assistance). A development 
loan of £416,000 was also provided in the first quarter of 1966 (ODM 28/9, no 32, 'Aid to the Caribbean', 
ODM survey, 17 Oct 1966). 
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246 PREM 13/734 19 Nov 1965 
'British Guiana conference': outward circular telegram no 465 from 
FO and CRO to missions abroad on the outcome of the independence 
conference 
In fulfilment of the British Government's undertaking the Colonial Secretary invited 
all parties in the Legislature to attend a Conference opening in London on 2 
November 1965 to settle an independence constitution and to fix the date for 
independence.I The Conference (boycotted by Dr. Jagan's opposition party) 
concluded 19 November with agreement that British Guiana should become 
independent, under name of Guyana, on 26 May 1966. Guyana will be a monarchy 
but there is provision for a change to a republic not earlier than 1969. It is intended 
to seek membership of Commonwealth. 
2. Dr. Jagan, the P.P.P. leader who ceased to be Premier after the December 1964 
elections, declined to attend the Conference claiming that the electoral system 
devised in 1963 was unacceptable to the majority of the B.G. people, pointing out 
that a state of emergency existed and a number of people were in detention, and 
concluding that the conference should not be held in such circumstances.2 He 
rejected the Colonial Secretary's appeal that he should not throw away this 
opportunity to share in the making of vital decisions at the Conference and persisted 
in his boycott. (As regards detainees, there are at present only 17 and these can apply 
to have their cases reviewed by a tribunal) . 
3. Very full discussions, from which no relevant matters were excluded, took 
place. The Conference agreed on a form of constitution based generally on the 
existing constitution with adaptations appropriate to an independent state. In view 
of absence of opposition parties the Conference was especially conscious of its 
responsibility to take decisions in best interests of all the people of British Guiana 
whatever their race or creed. Particularly important was the International 
Commission of Jurists ' Report on Racial Problems in Public Service.3 Memoranda 
from individuals and organisations on draft constitution were all closely examined 
by Conference. The constitution contains strong safeguards for protection of indi-
viduals and minorities, independence of judiciary and impartiality of Public 
Service. 
4. The Conference can (despite absence of P.P.P.) be regarded as satisfactory. 
Although its reception in British Guiana cannot be predicted with certainty, it is 
hoped that now the die is cast there will be general cooperation. The solemn 
declaration of intent at end of Conference Report (which will be sent to some posts) 
calls for an end to communal divisions and for all Guyanese, on independence, to set 
aside bitterness and strive together for peace and prosperity. 
5. All the above may be freely used. 
1 See CAB 133/158 and Report of the British Guiana Independence Conference, 1965 (Cmnd 2849, 1965). 
2 See 239. 3 See 236. 
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247 PREM 13/734 21 Feb 1966 
[Venezuelan-British Guiana frontier]: outward circular telegram no 
63 from FO and CRO to missions abroad on the Geneva agreement 
On 17 February the Foreign Secretary, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister and the 
Prime Minister of British Guiana, signed an agreement the main provisions of which 
are:-
2. A Mixed Commission, consisting of two Venezuelans and two Guianese, is to 
be established. If the Commission cannot solve the controversy within four years, it 
will refer outstanding questions to the Governments of Venezuela and British 
Guiana, who will then decide which of the means of peaceful settlement provided in 
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter they will adopt. If unable to agree they will 
ask an appropriate international organ acceptable to them both, to decide on the 
means of settlement under Article 33, or failing that, the Secretary General of the 
United Nations. 
3. The Agreement does not prejudice the legal position of either side, which 
remains unaltered. The United Kingdom and British Guiana continue to regard the 
1899 Award as valid, while Venezuela regards it as null and void. During the life of 
the Commission neither side may assert territorial claims of any kind except in the 
Mixed Commission. The provisions of the relevant article of the Agreement are 
modelled on those of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. 
4. We regard the Agreement as an honourable compromise between two 
diametrically opposed points of view. It is also a remarkable achievement in settling a 
difficult dispute peacefully. You will recall that the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 
formed the subject of an initiative which the United Kingdom took at the last session 
of the United Nations General Assembly. We hope that the Mixed Commission can be 
set up quickly and that the Agreement will pave the way for a friendly and 
constructive relationship between British Guiana and Venezuela. 
5. The Venezuelan delegation included representatives of all parties represented 
in Congress, who expressed their support for the Agreement. We therefore hope that 
the Venezuelan propaganda campaign directed against ourselves will now be brought 
to an end. 
6. All the above may be used freely. 
248 CAB 148/27, OPD(66)36 25 Feb 1966 
[Associated status]: memorandum by Lord Longford for Cabinet 
Defence and Oversea Policy Committee 
The first of a series of conferences with most of the Leeward and Windward Islands, 
designed to give them a new relationship with Britain as "Associated Territories" will 
open with Antigua on the 28th February. It is planned that two other conferences 
will follow, first with the four Windward Islands on the 18th April and then with St. 
Kitts on the 11th May. 
2. The purpose of these conferences is to see whether it is possible to reach agree-
ment with these territories on the proposals put to them last year and published as 
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Cmnd. 2865. 1 The object of the proposals is that the Islands should cease to be colonies 
and become associated territories: the basis of their association with us being that they 
should have full internal autonomy while we remain responsible merely for their 
defence and external affairs. It would be a condition of the creation and continuance · 
of this new relationship that there should be constitutional provisions that would 
ensure the rule of law and the observance of normal democratic practices and that we 
should have adequate powers under the constitutions to discharge our external affairs 
and defence responsibilities in any circumstances that may arise. 
3. The main features of the proposals are as follows:-
(a) Except in the interests of external affairs and defence, the British Parliament 
would no longer have the power to legislate for these territories save with their 
consent. The local legislatures would have full powers of legislation- even to the 
extent of taking the territories to independence if they so wished. 
(b) The constitutions would contain certain basic clauses enshrining the 
arrangements for democratic government and for the relationship between Britain 
and the territory. These clauses could be amended only by a two-thirds majority in 
the legislature followed by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in a referendum. 
(c) There would be a Superior Court for the region under a President appointed by 
the Lord Chancellor with special jurisdiction and powers to uphold the 
constitution. The Court would have the power to issue orders to any authority to 
ensure that the Constitution is complied with. 
(d) The British Government's powers in relation to defence and external affairs 
would, subject to the constitution, include full power to legislate on any matter as 
might appear necessary to the British Government to prevent circumstances aris-
ing in a territory which might prejudice the discharge of Britain's responsibilities. 
4. The proposals have been reasonably well received in all territories. It is, 
however, expected that the island Chief Ministers will try to restrict the powers of the 
superior court and also to limit Her Majesty's Government's powers of intervention 
in the discharge of its external affairs responsibilities. Both these features are 
fundamental from Her Majesty's Government's point of view and the negotiations 
may be difficult. 
5. I circulate this for the information of my colleagues. 
1 Constitutional proposals for Antigua, St Kitts!Nevis!Anguilla, Dominica, St Lucia, St Vincent, Grenada 
(Cmnd 2865, Dec 1965), elaborating on the proposals discussed in 234. 
249 CAB 148/27, OPD(66)48 7 Apr 1966 
[Associated status]: memorandum by Mr Lee for Cabinet Defence and 
Oversea Policy Committee on the Antigua constitutional conference. 
Annexes C and D to the report of the conference on the procedures for 
dealing with defence and external affairs 
The Antigua Constitutional Conference referred to in O.P.D. (66) 36 of 25th February1 
concluded successfully on 25th March after a month of difficult negotiation. 
1 See 248. 
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2. There were two aspects of the proposals put forward in Cmnd. 2865 which 
gave difficulty. The first was the extent of the British Government's powers in the 
field of defence and external affairs, and the second was which clauses in the 
Constitution should be subject to special entrenchment-and as such amendable by 
the special procedure which would require a referendum carried by a two-thirds 
majority of votes cast. 
3. In the end satisfactory agreement was reached on both points and the results 
of the Conference are set out in an agreed Report (copy attached) 2 which has already 
been made available to the Press and which it is hoped to publish later this month as 
a Command Paper. The proposals set out in the Report differ from those in 
Cmnd. 2865 in the following main aspects:-
(a) If Antigua wishes to sever the association with Britain and replace it with an 
association with an independent Commonwealth country in the Caribbean area, 
there will be no need for a referendum. The reason which, it was felt, made 
possible this concession was that one of the main objects of insisting on the 
referendum procedure is to make it fairly difficult for these small islands to 
proceed to independence, since neither we nor the Americans are anxious to see a 
proliferation of "mini-states" in the Caribbean Sea. If, however, a state in 
association with Britain were to link up instead with another already independent 
Commonwealth country, there would as a result be no increase in the number of 
sovereign states in the area. 
(b) The court arrangements have been slightly changed, and there will be a 
Regional Supreme Court consisting of a High Court and a Court of Appeal. 
Constitutional cases and cases affecting fundamental rights will go to the High 
Court in the first instance, and not to the Court of Appeal. The President of the 
Supreme Court will be appointed by The Queen. (This will be done on the advice of 
the Lord Chancellor, though this is not expressly stated in the Report, so the effect 
is the same as in the proposals in Cmnd. 2865.) 
(c) The British Government Representative in the area will not have the right to 
refer a matter to the courts. 
4. A solution to the difficult problem of Britain's powers in the field of defence 
and external affairs was arrived at by setting out in an agreement (as outlined in 
Annex C of the Report) the way in which the British government's powers in this 
field will be exercised. Britain will also entrust to Antigua responsibility for carrying 
out certain external affairs functions. This procedure is described in a proposed draft 
despatch at Annex D of the Report. 
Windward Islands constitutional conference 
5. The Conference with the Windward Islands of Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and Grenada on the proposals in Cmnd. 2865 will open in Lancaster House on the 
18th April. All four territories have put forward their proposals or comments on 
Cmnd. 2865. These were prepared before they had seen the Antigua Report. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the points which caused difficulty in the case of Antigua 
will also be the principal points for discussion with the Windward Islands, namely, 
the extent of Britain's powers in the field of defence and external affairs and the 
2 Only Annexes C and D are reproduced here. 
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procedure for amending the basic clauses of the Constitution, particularly the 
procedure of having a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in a referendum. On the 
external affairs point, however, it is hoped that when the Windward Governments 
have studied the arrangements come to in the case of Antigua they will consider 
them acceptable. The maintenance of a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in a 
referendum before the basic clauses can be altered-especially the clauses which 
would take a territory to independence-is a point of great importance to the 
Foreign Office as well as to the Colonial Office, and it is expected that if the United 
Kingdom side stand firm on it the Windward Islands Governments will agree. 
6. One of the main difficulties in dealing with the next Conference will be 
negotiating four internal territorial constitutions; but this is not a matter which is 
likely to raise points of interest to other departments. 
Annex C to report of Antigua constitutional conference: The heads of agreement on 
defence and external affairs 
General 
1. There will be a preamble referring to the provisions of the Order in Council 
defining the powers of the United Kingdom Parliament and Her Majesty in Council 
to Legislate for Antigua. 
2. This agreement will have effect as long as the association between the United 
Kingdom and Antigua lasts, but will be capable of modification by mutual 
agreement. 
Defence 
3. The United Kingdom Government will be responsible for the defence of 
Antigua against external aggression. 
4. The Antigua Government will take all steps (including, where necessary, steps 
to secure the passage of legislation) to provide such facilities as may be required in 
Antigua by the United Kingdom Government for the fulfilment of their 
responsibilities or obligations with respect to the defence of Antigua or of the United 
Kingdom and its associated states and territories or the safety of any other part of the 
Commonwealth or of any of the allies of the United Kingdom. 
5. The Antigua Government will not, without the consent of the United 
Kingdom, grant access to any part of its territory or territorial waters to, or allow the 
use of any of its airfields, communications or harbour facilities by, the forces or 
agents of any other government. 
6. An agreement dealing with the exercise of jurisdiction over U.K. visiting forces 
and other matters normally dealt with in status of forces agreements will be entered 
into at the same time as this agreement. 
7. Any United Kingdom forces introduced into Antigua for defence purposes 
under this agreement will not be used in aid of the civil power or for any purposes 
other than defence purposes except at the request of the Antigua Government and 
with the agreement of the United Kingdom Government. 
External affairs 
8. The United Kingdom Government undertakes responsibility for the external 
relations of Antigua. 
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9. The United Kingdom Government will consult the Antigua Government 
before entering into international obligations with respect to Antigua. 
10. The United Kingdom Government will from time to time by despatch define 
the extent to which the Antigua Government will have authority to act in the field of 
external relations. 
11. The Antigua Government will take all steps (including, where necessary, 
steps to secure the passage of legislation) required by the United Kingdom 
Government:-
(a) to secure the fulfilment of the Commonwealth or international obligations or 
responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government; or 
(b) in the interests of good relations between Antigua or the United Kingdom and 
another country. 
12. The Antigua Government will not introduce or support legislation which 
might affect the discharge of the United Kingdom Government's Commonwealth or 
international obligations or responsibilities or the maintenance of good relations 
between Antigua or the United Kingdom and another country without prior 
reference to and consultation with the United Kingdom Government. The Antigua 
Government will not proceed with or support legislation if the United Kingdom 
Government informs them that its passage would be detrimental to the discharge of 
those obligations or responsibilities or the maintenance of such relations. 
13. (1) Where in the opinion of the United Kingdom Government the enactment 
of legislation for Antigua is required in the interests of the responsibility of the 
United Kingdom Government for the external affairs or defence of Antigua or of the 
United Kingdom and its other associated states and territories the United Kingdom 
Government shall invite the Antigua Government either:-
(a) to signify its consent to the enactment of the legislation by the Parliament of 
the United Kingdom or by Her Majesty in Council; or 
(b) to take steps to secure the enactment of the legislation by the Parliament of 
Antigua or other appropriate authority in Antigua. 
(2) If the consent of the Government of Antigua to the enactment of legislation by 
the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by Her Majesty in Council is signified 
under paragraph (1) (a) of this clause, the United Kingdom Government may take 
steps to secure the enactment of the legislation accordingly. 
(3) If the Government of Antigua sees difficulty in acceding to a request made to 
it by the United Kingdom Government under paragraph (1) of this clause, then the 
fullest consultation that is practicable in the circumstances of the case shall take 
place between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of 
Antigua with a view to resolving the difficulty. 
(4) Where after consultation under paragraph (3) of this clause there is failure 
to reach agreement concerning the enactment of legislation, and the United 
Kingdom Government remain of the opinion that it is nevertheless necessary for 
legislation to be enacted in the interests of its responsibility for the external affairs or 
defence of Antigua or of the United Kingdom and its other associated states and 
territories, the United Kingdom Government shall give as much notice as possible to 
the Government of Antigua of its intention to take steps to secure the enactment of 
the legislation by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by Her Majesty in 
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Council; and before taking such steps shall so far as is practicable afford the 
Government of Antigua the opportunity of considering whether, in all 
circumstances, it would wish to take steps to secure the termination of the 
association between the United Kingdom and Antigua. 
Annex D to report of Antigua constitutional: Draft despatch on external affairs 
1. In carrying out its general responsibility for the external affairs of Antigua the 
British Government will seek the fullest consultation with the Government of 
Antigua and will at all times have special regard to the interests of the Government of 
Antigua and of the association between the two Governments. 
2. Subject to the understandings set out in later paragraphs of this despatch Her 
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom hereby delegate executive authority to 
the Government of Antigua with respect to their external relations with other 
countries as follows:-
(a) authority to apply for full or associate membership, as may be provided for in 
the Constitution of the organisation concerned, of those United Nations 
Specialised Agencies or similar international organisations of which the United 
Kingdom is itself a member and for membership of which Antigua is eligible; 
(b) authority to arrange or permit visits by representatives of or persons in the 
employ of any organisation under subparagraph (a) above of which Antigua is a 
full or associate member; 
(c) authority to negotiate and conclude trade agreements with other countries, 
whether bilateral or multilateral relating solely to the treatment of goods. 
Agreements relating to establishment matters (i.e. those affecting the rights of 
persons and companies of the contracting parties) will continue to be dealt with in 
commercial treaties negotiated by the British Government. The British 
Government will, however, be prepared, in appropriate circumstances to delegate 
to the Government of Antigua ad hoc authority to conclude individual trade 
agreements in which establishment matters are included. Agreements affecting 
Antigua relating to civil aviation and shipping will continue to be dealt with in 
accordance with present practice whereby the British Government engages in the 
fullest consultation with the Antigua Government and invites their participation 
in such negotiations as are necessary; 
(d) authority to arrange or permit visits of up to thirty days for trade or 
commercial purposes by representatives or residents of Antigua to any other 
country, and by representatives or residents of any other country to Antigua 
(though questions relating to the establishment of permanent or temporary 
representation of other countries in Antigua or of Antigua in other countries will 
continue to be determined by the British Government after consultation with the 
Government of Antigua); 
(e) authority to negotiate and sign agreements of purely local concern with any 
member of the British Commonwealth or any British Colony in the Caribbean 
area; 
(f) authority to negotiate and sign agreements for financial and technical 
assistance or of a cultural or scientific nature with any member of the British 
Commonwealth and with the United States of America; 
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(g) authority to negotiate and sign agreements with other countries whether 
multilateral or bilateral relating to emigration from Antigua to those countries 
and to emigrant labour schemes. 
3. In addition the British Government will give sympathetic consideration to any 
request by the Antigua Government for authority to take action on individual 
questions of external relations not covered by this despatch. 
4. In view of the general responsibility of the British Government for the 
external affairs of Antigua under the terms of the association mutually agreed 
between them the Government of Antigua have agreed to inform the British 
Government in advance of any proposal for the exercise of the authority to conduct 
negotiations delegated to the Government of Antigua in paragraph 2(c), (e), (f) and 
(g) of this despatch and to keep the British Government informed of the progress of 
any such negotiations. The British Government will inform the Antigua Government 
if it shall appear that there is any conflict between the actions or proposals of the 
Antigua Government in this field and the international commitments, 
responsibilities or policies of the British Government. The Antigua Government have 
agreed that after consultation they will accept the decision of Her Majesty's 
Government in such matters. 
250 FO 3711184566, no 54 29 Apr 1966 
[Associated status]: letter from Mr Stewart to Mr Rusk explaining the 
proposed arrangements and requesting US support 
[Earlier in the month, the UK embassy in Washington reported that the State Dept was 
'still in some confusion' over the exact status of Antigua under the proposed 
constitutional arrangements. US officials were taking a legalistic view that although 
Antiguans possessed the right to move to independence unilaterally whenever they chose 
to do so, pending the exercise of that right they could not formally be regarded as 
independent. The issue was important because US support for the new arrangements 
would be needed at the UN; also it would be difficult to obtain US aid if Congress could 
not be persuaded that, to all intents and purposes, Antigua was independent from a 
financial point of view. It was therefore suggested that the foreign secretary should write 
to Rusk to clarify the position 'before the various legal officers in the State Department 
begin to put possibly unfavourable interpretations on the new constitution' (FO 
3711184566, no 36, M N F Stewart (UK embassy, Washington) to HA F Hohler (FO), 7 Apr 
1966).) 
When Mr. Greenwood was in Washington last autumn1 (as Colonial Secretary) he 
mentioned to you, in the course of a general discussion on our colonial problems, 
the new proposals which had been worked out for a number of our smaller islands in 
the Eastern Caribbean. We have just completed the first of a series of conferences in 
London with the local governments and after long and hard discussions the Antigua 
Government has accepted the framework of our scheme. 2 Your officials have received 
copies of the report of this conference. We have just begun a conference with the four 
Windward Islands (Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent) and a conference 
with St. Kitts is to follow; we shall naturally keep you informed of the outcome. 
We hope to secure agreement that each of the territories will become a state in 
voluntary association with Britain. We shall remain responsible for the defence and 
1 See 235. 2 See 249. 
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external affairs while they will have full autonomy in other respects, with the right to 
amend their own internal constitutions and even become independent if there is an 
overwhelming demand for independence confirmed by two-thirds of the votes cast in 
a referendum. The exception to this is where Antigua may wish to associate with 
another Commonwealth country in the Caribbean which would assume all our 
responsibilities for Antigua's external and defence affairs. 
We have included this option of independence in order to demonstrate the 
voluntary character of the new relationship. None of the territories (except Antigua, 
and they only half-heartedly) has so far shown any interest in separate independence; 
but if later on there were a demand for independence from any of these islands 
backed by such a large majority as we have prescribed, it would in practice be 
impossible to resist it. 
An important point we stood out for with Antigua was that, since we retain 
responsibility for defence and external affairs, we must in the last resort have the 
power to legislate for the territory in that sphere. Nevertheless we shall of course do 
everything we can to proceed by agreement. To do otherwise would put the 
continuance of the association in jeopardy. At the same time we have made it plain 
that we shall also need to take into account our obligations to any other associated . 
states, to our dependent territories, and to the Commonwealth and our allies. These 
understandings are to be incorporated in a formal agreement. 
In addition, we have promised (as was always our intention), to delegate to the 
Antigua Government considerable authority to act in the field of external affairs, 
subject to our own general responsibility in this sphere. It has been a common 
practice of ours to make formal delegations of this kind to territories not yet 
independent, but at an advanced stage of constitutional development. In this case the 
delegation will, among other things, authorise the local government to enter into 
negotiations, and conclude agreements, with other governments on certain specified 
subjects (such as trade and technical assistance) and in other cases with specified 
countries only. The Antigua Government have undertaken to keep us informed of the 
course of such negotiations and we shall have the power to intervene if they appear 
to run counter to our international commitments, responsibilities or policies. 
They themselves may wish from time to time to have our direct assistance 
(through our Embassies or otherwise) and this we shall naturally be very ready to 
accord. Subject to these general considerations we shall wish to encourage them to 
run their own show as much as possible themselves in regard to the specified 
subjects, and to be seen to be doing so. They will also be empowered to join 
international organisations (excluding the United Nations itself) of which we are 
ourselves a member and for membership of which they are eligible. 
Naturally, the value of this kind of delegation turns on how far other governments 
are ready to recognise the authority we confer on the local governments. This applies 
in particular to the way the latter are regarded as potential recipients of United States 
aid. I hope that the United States agencies concerned will be able to deal with the 
Antiguans in virtually the same way as an independent country. 
I am sure that you will agree that everything possible should be done to make 
the Antigua Government feel that their new status represents a major step forward 
and is one with which they can be content. We shall do all we can to ensure that 
they do not find the relationship unduly restrictive and that they are not tempted to 
take up the option of complete independence. As you know, they can be exceedingly 
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difficult. It would help us immensely if you would follow a similar line in dealing 
with them. 
The new status of these territories will be a novel one, although the arrangements 
are in many respects analogous to those recently introduced in the Cook Islands by 
New Zealand. But the Eastern Caribbean is internationally more sensitive and the 
politicians there are more accustomed to contacts with other countries. It is 
therefore probably [sic] that many of the problems of international law posed by the 
new status will first arise over these territories. We believe it will be possible to deal 
with any such problems pragmatically and without embarrassment to the parties 
involved. 
We shall be discussing with your Mission in New York the presentation of these 
new arrangements in the United Nations as representing in the Charter phrase "a full 
measure of self-government". This question was mentioned briefly in the talks on 
United Nations matters which Mr. Goldberg3 had in London earlier this year and I am 
sure that at the appropriate time we can depend on your support on this point. But 
the more general point which I have wanted to put to you in this letter is the 
importance we attach to your fully acknowledging the dignity of the new status of 
these territories and helping to convince them that it is indeed a worthy alternative 
to full independence. 
3 Arthur J Goldberg, US ambassador to the UN. 
251 CAB 148/28, OPD(66)57 12 May 1966 
[Associated status] : memorandum by Mr Lee for Cabinet Defence and 
Oversea Policy Committee on the Windward Islands constitutional 
conference 
[The problem to which Lee refers in para 2 of this memo arose in more acute form at the 
St Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla conference which was convened between 12 and 26 May 1966. In 
order to attract private capital for specific tourist development schemes, Mr. Southwell, 
the chief minister, insisted that he needed assurances of further financial assistance from 
the UK, particularly for airport facilities to allow direct flights from the American 
continent. At Southwell's request, the conference set up an economic sub-committee, at a 
meeting of which on 18 May the chief minister was informed of the extent of the UK 
balance of payments crisis; the UK had to repay £900 million to its international creditors 
by 1970 (CAB 133/349, SKCC(ESC)66/1). On development aid, the UK proposed to 
honour undertakings already given in the Overseas Development and Service Act, 1965 
(Cmnd 2865) under which CD&W allocations to each territory had been determined to 31 
March 1968. Allocations for the remaining period of the Act, to 31 March 1970, would be 
considered at an appropriate time. Territories would also be eligible for budgetary aid 
over three-year cycles (CAB 133/348, SKCC(66)6, 'Budgetary aid and development aid to 
territories in association with GB', note by B A SU Hepburn, secretary general to 
conference, 12 May 1966). Only when he was convinced by Lee and Greenwood, now 
minister for overseas development, that the UK could not go beyond the limited 
assurances already given was Southwell persuaded to sign the final conference report 
(CAB 148/28, OPD(66)67, memo by Lee on St Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla constitutional 
conference, 9 June 1966).] 
As foreshadowed in paragraph 5 of O.P.D. (66) 48 of the 7th April, 1966,1 the 
Windward Islands Conference opened on the 18th April: it concluded on the 6th May. 
1 See 249. 
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Contrary to the forecast in paragraph 6 of O.P.D. (66) 48 the negotiation of the four 
internal territorial constitutions did not give rise to undue difficulty. The association 
arrangements themselves, as proposed in our White Paper Cmnd. 2865, were also 
generally acceptable to all the Governments and the Opposition parties, subject to 
certain minor modifications. Although there was some opposition to our proposals 
for a referendum as a safeguard against too easy constitutional amendment and also 
about external affairs, it was not pressed. 
2. The difficulties of the Conference were of a different nature. Very early in the 
proceedings the delegates made it plain that they suspected that we had put forward 
the proposals in Cmnd. 2865 largely because we wanted to be rid of them. They 
therefore pressed me very hard to give them guarantees that under these association 
arrangements they would enjoy a more favourable position as regards aid, trade with 
the United Kingdom and immigration into the United Kingdom than they would 
enjoy either as Colonies or as independent countries. These assurances I was unable 
to give. I took the line that the constitutional changes proposed did not, as such, 
affect the islands' position in these matters one way or the other. 
3. In the end agreement was reached with all four delegations that they would 
recommend to their legislatures arrangements for association substantially on the 
lines of those agreed to with Antigua and set out in Cmnd. 2963. The Conference 
Report will be published early next month. 
St. Kilts constitutional conference 
4. The Conference with the Government of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla will open in 
Lancaster House on the 12th May. It will be the last of the series of conferences to 
deal with the proposals in Cmnd. 2865. No special difficulties are expected other 
perhaps than on the use of the referendum for amending the basic clauses of the 
constitution, to which the St. Kitts delegation have expressed opposition. I am 
hopeful that I shall be able to convince them that their apprehensions on this point 
are groundless. It is not one on which we should yield. 
252 FO 371/184566, no 76 28 May 1966 
[Associated status]: letter (reply) from Mr Rusk to Mr Stewart on the 
US view of the proposed arrangements 
Thank you for your letter of April 291 discussing the future status of the British 
islands in the Eastern Caribbean. We have received the reports of the Antigua and the 
Windward Islands constitutional conferences. The plan for each of the six territories 
to "become a state in voluntary association with Great Britain" does seem a clear step 
in the direction of preventing a fragmentation of small entities in the area. In the 
light of the reluctance of these islands to form a federation, the new association 
offers a practical alternative to continued colonial dependence on the one hand and 
independence on the other. 
You can be assured of the cooperation of the United States with regard to your 
presentation of the new arrangements in the United Nations. You should, however, 
be aware that the proposal to permit Antigua to join international organizations 
1 See 250. 
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other than the United Nations may pose some problems to this government since the 
United States Government is solely responsible for the foreign relations of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. I am confident that the evolving relations of the 
United States with the area will be consistent with the dignity of the new status of the 
territories. I am especially pleased to note that the continuing United Kingdom 
relationship and guidance will insure constitutional and civil order in the islands. 
Your request that we regard Antigua and the other islands as independent in 
connection with their becoming "potential recipients of U.S. aid" raises a question. 
As you know, there has been increasingly strong pressure from Congress to limit 
United States economic assistance and the number of recipient countries. As part of 
our current review of United States relations with the Eastern Caribbean islands, we 
will be considering the subject of United States participation in the economic 
development of the islands. 
May I again express my thanks for your letter. We would appreciate being informed 
on a continuing basis of the progress of the constitutional conference not yet 
concluded, and your general views regarding the constitutional developments taking 
place in the Eastern Caribbean. 
253 CAB 148/28, OPD(66)70 15 June 1966 
'Barbados constitutional conference': memorandum by Mr Lee for 
Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee 
General background 
Barbados is the most easterly of the Caribbean islands, with an area of 166 square 
miles and a population of about 250,000 (about 90 per cent of African descent, about 
4 per cent of European descent, and the remainder mainly of mixed descent). The 
island, which was first settled early in the seventeenth century and has remained a 
British possession throughout, is one of our oldest Colonies. For most of this time it 
has enjoyed a large degree of self-government, although complete internal self-
government, with responsibility for defence and external affairs reserved to the 
Governor, did not come until1961. 
2. Barbados has for long been financially self-supporting and has a tradition of 
stable government. Commerce is still mainly, but to a decreasing extent, in the 
hands of the white and mixed elements, whilst the Government consists of persons of 
African descent (there is universal adult suffrage with the vote given at age 18). There 
are no racial tensions likely to produce security problems, though at present feeling 
is running high between the governing party, the Democratic Labour Party, on the 
one hand and the two Opposition parties-the Barbados National Party and the 
Barbados Labour Party-on the other. The economy is almost wholly based on sugar 
and tourism, and the well-being of the sugar industry is directly related to the 
island's participation in the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. 
Political background 
3. After the break-up of the Federation of the West Indies and the grant of 
independence to Jamaica and Trinidad in 1962, there were extensive but abortive 
discussions about the possibility of federating the remaining eight dependent 
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territories. It became clear by 1965 that there was little prospect of early agreement 
being reached, and in August the Barbados Government proposed to its Legislature 
that Barbados should proceed to separate independence before considering 
federation further. We have since agreed with six of the Leeward and Windward 
Islands that they should enter into the new constitutional relationship, as states in 
association with Britain (see O.P.D. (66) 48, 57 and 67).1 
4. The Barbados proposals were debated in the local Legislature in January this 
year, and a resolution was passed requesting me to convene an early conference to 
discuss independence within the Commonwealth in 1966. But in both cases the 
voting followed almost exactly the strengths of the Government party on one side 
and the two Opposition parties combined on the other. The main arguments of the 
Opposition were that the Government had no mandate to take the island into 
separate independence, that further efforts should be made to bring about a new 
Federation, and that the electorate should first be given the opportunity of 
expressing their wishes in so important a matter. 
5. The resolution was transmitted to me at the end of January. It was accepted 
and arrangements have been made for the Conference to open in London on Monday, 
20th June. 
Independence and the alternatives 
6. Despite its small area and population Barbados is at least .as capable of 
sustaining independence as many of the ex-colonies which have already achieved it. 
If it can be shown that independence is what the people of Barbados want we should 
be ready to agree. This would be in line with our general colonial policy and would 
not prejudice our interests. 
7. It is possible that the Opposition parties may ask the British delegation to say 
whether, if Barbados does not go to independence in the immediate future, the 
British Government would agree to its remaining a Colony with internal self-
government, or whether we would be prepared to see Barbados become an associated 
state on the lines agreed with the Leeward and Windward Islands. My view is that we 
should certainly be willing to make Barbados an associated state, if it can be shown 
that this is what most Barbadians want. Whether we should be prepared to see 
Barbados remain a Colony with internal self-government is more difficult. From our 
own point of view this would run contrary to our general colonial policy, and from 
their point of view I cannot think that Barbados will want to remain a Colony after 
the neighbouring and smaller islands have advanced to a new non-colonial status. 
Internal self-government is an appropriate constitutional status for a colony until it 
has decided what final status it wants, but is not a satisfactory permanent 
arrangement. I think Barbados is now ready to choose this final status and I would 
regard any prolongation of internal self-government as an anomaly. I propose that if 
the question is raised at the Conference, our line should be that if Barbados does not 
go independent, we should prefer it to have associated status, and would be most 
reluctant to agree that it should remain a self-governing colony indefinitely. In 
practice, however, I do not believe that the parties will agree on any solution other 
than independence. 
1 See 249 and 251. 
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Timing 
8. The issue that is most likely to cause difficulty at the Conference is the timing 
of independence in relation to the next general election. Under the constitution the 
present Legislature must be dissolved by the 19th December this year. The 
indications are that the Premier will ask us to grant independence before that date, 
but the Opposition will demand that the election should be held first. The Premier 
can argue that he secured a mandate for independence at the last election (in 1961) 
in that the matter was mentioned in his party's election manifesto. The most likely 
prospect then however was that Barbados would become independent as part of a 
federation. Moreover, although the Government obtained an overwhelming majority 
in the House, they polled only 37% of the votes in the election. (This analysis of the 
voting, incidentally, casts some doubt on whether the Resolution in favour of 
independence passed in January of this year- see paragraph 4 above-can really be 
taken as a "popular mandate".) This somewhat odd result is believed to be largely due 
to the existence at that time of several two member constituencies. A report of a 
Boundaries Commission since the 1961 election has recommended their abolition. It 
has been accepted by the Government but not implemented. If new elections are to 
provide a more accurate reflection of the popular will, they ought to be held on the 
basis of the new constituencies. 
9. In any case we could not, without great inconvenience, get the independence 
constitution drafted or the necessary legislation through Parliament before 
November and it would obviously be wrong for a new country to go into 
independence with a Legislature that had only a bare month of life before it, and the 
prospect of an early and controversial election. 
10. Unless therefore all parties agree that Barbados should proceed to indepen-
dence without further reference to the electorate I propose to make it a condition of 
independence that a resolution requesting us to grant it should be passed by the new 
Legislature after a general election has been held. Further I should have to insist that 
the elections were held after the report of our Conference had been publ ished (so that 
the electors knew what they were voting about) and on the basis of the revised con-
stituencies. If on the other hand we should be confronted with a general demand for 
independence before the election I would hope to secure agreement that the life of the 
present Legislature should be extended by about six months. 
Summary 
11. I seek the agreement of my colleagues that the British delegation should take 
the following line at the Conference:-
(a) We would be prepared to see Barbados go to independence under a suitable 
Constitution if that can be shown to our satisfaction to be the wish of the majority 
of Barbadians; 
(b) We would be prepared to contemplate associated status for Barbados, if that 
were shown to be the wish of the majority of the people of Barbados, but we would 
be reluctant to agree that it should continue as a self-governing Colony; 
(c) We should refuse to agree to independence before fresh elections have been 
held on the basis of the revised constituencies, following the publication of our 
Conference report, and a resolution in its favour has been passed by the new 
Legislature, unless there is general support in the Conference (including the 
Opposition parties) for independence before the forthcoming elections. 
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254 OD 28/9, no 35 20 Oct 1966 
[UK aid publicity in the Caribbean]: letter from W L Bell1 to K G Fry2 
on the need for a new approach to aid publicity [Extract] 
Thank you for your letter CLA 201/426/01 of 28 September about aid publicity. I 
confess now to greater unease than before. 
2. As I understand it (and I list here the great and the small, to clear my own 
mind):-
(a) John Walsh3 wants an article for "British Trade Topics" featuring the 
Development Division. I have told him I will write it. 
(b) Alan Elgar wants a similar article for the Board ofTrade Journal; and has asked 
me to write it. 
(c) Barbados Chamber of Commerce have asked me for an article for their 
Journal. I have written it. Copy attached.4 
(d) Barbados "Bajan" have asked similarly for copy for their Independence issue. I 
have written it. Copy attached. 
(e) Barbados Rotary Club has asked me to address them. I have accepted. 
(I have felt unable to refuse these precious gifts of free publicity, even though I still 
have no answer to my query of 13 June.) 
(f) C.O.I./C.R.O. are planning "a distinct campaign this autumn" (it is now nearly 
November) on which the only action yet taken is, apparently, to invite the 
Photograph Division to discuss it, and to engage certain authors to write about it. 
3. I turn now to (f), and to the minutes of the meeting held at Central Office of 
Information on the 18th August. They emphasise "considerable difficulties in finding 
the most effective level to address a Caribbean audience" and list some more:-
(i) Difficult to find new stories. 
(ii) Difficult to find "events of even minor importance". 
(iii) Difficult to write up V.S.O. and technical advice-and so on. The issues are 
apparently so complex and so difficult that sixteen people meeting last August felt 
unable to grasp, on the eve of Barbados' Independence and Associated Status 
elsewhere, a non-recurring, perfect opportunity of publicising what Britain is 
doing in the Caribbean. Now the opportunity has almost slipped away. 
4. I find this defeatist, and depressing. The Caribbean . audience is one of the 
easiest, not the most difficult, to reach. English is spoken; each territory is so small 
that minor events make news; and the grape-vine is splendidly efficient. Canada 
produces a mini-project, the U.S. a handful of scholarships, and the publicity is 
deafening. We put 40 V.S.O. in the Little Eight-a large number, relatively; provide 
hundreds of thousands of pounds for development in all sectors; help to establish 
radio stations everywhere, all avid for material-and then recite countless reasons 
why we have nothing to say. Yet this year Britain is putting £4 m. into the Little 
Eight alone. Surely it can't all be spent on matters of no local interest? 
1 See 233. 2 Chief executive officer, Caribbean and Latin American Dept, ODM. 
3 UK trade commissioner, East Caribbean. 4 Annexes not printed. 
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5. There is so little about the minutes of the 18 August meeting that seems 
remotely relevant to the problem on the ground. That problem, in simplest terms, is 
to keep Britain in the eye of the beholder. Its solution does not involve the provision 
of articles by West Indians (who may thereby be dubbed Uncle Toms), of 
documentary films, television features, picture-sets and so on. All these are 
admirable, and excellent background material; but when do they start, and what are 
they the background to? To-I suggest-an immediate and continuing publicity 
programme launched now on the following lines:-
(a) A short press release on every C. D. and W. project, as soon as it is approved. A 
£10,000 water project for Dominica is big news-in Dominica. But it must be 
promptly and accurately released-right time, right place. And the right place is 
direct to the appropriate press or radio office; not through the local Government 
Information Officer, (although he should of course receive a copy), because he is a 
civil servant who won't distribute it if his Minister happens to be anti-British that 
morning. 
(b) A requirement that the visit of every technical adviser be announced well 
before hand, with a clear expression of its purpose; and acceptance of the doctrine 
that each visitor normally offers an interview, broadcast or release before he 
leaves. All island newspapers and radio won't always bite-but most will. (The 
Development Division does this with excellent free publicity as a result. We don't 
all enjoy it; but that's not the point). 
(c) A cessation of the concept-for publicity purposes-of "The Caribbean" as an 
area. Every territory is different; each requires different treatment; and by and large 
each is only interested in what Britain is doing for him. Releases such as the 15 page 
factel (still a draft?) headed "Aid to the Caribbean-General Survey" are, with 
respect, of very little value-far too long, far too diffuse, far too involved for the news 
editor who wants to know what St. Lucia got. The same effort put in to a series of 
territorial pieces could be productive; but even so not at the snails pace that has so 
far characterised the 1966 publicity "drive". Simple and speedy publicity beamed to 
a territory about that territory will meet response; the bigger picture should be 
painted after the audience has been secured-for it can't itself secure it. 
6. I am sorry if I appear outspoken and impatient, but the slow waltz of the C.O.I. 
August meeting is so out of tune with local rhythm. This is calypso country; and the 
most popular and hence most successful calypsos are bluntly phrased, attractively 
packaged, slap up to date, intensely local, savoured by illiterate and sophisticated 
alike. I am not suggesting that guitars and steel drums ring out in Hercules Road; 
but I do urge that someone takes a fresh look at the problem, and ponders the lesson 
behind the calypso technique. Essentially, the crying need is to tell the people what 
Britain is doing for them. Which means simple, parish-pump stories for the lads of 
the village. The medium is there-local press, local radio, local grape-vine. The 
language is common. The facts are readily available-C. D. and W. and the like, 
projects being approved, implemented, completed week in, week out. The machinery 
exists-B.I.S., throughout the Caribbean, supported perhaps by the Development 
Division. The time is right-new political status, new High Commissions, new 
British Government Representatives. This really is a golden opportunity. 
7. The mechanics should not be too difficult to resolve-perhaps along these 
lines:-
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(a) Three copies of C. D. and W. Treasury submission sent by the O.D.M. desk 
officer to the Development Division (easier still if and when the Development 
Division itself prepares the submission). 
(b) Development Division passes one copy to appropriate B.I.S. officer, one to 
appropriate High Commissioner/B.G.R. 
(c) B.I.S. prepare release, and clear draft with Development Division. 
(d) Desk Officer cables Development Division immediately project is approved, 
detailing any amendments. 
(e) Development Division gives all clear to B.I.S., who issue release direct to 
appropriate island press and radio, with copies to the Government Information 
Officer concerned, to Development Division, and to the appropriate High 
Commissions/B.G.R. 
8. Can we not give this a trial now; and let the films and the television and the 
distinguished authors and all the other paraphernalia follow along as fill-in? There is 
a story in every single C.D. and W. release; no-one will tell it unless we do .... 
255 FO 371/185004, no 10 29 Nov 1966 
'United States policy in the English-speaking Caribbean: despatch no 
158 from Sir P Dean1 (Washington) to Mr Brown. Annex 
In my despatch No. 156 of the 16th of December 1965, I attempted to describe United 
States policy in the Western Hemisphere, and in paragraphs 10 and 11 I .drew 
attention in particular to the special considerations which affect that policy in the 
Caribbean area. I now have the honour to report on what appears to be some 
evolution of American policy towards the English-speaking Caribbean over the last 
eighteen months. In some respects, particularly as regards the Leeward and 
Windward Islands, it may be said that a policy is emerging where none existed before. 
2. . The United States Administration of the day were keen supporters of the 
Federation of the West Indies and it is a fair assumption that had the Federation 
survived both the Administration and the Congress would have been ready to develop 
a close relationship with it. The Americans had already participated in a joint 
US/UK/Canadian economic mission to the Leeward and Windward Islands in July 
1961,2 and in the same year had made a grant (which later had to be refunded) 
towards the establishment of the Federal Loan and Guarantee Fund. Moreover they 
had told us informally that they were thinking in terms of matching our own 
programme of economic assistance to the Federation. When therefore the Federation 
was dissolved in early 1962 there was a corresponding feeling of disappointment, 
impatience and frustration which coincided with a period of heavy attacks by the 
Congress on the Administration's world-wide aid policies. It was only natural 
therefore that if economies had to be made one of the first sufferers should be an area 
which in American eyes had failed to face the political realities of the modern world 
and for which the United Kingdom as the metropolitan power could reasonably be 
held to have the primary responsibility. Accordingly in the period immediately before 
1 See 180, note 3. 2 See 193. 
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and after dissolution the relationship between the United States and the English-
speaking Caribbean became rather cooler. No new United States aid funds were made 
available and the activities of the U.S. aid mission in Trinidad, which had been 
accredited to the Federation of the West Indies, were run down and eventually 
terminated in 1964. 
3. On the attainment of their independence in August 1962 Trinidad and Jamaica 
did, however, manage to establish a friendly working relationship with the United 
States, and American Embassies were set up in both countries. Indeed at one time 
JamaiCa at least seemed to be moving rapidly under American influence. As 
independent states both Jamaica and Trinidad qualified for American aid which 
would not have been available to them as dependent territories and Jamaica has since 
enjoyed a rather limited programme of assistance from the Agency for International 
Development. Trinidad, apart from an exceptional grant of $30 million over six years, 
for which there were special reasons, and minor technical assistance, has been 
helped only indirectly through the maintenance of the United States base, possibly at 
a level rather higher than strict United States defence requirements would have 
dictated. As for the remaining eight territories of the former West Indies Federation, 
namely the British Windward and Leeward Islands and Barbados, the Americans 
seem at first to have looked no further ahead than the assumption that they would 
remain British colonies. Although the State Department soon resigned themselves to 
living with the prospect of an independent East Caribbean Federation or even, if the 
worst came to the worst, with an independent Barbados, they made no secret of their 
preference for the continuance of a straightforward colonial relationship.3 Moreover 
they soon made it quite clear that there could be no question of United States aid and 
that it was for the United Kingdom as the metropolitan power to look after the 
territories' needs. 
4. The preceding paragraphs give a necessarily over-simplified picture of the 
position as it looked by 1964. The United States relationship with the area could not, 
however, long remain rigid because the situation itself was changing. The danger 
that a communist-sympathising government would be elected in British Guiana and 
the potentially ugly situation which had been developing since 1962 between British 
Guiana and Venezuela helped to bring home to United States officials that they could 
no longer ignore the non-Latin countries of the Hemisphere. Moreover we had made 
it clear that if our remaining colonies wished for constitutional advance we would be 
prepared to grant it: and the islands on their side had shown quite clearly that they 
would no longer be content with the status of Crown Colonies. An uneasy feeling was 
therefore abroad in Washington that the British might pull out of the area altogether 
leaving a dangerous vacuum behind them. 
5. In the meantime an inter-departmental battle was taking place within the 
State Department which, strange though it may sound to those not versed in the 
ways of the Washington bureaucracy, quickly affected United States policy. 
Previously all British dependent territories in the Caribbean had fallen within the 
bailiwick of the Bureau of European Affairs, who had little if any dialogue about them 
with the Inter-American Bureau since the latter's responsibilities covered the Latin 
countries of the Hemisphere. Policy towards the English-speaking countries had 
3 cf 220. 
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tended therefore to be evolved by those familiar only with Commonwealth and 
European problems and to be unrealistically divorced from United States policies in 
Latin America as a whole or even in the Spanish-speaking Caribbean. On 
independence responsibility for both Trinidad and Jamaica was transferred to the 
lnter-American Bureau and this seems to have whetted the latter's appetite. During 
1963 and 1964, and increasingly in 1965, the Inter-American Bureau fought hard to 
obtain responsibility for the whole of the Western Hemisphere except Canada, and 
the European Bureau for its part resisted tooth and nail. This led to an ambivalence 
in United States policy towards, for example, the British Guiana!Venezuela dispute, 
with the Inter-American Bureau concerned above all not to offend Venezuela and the 
European Bureau generally sympathetic to our own arguments. There was some 
reason to fear, moreover, that the Inter-American Bureau, used to a free hand in 
Latin America, would not be much inclined to listen to the British point of view in 
the Caribbean. That the Inter-American Bureau, the largest and most powerful in the 
State Department, would get its way was, however, a foregone conclusion and in 
1965 (1966 for Guyana) responsibility for all our Caribbean territories was 
transferred to them. The European Bureau retained responsibility for Bermuda and 
the Bahamas which were considered to be Atlantic rather than Caribbean islands. 
The affairs of the English-speaking countries were now therefore being looked at for 
the first time by an entirely new set of officials, unfamiliar with the region, versed 
almost exclusively in the ways of the Latin Americans and suspicious of any policy 
which had been recommended or initiated by the European Bureau. At the same 
time the Inter-American Bureau, as guardians of the Alliance for Progress, had at 
their disposal very substantial funds, heavily committed though these might already 
be, to which the European Bureau could never have aspired. 
6. As far as the independent countries of Trinidad and Jamaica are concerned, 
the main effect of the transfer of policy control to the Inter-American Bureau has 
been an increased United States interest in persuading them to join the Organisation 
of American States. This is partly because the whole of the vast Inter-American 
Bureau machine is geared to the Alliance for Progress, for which most of its funds are 
voted, and there seems to be some genuine bureaucratic difficulty in dealing with 
countries who are not part of the Alliance. More important, however, it is hoped that 
if Trinidad and Jamaica join, Canada will be tempted to follow them into the 
Organisation. Even if Canada stands aloof the American officials concerned with OAS 
affairs, not to mention much liberal opinion in Washington generally, would be only 
too pleased to see two or more English-speaking parliamentary democracies enter 
this somewhat frustrating "Spanish Club" of which the U.S. are [sic] the only 
English-speaking member. It is recognised that the entry of a number of new 
countries brought up in the British tradition might well change the whole character 
of the Organisation but the State Department clearly feel that this could be a positive 
advantage. The recent declarations by Mr. Barrow, the Prime Minister of Barbados, 
which seem to indicate that he will soon apply for membership of the OAS, are 
therefore genuinely welcomed here; in Washington it is hoped that he will drag in 
Jamaica and Trinidad after him. 
7. Guyana, which had never formed part of the Federation of the West Indies, 
remains a special case. This is not the place to rehearse the history of increasing 
American concern with Guyanese affairs, but the Administration have made no 
secret of the fact that they will do their utmost to prevent the establishment of 
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another Communist-dominated state in the Hemisphere. In the case of a small and 
fairly accessible country like Guyana they would not in the last resort shrink from 
military intervention. In the case of a larger or more remote country like Brazil or 
Colombia every weapon of psychological and economic warfare together with direct 
aid to friendly factions would no doubt be brought into play. The policy was set out 
clearly when in his speech on television on the 2nd of May, 1965 at the height of the 
Dominican crisis, President Johnson declared: "The American nations cannot, must 
not and will not permit the establishment of another Communist government in the 
Western Hemisphere". In the context of Guyanese affairs this has meant that the 
Americans have been and will continue to be prepared to devote considerable sums of 
money to helping Mr. Burnham make a success of his government. Fortunately they 
appear only too anxious to work in collaboration with Her Majesty's Government and 
not to "go it alone". The forthcoming talks in London between British and American 
officials in which the Assistant Secretary of State for lnter-American Affairs will take 
part will be of . the greatest importance in this respect. Again, because of the 
Communist threat the Inter-American Bureau would much prefer to see Guyana in 
the OAS and thus within the lnter-American defence system and under the 
protection of the Rio Treaty. Although they have little hope of persuading the 
Venezuelans to withdraw their virtual veto as long as the present Venezuelan Foreign 
Minister is in office, the State Department can be expected to try hard for Guyana's 
eventual membership. 
8. As for the Caribbean dependent territories, in late 1964, and before the 
transfer of responsibility to the Inter-American Bureau, the Bureau of European 
Affairs had already approached this Embassy to suggest an exchange of views about 
our remaining Caribbean dependencies. They were becoming increasingly perturbed 
at the prospect of an independent Eastern Caribbean Federation which they felt 
would probably be too weak to resist communist and especially Cuban subversion. 
They told us frankly that they were chiefly concerned to see that the British should 
not reduce their influence and presence in the area (whether or not the Eastern 
Caribbean Federation came into being) and they suggested that the United States, 
Canada and the United Kingdom should see what could be done to tackle the 
economic problems of the region jointly.4 They made it clear that their immediate 
objective was to use with the Congress the leverage which a tripartite approach 
would give them so as to bring about the resumption of American aid. This informal 
approach was followed up by formal talks in London in December, 1964 at which Sir 
Alan Dudley5 of the Ministry of Overseas Development took the chair and it was 
subsequently agreed that a tripartite economic survey should be carried out. In April 
1965 American anxieties increased when Antigua withdrew from the scheme for 
Eastern Caribbean Federation and Mr. Rusk at once strongly emphasised to us his 
dislike of the prospect of the emergence of a number of independent but unviable 
mini-States in the region.6 Nevertheless, in spite of this concern over the political 
prospects and although the suggestion for a Tripartite Survey had originally come 
from the Americans and had, we were assured, the support of the Inter-American 
Bureau, it became clear shortly after the transfer of responsibility to them in 1965 
that the latter were not particularly enthusiastic about the general concept. It was 
only after considerable pressure from our side that they finally agreed to American 
4 See 228 also 229. 5 See 234, note. 6 See 235. 
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participation in the Mission and even then they did so only with loud protestations 
that their participation did not mean that they were committed to giving aid. By the 
time the Tripartite Economic Survey's ReporF finally emerged in the Spring of 1966 
the Americans were indeed maintaining that there could be no question of United 
States aid except for a minor technical assistance programme. As we had foreseen, 
however, it was almost impossible for them to explain either to us or to the islands 
(or indeed to themselves-the State Department was the scene of some fairly sharp 
post-mortem arguments) why they had taken part in the Survey at all if they were 
not prepared to examine and assist in giving effect to its recommendations. 
9. Faced with this vacillating and even unhelpful policy on the part of the 
Americans our own efforts during 1966 have therefore been concentrated on trying 
to persuade the Americans to recognise the strategic importance of these islands to 
them and to evolve a satisfactory relationship with them at this moment of 
constitutional advance. On the political side there has been no difficulty. We have 
kept the Americans fully informed of our constitutional proposals and they have been 
as anxious as ourselves to see the Leeward and Windward Islands content with the 
status of non-independent "Associated States". They are already doing their best to 
treat them as adult members of the international community. 
10. On the economic side too our repeated representations at both the 
ministerial and official levels seem gradually to be having some effect, although 
various provisions of the 1966 Foreign Aid Bill and the general attitude of the 
Congress towards the granting of aid to additional countries militated against firm 
decisions being taken. In September this year there was a distinct step forward when 
we managed to persuade Mr. Lincoln Cordon, the Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, to lead in person 
the United States delegation to a conference in Antigua at which the United States, 
Canada and the United Kingdom were to discuss the Tripartite Economic Survey 
with the Chief Ministers of the Windward and Leeward Islands and representatives of 
Barbados. This decision by Mr. Cordon to attend made it impossible for the United 
States to go on stalling. He instituted a series of urgent studies within the State 
Department designed to see what the United States could do short of giving bi-lateral 
capital assistance on concessional terms to each island and for the first time the 
problems of the islands received a full airing at the policy-making level. The result 
was revealed at the Antigua Conference on which your Department have already 
7 On which see, Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey of the Eastern Caribbean, January-Apri/1966 
(London, 1967). The survey was undertaken by six economists and in his preface to the report (p vii), the 
leader of the mission observed: 'It was said to us in virtually every island, and similar sentiments were 
expressed from time to time in the press, that the islands had far too many reports written on them, that 
another was entirely superfluous and that what they needed was not more paper but hard cash' Having 
surveyed the familiar problems of the region- density of population and high rate of increase; shortages of 
usable land, capital and skills; export-orientated economies dominated by agricultural exports; limited 
possibilities for industrial development; potential for tourist development but not to the extent that 
growth could be based on expanding tourism alone-the team reached the conclusion (pp xx-xxi) that 
without a more integrated approach, the development of the eight islands would be 'severely handicapped'. 
It advocated the establishment of a Regional Development Agency under the joint sponsorship of the US, 
UK and Canada, these three countries initially providing the bulk of the finance. It was envisaged that the 
Agency would operate in two divisions for groups of functions-a Technical and Commercial Services 
Division, and a Development Bank Division. 
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received a report from the Ministry of Overseas Development. The American position 
with regard to helping the Associated States is clearly set out in the summary of Mr. 
Cordon's statement at the Meeting, a copy of which I attach for ease of reference. 
This statement, which was drafted with great care, probably represents as favourable 
a position as Mr. Cordon could have been expected to reach at this juncture and he is 
well aware that he has aroused expectations among the Chief Ministers which it 
would be unwise for him to disappoint. Nevertheless the Americans are masters of 
procrastination when it suits them and we shall need to keep up the pressure on 
them if we are ever to see U.S. aid actually flow. 
11. The importance of the Antigua Conference does not, however, lie only in the 
field of aid. Its primary significance from the point of view of U.S. policy in the area is 
that the Administration, in the person of the senior policy-making official at the 
State Department responsible for the region, supported by a strong delegation, 
visited the area, met the Chief Ministers and assured them of the desire of the United 
States to have a closer relationship with them in all fields. The Chief Ministers should 
have come away with the feeling that the United States would give due weight to 
their forthcoming constitutional advance and would be willing to treat them in 
future as neighbours to whom due attention should be paid. This is solid gain and the 
trend should be reinforced once a United States Ambassador has been installed in 
Barbados with responsibility for all the islands and with a vested interest in building 
up a closer relationship. This should all help to lessen any temptation the islands 
may feel to opt for full independence. 
12. It would appear therefore that the Americans are evolving a new and 
satisfactory relationship with the English-speaking Caribbean which should be 
welcome to us. Although many of our exchanges with the State Department this 
year, and therefore much of this despatch, may seem to have concentrated 
disproportionately on the smaller islands, it is for these countries that Her Majesty's 
Government remain directly responsible. Moreover in focusing attention on part of 
the English-speaking Caribbean we have inevitably led senior officials to give more 
thought to their policy to the area as a whole. Much though the Americans would 
like us to be more active elsewhere in the Hemisphere they would, I am sure, feel 
that we should give first priority in this Hemisphere, particularly as far as our aid 
programmes are concerned, to the English-speaking Caribbean. From the point of 
view of this post I would hope that this proposition might be generally acceptable in 
London and that in the interests of Anglo-U.S. relations a high priority could be 
given to aiding the Commonwealth countries in certain sensitive fields such as police 
training about which we have been in correspondence with your Department. 
13. If I may be allowed to end this despatch on a note of warning it seems to me 
important in the context of Anglo-American relations that we should not fall down 
on what the Americans regard as our remaining obligations in the area. If the 
Americans are willing to do their best to help make the concept of "Associated 
Statehood" work, it is because it not only avoids the entry of more mini-States into 
the U.N. but lays on us the direct responsibility for defence as well as foreign affairs. 
The basis for American interest in the area is the national defence of the United 
States. These islands are too close for comfort. It follows that if we seem unwilling or 
prove unable to do what is necessary (or what the U.S. deems necessary) to keep the 
area in the Western camp the United States herself will step in and take any measures 
which seem to her called for to prevent communism obtaining a foothold. In the 
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worst case, military intervention by the U.S. in a Commonwealth country could 
obviously pose very serious problems which lie outside the scope of this despatch. 
14. I am sending copies of this despatch with enclosure to the Commonwealth 
Office, the Ministry of Overseas Development, the Ministry of Defence, H.M. Treasury 
and the Bank of England; to the British High Commissioners in Ottawa, Georgetown, 
Port of Spain, Kingston and Bridgetown; to H.M. Ambassadors in all Latin American 
posts; to the U.K. Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and Personal to 
the Governors of the Bahamas and British Honduras. 
Annex to 255: Tripartite survey conference, Antigua, 2 Nov 1966: summary of 
remarks made by Mr Lincoln Cordon 
After noting that he personally preferred the phrase "cooperating governments" 
rather than "sponsoring governments", Mr. Cordon stated he and the other members 
of his delegation had learned a great deal during the morning session from the 
presentations made by the island delegations. 
Turning to the substance of the conference proceedings, he said the United States 
strongly supports the regional approach. As a matter of fact the United States can 
scarcely offer aid other than technical assistance on a bilateral basis. There is a 
legislative problem in the United States since the Congress not only discourages 
bilateral assistance in favour of regional and multilateral but also has limited the 
number of countries outside the Alliance for Progress area which can receive 
bilateral aid. And the trend within the Alliance for Progress area (the Western 
Hemisphere) to which the islands belong is definitely in the multilateral direction. It 
also appeared to him that many of the things that needed to be done in the Eastern 
Caribbean could be done on a better basis regionally. 
With respect to the statements made earlier in the day suggesting the possible dan-
gers of regional organizations impinging on island sovereignty he thought, in view of 
the different ways in which regional organizations could be set up, that this would not 
be an issue. He discussed briefly the Central American precedent on regionalism. 
With respect to any new financial institution or development bank there should be 
a careful definition of scope and area. He thought the suggestion covered by the 
Ottawa communique and referred to previously by Mr. Towe8 might be very helpful. 
While a bank covering even a wider area might not be completely viable in economic 
terms and could well need concessional assistance, certainly the larger the area 
covered the more chance there was for a workable, useful institution to be developed. 
The question was, would the United States contribute to any such bank. Mr. 
Cordon said he did not know at this stage, when the institution still had to be 
developed and that he, in any event, could make no commitment. But the United 
States, if invited, was prepared to join in working on the proposal particularly if it 
developed along the Ottawa lines. He would also be prepared to talk seriously with 
members of the Administration and the Congress in trying to get support for the 
bank. Other systems might be developed but as of this moment the United States 
dealt with development banks in one of two ways, i.e. with full participating 
membership as in the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank or with non-membership but making concessional loans as in the Central 
8 See 208. 
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American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). The United States would 
seriously consider the possibility of help for a Caribbean Development Bank. 
The United States also favoured the idea of a new Regional Development 
organization for the group of eight islands. Perhaps the word Agency sounded too 
grandiose and "Commission" might be a better word. But we wanted to see 
something organized very soon and this entity could count on United States 
cooperation. It should be a regional group that worked continuously on the technical 
level and should have a permanent secretariat. It could work in such areas as tourist 
promotion, food development, processing, and marketing, education, fisheries, 
specialized industrial activities, etc. It could work out specific methods for operating 
in specific areas, e.g. a Regional Tourist Promotion Board. It could also help assure 
that the Caribbean Development Bank gives proper attention to the wide needs of the 
smaller islands. 
The United States was prepared to have a governmental official work with it to 
whatever extent desired by the islands. After the United States Embassy at 
Bridgetown was established following independence an officer would be assigned to 
that embassy to work on such matters. He assumed the islands would not want this 
officer as a formal member but rather as an associate. 
There was also the possibility that revenue-producing projects might be eligible to 
receive financing from the United States Export-Import Bank for the dollar portion 
of their capital needs. 
Turning to the private sector Mr. Cordon expressed his thought that most 
economic development in the region would be done through private channels, 
although he noted there was definitely some necessity for public financed 
infrastructure projects. He thought that CARINCO, a private investment company 
already in formation or something similar, could perform a useful function, not as a 
substitute for a public regional bank but rather as a parallel organization. He 
mentioned that ADELA appeared to be interested in the CARINCO initiative. 
The United States Government has a system of investment guarantees whereby the 
United States Government guarantees that a U.S. private investor in a foreign 
country with which the United States has a guarantee agreement is insured against a 
variety of risks (convertibility, expropriation, war and commercial). This guarantee 
system in many instances has acted to stimulate United States private investment 
abroad. The United States has investment guarantee agreements with 74 countries, 
recently signed agreements with British Honduras, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Guyana 
and he saw no problem on the United States side to negotiating agreements 
separately with the eight islands if their governments are so disposed. 
Another important area for consideration was that of the identification of 
investment opportunities. In this field the island "commission" referred to previously 
could be useful. Along this line the United States had an International Executive 
Service Corps of retired businessmen who were available for service in foreign 
countries. These men were alert to investment opportunities, knew how to make 
contact with the United States investing community, and could also help in the 
technical management field. 
He brought up the IBRD family and said that while he didn't know if it could 
directly be a source of capital he was encouraged that the Bank had sent an observer 
to the meeting. The United States as the largest stockholder in the bank could be 
expected to view sympathetically the prospect of bank operations in the area. 
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participation in the Mission and even then they did so only with loud protestations 
that their participation did not mean that they were committed to giving aid. By the 
time the Tripartite Economic Survey's ReporF finally emerged in the Spring of 1966 
the Americans were indeed maintaining that there could be no question of United 
States aid except for a minor technical assistance programme. As we had foreseen, 
however, it was almost impossible for them to explain either to us or to the islands 
(or indeed to themselves-the State Department was the scene of some fairly sharp 
post-mortem arguments) why they had taken part in the Survey at all if they were 
not prepared to examine and assist in giving effect to its recommendations. 
9. Faced with this vacillating and even unhelpful policy on the part of the 
Americans our own efforts during 1966 have therefore been concentrated on trying 
to persuade the Americans to recognise the strategic importance of these islands to 
them and to evolve a satisfactory relationship with them at this moment of 
constitutional advance. On the political side there has been no difficulty. We have 
kept the Americans fully informed of our constitutional proposals and they have been 
as anxious as ourselves to see the Leeward and Windward Islands content with the 
status of non-independent "Associated States". They are already doing their best to 
treat them as adult members of the international community. 
10. On the economic side too our repeated representations at both the 
ministerial and official levels seem gradually to be having some effect, although 
various provisions of the 1966 Foreign Aid Bill and the general attitude of the 
Congress towards the granting of aid to additional countries militated against firm 
decisions being taken. In September this year there was a distinct step forward when 
we managed to persuade Mr. Lincoln Cordon, the Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, to lead in person 
the United States delegation to a conference in Antigua at which the United States, 
Canada and the United Kingdom were to discuss the Tripartite Economic Survey 
with the Chief Ministers of the Windward and Leeward Islands and representatives of 
Barbados. This decision by Mr. Cordon to attend made it impossible for the United 
States to go on stalling. He instituted a series of urgent studies within the State 
Department designed to see what the United States could do short of giving bi-lateral 
capital assistance on concessional terms to each island and for the first time the 
problems of the islands received a full airing at the policy-making level. The result 
was revealed at the Antigua Conference on which your Department have already 
7 On which see, Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey of the Eastern Caribbean, January-Apri/1966 
(London, 1967). The survey was undertaken by six economists and in his preface to the report (p vii), the 
leader of the mission observed: 'It was said to us in virtually every island, and similar sentiments were 
expressed from time to time in the press, that the islands had far too many reports written on them, that 
another was entirely superfluous and that what they needed was not more paper but hard cash' Having 
surveyed the familiar problems of the region-density of population and high rate of increase;. shortages of 
usable land, capital and skills; export-orientated economies dominated by agricultural exports; limited 
possibilities for industrial development; potential for tourist development but not to the extent that 
growth could be based on expanding tourism alone- the team reached the conclusion (pp xx-xxi) that 
without a more integrated approach, the development of the eight islands would be 'severely handicapped'. 
It advocated the establishment of a Regional Development Agency under the joint sponsorship of the US, 
UK and Canada, these three countries initially providing the bulk of the finance. It was envisaged that the 
Agency would operate in two divisions for groups of functions- a Technical and Commercial Services 
Division, and a Development Bank Division. 
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received a report from the Ministry of Overseas Development. The American position 
with regard to helping the Associated States is clearly set out in the summary of Mr. 
Cordon's statement at the Meeting, a copy of which I attach for ease of reference. 
This statement, which was drafted with great care, probably represents as favourable 
a position as Mr. Cordon could have been expected to reach at this juncture and he is 
well aware that he has aroused expectations among the Chief Ministers which it 
would be unwise for him to disappoint. Nevertheless the Americans are masters of 
procrastination when it suits them and we shall need to keep up the pressure on 
them if we are ever to see U.S. aid actually flow. 
11. The importance of the Antigua Conference does not, however, lie only in the 
field of aid. Its primary significance from the point of view of U.S. policy in the area is 
that the Administration, in the person of the senior policy-making official at the 
State Department responsible for the region, supported by a strong delegation, 
visited the area, met the Chief Ministers and assured them of the desire of the United 
States to have a closer relationship with them in all fields. The Chief Ministers should 
have come away with the feeling that the United States would give due weight to 
their forthcoming constitutional advance and would be willing to treat them in 
future as neighbours to whom due attention should be paid. This is solid gain and the 
trend should be reinforced once a United States Ambassador has been installed in 
Barbados with responsibility for all the islands and with a vested interest in building 
up a closer relationship. This should all help to lessen any temptation the islands 
may feel to opt for full independence. 
12. It would appear therefore that the Americans are evolving a new and 
satisfactory relationship with the English-speaking Caribbean which should be 
welcome to us. Although many of our exchanges with the State Department this 
year, and therefore much of this despatch, may seem to have concentrated 
disproportionately on the smaller islands, it is for these countries that Her Majesty's 
Government remain directly responsible. Moreover in focusing attention on part of 
the English-speaking Caribbean we have inevitably led senior officials to give more 
thought to their policy to the area as a whole. Much though the Americans would 
like us to be more active elsewhere in the Hemisphere they would, I am sure, feel 
that we should give first priority in this Hemisphere, particularly as far as our aid 
programmes are concerned, to the English-speaking Caribbean. From the point of 
view of this post I would hope that this proposition might be generally acceptable in 
London and that in the interests of Anglo-U.S. relations a high priority could be 
given to aiding the Commonwealth countries in certain sensitive fields such as police 
training about which we have been in correspondence with your Department. 
13. If I may be allowed to end this despatch on a note of warning it seems to me 
important in the context of Anglo-American relations that we should not fall down 
on what the Americans regard as our remaining obligations in the area. If the 
Americans are willing to do their best to help make the concept of "Associated 
Statehood" work, it is because it not only avoids the entry of more mini-States into 
the U.N. but lays on us the direct responsibility for defence as well as foreign affairs. 
The basis for American interest in the area is the national defence of the United 
States. These islands are too close for comfort. It follows that if we seem unwilling or 
prove unable to do what is necessary (or what the U.S. deems necessary) to keep the 
area in the Western camp the United States herself will step in and take any measures 
which seem to her called for to prevent communism obtaining a foothold. In the 
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worst case, military intervention by the U.S. in a Commonwealth country could 
obviously pose very serious problems which lie outside the scope of this despatch. 
14. I am sending copies of this despatch with enclosure to the Commonwealth 
Office, the Ministry of Overseas Development, the Ministry of Defence, H.M. Treasury 
and the Bank of England; to the British High Commissioners in Ottawa, Georgetown, 
Port of Spain, Kingston and Bridgetown; to H.M. Ambassadors in all Latin American 
posts; to the U.K. Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and Personal to 
the Governors of the Bahamas and British Honduras. 
Annex to 255: Tripartite survey conference, Antigua, 2 Nov 1966: summary of 
remarks made by Mr Lincoln Gordon 
After noting that he personally preferred the phrase "cooperating governments" 
rather than "sponsoring governments", Mr. Gordon stated he and the other members 
of his delegation had learned a great deal during the morning session from the 
presentations made by the island delegations. 
Turning to the substance of the conference proceedings, he said the United States 
strongly supports the regional approach. As a matter of fact the United States can 
scarcely offer aid other than technical assistance on a bilateral basis. There is a 
legislative problem in the United States since the Congress not only discourages 
bilateral assistance in favour of regional and multilateral but also has limited the 
number of countries outside the Alliance for Progress area which can receive 
bilateral aid. And the trend within the Alliance for Progress area (the Western 
Hemisphere) to which the islands belong is definitely in the multilateral direction. It 
also appeared to him that many of the things that needed to be done in the Eastern 
Caribbean could be done on a better basis regionally. 
With respect to the statements made earlier in the day suggesting the possible dan-
gers of regional organizations impinging on island sovereignty he thought, in view of 
the different ways in which regional organizations could be set up, that this would not 
be an issue. He discussed briefly the Central American precedent on regionalism. 
With respect to any new financial institution or development bank there should be 
a careful definition of scope and area. He thought the suggestion covered by the 
Ottawa communique and referred to previously by Mr. Towe8 might be very helpful. 
While a bank covering even a wider area might not be completely viable in economic 
terms and could well need concessional assistance, certainly the larger the area 
covered the more chance there was for a workable, useful institution to be developed. 
The question was, would the United States contribute to any such bank. Mr. 
Gordon said he did not know at this stage, when the institution still had to be 
developed and that he, in any event, could make no commitment. But the United 
States, if invited, was prepared to join in working on the proposal particularly if it 
developed along the Ottawa lines. He would also be prepared to talk seriously with 
members of the Administration and the Congress in trying to get support for the 
bank. Other systems might be developed but as of this moment the United States 
dealt with development banks in one of two ways, i.e. with full participating 
membership as in the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank or with non-membership but making concessional loans as in the Central 
8 See 208. 
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American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). The United States would 
seriously consider the possibility of help for a Caribbean Development Bank. 
The United States also favoured the idea of a new Regional Development 
organization for the group of eight islands. Perhaps the word Agency sounded too 
grandiose and "Commission" might be a better word. But we wanted to see 
something organized very soon and this entity could count on United States 
cooperation. It should be a regional group that worked continuously on the technical 
level and shouid have a permanent secretariat. It could work in such areas as tourist 
promotion, food development, processing, and marketing, education, fisheries, 
specialized industrial activities, etc. It could work out specific methods for operating 
in specific areas, e.g. a Regiona1 Tourist Promotion Board. It could also help assure 
that the Caribbean Development Bank gives proper attention to the wide needs of the 
smaller islands. 
The United States was prepared to have a governmental official work with it to 
whatever extent desired by the islands. After the United States Embassy at 
Bridgetown was established following independence an officer would be assigned to 
that embassy to work on such matters. He assumed the islands would not want this 
officer as a formal member but rather as an associate. 
There was also the possibility that revenue-producing projects might be eligible to 
receive financing from the United States Export-Import Bank for the dollar portion 
of their capital needs. 
Turning to the private sector Mr. Cordon expressed his thought that most 
economic development in the region would be done through private channels, 
although he noted there was definitely some necessity for public financed 
infrastructure projects. He thought that CARINCO, a private investment company 
already in formation or something similar, could perform a useful function, not as a 
substitute for a public regional bank but rather as a parallel organization. He 
mentioned that ADELA appeared to be interested in the CARINCO initiative. 
The United States Government has a system of investment guarantees whereby the 
United States Government guarantees that a U.S. private investor in a foreign 
country with which the United States has a guarantee agreement is insured against a 
variety of risks (convertibility, expropriation, war and commercial). This guarantee 
system in many instances has acted to stimulate United States private investment 
abroad. The United States has investment guarantee agreements with 7 4 countries, 
recently signed agreements with British Honduras, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Guyana 
and he saw no problem on the United States side to negotiating agreements 
separately with the eight islands if their governments are so disposed. 
Another important area for consideration was that of the identification of 
investment opportunities. In this field the island "commission" referred to previously 
could be useful. Along this line the United States had an International Executive 
Service Corps of retired businessmen who were available for service in foreign 
countries. These men were alert to investment opportunities, knew how to make 
contact with the United States investing community, and could also help in the 
technical management field. 
He brought up the IBRD family and said that while he didn't know if it could 
directly be a source of capital he was encouraged that the Bank had sent an observer 
to the meeting. The United States as the largest stockholder in the bank could be 
expected to view sympathetically the prospect of bank operations in the area. 
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Referring to technical education Mr. Cordon said he. has not seen the Gaylor 
report but would study it with int.erest. In this connection the IRBD family might be 
able to help. Also the United States Peace Corps, which is already operating in 
Barbados and St. Lucia and is interested in expanding throughout the area can be of 
even greater help in this field . 
With respect to trade and markets he mentioned CARIFTA and the idea of a 
Caribbean customs union and observed that he thought these initiatives were useful 
and that he hoped they -came to pass. 
Looking to the future oftrade relations he pointed out that the area would develop 
increasing economic and trade relations with Central and South America. 
On the question of assured markets there was little the United States could do 
formally. The status of Puerto Rico could not be extended to other areas. The 
preferential sugar quota comes up for review in several years time but the present 
legislation is inflexible and there is no assurance the same kind of system will be 
maintained in the future. The United States gives Most Favored Nation treatment 
generally and is carefully looking at proposals which would give preferential 
treatment to underdeveloped nations in general, but in any event nothing new in this 
field will develop until the Kennedy Round negotiations in Geneva are completed, 
probably late next year. · 
Apart from formal preferences he wishes to point out that private initiative was 
often able to develop new marketing opportunities through its own efforts, and 
wondered for example, about the possibility of the development of light industry, 
food processing, and an off-season fruit and vegetable export industry. 
In conclusion Mr. Cordon said, speaking for all three cooperating governments, 
they would be most interested in hearing how the eight island governments felt 
about the proposal for a development bank covering a wider area and for a new 
flexible technical working group or commission covering the group of eight 
islands. 
And in summary the United States is prepared:-
(1) to assign a full time officer to its about-to-be-established embassy in 
Bridgetown to be available to work on development problems in the entire area. 
(2) to provide requested technical assistance for an [sic] be associated with a 
commission for regional development of the eight islands. 
(3) to join, if invited, any group set up to develop a workable proposal for a 
Caribbean Development Bank along the lines of the Ottawa communique. 
(4) to consider the possibility of providing financial support for a Caribbean 
Development Bank of this nature, if and when established. 
(5) to encourage efforts under way for the formation of a private Caribbean 
investment company. 
(6) to negotiate investment guarantee agreements with the islands. 
(7) to expand Peace Corps assistance in the field of education. 
(8) to assist United States firms in investment surveys. 
(9) to assist in making available highly qualified industrial executive assistance 
through the International Executive Service Corps. 
(10) to encourage positive interest in the area by international financial and 
technical assistance agencies, particularly the World Bank family and the United 
Nations Development Program. 
726 THE BREAK-UP OF THE FEDERATION [256) 
256 FO 371/184567, no 269 5 Dec 1966 
[Associated status]: minute by HA F Hohler1 on the role of the FO in 
the arrangements for associated status 
We had a good deal of discussion with the Colonial Office in regard to . the 
constitutional arrangements of Antigua which, with minor modifications, would be 
the pattern for the remaining islands referred to in the first paragraph of Mr. 
Edmonds's minute.2 
2. Our first concern was that, in relation to . foreign affairs, we should not find 
ourselves in a position of having responsibility but no control. Annex D3 of the 
attached report on the St. Kitts Constitutional Conference shows the pattern for the 
delegation of authority in the external field. I think this is quite satisfactory. 
3. Our second concern was to meet the fear of the U.S. Government that these 
small communities would vote themselves into full independence, thereby at the best 
setting up mini-states and, at the worst, little Cubas. The arrangement reached, as a 
result of considerable Foreign Office pressure, is that the association with the United 
Kingdom can only be terminated by a two-thirds majority in the House of Assembly, 
followed by a two-thirds majority of votes cast in a referendum (see paragraph .23 of 
the St. Kitts Report). Here again, I am satisfied that we got the most we could 
reasonably ask for. If higher majorities than these were in favour of terminating the 
association, no legal safeguards would be effective. It would be a question of deciding 
whether or not to use force as far as force is concerned, but it should be noted that, 
from now on, the British raj will be represented in the Caribbean by one frigate. 
4. Our very proper desire to meet any American anxieties on the above score was 
reinforced by the importance which we attach to the grant of American aid being 
available to the Caribbean islands. When he was Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael 
Stewart wrote personally to Mr. Dean Rusk on this subject.4 It was also discussed at a 
tripartite meeting in Antigua at the beginning of November. These discussions will 
be continued by Mr. Lincoln Gordon5 with the Overseas Development Ministry on 9 
December. Under current American legislation, the islands, which will still be 
dependent territories, cannot receive direct aid. It will, however, be made available to 
them through the Regional Development Bank. 
1 Assistant under-secretary, FO, 1966-1967 
2 Referring to the preparation of the West Indies Bill which was presented in the House of Commons on 20 
Dec 1966 and which received the Royal Assent as The West Indies Act on 27 Feb 1967. 
3 cf 249, annex D. 
4 See 250 and 252. 
5 See 255, para 10. 
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